

## **The British Policy and the Indian Princes : A Case Study of the Reactions of the Maharajas of Tripura**

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The British policy towards the Rulers of Tripura was, to some extent, different from their general feudatory policy. True, there had been inconsistencies in their policy towards the native states of India, as it varied from state to state, depending on its size, population, resources and strategic importance. But the State of Tripura had certain peculiarities of its own which made the British policy hesitant and uncertain for a long time. Indeed, it is possible to discern two distinct phases of British policy in respect of Tripura. The first phase lasted from 1761 to 1865, while the period since 1866 formed the second phase.

### **First Phase : 1761-1865**

The British first came into contact with the State of Tripura in the year 1761, when the English East India Company had just started its imperial career. There was a time when the State's territories stretched "from the Sundarbans in the West and Burma in the East and South and Kamrup in the North."<sup>1</sup> But what the British found was a peculiar State, its territories being clearly divided into two parts : the hills and the plains. In the hills, the ruler was independent ; but in the plains, known as 'Chakla Roshnabad'<sup>2</sup>, he was a zemindar under the Nawabs of Bengal. It was through this Estate of Chakla-Roshnabad that the British came to dominate over the affairs of the Tripura State.

In 1761, a quarrel broke out between the then Ruler of Tripura, Rajah Krishnamanikya (1760-1783), and the Nawab of Bengal, over the payment of revenue of the Roshnabad Estate. The Nawab sought the help of the English to punish the defaulting Rajah. Accordingly, under instructions from Governor Vansittert, Verelst, the Chief at Islamabad (Chittagong), in Feb, 1761, sent Lieutenant Mathews "with 200 sepoyes and two guns to Tipperah."<sup>3</sup> The apparent aim of the English was to assist the Nawab of Bengal. But in reality, they were bent on acquiring some new

territory. This becomes very much clear from Vansittert's letter to Verelst, dated 20 January 1761, where there were clear instructions "to reduce him (the King) to his due state of obedience to the Government of Islamabad, acquainting us then what advantages may accrue to the Company from the possession of that country, and we will answer any representations the Nawab may make on the subject."<sup>4</sup>

Thus the Raja of Tripura was to be reduced to his 'due state of obedience' not to the Nawab for whose cause the Company took up arms, but to the 'Government of Islamabad', i. e., the Company itself.

The Rajah surrendered. A collector of revenue, Marriott, was sent to Tripura with instructions to inquire into the resources of the country. The officer found, in the words of A. Mackenzie,

"The paying part of Tipperah lay on the plains, and appeared in the Mahomedan revenue roll as pergunnah Roushnabad. For this of course a settlement was made. We found it a Zemindari, and as such we treated it. But of the barren hills that fenced it on the east we took no cognizance. Covered with jungle and inhabited by tribes of whom nothing was known, save that they were uncouth in speech and not particular as to clothing, the hills were looked upon as something apart. The Rajah claimed to exercise authority within them, but did not, as it seemed, derive much profit from them. Accordingly the hills became 'Independent Tipperah.'"<sup>5</sup>

Indeed, the hills were left undisturbed not because the Company sought to 'conciliate the Rajah' or show 'generosity to a foe in their power,' as indicated by Halliday,<sup>6</sup> but because these were not profitable. Then, the Company was, to some extent, apprehensive of the tribes inhabiting the hills 'of whom nothing was known'. As a result, though a settlement was made with the Raja in respect of the zemindary, no reference was made to hills. No treaty was enacted and the hills became known as 'Independent Tipperah.' Thus the Raja, to quote Mackenzie, "who is an ordinary Bengali zemindar on the plains, reigns as an independent prince over 3,000 square miles of upland, and was for many years a more absolute monarch than Scindia or Puttiala, -owing no law but his sovereign will, bound by no treaty, subject to no control, safe in his obscurity from criticism or reform."<sup>7</sup>

There is no denying the fact that this independence of Tripura was maintained even in the hey-day of annexation. And the zemindary was always regarded as part of the State, an "integral portion

of an impartible Raj,"<sup>8</sup> though in 1793, it was permanently settled with the then Raja, Rajdhar Manikya. And because of this, the normal zemindary rules under the Permanent Settlement were not applicable to the zemindary of the Raja. Its proprietorship was indeed hereditary, but not just heritable like ordinary zamindari. The Sun-Set Law was not to be applied even in case of default of government revenues as the zemindary of Chakla Roshnabad and the Raj was impartible. Thus, the Rajah was never 'an ordinary Bengali zemindar' as claimed by Mackenzie.<sup>9</sup>

There were attempts, first in the year 1800, to end the independence of the State. In that year, an offer to farm the hills was made, as appears from the Tipperah Collectorate papers, by one Chandra Narayan Choudhury. It was even understood by officers of the Government at Calcutta that the Raja's engagement was for his whole territory, but the local Collector pointed out that the hills of Tipperah were not included in the Kabuliyat of the permanent settlement, though they were understood to be the Raja's property.<sup>10</sup> Again, in 1827, another farming application was made by one pretender, a relative of the Rajah, Sambhu Chandra Dev Thakur. But the Government rejected the application on the ground that the "hills had been so long unassessed, and had become to be looked upon as independent territory."<sup>11</sup> Finally, in 1836, the revenue officials of the Government, led by Mr. Dampier, tried to prove that the Raja had actually no independent territory, and as such the whole of the State should be assessed and brought under the permanent settlement.<sup>12</sup> But in 1938 it was held by the Deputy Governor of Bengal, after a review of the previous history of the Raj, that owing to the unchallenged position from at least 1793, the Raja had obtained a prescriptive right to the territory within the hills. The independence of Hill Tipperah was thus recognised, and it arose from the passive conduct of the British administration.

This recognition of the State's independence seemed strange particularly at a time when the British officials were keen on laying hands on all territory on any pretext. The reason for this strange behaviour probably lay in the fact that the Britishers had already made up their mind not to meddle in the affairs of hill tribes. And this explanation was indicated in Halliday's letter dated Fort William, 27th December, 1938 to J. J. Harvey, Commissioner of Chittagong, reporting the Bengal Government's views that even as a temporary measure "the assumption of the management of the hill territory" would lead to "a positive embarrassment in the

hill people", and "deprive them of the immemorial privilege of being ruled by a Chief of their own, and in retaining which privilege the pride and prejudices seemed deeply interested.....".<sup>13</sup>

It is, of course, true that the Rajas of Tripura after 1761, or at least in 1785, received investiture as Rajas from the hands of the British Government, and it is also true that one of them was once apprehended and sent to Chittagong as a prisoner to answer a charge of harbouring dacoits.<sup>14</sup> But it would be a mistake to treat the investiture ceremony as the beginning of the end of Raja's independence. On the contrary, the investiture ceremony was a confirmation of the Raja's independence (particularly, in the absence of any treaty-rights), where the term 'Independent Tipperah' were used officially. At the same time, it confirmed the Superior power of the British, as successors of the Mughals. It was a symbol of recognition from both sides. The Company-Government badly needed it as a legal cover.

As for the arrest of one Raja, i.e. Rajdhar Manikya, in 1783-84, it can be pointed out that the Raja had two capacities : one as a subject and Zemindar of the British Government, the other as an independent Raja in the hills. It was as a Zemindar and a British subject that the Raja was answerable to the British tribunals. But for that no one should suppose that the British Government, "by exercising jurisdiction under the regulations over the Zemindar, necessarily enforced the same jurisdiction over the independent Raja."<sup>15</sup> At least that was the official British view.

The British Government had of course, the remote-control apparatus to determine the succession to the Tripura Raj. It appeared that from the Mughal period, the hill portion of Tripura and the zemindaree of Roshnabad were always held by one and the same person. The Raja of that hill territory was uniformly Zemindar of Roshnabad. As such, the succession to the latter was always dependent on the succession to the former capacity. But as the Company was more interested in the uninterrupted supply of money from the zemindary, they made it a point to recognise any person holding the zemindary as *de facto* Raja, and then to confirm him by the investiture ceremony unless of course, the Courts had decided otherwise. Thus the succession to the Tripura Raj was actually controlled via Zemindary.

But this fact should not be overemphasized. Compared to other native states, Tripura was fortunate that some more interference did not take place. Though it was completely at the mercy of the British Government, it must be said that at least up to early

1860s, the British Government gave its due recognition as an independent state. Even as late as 1861, the British Government assured the Tripura Raj that it had no intention of interfering in the affairs of the State,<sup>16</sup> and indeed, there was very little interference up to that period. The British Government was yet to formulate a definite policy towards it because of its insignificance as a State.

### **Second Phase : Since 1866**

But there was a perceptible change in British policy towards Tripura from the late sixties of the 19th century ; and with that, the idyllic position, which the State had enjoyed for the last 100 years, came to an end. What is noticeable in this is the fact that this changed British policy was a definite departure from their declared policy towards the Princes after the Mutiny.

It is possible to make out at least three major principles of British policy towards the Indian Princes after 1858 : first, to rally the Princes behind the Throne of England by respecting their rights, dignity and honour ; secondly, to discard the policy of annexation ; and finally, to follow the so-called policy of *laissez-faire* towards the State, particularly after 1909. But strangely, in respect of Tripura, there was a clear violation of all the principles. Instead of respecting the Raja's rights, dignity and honour, and instead of following the policy of *laissez-faire*, the British Government deliberately followed a policy of humiliating the Rajas, even in trifling matters ; and there were large scale interventions in the affairs of the State, which virtually put an end to its independence. Side by side, there was a silent annexation of the State's territory. D.A. Low's comment that after 1860, 'Annexation' ceased, is difficult to accept.<sup>17</sup>

The process started in the year 1866. In that year, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal suggested to the Government of India, the substitution of the words "Hill Tipperah" for "Independent Tipperah", "as the territory though not subject to the jurisdiction of our Courts, is not politically independent."<sup>18</sup> This suggestion was approved in the Resolution of the Government of India No.257, dated 26 September, 1866. Thus the traditional independence of Tripura was scrapped off overnight. For this, no reason was given, and no reference was made to the King. This was a unilateral decision of the strong over the weak, clearly in violation of the Royal Proclamation, that the rights, dignity and honour of the Princes would be respected.

In the wake of this came the 'Nazrana Resolutions', published

by the Government of India on March 30, 1870,<sup>19</sup> where it was emphasized that as 'Hill Tipperah' was not an independent territory, the rulers of Tripura would henceforth be subject to 'Nazrana rules' (in case of the son succeeding the father, the 'nazar' or tribute to be paid to the Govt. at the time of succession, would be half of the annual revenue of the State; in all other cases, the ('nazar' would be one year's revenue).<sup>20</sup>

Late in the same year the Government decided to station an Agent in Tripura. The decision was based on the apparent grounds that "the Raja was in the habit of sending expeditions against the Kookies, who retaliated by raids into our territories; that we had no proper means of knowing what goes on in Tipperah; and that it is absolutely essential to prohibit the Raja from making war upon the tribe."<sup>21</sup> But the real aim of the Government was made clear by A. Mackenzie, Offg. Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal :

"The object of the appointment of the Agent should be clearly explained to the Raja. He should be told that while it is not the intention of the Government to interfere in the detailed management of his hill possession, the present anomalous state of things under which a British subject exercises absolute and entirely uncontrolled authority in a tract of country surrounded by British territory can no longer be permitted."<sup>22</sup>

We find evidence of similar thinking from A. Eden, Secretary to the Govt. of Bengal, Judicial Department :

"If the Raja has been so much left to himself hitherto, it has been simply owing to the insignificance of his territory and the obscurity of his position."<sup>23</sup> This was, in fact, an open admission on the part of the British Government that they would no longer allow the Raja to run his administration on his own. There have been attempts at some quarters to justify this trend arguing that, as in other parts of India, the period 1870-1890 witnessed an all-out effort by the imperial authorities to modernise the Indian states through the agency of indirect rule.<sup>24</sup> It is, of course, true that in case of Tripura, the Political Agent was instructed that 'without directly interfering he should watch the proceedings of the Tipperah Courts, and bring to notice any acts of outrage, injustice, or barbarity... he should counsel the Raja in regard to the reforms which suggest themselves as absolutely necessary....'<sup>25</sup> But our evidences suggest that in spite of the Agency system, 'modernisation' did not virtually touch the State proper though some imitations of the British systems were introduced. On the

other hand, it was through the Agency system that virtual interference in the affairs of the State began, because the Political Agent's 'counselling' were always backed by covert threat. For example, in August 1889, R. T. Greer, the officiating Political Agent was sent, under instructions from the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, to the Maharaja, Bir Chandra Manikya, with authority to give him advice as to the matters which specially required reform. It was agreed, following the 'advice' of the Political Agent, that a Minister for the State with full powers of administration, and a Manager for the Maharaja's zemindaries would be appointed by the Maharaja for five years. But "the selection of these officers will be made by the Maharaja in consultation with the Political Agent." During the five years mentioned above, the Minister and Manager would supply the Political Agent with any information regarding the State and the zemindary which might be called for. And "should the dismissal of the Minister and the Manager become necessary, the measure will be carried out by the Maharaja in consultation with the Political Agent."<sup>26</sup> That such an agreement was made under threat becomes evident from Bir Chandra's subsequent letter to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, dated 27th September, 1889.

"I feel deeply that the proposals of Mr. Greer will result sooner or later in the total loss of my independence. Mr. Greer should not . . . . . have insisted on my accepting the proposals, even provisionally, without allowing me adequate time . . . I requested him to allow me time, but was told that such a course on my part would incur Your Honour's displeasure . . . I at last agreed to sign the memorandum he so persistently urged upon me, fearing that a refusal might displease Your Honour and be construed with disloyalty towards the British Government . . ."<sup>27</sup>

As the Maharaja made it clear that any interference with his management was derogatory to his dignity, and an attack on his independence, the above arrangement was repudiated in paper, but the Maharaja, nonetheless, was made to appoint the Assistant Political Agent, Umakanta Das, as Minister of the State, with almost full powers, in 1890.<sup>28</sup> But when after a period of two and a half years, the Maharaja asked him to resign, after issuing dismissal order, the Minister informed that he could not do so without the permission of the Bengal Government and continued to administer the State. The Maharaja had to withdraw his dismissal order. Ultimately, at the Comilla Durbar held in 1892, where the Maharaja met the Lieutenant Governor, it was decided that the Govt.

would withdraw Umakanta Das, but in return the Maharaja would submit annual administrative reports to the Government. Over and above, it would be incumbent on the part of the Maharaja to pay a visit to the Commissioner of Chittagong at Comilla when ever he would visit the place, and supply all the informations asked for.<sup>29</sup> Thus, "The Comilla Durbar was shrewdly organised to wring concessions and to bring the State to a position hardly tenable with the concept of independent status."<sup>30</sup>

In fact, the British Govt. made it a policy to remind the Kings of Tripura from time to time that they were no longer to be treated as independent. In 1914, for example, the Magistrate and ex officio Political Agent, T. Emerson wrote to the Minister of the State, "In the Arms Act Rules published by the Hill Tipperah Durbar it appears that the word 'Swadhin Tripura' (Independent Tripura) have been used. . . . The use of the word 'Swadhin' (Independent) to describe the State appears to be contrary to the orders of the Bengal Government. . . ."<sup>31</sup> A similar warning note was sent by the Bengal Govt. in 1927. The Political Agent, W. H. Nelson, in a letter to the Minister, Tripura State, wrote, "In the Robkari of His Highness the Maharaja dated 12.5.37. T. E. Published in the Tripura State Gazette of 15th Bhadra, 1337 T. E. Tripura State has been described as "Swadhin Tripura" or "Independent Tripura." I have recently seen the same appellation on an engrossed Stamp paper of this State.

"I am directed to point out that it is irregular to give the State this title. . . .

"There is no authority for the use of the word "Swadhin" or "Independent" used in the Robkari referred to and elsewhere."<sup>32</sup>

In reality there had been no Independent Tripura since 1866. That the rulers had accepted their loss of independence was made amply clear by Bir Bikram Manikya in 1928 : "The Durbar has never used the expression 'Independent Tripura' as the designation of the State since it was changed. 'Swadhin Tripura' is by no means an equivalent. The best approach to an English rendering of the word objected to, according to the context - would be "Non-British" or "Self-Governed" used by way of contrast with "British Governed."<sup>33</sup> Indeed, it became a Vassal State with some amount of internal sovereignty only. And as such it was treated.

Not only the State lost its independence, it lost almost half of its territory "by a mysterious process", which had astonished even British Officials. Even as late as in 1857, the area of the State was admittedly 7,632 square miles, its eastern boundary being

identical with the western limits of Burmah. Major Rennel's map of Bengal, 1781, corroborated this, as did Thornton's Gazetteer of 1857.<sup>34</sup> But during the Lushai Expedition 1871-72, the eastern boundary of the State was unilaterally pushed to the Longai river on the west, and a notification was issued to that effect on 23 June, 1874, thus causing the State a loss of territories which nearly brought down its area to half.<sup>35</sup> The Lushai Land had not been wrested from the Rulers of Tripura by right of conquest ; but gradually absorbed in British India. It appears from the utterances of then Political Agents and the Commissioners of Chittagong that the Longai boundary was merely a provisional 'Inner Line of Defence.'<sup>36</sup> But the tract was not restored to the State on the ground that the Lushai troubles were not over. This state of things continued till 1900, when the Government of India issued a notification, without the knowledge of the Tripura Durbar, confirming the Longai river as the western boundary of the Lushai Hills District. It is interesting to note why the British Government, while unwilling in the earlier phase to annex any portion of the territory of Tripura, became so much interested in absorbing that part later. The reasons become clear from John Edgar's notes on his tour among the Lushais in 1871, where he had suggested, among other alternatives, a permanent occupation of the Lushai Hills for the safety of the exposed tea-gardens.<sup>37</sup> The tea-planters were very much against the transfer of the territory. To this 'tea factor' was added the 'missionary factor'. The Christian Missionaries also objected to the transfer of the territory on the ground that they would not be allowed a free hand in the King's territory.<sup>38</sup> Thus under the concerted pressure of the Tea-planter's and the Missionaries, the British Government silently annexed a large tract of territory of the State of Tripura.

The Kings of Tripura, from Bir Chandra Manikya to Bir Bikram Manikya, that is from 1862 to 1947 fought continuously a losing battle through pray, petitions and protests to preserve their rights, dignity, honour, and territorial integrity. But all along they maintained their outward loyalty to the British Government because upon it depended their very existence. But in the process, they had to suffer occasionally, acute humiliations. True, they were able to extract occasional concessions, such as the 13 Gun Salutes, the title of hereditary Maharaja, or the Sanad of hereditary Succession. The Nazrana Rules were also made purely symbolic. No Nazrana had had to be actually paid by any of the Rulers who had followed Birchandra Manikya. The practice for the

Ruler to offer, after the Viceroy's Khilat was received, a Nazar of 125 Gold Mohurs which was touched and remitted.<sup>39</sup> But wherever the vital interest of the Britishers were affected, they did not budge an inch from their position, as indeed was the case with regard to the Lushai Lands. The Tripura Durbar repeatedly objected to this boundary in 1890, 1891, 1897, 1905, 1913 and 1919. There were several other protests and representations between 1891 and 1897.<sup>40</sup>

The Kings naturally felt aggrieved, because, there was a great gulf between the declared policy and the actual practice of the British Government. Their wounded pride was particularly hurt as they were very often subjected to personal humiliations, even in trifling matters. Tripura's history is replete with such instances. In 1870, for example, Browne, the Commissioner of Chittagong, made an inquiry to the Govt. of Bengal that since his installation, the Raja Bir Chandra Manikya, had always called himself "Maharaja"; but the custom had been to address him and his predecessors as "Raja". Therefore, the Commissioner requested instructions on this point.<sup>41</sup> The Government replied that "the proper title of the Hill Tipperah Chief is "Raja", and not 'Maharaja', and that by that title "the Chief of Hill Tipperah is to be addressed in future in official correspondence."<sup>42</sup> When Bir Chandra remonstrated against this and pointed out that he himself had conferred the title of 'Raja' to some of his tribal Chiefs, and therefore, his proper title should be 'Maharaja', and that, in the Printed List of the Government of Bengal, published in 1870, he was entered as a 'Maharaja', the Government bluntly told that 'it was clearly by a mistake that the present Chief was entered as Maharaja in that list....'<sup>43</sup> The Government added a further insult saying that, "Whether or not at any future date the Government of India may be pleased to confer the higher title of Maharaja on him must depend on the Raja's own conduct and the approval of the Government of Bengal on the administration of his State."<sup>44</sup>

It is true, that Bir Chandra ultimately received the 'higher title of Maharaja' by proving his absolute loyalty to the British Government - by generously contributing to the celebration held at Comilla on the occasion of the assumption of the title of 'Empress of India' by Queen Victoria ;<sup>45</sup> and by organising a grand Durbar at Agartala on the same occasion. His display of loyalty so much impressed Lord Lytton, the Viceroy, that in his report to the Secretary of State for India, in Aug. 1877, he stated :

".... the Rajah of Hill Tipperah personally superintended the arrangement of the Durbar held at his capital, and evinced much pleasure at having such an opportunity of testifying his fidelity to the British Government...."

But such display of loyalty to the British Government should not be construed as reconciliation to the British rule. It was but a plea adopted by the Princes of India to preserve remnants of their tradition against a much superior force. It was but a show. Secretly, however, they were nursing grievances against the unprincipled rule of the British Government.

The cumulative grievances of the Kings of Tripura from Birchandra Manikya onwards found expression in a strictly confidential Memorandum submitted in 1928 to the Director, Special Organization by the Chamber of Princes, by Bir Bikram, the last ruling Prince of Tripura. In this Memorandum, we find a long list of humiliations suffered by the different Kings of Tripura at the hand of the British. To quote a few examples :

#### (1) *Derogatory Requests*

"30. In the past Rulers of the State have often been asked to visit Comilla, the headquarters station of the British District of Tippera, whenever the Divisional Commissioner of Chittagong, within whose jurisdiction it was, visited the place..... The Maharajas concerned always considered such directions highly derogatory.....

"33. Contrary to standing arrangement with the Government the Rulers have also been .... asked to call on the Divisional Commissioner first ....

#### (2) *Sudden Derogatory Change of Programme in Ceremonials*

"34. It was uniform practice till some time ago for the Ruler of the State to receive the Provincial Head of the Government during a visit on the outer door leading to the reception hall, which was on the top of the Grand Stairs of the palace. On the occasion of the Lieutenant Governor's visit in 1912, the Political Agent drew up a programme accordingly. When the actual visit however came and the Lieutenant Governor arrived, the late Maharaja was all on a sudden asked to come down and receive His Honour at the foot of the Grand Stair case, which His Highness ultimately did under protest.....The new procedure thus initiated.....has since then been standardised.

### (5) *Objectionable change of Nomenclature*

"40. The recognised official designation of "Independent Tipperah"..... was suddenly changed in 1866 on the recommendation of the then Lieutenant Governor of Bengal into the exceptionable designation "Hill Tipperah"..... and it was not till quite recently that it was changed to "Tripura."

The Memorandum also included other instances of humiliations - the so-called Manikya Dispute,<sup>47</sup> the dispute over the distribution of 'Atar and Pan',<sup>48</sup> the objection to the use of the word "Swadhin Tripura"; the unilateral change of the State's eastern boundary; and finally the over-cautious policy of the British Government with regard to the purchase of arms and ammunitions by the State, which has been described as "a policy of mistrust."<sup>49</sup>

It becomes clear thus that even the so-called laissez-faire policy of Minto failed to reconcile the Princes to the British rule though a show of loyalty was always there. In fact, there was an inherent 'mistrust' on both sides, which made any reconciliation difficult. This situation should have resulted in the alienation of Indian Rulers followed by their some sort of involvement in the anti-British movement. But that did not happen - the lone exception, to some extent, being Baroda - because there was none among the Princes to articulate and coordinate their grievances. And moreover, they were always afraid of people and people's movements. As a result, in spite of all the humiliations and insult, they clunged to the British rule and were gratified with whatever hinge benefits they were able to extract from it.

### Notes & References

1. Memoranda on Indian States 1936 (corrected up to 1st January 1936) Published by Authority, Delhi 1937, p. 290.
2. The name was given by Sujauddin, the Nawab of Bengal. It comprised the zemindaries of the King of Tripura in Sylhet, Noakhali and Tippera. See Sinha, K.C., *Rajmala* (Reprint), Agartala, 1984, p. 115. (in Bengali).
3. Mackenzie, A. *The North East Frontier of India* (Reprint), Delhi, 1981, p. 272.
4. Cf Mackenzie, A, Op. cit. p. 271.
5. *Ibid*, p. 272
6. F. J. Halliday, Sec. to the Govt. of Bengal, to J. J. Harvey, Commissioner of Chittagong, para 45, No. 121 of 27 Dec.



34. Cf. Tripura State Memorandum for the Indian States Enquiry Committee No 2 (Financial), State Press, Agartala, 1932, pp. 5-6.
35. Ibid. p.7.
36. Ibid. Appendix - XI, Exhibit B, Letter No. 60 of 3.8.77 and Appendix - XIII, Exhibit B, Letter No. 1966 of 7.1.87.
37. Ibid. Appendix - VIII, Exhibit C, Minister's note on Letter No 4248 AP from Sir William Marris, Governor of Assam.
38. Ibid. Appendix -IV, Exhibit C, His Highness's Letter to Governor of Assam.
39. Ibid. p.2.
40. Ibid. Appendix - III, Exhibit C, Ministers note of 19 July, 1922.
41. Lord H. Ulick Browne, Commissioner of Chittagong to A. Eden, Sec. Govt. of Bengal, PD, No. 151 of 9 July, 1870, NAR, PA, Dec. 1870, No. 362-374.
42. A. Mackenize, Junior Sec. Govt. of Bengal, to Political Agent, Hill Tipperah, No. 4839 of 26 Nov. 1873, TSAR, B-51, S 14.
43. Ibid.
44. J. Henvey, Under Sec. Govt. of India, FD, to Sec. Govt. of Bengal, PD, No. 1726 P of 10 Aug. 1874, TSAR, B-41, S-14.
45. His Highness the Maharaja of Hill Tipperah to A. S. Alexander, Magistrate of Tipperah, No. 202 of 27 Nov. 1876, TSR, B-3, S. 11, 1878.
46. Lord Lytton to Sec. of State for India, No 142 of 6 Aug. 1877, NAR, PA, Dec - 1877, No. 286-496.
47. In 1918, the Political Agent deleted the word 'Manikya' in the draft programme for the Lt. Governor's visit to Agartala. See J. Bartley's letter to Chief Dewan, DO No. 273P of 13 Feb. 1918, TSAR, B-62, S-3, P.
48. In 1916 Raja Birendra Kishore made a mistake in protocol regarding the distribution of Atar and Pan during his visit to the Viceroy. For this he was severely reprimanded. See Bartley's letter to the Raja, Do No. 748 P, of 11 June, 1917, TSAR, B-51, S - 15, P.
49. Tripura State Memorandum, (Strictly confidential) op. cit.

**List of Abbreviations used**

NAR	- National Archives Records
TSAR	- Tripura Secretariat Archives Records
P	- Political
PD	- Political Department
TD	- Foreign Department
JD	- Judicial Department