


KNOWABLE AND THE SAYABLE



By

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SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT
OF THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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In habit and character, Aditya Kumar Mohanty is a fit and proper person for the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY (in Philosophy).


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to dedicate this work to 'Him,' the eternal witness of all that we think and do, the real agent of all that we achieve, the dispenser of all that we cherish, the beacon light in all my life's endeavour.

I fail to find words to express my deep sense of indebtedness to Dr. N. Malla, my friend, Philosopher and guide, but for whose protective care, dogged attention on my movements, the well meaning admonitions, sustained interest, the work, perhaps, would not have seen the light of day.

I take this opportunity to express my gratitude to all my teachers in the Department for their genial and encouraging gestures.

I remain grateful to 'Mami,' who has been my unflinching and ungrudging companion during moments of despair and dejection and has helped me in taking dictations and preparing the manuscript. It is needless to state here my debt to my parents which would remain ever unpaid for their silent sacrifices but for which I would not have been what I am today and to my family members who courted suffering and negligence on account of my academic pre-occupations and prolonged absence.

As this work has been completed during the tenure of my study leave the positive and cordial gesture of the Education and Youth Services Department, Government of Orissa, is gratefully acknowledged.

My thanks are due to Mr. Thomas who typed the rough draft and Mr Joseph F. Khongbuh for his efficiency and unusual sense of identification in typing out the dissertation.

DATE 20-12-1984

Aditya Kumar Mohanty
ADITYA KUMAR MOHANTY

CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

'Knowledge' in the paradigmatic sense is a prerogative of the human species despite the fact that the term is found to have application in case of non-humans. We very often say 'The dog knows his master well,' 'The elephant in the circus knows how to greet and worship with its trunk and forelegs.' But for some logical considerations the awareness on the part of the dog or the elephant and for that matter on the part of the non-humans do not qualify to be 'knowledge' proper.

The term 'to know' has had varied uses, such as (S₁)* I know Mr X (knowing in the sense of acquaintance) (S₂) I know swimming (knowing how i.e. to be in possession of some ability or skill) (S₃) I know that water freezes at 0° centigrade (knowing that - the propositional knowledge). Prima facie, the dog can be understood to be knowing in the sense of S₁ though a closer view would reveal a world of difference between the dog's knowing of his master and my knowing of Mr X. In case of the former knowledge consists in the mere capacity to recognise or identify a person or a thing on the basis of sameness or similarities in physiological features. If the master would put on a mask, walk in a changed gait and talk in a changed voice the dog probably would mistake him to be a stranger and behave as appropriately as it would to a stranger. Thus the dog is seen to be in possession of a kind of elementary

*S¹ = sense one

awareness in terms of physicalities accompanied by certain conditioned and therefore predictable behavioural responses or peculiarities. But my knowing of Mr X may vary from my mere capacity to recognise him as and when we meet each other to my knowledge about the place he hails from, the family he comes off, the station he is placed in, his attitudes and aptitudes and innumerable other facts about him. In other words, knowing Mr X might amount to knowing certain propositions about Mr X that are true. That I know Mr X can be disputed and may turn out to be false when my propositional claims are proved to be false. So knowing in the sense of S_1 is in a sense parasitic upon S_3 . Similarly the elephant's knowledge about the art of greeting and worshipping is vastly different from knowing in S_3 (i.e. in the sense of knowing how). The movement of trunk and legs, in case of the elephant, is conditioned to certain external stimuli or circumstantial peculiarities so that it acts on instinctive or habitual reaction to the signals of the coach. But greeting in human context connotes much more than mere raising of hands or articulation of certain sounds. It calls for so many other accompanying conditions, behavioural and non-behavioural, to entitle one to say that one is greeting somebody. Greeting becomes meaningful only in a framework of human relationship defined by certain values. Knowing the art of greeting implies one's knowledge

as to the 'where,' 'when' (The context) and the 'how' of greeting. Apart from the physical gestures such as raising or shaking of hands, utterance of the greeting expressions such as 'Hallo, 'good morning' or 'Namaste' is supposed to betray a sense of warmth and cordiality. 'To use a language is to enter into a mode of life.' The elephant somehow manages to display the 'how' of it and with the absence of the other attendant semantic conditions the elephant cannot be said to have knowledge in the sense of S_3 . Hence the use of the expression in non-human context appears to be semantically loose. Moreover, in knowing how (in the process of learning a skill) use of language, at times, proves expedient and indispensable so that it can also be passed unto others, improved and deliberated upon. This is what has led man to develop a science for each art. The above accounts tend to indicate that all cases of knowing are, at the core; propositional.

Knowing a proposition (in S_3) on my part entails that I know P to be the case, that is, I know p to be true. Conversely, to say that 'I know P and it is not true' is self-stultifying a claim. Hence what constitutes a part of knowing a proposition is knowing it to be true. 'Knowing' is different from 'Believing' for one can, without inconsistency, say that 'one believes P and it may not be true.' A belief, duly verified gets the status of knowledge. The distinction between

Knowledge and Belief can be shown to be both of degree and kind. Knowing 'P' is inclusive of believing p, i.e. to say that 'I know P' also has the necessary suggestion that 'I believe p to be true' but not vice versa. Knowledge, moreover, has a degree of objectivity which a belief lacks. To make a knowledge claim is, in other words, to make a truth claim which is nothing but a claim to objectivity. This however, need not coerce one to think that making a knowledge claim does not mean that it can never be falsified. Rather the growth of human knowledge has been possible only by negating, altering and improving a given body of knowledge. But what is essential is that making a knowledge claim implies an ability on the part of the claimant to advance reasons or provide evidence in favour of the validation of the claim. One can, therefore, well visualise a possibility where a proposition is true, and one believes it to be true but one does not know it to be true. For example, it might actually be the case that there are human habitations on planets other than the Earth or that 'the soul continues to be in a disembodied state after the dissolution of the physical frame' and people believe them to be so but in the absence of any corroborative evidence they cannot, with all competence, be said to have known those truths. To sum up, to know P is to know P to be the case and to know P to be the case is to be in a position to state the authenticating procedure in absence of which such claims would at best remain as

belief claims and even if they are found to be verified on subsequent occasion the status of these claims, in retrospect, would be those of lucky guesses. To take one more example; ~~He~~ a child in course of playing with a pencil might make some marks at random which resemble that of the alphabet 'A' he, on that account cannot be said to have knowledge of the alphabet. For knowing something must stand the test of knowing it. Thus knowing something connotes (a) knowing it to be true (b) believing it to be the case (c) competence to provide reason or evidence for its authentication.

Let us now examine the genesis of knowledge, knowledge minimally entails a state of awareness on the part of a conscious being. Awareness of something, again presupposes the receptivity of sense organs (In case of external perception) and that of mind (In case of internal perceptions). Knowledge of the external world is possible on account of an effective interaction between sense organs and the objects of perception and of the internal states by reflection or inward perception of the mind. But the centrality of the mind in all perceptions internal or external has been elaborated by philosophers from time to time. Kanād, in Vaisesika Sutra dilates upon the indispensability and atomicity of mind, even in cases of external perception. The different sense organs such as the eyes, the ears etc. are only the gateways allowing

the external stimuli to act upon the percipient. Over and above this, what is still essential is that the mind must also be associated with the attending organ. Sometimes, it so happens that there are a plethora of stimuli impinging upon the different sense organs simultaneously. But mind being atomic or unitary can get itself associated only with one particular sense organ at a point of time. As a result, the stimuli affecting the other sense organs remain unperceived. For example, if one is engrossed in study, he becomes oblivious to the external disturbances, even does not hear the loud noise of the crackers or orchestra and for that matter remains indifferent to all other stimuli. Thus, even in the mere act of receiving the sense impression the role of mind is indispensable.

Knowledge being a finished product of the epistemic process any cognitive content can be shown to have two distinguishable aspects, namely, the sense content and the act of conceptualization involving the interpretation of the sense content. Kant ascribes the dual function to two distinct faculties i.e. to sensibility and understanding respectively. 'Knowing' as a process is initiated by the sensibility (the receptive faculty) but would remain incomplete without the synthetic function of the understanding which acts upon the discrete and chaotic data and converts them to knowledge proper.

Through the minor details and subtleties in the Kantian analysis what stands out conspicuously is that any case of knowledge has got to assume the indispensability of sensation and intellection what the sense organs provide are mere percepts which without being categorised, or interpreted in terms of concepts and judgements are but a medley; as meaningful and as meaningless as they are to the animals and newly born babes. Against this, the empiricists and the rationalists, at dispute, can be seen to be betraying their respective metaphysical bias, ^{as to} ~~in~~ the ultimacy and the absolute role of sense experience and reason respectively. Kant sought to make them see the truth by appreciating the relative role of sense experience and reason. The remark 'understanding maketh nature out of the materials it does not make' is highly consequential for the empiricist-rationalist controversy.

In view of the fallibility of sense organs and the facts of perceptual errors one might pertinently question the legitimacy of sense perception in the structure of knowledge and more so, when verification is taken as the parameter in methods of validation of knowledge claims. The errors in perception may accrue either due to the defect in organs of perception or in conditions of observation or on account of mistaken ~~in~~ interpretation of the sense content. Whatever might be the reasons that the errors are due to; that the sense organs go wrong or that the perception is proved to be erroneous pre-

supposes that there are paradigm cases of veridical perception against which the errors are delimited. The errors in perception are made good only by further corrective sense perception. As the realists advocate the mind-object dichotomy and the independent existence of the latter over the former, knowledge becomes a case of the mind confirming to the nature of the object and errors ensure when ideas constituting knowledge do not correspond with the objective states of affairs. The idealists, on the other hand, finding there to be no logical warrant to postulate an external world over and above ideas or experiences; construe ideas or universals to be the sole contents of knowledge and account for knowledge or truth as standing the test of coherence and error in terms of non-coherence. Knowledge being organic, a proposition becomes true to the extent it coheres with the whole and false to the extent it does not. Thus, they admit degrees of truth and error. The phenomenologists go a step ahead in philosophical precision. According to them, what is perceived by the sense organs are mere sense-data. The problems of error arises only when one applies categories or concepts to interpret them. If one could restrict oneself to the description of mere sense data one could thereby avoid the very possibility of error. Instead of saying that 'there is a table' one should prefer saying 'I am having tablish (table like) sensation.' The

pragmatists, on the contrary, propound that knowledge has an instrumental value and therefore is relative to human purposes or ends. Truth and falsity do not signify the stagnant properties of judgements. They rather are the values to be attached to proposition depending on their workability in a given context.

Let us now turn to 'Reason' as a source of knowledge. The capacity to reason out, is perhaps the unique endowment of man which has enabled him to score over the other co-primates and conquer the forces of nature. In the evolutionary hierarchy because of certain functions that do not strictly come under the purview of sense experience man is said to have a distinct faculty called 'Reason.' The knowledge in Mathematics and logic are arrived at by methods of formal reasoning without any appeal to facts. Geometry is an ideal case where the deductive reasoning is employed. One begins with certain self-evident axioms (true in the given framework) and proceeds with the principles of deduction to arrive at results that are universally binding. The natural sciences use inductive reasoning for description, explanation and prediction of natural phenomena. The scientist beginning with the discovery of the causal uniformities, makes a leap to the unknown by making unrestricted generalisations. It enables him to transcend the particularities and find a pattern in an apparently

disorderly universe. The precise mapping of the course of planetary movements, the remote control over the space crafts, the test-tube baby, the robots bear eloquent testimonies to the fact that Reality obeys a rational order.

"Nature writes in the hands of mathematics" observes Newton. Hegel remarks 'Real is rational.' The laws that govern the process of reasoning are also the ways nature operates. Therefore, reason remains an effective way of discovering the secrets of nature and thereby establishes supremacy over her— 'knowledge is power.'

On the other hand the mystics, theologians, and the anti-intellectualists in philosophy cast suspicion about the appropriateness of sensation and intellection in obtaining the highest knowledge or the knowledge of the Absolute. The highest knowledge dawns upon man only through intuitive flashes. Intuition is understood as a state of immediate awareness involving the totality of one's being. It is a sort of total awareness where the distinction between the knower, known and the knowledge cease to exist and this being so the cognitive content thereof, defies all attempts at verbal articulation. In fact, the claim of intuitive awareness to knowledge raises a storm of controversy. However, what is normally called it to question is not so much the fact of a state of awareness, called intuition, as its very claim to knowledge. Mere having of an experience does not make it true. In case

of intuition one does not know how to go about it in settling its truth claim. In absence of a validating procedure one fails to distinguish between a genuine and a pseudo claim and the difficulty becomes all the more inseparable in view of the conflicting truth claims. One knows not how to adjudicate or resolve the incompatibilities. Even if some cases of intuitive foretelling turns to be true without any criterion of authentication it can hardly be counted as 'Knowledge' proper and be dismissed as a chance coincidence. But the above objections against the intuitionists do not seem to hold water. The discussions pertaining to this controversy is deferred, for the sake of clarity and coherence, to subsequent chapters.

The avowed positivists as well as the philosophers with subterranean positivistic bias do uphold that whatever is, can be known, at least, in principle. The frontier of knowledge is ever widening. Hence, for anything, howsoever, subtle or otherwise inaccessible it might be with reference to the given modes of knowing there can be nothing in it which would make it unknowable, in principle. But the Upanisadic thinkers the syādvādins, and the anti-intellectualists like Bradley, Bergson, demonstrate to the contrary the inherent inadequacy of the categorial mode of knowing.

This takes one further to the problem of communicability. For the philosophers with positivistic leaning 'Knowledge' and 'Experience' are semantic concepts. To know is to apply categories, that is, to use language. Since everything, that is the case, is knowable is also communicable. It is worth noting that experience for them means sense experience and knowledge for them connotes knowledge through sense experience or intellection. But, this can be shown to be an illicit assumption on the part of the philosophers with their characteristic empirical bias. In fact, 'experience' has much wider a domain, a part of which falls within the purview of the 'sayable.' There are alternative modes and levels of experience. In certain cases, (as we shall subsequently discuss) owing to the incompatibilities in the very nature of the experiential content and the means of communication ~~that~~ the former defies the scope of the latter. That they are not so, do not, on that score, make them less meaningful. The non-positivists, while questioning the viability of language to express the highest knowledge do enlighten us about the alternative modes of knowing.

So to define the knowable in terms of the sayable would commit oneself to a categorial confusion and ^{to} seek to describe the 'Indescribable' is to harvest non-sense.

CHAPTER - II

THE KNOWABLE


In continuation of the preceding discussion about 'what is knowledge?' it is worth while to cogitate upon 'what can one know?' This will not only help acquainting us with the varied modes of knowing but afford a vantage perspective to chalk out the domain of the 'knowable.'

The query 'what can one know?' for a definitive answer, awaits discussions on 'what is knowledge?' and 'how does one know?' i.e. on nature and the genesis of knowledge. The analysis in the previous section goes to show that 'knowledge,' in the paradigmatic sense implies that (a) it must be true and (b) it must be amenable to authentication. The latter imparts 'knowledge' its objective or inter-personal character. If something is claimed to be the case, thus amounting to knowledge it must leave scope for others to be in a position to concede that it is so. That is how 'knowledge' comes to possess objectivity being distinct from 'belief,' 'opinion' etc. 'Truth' and 'objectivity' together are the sine-qua-non of knowledge and keeping this in view one can attempt to assess the relative viability of the various ways that, supposedly, give rise to knowledge.

In Indian philosophy one finds reference to the six ways of knowing namely; Pratyaksa (perception), Anumāna

(Inference), Sabda (Testimony), Upamāna (comparison), Anupalabdhi (non-perception) and Arthāpatti (postulation). In western philosophy one comes across discussions about Experience, Reasoning, Intuition, Authority and Revelation, ~~and~~ though, the tendency by and large is to question the validity of the latter three (Intuition, Authority and Revelation) as the possible sources of knowledge. It should here be stressed that the different sources of knowledge, on analysis, turn to be but different forms of justification of knowledge. For example, the perception or experience that yields me the cognition that 'It is a rose,' also justifies my claim that it is a rose. That 'it is a rose' is true for I perceive it to be so. But one could still persist to question the validity or justifiability of the various sources by considering whether and to what extent they yield 'knowledge' in the aforesaid sense of the term.

'Authority' as a source of knowledge corresponds to Sabda (verbal testimony) in Indian philosophical systems. It refers to the knowledge obtained from the sayings or writings of persons with undisputable expertise on the subject concerned. In fact, much of what we claim to have known has been handed down to us through generations. It is of the form 'I know something to be the case because Mr. X, supposed to have an expertise on the subject', says it to be so. Moreover in



view of the short span of human life it is neither possible nor desirable to start afresh by verifying the age old truths by oneself. To know is not the privilege or monopoly of the few. We all share from the common stock of knowledge enriched constantly by the contribution of individuals or groups. But, this need not make us say that a person considered to be an authority with reference to a particular subject and given time would also prove infallible in other subject or in the light of developments in subsequent time. Even in the same field the experts disagree, refutations are made. Theories prove inadequate and are changed and modified to accommodate more facts or informations. But in settling the conflicting claims of the authorities one has to appeal to the relevant facts, or observations. Moreover, if one had for some reasons, any suspicion about the veracity of the claims made by an authority one could also verify them by oneself. After all the knowledge bequeathed to us must have been tested at some point of time by some one or other and have withstood the tests of repeated experiences. All these go to prove that the validity of 'Authority' or verbal testimony is parasitic on experiential or perceptual corroboration.

'Revelation' is indicative of the mode of knowing where the knower works as a medium, as it were, to receive the knowledge from some extra human or non-perceptible agent and transmits them to the lesser mortals. Mohammed claims himself to be the messenger of God on Earth. The statement

that 'God is one and that the existent beings are but His offsprings' is just not an ethical injunction to inspire men to lead a harmonious and integrated life but a state descriptive of the truth; ultimate. The veracity of the claim can be ascertained by its workability in practice, (thus verifying it pragmatically) and also by elevating oneself to a state where one gets the realisation that different things and beings are but the varied expressions of the supreme reality, God. The great seers do only endeavour to make these truths, revealed to them in moments of exaltation; operative. Thus the validity of such knowledge consists in their relevance to concrete human affairs and its verifiability, through extra-ordinary perception. That is how, the revelatory knowledge remains distinguishable from the subjective outpouring of an abnormal mind or the wilful concoctions of a self-styled impostor.

Upamāna (comparison) as an independent source of knowledge (pramāna) is acknowledged only in the Nyāya and the Mimāsa. To mention the oft quoted example - A person having had the verbal knowledge that the Gavaya (wild cow) resembles the ordinary cow, goes to forest and encounters an animal resembling a cow and claims 'It is a gavaya.' The knowledge so obtained is said to be accruing due to comparison. This, therefore consists in finding an intelligible relation between a description and the denotation satisfying the description. The Mimāsakas on the other hand, contend

that knowledge through upamāna consists in discovering the similarities between the perceived and the remembered objects. By seeing the gavaya in the forest one comes to get the knowledge that a Gavaya is very much similar to the ordinary cow. What is contested here is not the genuineness of knowledge obtained through upamāna but its validity as an independent source of knowledge. The Buddhists reduce it to perception and testimony, the samkhyāites treat it as a form of Inference and the 'Jaina thinkers treat it as recognition. Despite the differences in interpretation it remains indisputable that the objects compared are as much perceived as the characteristics that constitute the ground of comparison.

The Mimāsakas admit Anupalabdhi (Non-perception) and Arthāpatti (postulate) as non-perceptual sources of knowledge, Non-perception is defined as a mode of immediate cognition whereby one comes to know the non-existence of something. For instance, I come to know the non-existence of a book on the self by the non-perception of it. It cannot be treated as perception because 'non-existence', being a negative fact cannot stimulate the sense organs which according to them is the basic pre-requisite in perception. It is, therefore, not the perception of non-existence but non-perception of the existence of the book that makes us say that the book is not in the self. But one fails to understand the very rationale in

treating non-perception as a non-perceptual mode of knowledge for both the existence and non-existence of the book is determined by the same kind of perception. A man without the capacity to see or feel could neither claim the existence nor the non-existence of a book in the self. Hence, Non-perception could, with all appropriateness, be defined as a kind of perception wherein the absence of the requisite cognitions entitles one to claim the non-existence of something.

"Postulation is the necessary supposition of an unperceived fact which alone can explain a phenomenon that demands explanation." (1)

Usually a phenomenon is explained in terms of another phenomenon or a group of phenomena which are equally palpable. But at times an adequate understanding or knowledge of a phenomenon or incompatibilities in the perceived phenomena lead us to postulate or assume certain things to be the case, even though that are not perceived to be the case. Such postulations are made as a matter of causal and logical necessity for without them the putative facts remain unexplained and unintelligible. The popular example is - 'If a man is found to grow fat, even though he is seen to fast for the whole day, in the face of the apparent incongruity one is led to postulate that 'He must be taking food in the night.' The scientist also is led to postulate the hypothetical entities like quarks, anti-matter etc. to explain the otherwise inexplicable behaviour of the sub-atomic particles. Arthāpatti

has the semblance of the hypothesis except that a hypothesis being tentative in character is liable to modification and sublation in the light of experience whereas Arthāpatti being the only explanatory principle yields knowledge in the true sense of the term. To know the fact also amounts to knowing the ground of its explanation. But the fact remains that in testing the validity of the postulate one has to fall back upon experience. Its validity for example can be determined on the strength of its explanatory adequacy or if possible by verification. In the above example, one could, if so desired, keep vigil at night to verify if the man takes food at night. Similarly, though the 'quark' is construed to be hypothetical in relation to existing state of scientific progress, in context of subsequent advancement it might be brought under the scope of observational corroboration as it has happened with many other postulates.

'Knowledge' through reasoning is Inferential in nature. An inference can be Deductive, Inductive or Deduction-Inductive. The formal sciences like logic and mathematics employ deductive mode of reasoning. In deductive inference, the conclusion is entailed by the premises which are self-evidently true or assumed to be true. Given the premises and the set of well defined operational symbols and rules of deduction the conclusion necessarily follows. Such knowledge being necessarily and universally true is said to be a priori. Philosophers account

for their a priori character by showing that they are fact-neutral i.e. they are bereft of factual content and are expressive of the logical relationship between the premises or axioms on the one hand and conclusions or theorems on the other. Even conceding to the fact that the truths arrived at by the process of deduction are not fact dependent they are not as divorced from facts as they have come to be construed. How do the basic concepts and symbols get their meaning or significance? If there were no multiplicities, what meaning could we attach to the ordinals. The expression ' $2 + 2 = 4$ ' apart from conveying relation of equivalence between ' $2 + 2$ ' and '4' can also be paraphrased into a statement about the empirical reality such as 'two things added to two things (provided that the things added retain their identity) make four.' In fact, the scientific predictions involving the sophisticated process of calculation and reasoning come to hold true of reality. In order to attain proficiency in the art of reasoning we very often, engage ourselves in abstract operations having no immediate bearing on matters of fact. But the fact remains that 'Reasoning' gets its significance because of the world of facts and proves instrumental in understanding it. As the reality exhibits a rational order it makes itself amenable to study through reasoning. Thus we notice that reasoning, despite its avowed claims to be a distinct and independent source of knowledge is parasitic on the world of facts or experiences in an indirect way.

'Knowledge' in Natural Sciences is got through Induction. The observation of certain features in the world leads the scientist to make generalisation in form of hypothesis the validity of which is tested by its explanatory adequacy. It consists in taking a leap from particular to general, observed to the unobserved generalising the causal relation (discovered in the particular instances) by the law of uniformity of Nature. This makes it amply clear that such knowledge obtained by Inductive generalisation is not only rooted in experience but that its validity is also determined by the extent to which it augments ones understanding of experience. It should be remarked here that no truth in science is absolute or adhered to as sacrosanct. The history of science acquaints us with alternative models of explanation. A theory true of certain aspects of experience may prove inadequate in explaining certain other aspects of reality, thus necessitating a more comprehensive theory. Science in its incessant attempt to comprehend the otherwise incomprehensible makes hypothesis, floats theories, builds models and expands the domain of knowledge. But the irony is that it raises more problems than the ones it claims to have solved. While offering solutions to certain enigmas it generates a host of other cognate issues calling for a renewed attempt on the part of the scientific community to ponder over. The more we know, the more we come to realise our limitations, inadequacies and

finitude. Ignorance grows with knowledge. Scientific knowledge, thus, has had an openmindedness preventing one to draw the optimum limit to it. At no point of time could a scientist decide to stop his investigation declaring that everything that could be known has been known. Rather it would be most unscientific to think so.

Inference as enunciated in the Nyāya system is deductio-Inductive, in nature. The five components (avayavas) of the inference, namely pratijnā, hetu, udāharana, upanaya and nigamana can be restated without redundance as follows:

- (A) Wherever there is smoke there is fire
(udāharana)
- (B) The hill is smoky (Upanaya)
- (C) Therefore, the hill is fiery. (Nigamana)

The inference is deductive to the extent the conclusion is necessarily implied by both the premises conjointly. It is Inductive in so far as the premises are got through observation and are asserted as matters of fact. That the 'hill is smoky' is perceived and the knowledge of the invariable relation (Vyāpti) between smoke (hetu) and Fire (sādhyā) is derived from the repeated experience of their co-existence or causal co-relation. Thus Inference as a source of knowledge rests eventually on perception.

The above analysis tends to reveal that all the sources of knowledge except Intuition do explicitly or indirectly involve reference to experience in general and to perception in particular. So perception seems to be a basic mode of obtaining knowledge.

It is remarkable that in western philosophical tradition 'experience' is taken to mean sense experience and perceptual knowledge denotes knowledge by sensation or reflection or through both. Sensation refers to knowledge that arises as a result of effective interaction between the sense organs and the external stimuli and reflection due to mind's contact with internal psychic states whereas in the Nyāya system 'perception' in the above sense is assimilated to the category of ordinary perception (laukika pratyaksa), which is but a sub-class of perception; the other sub-class being, extra-ordinary perception (Alaukika pratyaksa). Extraordinary perception is of three types, namely samānya laksana, Jñāna laksana and Yogaja.

Sāmānya laksana refers to a mode of perception whereby one is able to recognise a class by perceiving the class essence. For example while perceiving the class of horses all that we perceive through sense organs are the individual horses with determinate features, but to identify them as horses presupposes ones' knowledge of the universal (sāmānya) 'horseness.'

The universal 'horseness' being the essence of all actual and possible horses could not have been perceived by the senses. Nonetheless, the knowledge of the class proves that one has knowledge of the same. Hence such knowledge must be a case of extraordinary perception. But a closer look reveals that the universal 'Horseness' connotes nothing other than the defining properties which are as much real and co-existent as the other variable qualities that the individual horses possess.

In Jñāna laksana perception we make statements such as 'The flower looks soft,' 'The ice looks cold' etc. Though 'softness' and 'coldness' are not objects of visual perception because of the invariable association of the tactual feeling of cold and softness of the 'ice' and 'flower' respectively with the visual perception of them they constitute an integral part of one cognition so that whenever one has the visual perception of them the tactual properties are recalled to the mind. It is noticed here that a Jñāna laksana perception would not be possible without the previous perception of the objects. From the above discussion one could, without oddity conclude that both the variants of extraordinary perception are also parasitic on perception.

'Yogaja' can be understood as a form of intuitive perception wherein one has the knowledge of past, present and future, of things smaller than the smallest and bigger than

the biggest; a stage attainable by the meticulous observance of yogic ways. The claims of Intuition to knowledge can best be evaluated against the controversies pertaining to it.

The philosophers who explain experience or perception in terms of sensation and reflection and explain knowledge as conceptual involving necessary application of intellectual categories on the sense data may, for the sake of clarity, be dubbed as positivists in the very generic sense of the term. Let us by pass the absolute claims of the traditional empiricists and the rationalists as to the ultimacy of 'experience' and 'reason' for their obvious adequacy and lopsidedness. A modest exponent of the positivistic epistemology would, probably, maintain that neither experience nor reason by themselves can make knowledge possible. The sense-object contact acquaints us with the existence of mere stimuli but knowledge ensues only when the bare stimuli are interpreted in terms of concepts and judgements. Hence knowledge under this interpretation refers to the end product of the epistemic process involving both experience and intellect. Knowledge for them is conceptual or categorial. To know is to judge or interpret, to judge is to apply concept or categories to the data provided by experience. Even 'Experience' for them is a semantic notion. Experiencing means understanding the bare sensation, that is, to give meaning to the otherwise meaningless chunk of stimuli and this presupposes the appropriate ordering and interpretation of the virgin sensation by application of concepts and categories.

Kant appears to be most articulate and thorough going in spelling out the nature, genesis and the limit of knowledge along this line. Knowledge arises only when the receptivity of sensibility is supplemented by the spontaneity of the understanding. Space and time being the a priori forms of sensibility, if there would be anything beyond the space time continuum, it could not for that reason enter into the domain of the phenomenal. As understanding operates only on the data provided by sensibility the non-spatio-temporal reality or the noumenal, if there be one, cannot be brought under it and therefore would remain unknown and unknowable. Kant also argues for the unknowability of 'I consciousness.' Knowing involves the various sorts of synthesis at the level of sensibility and understanding. As they constitute an integral part of the process leading to knowledge it logically presupposes a non-empirical or transcendental ground of synthesis. The synthetic function of sensibility and understanding is therefore appropriated to the unitary 'I consciousness,' the synthetic unity of apperception. This being instrumental, the very ground in making knowledge possible it could not be made the object of knowledge. Therefore knowledge in the Kantian scheme, means knowledge of the sensuous, the spatio temporal, the phenomenal, the categorial. There being no sense intuition corresponding to 'world,' 'soul' and 'God' it is not

only that one cannot have any knowledge about them but that any attempt to comprehend them through categories is bound to generate antinomies. This positivistic under-tone of the Kantian epistemology goes a long way in providing the rationale and impetus to the positivistic thinking.

The recent formulation of the view is discernible from the writings of the logical behaviourists like Wittgenstein and Ryle and the positivists like Ayer. Wittgenstein in the philosophical Investigations and Ryle in the Conception Mind, by way of furthering the tradition are found to be critical about the traditional notion that knowing consists in being in a special state of mind. For them 'to know something' is a capacity by displaying which one could let others know that one knows. Knowing, therefore has to crystallize into publicly observable behaviour. Hence the issues pertaining to knowledge are criteriological. For example, to say that 'I know singing' implies the capacity to display certain skills when asked for and to say that 'I know the science of music' is to be in a position to prove ones' knowledge about rhythm, meter and various theories in the field. This view has the implicit suggestion that the knowledge claims made by the mystic, the intuitionists shall turn to be pseudo claims as there apparently ~~exists~~ no observable criterion by which one could let others know that one knows. In fact, knowing the 'Absolute' as it has been expounded in the relevant literatures consists in being in a special state of awareness.

Let us formulate the positivistic stand, on the 'knowable.' Whatever exists or can possibly exist could in principle be known for there can hardly be anything in the existent which would make this impossible for it to be known, and what one can know could be expressed at least, in principle. Conversely, if one, on the basis of the principles determining a meaningful discourse could determine what one could know, can, by virtue of that, say what could possibly exist. In view of this the claim of the intuitionist that 'I know something which is in principle incommunicable' would be a contradiction in terms. The limit of language and the limit of the knowable are deemed to be co-terminus.

Quite contrary to the above school there are a host of thinkers whom, for the sake of convenience, we would term as intuitionists or anti-intellectualists or the non-positivists. Despite the differences in the nature of questions they address themselves to and reasons advanced to substantiate their claims, all these thinkers have the underlying unanimity in so far as they demonstrate the inadequacy of the rational or the categorial and plead for the non-categorial, a non-rational mode of knowing in respect of the comprehension of the ultimate reality.

The most profound and logically well grounded are the views of the Upanisadic thinkers. In the Upanisads, 'Brahman,'

the ultimate reality, is conceived as the supreme witnessing principle and the ultimate substratum of all the cognitive activities. That being instrument in all cases of cognition, it is argued, cannot be made the object of cognition.

The means of representation cannot be represented. Moreover, knowing, in the so called sense presupposes the exclusiveness of the knower and the known. The perceived must be extrinsic to the percipient. Brahman is all pervading. It is both immanent and transcendent. How could the all pervading, the pan-consciousness be externalised by the knower who also constitutes an integral part of it.

But instead of ending up with agnostic despair they acknowledge the possibility of knowing Brahman by a mode fundamentally different from the ordinary modes of knowing. Here the knower has to sublimate his unitary or the fragmentary awareness into a state where the finite 'I' is metamorphosed into the cosmic 'I'. The atomic becomes cosmic. The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman. 'Bramavid Brahmaiva Bhavati.' In this mode of knowledge, obviously where the knower knows the known (The Brahman) by becoming it the distinction between components of knowledge (the knower, known and the knowledge) disappear and one gets oneself established in the cosmic awareness; Aham Brahmasmi, (I am Brahman), Tattvam asi (That thou art), Sarvam Khalumidam Brahman (Everything verily in Brahma).

The Jaina thinkers show the characteristic imperfection of the intellectual forms of knowledge. Reality is infinite and multi-faceted and everything in it has innumerable properties (Ananta dharmakam vastu). The human mind is finite and human knowledge perspectival.

Describing reality involves making judgements about it. As a judgement is made invariably from a particular standpoint, the knowledge so obtained remains true of reality only in relation to it. Hence there can be as many descriptions of the Reality as there are standpoints from which one could look at it. All such knowledge are mediate and relativistic. Philosophy (in the sense of metaphysics) being an attempt at rational understanding of the reality as a whole all the philosophical systems are bound to fall short of the totality but the philosophers, for their ignorance of this truth, often, commit the fallacy of mistaking the partial knowledge to be the knowledge about the whole (Ekānta vada or exclusive predication). The absolute with all its vastness and plenitude can be known only by the knower (kevali) by a special kind of immediate knowledge (kevala jñāna) by cultivation of the spiritual ways.

Henry Bergson, by way of expounding the nature and mode of apprehending the ultimate reality draws a distinction between intellect and intuition. He traces the origin of the diversities to the unitary primordial creative force 'Élan

vital' and equates it with the ultimate reality. The 'Elan vital' is very growing, dynamic and continuous with ones' being. This reality at its core, signifies a flux, the whole, where parts grow, multiply and interpenetrate losing their identity in it. This cannot be known by intellect which offers only a static and fragmentary picture of reality. The intellect operates with concepts with fixed meaning attached to them and so the reality understood through them is bound to appear as static.

"The more consciousness is intellectualized the more is matter spatialized."2

It is known only through intuition where the whole being is involved and experience is too deep and intense for words. It is a mode of cognition where time loses its significance, the past, present and future merge into a wholistic awareness. This mode of temporal cognition is the 'Duree.'

"Philosophy can only be an effort to dissolve again into the whole.... the ocean of life in which we are immersed.... whence we draw the very force to labour and to live and from which both matter and intellect originate."3

Bradley conceives reality as a whole where distinctions can be made but divisions do not exist. The reality is inclusive of all that is existent, thought, object, matter, mind etc. It is a concrete universal. Knowing is characteristically judgemental. A judgement involves the relation between

the subject and the predicate, the 'that' and the 'what.'
As both the 'that' and the 'what' constitute the finite aspects of the all inclusive whole, all cases of knowing are but the relational mode of knowing one finite by another. Bradley exhibits the contradiction implicit in the very concept of relation. As all cases of intellectual understanding involves relation it is bound to be fraught with inevitable contradiction in understanding of reality. So all that the intellect acquaints one with is not the reality but the appearance. To know the reality the 'intellect has to commit suicide, as it were.

"Fully to realise the existence of the Absolute is for finite beings impossible but a limited idea of the Absolute seems fully attainable by finite intellect."4

It is known only in a mode of immediate awareness of the whole where the finites exist in harmony. It is a mode of non-verbal awareness where the intellect has not yet begun to dissect the reality into 'that' and 'what.'

"In mere feeling of immediate presentation we have the experience of the whole. This whole contains diversity and on the other hand is not parted by relations....(it) serves to suggest us the general idea of a total experience where will, thought and feeling may all once more be one."5

Now conceding the possibility of a non-sensuous and non-rational mode of experience, let us examine if it can amount to 'knowledge' proper, having been

objectively demonstrable, To say that an experience or a cognition is subjective is to acknowledge that it is peculiar to the experiencer or the subject. Conversely its objectivity would imply that it can constitute the object of experience or cognition of individuals other than the subject. For example, my claim 'the tree is green' is said to be objective for any one other than myself with the minimal capacity for visual perception, from a reasonable distance and in adequate light can have the same, ne, the similar cognition. Negatively, a blind man, or a man from a long distance or in the absence of adequate light may fail to have the perception, 'the tree is green.' But the inability or failure of the latter to have the experience does not make it cease to be objective. In a country of blind, to the lone man with sound visual capacity, the perception of multi-coloured rainbow will be objective, even though, there is none other to certify its objectivity. Thus to demonstrate the objectivity of experience or a knowledge claim is to enumerate conditions under which anyone whatsoever can verify it. Considered in this perspective the 'Intuitive experience' can very well be seen as objective. Though all the intuitionists without exception speak of the uniqueness of the experience none of them claim it to be subjective, on the sense that none else can have it. Rather, they appear to be quite articulate in

spelling out the nature and conditions of such experience so that any one taking recourse to the appropriate ways can have the knowledge of the ultimate or the Absolute.

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CHAPTER - III

SENSE AND NON-SENSE

There exists a subtle distinction between 'Sense' and 'Meaning.' A linguistic symbol or expression is understood to have 'Sense' where as the term 'meaning' has had application even in non-linguistic contexts. For example, we say "The black clouds mean the imminent rainfall;" "The vermillion on the forehead of a woman means that she is married" and 'The yelling of the beasts in the forest means that they are panicky.' Since the philosopher's concern is with concepts, propositions and therefore with language the terms "Sense" and "Meaning" are interchangeably used in philosophical literatures.

The controversies surrounding 'meaning' chiefly rest upon the issues pertaining to the nature and criterion of meaning, the relevant questions being;

(a) What is Meaning? What does it consist of? What does it signify - the object, ideas, behaviour or a function?

(b) How do, the otherwise meaningless string of noises or marks come to acquire sense? How to distinguish a meaningful expression from a meaningless one?

(c) What is precisely involved in saying something and meaning it (on the part of the speaker) and understanding of the same (on the part of the hearer).

The cluster of questions in "a" relate to the nature and in "b" to criterion of meaning and those in "c" to 'meaning and Intelligibly' respectively. It is worth noting that the considerations leading to the views about the criterion of meaning also go a long way in determining the nature of meanings and the conditions of intelligibility enabling one to delimit the domain of sense and non-sense.

Philosophers subscribing to the referential theory of meaning maintain that a word or an expression acquires sense by standing for things, concrete or abstract. The proper name 'Isa' denotes a particular upanisadic text, the common noun "Book" stands for any particular from among the class of particulars called "Book" and the term "Honest" signifies a quality or a set of qualities. A verbal symbol spoken or written is meaningless unless and until it is made to stand for something beyond it. So it is the things and events in particular and the reality in general that impart meaning to language and therefore constitute the meaning of the linguistic expressions. Meaning, thus, comes to be identified with their references. The advocates of this view seem to be working with the tacit assumption that the sole function of language is to describe the reality. The philosophical ancestry of this view can be traced to Dialogues of Plato. Plato, assuming that knowledge must have objectivity, went on to postulate the world of forms to account for the objectivity

of ideas. But the inadequacy of this theory of meaning and the oddities involved in the very assumption has been much trumpeted upon by philosophers from time to time. It is obviously the case that the connectives and expressions like 'the,' 'of,' 'in,' 'on' etc. are meaningful even though they are not referringly used. Moreover, the expressions like 'mermaid,' 'angel,' 'ghost' are meaningfully employed in course of relating stories fantasies or even otherwise even though there are evidently no real things answering to these expressions. Frege, in "On Sense and Reference" draws a logical distinction between sense and reference. The expressions the "morning star" and the "evening star" are denotative of the same object but have different senses. Wittgenstein in his "Philosophical Investigations" dwells on the distinction between name and the bearer of the name. It is argued that when the person called Mr. N. N. dies the meaning of Mr. N. N. does hardly cease to be significant. Had it not been so the statement that Mr. N. N. died would be rendered meaningless and for that matter no proposition whatsoever about a person who is dead and gone would have any sense. It might be the case that many of our expressions come to have meaning when they stand to signify certain unique particulars. But their meaning, on that account, is not logically dependent on the referents, so that the non-existence of the latter does not make the former non-significant. For example,

the term 'Chimpanzee' is still meaningful even though that particular species is extinct.

The assumption that description is the only function of language and the conviction that meaning consists in reference also led to the picture theory of meaning enunciated by Wittgenstein in his classic Tractatus, Logico-Philosophicus. According to this, language pictures reality. In other words, language gets sense by virtue of the projective relationship between the constituents of language and reality. Understanding the sense of a proposition amounts to knowing its truth conditions and to understand the truth conditions is to know the meaning of the primitive expressions, i.e. names and the form of their arrangements. The names get meaning by standing for the objects. There is one to one correspondence between names and the objects and the elementary proposition which is but concatenation of names is structurally identical with the configuration of objects in the atomic facts. In other words, the meaning of the basic constituents as well as the form of language are determined by the nature of reality. The relation being one of necessity, an expression or a set of expressions being given, one can read off the states of affairs, actual or possible it describes and the reality being given, one could think of the form of language that would describe it. Therefore, understanding the meaning of an expression consists in tracing the

passage from language to reality. Wittgenstein was also explicit about the remote implications of his fundamental thesis that everything actual or possible can be expressed through language and therefore whatever could be said, can be said clearly. Conversely if there is anything which could not be brought under the ambit of language it is as good as non-existent.

"The limits of my language is the limits of my world." (5.6)
Logic pervades the world: the limit of the world are also its limits." (5.61)1

In other words, finding out the domain of meaningful discourse would enlighten one as to what could possibly exist and thereby what one could possibly know.

The positivists in their cherished objective to explode metaphysics by exhibiting that metaphysical assertions are bundle of non-sense had to offer a criterion of meaning. For the positivists, a meaningful discourse would be either analytic or synthetic. The analytic statements are true independent of experience and are necessarily so because they are bereft of factual contents. As the predicate expression is explicative of the subject, that they are necessarily true can be determined only by an analysis of the expressions used. The propositions of formal sciences like mathematics and logic fall in this category. A synthetic proposition is one which, unlike the former purports to be expressive of reality. The

positivists are of the view that the meaningfulness of a synthetic proposition consists in its verifiability. To determine the meaning of a sentence is to ascertain the conditions under which the sentence will be rendered either true or false.

"The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification."²

In view of the inadequacy of the principle to account for the meaningfulness of propositions relating to past and future, general propositions, the postulates and hypotheses of science it had to undergo a series of modifications. Direct verification was supplemented by indirect verification; the conclusive verification by the notion of weak verifiability; the verifiability in practice was restated in terms of verifiability in principle the sophisticated version of which has been given by A. J. Ayer. According to the modified version of the principle, a statement is said to have literal significance if and only if one could think of an actual or possible state of affair or experience which would be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsity. Conversely, if one could come across a statement such that one could not know in principle how to go about in settling its truth claim it could safely be treated as semantically odd despite its grammatical soundness. Ayer finds no difficulty in showing that metaphysical assertions such as 'Reality is one,' 'The ultimate

reality is of the nature of mind,' though grammatically meaningful, yet deserve to be treated at par with the propositions such as "Saturday is taking tea" and 'My kindness is long' etc which are syntactically sound though convey no sense i.e. are non-sensical.

The above criterion of meaning has had far reaching consequences as it tends to show a bulk of philosophising and the whole of theology as consisting of patently nonsensical claims. It is tempting to note that the early Wittgenstein and Ayer; in particular; and the positivists, in general, in their attempt to define meaningfulness in terms of the observables in or about the world only betray their typical empirical bias. Experience for them meant only the sense experience. Their inability to visualise the alternative dimensions of experience and the consequent knowledge claims led them to delimit the domain of significant discourse to those definable in terms of observables and consequently their criterion of meaning proved recalcitrant to otherwise meaningful discourses. To insist on verifiability in understanding of metaphysical and theological assertions is as ridiculous and unpaying as the attempt to appreciate one game by the rules of another. Moreover, the term 'verifiable' appears to be unworkable even in empirical domain. The horizon of human knowledge is ever extending. So one could not a priorily define the

limit of the 'verifiable.' With the advancement of science and technology man's knowledge has broadened the verifiability spectrum of man. So even in empirical sphere if something is found to be unverifiable in relation to the past and present know-hows one could not, on that score, pronounce it to be unverifiable in principle and therefore nonsensical.

Though a priorily opposed to the claims of metaphysics and theology the positivists could hardly brush aside the propositions in Ethics, Aesthetics as gibberish simply because they do not confirm to the analytic - synthetic dichotomy. This led them to propound the emotive theory of meaning. Under this interpretation, the value statements in ethics and the expressions in poetry involving similes, metaphors, hyperboles are obviously not cognitive for they do not purport to describe the matters of facts. Nonetheless they are significant in so far as they are expressive of the emotion of the speaker or aim at invoking emotive responses in the reader or the hearer. Ayer remarks,

"In saying that a certain type of action right or wrong, I am not making any factual statement, not even a statement about my own state of mind. I am merely expressing certain moral sentiment."³

On the other hand, Prof. Stevenson defines meaning in terms of the emotive responses which the expression is supposed to produce.

"The emotive meaning of a word is a tendency of a word to produce (Result from) affective responses in people....Because of the persistence of such affective tendencies (Among other reasons) it becomes feasible to classify them as meanings."4

It is worthwhile to submit that the cognitive and emotive dimensions of meaning do not exhaust all the facets of linguistic activity. Language can, as well, be employed in making promises, giving commands and so on. Moreover, even accepting the claim of the emotivists that the utterance or mention of an expression very often expresses or influences one's feelings it does not warrant one to construe the feelings and responses as constituting the meaning of the expression. For example, an expression having a cognitive content, when employed might invoke affective responses of the hearer. The statement that "it is time for study" might annoy somebody who wants to while away the time in idle gossip. In view of the fact that the same statement might have been preceded by different feelings of the speaker or result in different emotional responses or even sometimes no response in the hearer leaves us in a quandary as to how to determine the sense of the statement. What is still radically untrue is Ayer's claim that the propositions in ethics and poetry are out and out emotive in their import. For instance, the judgement that "Adultery is bad" is just not indicative of one's subjective taste and consequent reaction towards a certain

practice but is backed by considerations that are objectively viable in the context of collective living. Moreover, it being a contingent fact that certain expressions do produce certain range of affective responses in the hearer the responses so generated do not form part of what the expression means.

Contrary to the theory that meaning consists in reference to the objective particulars runs the view that the words or expressions are denotative of the mental contents such as thoughts, pictures or images. What gives meaning to a linguistic symbol is the idea or the image preceding its articulation.

"The...use of words is to be sensible marks of ideas, and the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate signification."⁵

The words signify ideas and the ideas in turn are produced in the mind by the corresponding particulars or facts in the world. The sense object contact generates ideas in the mind which are but copies or the exact representation of the former. The singular terms stand for ideas corresponding to the individual objects whereas the generic terms such as 'man,' 'triangle' etc. signify the general ideas formed by abstracting the qualities common to all the particulars of the class. Berkley, while amending the above interpretation argues that in entertaining a general idea what we have, in fact, is the

image of a particular object with its determinate characteristics but is made to stand for the whole class of particulars. Despite the differences as to the specific nature of the mental contents what stands out as striking and essential to the various expositions of the view is that the linguistic symbols are designative of their mental counterparts and the mental contents are causally dependent upon facts or reality. In talking about reality we in fact talk about our ideas or experiences about them. So the relation between language and reality, symbols and the objects is established in and through ideas.

"Between the symbol and referent there is no relevant relation other than the indirect one which consists in being used by some one to stand for a referent."⁶

Langer remarks;

"In talking about things we have conceptions of them not the things themselves and it is the conceptions not the things that symbols directly mean."⁷

This view seems to be more plausible than the referential theory as it explains the meaningfulness of 'centaur,' 'mermaid' as standing for the complex ideas even though there exist no objective correlates. In a very generic sense it also takes cognisance of the fact that language, in order that it is not merely a string of noises or marks signifying nothing, must be understood as an activity significant in relation to human intentions and purposes. But the view in its

classical form with the claim that the words necessarily point to thoughts or images have evoked a host of objections. Except the cases where the words stand for perceptual simples like 'red,' 'sour,' 'cold,' 'fragrant' it is simply not true that all cases of meaningful uses of language are invariably preceded by the occurrence of the appropriate thoughts or images. Even if an image or a thought is found to accompany the use of a symbol it is logically irrelevant in determining its proper use and understanding. The knowledge of language depends on one's ability to make the right use of the expressions irrespective of the images or thoughts one has while using them. If the meaning had the necessary association with an image, a man, very poor at imaging, would also prove very dull at using and understanding the language. Moreover, the attempt to explain meaning of a linguistic symbol in terms of the image leaves us halfway for the meaning of image stands in need of explanation in terms of the corresponding counterparts in reality.

The mentalistic theory had its immediate opponents. Philosophers in some quarters have come to recognise communication as a bipolar process involving speaker on the one hand and hearer on the other and sought to explain meaning in terms of behavioural interactions between the hearer and the speaker. Leonard Bloomfield defines the meaning of an expression as the situation in which the speaker utters it and the responses

which it calls forth in the hearer. Using language is an activity like many other activities that human beings perform, It does not consist in mechanical articulation of verbal symbols but they are, as it were, like the stimuli aiming to produce certain specific behavioural responses in the hearer. To this it may be submitted that it is only the perlocutionary speech acts that get their meaning only when the desirable changes are affected in the hearer. I cannot be said to have persuaded somebody to do something unless I have really succeeded in getting him to do that. But in case of illocutionary speech acts (which is performed in the mere act of saying something) one need not wait for any palpable response in the hearer. For example the utterance of the sentence "It is raining" might be treated by the hearer as a mere statement of fact and thereby produce no behavioural response in him but the same utterance might induce my friend to stay indoors or any neighbour to go out with the umbrella. Despite the fact that there are different behavioural responses and sometimes no response at all to a given expression the meaning of it does hardly change. This goes to indicate that the behavioural responses do not necessarily enter into the defining properties of meaning. Charles Morris in order to obviate this difficulty observes that the words and expressions are like preparatory stimulus that creates an appropriate disposition in the hearer to behave in certain determinate ways. The changes in

the pattern of behavioural responses may be explicit or be potentially there. This formulation of meaning seems to be more plausible because even the illocutionary speech act are intended to have the illocutionary effects in the hearer which consists only in comprehending the meaning. The hearer in the very act of understanding establishes a semantic rapport with the speaker disposing him to participate in the language game in appropriate ways.

Wittgenstein, the pioneer and the trend setter of the analytical movement brings into focus the inadequacy and the oddities of different theories of meaning by pointing to the dynamic nature of language. He was, especially, critical of the view that identifies meaning with ideas and inner psychic processes. Not only because it was based on a basic misconception about the working of language but also for its unfortunate contribution to the genesis of certain metaphysical muddles. He sought to bring home the obvious but often overlooked and ignored truth that language is employed like an instrument, as it were, for doing divergent jobs or to achieve various objectives. Language is used to express and hide, to bless and curse, to praise and humiliate, to please and annoy, to foment and ease social tension, to persuade and to dissuade, to pray, to order, to console, in asking questions and relating stories and to perform a great many other speech-acts (as

Austin calls it) depending on the intentions of the user and circumstances of its use. The other basic suggestion of his analysis is that language is rule governed. This is precisely what makes it inter-subjective. Anyone who knows the rules finds no difficulty in using and understanding the language. But he makes a fundamental departure from other exponents by indicating that language as a form of human activity is intimately wedded to life situations. Language is context-bound. In order for a particular combination of linguistic symbols to be meaningful it is not only essential that they conform to the rules of syntax (or grammar) but also that they must be employed in appropriate context or circumstance. So learning a language is as much a case of knowing the rules of grammar as mastering the skills to use them only when the appropriate non-linguistic conditions are obtained. For example, if I say "I love Mr. X from my heart of heart" but in actuality I am found to be annoyed at his very presence, to think and speak ill of him, to leave no stone unturned in creating difficulties for him I cannot be said to have made the proper use of the locution "to love." So in this case, my use of the expression in order to be meaningful should have been accompanied by certain behavioural peculiarities, the absence of which renders the expression "I love...." meaningless despite its grammatical soundness. Thus, the use^{of} language is inextricably bound up with the forms of life.

"...speaking of language is a part of an activity or of a form of life."⁸

That is why,

"If a lion could talk, we could not understand him."⁹

As the meaning of an expression is determined by "the context of its use the understanding of it is finding the way it is used in the given context or the language game. The analogy "Game" is highly suggestive. A game is played with certain set of rules. In so far as the rules define the very nature of the game and thereby make one game different from others they are 'constitutive' and to the extent the rules regulate the conduct of the game they are also 'regulative.' Similarly using the language also amounts to conforming to the semantic rules appropriate to that particular use of language. Moreover, as playing a game calls for participation on the part of the players, while using the language the user has got to participate in the mode of life appropriate to that use of language. It is worth noting that a given locution carrying a particular meaning may have a different meaning or no meaning (Non-sensical) in another. For example the term "Truth" in "Speak the truth" (the teacher exhorting his students), ~~in~~ "Truth is beyond space and time," (in theological domain) "The science is a dispassionate search **for** truth," (in scientific domain) connotes 'the propositional value,' 'the reality' and 'facts' respectively. The term 'good' and 'desirable' have their meaningful application in normative discourse but oddities

ensue when they are transplanted beyond context and we say "It is good that fire ^{burns} or "It is desirable that H₂O make water." Wittgenstein observes that ~~the~~ host of the metaphysical issues are of the nature of muddles felt as problems for the metaphysicians treat the expression in abstraction, that is beyond the legitimate sphere of their application. The sense of an expression depends on the way it functions in the language game. So to ascertain the meaning of the expression is not to consider the expression in isolation but to find the way it functions in the language which is its natural habitat. Hence his remark,

"Don't think but look."¹⁰

As a tool in a toolbox is put to divergent uses the same locution of language can be used to perform different speech acts or in course of different language games. So an expression will have as many senses as there are uses. The ambiguities surrounding an expression can be removed only when one commands a clear view of the uses of the expression. That is ensured when one takes note of different core uses, the remote uses, the intermediate uses, and even the deviant uses of the expression. Wittgenstein also pleads for inventing possible alternative language games and visualises how the given words and expressions would function.

The above theory seems to fare better than the other views by making meaning dependent on the various uses that an expression can be put to in different contexts. An expression does not have meaning by itself but acquires meaning only in its actual employment in a language game. So to determine whether an expression is meaningful or not is dependent on the non-linguistic or extra-linguistic conditions constituting the context. So a change in objective conditions is natural to have its impact on the mode of employment of the linguistic tools. So that an expression having a particular meaning in the framework of existing set of conditions will have different meaning or may be rendered non-sensical in the changed circumstances.

"But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command? - There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences." And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all, but new types of language, new language games, as we say, come into existence and others become obsolete and get forgotten."11

As for instance one thousand years ago the expression such as "A machine, working out sums," "Baby being born in the test tube" would have been treated as semantically odd whereas they have come to acquire definite meaning with changed realities. Since one cannot a - priorily stipulate or define the limits of change consequent upon the growth of human knowledge or

otherwise the domain of sense and nonsense cannot a priori be mapped out. The "context" has, therefore, an openendedness that renders 'meaning' a flexible property of the expression. Under this interpretation "sense" and "non-sense" accruing to the expressions will be relative to their context of occurrence.

Against the back-drop of conflicting views let us think afresh as to what does meaning consists of, what does it amount to for a person to mean something while using an~~t~~ expression and for an expression to convey a meaning and what is precisely involved in understanding the meaning.

How do the otherwise meaningless string of symbols (spoken or written) come to acquire sense or significance? An acoustic blast or the written marks in order to be meaningful have got to be in keeping with the phonological and the syntactical regularities defined by rules; codified or tacit; in that linguistic convention. But per chance, a sound produced by a machine, a bird or an animal is found to be phonologically and syntactically sound or the marks made by water or the wind resemble a meaningful sentence one cannot for that matter treat them as meaningful linguistic units. This tends to suggest that using language is distinctive of human species and it implies that over and above being in conformity with the rules of grammar, an expression in order to count as a part of meaningful communication must occur in course of the speech acts. A speech act is the basic unit of communication.

It may also be indicated that any sort of tampering with linguistic tools does not amount to using language. For example, the child, while babbling, might utter a string of noises resembling a meaningful utterance but this does not entitle one to say that the child knows the meaningful and proper use of locution. Here one has got to go along with Wittgenstein in accepting that using a language involves participation in a mode of life.

It is worth mentioning that language like most other human activities is purposive. A speech act, be it locutionary, illocutionary, perlocutionary, constative or performative, indicates the human intention to achieve something. That is to say, intention is built into the speech act. The speech acts performed to inform, to order, to ask questions etc. are significant in so far as they are performed to achieve certain purposes. But can we visualise a possibility where the speaker says something but intends or means something else? In other words, can one say "It is a cat" while meaning that "It is a dog." This is ruled out because while performing a speech act the speaker is under constraints in conforming to the rules of syntax and semantics in order to make himself intelligible to the readers or the hearers. Meaning is transcendental. The use of symbols in certain particular ways gives it a determinate meaning. The willingness on the part the speaker

to conform to the rules amounts to the fact that he means what he says. Language has an open texture. Expressions have meaning in their actual uses determined in terms of the rules of syntax and semantics. So to understand the meaning is to reconstruct the semantic import from the given symbols. ~~As~~ The intention of the speaker for all logical consequences is crystallized into the meaning that the expression conveys. Understanding the meaning on the part of the hearer, therefore amounts to recognising the intention of the speaker. Language thus, becomes an effective medium for establishing the inter personal rapport which is a social necessity.

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CHAPTER - IV

THE SAYABLE

Human beings express themselves in very many modes. It may be voluntary or involuntary. The expressions of pleasure, pain, anger, fear through laughter, cry, exclamations and interjections are involuntary as they do not evidently, involve conscious articulation on the part of the individual. Birds and animals are found to exhibit certain sound patterns which have led the linguists to ascertain if they also have language. The croaking of frogs in the mating season, the shrill of the birds at the death of a member of their species seem to show some acoustic uniformities. The experiments and the interpretations so far, go to establish that they are mere signs signifying the reflex expressions of a physical state or instinctive reactions to the external stimuli and are taken as the equivalent of the involuntary expressions of human beings. Koehler observes:

"It may be taken as positively proved that their gamut of phonetics is entirely 'subjective' and can only express emotions, never designate or describe objects. But they have so many phonetic elements which are also common to human languages, that their lack of articulate speech cannot be ascribed to secondary (glosso-labial) limitations. Their gestures too, of face and body like their expression in sound, never designate or 'describe' objects."¹

A sign is not a symbol. A sign stands in a determinate relation with its causal counterpart. But a symbol is arbitrary in so far as it is made to stand for something

other than itself. This requires conscious and voluntary mediation of the symbol user. Wielding of symbols to communicate ones experiences, thoughts, attitudes and inclinations is deemed to be distinctive of human species and can be traced to his rational acumen. A symbol may be linguistic or non-linguistic. Art, architecture, rites, rituals, music and dance are some of the dominant forms through which man expresses himself through symbols. But language remains the most sophisticated and effective way of communication through symbols.

Language consists of a set of symbols (spoken or written) deriving meaning from the net work of rules or conventions. We have seen how a otherwise meaningless string of words acquire meaning when they conform to the rules of phonology, syntax and semantics and also that in order to count as unit of linguistic communication, over and above being grammatically and semantically sound, an expression must occur in course of a speech act. The latter explains why the sounds of a rattling machine or the babbling of a child resembling a sound phonemic and syntactical structure do not constitute part of language. Using language, like most other human activities is purposive or intention oriented. Its cognitive use consists in expressing thoughts, attitudes, and non-cognitive uses in asking questions, giving commands

and expressing emotions or arousing emotions in the hearer. Since speech act, is by far, the most basic of different modes of linguistic communication it would suffice to restrict oneself to the analysis of speech act in exploring the dimensions of the sayable.

There are two distinguishable aspects of use of language, namely the utterance of sounds in conformity with the rules of phonology and syntax and the appropriate non-linguistic conditions from which the expressions get their meaning or which they signify. Meaning is not an ~~inalienable~~ property of the symbols. The symbols, as such, have no meaning and are mere sounds but they come to acquire sense or significance only in their actual employment in appropriate context. A symbol, thus, stands co-related with things other than itself. A combination of symbols meaningful in one language may not have any meaning in another and an expression having a particular meaning ⁱⁿ one context may have a different meaning in another. Speaking language is a corporate activity. Saying something presupposes a sayer and a sayee. The **speech** act is said to be directed as it is initiated by the sayer in production of the sounds and terminated in the understanding of the hearer. What the speaker intends is what the expression means. Intention is subjective ~~but~~ meaning is impersonal ~~but~~ The speaker's discretion to use the symbols in certain

determinate ways objectifies his intention in form of meaning. Meaning is objective or trans-personal for **any** one in know of the rules can understand the meaning of a given sentence, can distinguish a sentence from a non-sentence and can formulate an infinite number of meaningful sentences. All speech acts locutionary, illocutionary or perlocutionary express meaning. A question or a command before being answered or followed must have already been meaningful. In communication what the sayee gets at are mere string of sounds in form of symbols. To understand or to make sense out of them is to decode or reconstruct the symbolised from the symbols. This, obviously, calls for a prior knowledge of the rules and conditions governing the uses in the language.

The conditions indispensable for successful linguistic communication are:

- (a) The symbols must be **objective**
- (b) The rules surrounding its use have to be relatively fixed and objective.
- (c) The symbolized is to be specifiable and objective.

The objectivity of symbol means that it consists of distinct phonemic units, reproducible as and when needed and amenable to the formation rules. The rules (syntactic) determining the combination of phonemes into legitimate meaning patterns have

got to be relatively invariable and uniform so that a person conversant with them does not find constraints to understand and communicate by means of the language. The rules must be objective for it is against these that one could ascertain the correct and incorrect use of language. The most significant is the requirement that a symbol to have a definite sense must signify or be designative of something determinate. Meaning, as already observed, is a relational concept. It does not point to any stagnant property of an expression but something that obtains only when the symbol is used in correlation with something other than itself, the symbolized. The symbol and the symbolized stand in projective relation to one another so that given one the other can be read off. The rules determining the relation of the symbol with what it signifies may be called the rules of co-relation. For an utterance to have meaning the rules of co-relation must be as objective as the formation rules (syntax). This necessarily implies that the terms of relation (the symbol and the symbolized) must be specifiable and objective. In other words one cannot have a symbol which stands for everything or something non-objective. If a symbol purports to stand for everything actual and possible or express all that can be said we would not know what it means. It defeats the very purpose of communication. Language is employed to express something definite or to

achieve something specific. Its function is relative to the purposes at hand. All illocutionary speech act of the type 'Milk is nutritious' has a definite meaning to convey and aims at producing the corresponding illocutionary effect in the hearer. Similarly a perlocutionary act like 'Arrest the culprit' has a specific semantic import so that the person commanded does something specific, not otherwise i.e. he is to arrest but not to punish and arrest the culprit not the innocent. A description which describes everything, a question that asks all that can be asked, a command that exhorts everything to do is neither a description nor a question nor a command. Thus the referent has got to be specific. This necessitates that it must be objective and identifiable by both the speaker and the hearer.

This takes us to the issues relating to "what can one say or the content of communication. The demand or objectivity in respect of the symbolized precludes prima facie the possibility of communicating anything pertaining to ones internal feelings or psychic states and the language of pleasure and pain would be lack meaning (in its paradigm sense of objectivity). This militates against the fact of the meaningfulness of pain language. It may here be pointed out that the internal feelings or experiences are subjective in the sense that no one else can undergo the same but are intersubjective in the sense that the individuals are prone to have

similar experiences under similar circumstances. The utterance 'My head aches' is understood by the hearer for he finds no difficulty in relating it to the similar experiences of his. If all that I experience were peculiar to me there would have been hardly any need for a communication medium and even if I could invent one no one would understand it. Even to understand an expression that is otherwise meaningful calls for a minimal experiential acquaintance or richness of experience. For example a born-blind cannot make out anything of the terms signifying colour perceptions.

Even fulfilling the above criteria for a successful communication a competent speaker finds logical constraints in communicating about the perceptual simples. Language consists of complex and elementary symbols. The meaning of the complex symbols are parasitic upon the meaning of elementary symbols. For example to a person who knows not 'what is gold?' the term gold can be analysed in terms of solidity, yellowness, malleability etc. But if he does not know 'what is yellow' one could hardly make him understand what a gold is by the help of verbal description. 'Yellow' can only ostensibly be defined. One has to undergo the experience of seeing yellow in order to understand what the term 'yellow' connotes. Russell calls it the knowledge by acquaintance distinguishing it from knowledge by description. Thus all knowledge is not verbally communicable.

There, obviously, exist no logical handicap in communicating what we know through sense experience or reasoning or through both for in these cases both the symbol and the symbolized are demonstrably objective. But the difficulty in communicating the intuitive knowledge remains logically insuperable. As already seen the content of intuitive awareness does not refer to anything determinate, finite but to a totality signifying a wholistic awareness where the knower, known and the knowledge remain indistinguishable. It being all inclusive cannot for the aforesaid reasons be represented by a symbol. If one persists to describe it by symbols meaningful in descriptive universe of discourse they would not only prove inadequate but it being non-finite (Infinite) all symbols will be found to be applicable to it resulting in inevitable contradiction. A symbol being finite has a limited semantic import. Hence to describe the infinite by a predicate is to limit it and thereby to distort it. 'Neti Neti' of the upanisads is suggestive of the failure of predication and indicative of the inadequacy of the categorial mode in describing the indescribable. That such knowledge is not sayable do not render them less viable for categorial mode is not the only mode of communication. The intuitionists, the mystics take recourse to similes, ~~metaphors~~, analogies, metaphors, hyperboles and even contradictions which though lack cognitivity serve as positive pointers to the domain beyond the speakable.

Thus language effective and expedient for all practical purposes proves unwielding and unworkable when employed beyond the legitimate sphere of their application. Instead of representing they misrepresent, produce nonsense in lieu of sense. Hence the mystic prefers 'silence.'

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CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

This work is but an humble attempt to analyse and explore the meanings of 'knowledge,' 'meaning' and 'communication' and thereby to delimit the respective domains of 'the knowable' and 'the sayable.' Knowledge, as we have come to notice, is multi-dimensional and is not restricted to the domain of the phenomenal or the categorial. Truth and objectivity are sine-qua-non of knowledge. But if objectivity means person neutrality it is a myth for all cases of 'knowing' are cases of knowing as they necessarily involve an interpretation (on the part of the knower) of the experiential content. In this sense, all knowledge, categorial or non-categorial, phenomenal or transcendental are qualificatory of the state or form of consciousness with the sole difference that the former is relative, fragmentary, discontinuous whereas the later is absolute, total and continuous. But if objectivity means the knowledge that is non-subjective or inter-subjective, the intuitionists' claim to knowledge can also be seen to be objective as the intuitionists appear to be quite articulate and explicit in delineating the nature and conditions of such knowledge.

Are all knowables sayable? Saying presupposes the trichotomy of the 'sayer,' 'sayee' and a medium for saying. What the sayer communicates is what he means or intends. The intention of the speaker crystalizes into the meaning that

an expression comes to acquire having been rule-bound and that is precisely what is understood by the hearer. One of the minimal conditions of communication is that the rules of co-relation have got to be objective which necessitate that the symbolized must be specifiable and objective (spatio-temporally determinate) along with the symbol. In other words, the symbol in order to be significant must signify a finite or specifiable co-relate. This, therefore, implies that verbal symbols get their meaning from the world of finites and are communicative of only the phenomenal. The intuitive knowledge being all encompassing, total, non-finite eludes the scope of categorial or symbolic presentation. Because of the basic incompatibilities in the nature of the experiential content (in respect of Intuitive knowledge) and the condition of communication we have been led to maintain that there remains an area of the knowable that are not sayable and that the domain of knowable and the sayable are not co-terminus.

This, logically coerces one to question the positivists' (in the generic sense of the term) assumptions that (a) all knowledge is categorial, relational (b) language is the only valid mode of communication (c) cognitivity consists in describing the phenomenal and the corollary that all knowables are in principle sayable. On the contrary, we are led to maintain that the conditions determining 'knowledge' and 'communication' being different and mutually independent

belong to two distinct categories. Hence to say that they are co-eval is to commit oneself to a categorial confusion.

Knowing is characteristically a human phenomenon. Unlike in the non-humans (the birds and animals) knowledge in the human context denotes more than the bare physical awareness. Knowing something is to know it to be true and knowing something to be true is to make claim for its objectivity. The claim 'I know P' is in other words, the claim that 'I know P to be true' which is nothing but to vouchsafe its claim to objectivity. Hence in making a knowledge claim one bears the onus to demonstrate the objectivity, in the absence of which the so called claim is degraded into a belief or a opinion and a belief which is actually true fails to pass off as knowledge. One may believe something to be the case which is actually the case but in absence of corroborative evidence one cannot claim to know it to be the case. But these need not make one conclude that that which is claimed to be true cannot be falsified on subsequent occasion. All that emerges from our analysis is that 'knowledge,' perse, contains the justification for its truth and objectivity.

The justificatory reasons in favour of a knowledge claim involves reference to the way it originates i.e. the genesis and to the fact that it is objective or inter-subjective. The different sources of knowledge are but varied forms

of its justification. To substantiate that a cognition amounting to knowledge is objective is to show that it is not peculiar to the knower or the percipient but has a open texture i.e. any one who places oneself in the vantage point (defined by the conditions of perception) as that of the knower, will also have similar (though not the same) cognition.

The analysis of the sources of knowledge tend to show that knowledge obtained through different sources or modes such as, reasoning (Inference or anumāna), testimony (Sabda), comparison (Upamāna), non-perception (Anupalabdhi), postulation (Arthāpatti) the samanya laksana and Jananalaksana (the variants of extraordinary perception in Nyaya) and revelation with the exception of intuitive knowledge (yogaja) are, directly or indirectly parasitic on perception. It is of paramount significance that the Nyayayikas acknowledge intuition (yogaja) as a form of perception i.e. a sub set of extraordinary perception (Alaukika pratyaksa). Unlike others they do not define perception as a resultant of the sense-object contact but in terms of immediacy. All perception are immediate in nature in so far as the object of knowledge is presented to the mind directly. In intuitive knowledge, one has the immediate grasp of the totality as in ordinary perception (laukika pratyaksa) one is in know of the objects

around and the feelings inside without the mediation of anything in between. It constitutes a significant departure from the naive or empirical interpretation of perception in terms of sense experience. The empiricists (whom for reasons of convenience and clarity we dub as the positivists) who define perceptual knowledge as the outcome of sense-object interaction refuse to accord the status of knowledge to intuitive cognitions. What such critics would contest, precisely, is not the genuineness of undergoing an experience or having an awareness which the transcendentalists or the mystic qualifies as intuitive but their insistence to sale them as knowledge proper with their avowed claim to be objective.

Knowledge in the accredited sense is inter-subjective or impersonal. The objectivity can be understood as contrasted from subjectivity. Ascribing objectivity to a cognition is to specify conditions under which anybody could verify its truth claim. In this sense, the claims of the intuitionists can also be seen to be objective for no intuitionist claims such knowledge to be his unique possession. Rather, they appear to be quite exhaustive and explicit in delineating the ways and means whereby any one can have access to the ultimate knowledge. There is, in fact, a community of

intuitionists, mystics, who, despite the differences in idioms have the underlying unanimity as to the nature of intuition, knowledge and the mode of attaining it.

To this, the positivists may submit that 'objectivity,' over and above other conditions, connotes a necessary reference to space and time and is predicative of cognitions obtainable through either sense experience or reasoning or both. In this sense, therefore, objectivity is equated with factuality and knowledge is deemed to be person neutral. Thus, under this ideal interpretation, in all cases of knowing the knower remains a non-participating observer. It needs be stressed that no knowledge worth the name can be seen to be objective in this sense. Knowledge marks the culmination of the process involving the apperceptive act of the sense organs and the interpretations of the bare sense data by the act of intellection. Even in the mere act of receiving stimuli the receptive faculty imposes its own forms in organising the plethora of discrete sense data. The process of synthesis which begins at the receiving end of the afferent nerves is completed in the act of subsuming them under concepts and then relating these concepts in judgements. Thus, knowledge accrues when the so called objective particulars are interpreted and appropriated to the synthetic activity of the knowing consciousness. In perceiving, mind takes the form of the objects of perception.

"The faculty of knowledge....is the subjectivisation of external objectivity,"¹ observes P.R. Sarkar.

To say that I know this to be a true is to qualify my state of consciousness as 'true.' All knowledge is subjective. Hence, the so called objectivity claimed in respect of objects in space and time turns to be a misnomer. Nonetheless, one finds meaning in the time-honoured distinction between the 'subjective' and the 'objective' in looking for forms of consciousness that are peculiar to individuals and those that have or can have analogous patterns in other individuals.

The intuitionists or the anti-intellectualists do not undermine the relative viability of sense experience and reasoning in meeting the practical exigencies of life but deplore their inadequacy in knowing the totality, the infinite, the absolute.

"It is a makeshift, a device, a mere practical compromise, most necessary, but in the end most indefensible."²

The rational or the intellectual modes of knowing are characteristically categorial, relational and discursive as they evidently, issue out judgements involving relations among the finites. All such knowledge presuppose the externality of the known to the knower. The reality being infinite or the all

pervading totality cannot be made the object of knowledge for the finite. Hence the anti-intellectualists plead for an alternative mode of knowing - the Upanisadic seers; speak of 'knowing by becoming,' the ~~syādvadins~~ ^{śādvadins}, 'Kevala-^ḥ jñāna,' Bradley, immediate experience, and Bergson, 'intuition.' In Upanisadic sense; as the individual constitutes an integral part of the Infinite or Brahman, knowing 'That' amounts to knowing one's self and vice-versa. The 'Brahman knowledge' signifies a mode of knowing where the distinction between the knower ('jnānta'), known (Jneya) and the knowledge (Jnāna) disappears and the finite consciousness is transmuted into the cosmic awareness where one feels oneself identified with the whole. The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman (Brahmavid Brahma~~ḥ~~ bhavati). They have also conceived Brahman as the ultimate ground of all cognitive functions, protasis of all intelligibility and point to the logical oddity in knowing the ground as the object of knowledge. The literatures do not only contain the description of the 'Absolute' but also the ways to attain it so that it remains the birth right of every ardent seeker to know it by attaining it as a consequence of the meticulous cultivation of the ways.

The positivists also seek to prove the untenability of the knowledge claim of the intuitionists on considerations

of semantics and intellegibility. For them, whatever can be known can also be communicated. 'The knowable' and 'the sayable' are co-extensive. This stems from their assumptions that

- (a) All knowing is categorial.
- (b) Language or the discursive symbolism is the only form of legitimate communication.
- (c) The only meaningful language is the one that remains wedded to matters of fact.

All that can exist can be known and as knowing is conceptual all that can be known can be communicated through verbal symbols. By analysing the logic of intelligible discourse if one could ascertain the limit of what can be said, one could, on the strength of it, determine a priori what can possibly exist.

The observation of Hume, the precursor of positivism,

"If we take on our hand any volume; of divinity or school of metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact or existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion."³

was systematically incorporated into a programme for elimination of metaphysics. The significant discourse being either

analytic or synthetic an expression that cannot be subsumed under either must be meaningless or at most be of emotive significance. Obviously under this interpretation, the propositions of metaphysics and that of the intuitionist is mercifully ~~be~~ conceded the status of poetry, signifying nothing cognitive.

"Many linguistic utterances are analogous to laughing in that they have only expressive function, no representative function. Examples of this are cries like 'Oh!' 'Ah,' or On a higher level, lyrical verses....Metaphysical propositions - like lyrical verses - have only an expressive function, but no representative function, Metaphysical propositions are neither true nor false, because they assert nothing.... But they are like, laughing, lyrics and music, expressive. They express not so much temporary feelings as permanent emotional and volitional dispositions."4

Though Kant professes to have reconciled the rival claims of the empiricists and rationalist by showing the indispensability of both the sense experience and reasoning in the structure of knowledge he fails to get rid of the typical empiricistic or positivistic (in the generic sense of the term) bias for the factuality. Knowledge for him is the scientific knowledge constituting the body of formal and natural sciences and the only significant discourse is synthetic a priori. All knowledge begins with apprehension of the sensuous content in space and time which is later organised into concepts and judgements by the categories of

understanding. Kant works out the catalogue of a priori forms and categories with the tacit assumption that there is a universal structure of knowledge and ^{there are} the eternal categories (space, time, causality etc.) of understanding. All knowable must have sensuous properties having been amenable to categorial **synthesis**. All sayables therefore must be synthetic a priori. Thus in Kant, meaningfulness is tied down to cognitivity and cognitivity to factuality.

The Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus of Wittgenstein seems to be a continuation of the Kantian legacy with the sole difference that Kant conceived reality to be category bound and Wittgenstein conceives categories or language to be reality bound. Language is a logical picture of reality and they stand in projective relation to one another so that given one, the other can be reconstructed. Language is thought to be modelled after reality as the meaning and structure of language are determined by what the reality is like. Language consists of elementary propositions and elementary propositions consist of names (the minimal semantic units). The meaning of a name is determined by the object it stands for and the structure of the elementary proposition (the concatenation of names) is determined by the configuration of objects in the atomic fact. The elementary propositions directly and the complex proposition indirectly get their sense and significance by representing facts.

"A propositions represent the existence or non-existence of states of affairs."(4.1)

"The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science."(4.11)5

Conversely, if there would be a proposition which describes no actual or possible state of affair we would not make out what it means. He, of course, acknowledges the logical beyond by arguing that the structural peculiarity by which the proposition is said to be a picture of reality cannot be pictured. The means of representation cannot be represented. The eye cannot be an object in the visual field.

"All propositional sign, applied and thought out, is thought. (3.5)

A thought is a proposition with a sense.(4)

The totality of propositions is language.(4.001)6

Everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly. Everything that can be put into words can be put clearly."(4.116)7


Thus all knowledge is propositional and all propositions are fact-bound. This led him to leave no room for the metaphysical,

"Most propositions and questions, that have been written about philosophical matters, are not false but senseless. We, cannot therefore answer questions of this kind at all, but only state their senselessness. Most questions and propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language." (4.003)8

and for the same reasons for the mystical or the intuitive in his scheme of meaningfulness.

Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations*, by way of discussing the nature, genesis of philosophical problems and method of philosophising offers a critique of language and meaning. Language, according to Wittgenstein, is context bound. The sense or meaning of an expression can be ascertained not by looking into its grammatical form but by looking into the mode of life it is woven into. The linguistic symbols by themselves are mere signs signifying nothing but come to acquire meaning in their actual employment in different language games. Hence finding meaning of an expression is to trace its function in the language game it occurs. As a language game is determined by conditions both linguistic and non-linguistic, an expression having a particular sense in one may have a different sense or no sense in another. Hence to command a clear view of an expression he urges not only to take note of its actual uses in different language games but also its use in a possible language games. To think of a possible language game is to imagine the non-linguistic conditions to be different and visualise how a putative expression would function or what meaning it would have. As a game is played by a set of rules that are both constitutive and regulative every language game has its own logic or semantic rules. He observes that many language games go out of use and new language games emerge with the changed conditions or

forms of life. Though he parts company with the essentialists in maintaining that expressions with identical grammatical structure may have different semantic import depending on their use on different language games he does not go to the other extreme to maintain that the language games are hermetically sealed from each other. In fact, a person having exposure to one mode of life can successfully talk and understand a person in another. The different language games are not isolated islands. It is rather that they criss cross and overlap, interpenetrate and intersect as represented in the following figures in respect of the language games A, B, C and D.



For example, a scientist and a theologian can communicate in principle, to each other about their respective domain with sense and profit. The inter-translatability, among language games becomes possible because of the tangential or contact-points between them. No language game is basic and sacrosanct. As there can be infinite modes of life, there can be infinite modes of expressions and consequently, an infinite number of language games. The meaning of an expression is context specific. When we encounter an experience altogether new either we use the old expression with new meaning or coin a new expression.

The so called laws of thought (The laws of identity non-contradiction and excluded middle) which are in other words, the basic laws of intelligibility and the categories space, time, causality etc which are deemed to be the universal categories, are but constitutive of descriptive language games. Hence to uphold that anything that does not conform to these laws is non-sensical or non-cognitive betrays the illicit assumption that descriptive language is basic and makes one indulge in unwarranted reductionism. Wittgenstein goes steps ahead in viewing the possibility of infinite number of frame-works or language games defined by their respective rules of meaning. Let us consider in this perspective if a Wittgenstein or a consistent interpretation of his view would accommodate the intuitionists' arguments as to the inadequacy of categories, his insistence that communication through similes, metaphors, analogies, contradictions or even silence as the legitimate modes of expressing his knowledge. The suggestion implicit in his analysis would coerce one to entertain or visualise the possible state of affairs where the experience is so total and all encompassing that it proves recalcitrant to communication through categories and modes appropriate to the descriptive language games. He would, perhaps, even view contradiction as semantically significant constituting a necessary mode of communication

in the context of intuitive knowledge and even treat silence as the most eloquent as it becomes meaningful only against the categorical mode of communication for its inevitable failure to describe the indescribable. But his tirade against metaphysics as is evident in his insistence that ordinary language is the natural habitat of the expressions, that metaphysical problems are of the nature of muddles that crop up when the expressions are taken beyond the context of ordinary use (when language goes on a holiday) and that they can be solved by bringing back expressions from their metaphysical use to their home-use betrays his subterranean bias for the empirical and the consequent assumption that cognitivity is tied down to factuality. He obviously fails to see through the logic of the metaphysicians to reckon metaphysics as a form of language game. This again can be attributed to his inability to liberate himself from the empiricistic or the positivistic legacy despite the positive inklings to the contrary in the passages of his master piece, the Philosophical Investigations.

The Upanisads appear to be most articulate in giving illumination on the nature of the transcendental in relation to the categorial mode of communication.

"Yad vaca nabhyuditam yen vag abhyudyate tad
eva Brahma tvam viddhi nedam yad idam upasate."
(Ken-1-5)
(That which is not expressed through speech
but that by which speech is expressed; that
verily, know though, is Brahman, not what
(people) here adore.)⁹

Here they point to logical oddity involved in expressing that which constitutes the very ground of communication. Moreover a propositional description involves application of predicates. A predicative symbol is necessarily finite in its semantic import. So to seek to describe Brahman or the Absolute by predicates is to subject it to empirical determinations. The expression 'Neti Neti' though often misread as an alternative form of predication i.e. negative predication is, in fact, explicative of the nature predication, as such, signifying its modal inadequacy and failure to describe the ultimate. As we have observed earlier, if one persists to describe the ultimate, it being all pervasive all the symbols will hold good of 'It', resulting in inevitable contradictions as testified in the different passages of the Upanisads.

"Tad ejati tan naijati tad dure tad vad antike
Tad antarasya sarvasya tad u sarvasyasya
bahyatah."(Isa-5)
(It moves and It moves not; It is far and it is
near; It is within all this and it is outside
all this.)¹⁰

"Asino duram vrajati, sayano yati sarvatah:
Kastam madamadam devam mad anyo jnatum arhati."
(Katha 2-21)
(Sitting he moves far; lying, he goes everywhere
who save myself, is fit to know that God who
rejoices and rejoices not?)¹¹

"Asariram sariresu, anavasthesv avasthitam,
mahantam vibhum atmanam matva dhiro na socati."
(Katha 2-22)
(Knowing the self who is the bodiless among
bodies, the stable among the unstable, the great,
the all pervading, the wise man does not grieve.)¹²

Does the seer relapse in to absurdity and meaninglessness by taking recourse to such jarring contradictions? In fact, by and large, the law of Identity, contradiction and excluded middle are acknowledged to be the basic laws of intelligibility so that one can afford to violate them only at the cost of sense and intelligibility. A closer scrutiny would reveal that the so called universal laws get their significance or can be operative only against the multiplicities of the finites. If the Reality would have been only one, undifferentiated unitary something, we would not know what one could mean by 'A' is 'A', 'A' is either 'B' or not 'B' and 'A' is not both 'B' and not 'B.' The significance of these laws, therefore, presuppose the manifoldness of the finites which are relatively stable. Symbols have their determinate meaning because of relative fixity of the objects in the reality they signify. If the thing in the world would cease to be what it

is in the very moment of its existence we would not know what the law of identity would connote. Hence there is no reason as to why the laws constitutive of the language descriptive of the world of finite existents should be adhered to as indispensable in describing the intuitive awareness wherein the finites lose their finite character in the unified awareness of the Infinite. The contradictions, unlike in the descriptive discourses do not mar our understanding, rather, are the only significant idioms to communicate the otherwise incommunicable.

Hence, one has to choose between speech or silence. If one insists on the former, ^{the} language of metaphors and contradiction are all that one can take refuge in.

"
WHEREOF ONE ~~CAN~~ CANNOT SPEAK THEREOF
ONE OUGHT TO BE SILENT"

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6. Ibid, page 19.
7. Ibid, page 26.
8. Ibid, page
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