


WILL AND ACTION

BY

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Submitted in Partial fulfilment of the requirement of the degree of
Master of Philosophy



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In habit and character Debjani Tarafdar is a fit and proper person for the degree of M.Phil.

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The 5th July, 1982

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Introduction

Problems concerning 'will and action' have occupied an important place in the debate in the area of philosophy of mind. Although a lot has been said about these problems, but, one still feels a sort of discomfort while talking about them, for it is difficult to see one's way through to correct conclusion.

In this dissertation my main task will be to deal with the problem regarding the relationship that exists between will, motive, intention etc. on the one hand and action on the other. I shall try to refute those who consider will, motive, choice or intention to be the causes of actions and in doing so I shall also try to deal with the related problem i.e. human freedom.

Before going straight to the actual problem in the first chapter, I shall talk briefly about the concept of action (what is it for any bodily movement to be counted as action?) and will show that only those movements which are the expressions of our motive, intention, will, etc. are to be considered as actions proper. I shall talk about will, motive and intention. I have chosen these because, among all mental concepts these are the ones which are most centrally connected with the concept of action.

The actual problem begins in the second chapter. There is a group of philosophers who are of the opinion that human actions are causally determined in the sense that reason, motive, will, etc. can cause an action to take place. Here I shall talk about Hume's notion of cause and thereby try to show that his notion of causality is inapplicable to these mental phenomena. They cannot be treated as the causes of actions.

In support of my argument that human actions are not causally determined, I shall bring the notion of interpretation in the last part of the second chapter, and shall continue to talk on the nature of interpretation, how Freudian notion of interpretation differs from the sort of interpretation we need to advocate in order to show that actions are not determined, in the third chapter.

As interpretation of human action is possible, it will follow that human actions are free and not determined. In the concluding chapter I shall talk about freedom, that it is possible for a man to choose between alternative courses of actions, and such a choice, will, decision, etc. on part of the man proves that he is free to act. Not only his action is free but also his choice, reason or motive are free in the sense that they are not caused by any further choice, motive etc. Thus to talk about determinism in cases where human beings are not "externally" conditioned, would be nonsense.

Will, Motive and Intention

In this chapter I shall talk about the mental states like will, motive, intention. I shall take into account the different views given by the philosophers and thereby try to show what do we understand by intention, motive and will.

Before going to discuss will, motive, etc. I must try to answer the question- What is an action? Because action is very closely connected to these concepts. Generally we define an action as voluntary, as well as involuntary bodily movements. In this sense actions are not only intentional or voluntary but also habitual or involuntary. Reflex action, habitual action or actions done from outward pressure are also classified as actions. Thus an action is equivalent to a bodily movement. But this definition of action is not adequate to our present purpose. I must confine myself to that range of the theory of action where an action is defined as an voluntary, intentional, purposeful bodily movement. Philosophers define actions as that- which are done not only intentionally but also deliberately can be regarded as actions par excellence. An action is a contraction of muscles, or a motion or stillness of our body, which has resulted from certain mental goings-on.

Action is an overt bodily event which is done along with the presumably mental 'doing of the event'. A movement can be counted as an action imputable to a person only to the degree to which it approximates to an action, performed intentionally, with an awareness of alternative possibilities, and of the agent's free-will. We can very well make a distinction between my raising my arm and my arm rising. In raising my arm, I remain fully conscious of what I am doing and that I am doing it willingly. It is within my control to regulate the movement. But in case of my arm rising I may or may not remain conscious, sometimes, I even observe such an involuntary movements of my arm. In such a case I may not be able to give reasons, when legitimately asked, for my action. Here I cannot regulate my arm's movement.

According to Prichard a movement can be said action only if that movement is done willingly. He insisted that 'to act is really to will something' and that 'a human action is an activity of willing some change'. When a sleeping man moves his arm he does not act for he does not will anything. We can bring about a movement in the activity sense, only by willing that movement. The bodily actions of men typically involves a mental action of volition or willing, and that such mental acts are, in at least important sense,

the basic actions we perform when we do things like raise arm.

I

Now, will may be regarded as the capacity for voluntary movements irrespective of whether such an action covers only external behaviour or also mental activities. We very well know how to use the term 'willing' but we are incapable of giving any definition of it. It is a peculiar mental activity by which we bring about a change in our behaviour. Traditionally, this kind of mental activity considered as the cause of a man's voluntary movements is called willing.

G. Ryle in his book 'Concept of Mind' has criticised the traditional theory of 'will' as mythical entities. He tried to establish that there is no hidden operation of willing which translates itself in the overt action. He argued that if volitions are genuine mental events from which a physical action follows, it should be possible for the human beings, those who undergo such a mental process, to answer the questions about their nature, intensity, timing, etc. But no one would ever be able to answer such questions. People are unable to give any description of such a inner conscious process of mind.

Again, volition is postulated to be that which makes a bodily movement as well as mental happening voluntary. So what of volitions themselves? Are they voluntary or involuntary? If the latter, then how can the actions that¹ issued from them be voluntary? If the former, then they must themselves proceed from prior volitions, and those from other volitions and so on ad infinitum.

Considering Ryle's criticism it can be said that his approach towards the traditional doctrine of 'will' is negative. What does Ryle mean by volition? On the one hand he criticised the doctrine of there being mental state and processes, on the other hand he talked about competence, intelligent capacity, etc. Can these terms be thought of as being devoid of any mental process? There is, no doubt, that the concept of will plays an important role in the philosophical discourse. Following Ryle's steps what can we say about will? Though Ryle has put a great stress on the behaviouristic activity of men. No doubt, we judge one's will by interpreting one's behaviour, "but the behavioural clues on which people rely are only the evidence of his intention and do not constitute it."¹

' H.A. Prichard made a move which is quite different from what Ryle said about will. The influential conclusion

of Aristotle, that acting requires a desire, led Prichard to maintain that an act of volition involves a desire, willing a movement results from, and could not occur without a certain desire. "It is the desire of the willing of"² something. Although willing is an activity, it cannot, for Prichard, be directly brought about by further willing. What we will, he says, is always "some change of state of something or person",³ and the activity of willing is not, in his view, a change of this kind. "An action" he says, "is an activity of willing some change... and in some case a physical change."⁴ By using the words "some cases" he makes it clear that there are changes which are not physical changes. The changes which we will are actions. The statement that 'John moved his hand' asserts that John performed certain action in the activity sense of the word and that by moving his hand he brought about a change. He willed his hand to move and thereby performed an action. The action a man performs in moving his hand could also be performed if, owing to paralysis, his hand failed to move. This suggests that the action statement 'John moved his hand' asserts the something as 'John willed his hand to move.' Prichard was aware of the difficulty that is involved here and said that John's activity of willing his hand to move would not "ordinarily be called an action"⁵ if his hand did not move. He insisted that John's activity of willing

is still "of the same sort" as what we ordinarily call an action. He grants that willing can result from a desire to will something but denies that it can result from a further willing. In any case if willing is some sort of doing which one performs not by means of other doing- one wills and that is the end of the matter. Thus to speak of willing as he does, is not therefore to invite the kind of vicious regress Ryle speaks of when criticising 'The myth of volition'.

Prichard's conception of 'will' reminds us what C.H. Whiteley said in his book 'Mind in action'. He opines that every volition is the outcome of some desire. It is always the strongest desire that determines the will. He considered desire as passive whereas 'will' as active mental states. The will is exhibited in intentional or voluntary action. When I am willingly moving my arm, I am not aware of two things, I am not aware of first doing something else which is followed by the movement of my arm.

(Generally it is supposed that a voluntary action is such where people act according to the dictates of the will. It is true that whenever we will we perform some action either physically or mentally. Wittgenstein say, "Willing, if it is not to be a sort of wishing, must be the action itself. It cannot be allowed to stop anywhere short of action."⁷ Such action not necessarily be

physical. We can rightfully make such expressions like "so far as he, but not necessarily, his arm, was concerned, he moved his arm."⁸ Thus Vesey concludes, "He moved his arm, except that it can be true even when 'his arm moved' is false."⁹

What ^I/have tried to show is that both Ryle and these 'introvert' philosophers have gone to the extreme. Ryle's behaviouristic view towards volition, devoid of any mental process is as much unacceptable as what Pri- chard and Vesey said about will. The extreme view, the 'introvert' philosophers produce like 'I will to move my hand and thereby I perform a mental action' is difficult to accept. Whenever I will something, I will it whether I materialise it physically or not. And if we are to accept 'willing' to move one's hand is the action itself then we equate will with action and therefore, whatever is will is an action. If will is nothing but action then the very possibility of asking whether an action has a causal connexion with will, does not arise. But as a matter of fact, the problem regarding causality and action occupies an important place in the philosophers' world. And I am interested in showing in the next chapter what can be said on this problem./

II

The Oxford English Dictionary defines motive as

'that which 'moves' or induces a person to act in a certain way; a desire, fear, or other emotion, or a consideration of reason, which influences or tends to influence a person's volition; also often applied to a contemplated result or object of desire of which tends to influence volition'. Motive is something which makes a man to act in a certain way. It moves a man towards a particular goal. Such a motive can be emotion of certain types. A motive influences a man's volition or induces a man to perform a voluntary action. When we are motivated to act in a certain way we are in a way conscious of what we are doing or at least able to find out the reason and that we are doing according to our own desire and will and we have some objectives in our mind while performing an action from a motive. Thus a motive-action has demarcated from those of habitual action, reflex action and actions which we perform under the pressure of some external forces. Actions which are done from a motive are actions where we have always some further end to achieve. Reflex action, habitual action, actions done by accident, actions which we perform for the sake of performing them, etc. are actions for which there can be no explanation in terms of motive. A murder which was committed merely because the murderer wanted to kill a man without any reason or any goal to achieve by murdering

that man, is an action without a motive, if this act were done out of jealousy or for money, etc., then the murder would have a motive. Thus, "the great majority of motive explanation of action do fit the paradigm of explaining the action by assigning a further end towards the accomplishment of which the action was directed"¹⁰ says Sutherland.

R.S. Peter, in his book 'Motives and motivation', tries to show the characteristics of motive as an explanatory concept in ordinary language. According to him motives are a particular class of reasons. Motive-words serve as the reasons for action. We can ask for a reason for an action 'what was his motive?' and he gives a motive-explanation by showing the reasons for which he has acted in a particular way. A motive-question is generally asked when an action does not conform to the customs or where there is a breakdown of conventional expectation. We do not generally ask 'why' when someone is playing chess or getting married. But we ask for a man's reason for committing a murder because this action is not characteristic of him. Thus, a motive-action needs justification. We often ask for motives when there is a departure from a habit or usual process; for it is just in these sorts of contexts that men have to justify their actions. Peter says,

"It is used in context where conduct is being assessed and not simply explained, where there is a breakdown in conventional expectation."¹¹

'Motives are particular class of reason' says Peter and such reasons must of directed sort. Whenever we ask for a motive, we ask for reasons in support of the done action. When one's action is not within our social convention we look for such a reason which is operative in that particular context. Directedness of motive is one of the most important characteristics. Peter says, "It is used to refer to a reason of a deirecte sort and implies a directed disposition in the individual whose conduct is being assessed."¹² An example Peter gave of a directedness of reason is 'His motive for marrying the girl was greed.' As this is not a conventional means of fulfilling one's greed, so the usual reasons for getting married do not fit his case. Such directness of reasons distinguishes a motive from other types of actions. For instance, we can explain a man's actions in terms of traits of character, such as, considerateness. Considerateness may be the reason why a people act ~~an~~ a certain way. But this cannot be treated as motive, for a considerate man does not have any definite sort of goal towards which his action is directed.

"It must state the reason why a person acts, a reason that is operative in the situation to be explained. The motive may coincide with 'his' reason but it must be 'the' reason why he acts."¹³

There are reasons which induce a man to act in a certain way. Such reasons may be agent's own reasons or may be reasons which justify the action in that particular circumstances. Psychologists are interested in showing the difference that exists between 'his reason' and 'the reason' why a person acts in a certain way. Our actions must be rule-governed. Thus when we see a man walking very fast towards a shop and ask him the reason behind his walking so fast, we come to know that he is going to buy some tobacco. 'To buy tobacco' is his "reason". Walking towards a shop is not only 'his' reason for buying tobacco but it is really a means for all to get tobacco. His way of getting tobacco is not something unconventional. If there is no other reason except buying tobacco then 'his' reason coincides with 'the' reason. We sometimes say that 'his' reason may have been 'x' but 'the' reason why he acted like that was 'y'. Thus a man's reason may be buying tobacco but 'the' reason why he walked so fast is to see the girl who was looking in the window of the tobacconist. To speak of 'the' reason is a way to call attention to the law under which the given case falls. According to Peter, our reason must not only be 'our'

reason but it must be 'the' reason which would be appropriate to a particular context. Psychologists speak of 'unconscious' motive where the persons do not entertain their goals as conscious objectives. As the person is unconscious of his goal he cannot have 'his' reason but only 'the' reason which is justifiable. Repressed wish, etc. can be treated as 'the' reason why a person acts in a particular way. As a person is unconscious of his wish, the reason for acting in a certain way, cannot be 'his' reason.

Now, against Peter's account of motive, which serves as the reason for action, it can be said that a reason cannot be one's motive. We need to distinguish between motive and reason. Reasons by themselves are not motives. Of course, when a man produces reasons for an action, we can find out the motive considering such reasons. We cannot equate a reason with a motive. When asked for motive, we give reasons for performing an action and such reasons cannot be treated as motive. We can give reasons like - John killed Henry because Henry had killed John's brother, that Henry had beaten John several times, etc. but these are only reasons and not motives. The motive that John had behind killing Henry was 'revenge'. Killing John's brother, etc. are reasons whereas taking revenge is a motive.

Again, Peter says, "Motives, then, are reasons for actions which are asked for when there is a issue of justification...."¹⁴ D.S. Mannison while discussing 'My motive and its reasons', said that it is troublesome. The question arises in what sense he is using the term justification? Obviously he is not asking for moral justification. Suppose I ask John to give reason for marrying a particular girl and I am answered, "out of greed", in what way is John's action "justified" by this reply? What would count as justification in this case?

There are some psychologists according to whom, we have motive for everything that we do, that all our behaviour is motivated, and thereby they ignore the fact that there are some characteristics special for a motive action which the other types of actions lack. For instance, in case of motive we ask of a reason for an action because there is a departure from the conventional expectation. We ask, 'what is his motive for committing a murder?' The implication is that the action is not characteristic of him. A habitual action or a reflex action can never be treated as motivated action. These actions are stereotyped. These are performed almost automatically. We do not have any reason while doing anything habitually. Though, it is true that like a motive-action, sometimes, our habitual actions are also directed towards goals, but we are not

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totally conscious of such a goal directed behaviour and therefore, unable to give reasons. McClelland, the Psychologist, tries to resist the tendency of considering everything that we do are done from motive. He claims that the concept of motive is useful only if it has some sort of limited base. He holds, "the essence of motivation is its capacity to elicit alternative behavioural manifestations. This would differ from acting out of habit."¹⁵ If we accept the view that we have motive for everything that we do, then the criteria, that we use for distinguishing a motive-action from other sorts of action, would be meaningless. All actions would become motive-action, they would be of same category. Thus Peter concludes, "... from the point of view of ordinary usage it is bad enough for Psychologists to suggest that we might have motive for everything that we do."¹⁶

In chapter IV of 'Concept of Mind' G. Ryle has expressed his view about motive. His main contention is to describe motive as propensities, traits of character or behaviour trends. According to him, we should not correlate motive with an 'occult cause', but we should bring it under a behaviour trends. A motivated action is such while doing it the agent is

"acting more or less critically, carefully, consistently and purposefully, adverbs which do not signify the prior or concomitant

occurrence of extra operations of resolving, planning or cogitating, but only that the action taken is itself done not absentmindedly, but in a certain positive frame of mind." -¹⁷ says Ryle.

Ryle gives an example of motive by using the term 'vanity'. A person is said to be vain if he acts in a certain way under certain circumstances. Vanity is more or less a lasting-trait in his character, which is also a dispositional property. A dispositional statement can be expressed in hypothetical proposition as 'whenever situations of certain sorts have arisen, he has always or usually tries to make himself prominent.'

Ryle explains motive in terms of behaviour, there is no such mental states or processes, which Ryle calls 'occult cause', behind an action. A vain person is not undergoing a peculiar mental states or vanity does not have any 'occult' cause, it simply implies that he talks a lot, rejects criticism and so on. 'Vanity' refers only to the 'overt' performances. Now, when we judge others motive we do interpret their behaviour, but the behavioural clues on which they rely are evidences of their motive and do not constitute vanity. Moreover, I do not rely on my behaviour while acting from a motive. On this matter I have a unique authority.

Ryle concentrates only on the use of such single

words, for instance, vanity, patriotism, etc., to answer questions about motives. But how far explaining behaviour by use of one of these words is explaining it by pointing to the end to which it is directed? N.S. Sutherland expressed his view that when we say someone does something from vanity, part of what we mean by being vain is that a person enjoy contemplating his own imagined good points or that he dislikes contemplating his own feeling etc. A single word 'vanity', without any description of behaviour, does not explain a motive properly. Moreover he says,

"although, vanity may function as a motive word it often does not: a person may be vain knows he is vain and deliberately refrain from doing thing out of vanity. If he looks pleased when praised for something trivial, or downcast when criticised, we shall know he is vain: but vanity is not his motive for feeling pleased or downcast."¹⁸

Ryle tries to assimilate motive explanation to dispositional explanation. Motives are not themselves dispositions. Being of certain disposition or having a certain propensity may be reason which explains one's behaviour, but motive is not itself disposition. A.R. White expressed his view that an inclination, which Ryle uses as an alternative to motive, "is a disposition but not motive, although inclination may furnish the motive.

The fact that a man is inclined to do something may provide a motive for one's doing it but motive is not inclination itself."¹⁹

Again, when there is no idea of a purpose or goal but only the exercise of disposition, the disposition does not serve as motive though it is a reason. For example, vain people often do vain things automatically. Dispositions which compel a man to do something are not motives. Vanity is a motive but whenever a vain people does something without being aware of it, he is not acting from motive. The antithesis of acting from motive and not acting from motive is bound up with the purposive and not purposive, and not with that of disposition and not disposition. A man can have disposition to behave in certain way without being aware of it. But he cannot have a motive, nor can he does intentionally, or on purpose, without being aware of that he does so.

Ryle uses character traits as motive. But if we are to take directness of motive as one of the characteristics, then we cannot treat most of the character traits as motive. We have already seen that 'considerateness' which is a character-trait, is not a motive, as it does not have any definite goal to attain. Goodness and 'badness'

do not function in motive explanations of behaviour. A good man does good things just because he wants to and not to achieve some further end. Although, of course, the good man may presumably pursue good ends.

So far I have discussed what philosophers have said about motive. To my mind, motive word should include both 'outward' and 'inward' activity of man. Motives are not reasons, but a man when acting from motive, must be able to give reasons for his action. He is acting consciously, with purpose and has a particular aim to fulfil.

III

Generally we take motive and intention as having almost the same sense and often use them interchangeably. The characteristics that a motive word has, are sharable by intention also. We can say that an intentional action is such where the agent while engaged in acting something know, and is able to specify the action which he is doing. When a person has done something, for example, struck another person, the question whether he did it intentionally or unintentionally may arise. And if such an action is intentional, that is, if he is not working under any pressure or if he is ignorant of the fact or if it is only a habitual action, then he must be able to give the

honest answer. Because intentional action makes a man answerable to his deeds. We ask 'did you do that intentionally? When such an action is not characteristic of him or when there is a conventional expectation. Usually the suggestion arises from the fact that what he has done is abnormal or wrong in some way or that it is something which ordinary people would not do except unintentionally. The whole meaning of intentionality lies simply in its negation of accident or mistake. According to Hampshire and Hart, if an action is intentional they must satisfy two different kinds of requirement.

- (1) "The agent must have ordinary empirical knowledge of certain features of his environment and of the nature and characteristics of certain things affected by his movements, (2) the agent must know that what he was doing is different from other non-accidental actions performed at the same time."²⁰

Such characteristics are equally applicable to motive.

G.E.M. Anscombe has made a distinction between motive and intention. She considers love, pity, hatred, revenge and some such mental goings-on as motives. According to her, "Intention is what he aims at or chooses", whereas "motive determines the aim."²¹ Intention helps to perform an action whereas motive can be treated as the

cause of such intention. We sometimes say- 'to release himself from this awful suffering' he has done something, here as long as we are talking about the "spirit" with which an man has done something, we are talking about motive. But as soon as we consider the done action we are concerned with one's intention and can rightfully put the question "why?" A motive is that which produces or brings about a choice. According to Anscombe motive for an action "has a rather wider and more diverse application than intention with which the action was done."²² Philosophers are interested in considering 'gain' as intention whereas 'desire for gain' is motive. Motives imply desire but intention does not.

According to A.R. White, intentions cannot be properly quoted as motive for action. To cite a motive is necessarily to offer an explanation, whereas to mention an intention is not. He gives an example by saying that if someone goes to Australia with the intention both of visiting his grand children and of returning to England before Christmas, the latter intention cannot be the explanation of his journey to Australia, even if the former can; whereas whatever is quoted as one of his motives for journey must be part of the explanation.

According to Barnes and Falk, the question as to how 'motive' is related to 'intention' seems the question

whether an explanation of a person's conduct in terms of intentions can be said to be a motive type explanation, and not the question whether a motive is or is not part of an intention, whether it precedes, follows, etc.

Anscombe said that motives are not intentions and do not have intention as component part. An action is intentional if the question 'why did you do that?' has application in the sense in which it asks for a reason for action. She talked about three kinds of motives, forward-looking, backward-looking, and motive-in-general. She says, "I call a motive forward-looking if it is an intention."²³ Examples are 'to gain wealth, fame or happiness. One has a backward-looking motive if "something (that) has happened (or is at present happening) is given as the ground for an action or abstention that is good or bad for the person....at whom it is aimed."²⁴ Examples are revenge, pity, gratitude, remorse, etc. Finally, motive-in-general give something like light in which the action is to be seen and seem to require a "description of the feelings prompting the action or of the thought that had gone with it."²⁵ Examples are acting out of love, hatred, friendship, etc.

Now, to consider motive as totally distinct from intention is impossible. Intention, which is a forward-

looking motive, can be found in backward-looking motive. Susan L. Feagin expresses the view that one can act from revenge, which is a backward-looking motive, only if one intends to harm someone. If he is ultimately to help he is not motivated by revenge. One acts out of gratitude if he intends to help those to whom he is grateful. Similar specifications of intentions for each backward looking motive can be made. "Backward-looking motives, then, do not form a totally distinct class of motive, but involves a forward-looking component"²⁶ — says S.L. Feagin.

One action has to be thought of by the agent as doing good or harm of some sort while acting with a backward looking motive. Such thoughts must be intentions with which one acts, as the thoughts of doing good or harm are the objectives of one's action.

If there is no intention related to the motive-in-general i.e. love, hatred, etc. then one would say that he is only expressing emotion while acting in a certain way and not acting from motive. And therefore, motive-in-general cannot be treated as motive words.

From the above discussion it becomes clear that the notion of will is involved in other mental states from which a man acts, that whenever I act from a motive,

intention or, I act willingly, I am aware of what I am doing. A bodily movement which can be considered as action, generally follows from a will, motive or intention. Whenever I am acting from a particular motive or intention, I have a will to act accordingly. Motive and intention have a necessary relationship with will. Action not done willingly, cannot be treated as motivated or intentional action. Reflex-action, action done under pressure, are not done voluntarily and therefore, they cannot form the part of motive or intentional actions. Various attempts have been made to exhibit the relation between intention volition etc. on the one hand and actions on the other. Now whether there exists a causal or logical relationship that I shall discuss in my next chapter.

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Causation and Human action

In recent philosophy there has been two issues concerning the relationship between an action on the one hand and motive, intention, will, etc. on the other. From a particular motive to perform an action, a man performs the action. Such motive, intention, etc "accompany" our actions, or from such "mental phenomena", action follows. The question generally arises- does it causally follow or logically follow, or whether explanation by reason is or is not as species of explanation by cause.

Accordingly there are two groups of philosophers. One group holds that explanation by reasons in causal explanation, the other groups holds that explanation by reason can never be causal explanation, as the reasons that we give while explaining an action cannot satisfy the causal conditions.

Now, what are the conditions that must be satisfied while explaining something causally? According to David Hume, "We may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to second¹." If we analyse the Humean idea of a causal relation- that must hold between events when one is the cause of other, we can say: A causes B if (a) it is logically possible for A

to exist without B and vice versa, (b) there is a non-trivial empirical generalisation to the effect that whenever there occurs event of a type to which A belongs there occurs a subsequent event of a type to which B belongs.

It is clear that cause and effect are two different entities. They are two events. Hume says "... the idea of cause and effect are evidently distinct...." They are logically independent in such a way that the existence or non-existence of the one must in no way logically entail the existence and non-existence of the other.

Cause-effect relationships are instances of generalisation. Whenever we see a cause we appeal either explicitly or implicitly to a generalisation which links cause and effect by stating that whenever the prior circumstances obtain the event follows.

A causal relationship can be known only on the basis of inductive evidence. In the ordinary cases, to know that A is the cause of B rather than a mere accidental predecessor of B, one must have evidence.

There is a tendency amongst philosophers to

explain human actions causally. They take reasons as the causes of actions. McCracken holds that one's aroused motive or one's character is the fundamental cause of one's actions. It is necessary to hold motives are causes if we are to attribute to them a true importance. '...that it is somehow to belittle motive to deny that they are causes'- says McCracken.

It can be said that the concept of action belongs to a sphere of discourse quite different from that in which the notion of causal explanation finds its place. Whenever we perform an activity with certain motive, we remain aware that we have alternative courses open to us and that we can choose and decide between the actions, and therefore we are in no way bound to act or that our action is not causally determined. J.O. Urnson, in his article "Motives and Causes", made a distinction between the following sorts of questions: 'what was the point of his doing that? What made him do that? What led him do that? What was his reason for doing it? etc. The general conclusion was that it would be futile to attempt to accommodate all the different situations in which these questions are asked into an over all explanatory model of causal type. Where we can ask what made or possessed the agent to act there we cannot ask for his reason.

Again, if an action is the effect of something

or if it is an event, then it merely happens to persons who are thereby rendered passive and "helpless victims"² of events which befall them rather than active agents doing things on their own. An event is that which occurs but an action is that which a man performs. Human actions are not events. No person is an event. So he cannot cause another event to occur. Therefore, action is not an event.

Causal relation demands two distinct events. Melden says that a cause must be logically distinct from the alleged effect'. But our reason for an action is not logically distinct. If a motive of one kind (M_1) is causally connected with an appropriate action (M_2) then M_1 must be a description which is available to the agent and which meets the requirement of causal isolation but such a description has not yet been found. Intention and motive cannot be individuated or identified as mental processes without mentioning their logical relation to the objectives, or action. Actions are the expressions of our motive, intention, etc. Melden says "... The willing in question cannot be a cause of the muscle movement, since the reference to the muscle movement is involved in the very description of willing"³.

D.W. Hamlyn says that to give a causal explanation of an event requires being able to show how, other

things being equal, a change in one of a given set of variables is a sufficient condition of a change in another. However, if this sort of explanation is to be applied to human behaviour, it seems to require that we should be able to specify actions exhaustively in terms of movements of the body for only in this way could we set down a set of variables. But he says that it is impossible to say how a person must move in order to be said to have signed a contract, precisely what movements he must make. He may hold his pen between his toes. All we can do is lay down certain very general specification, as signing. So we can never give a sufficient explanation of an action in causal terms, because we can never specify the movements which would have to count as dependent variables.

Similarly, human action cannot be taken as instances of generalisation. For example, it is not always true that whenever I feel faint, I put my head down between my legs, although very often I do so. I may sometimes, lay down or do other thing. Similarly feeling, willing etc., may get different expressions in different times and places.

Inductive evidence is not needed in case of an action done willingly. A man knows his reason for acting in a particular way without any evidence. When I say 'It is raining' I need evidences to believe it. Humean causal

statements are like "it is raining", in that a person making them can be mistaken but my reasons have the logical feature of first person utterance like 'I have pain'. Our avowals may be sincere-insincere, but it does not make sense to say that they are mistaken. They need no evidence.

Dr Davidson is quite aware of the above difficulties and tried to reply them in his article 'Action, Reasons, and Causes'. He discusses that explanation by reasons are basically explanations of what one has done because of reasons one has and that one has reasons for acting if and only if having reasons causally effects one's action. He say primary reason for action is its cause."⁴ For him having reason means (a) "having some sort of Pro-attitude towards actions of certain kind, and (b) believing that his action is of that kind."⁵

Philosophers who assimilate reasons to causes have pointed out that both causal explanation and explanation in terms of reasons can be signified by the words 'because' and 'cause' and even reason. Each explanation may on suitably described occasions give the necessary and sufficient conditions of the occurrence of what is to be explained. Davidson say "if, as Melden claims, causal explanations are wholly irrelevant to the understanding we seek of human action then we are without an analysis

of the because in 'He did it because....', where we go on to name a reason"⁶

The first difficulty in treating primary reasons as causes, is that primary reasons are states, dispositions and not events. Davidson replies that events are closely associated with the primary reasons. States, dispositions are not events but the onslaught of state and dispositions is. Those who tried to show that mental states are not events, have the idea that an event must be observable or they must be like a stab, a qualm, a prick, etc. But in driving a car the driver knows his turn is coming up and he signalled. If we ask the driver 'why did you raise your arm' we learn from his answer the event that caused his action. We sometimes even cannot mention the reason and give answer like- 'finally I made up my mind'- here we are ignorant of the event that caused my action, but there are events. When a bridge collapses because of its structural defect, we do not see the preceding event. But, Davidson say that though we are ignorant of the event, "we are sure there was such an event or sequence of events"⁷

We have seen before that causal relation demands two distinct events but a reason is not logically distinct from an action. But, Davidson says that our primary reasons like desires, wants, etc., cannot be defined in terms of

the action they rationalise. Primary reason and action are distinct. Our desire for doing an action cannot explain an action in the way the solubility of a thing explains its dissolving. Here the very nature of the thing is found in the thing itself. To describe an event in terms of its cause is not to identify the event with its cause. When I flip the switch, I am caused by my wanting to turn on the light, and my wanting and action are not identical. If there is any link between my turning on the light and my wanting to turn on the light, it must be grammatical rather than logical. Thus our primary reason, i.e. our desire, belief, wants, etc are distinct from our action.

Against the opinion that we can know our own reason for action without any inductive-evidences, and causal relation demands evidences, therefore the relation between reason and action is not causal, Davidson holds the view that sometimes we are wrong about our own reasons. Especially, when there are two reasons for an action, e.g. one wants to save Charles from pain and wants him out of the way. In such a case one may be wrong about which motive made him poison Charles. One may, after sometimes accept public or private evidences showing that he is wrong about his reason, but he does not have evidence and makes no observations. Here one's knowledge of one's reason is not

inductive because where there is induction, there is evidence, but the lack of this inductive evidence does not prove that the relation between reasons and actions is not causal. Induction is no doubt a good way of learning the truth of a particular law but that does not mean that it is the only way to learn the truth says Davidson. Causal relation exists even without any direct inductive evidence.

Davidson opines that in case of motive and desire- which are the causes of actions, we cannot apply generalisation. Human causal relationship does not hold between a motive and action. Hume's definition of cause-effect relation is ambiguous, it may mean that a causal statement of the form 'A' caused B' entails some particular law in terms of the description 'A' and 'B' or it may mean that 'A and B' entails only that there exists a causal law instantiated by some true descriptions of A and B. On the first version, a causal statement of the form 'A and B', would entail covering law. But on the second version it would not be used to predict the occurrence of B without replacing its descriptions of A and B with the descriptions 'A' and 'B'.

Davidson avoids the difficulties of making reason

fit the covering law model by holding that only second version of Hume's account, which does not fit the covering law model, can be made to fit most causal explanation including rationalisation' or explanation in terms of reason.

The view, that whenever we are caused to act in a certain way, we are helpless victim and we are not responsible for our action, is not true. Davidson holds that the source of this mistake is that we tend to assume that a cause demands a causer'. But some causes have no agents. The states in us are reasons as well as causes, and such state does not make a man victim of it, but makes a person its voluntary agent.

Davidson claims that if a primary reason is to be the agent's reason, then that primary reason must also satisfy the conditions that it is a cause. But the term 'cause' stands for a thing which we cannot choose, whose very nature is that it is determined by some other thing. Whereas a reason is that which I choose from a number of possible reasons. James, E. White says that avowed reasons for an action are not causal explanation. The reason that I avow for my action is 'my reason', I choose that from a number of possible reasons.

"An avowed reason could not be causal explanation because there is no causal

condition for, say, insulting a man and stating scientific laws covering insulting remarks were explicitly stated i.e. if such-and-such antecedent conditions obtain, then events of the same kind as insulting will occur"⁸ - says J.E. White

Again a person does not always avow a primary reason when he explains his action. For he might have reasons avowed for insulting a stranger at a party was simply "because I just did not like him", and this is not primary reason. For he could truthfully say, "before I uttered my jibe, I really did not want to insult the fellow, but when it came out, I suddenly wanted to say it." But Davidson's primary reason would be (1) because I wanted to do it, and (2) because I believed that remark would insult him. For it consists of a pro-attitude and a belief about it. J.W. White says .

"....but in this case my avowed reason expresses my negative con-attitude' (dislike) of a person, not a pro-attitude towards my action. It is a dislike and not belief about him or my action. In fact it seems absurd to speak of an expression of dislike as a "belief" at all, for this would absurdly imply that my expression is based on evidence."⁹

Avowed reason for an action is not cause of that action. Even if my avowed reason for insulting did refer to some past event, this past event would not necessarily be a cause. My remark may only be an expression of contempt for this stranger. Even not only I might be ignorant of the

cause of my behaviour, but the cause might be completely different from my avowed reason. The cause may be that I am angry because I had a quarrel with my friend and this is the cause of my outburst. Thus a cause cannot be my reason.

Davidson fails to distinguish two very different ways in which a primary reason can result in an action, (a) the primary reason is the agent's reason for acting; (b) it is the cause of his action or it caused his action. D.E. Milligan gave one example of a man whose desire for alcohol may be his reason for taking a drink, or it may cause him to take a drink; the first would be a voluntary action, second a compulsive involuntary action. If we compare the case of an ordinary drinker, with that of an alcoholic then in each case we may find the same primary reason. Each of them has a desire for alcohol, each of them believes that the action in question is of a sort to satisfy that desire. If what Davidson says is accepted, then in order for the ordinary drinker's desire for alcohol to be his reason for his action, it must also be the cause of that action.

In the first case the desire for alcohol was something the agent could have decided not to satisfy, and as this was a deliberative action the agent decided how far

his desire for alcohol was to affect his action. In the second, the agent is addicted to alcohol, he has a craving for it he cannot but try to satisfy his desire. Thus in explaining the two actions the desire is related to the action differently in each case. In the one a decision of the agent makes the desire his reason for the action; in the other the desire directly causes the action; whatever the agent may think or feel about that desire. Thus if the agent can make that decision and he can act on it, than the action is to be explained in terms of the agent's reasons. If he cannot the action is to be explained causally.

Petero suggested that explanation of human behaviour in terms of a "purposive, rule-following model" is the only appropriate sort of explanation to give except in cases where there is obvious reason to think that a person is deviating from the accepted set of standards for behaving in some situation. Only when this happens, we ask what caused a person to behave in a way he did.

Petero makes the objection to many so called theories in Psychology that they attempt to divorce the constraints, predisposing factors or antecedent conditions from the conceptual requirement of the model and talk simply in terms of mechanical forces as the sole determinants of behaviour, as the Psychologists hold that if we know enough

about the processes going on in the body- particularly in the brain- then we should be able to specify sufficient conditions for the occurrence of a particular piece of behaviour.

Whenever we explain one's action in terms of some standards and rules, his action is not caused by something else. 'Jones crossed the road because.... we must give here a sufficient explanation of Jones' action. Peters says,

"to ascribe a point to one's action is ipso-facto to deny that it can be 'sufficiently' explained in terms of causes, though, of course, there will be many causes in the sense of 'necessary conditions. A story can always be told about the underlying mechanism; but this does not add up to a sufficient explanation, if it is an action that has to be explained" 10

If Jones' crossing the road is not an action done from certain reasons, but only something that happens to Jones then we can deny it as a human action. A causal explanation in terms of internal and external stimulation would be counted as Jones' suffering rather than performing an action. Again, in case of causal explanation there involves a spatial and temporal contiguity between the movements. But this sort of explanation of human action is inappropriate as "we can never specify an action exhaustively in terms of movements of the body."¹¹ For a human action is

inseparable from will to perform that action. A precise functional relationship between movements that we make while performing an action could never be established.

Again, reasons, wants, etc cannot be treated as mental events as causing the action through some spiritual mechanism whose operation is as yet imperfectly understood. There is always openness between performing or failing to perform an action. If there were a causal link between reason and action, the action would cease to be voluntary. It may be that there is a causal generalisation to the effect that those who have been without food for some days cannot help grabbing the first food they see, irrespective of all consideration for others. If so, there is a good case for saying that their movements are causally determined by their hunger, and they cease to be voluntary actions. In the normal case of motivated action this is not so. A man who gives a present out of generosity is not compelled to give by anything, not even by his generosity. The voluntary actions of an agent are not caused by anything, neither by the agent's desires, nor by the agent himself. Whatever he does he does it according to his own will, power and knowingly. There is no mysterious causal link between volition and action.

Davidson, says, "I flip the switch, turn on the

light, and illuminate the room. Unbeknowst to me I also alert a prowler to the fact that I am home. Here I do not do for things, but only one, of which four descriptions have been given".¹² In his opinion the said actions are identical as the same bodily movements are involved. In the article 'individuation of events', Davidson suggests that events are identical if and only if they have exactly the same cause and effect. Identical actions have identical causal role. In reply to Davidson, Goldman¹³ says that many pairs of acts (Davidson) would class as identical do not have exactly the same causes or do not have exactly the same effects. Goldman gave an example that by playing piono, John puts Smith to sleep and awakens Brown. Since the playing, the awakening, and the putting to sleep involve the same action. But Goldman argues that while John's playing piano caused Smith to doze off, John's awakening Brown did not cause Smith to doze off. Thus, his playing and his awakening Brown differ in their effects, and on Davidson's view/^{of} events, they cannot be the same event. Events are identical only if they have exactly the same effects.

By the same reasoning, it seems Davidson must say John's playing is a different event from his putting Smith to sleep, since the playing did awaken Brown, and putting

Smith to sleep did not. Different events cannot be the same action. So either sameness of causal role or sameness of bodily movements must be rejected as the criterion of identity of actions.

In the above example of flipping the switch and turning on the light Davidson uses same bodily movements as the criterion of identity of actions. Goldman sees a difficulty here for Davidson. He says that since no asymmetric and irreflexive relation can hold between a given thing, and itself we must conclude that the acts in example are not identical.

G.E.M. Anscombe in her article "Intention" made a point that same bodily movements cannot be treated as the criterion of same actions. She gives an example of a man who moves his arm in a way which under the circumstances, constitutes working a pump, replenishing a water supply, and poisoning a household with tainted water. On Davidson's view he has performed just one action, to which our four descriptions differently refer. But Anscombe asks Are we to say that the man who moves his arm, operates the pump, replenishes the water supply, poisons the inhabitants, is performing four actions? Or only one? She answers: moving his arm up and down with his fingers round the pump

handle is, in these circumstances, operating the pump;
 in these circumstances it is replenishing the house-hold
 water supply; and in these circumstances, it is poisoning
 the household.¹⁴

Having the intention of operating the pump
 explains moving one's arm up and down on the pump handle
 - explains it, as Anscombe says, by interpreting the action,
 by answering a certain question "Why?" Thus- though one set
 of bodily movements is involved here we can not treat them
 as the same action. Interpretation plays an important role
 here for explaining human action. One's intention to operate
 the pump does not explain the action of poisoning the
 inhabitants at all, in the sense of providing reasons for
 the action done. Anscombe says that the reason or motive for
 doing something interprets an action- explains it thus-
 but the reason supplied for an action cannot be said to be
 the cause of the action. A particular series of movements
 may be interpreted in a number of different ways, for
 example, a movement of A's foot into B's shin may be
 interpreted as A's kicking B, A's clumsy attempt to per-
 form a certain dance step, or a completely involuntary
 movement. Thus a particular movement may be interpreted in
 a number of different ways.

There is a group of philosophers who try to

reconcile the two kinds of explanation of human behaviour, There is no inconsistency between according a privileged status to an agent's report of why he acted, and counting his reasons among the causes of his deed. C.H. Whitely, in his article 'Reasons and Causes', has given an example that Smith being threatened with a beating-up unless he hands over his wallet, promptly does so, and accounts for his action by saying 'I was too scared to do anything else'. This looks like a causal explanation because he might say that his fright compelled him to hand over his wallet. But here we can very well say that the avoidance of a beating-up an excellent reasons for parting with one's money.

According to them when we enquire into the causes of a man's behaviour we find that what they do is rational and purposive. Reasons do not operate in the absence or to the exclusion of causes; they function in a context in which causes are also functioning. The relevant differences, that exist between reasons and causes, are differences of degree. Reasons for action can never account for being done without reference to other factors which make an agent ready to accept them as reasons. Thus there does not exist any dichotomy between an action done from reasons and action done causally.

Of course, I have no intention to establish this thesis of reconciliation. In fact I want to show that reason in no way can be treated as cause- in the true sense of the term- 'cause'. And my next chapter will give an account of interpretation of human action which, in my mind, will make this point more clear.

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Interpretation

In the last part of the previous chapter I have said something about interpretation in a very nut-shell way and thereby tried to defend the position that human actions are not causally explicable. In this chapter my main concern will be interpretation, its nature and subject-matter.

What is an interpretation? What role does it play in the sciences of man? Charles Tylor in the article 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', made an attempt to answer these questions by saying that interpretation "is an attempt to make clear, to make sense of an object of study. This object which in some way is confused, incomplete, cloudy, seemingly contradictory- in one way or another unclear. The interpretation aims to bring to light an underlying coherence of sense."¹ Interpretation also deals with the confusingly interrelated forms of meaning. It is a matter of taking someone's utterance or behaviour in some context as giving a basis for ascribing a particular motive, attitude or experience to him, it is a matter of finding an explanation of some mental states. An example will make this point clear- Are X's political views the result of a reaction against his family background, or are they the result of sustained thought about the possible forms of social organisation? These are

the problems which arise in interpreting X's particular views. And we seek the correct answer by interpreting his actions most successfully. If we consider Anscomb's example of a man who moves his arm, operates the pump, replenishes the water supply, poisons the inhabitants, etc., we are in a fix to decide what he is actually doing. And we need the help of interpretation. Human actions are usually described by the purposes or end-state realised, and in case of Anscomb's man's action we try to understand his goals or purposes, the meaning of his action. And Anscomb says that interpretation is the only source by the help of which we can decide the purpose of that man's action.

If we are to understand an interpretation properly then we must see what it involves. Hermeneutical science deals with the confused forms of meaning. They are confused because such meanings in interpretation admit more than one expression. A meaning under different circumstances may have different expressions. Interpretation lays a claim to make a confused meaning clear. It explains a confused behaviour and such an explanation of behaviour makes sense of that behaviour. This "making sense of" is the proffering of an interpretation. Thus the task of interpretation is to restore the "real" meaning of an expression.

There are certain characteristics which an inter-

pretative meaning must satisfy. In an interpretation a meaning must always be for a human subject. Without such a subject the sense and coherence among the different concepts will be arbitrary. The subject must be a human subject.

Secondly, a meaning is of something. We must be able to distinguish between a given element - situation, action - and its meaning. A meaning must be of a substrate but that does not mean that meaning and substrate are physically separable. For otherwise, the task of making clear what is confused would be impossible.

Things have meaning in a field, in relation to the meaning of other things. There cannot be any such thing which is single, unrelated meaningful element. A change in one meaning in a field may lead to the change in another. The meaning of a word depends, for instance, on those words with which it contrasts; on those which defines its place in language. The introduction of new concepts will alter the boundaries of others. Therefore, the meaning in interpretation is 'experiential meaning'. Meaning changes with the changes in another thing in that particular field.

It is sometimes thought that the meaning in interpretation is only an extension of linguistic meaning. No doubt, there are likenesses as well as differences between

them. Linguistic meaning, like meaning in interpretation, is also for a human subject and it has meaning only in a field. But the meaning in language, unlike the meaning in interpretation, is of signifiers and it is about the world of referents. In interpretation we do not know the meaning of an expression by knowing the object it refers.

In interpretation an action makes sense when we find a coherence between the action of the agent and the meaning of his situation for him. We find his action puzzling until we find such a coherence. Likewise when we consider Anscombe's man's action we must be able to relate his action to the situation. His action will carry meaning only when we take his feeling, emotion, desire, etc. into consideration. We must take these mental phenomena and the situation as a whole and must relate them. Ultimately a good explanation of his action will satisfy us.

Of course there is every chance for people to doubt the explanation we offer by interpreting a man's action. An "interpretative dispute about meaning is potentially endless"- says Taylor.² Every affirmation may be challenged by a rival interpretation. This procedure may continue unless someone sees the adequacy of our interpretation. He must recognise the expression, which we are trying to interpret, and puzzling and must "...read the original language as we do..."³

We know that our interpretation is successful because the meaning is expressed in a new way, or if this does not satisfy our quest we must ultimately be able to ask the man about his motivation and settle the dispute. The agent is the ultimate authority to settle an interpretative dispute.

Interpretative dispute does not arise in case where human activities can be checked against some brute-data. It seems that political and social activities are checkable against some brute data. There are rules, and people who are active politically, their actions are constituted by such rules. People in a political group are more likely to consent to a certain sets of propositions supposedly expressing the values underlying the system. Their behaviour is verifiable against the rules of that institution. Political reality is made up of brute-data. Such brute-data are nothing but the activities and behaviour of people. There are constitutive rules and such are the basis for understanding a particular action. Such rules are constitutive in nature for they constitute an action. In this connection we can talk about J.R.Searle's⁴ conception of constitutive rules. He says that the constitutive rules are such that create or define our behaviour. For example, 'voting' is a political activity. What counts as voting can be checked against the rules constituting this notion of voting. What is essential to the practice of voting is that some decision or verdict be delivered, through

some criteria of preponderance out of a set of micro-choices. If there is no some such significance attached to our behaviour, no amount of marking and counting pieces of paper, rising hands, etc. amounts to voting. These constitute the practice of voting. Thus the rules of voting create the possibility of or define that activity. The activity is constituted by acting in accordance with the rules. Voting has no existence apart from these rules. These constitutive rules are the basis for the brute-data. against which an act of voting can be checked.

Such constitutive rules render the possibility of inter-subjective meaning. Every society has practices constituted by such rules. It is, therefore, possible for two societies to understand each other by understanding such rules and can follow a single practice. Thus, a man who is acting politically has a common language, belief, etc. shared by all others who are within this political institutions. These are the parts of inter-subjective meaning or common meaning. An inter-subjective meaning is such that it can be shared by all in the institution or society. It cannot be the property of a single person. It gives a common-language to talk about social reality and common understanding. We all are caught in these inter-subjective meaning as social beings. The social reality is constituted by brute-data and such brute-data in a society, are nothing

but acts of people as identified supposedly beyond interpretation by physical descriptions and they include the individual's attitude, beliefs, values, etc.

Constitutive rules are important for inter-subjective meaning but they exclude subjective meaning, for subjective meaning in no way tally with brute-data. Subjective meaning needs insight on part of the interpreter and not some rules written out there. The meanings and norms of a political activity is out there in the practice, and therefore, intersubjective meaning is possible. But subjective meaning requires insight which cannot be communicated by gathering brute-data alone. Hermeneutical science is founded on subjective meaning and not on brute-data, its most primitive data is reading of meaning.

I have said that political and social activities can be checked against brute-data, but it does not contain the whole truth. Society and political institutions which are made of individual agents cannot be totally based on brute-data like natural science. Men are self-defining beings and therefore, meanings are partially constituted by their self definition. Such self-definitions are nothing but interpretation.

It is argued that communication between men is possible if and only if words have only one meaning. That

meaning must be a literal meaning. A sentence containing more than one meaning cannot be smoothly communicated. Philosophers have gone to the extreme by saying that not to have one meaning is to have no meaning. More than one meaning in a sentence is equivalent to having no meaning at all. Meaning simply is what it is.

But the general theory of interpretation is operative in the notion of analogy, allegory and symbolic meaning. In the early stage hermeneutics were confined only to the interpretation of the Holy scriptures. And a proper understanding of a Holy scripture or an allegory, only in terms of the literal meaning it conveys, is not possible. A literal meaning is direct meaning. But in case of Reality, Metaphysics, we can not say anything directly. We interpret reality by saying something of something because the real meaning is indirect. We attain things by attributing meaning to a meaning.

I have said that hermeneutic science is founded on subjective meaning. But that does not mean total exclusion of inter-subjective meaning from the science of hermeneutics. For reading of meaning is the main concern of an interpretation. And therefore, in an interpretation "we need to go beyond the bounds of a science based on verification to one which would study the intersubjective

and common meanings embedded in social reality."⁵ In this sense political science, psycho-analysis, etc. are also hermeneutical because their most primitive data are readings of meanings. For them the 'hermeneutical circle' is unavoidable. Now what is the hermeneutical circle? C. Tylor says,

"An emotion term like 'shame' for instance, essentially refers to a certain kind of situation, the 'shameful' or 'humiliating', and a certain mode of response, that of hiding oneself, of covering up, or else 'wiping out' the 'blot'. That is, it is essential to the feeling's being identified as shame that it be related to this situation and give rise to this type of disposition. But this situation in its turn can only be identified in relation to feelings which it provokes; and the disposition is to a goal which can similarly not be understood without reference to the feelings experienced: The 'hiding' in question is one which will cover up my shame; it is not the same as hiding from an armed pursuer; we can understand what is meant by 'hiding' here if we understand what kind of feeling and situation is being talked about. We have to be within the circle."⁶

Now Psychoanalysis being a science of interpretation- as it is a search for meaning- must remain within the circle. But Freudian explanation of man's behaviour involves a notion of causal connection whereas the idea of

interpretation, that I have tried to outline above, is free from all sorts of causal explanation.

Freud interprets unconscious human behaviour; his interpretation is concerned with any set of signs that may be taken as a text to decipher, hence a dream or neurotic symptom, work of art, etc. He tries to find out some meaning of the neurotic behaviour of the dream of a man. In The Interpretation of Dream he says, "A child of under four years old reported having a dream that he had seen a big dish with a big joint of roast meat and vegetables on it. All at once the joint have been eaten up whole and without being cut up. He has not seen the person who ate it."⁷ This dream represents the child's wish for rich food. If we make an enquiry we shall find that the boy had been put on a milk diet for some days and the day he had the dream, he had to go to bed without any supper because he had been naughty. Here hunger is the cause for the child's dream. "It is clear that what fixes the meaning of the dream for Freud is its explanation in terms of causal powers of a wish"⁸ says M. Miri. The explanation Freud offered for neurotic behaviour is causal. He tried to spell out the meaning of certain actions, behaviour, dream, etc., whose surface meaning is obscure and confusing. And here is the need for interpretation. For the task of interpretation is to make clear

what is obscure and confusing. Freudian interpretation involves a notion of causality. Miri says, "The interpretation that psychoanalysts offers flow from certain fundamental assumption about the working of human psyche. And these assumptions are essentially causal."⁹ Thus while talking about Freudian interpretation we cannot but talk about his notion of causation.

In his classical analysis of causation David Hume pointed out that causation implies a regular conjunction of cause and effect and, furthermore the effect has a functional dependence upon the cause. Similarly in a careful study of explanation of human behaviour one can consider the nature of causation. In a somewhat negative statement it can be said that a cause of a phenomenon would be defined as any condition or occurrence, which if it did not exist, or had not existed, would result in the phenomenon not being precisely what it is observed to be. The explanation of a bit of human behaviour involves the discovery of a whole net-work of causal relationship. Freud assumed that all mental processes are causally determined slips of tongue, forgetting names, etc. are dependent upon the mental causes. All behaviour is dependent upon certain conditions and determinants. But there are differences between Humean causation and Freudian causation. We can say that Hume's causation is applicable only in natural

sciences whereas Freud's causation is intelligible only in sciences of man and not in the natural sciences.

Hume's cause-effect relation is static in the sense that given a particular cause the same particular effect must occur under all circumstances. The relation exists between a particular cause and its effect is fixed. There is no obscurity or hidden meaning which we want to make clear in Hume's causation. The cause-effect relation being determined in such a way in Hume's account, the question of restoration of meaning does not arise. But Freudian causal relation is such where as man's particular motive may be the cause of different types of expressions, under different circumstances, as its effect. Given that a child is hungry, it is not necessary that the same particular dream must occur. The hunger may find its expression through different activities of the child. So, interpretation has a place in Freudian causation.

As Freudian causality is applicable only to the science of man, we can talk about causes only in terms of mental causes. Motive, intention, etc. are the mental causes which lead to the physical activities. Feeling of insignificance is the cause of a Kleptomania which leads the man to steal. Stealing is the effect of such a feeling.

There are conditions and determinants both for

Humean causation and Freudian causation. But in case of Freudian causation it is difficult to discover all the determinants of a human act.

If we look to the Freudian interpretation and interpretation in the writing of C. Taylor, we find that there are two polarised opposition concerning interpretation. According to one pole, hermeneutics is understood as the manifestation and restoration of meaning, according to the other pole, it is understood as demystification, as a reduction of illusion. It is in the second sense psychoanalysis aligns itself to hermeneutics.

An essential feature of Psychoanalysis is the way in which the neurotic comes to recognise and to acknowledge the purpose of his acts. It is only when this has come about that he is able to redirect his intentions, to alter his behaviour in the light of new self-knowledge. This acknowledgement by the patient confirms the analyst's interpretation of the motivation of the neurotic behaviour. And unless the patient will in the end allow his intention the analyst's interpretation of his behaviour is held to be mistaken.¹⁰ Sometimes patients deny strongly the analyst's interpretation of his conduct. And there are unsuccessful analysis. For an interpretation to be successful the intentions or purposes behind an action must be capable of being avowed.

It is also the case for the sort of interpretation we are concerned with. While interpreting one's action, we must ultimately depend on the man's explanation of his own action. Because the man- whose action is being interpreted, is the ultimate authority to explain his motive, intention etc. If he denies the explanation we offer for his action, then our interpretation is unsuccessful, if he affirms, then it is successful.

Now while talking about Psychoanalysis as the science of interpretation, we should know the difference, between a Psycho-analyst's interpretation and the interpretation we are advocating. There is no doubt differences between Freudian interpretation of a neurotic behaviour and the interpretation we offer for the action done by a normal man. In Freudian interpretation the analyst imposes an extra image on the patient and thereby helps him to recognise his own motive for a particular action. The patient's own motive is something which is realised by him with the help of the analyst. His activities are explained to him in a way which ultimately gives a firm picture to the patient of his own motive. But this is not the case for the sort of interpretation we are concerned with. The man in our interpretation is more or less aware of his motive and therefore, does not need the help of any outsiders.

In Freudian interpretation it seems that the patient

is unconscious of his motive and therefore, the measure
the analysts take is therapeutic in nature. Freud say:

"For a Psycho-analysis is not an impartial scientific investigation, but a therapeutic measure. Its essence is not to prove anything but to alter something. In a psychoanalysis the physician always gives his patient the conscious anticipatory image by the help of which he is put in a position to recognise and grasp the unconscious material."¹¹

But while interpreting an action of a normal man we do not take any therapeutic measure as we assume that the man is normal and he is acting out of his motive freely. And that his motive is not a cause for his action.

Now, it seems that Freud is not conscious of the insight contained in this passage and thought the acceptance of psycho-analytic method is a therapeutic and transforming procedure is compatible with the claim that the method enables the patient 'to recognise and to grasp the unconscious material' and thus to discover truth about himself. Thus to look at Freud therefore is to bring out the truth of a passage in Wittgenstein's philosophical investigation (247) "only you can know if you had the intention".

B.A. Farrell, in his article 'The Criteria for Psychoanalytic interpretation' says that it is duty on part of the Psycho-analyst to find out the cause of one's

depression or repressed motive behind a particular expression etc. And while finding out a cause they give a mechanical interpretation of such behaviour. Such an interpretative utterance of a Psycho-analyst is declaratory in character, and which, therefore, serves primarily to express an hypothesis about the patient. The procedure they take in finding out the real cause is compelling in nature for they impell a patient to recognise and talk about his own feeling, attitude, etc. and help to change the patient so as to make the interpretation seem to be true of him. If these hypotheses were true then it is natural to search for a truth criteria. But "it is doubtful whether this general assumption is true"¹² He says that a Psycho-analytic interpretation is not a genuine hypothesis which is either true or false, but a "statement whose main point is instrumental, proposed in order to change the patient rather than to explain his state."¹³

Now, if we take Psycho-analyst's hypothesis as true then it is natural that we should look for a criteria which an interpretation must satisfy. For Dr. M. Miri says "... there must always be criteria of correctness for any genuine description. If any putative description there are no obvious criteria of correctness, it must be doubted whether it is a genuine description at all."¹⁴

But our search for such a criteria in the psycho-

analytic interpretation is difficult and frustrating:
for there is none to be found.

One can criticise that the kind of interpretation we are advocating also lacks independent criteria of truth, for the man is the ultimate authority to explain his motive or to affirm the truth or falsity of our interpretation of his action. So there is no other way to find out the truth of our interpretation except the agent's own verbal statements. But the nature of this type of interpretation is different from the Freudian interpretation for Freudian interpretation involves a notion of causality and therefore, the necessity for an independent criteria in Freudian interpretation is acute. A causal explanation must have a independent criteria for it is necessary that we must be able to point out the cause independently of the explanation given in causal terms. In an interpretation it is not possible to distinguish between an interpretation and an interpretative explanation. It is nonsense ^{to} think in this way. But it is always possible to make a distinction between the cause and the causal explanation. So it is necessary for a causal explanation that there should be an independent criteria for finding out the truth and falsity of the causal explanation. Causality is such a notion which finds its place in the scientific world and therefore verification must be possible. But the

type of interpretation we are concerned with is beyond the bounds of verifiable science. Thus asking for a criteria of truth in case of Freudian interpretation is more important and genuine than to the interpretation we are advocating.

"Man is a self-defining animal with the change in his self-definition go changes in what man is, such that he has to be understood in different terms"¹⁵ - says Tylor. Hard prediction is impossible in case of human action. Prediction works in cases of natural sciences only; We can predict that future states of solar-system, etc. only by bringing past and future— under the same conceptual net and by realising that the latter is some function of the states of former. But man is to be understood in different terms. Human science is largely "expost understanding". The assymetry which is in the science of man is not there in the natural science because here events can be predicted at ease with the help of past events. In the science of man we have all such radically unpredictable events like Puritan rebellion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Tylor says, "... really to be able to predict the future would be to have explicitated so clearly the human condition that one would already have pre-empted all cultural innovation and transformation. This is hardly in the bounds of the possible."¹⁶

Thus a hermeneutic science relies on insight. It required that one must have sensibility and understanding. A certain measure of insight is indispensible. Such insight cannot be communicated by the gathering of brute-data."This is not a study in which anyone can engage, regardless of their level of insight; that some claims of the form: "if you don't understand, then your intuitions are at fault, are blind or inadequate", some claims of this form will be justified".¹⁷

From the above discussion it clearly appears that the subject-matter of interpretation is human behaviour. The method we apply in interpreting is analytical. It adds nothing and subtracts nothing from the subject matter but restores the meaning which is hidden and confusing. Proper understanding of a confused action leads one to interpret that action successfully. And a good explanation ultimately is one which makes sense of the action. And therefore, the causal notion by the help of which people try to explain human behaviour is inapplicable to interpretation which I have tried to advocate. For in interpretation we try to find out the meaning or 'sense' of a particular behaviour and thereby try to make that behaviour intelligible to us which was previously confused and unclear. But in case of causal explanation our aim is not to make clear the meaning or sense, but to show that whenever there is a particular cause the effect must follow. The relation between a cause

and its effect is fixed and clear. There is no chance for unclarity.

Again there is possibility that a particular action may be interpreted differently under different circumstances but it is impossible to imagine that a causal relation can be interpreted differently or that it changes with the change of the situation. And therefore 'experiential meaning' of which I have talked above in connection to the meaning in interpretation, has no place in causality.

Human behaviour cannot be generalised. If it were such that each and every human behaviour can be checked against some brute-data than it would have been possible for us to generalise human behaviour and there would have no scope remained for interpretation. I have shown that action which can be checked against brute-data, are not the primary concern of an interpretation. We interpret such behaviour for which there is no definite constitutive rules which can be taken as criteria of correctness. A causal relation involves this condition of generalisation and therefore we can very well say that the notion of causality is outside the boundary of interpretation.

Moreover, 'insight' which is the basic need on the

part of a interpreter, has no role to play in causality. For a causal explanation needs scientific proofs and not 'insight' or intuition.

Now, what I have said on interpretation in this chapter have been taken mainly from what C. Tyler said. I think Tyler's article can be treated as the basis for understanding the notion of interpretation for a novice. I have not discussed it in detail for I think it needs a separate research work and what I need for my present purpose i.e. to show that human actions are not causally explicable, is a very general understanding of the notion of interpretation.

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Freedom

This is the concluding chapter of this dissertation. In this chapter I want to devote myself to a discussion of human freedom. Freedom of which I want to talk, can be seen as a consequence of which has been said in the previous chapters. Human freedom occupies an important place in the arguments concerning moral responsibility. Of course, my main contention will not be to show how, being determined, man does or does not escape moral responsibility. I will try to answer the question generally arises- Is man in his thinking and acting a free-being or is he compelled by something outside or inside him?

In the second chapter I have made an attempt to show that the Humean variety of causal relation does not hold between motive and action. According to some philosophers human actions are causally determined. They take reason, motive or choice for action as the cause of that action. But we have seen that human actions are not causally determined. We have always the possibilities open for us for performing an action and failing to perform it. Such a possibility makes an action free. Those philosophers who believe that Humean causality does not hold between motive, intention etc on the one hand and actions on the other, also use the term 'cause' and take motive, reason, choice as the causes of actions. The question might arise, in what sense do they use this term? Here we must

be clear that the term 'cause' is not used in the Humean sense.

Now, what did Hume say on causality! He offered two definitions of cause: (1) "an object precedent and contiguous to another and where all objects resembling the former are placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter," and (2) "an object precedent and contiguous to another and so united with it that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of other and the impression of the one to form the idea of other and the impression of the one to form more lively idea of the latter". He says, "We may define a cause to be an 'object', followed by another....etc."

It is clear that Hume's idea of causality is applicable to the objective world and not to human will, motive, etc. Given a particular cause, on Hume's account, the same and particular effect must follow. But in case of human activity, which is performed with a particular motive, there remains alternative courses open to the agent and that he can choose and decide between the actions. It is not necessary that a particular motive should get its expression through a particular action only. It might get expressions through the different activities of a man, under different circumstances. And therefore, we cannot say that a motive is the cause of that type- where a particular bodily movement must

occur given that particular motive. And this makes interpretation of human behaviour possible. If a man's actions were caused, then there would have no chance for interpretation. It is possible for an agent who acted one way under certain conditions may subsequently act in an entirely different way under similar circumstances, even though he himself has not changed at all. According to Hume the relation between a cause and its effect is fixed, i.e. a particular cause has only a fixed particular effect. But in case of human action, a man can choose to act differently, even though the motive behind the action may remain one and same.

In this paper while going to establish the belief that human beings are free both in his thinking and acting, I shall talk about agent's causality. Philosophers like Chisholm, Campbell are of the opinion that an action is free if it is not done due to any external forces but it is done because of the agent's will, motive, etc. Agent is the ultimate, indeterminate cause of the action. He can choose to perform an action out of several alternative courses of action. In choosing to perform that action he himself is not caused by anything else outside him. The agent is causing the act. And therefore, in this sense he is free. A man should be considered as determined only when he himself is caused by some foreign cause. Given a motive, it is upto the agent whether he would materialise it in this or that manner. He has the ability

and power to choose between the alternative courses of actions. And such a power and ability on part of the man shows that he is free.

While talking about human freedom, we must know what is it to talk about determinism. Determinism can be defined as the view that whatever happens has all along been necessary, that is fixed or inevitable. It is the thesis that every event is caused. Psychologists are interested in considering man as determined by their inner causes and thus tend to imagine that the circle of our freedom is forever diminishing as psychology advance. Thus Hampshire writes:

"...as our psychological and physiological knowledge of human actions and reactions increases, the range of human actions which we can reasonably say 'an alternative action was possible' or 'he could have acted otherwise', necessarily diminishes."¹

The psychologists insist that an incident or accident in the early stages of our development may affect the whole course of our lives. Heredity, accidents, etc. have a bearing on man's thought, character and actions, and even sometimes have a determinative one.

Heredity, environment, etc. are no doubt, important and have effect on man's reason and action, but they do not exhaust the matter. Man has the power to bring about a change in what he gets by heredity. Such a power in man makes him

responsible for what he does. He is not determined by his environment as the flame is determined by fire.

There is a group of philosophers who believe that the actions we perform are determined in the sense that the actions could not have been done otherwise from the way we have done and therefore, we are not free in performing them. This conclusion holds even if the antecedent conditions are our own desires, beliefs, character trait or whatever. If our actions are determined by nothing, then they are just random happening and in no sense our actions. Edward Von Hartman asserts that human will depends on two chief factors, the motives and the character. If one bears in mind that a man adopts an idea or a mental picture, as the motive of his action only if his character is such that this mental picture arouses a desire in him, then he is determined from within. According to him even though we ourselves first adopt a mental picture as a motive, we do so not arbitrarily, but according to the necessity of our characterological disposition, that is we are anything but free. Our want, will, etc. are determined by motive. Without a determining motive the will is an empty faculty; only through the motive does it become active and real. It is therefore, quite true that human will is not free in as much as its direction is always determined by the strongest motive. It is easy to explain

why the movement of a stone seems to us necessary, while the volition of a man does not. The causes which set the stone in motion are external and visible, while the causes which determine one's volition are external and invisible. The determining causes are not visible and therefore thought to be non-existent. The volition on the other hand is the cause of one's action.

A man may be said to be psychologically determined, for example, a kleptomaniac, a neurotic, etc. A mentally ill person sometimes performs voluntary crimes (where voluntary is used so as not to beg the question about freedom). Why is it that we allow the presence of mental illness as the cause of the mentally ill person's motives or desire? It can be said that a mentally ill person's criminal behaviour is incoherent, senseless, etc. and he characteristically lack insight into his own motive. His mental illness is the cause of his action and therefore his actions can be taken as determined because he lacks the rational power to regulate his action. Thus psychotic behaviour is not intelligible behaviour and cannot be explained in terms of motive and reason. Psychologists emphasise that our behaviour including our so-called reasonable behaviour is really unconsciously determined. The unconscious is the master of every fate and the captain of every soul. Freud was steeped in causal psychology in his search for 'unconscious' desire, needs

and pleasures, where no such 'motives' were obvious either to the agent or to the close observer. If Mr. Jones suddenly kicks Mrs. Jones' shin, and if he is unable to answer the question 'why did you kick your wife?' then Mr. Jones's actions needs a psychoanalytic explanation. His action may be identified as the necessary response to a psychic stimulus. We must admit that Mr. Jones could not have refrained from kicking his wife, wince he was the helpless victim of an irresistable psychic force.

Determinists treat reason as a special kind of cause. According to them whenever a person has a reason for doing something or other he cannot help doing that thing. It depends entirely how strong the reason is. And such a reason is th cause of his behaviour.

MacIntyre says, "...to say that our giving of reasons supplied a sufficient determining condition or cause of behaviour would be to utter an empty tautology."²

Those who believe that the strongest desire to perform an action causes that action, might give an example like- when a person say, "I can't help smoking" it means that his action is determined by his desire or liking for tobacco. His liking or interest becomes so strong that a person cannot help doing what he likes or is interested at all. He might say to someone; "you smoke because you like tobacco, but you

can't help liking tobacco, and therefore you can't help smoking".

This argument is fallacious. R.C. Skinner³ says that it is as fallacious as saying that a person acts freely when he has no reason for doing what he does. If someone broke a cup accidentally, we should certainly not say that, since he had no reason for breaking it, he did so of his own free-will; but should say, on the contrary, that he could not help breaking it.

A man's strong liking for tobacco can be said to be formed by habit. His case is not the same as the kleptomaniac's. A kleptomaniac may not realise that he cannot help stealing, and thinks that he does so in order to improve this standard of his living, whereas the reason may be actually be a feeling of insignificance. But he is unconscious of his feeling of insignificance. He does not know the actual reason. A man's helplessness in the matter of smoking can be said to be a result of his habit. R.C. Skinner says that actions done from habit are not determined because they can be changed. It might happen that a particular habit was so deeply ingrained that a person found it impossible to change it, in which case we should say that the person could not help doing what he did. A desire, however strong it might be, cannot be said to determine one's conduct because it is not

totally impossible or outside the capacity of a man to act contrary to that desire.

The answer that has been given to the free-will problem by a number of philosophers is that a person's action is free when, however he behaved, he could have behaved differently if he had chosen to do so, and that his action is determined when he could not have acted differently, even if he had chosen to. Now what does it mean to talk of a man acting contrary to his choice? A man acts contrary to his choice only when he is determined not by his will, motive or intention but by the external factors- for example, when someone pushes me, I fall.

As man is a rational being, we seek for the reason as well as for the causes of his behaviour. It is true that some of his behaviour is more correctly ascribed to causes than to reasons, and that a causal element may enter into all his behaviour. Where a causal explanation is completely adequate, we have movements of the human body, and not acts or deeds. If in a loaded bus a person boards on the bus and stamps on another person's feet therefore hurts the man, he in fact did not cause injury. We would say that injury was an accident or that it was caused by his stamping. The more non-rational an act is, the more it is a movement of the human body, the more mechanical it is; and the more appropriate it is

to think of it under the concept of causality. Freedom of will can be conceived of in terms of rational choice as contrasted with mechanical and quasi-mechanical responses.

When we talk of man acting freely we use the term 'freely' in the sense, i.e. to mean 'without any external compulsion'. The causes from which men act when they are free are not the same as the causes from which wheels act when they are 'free'. It makes sense to talk of a man's motive for free action, whereas wheels do not have motives. Men are in control of their actions or responsible for their actions just as a wheel may be thought to be responsible for the way in which it runs; but the two are not responsible in the same way. Now what is meant by 'outside' and 'inside' cause. 'Inside cause' cannot be counted as Humean cause, but it necessary for free action. Free action occurs when the 'cause' or 'origin' of the action is 'within' the agent. Wanting, desiring or choosing to do something are 'inside cause'. Compelled action occurs when it is 'outside' the agent. Being pushed, threatened or diseased are all cases of the operation of inside cause. According to J. Wilson when we speak of a man compelled by his desire, we are not talking of the causes outside us but we are talking of the inside cause. Compulsion by desire is in no way incompatible with freedom. Here the term 'compulsion' should not be taken in its strictest sense. "...for it is nonsense to say that

a man can be compelled by himself."⁴ An action is compelled by desire means that such an action is done with a desire to perform it, and not without any desire. There are possibilities open even not to perform it. Thus before going to judge whether an action is 'free' or 'compulsive', we must know whether its cause is 'inside' or 'outside'. One's motive, intention or reason for action in no way makes a man compelled like an outside cause. Plato, for example believed that man was only 'really' free when governed by his reason. When we act according to the dictates of our reason, we do not become compelled, on the other hand an action becomes meaningless or loses its sense when done without any reason. It is believed that agent causality is necessary for freedom. Chisholm grants that agent causality is not incompatible with the presence of desire or motives upon which the agent may choose to act.⁵ But these desires 'incline without necessitating' if the agent can resist the temptation to act upon them- and he can only resist the temptation if there are no psychological laws according to which people invariably act in a certain way, given these desires and beliefs. If on the other hand, the desires necessitate action in accordance with a psychological law, there is no agent causality. For Campbell,⁶ too, the agent is in a position to say why he acted in the way that he did. The action is under the agent's control. He is the cause of that action and there is no other outside cause. Campbell, Chisholm, and other writers have argued

eloquently for the following proposition: responsibility for an action may be placed on the agent if and only if the agent is understood to be the ultimate, undetermined cause of the action. All actions involving physical movement are caused by the identifiable physiological events, and they are caused by the agent — the man. The concept of agent as the immanent cause of his action provides us automatically with a proper center of responsibility. The agent is the true originator of the act, since immanent causation is understood in such a way as to preclude any change happening to the agent in his causation of the act. While the agent is causing the act, nothing is happening to the agent. Therefore, there is no foreign causal influence that might remove responsibility for the act from the agent himself. The agent is free in the simple and clear sense that he can cause an act without himself being subjected causal influences. A man is free with respect to an act and therefore, responsible, says Chisholm, if he has the power both to perform and not to perform that act. Immanent causation accounts for the presence of that power.

'Everyone is at liberty to desire, will, decide or not to will, desire, etc.' which is the real proposition involved in the notion of freedom. A thing is free which exists and acts from the pure necessity of its nature, and unfree, when precisely and fixedly determined by something

else. A person is free only by virtue of his decisions. If someone has several possibilities set before him but cannot of his own power bring some of these possibilities into play for himself, the concept of freedom is then irrelevant. Otherwise stated, he is free. The very nature of freedom implies the person's potential to alter his behaviour, situation, meaning that he may choose not to change it, or to alter it in any of several directions. According to one philosophical tradition, being free is fundamentally a matter of doing what one wants to do. Human freedom entails the absence of determinism. Whenever a person performs a free action, according to Chisholm, it is a miracle. The motion of a person's hand, when the person moves it, is the outcome of the series of physical causes; but some events in this series, "and presumably one of those that took place within the brain, was caused by the agent and not by any other events."⁷ A free agent has, therefore, a "prerogative which some would attribute only to God; each of us when we act, is a prime mover unmoved."⁸ Not only one's action is free as it is caused by the agent himself but one's will is also free. Our will, decision, choice, motive, etc. are not determined by anything. His will, choice, etc. are free only if he is free to have the will, decision, etc. which he wants. He is free to will anything and thereby free to act according to his will.

Philosophers while discussing human freedom state

the propositions "He could have done otherwise" or "I could have done otherwise", in order that human beings can be thought of as free to choose the course of action he will take. He had the ability to do otherwise. The analysis of "could have" implies 'would have if certain conditions had been fulfilled'. Such conditions are 'if he had chosen', 'if he had tried', 'if he had wanted to', etc. Now these conditions seem to determine our action but in no way the determination can be taken in Humean sense. Suppose I failed to solve a problem and say to someone "I could have solved the problem if I had wanted to". Here my choice was a necessary condition for my solving the problem, but this cannot be the sufficient condition. From the fact that 'X is sufficient for Y' we may infer that 'Y is necessitated by X'. This fact has given rise to the fear that if there are sufficient conditions for human decisions and actions, then such decisions and actions must be necessitated, be unfree. If human decision and actions are determined, then for all such decisions and actions, there are antecedently sufficient causal conditions. If there are sufficient conditions for an action, then such decisions and actions are necessitated by those conditions. But if decisions are necessitated, no one could decide or act differently from what he does. But we see people acting differently under different circumstances. There may be events occurring now, at t_1 , which causally necessitate that I will not want or choose at t_3 , to go to a certain lecture

At t_5 . Suppose, for instance, that a lady is now making (at t_1), or has, at sometime in the past made a plan to invite me to her place for dinner at t_5 . This making of plans, together with a wide variety of other events at t_1 , causally necessitates my being invited, at t_2 to the dinner party. Furthermore it causally necessitates my wanting to go to the dinner party at t_3 , and hence my not wanting to attend the lecture.

But none of this sequence of events and none of this causal necessitation need make me powerless (From t_1 through to t_4) to go to the dinner party at t_5 . I had the resources, the knowledge and so on to attend the lecture. My not going was not the outcome of my not possessing the power to attend, but simply the fact that I was disinclined to go. Clearly, I had the power to do other than I, in fact, happened to do, and this satisfies the demand of freedom.

A.C. MacIntyre in his article 'Determinism' says, "rational behaviour is defined with reference to the possibility of altering it". Hence: "to show that behaviour is rational enough is to show that it is not causally determined in the sense of being the effect of a set of sufficient conditions operating independently of the agent's deliberation or possibility of deliberation"⁹

To explain a piece of behaviour as rational is

to show that there were good, sufficient reasons for the action and that these reasons were the agent's own in performing the act. One has the power and ability to control or regulate one's action. Only when he exercises his power or knows that he has the ability to exercise, then he is free. This use presupposes our ability to make decisions, and generally speaking, to implement them. For it is appropriate only to the matters about which we can deliberate, and as Aristotle observed, we do not deliberate about matters outside our own control. A person's action is free when, however he behaved, he could have done differently if he had chosen to do so, and that his action is determined when he cannot act differently even if he has chosen to. According to the sceptics, for a person's action to be free, it is necessary not only that he could have behaved differently if he has chosen, but also that he could have chosen differently. The statement that "he could have behaved differently if he had chosen", can be analysed as "He did what he did of his own free-will" or of its equivalent "His action was done freely".

There are, sometimes situations (Wilson's example) where we want to say that a man's action is not free. Suppose, a man had the chance of breaking a promise, but did in fact keep it, because of his sense of honour and obligation. It must be granted that to say that he kept his promise 'because of his sense of honour' is not to give a full explana-

tion. In order to do this, we should have to trace back the causes of his having sense of honour, we should come to the conclusion that his sense of honour was due to some 'outside' cause'. We should sensibly say that as a child, he was compelled to acquire a sense of honour, in the sense of conditions of heredity and environment. It must be admitted that if we trace the causes for their actions sufficiently far back, we shall always arrive at 'outside' causes. Thus we could argue that to defend his action as free on the grounds that a sense of honour is an 'inside' cause is merely short-sighted; for that sense of honour is itself the product of 'outside' cause. Yet despite all these, it seems that we should want to say that the action is free. It is free because given a similar situation, it is not irrational to expect him to act in a similar way each time. He is not compelled by his sense of honour in the Humean causal sense. There is always 'chance of open for him not to keep the promise. It is within the agent's power whether to keep it.

The most important condition for making a choice and taking a decision is the possession of freedom of action. A person has freedom of action if, in a particular situation, there are two or more alternative courses of action which he is able to follow. Suppose a man one evening is considering whether to go to the dinner party or to a lecture, he is able to go to either, but not, of course,

to both, and he knows that he is able to. Even if, therefore he chooses to attend the dinner party, we should say that he could have chosen to go to the lecture. Since he was able to go to the lecture, and knew that he was able to: there was therefore, nothing to prevent his choice. We are all of us often in situations where, whatever we choose to do, we could equally well have chosen to do something different, since choosing to behave differently, and knowing that one is able to behave differently show that man is free.

But this is not the case with people whose activity is determined. A hypnotist may suggest to someone that in an hour's time he will take off his coat and open all the windows in the room, and the man will do this even if he suffers severely from the cold in doing so. He will invent reasons for his action and even- this is the disturbing point- imagine himself to be acting freely. Yet when we found out that his action was due to the hypnotist's command, we should have no hesitation in calling it compulsive.

Thus, a man is free both in his thinking and acting. He is not compelled by his reason, motive or will. These mental goings-on are also within the agent's

control because he is free to have the will, motive, etc. he wants. His motive or will is not determined by any further motive or will.

I have talked about agent's causality and showed that as agent is the cause of a particular action, that action cannot be treated as effect in the same sense as Hume discussed. Because his notion of causation is held only between two objects in the external world and not between will and action, which I have tried to show in the Second chapter.

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