

# INSURGENCY

and

## ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

### in North-East India



303.625095416

SON  
006435  
ICSSR

Edited by  
**Paramananda Sonowal**

Although the insurgency problem in North Eastern India including Assam has been a baffling problem eluding solution for over half a century, no concerted and systematic attempt has been made to understand the problem in its true perspective. Attempts so far made had been a piecemeal and fragmented approach. The present volume contains a collection of papers written by a galaxy of eminent personalities including seasoned bureaucrats, historians, journalists, economists, educationists and social scientists who are authorities in their respective domains. Tracing the origin of the insurgency problem to the treaty of Yandaboo in 1826 and then traversing across the entire gamut of social, political, administrative, economic and historical factors that were responsible for the insurgency problem in North East India, the present publication is a systematic, coherent, well-coordinated and exhaustive treatment of the insurgency problem in this region. In this sense the present publication has removed a long-felt desideratum in an important area. The volume at first attempts to understand the problem of insurgency and then tries to find out a lasting solution to the problem as any attempt to find a solution to a problem without understanding it will be like going to stage the Hamlet without the prince of Denmark. The volume also contains valuable inputs of research value on the insurgency problem. Published in the form of a compact handy compendium, the present publication is a treasure trove of valuable, vital and relevant facts and information about the insurgency problem in North East India.

**ISBN 978-81-86307-09-0**

**INDIA 2007      Rs 395.00**

Paramananda Sonowal (b 1975) has done his M.A. in education from Dibrugarh University (DU), Assam. He is now serving as a Lecturer in the Dept. of Education in Sibsagar College, Joysagar, Assam. Mr. Sonowal is at present doing research under DU. In his student life he was actively involved in students politics. Well-versed with the ground realities of social life of this region, Mr. Sonowal has a vision to bring about a silent social revolution through academic excellence. His area of interest is teacher education.

# **INSURGENCY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH-EAST INDIA**

*Edited by*  
**Paramananda Sonowal**



**DVS PUBLISHERS**  
**GUWAHATI-781 001**


Copyright ©, Department of Education, Sibsagar College, Joysagar, 2007

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner and the publishers.

First Published in 2007 by

501

## DVS PUBLISHERS



H.B. Road, Panbazar, Guwahati – 781 001

Phone: 2638295, 99540 93386, 2511789

Fax : 0361-2638295


e-mail : [dvspub@sify.com](mailto:dvspub@sify.com)

website : [www.dvspublishers.com](http://www.dvspublishers.com)

The view expressed in this book are those of the Author/Editor, and not necessarily that of the publisher. The publisher is not responsible for the views of the Author/Editor and authenticity of the data, in any way whatsoever.

ISBN: 978-81-86307-09-0

Rs. 395/-



Printed at: Sachi Printers, Delhi.



006435

## Contents

---

### *Foreword*

### *Insurgency Situation in the North-East – An Introduction Across Editor's Corridor....*

1. The Movement of Economic Development. 1  
*Dr. Jayanta Madhab.*
2. Politics of Insurgency, Identity and State: 9  
Scenario in India.  
*Dr. Nani G. Mahanta.*
3. Socio-Psychological Factors of Insurgency in 34  
North-East India: A Brief Discussion.  
*Prof. B.N. Borthakur.*
4. Terrorism in Context: 46  
Debating the Logic of Terrorism.  
*Dr. Archana Upadhyay.*
5. Insurgency in the North-East. 57  
*Mr. Nitin Gokhale.*
6. Failed States and Successful Insurgents. 70  
*Mr. Sunil Nath.*
7. Psychology of Terrorism. 87  
*Dr. Bijoy Prasad Bora.*
8. Psycho Social Perspectives: 95  
Effects of Insurgency on Children and Women.  
*Ms. Sonia Pereira Deuri.*
9. Analyzing the ULFA Imbroglia. 104  
*Dr. Rajib Handique.*

10.	Insurgency-Whether Thought and Fancy or Reality: A Sociological Outlook. <i>Dr. Jyoti Prasad Saikia.</i>	116
11.	Insurgency and Good Governance: Experience in the North-East. <i>Dr. Amiya Kr. Samanta. IPS, (Retd.).</i>	124
12.	Insurgency, Law and Order, Problem of Efficient Governance. <i>Dr. R.C. Borpatra Gohain.</i>	131
13.	Human Rights in the Era of Insurgency: The North-East Profile. <i>Mr. Sabyasachi Mahanta.</i>	136
14.	Combating Terrorism—Role of Confidence Building Measures in Checking Cross Border Terrorism. <i>Ms. Rekha Borthakur.</i>	144
15.	Economic Consequences of Insurgency in Assam. <i>Mr. H.N. Das. I.A.S. (Retd.)</i>	152
16.	Economic Constraints as Factors Responsible for the Emergence of Insurgency in Assam: A Case Study of ULFA. <i>Ms. Uttara Phukan.</i>	162
17.	Insurgency: As An Impediment to Economic Development. <i>Dr. Pranab Sandilya.</i>	173
18.	Insurgency—A Hindrance to Economic Development of North Eastern Region (NER). <i>Ms. Sangita Hazarika Bhagawati.</i>	183
19.	Initiation of Development Efforts Sounds the Death Knell of Insurgency. <i>Dr. P.C. Kalita, Mr. Bijoy Mohan.</i>	196
	<i>Contributors</i>	208

## **Insurgency Situation in the North-East – An Introduction**

---

The North Eastern Region of India has been gripped with the serious and vexed problem of insurgency, starting with the Naga rebellion, in the mid Fifties of the last century. Initially the rebel group was Naga National Council (NNC), which is known as the mother of insurgencies in the North-East. Presently about 26 main insurgent outfits are active in the region. These groups have formed themselves into two broad alliances, namely the Indo Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF) comprising NSCN (K), ULFA, ATTF, PLA, UNLF and PREPAK and another alliance comprising NSCN (IM), NDFB, Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC), and NLFT as its constituents. The outfits also enter into bilateral agreements from time to time, depending on strategic requirements. Such agreements exist between ULFA and NDFB, ULFA & ANVC, NDFB & ANVC, PLA & NSCN (IM), PLA & United Peoples' Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), ULFA & NSCN (K), etc. The outfits have also rivalries because of the overlapping territorial claims, ideological differences, ethnic claims for superiority, ethnic rivalries etc. Apart from the alliance partners often going for joint operation against the security forces, they support each other in areas like giving shelter, transit facilities through their territories, training of new cadres, supply of arms and ammunitions, intelligence gathering and sharing and so forth. Interestingly, even outside the alliances, insurgent groups like ULFA have strategic understanding with NSCN (IM), which enables it to send their new recruits for training in their camps in

Nagaland, get services of arms supplies, shelters by sneaking into their areas of control to escape chasing by Security forces in Assam's bordering districts etc.

It was believed that, granting of full statehood to the Naga Hills in, by dissecting from Assam, the Naga Hills districts, would satisfy the Naga insurgents led by A. Z. Phizo heading the Federal Government of Nagaland, with his headquarters in London. Accordingly, full statehood was granted at the initiative of the then Prime Minister Nehru in 1963, which then raised much hopes for permanent peace in the newly created state called Nagaland, as a part of the Union of India. But, the hopes of New Delhi were belied very soon, with the formation of the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980, under the joint leadership of Issac Suo, Muivah and Khaplang, which vouched to free Nagaland from the Indian domination, as they considered Nagaland as always separate from the mainland. At the peak of the Naga rebellion, thousands of lives of civilians were lost, due to suppressive policies followed by the Center, and there were many casualties faced by the Security forces as well. For the last ten years, there has been some improvement in the overall situation, as the NSCN (IM) and the Center are having cease-fire agreements in force and the dialogue process between the two, has been going on. The other faction- NSCN (Khaplang) has also got cease- fire arrangement with the Center for last two years or so. As such, there does not seem to be any significant confrontation between the Security forces and the rebel outfits, though the oft-reported clashes between the two factions, leading to loss of lives on both sides, as also civilians have become a matter of concern. Three worst affected districts due to such clashes are- Wokha, Tuenchang and Kohima, though Dimapur is also occasionally affected. Another major area of concern has been 'ground rules' violations by both the factions, on numerous occasions. On the other hand, the positive side is that, there has

been a substantial decline in the killings of security personnel as well as innocent civilians. Secondly, there has been growing public response and enthusiasm over the continuing peace- talks with NSCN (IM), and also demand for holding discussion with the other faction of NSCN expeditiously. On the other hand, the potential for conflicts with the neighbouring states of Manipur, Arunachal and Assam is very much there, because of the NSCN (IM)'s demand for Nagalim or greater Nagaland, which includes some districts of these states. NSCN (IM) through its Charter of Demands submitted to the Center on 21.9.2001 makes the following demands- (1) Integration of Naga inhabited areas into one administrative unit called 'Nagalim or Greater Nagaland'. As per this demand, they claim that parts of three districts of Assam, e.g., Sivasagar, Karbi- anglong and North Cachar Hills, four districts of Manipur, namely, Ukhrul, Tamenglong, Sanapati and Chandel and two districts of Arunachal Pradesh, i.e., Tirap and Changlang are Naga areas. (2) Recognition of Nagas as sovereign people and a separate Nation. (3) Devolution of more powers to the Nagalim on federal structure, i.e., the Centre retaining powers related to Defence, External affairs, Currency, Communications only and all other powers to Nagalim. The problem is getting compounded, with strong support for this demand, by the apex Body of the civil societies of Nagaland- Naga Ho Ho, on one hand and strong opposition to it, from the people of these three States. Only time will show how the issue would finally be sorted out, without creating fresh avenues for violence over this most sensitive and tricky issue. Intriguingly, during the cease- fire period, the actual strength of the armed cadres of NSCN (IM) has gone up very high, with present strength of at least 10,000 against the earlier strength of about 4-5000. Taking advantage of the peace process, with the inherent connivance of the security forces in Nagaland, and possibly the Central forces in the adjoining states, NSCN (IM) has made

inroads into NSCN (K) dominated areas of Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh, and also the disputed (!) areas along the Assam-Nagaland border in Golaghat, Sivasagar, Jorhat (Undivided Sivasagar district) and Karbi- Anglong & N.C. Hills districts of Assam and Hill districts of Manipur. As per media reports, this group is getting tacit support of Nagaland Government as well local Nagas, which has enabled it to encroach into Assam lands in Dhansiri, Bokajan and other areas, thereby creating strong resentment amongst the local populace of Assam. The passive role of Assam Government has become a subject of general criticism in the State. There is a third rebel group in Nagaland, Naga Nationalist Council (NNC), which has got some influence in Chakesang and Kheimungan regions of Nagaland. On the whole, Nagaland is having a period of relative peace, after both the factions of NSCN have come under cease- fire agreements; NSCN (IM) effective from 28th April, 2001 and NSCN (K) from 2005.

Following the secessionist example of the Naga rebels, the Mizo secessionists formed the Mizo National Front (MNF) under the leadership of Laldenga, when Mizo-dominated Lushai Hills district of Assam, faced a severe famine 'Moutam' - the flowering of bamboos, leading to unimaginable growth of the rodent population, which ate up whatever paltry amount of food stuff was grown locally. This resulted in the famine leading to deaths and starvation of hundreds of people there. The then Assam Government miserably failed to provide timely relief to the suffering populace, because of which the armed rebellion launched by the MNF received instant support from the people. Laldenga too went into exile and continued guiding the armed insurrection by his commanders and cadres, which resulted in loss of many lives of both the rebels as well as the security forces, besides large scale repression on the common people in counter-insurgency operations. In order to wrest the support of the people

to the MNF, the Government shifted huge number of Mizo villagers from their natural habitats to newly set up centers called People's Progressive Villages (PPVs), with the ostensible declaration to provide them secured environment and support of food and employment. This was the brain-child of the Army top brass; but then the PPV experience became a total failure, as the Mizos had to live far away from the fields, thereby losing whatever harvest they could get out of their land, through 'jhum cultivation', besides facing total disruption to their social life and culture. The affected people became more loyal to MNF and totally anti-government. Once it became dusk, they were totally confined to their chang type huts, as no movement outside was permitted due to 'dusk to dawn curfew' on a regular basis. Even in the early seventies, this was the situation, when I happened to serve in then Lushai Hills District, as Assistant Commissioner and then Sub-divisional Officer, in the interior Pawi-Lakher sub-division, with headquarters at Saiha. Though insurgency was losing its momentum by 1970-71, due to many employment oriented food for work schemes, in particular and involvement of the civil officers in developmental activities, the quality of life was too poor, as most villagers went without any sugar or kerosene, not to speak of milk and other healthy stuff.

During the peak of the Mizo rebellion in late sixties, the MNF even succeeded in capturing the reins of administration at Lungleh, and also kidnapped the then SDO- a young IAS officer and a few EACs of the State Civil Service. They were treated very cruelly by the insurgents, who took them to their camps in nearby Myanmar and engaged in different types of menial works. Finally after prolonged negotiations with the MNF leader Laldenga, at the initiatives of the Church leaders, the famous Mizo Accord was signed, and Lushai (Mizo) Hills district was notified as Union Territory of Mizoram, with a Lt. Governor. So there was dissection of Assam once again, and Mizoram was

created. Laldenga returned to his homeland as a great hero to the tumultuous welcome of thousands of Mizos of all clans. Soon, Mizoram was declared as a full-fledged State and MNF became a regular political party of the State, which captured power by winning in several elections to the State Assembly. After laying down arms by the MNF, permanent peace has returned to Mizoram, the development initiatives have been made on all fronts, and interestingly the State has earned Special Peace Award by way of massive one-time grant from the Center. Thus recognition of the right of self-determination by the Mizos, within the Indian Constitution, has definitely contributed to the heralding of peace in Mizoram. Though there has been certain discontentment amongst the Hmars or Brues against the State Government, who have formed a militant outfit called the Bru National Front, the State Government have been successful in tackling their movement, by some Peace Settlement.

Manipur is another state, which has been facing insurgency, by several militant outfits-the main lead over a lingering period being taken by the People's Liberation Army ((PLA) and the People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak or Pre-Pak, United National Liberation front (UNLF), Kanglei Yawol Kana Lup (KYKL), Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) and other smaller ones- all demanding secession from the Indian Union. Meitei underground groups have been dominating the violence scenario and have established strong bases along India- Myanmar border in Chandel and Churachandpur districts. These groups have supported the issue of territorial integrity of Manipur, which continues to be a major emotional issue for the Meiteis. This has also encouraged alignment of the insurgent groups of the hill tribes- the Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA), United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF), Zemi Revolutionary Army (ZRA) and Hmar Peoples' Convention (Democratic) or HPC (D), which are close to NSCN (IM). Manipur was one of the Princely States,

which became united with India, under the Sardar Patel Plan, but the people were not happy with the arrangement, because of cultural differences with the mainland India, apart from lack of development, alienation due to poor communication network, proximity to Myanmar ruled by different war lords, who are the major sources of weapons and ammunitions, acute unemployment problems amongst the youth, the flourishing of the drug cartel & narcotics trading, illegal gun running and other smuggling activities through the golden triangle, rivalries amongst different ethnic groups, mainly the Meities and the Nagas, Cookies, Hmars etc., each resenting domination by the other, and demanding its own right to self- determination and independent governance and also vying with each other for superiority, mostly through bloody fights, and above all political instability coupled with poor or 'no governance'. Killings of opponents and rival clan members, rampaging houses of opponents, extortions from one and all in their respective area of influence, blocking of the National Highway thereby disconnecting Manipur from the rest of the country, directly by militants' seize or by human rights activists and at times, even by general public protesting against alleged excesses, committed by the Security forces are common features in Manipur. Rampant corruption at all levels, as reported in the media, is also contributing to the free play of the divisive forces, besides filling the coffers of the militant outfits regularly. The law & order situation in the State is reported to be the worst in the region. There does not appear to be any major peace initiatives from any side, for bringing the insurgent groups to the negotiating table so far; so the stalemate continues. Extortion has practically become the most lucrative business of the insurgent groups or any other armed militia, who have established a strong network with the collusion of politicians, bureaucrats, contractors etc. and are siphoning huge chunk of development funds. The situation continues to be extremely grim in the State.

Meghalaya is a relatively peaceful State, with only two militant outfits, which occasionally make their presence felt, by attacking non- indigenous people or businessmen- though they do not have any major demand outside the present constitutional set- up. HNLC is active in Khasi Hills and Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) mainly operates in Garo Hills districts. The militants however often have some kind of understanding with the militant groups of Assam, which enables them- ULFA and NDFB in particular, to receive temporary shelter against combing operations by the Security forces along the Assam- Meghalaya border areas, mainly in adjoining Garo Hills district. They also assist in safe passage of these militants across the international borders with Bangladesh, either to enter Bangladesh or enter Assam from that side. This kind of strategic support was extended to the ULFA and NDFB militants, when they were on the run, following the RBA operation 'All Clear' jointly launched with the Indian Army in 2003. While ANVC cooperates with ULFA and NDFB in joint operations also, HNLC has been maintaining cordial links with NSCN (IM), though they also co-operate with ULFA on Meghalaya soil. ANVC's main demand is for a separate state of Garoland to be carved out of Meghalaya and adjoining areas of Assam.

Arunachal Pradesh is relatively quite peaceful, but for the presence of a sizeable strength of NSCN (K) and NSCN (IM) militants and also occasional presence of ULFA militants, particularly in the three districts adjoining Tinsukia in Upper Assam- Tirap, Changlang and Lohit. Though a stronghold of NSCN (K) initially, the NSCN (IM) made inroads into the Tirap district since about 2000, resulting in frequent conflicts with NSCN (K), resulting in casualties on both sides. As per intelligence reports, presently NSCN (IM) dominates Tirap district and the other faction continues to dominate in Changlang district. Extension of area of domination of both the factions

into Lohit district are recent developments. NSCN (K) has very strong presence in the Kachin province of Myanmar, which is under control of the Kachin Independent Army (KIA), and has got a sizeable strength of Naga population, which provides logistic support to NSCN (K). The ULFA has got strategic alliance with this group for the purpose of training, arms supply, safe passage through their areas of influence in Arunachal Pradesh and also setting up transit camps there, besides setting up regular camps in Myanmar. These two militant outfits also jointly resist any operation conducted against them by the Myanmar Armed forces, and support the KIA in their defensive as well as aggressive activities against the regular army of Myanmar. In addition, the NSCN (K) provides all kinds of strategic support to the ULFA in Nagaland, wherever they have their ground dominance. Now that, NSCN (IM) has been negotiating with the Center, under 'cease fire agreement', their commanders and cadres are mainly restricting their movements within Nagaland and also living in 'designated camps' at different locations, with their 'headquarters' at the Hebron camps across the Dhansiri opposite N. C. Hills district. Right now Arunachal Pradesh has become suddenly very hot, with the Army launching multi-pronged operations, in the three districts of Arunachal under 'Operation Clear', in order to eliminate or flush out the ULFA militants, following their wanton killing of Hindi- speaking Bihari laborers, petty traders etc. in Upper Assam districts of Tinsukia, Dibrugarh, Sivasagar, Dhemaji and Golaghat. As NSCN (K) is also under 'cease- fire agreement' with the Center, though formal talks are yet to start, it is very likely that, their camps might not be attacked under the 'Army operation'.

Tripura is another state, which is very badly affected by insurgency for past several decades, with 30 out of 40 police stations affected by terrorist violence, resulting in heavy loss of lives- both militants as well as security forces, apart from hundreds of innocent civilians. There are many insurgent groups

as in Manipur, and these groups are often involved in fratricidal belligerence, due to the same reasons as in Manipur. The main two militant outfits are- National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and All Tripura Tribal Front (ATTF)- the primary objective of both these outfits are creation of an independent Tripura and eviction of Bengali migrants from Bangladesh. NLFT has two factions, namely NLFT (B) led by Bishwamohan Dev Verma and NLFT (N) led by Nyanbasi Jamatia. NLFT (B) suffered a setback when Mantu Kaloi faction signed a Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) with the Central & State Government on April 15, 2004, in pursuance of which 72 militants surrendered. Interestingly, the same day the NLFT (N) entered into an agreement with the Centre and the State for 'suspension of operations' and a number of senior leaders of the outfit came overground. Tripura has got long international borders with Bangladesh, and at many places the borders are simply unmanned, though of late border vigil by the BSF has been intensified and fencing works are also going on. Islamic fundamentalists as well as 'jehadi' terrorist groups of Bangladesh are, reportedly, maintaining close links with various rebel groups of Tripura. Bangladesh also provides safe sanctuaries to these rebels, together with rebel outfits from Assam and Manipur, under the sponsorship and patronage of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan and the Director General of Field Intelligence (DGFI) of Bangladesh, who have the mandates to destabilize and bleed India in all possible ways. The rebel groups of Tripura are mainly formed by the disillusioned youths of different ethnic tribes, who felt totally let down and neglected in all areas of socio- economic development, due to the dominance of the Bangladeshi refugees and illegal migrants, who have made the local population a minority in their own homeland, with barely 30 % of the total population. Successive CPM run Governments in the State have hardly done anything to improve the economic conditions of the tribal population, who are living in abject poverty, in interior

areas, without the benefit of education, health care, roads, electricity and other basic amenities for a civilized living. This tragic development took place only after India's Partition, when the princely State joined the Indian Union, not before or during the British rule, when they had their own kings even in the status of a vassal state. Surprisingly, in recent times, some Muslim rebel outfits have also come into being in Tripura, which, obviously have the blessings of ISI, DGFI and the fundamentalist Bangladesh Government of Khaleda Zia- composed of a three-party alliance led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which has just gone out of power completing its five year term, before the next General Election.

In Assam, a number of insurgent outfits are active of which the most important is the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), which had its birth in 1979 at the historical 'Rang- ghar' in Sivasagar district. The other active organizations, with their objectives restricted to specific areas are the United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), which wants to carve out a Karbi-land state covering some contiguous areas of Nogaon, Golaghat and North Cachar districts; the Dima Halong Daoga (DHD), which is fighting for a Dimacha Land called Dimaraji as a separate State within India, National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) with its demand for an independent Bodoland comprising all Bodo dominated areas, Hmar Peoples Convention (Democratic)- HPCD- mainly owing allegiance to the parent body in Manipur, but extending its domain through settlement in N. C. Hills and bordering Cachar districts in particular. The Kukis also have an outfit called the Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA), which wants to carve out a separate land for the Kukis by including areas from Karbi- Anglong and N.C. Hills districts. NDFB had recently signed cease- fire agreement with the Center and presently its cadres are hosted in designated camps. Though they are largely peaceful, they were reported to be going in for extortions in many Bodo dominated areas, resulting in some

clashes with Non- Bodos. The Bodo Liberation Tiger (BLT), which was an underground Bodo organization and having rivalries with the NDFB, came overground after the Bodo Accord and disbanded the organization. They are now holding the reins of power in the Bodoland Territorial Area District (BTAD) - an autonomous region within Assam, comprising the districts of Kokrajhar, Baksa, Chirang and Odalguri. That way peace has returned to the Bodo dominated areas, which in not too distant past had witnessed too much bloodshed, with several thousands of innocent civilians killed as well as made homeless. However, the Center's dilly- dallying in starting the negotiation process with the NDFB, has been creating tensions amongst the NDFB leadership, which has even threatened to go back to the jungles, if the talks are further delayed. Both the DHD and UPDS got divided over internal differences, mainly on the issue of 'sovereignty' as well as leadership conflict. So, they have now the anti- talk factions, which often go berserk by resorting to extortions, sabotage activities, kidnapping and also clashes with the other faction, in their respective area of influence. The UPDS (pro- talk) faction led by its General secretary Horensing Bey signed a cease- fire agreement with the Center effective from 1st August, 2002 and wants solution to their problems within the Indian Union. The DHD (pro-talk) faction, led by Dilip Nunisa also signed an agreement with the Center effective from January 1, 2003 and wants a solution like UPDS (pro- talk). However, the poor progress of the talk process with the pro- talk factions, which are also under cease- fire agreement with the Center, has been a matter of concern for their leadership and supporters. Then, there is the Adivasi Kobra Militant Force, restricted to Dhubri, Bongaigaon and Kokrajhar districts, who are also on cease fire Agreement. The other Adivasi organization also under cease- fire is Veersa Commando Force. These two organizations simply demand adequate safeguard of the interests of the Adivasis - members of the tea tribes and ex- tea garden labourers, and more

specifically resettlement of thousands of their tribes who were rendered homeless, due to the Bodo agitation and killings by underground Bodo outfits, and proper security for them.

As of now the ULFA is the most dreaded insurgent group not only of Assam, but the entire North-East, in spite of major reverses faced in the 'Operation All Clear', which led to demolishing all their 9 camps in the Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan, besides causing heavy loss of fighting men, sophisticated arms including anti- aircraft guns, machine guns, rocket launchers, grenade & mortar launchers, huge number of AK series automatic assault rifles, huge quantities of grenades, mortars, ammunitions of all kinds and arrest of many of its key leaders including the founder member Bhim Kanta Borgohain alias 'Mama', Ashanta Baghphukan, Bening Rabha, Robin Neog and Ramu Mech besides a large number of casualties and many important commanders missing or killed. But the top leaders like Arabinda Rajkhowa, Paresh Barua, Chief of Army Staff (CAS), Sasha Choudhury- Foreign Secretary, Raju Barua- Commander of ULFA camps in Bhutan and Chitraban Hazarika- Finance Secretary- all believed to be in Bangladesh evaded arrest.

Earlier, there were a number of surrenders of ULFA leaders as well as cadres, supporters, linkmen etc., since the days of Hiteswar Saikia- then Chief Minister in the early eighties, the figure having swelled to more than ten thousand. The Army had launched two major operations against the outfit in the nineteen nineties- known as 'Operation Bajrang' and 'Operation Rhino', which caused many casualties on both sides, besides leading to many arrests and surrenders. The 'Operation All Clear', it was claimed, broke the backbones of the ULFA, NDFB and the North Bengal based Kamatapur Liberation Army (KLO); but ULFA has surprisingly bounced back within a sort time, though NDFB came forward to have 'peace talks' and executed a 'Cease- fire Agreement' with the Center. The KLO, after initial shocks for

sometime after loss of many of its cadres, has now gradually come out to the surface once again, and is reportedly getting various supports from the ULFA, which also acts as the link-organization with the ISI and DGFI. As a sequel to the brutal killing of about 70 Hindi speaking Bihari people in five Upper Assam districts- Tinsukia, Dibrugarh, Sivasagar, Dhemaji and Golaghat, counter- insurgency operations have been intensified under the Unified Command now headed by the State Chief Minister, and the Army has launched a massive operation, code-named "All Clear" in Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Nagaland and other adjoining States, which the ULFA uses for various strategic reasons, with the objective to eliminate ULFA altogether or at least to bring it to their knees, and thereby compelling it to have some form of talks with the Center. This operation has full blessings of the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, the Chief of Staff, the State Chief Minister- rather the entire leadership at the Center - both political as well as military. The army operation is supported by the State Police, with force strength of about 60,000 policemen, the para- military forces like the Territorial Army, CRPF, BSF, SSB, Home Guards, Railway Protection Force (RPF), Intelligence Wings of all these forces and so forth. As per media report, the Army has deployed one Division in full strength and three additional Brigades- all totaling about 36,000 heavily armed soldiers, to track down and combat the ULFA militants in the five Upper Assam districts and the three Arunachal districts alone. The strength of the paramilitary and other forces are estimated to be at least 60,000 (Home Guards included). In addition, Village Defence Parties (VDPs) whose total strength is about 20,000, are put on the job for surveillance of railway tracks, oil pipelines, electricity towers and installations, telecom lines etc. The Central and the State Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) have also geared up their own internal security arrangements, by deploying additional

manpower wherever required. Such massive deployment of heavily armed forces have been made after 9th January 2007, following the merciless killing of about 70 persons, and a number of terrorist strikes by the ULFA through bomb / grenade blasts at different places in the State, with three blasts in the heart of Guwahati itself, killing about a dozen persons and injuring many-all civilians. During the month, till 20th January / 07 about a dozen ULFA cadres have lost their lives and an equal number arrested by the security forces, with some surrenders as well. Upper Assam has practically become an undeclared 'war zone' and the rest of the State has also witnessed tightening of security checks and C.I. operations. It may be recalled that, certain peace initiatives were made recently by the ULFA constituting a 9-Member People's Consultative Group (PCG) and Dr. Mamoni Raysom Goswami as mediator to start with, later joined by Rebati Phukan- a friend of ULFA supremo Paresh Barua. Three formal meetings with the PCG were held by the Centre, including the first one with the Prime Minister. The two mediators also held a number of informal as well as formal meetings with the National Security Adviser, Home Secretary etc. The Center also declared a unilateral cease-fire for 30 days, as a gesture of good will, which was later extended for another 15 days. ULFA went on insisting on the release of its five Central Committee members arrested during the RBA Operation and lodged in jails in Assam, for consultation purpose to discuss about talk, which the Union Home Minister also assured to the PCG, under guarantee of their not 'flying away'. Later, for reasons not known, this assurance was not honoured, which definitely helped ULFA to gain considerable public sympathy. When the stalemate was thus going on, efforts from Dr. Goswami continued, but then there was the bomb-shell from ULFA, first issuing a notice to the Hindi- speaking people to quit Assam, and next striking at the poor, hapless brick-kiln workers, petty traders, milk farmers etc.

Security analysts believe that, the ULFA, which has been acting at the dictates of the ISI, are not keen for talks and it utilized the cease-fire period for regrouping, extortions, acquisition of fresh quantity of arsenals etc. The recent spate of ULFA violence leading to loss of many innocent lives- both Hindi speaking as well as non Hindi speaking local people through bomb / grenade blasts etc., are committed at the instance of the ISI and DGFI of Bangladesh, states security analyst and former Joint Director of Intelligence Bureau (IB), M.K. Dhar. According to him, DGFI officers initially trained some Harkat Ul Jehadi Islami (HUJI) and Jamat UL Mujahedin (JUM) top leaders. Bangla Bhai, a Bangladeshi terrorist, who was arrested last year, was also initially trained by the DGFI. The DGFI and ISI operate jointly in India, and that the North-East militants have been receiving support from DGFI over the years. He further states, in Assam, besides the ULFA, the main clients of DGFI included the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA), United Liberation Front of Barak Valley, Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA), United Liberation Militia of Assam (ULMA), Revolutionary Muslim Commandos etc. DGFI also helps and sponsors Bangladeshi jihadi elements to establish cells and modules in Assam, which are set up in areas inhabited by Bangladeshi nationals. The Indian Intelligence agencies and others are aware of the fact that the DGFI played a significant role in several attacks by jihadi groups in different parts of the country including the US consulate in Kolkata, New Delhi bomb blasts, Varanasi blasts and the Mumbai train blasts of 7/11. A serving Major of DGFI's Special Operation Cell crossed over to India about ten days before the Mumbai blasts. Dhar says that, there are reasons to believe that the recent attacks in Upper Assam districts were carried out jointly by the ULFA and DGFI. Around December 28, the leaders of the ULFA and officials of DGFI met at a safe house in Dhaka and an operational task was charted

out to create serious disruptions in Assam and Siliguri to divert Indian attention from polls in Bangladesh. [The Assam Tribune, Sunday, January 21, 2007].

Whence are the insurgent groups in the North-East getting their arms? Intelligence reports indicated that Chinese arms were making entry into India from Bangkok via Chittagong Hill Tracts, Rumah Bazar, Salopi in Bangladesh and the Trijunction, popularly known as the 'Golden Triangle'. The route then extends to Chandel district of Manipur and other neighbouring States. Coxbazar in Bangladesh was an important gun- running point. It is reported that, in 2003 recoveries of huge quantity of arms and ammunitions were made at Bogra in Bangladesh. A huge cache of most sophisticated, assorted arms, were hauled in April, 2004 by the Bangladesh Army near Chittagong port, after unloading from fishing trawlers, which took the deliveries from two ships and were being shifted to a godown, which could be due to lack of co-ordination by the concerned agencies of Bangladesh Government, ISI etc. It was one of the biggest seizures made, with about 1500 boxes seized from the premises of the Chittagong Urea Factory Ltd. (CUFL), a Bangladesh Govt. owned undertaking. The cache of arms and ammunitions were off loaded from two trawlers at a jetty belonging to CUFL and then loaded to trucks in the presence of Bangladesh police, but fortunately (surprisingly!) the Bangladesh Army getting scent, seized the arsenal. The arms consignment included the following weaponry: Rocket Launchers-150, Rockets- 840, Grenade Launchers- 2000, Grenades- 25000, AK-47 Assault Rifles 1290, Tommy gun- 100, semi- automatic rifles- / guns-400, magazines of sub- machine guns and other weapons- 7000, bullets and cartridges- 20lakh. Intriguingly enough the ships carrying the arsenal, MV QC Honour and MV Orient Freedom are owned by Salauddin Quadar Chowdhury of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), MP and Adviser to Bangladesh Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. He was also

the Bangladesh candidate for the post of Secretary General of Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC), though, he lost the election. The two ships arrived from the Kelang port in Malaysia and it was suspected that the arms were procured and supplied by ISI for North Eastern militants, including ULFA. Various intelligence reports and also statements by the BSF to the media from time to time reveal that, there are about 117 training camps and shelters of North Eastern Insurgent Groups in Bangladesh territory, which the Bangladesh Government never admits, in spite of the complete list given to them by the Indian authorities.

As per various reports, the militants of the North-East are also known to be using Myanmar territory for shelter, training camps, transit accommodation, transshipment of arms and ammunitions, drug- trafficking etc. Procurement of cheap Chinese arms is made by the rebel groups using the Myanmar territory, at the Myanmar border towns like Tengchong, Ruili, Yingjiang in Unan province, where small arms factories are running in sizeable number. The insurgent groups regularly pays hefty amounts to the Myanmar Army for allowing them to take shelter and operate from Myanmar besides procuring arms and ammunitions from them. NSCN (K) has its Central Headquarters (CHQ) at KIA dominated areas of Myanmar and receives regular consignment of arms from the KIA. Rebel groups of Manipur like the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), People's Liberation Army (PLA), Kuki National Army (KNA) receive their consignment of Chinese arms (without any marking) at Manipur from United War State Army (UWSA), KIA etc. using the Mandalay- Kalemmyo- Okkah (Yangoon Division) route. ULFA is also believed to be getting assorted varieties of Chinese arms, grenades etc. in the same manner at Myanmar, which they transport to Assam through Arunachal Pradesh.

From the aforesaid analysis of the insurgency scenario in the North-East India, it would be quite clear that, insurgency,

also called militancy and at times also called terrorism has become a very complex issue, with no quick- fix solution in sight. The reasons are generally ascribed as- concern for ethnic identity, extremely low level of economic development in the interior areas, poor infrastructures, sub human conditions of the poverty-ridden rural people, lack of opportunities for gainful employment of the youth in particular, lack of proper educational facilities, role of anti- India agencies like the ISI, DGFI, Jehadi groups like HUJI, JUM, SIMI, etc., coupled with their support groups in neighbouring Bangladesh, presence of long porous border and very inhospitable terrains facilitating free inflow of arms and ammunitions to the disgruntled youth and so forth. The Governmental approach to the issue, in respect of the militant groups in each of the States, has been one of 'serious law and order problem' requiring tough actions by the law enforcing agencies and the Central security forces. The political aspects of militancy were hardly given any serious consideration, in order to make sincere political initiatives for a meaningful dialogue with the insurgent groups, and main reliance was laid on a 'military solution'. The positive development for hammering out an acceptable political solution within the frame- work of the Indian Constitution, was first started with NSCN (IM), with whom the dialogues are going on for the last ten years or so. Similar process has started with some other groups, as stated earlier, starting with signing of cease- fire agreements; but the dialogue process is yet to make a beginning, which has been causing concerns in the minds of those outfits about the sincerity of the Center in chalking out a solution. The Center has also been trying to neutralize the militant groups by making diplomatic initiatives with the Governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar, in order to destroy their camps there and either get the top leaders handed over to India or to put them on the run. So far, no major success has been achieved, though with the recent visit of the Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee to Myanmar and his

meetings with the leaders of the Military Junta there, hopes are raised for some stern initiatives by the Myanmar Government to deal with the Indian Insurgent Groups (IIGs).

In order to deal with the IIGs militarily and also for preempting any public support to such groups, the Government of India has already banned all the major groups as “Unlawful Association” under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. These banned groups are- ULFA and NDFB in Assam, PLA, UNLF, PREPAK, Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP), Kanglei Yaol Kanba Lup (KYKL), Manipur People’s Liberation Front (MPLF), Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF) in Manipur, ATTF, NLFT in Tripura, HNLC and ANVC in Meghalaya. In order to empower the Army and the para- military forces with special powers to handle militants’ threats, the Central Government has also declared the militancy affected States / areas, i.e., the whole of Manipur, Nagaland and Assam as well as Tirap, Changlang and Lohit districts of Arunachal Pradesh and a 20 km belt in States bordering Assam as ‘disturbed areas’ under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 as amended in 1972. Similarly in Tripura also the entire areas under 22 Police Stations and part of areas under 5 Police Stations have been declared as ‘disturbed areas’. Incidentally, due to the sweeping powers given under this Act even to lower ranks of the forces. such as Havildar, there have been many reported cases of gross violation of human rights by the security forces, and agitations for scrapping the Act have been going on for years, particularly in Manipur. The misuse of the Act has resulted in alienation of a sizeable number of people, both in Manipur and in recent days, in Assam also, as many innocent persons have become victims of excesses by the Army and other security forces. This is certainly an unhealthy development in the insurgency affected states, where the Strategy should always be to wean away the sympathizers of militant groups, not to swell their number by committing excesses

on innocent men, women, young girls and youth in particular. Other Governmental measures have been to encourage militants to surrender in large numbers, and lead a normal life under a package of incentives given for rehabilitation. By and large, this strategy has not met with any success, if one has to go by the experience of 10000 and odd Surrendered ULFA Militants (SULFA) in Assam. The initiatives made to start the 'peace talks' with a few militant groups, as departure of the traditional 'divide and rule' policy is in the right direction, as the complex insurgency issue cannot be solved militarily, if one has to go by the Naga Insurgency experience or the ULFA militancy. It is observed that, successive major operations against the ULFA, the fourth one currently going on, have so far failed to bring the hard-core militants and ULFA leadership to their knees. As such, fresh peace initiatives are necessary to bring ULFA to the negotiating table, even though the efforts by Dr. Mamoni Roysom Goswami, Rebati Phukan and the Peoples Consultative Group (PCG) did not succeed, due to ULFA's strike against Hindi speaking Biharis and Center's intransigence in failing to release five jailed leaders of ULFA in terms of commitment given to the PCG.

In the backdrop of such devastating insurgency scenario, in the major States of the North Eastern Region (NER), with Assam being pushed into a stage of most disturbing turbulence in recent days, the thoughts, deliberations and recommendations made in the seminar "Insurgency and Economic Development in North-East India, organized by the Dept. of Education, Sibsagar College, Joysagar on 28th and 29th December, 2005 would be very helpful in finding out an acceptable, long term solution to the vexed problem. Prof. Paramananda Sonowal, a Lecturer of Education Dept., Sibsagar College deserves high appreciation for taking the pains to publish a compendium of the papers read/contributed by various participants at the seminar, who I find, are highly knowledgeable persons, drawn from different disciplines of

academic, economic, administrative and social circles. It is at the request and insistence of Prof. Sonowal, that I have endeavoured this Preface, and also trying to make it an elaborate one, as per his wish. Prof. Sonowal in his editorial notes, has gone to the core of issue, factors giving rise to the insurgency situation- a deep feeling of alienation from the national mainstream consequent upon long neglect and exploitation, both during and post independence era, resulting in abysmal poverty and backwardness of the region. Secondly, it is viewed that, the problem of insurgency has been aggravated by the growing ethnic unrest among the numerous ethnic tribes of the region. Again, as he has rightly pointed out, the ethnic unrest could be ascribed to the abysmal poverty, sub-human existence of the rural folk and backwardness of the region, more particularly the rural and interior areas, which lack all the basic amenities of a civilized life, apart from basic infrastructures.

Dr. Jayanta Madhab in his "*The Movement of Economic Development*", starts with the premise that, the genesis of most of the North-East insurgencies is either to preserve the unique indigenous identity or the lack of economic development and opportunities for its depressed communities. According to him, of all the movements of the North-East, the Naga issue is a special one. Even before independence, more so after, a section of Nagas made the point that they were never, and never wanted to be, a part of India. So much so that they declared Naga Independence on August, 1947. While independent existence of a small Naga nation- landlocked and with meagre resources is, from an economic viewpoint, unviable, they were ready to fight for their cause. Dr. Madhab further states that, so far as Tripura is concerned, militant groups came up mainly to protect their ethnic identity, when they saw that, influx of refugees from East Bengal, practically made the locals an insignificant part of the total population. In Mizoram, economic neglect by the Assam

Government and untold hardships the people faced during the 1960 famine, in the absence of timely and adequate support from the Government led to the birth of insurgency, with popular support behind. In the case of Assam, it was the illegal migration of Bangladeshis over the years, more particularly since the Partition, that made the local population lose their lands to the immigrants, lack of alternative economic opportunities for a living, ruthless repression of the agitators on the Foreigners' issue by State agencies, deprivation of the indigenous people in the matter of employment, even in petty jobs in central government departments and undertakings- the Railways, Posts & Telegraphs, Accountant General's establishments, coupled with exploitation of the State's Oil, Coal, Tea and Forests etc., treating Assam as a sort of 'enclave economy', that gave birth to the insurgent outfit- the ULFA. The other insurgent groups had their birth for both retaining their distinct ethnic identity as well as in protest against neglect in socio- economic development as equal partners, by the Assam Government and ruling classes. Dr. Jayanta Madhab has rightly observed that, after Partition in 1947, economic dislocation created havoc to the economy of Assam and which till today has not been fully repaired. Till 1950- 51, Assam was a surplus economy, which became a deficit one, with growth rate far below the national average, and even below the growth rate of population after 1980- 81 for a full decade. Therefore, it was natural that, there was a lot of discontent among the people, with their economic condition deteriorating with every passing year. Even now, when the country is growing at a rate of 7- 8 %, Assam is struggling with a 4 % growth rate, with unemployment close to 21 lakh and massive underemployment, which no agency is trying to quantify. But then, insurgency and social upheavals from time to time have cost the economy very heavily. Assam lost about Rs.1255. 37 crores due to bandhs alone during the period 1st. June 1997 to 31st. May 1998, Dr. Madhab laments. A simple calculation will indicate how many thousand crores

the State has lost and thereby the people made poorer by bandhs alone during past three decades, one can simply imagine. While earnest efforts must be made by the Government and the civil society to find an amicable settlement with the insurgents, first bringing them to the discussion table, in an atmosphere free from violence, economic activities with greater thrust have to go simultaneously, with greater thrust on modernization of agriculture and diversification of agricultural practices, by going for high value crops, a big push in the horticulture sector, as also encouraging setting up of industries. There has to be 'good governance' with an efficient delivery mechanism, free from corruption and nepotism, which will create public confidence, and help weaning away the militants.

Dr. Nani G. Mahanta, in his paper "*Politics of Insurgency, Identity and State: Scenario in India*", apart from dealing with the theoretical aspects of insurgency and terrorism, attempts to examine the experience of Kashmir and North-East India. As the Kashmir problem, the issues involved and the stakes on Kashmir are not identical with those of the North Eastern States, it would suffice to surmise here that, the Kashmir problem got aggravated due to political mishandling arising out of short sighted vested interests of the ruling party at the Center, as also a total military approach to find a solution by force, which the Kashmiri Muslims refused to accept. Leaders like Sheikh Abdulla, Farukh Abdulla and many others, who were not questioning the accession of Kashmir to India, but wanted a separate identity for the Kashmiris, and more autonomy, were simply pushed to the wall by the Center, totally ignoring their viewpoints, and thereby the State was practically handed over to the fundamentalists and terrorist groups to handle, with Pakistan fighting a proxy war. "The massive repression policy on the Kashmiri populace (whether militant or civilians) followed by Governor Jagmohan alienated even the common peace-loving citizen from the Indian mainstream. What people needed was a

spark to ignite their reaction 'which was provided by Jagmohan'. "What Jogmohan did in five months, the militants could not achieve in five years". Dr. Mahanta next deals with the case of Assam and the North- East. After interviewing 120 surrendered ULFA militants, Dr. Mahanta finds that the main motivating factors for joining the outfit were: (1) Had nothing to do or unemployment (2) Corruption of the Government machinery (3) Losing the Assamese pride mainly from the influx of illegal migration and the dominance of the non- Assamese in the business sector and the Government sector as expressed by cadres from Tinsukia (4) persuasion by friends in the organization (5) exploitation by the center through step- motherly treatment (6) utilization of the resources of Assam by the center and thus Assam getting nothing from the resources (7) Army and police atrocities during the time of operation Bajrang and Rhino (they wanted to take revenge- when they got the arms they felt terribly empowered). Dr. Mahanta's survey indicate that, about 80 out of 120 SULFA cadres had their training in Myanmar, Bhutan and Bangladesh and that some went to Pakistan and Afghanistan for training. This shows the 'foreign hand' to fish in troubled waters of the Region. He also states that the militias and ethnic groups of the Region also harp on history, memory and are making an attempt to find their roots in the neighbouring countries such as Myanmar, Thailand, China etc., rather than mainstream India, which they believe have been neglecting them in all areas. An excessive centralized State structure that reduces the units, i.e., states into mere dependents more particularly in the economic domain, is also responsible for the present state of insurgency. The attitude of the Indian State in finding a permanent peace formula with the ULFA, for instance, from a position of superior strength, i.e., 'victor and vanquished' by totally subduing the militants is also responsible for the stalemate and the 'holocaust'. He also observes, "in many occasions dialogues are put forward not to solve conflict but to delay it. The reliance of the State on

the basic premise of Kautilyan statecraft, which is based on the ideal of “Sam, Bhav, Danda and Bhed” argue that longer the negotiations, the easier it is to wear down the rebel leaders by partly discrediting them and partly by infusing a sense of complacency amongst the guerrillas”, is not the right approach to solve conflicts in a democratic set-up. Dr. Mahanta also criticizes the ‘tribal to tribal approach of the Indian State as a method of resolving conflict pertaining to the demands of the ethnic communities in the Northeast’, in view of the vast diversities amongst them. Dr. Mahanta finally observes- what India requires is a major change of thrust from State security to people’s security- where people can take care of their basic social-economic and cultural issues democratically. A civil society that recognizes the rights and plurality of other ethnic and minority groups can only strive for peace and progress”.

In his well researched paper- “*Socio-Psychological Factors of Insurgency In North-East India: A Brief Discussion*”, Prof. B. N. Barthakur traces the history of insurgency in the Region, to the Naga Rebellion, launched by the Naga Nationalist Council (NNC) in 1954. Even granting of Statehood in 1963 failed to restore peace and harmony as the extremist Nagas having shelter in the northern Myanmar, could not reconcile to the fact that Nagaland continued to be a part of India. The Shillong Accord of 1975 as well as subsequent 1978 elections in Nagaland failed to bring peace to Nagaland, mainly because of the underground leaders staying abroad who had their own axes to grind- Phizo based in London and the pro- Peking General Secretary of NNC, Muivah in Myanmar, Bangkok etc. The NSCN was formed in 1980 due to internal differences among the NNC leaders, which also later broke up into two factions, NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K), with whom presently peace initiatives are on. The Naga rebellion was followed by insurgent activities in Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram and Assam- each with different historical perspectives, but all focused on certain common grounds as well.

Dr. Barthakur diagnoses the following factors leading to insurgency- crisis of identity, economic exploitation, inadequate development of communication, abject poverty, unemployment of the youth, bureaucratic corruption, psychological alienation from the mainstream and influence of foreign power. Prof. Barthakur's final observation, which, we also agree with, is reproduced. "It may be mentioned here that no one in earth is born as an insurgent. It is the situation which tempts one to become an insurgent. ..It is very easy to deploy para- military forces and army personnel to combat insurgency but armed action is not the only solution. The basic task on the part of the authority is to infuse confidence in the hearts and minds of the people and that their ethnic and cultural identity would be protected and effective steps would be taken for their economic development. In order to solve the problem of insurgency in this sensitive region of the country, constitutional safeguards for protection of ethnic and cultural identity of the people, if necessary are to be provided. As such, the country today needs leadership with political will for solution of the age- old problems of the North-East as well as the country."

Dr. Archana Upadhyay has contributed her paper titled "*Terrorism in Context: Debating the logic of Terrorism*". In her own language, the paper attempts to understand the logic of terrorism by identifying both the non- psychological and psychological instrumental bases of terrorist actions. In her opinion, the cost benefit calculation is central to the decision to use terrorist methods. Terrorism is both defensive as well as opportunistic. Dr. Upadhyay is of the view that anti-terrorist policies ought to be tailored to challenge the specific group, which must be understood in its historical, cultural and political context, as terrorism differs in their structure and dynamics".

Nitin Gokhale, in his paper "*Insurgency In the North-East*" goes into the history of Insurgency in the region, starting with the Naga rebellion launched in 1954 under A. Z. Phizo, and traces

the reasons for insurgency in each of the affected states. He criticizes the general perception of the North Eastern states as a single entity, by clubbing them together and trying to find a common solution to their peculiar problems. "The problems are peculiar to each state, their strengths and weaknesses vary and yet, right from the MHA down to every two-penny scholar clubs us into one convenient zone". Isolation of the North-East, as also failure of leadership and the lack of initiative of its own people are also responsible for the [present state of affairs, Gokhale states. "For years a section of the leadership and the educated elite among North Eastern states, have become willing partners with the 'exploiter' class from Delhi and other parts of India. And this process began not today but almost three decades ago. If Jawaharlal Nehru was the over-sentimental benevolent dictator, bestowing largesse on the 'simple tribal folks', his daughter Indira Gandhi initiated and then perfected the art of buying over the North-East." He then illustrates on Nehru's over-generosity in the early sixties, quoting from what former Governor of Assam and Nehru's cousin BK Nehru told him. AZ Phizo had just launched the insurrection in the Naga Hills in the then composite Assam, with the Naga National Council demanding more autonomy to the area. As BK Nehru told Gokhale in 1990, "Jawaharlal had this sentimental thing about the North-East tribals. When the Nagas were just demanding an autonomous district, he gave them a whole state and that really opened the Pandora's Box". The point to note is, observes Gokhale, Nehru's decision in 1963 opened the floodgates for similar demands from different parts of the North-East. The formation of Mizoram and Meghalaya was direct result of creation of Nagaland. And today, the demands for a separate Bodoland, Rabhaland, Missingland and Karbiland (Dimacha land also) stem from that 40-year old decision. Then Gokhale mentions 'Neglect' of the Region, large scale misuse of central funds widening the gap between the 'haves' and 'have not's'

leading to frustration amongst the youngsters as other causes of insurgency. Gokhale concludes with his prescription:-(1) Evolve a self- help pattern (2) Ensure that central aid trickles down to the grassroots (3) Disenfranchise illegal migrants; issue work permits if necessary. (4) Change the people's mindset from seeing themselves as victims of a conspiracy theory. (5) Act as one entity when it comes to development and economic issues. He has left the lead to the young generation from within the Region, who will have to take up the lost cause and bring the North east out of its current mess.

Then we have a nice article from Sunil Nath, a SULFA leader, titled "*Failed States And Successful Insurgents*". He has extensively dealt with different aspects of State, Sovereignty and Governance citing the Westphalian, Weberian and Marxist models both in theory and practice, and then states the position of failed States, where insurgencies become common phenomena. His observations are reproduced- "Wherever and whenever the State loses confidence of the Civil Society and forfeits legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, insurgency has a field day. If the insurgent leadership is clever enough to exploit the situation, it becomes the alternative State, albeit gradually." Poverty and ever-growing unemployment, with stagnating economy, which are also symptoms of failed States, Nath believes have also led to sustained insurgencies across the world from Columbia in South America, quite a few States of Southern Africa and closer home, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Burma. Poor governance, rampant corruption, inequitable distribution of wealth, regional disparities in income and economic development, military approach to issues like the Assam Agitation on Foreigners' issue perceiving the Assamese people's fear of becoming minority in their own land as separatism followed by brute repression by Indira Gandhi's Government, thereby giving birth to secessionist sentiments, the continued slide down of the per capita income of the state till now-all are symptoms of a failed State- the Indian set-up and of

the failed state-the state Government of Assam. He comes to the conclusion that the chronic insurgency in the north-east is, besides other factors, a product of withering governance and the predominantly military approach to counter-insurgency. Quoting Romain Rolland, “where injustice is the order, disorder is the beginning of justice” Nath beautifully gives his prescription to end the present malaise. “The State has to be efficient and has to retain peace in the Civil Society. Efficient despotism or benevolent inefficiency cannot retain peace. When the State becomes inefficient yet despotic, insurgency becomes people’s revolution. The ultimate panacea for insurgent violence is a just and efficient State.”

In his “*Psychology of Terrorism*”, Dr. Bijoy Prasad Bora, goes into the various psychological factors, which contribute to the development of certain mindsets leading to collective frustration, turning some people under certain given situations, into insurgents or terrorists. According to Dr. Bora, it is very difficult to attribute the psychology of terrorism as behavioural disorder or anti-social activities. The sentimental issues, fear of identity crisis, emotional hyper reaction are some contributory factors in causing terrorism. How to prevent the psychological outburst should be studied by sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists and other agencies in cooperation with the Government. The causes of terrorism must be studied scientifically and the grievances must be addressed sincerely, states Dr. Bora. He further advises-in counter insurgency; the reprisal method, false encounter by killing innocent people, torturing the people and sexual harassment to women must be checked by the authority concerned. Ms. Sonia Pereira Deuri writes on “*Psychological Perspectives: Effects of Insurgency On Children And Women*” - an area mostly not taken adequate note of, either by the authorities or the society, let alone the insurgents as well as the security forces. Insurgency manifests itself as a revolt against the society involving violence, threats, killings,

homicide, suicide, detention, extortion, drug- trafficking, rape, malfeasance and no doubt counter insurgency measures. It brings together its by- products namely, widowhood, fatherless children, orphans, single parent families, rape victims etc. The general transition towards a nuclear society itself aggravates matters for women and children in an insurgency prone area. Ms. Deuri suggests a number of interventional strategies for minimizing the psychological trauma of the victims, including psychological response to the trauma, psychological first- aid training, counseling, psychotherapy etc. In his paper "*Insurgency- Whether Thought And Fancy Or Reality- A Sociological Outlook*", Dr. Jyoti Prasad Saikia concludes that insurgency is still in the form of either a dream or an imagination or a fancy of a section of people particularly in Assam. Youths' frustration, he feels is the prime cause of insurgency. Dr. Amiya Kr. Samanta, in his "*Insurgency And Good Governance: Experience In The North-East*" suggests that, in order to find a long- term solution to the insurgency problem in Assam, the dialogue with ULFA may start without any preconditions, as done with the NSCN. He opines that, once it starts, the dynamism of the process will find ways and means to move from issue to issue, without being hindered by any conditionality. Dr. R. C. Borpatra Gohain, in "*Insurgency: Law & Order Problem Of Efficient Governance*", holds the view that, in the North Eastern region, the struggle of the insurgent groups is basically aimed at the cultural and political autonomy, where violence becomes the only weapon for both the hegemonic and counter- hegemonic actors. Initially posing as a mere law and order problem, insurgency soon turns into a problem of public disorder of a grave nature through acts of violence as well as counter-violence, both of which affect human rights very adversely. The disorders again directly hit at the root of economic development of the region, leading to more of poverty, backwardness and unemployment, which incidentally were also factors leading to insurgency. Speedy economic development

and generation of employment avenues for the youth are the key to solving the insurgency problem, holds Dr. Barpatra Gohain. The paper "*Human Rights In The Era of Insurgency: The North-East Profile*", written by Sabyasachi Mahanta extensively deals with the concept of Human Rights, concept of Terrorism/Insurgency, linkage of 'Self Determination, Human Rights and Insurgency', violation of human rights by both the insurgent groups as well as the State machinery by misusing the 'Black Laws'. He emphasizes on imparting of Human Rights Education to all concerned, and more positive and pro- active roles from Human Rights Enforcement Agencies, the media, NGOs and of course the State.

Mrs. Rekha Borthakur gives her recommendations for combating terrorism, highlighting the "*Role of confidence building measures (CBMs), in checking cross- border terrorism*", more particularly to handle proxy war by Pakistan in Jammu & Kashmir through Kashmiri militant and Jihadi groups, by committing acts of terror in different places of India. She has grouped the CBMs under different heads- Military, Non-Military, Political, Social & Cultural. Mrs. Borthakur also discusses on the role of Civil Society- citizen based movements, NGOs, religious groups, academic institutions and corporate sector in conflict resolutions.

Shri H. N. Das gives interesting details on the economic cost of insurgency/terrorism, in his "*Economic Consequences of Insurgency In Assam*". Giving an outline on the insurgency scenario, he informs that, ULFA's annual expenditure for running the organization alone seems to exceed Rs. 30 Crores. The actual expenditure, Das feels, should be several times more because hundreds of crores of rupees are required for procurement of arms and ammunitions. Till November 1990 the ULFA extorted more than Rs. 400 crores, Das states, quoting from the report of the then Governor of Assam, Devi Das Thakur. What could be

the total amount collect by ULFA by way of extortion / Donation / Protection money during the post- 1990 period, one might simply imagine- the figure could be several thousand crores. The actual burden has fallen on the common man through artificial rise in prices by the business community, falling in the extortion net of ULFA. Then, business activities got shifted from Assam to Siliguri, thereby creating a booming business hub there, at the cost of Assam. Mrs. Uttara Phukan views 'Economic constraints as factors responsible for the emergence of Insurgency in Assam', which she derives from a case study of ULFA. According to Mrs. Phukan, the threat to identity posed by unchecked influx of illegal migrants together with their extremely high rate of birth, and economic backwardness leading to abject poverty are the major causes of ULFA insurgency. Amongst other measures, she has recommended promotion of bilateral and multilateral trade and investment with Bangladesh, Myanmar and China for improvement of investment in the state. She also makes a very important recommendation- to constitute a Special Census Commission to identify all illegal migrants.

Dr. Pranab Sandilya, in his "*Insurgency: As An Impediment To Economic Development*" also practically airs the views of H.N Das and emphasizes that, New Delhi has a very important role to play to ensure peace in the entire North East in the near future. The impression carried by the insurgent groups, which many people of the region also believe, that the Indian state is a colonizer, who have made victims of the local population through exploitation of their resources, without caring to give their due share by way of re-investment, has to be dispelled by the Center. Historically , culturally, as well as geographically most people of the Hill areas and many from the Brahmaputra valley have similarities to a certain degree, with the people of China, Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand etc., and have shown their willingness to exchange trade and cultural ties. This should be

encouraged under the Look East Policy, build up the Indian portion of the Stillwell road and even assist Myanmar in completing their portion, which would act as real catalysts for development of the Region. In our view, the myopic view of suspicion on the people of region going away from Indian control needs to be replaced by a broader perspective, which would bring them closer to the Indian mainstream. Similarly, the Asian Highway Project running from Singapore to Istanbul via India and Myanmar should be pursued for speedy implementation. Mrs. Sangita Hazarika Bhagawati has also extensively discussed about the economic impact of insurgency and possible solutions, in her elaborate paper "*Insurgency- A hindrance To Economic Development of North Eastern Region (NER)*". She has highlighted the adverse effects of insurgency on diversion of funds from development to law and order expenditures, administrative efficiency, social stability, pruning of employment avenues due to flight of capital from the region and absence of private investment from outside, tourism industry, political instability, and ever growing corruption and extortion, loss due to sabotage activities in the oil sector, sense of insecurity causing loss to mobile theatres, demoralization of tea sector etc. Amongst remedial measures suggested, she feels that, there should be more public awareness programmes to focus attention on various issues and aspects contributing to the growth and proliferation of insurgency and violence. Secondly, the media should exercise restraint in giving undue coverage to the views and activities of insurgent outfits. Thirdly, the public should come forward to refuse to accept any demand of any insurgent group. Fourthly, the Government should examine the genuineness of demand of the insurgents, who should also have a 'give and take' attitude. Fifthly, the economic development of all the areas and basic needs of the people have to be met by the Government, and adequate employment opportunities created for the youth. In the write-up

*"Initiation of Development Efforts Sounds The Death knell of Insurgency"*, Dr. PC Kalita and Mr. B. Mohan discuss in similar veins and have built up a strong case for removing the imbalances in human resources and economic development of the Region vis-a-vis main India. They have recommended time bound development in extending and improving rail transport, river transportation system, modernizing agriculture sector, flood management, employment of youth of the region in Central government establishments on preferential basis, and above all people friendly good governance, devoid of corruption and vested political interests.

The recommendations mentioned above are based on ground realities of the problem and as such these would definitely help in tackling the insurgency problem in a lasting manner. Over and above these recommendations, it would be absolutely necessary to exercise restraint from both sides- the ULFA and the Security forces, so that in their fights against each other, the common man, whosoever he or she may be, does not fall a victim. All terrorist acts like bomb blasts, grenade lobbing, kidnapping, extortion, threats etc. should be immediately stopped by the militant group, in order to create a congenial atmosphere for peace, to be followed by dialogues. The Center must restrain the Security forces, so that innocents are not harassed, humiliated, tortured or killed- and human rights violations do not take place, in the course of counter-insurgency operation, as in the past. The Center should also devise ways and means to bring the ULFA to the negotiation table, without dissipating men, money, energy and other resources with the resolve to finish ULFA. This type of hegemonist attitude is unlikely to succeed, if we go by the past experience of counter insurgency operations in the Region. There must not be any move for politicization by any political party or organization, while trying to find a realistic, practical and acceptable solution to the problem. The basic motivating

factors like unemployment, under development, security of food/housing/health care/education etc. have to be addressed under short, medium and long term basis. Mere long-term remedies are not good enough, as “in the long run we all are dead”, as J.M. Keynes commented.

**Jyoti Prasad Rajkhowa, IAS**

*Ex-chief Secretary*

*Govt. of Assam*