

# **MIND-BODY DUALISM : A CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUE**

BY

**BACHCHA PRASAD TRIPATHI**

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY



**THESIS**

SUBMITTED

IN

FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF  
**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

TO

**NORTH-EASTERN HILL UNIVERSITY**

**SHILLONG, INDIA**

**MAY, 2000**

Thesis

NEHU LIBRAR  
Acc No. 103728 ✓  
Acc By... *an*  
Date... 29-8-07  
Class... *Comp*  
Sub. Hea... *9/04/08*  
Enter...  
Trans... by...

DS  
128.2092  
TRI

# The North-Eastern Hills University

Shillong, Meghalaya

May, 2000

I 'Bachcha Prasad Tripathi' hereby declare that the subject matter of this thesis is the record of work done by me, that the contents of this thesis did not form basis of the award of any previous degree to me or to the best of my knowledge to anybody else, and that the thesis has not been submitted by me for any research degree in any other University/ Institute.

This is being submitted to the North-Eastern Hill University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy.

*Srijati Min*  
(Head) 25.5.00

*Srijati Min*  
(Supervisor) 25.5.00

*Bachcha Prasad Tripathi*  
(Candidate) 25/5/2000.

Department of Philosophy  
North Eastern Hill University  
Shillong-793014

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENT**

***I take this opportunity to put on record my sincere thanks to my Supervisor, Prof. (Mrs.) Sujata Miri for her affectionate and painstaking guidance, keen advice and constant encouragement during the moments when I lost patience and was in low spirits. She took pains to go through each and every word of the present work. But in spite of this there must have been a number of faults, for which I alone <sup>am</sup> responsible. I humbly admit that without her cooperation and encouragement the present work could never have been completed.***

***I find no words to thank Dr. S. C. Daniel, Reader, Deptt. of Philosophy, who spared his valuable time out of his very tight schedule and went through each word of this thesis and made many useful suggestions which helped in its improvement. I would be failing in my duty if I donot thank the other teachers of this department, specially, Prof. M. M. Agarwal (Rtd.) for their kind cooperation.***

***My special thanks are due to my friends Indrani, Adil, Jay, Shakuntala, Sabita Das, Shyam, Santosh, and others for their valuable support whenever needed.***

***I also thank Shri. K. D. Ramsiej and Dr. (Mrs.) Dipali Chattopadhyaya for their kind help and cooperation.***

***I am also thankful to my parents Sri. R. N. Tripathi, Smti. R. D. Tripathi, my wife Shobha, and my in-laws for their encouragement and support throughout the period in which I was engaged in writing of this thesis. Without their prayers and blessings the present work could never have been completed.***

***I owe my special thanks to Mr. Rajesh Kr. Thapa, for typing the first draft and also for doing the final typing of the manuscript with utmost care as speedily as possible.***



**(B.P. Tripathi)**

***Dedicated to my (Paternal) Grandfather and  
Grandmother, (Late) Shri. Ram Pyare Tripathi, (Late) Smti.  
Daulat Kunwar, and (Maternal) Grandfather and  
Grandmother, (Late) Shri. Ram Padarath Singh, and (Late)  
Smti. Jewar Kunwar. It is also dedicated to my Teachers for  
their invaluable contributions in my life.***

## **CONTENTS**

<b>CHAPTER I</b>	<b>:</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION (1 - 27)</b>
<b>CHAPTER II</b>	<b>:</b>	<b>DESCARTES' CONCEPTION OF MIND ( 28 - 68)</b>
<b>CHAPTER III</b>	<b>:</b>	<b>DESCARTES VERSUS GILBERT RYLE (69 - 96)</b>
<b>CHAPTER IV</b>	<b>:</b>	<b>THE IDENTITY THEORY AND FUNCTIONALISM (97 - 126)</b>
<b>CHAPTER V</b>	<b>:</b>	<b>WHAT IS A PERSON? (127 - 147)</b>
<b>CONCLUSION</b>	<b>:</b>	<b>(148 - 152)</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	<b>:</b>	<b>(153 - 165)</b>

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

The distinction between Mind and Body be it in any form, goes back to ancient times, and perhaps to the beginning of human self-consciousness. When we ask ourselves : What is a human being? Our answer is usually 'a human being consists of a body and a soul'. The soul is conceived as the essence of the body. In other words, the relationship between a human being and his soul or mind is the relationship between substance and essence and it was stressed that this essence, that is soul, or mind can exist separated from the body. The essence (soul/mind) is part and parcel of the substance and it determines the inner structure of the substance.

Modern philosophy took a completely new turn through Rene Descartes. Descartes' philosophy has one foot in tradition and the other in the new era of philosophy. He never questions the distinction between substance, essence and accidents. And he feels that the towering edifice of scholastic philosophy needed slight adjustment. According to Descartes, as I state in chapter II, mind or soul is conceived not as the essence of body but as the substance in its own right. And consequently he opines that a human being is a combination

of two individual substances namely a body and a mind. The relationship between the two is not the relationship of substance and essence, rather it is the relationship between two substances and therefore, each of these two substances must have its own essence. And as a result, we find that Descartes' innovation consists in his claim that minds are individual things (substances) and not essences of individual things.

Further, according to Descartes, God is the absolute substance and that whatever that has existential independence from any other substance, except the absolute, is a secondary substance. The absolute substance cannot be defined in terms of one exclusive property (attribute) whereas the secondary substances can be defined in terms of one exclusive attribute. Mind can be defined in terms of one exclusive attribute 'thinking' or 'consciousness' and the body or matter can be defined in terms of one exclusive attribute in terms of 'extension'. Both mind and body possess two different and mutually exclusive properties. Body is in space, and is public. It is extended and its behaviour can be mechanically explained. Mind, on the other hand, is not in space, but in time. It is private and has consciousness

as its attribute. It is not extended and therefore, cannot be inspected. However, Descartes maintains that there is some connection between the two which is, according to him, intuitively known, and that on the occasion of something happening in the mind a relevant happening takes place in the body. Descartes asserts that there is a pineal gland inside the nervous system where the body and the mind interact with each other and an impression is produced on the occasion of which a conscious act occurs.

Descartes gives a machanistic explanation of the body which is different from scholystic machanism where soul or the mind is conceived as the essence of the body. Descartes, on the contrary, conceived mind not as the essence of the body but as a substance in its own right. Thus, we see Cartesian Dualism is the dualism of substances where substance is the basic notion. And because of the due consideration of this basic notion we find that this dualism of substances, i.e. of the mind and the body is not acceptable. Not because we have improved or refined our objections clearly but because we want to understand mind at least as well as we understand the world around ourselves.

To understand the Cartesian notion of mind I have examined the concepts which emerge as central to his distinction between 'mind and body', in the second chapter titled 'Descartes Conception of Mind'. These concepts can be treated as the criteria for establishing the distinctness of the mind. In this connection, we find two key claims, two main candidates of the criteria of the mental which have received considerable attention today, they are 'privacy' and 'intentionality'. Both these criteria reflect the aspects of consciousness.

'Privacy', as suggested by Descartes is considered to be the most striking criterion of the mental. Privacy as one of the criteria of the mental, claims that one has 'direct' access to the modifications of one's own consciousness. No one else can know what conscious states I have or I am in. One has direct or immediate (without any inference or mediation) access to one's consciousness which leads us to the belief that consciousness is the private domain of mental states, processes and events which are fundamentally different from any feature of material things conceived in terms of extension <sup>1</sup>. For Descartes mind is inner, immaterial,

---

1. Descartes, Rene. Meditations, trans by E S Haldane and G R T Ross, Cambridge University Press, 1969.

private, has no window etc. None of the modifications of one's own consciousness will deceive him leaving him in doubt that he has this state of consciousness that he has as well as what its contents are. Consciousness has two aspects, awareness and self-awareness and i.e. first it is aware of an object in a straight forward manner, as for example, I see this tree then I am also aware that I am aware of the tree. It is that mental state which is necessarily owned by and ascribed to only one owner, namely the one whose states they are <sup>2</sup>. This unique relationship between the owner and the owned is that what gives an owner direct access to what he owns and which in turn gives sense to his 'privacy'.

Intentionality, the other candidate for the criterion of the mental or consciousness, is presented by Franz Brentano. Brentano believes that the feature of 'intentionality' differentiates the mental from the physical. 'Intentionality', which is said to be a reliable mark of the mental, is meant as (i) direction upon an object i.e. consciousness is always directed towards an object or is necessarily of something, and (ii)

---

2. Hamlyn, D W., Metaphysics, Cambridge University Press, 1984, P. 172.

reference to a content, i.e. consciousness always makes reference to a content or all mental acts, states and events do necessarily have some kind of content.

The claim here is that consciousness is always and necessarily of something, for instance, while perceiving a tree in the garden, our seeing-consciousness is directed towards the tree out there. In having pain, although, our consciousness is not directed towards any object yet it is a mental activity. Some psychological phenomena such as depression do not find any object. Brentano holds the thesis that the object must exist in order to involve consciousness, or at least be able to be conceived independently of the act which involves its consciousness.

At the same time, 'reference to a content' maintains that all our mental acts, states and events do necessarily have some kind of content. But it can also be seen that there is no content of those conscious states, processes and events which, do not have objects at all. And thus 'reference to a content' cannot be considered to be a necessary condition of the presence of consciousness.

And consequently, we find that 'intentionality', though it underlines some 'characteristic feature of the mental'\*, is proved unsatisfactory to serve as the criterion of consciousness (mental)\*.

Now the question arises: Should we infer from the failure of these two criteria of the mental that there is no such thing as mental? Can Cartesian Dualism of mind and body as two independent substances be defended? We have seen even after the three hundred years of debate the philosophers have not been able to bury the Cartesian theory known as Dualism or interactionism in the form presented by Descartes.

The thrust of my thesis has been towards the conclusion that though the mind-body theory considered as the theory of the relationship between two completely different substances as conceived by Descartes is

---

\* By the characteristic feature of the mental we understand something generally present in the mental. And its presence makes it sure that it is mental. It means that intentionality is sufficient condition of the mental but not a necessary condition.

\* By the criterion of the mental we mean it is indispensable, always present in the mental and only in the mental.

unacceptable, yet it does not imply the death of dualism as such. Dualism of mind-body in some form remains conceptually alive.

After having discussed the Cartesian dualism emphasizing the novelty of Descartes conception of mind signifying the total break from the past, I have discussed and tried to justify this conception in the same Chapter. However, Cartesian Dualism stands thoroughly discredited in present century with the coming of the behaviourists. Philosophers have advanced various forms of materialism thereby interpreting the concept of mind in non-Cartesian terms. They have struggled a lot to provide a more acceptable theory of mind-body. Three major attempts stand out in this connection, Logical Behaviourism, Identity theories and Functionalism. Unfortunately, none of these attempts have been successful. In my thesis I have discussed these three types of theories as the central argument against Cartesian dualism.

In this connection, the first very influential treatment of the concept of mind has been forwarded by Gilbert Ryle in his well known book 'The Concept of Mind'. I have

discussed Ryle's position in the third chapter. Ryle's main contention is that mind is not a substantial entity. He thereby argues by analysis of mental concepts that its (minds) entire expectorants can be classified under three heads namely dispositional, adverbial and achievement. He tries to show that items falling under any of these headings do not refer to either a substantial entity or to a process or events other than physical ones. Ryle gives a dispositional analysis of mind by holding that mind is simply the disposition of the body and thereby a person is not composed of two independent individual substances, i.e. body and mind.

There are many thinkers who do not have any difficulty with the concept of the physical body, but their difficulty lies in the mental term of the alleged relation. The main theory to consider here is that of philosophical or analytical or logical behaviourism as a philosophy of mind developed as a consequence of the rejection of Descartes' 'Mental substance theory'. The core problem here in fact is that expressions referring to mental and physical have different meanings. This notion has been simply assumed to be true. This assumption has been powerfully

attacked in recent times by Gilbert Ryle. Philosophical behaviourism as is advocated by Ryle seems to hold that the meaning of mental predicates must be explained in terms of overt behaviours, or that statement about mind can be completely analysed in terms of statements about what other people can or could observe him doing.

When we attribute some mental predicates to some one, we are attributing to him some kinds of behaviours or a disposition towards some behaviour or both. Now if we consider Ryle's assimilation of the mental to the physical as legitimate or valid, then mind and body are not different in principle. Thus, the conventional dualistic theories rest upon a confusion. Ryle assimilates all mental predicates to dispositional terms like intelligent or obstinate noticing that their ascription to a person does not imply anything about his "current experiences". Reacting against Descartes' view that there are actions like doubting, willing, feeling and so on, which necessarily require the existence of something, the mind which acts, Ryle (refer chapter III) sets out to show that there are no mental acts by examining psychological concepts and that each falls into one of three broad classes:

- (a) Dispositional concepts,
- (b) Adverbial concepts, and
- (c) Achievement concepts. Inclinations, motives, moods, agitations, etc., are sometimes called mental states but are in fact not really states at all. They are propensities (good disposition).

Going by Ryle's account, it appears that dispositional properties are non-occurrent because when we say that 'a glass is brittle', we do not mean that the glass is at a given moment actually being shattered. To say that a glass is brittle is to say that it may be brittle without even being shattered. A thing is said to be brittle if and only if under suitable circumstances it shatters. The behaviourists like Ryle use this feature of dispositional property and define, thoughts, feelings and wishes, etc., not in terms of actual behaviour but of disposition to behave. A man who hides his thoughts, feeling, wishes, etc., could still have a disposition to behave in certain ways. And therefore, to attribute consciousness or any particular state of consciousness to a person is to attribute a disposition to behave in certain ways. For Ryle to talk

of person's mind is to talk of person's abilities, inclinations, capacities, liabilities etc. For instance, to be angry is to behave in an angry way: to be flushed, abusive, banging the table, trembling etc. Hence we cannot say that to be angry is to have a mental state. There is nothing private. We should note that mental states are names of a particular pattern of behaviour and thereby attribution of intention, desire, intelligence, excitement, fear, and so on - are to be understood as attribution of a disposition to behave in a characteristic manner under suitable circumstances.

But we see that the Rylean behaviouristic account of mental states suffers from some difficulties. In Chapter III, I conclude that the logical behaviourist fails to show how one can account for the way one uses one's mental states to explain behaviour. The obvious difficulty, as far as our common experience is concerned, is that there can be mental processes going on although there may be no behaviour at all. A man may be angry & yet give no bodily sign. A man who is angry may think but may do nothing. Ryle argues here that though a man who is angry may not do or say anything but he has the


disposition to behave in some relevant ways. A glass does not shatter but is brittle. Therefore, it can be said that to be angry does not mean to be in a state of anger.

But behaviourism is considered to be profoundly an unnatural account of mental processes. It is not natural at all to speak of one's speech or action as identical with one's thought. The thought is distinct from speech and action. Under suitable circumstances, it is thought which brings about action. Mental processes can occur even in the absence of behaviour. Logical behaviourism involves many difficulties as it leaves out the essential feature of consciousness. Further, the feeling of pain in one's own mind may produce disposition in certain ways but this particular behaviour or disposition to behave is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for sensation. Feeling of pain and behaviour are not identical. It is wrong to analyse mental predicates behaviouristically.

Ryle commits a mistake by denying not only the mental substances but also mental events and occurrences. One may indulge in thinking without showing any outward sign for it. The dispositional account of mind presented

by logical behaviourists is that mind is reducible to behaviour. Physical description for each and every mental act is not possible. For Ryle to be intelligent is to behave intelligently, to be angry is to behave angrily, and so on. These mental events or processes do not require dispositional analysis. And to describe that one is intelligent because one is behaving intelligently, etc., is to commit the fallacy of *Petitio Principii*, i.e. 'begging the question'. Chapter two of my thesis deals with Ryle's attack on dualism.

Ryle's own theory is also largely discredited, yet the anti-Cartesian movement goes on. The other major attack on Descartes has come from those who propound the so called Identity Theory sometimes called Reductive Materialism, which I have analysed in the IVth chapter. Though this theory is practised in many ways but all versions of the theory deny the existence of mind as a separate substance claiming that mental processes, events, etc. are strictly identical with brain processes and events. The idea in this theory of mind is that each type of mental state or process is numerically identical with some type of physical state or process in the brain or inside our central nervous



system. In short, mental states and processes are nothing more than very complicated states and processes in the brain. Mental processes and brain processes are not two different kinds of events but are identical. Now the question arises: Is consciousness, or more simply awareness a brain process? UT Place says yes to this question.

"Consciousness is a process in the brain in my view is neither self-contradictory, nor self-evident; it is a reasonable scientific hypothesis, in the way that the statement 'Lightening is a notion of electric charges' is a reasonable scientific hypothesis"<sup>3</sup>.

At the sametime, Place in his article 'Is consciousness a brain process?', admits that there remains a number of our mental concepts, of consciousness, of sensations, and mental imagery where a dispositional analysis fails and an acceptance of inner process becomes unavoidable but still it does not entail dualism.

Smart's article 'Sensations and brain processes' has put the Identity Theory firmly on the current philosophical

---

3. Place, U T. Article, 'Is consciousness a brain process?' (ed) C V Borst, The Mind-Brain Identity Theory, Macmillan & ST Martins Press, 1970, P 44.

map. Smart, influenced by Place states that each and every process reported in sensation statements are in fact processes in the brain. A sensation statement is a report of brain process. Smart writes:

"When I say that a sensation is a brain process or that lightning is an electric discharge I do not mean just that the sensation is somehow spatially or temporarily continuous with the brain process or that the lightning is just spatially or temporarily continuous with the discharge"<sup>4</sup>.

Sometimes due to lack of knowledge about neurophysiology we talk about our after-images, aches, pains, etc. as these sensations cannot be processes in the brain just as an illiterate peasant knows nothing of electricity but can talk about lightning. He further argues, 'experience' and 'brain process' do not have the same meaning. He is not arguing that the after-image is a brain process but that the experience of having an after-image is a brain process. Experience is the introspective report of a sensation which is nothing over and above brain process.

---

4. Smart, J J C. (Article) 'Sensations and brain processes' (ed) C V Borst, 'The Mind-Brain Identity Theory', Macmillan & ST Martins Press, 1970, P 56.

Smart does not make clear whether 'sensation' means 'brain process' or is synonymous with 'brain processes' or something else. 'Sensation is a brain process' cannot be a case of pure identity as maintained by Smart. Moreover, to say mind is identified with the stimulus aspect of the brain just as in the sense 'lightning is an electrical discharge' leads Smart to materialism. This materialistic Identity Theory of Smart fails completely to deny dualism.

D M Armstrong propounds a slightly different form of Identity Theory from that of Smart's. He tries to solve the puzzle with established scientific doctrine that a nature of man, or what a man is, can be best understood in physio-chemical terms. Mental processes or thoughts cannot be identified with behaviour. It is possible that there is no behaviour but there are mental states. Mind can be defined as the inner cause of our behaviour and it can be surely identified, with the states of the central nervous system. It can be possibly assumed that there must be something 'going on' behind each and every sort of behaviour. According to Armstrong, this inner principle (mental states/mind), which lies behind every behaviour,

is a purely physical account of man and hence can be identified with purely physical states of the central nervous system. Mind is a sort of inner state that produces in man a capacity to bring about such and such behavioural expressions.

Now we see that the stand of Identity Theory in general is that mental states are identical to the brain process. Jerome Shaffer points out that if it is so that two conceptually different processes are identical then empirically it must be possible to show this identity by certain evidence. The problem of location is a genuine problem which must be solved before the Identity Theory can be regarded as a satisfactory theory of mind. It has been seen that Identity theorists are certain in describing mental states than in describing the corresponding physical states as it lays too much emphasis on future findings.

Besides all these what I want to make clear is that mental phenomena cannot be given a physical being. The ontological status of mental phenomena is not clear. All that we can say is that mental phenomena are attributed to the self in a way which is different from the

attribution of the physical phenomena to the self. So the question of the relationship of the mental and physical still remains.

The discussion of the arguments against dualism continues here with the Philosophy of Functionalism.

Functionalism is the main focus of my IVth chapter. Functionalism, the heir to behaviourism, differs both from behaviourism and the traditional mind-body identity theory. It differs from behaviourism on the ground that the behaviourist's account of mental states solely in terms of environmental input and behavioural output is not adequate. A reductive definition solely in terms of publicly observable inputs and outputs is not an adequate characterization of mental states. Identity Theory is also not adequate on the ground that the physiological constitution of each and every being is based on different chemical elements. Thus, there are different kinds of physical systems or physical constitutions and this raises a problem for the Identity Theory. How will it be possibly right to find out one-to-one correspondence between mental and the physical when there are different

kinds of physical systems.

Functionalism, a different approach to the mind-body problem, concentrates much on the functional role of the mental states mediating between a specified input and output. Functionalism studies mental states in terms of their normal causal role, as well as their normal behavioural effects. The concentration is made on input (injury), output (pain behaviour) and the relation between inner states (or with private states). It is to be understood that "the normal function of pain is to be the causal intermediary between a specified bodily cause and a specified sort of behavioural effect"<sup>5</sup>. Here it can rightly be said that manifestation of any behavioural effect involves factors like physical events in terms of bodily movement and characteristic cause of it involves the mental states such as thoughts and desires. Functionalism admits mental activity usually linked with behavioural disposition but also that mental states are, in fact, causes of behaviour.

Functionalism, provides a satisfying solution to the problem

---

5. Carruthers, Peter., 'Introducing Persons' Croom Helm, London and Sydney, 1986, p. 112.

of other minds as through the knowledge of correct input and output. We have been able to suppose that there really exists causal intermediary (causal link) between the input - injury, and output - pain. Though functionalism has succeeded somehow to make us understand the functional role of mental states it has failed to deal with the phenomenon of consciousness, like what is it like to be happy, what is it like to be in pain, etc. A highly sophisticated computer can play the functional roles of pain, pleasure or sensation-of-colour but it remains certainly doubtful that it would have intrinsic qualia as ours. A machine or computer can have internal states with functional properties but it can never be said to be conscious or having consciousness as we human beings do have.

Moreover, the various form of functionalism suggest reductions of mental states to physical states. The definition of mental states purely in terms of causal relations which cannot account for qualitative feel of mental states is the central problem with functionalism. This doctrine, therefore, fails to adequately deal with the mental states.

None of the attempts have been successful in rejecting completely Dualism as such. There is, something which still lingers on. I agree that Cartesian Dualism does not take ground in the sense that several standard arguments raised against it have not been answered by the defenders of Descartes. But this, does not amount to the rejection of dualism as such. The dualism of mental and physical states remains as it is.

In my thesis I try and see if some form of dualism is inevitable in trying to make sense of the human reality. And if it is so, what accounts for its inevitability? Is it some feature of the mental itself or is it a feature of our conceptual framework as a whole?

Answer to these questions necessitate some clarifications regarding the most valuable attribute of a person. Hence in Chapter V, I try and analyse the concept of a person/self. According to Descartes a person is his mind, essence of which is consciousness. In order to give a clear picture of the concept of a person Strawson asks two fundamental questions: (i) why one's states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all? And (ii) Why are they ascribed to the

very something as certain corporeal characteristics, a certain physical situation, etc.

Strawson believes that though mental and physical processes are exclusively different from one another but these two diverse kinds of predicates are, in fact, attributes of the 'something'. Or are ascribed to or belong to one and the something. A person is not only mind, or body but both. A person is a compound of two diverse kinds of subjects: a subject of experience, for instance, pure ego, and subject of corporeal characteristics, for instance body. In order to avoid further difficulty, we should rather say, according to Strawson, a person consists of a 'subject' and a 'non-subject', and therefore, this primitive concept of a person frees us from the difficulties of both Cartesian dualism and the no-ownership theory.

Strawson makes a distinction between 'm-properties and p-properties' which he thinks are equally applicable to a person because person is a primitive concept. And thus a person is a unitary concept, or unitary entity

having two different kinds of attributes <sup>6</sup>. A person is a combination or is constituted with two diverse kinds of attributes and this concept of a person does not make a dual sense.

But this view of Strawson is somehow not acceptable to us. Strawson admits in his book 'Individuals: An essay' that a disembodied person can exist and so dualism is there. Both conceptual and ontological dualism remains. And thus, Strawson theory does not destroy dualism.

Dualism emerges from the understanding of the concept of person. Dualism of person and body remains <sup>7</sup>, and of course dualism of mind and body through the understanding of the concept of person. Though this is not the Cartesian form of dualism, i.e. not the dualism of substances. The debate on mind-body relationship and on persons, conceived as selves, goes on.

In fact, a dualism of or a dualism between self and mind

---

6. Strawson, P F., Individuals : An essay in descriptive metaphysics, University Paperbacks, Methuen, London, 1964, pp. 101-102.

7. Hamlyn, D W, Metaphysics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge London, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney, 1984.

can also be conceived. Some philosophers, for example, recently McGinn, in his book 'The Character of Mind' points out that self is a simple, mental substance and at the same time, he denied substantiality to mental phenomena <sup>8</sup> (thought, emotion, volitions etc.). This raises a question of the relationship between the self and the mental phenomena since mental phenomena are ascribed to selves and they cannot be explained in physicalistic terms. In other words, the ontological status of mental phenomena is neither mental nor physical. Yet, it is attributed to the self which is a mental substance. So there is a dualism between self and the mental phenomena. However, I have not pursued this line of thought. I mention this only to point out that in the broader perspective of mind-body problem other versions of dualism are possible even after rejecting Cartesian dualism.

Conceptually the distinction remains. By conceptual distinction we mean the fact that in our language mental concepts and physical concepts are incommensurate. At the sometime, it doesnot imply that both mental and physical

---

8. McGinn, C, The Character of Mind. Oxford University Press, New York, 1997.

have two distinct kinds of being. That is, their ontological status remains uncertain. But whether a parallel ontological distinction can also be made is a question which remains largely unsettled.

Concept does not pick out anything. A concept is satisfied when it picks out an object of reality as for example, trees, chairs, etc. Contrary to these there are concepts like the concept of pure spontaneity or absolute freedom. Now, is there any spontaneous action to satisfy this concept?

Mental concepts cannot be reduced to non-mental concepts. But the question that mental concepts pick out something in reality is a separate question. It is an empirical or let us say a factual question.

I have not discussed two contemporary theories, namely Meta Linguistic Dualism, advocated by Richard Rorty (Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature), and Complimentarity Theory advocated by N. Bohr<sup>9</sup>. However, I would like to

---

9. Chakraborty, Alpana, Mind-Body Dualism : A Philosophical Investigation, D.K. Printworld, N Delhi, 1997.

simply state that these two theories also fail to solve the mind-body problem. Meta Linguistic Dualism is not the dualism between mind and body but dualism between 'Mental Events' and 'Physical Events', that is, the dualism between 'Incorrigibility' and 'Corrigibility' between the said events. Moreover, Rorty's solution is merely a linguistic solution. Bohr's theory of Complimentarity also cannot be accepted. The principle which he applies in order to solve mind-body problem is actually a principle that he applies in physics. Mental states and mental processes, and bodily states and bodily processes are different from that of physical things in kind. Therefore, the principle which is applicable to physical things cannot be applied to human beings.

I would agree with Richard Rorty when he says that mind-body problem has not been antiquated <sup>10</sup>, i.e. it has not been hitherto replaced by any newer or better theories. I am convinced that mind-body problem is modern, and not ancient.

---

10. Rorty, Richard, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980, pp. 17-69.

DESCARTES' CONCEPTION OF MIND  
CHAPTER II

## DESCARTES' CONCEPTION OF MIND

As we know that 'Mind-Body' relation is one of the most controversial problems in the philosophy of Mind. This problem arises because of the difficulties in understanding the relationship between the 'Mind' and the 'Brain'. This 'Mind-Body' dualism or relation continues to be the most central issue in the history of Philosophy, there are presently two major approaches to the understanding of the nature of 'Mind':-

(i) The Dualistic Approach, and (ii) The Monistic Approach.

The dualistic approach retains the traditional assumption that mind is non-physical, inner, private, and so on. The monistic or physicalistic approach states that all mental processes are nothing but the physical activities which originate or take place in the brain (body). However, we are not inclined to stick to either, or. If we regard 'mind' to be 'thought' as an immaterial entity, then the three following things need to be explained:

(i) The Mind, (ii) The Brain (body), and (iii) The interaction between the two.

Scholastic philosophy maintains that everything in this world can be divided into two basic categories of things mainly 'substances' and 'accidents', which in modern terminology can be understood as 'individual things' and 'accidental properties'. Accordingly, substances are independent existents whereas accidental properties can exist only as dependents upon substances. The tradition opines that a material substance is composite of matter and essence with a distinction that essence is part and parcel of the substance whereas accidental properties are added to it from the outside to the whole comprised of matter and essence in such a way that substance would still be what it is. In other words, an essence determines the inner structure of a substance and the accidental properties do not. Further, the traditional view states that 'a human being consists of a body and a soul'. The soul is conceived as the essence of the body. In other words, the relationship between a human being and his soul is the relationship between substance and its essence, i.e. the soul or mind.

Rene Descartes, the father of Modern Philosophy, offers the mental substance theory which states that every human being even idiots and infants in arms possess both 'mind'

and 'body'. According to him, both 'mind' and 'body' are two independent, individual substances. Every human being is a combination of 'mind' and 'body'. He says, the 'mind' is lodged in the 'body' but the relation between the two is contingent, i.e. not necessary. Because even after the death of the body, mind continues to exist. Thus, both 'mind' and 'body' are independent of each other. He opines that 'mind' is an active and conscious substance as having 'extention' as its essential attribute. Both 'mind' and 'body' possess two different exclusive properties in the form of 'consciousness' and 'extention', respectively. Thus what was considered as 'essence' in traditional view gets termed by Descartes into a substance having its own specific essence. Descartes says:

"By body I understand all that can be terminated by certain figure, that can be comprised in a certain place; and so fill a certain space as therefore, to exclude every other body that can be perceived either by touch, sight, hearing, taste, or smell; or that can be moved in different ways, not indeed of itself but by something foreign to it by which it is touched ..... I am therefore, precisely speaking, only a thinking thing, that is, a mind, understanding, or reason, - terms whose significance was before unknown to me. I am however, a real thing

and really existent, but what thing? The answer was a thinking thing. It is a thing that doubts, understands, denies, wills, refuses, that imagines also and perceives"<sup>1</sup>.

All human bodies are in space and subject to the mechanical laws and being in space can be inspected by external observers. So a man's bodily life is as much a public affair as are the lives of animals and plants. Mind, on the other hand, is not in space and is subject of non-mechanical laws. Its workings cannot be witnessed by other observers. The human body is public because it is in space, external, physical, outer and therefore, a subject of mechanical laws, such as the law of gravitation, uniformity of Nature, law of causation, etc. of nature while the 'mind' is private, it is inner, mental, non-spatial, etc. This distinction between mind and body also makes obvious that there are only two kinds of existences, namely physical existence and the mental existence. Events that take place in the body are events in the physical world and the events which take place in the mind are in the mental world.

According to the official doctrine of the mental substance

- 
1. Descartes, Rene, Meditations on the First Philosophy, translated by John Veitch, LL.D., introduction by A D Lindsay, Aldine Press, London, 1912. pp. 87-89.

theory of Descartes, there are three functions of the mind -- thinking, willing and feeling. Being conscious (or consciousness) is the main function of the mind and being extended is the main characteristic of the body. In other words, the inner life is the stream of consciousness, and to this stream, there are hidden tributaries which run hidden from their owner. We do not know what happens to these tributaries because they remain hidden from us. Those who advocate official doctrine say that 'I have direct access or knowledge of my mind'. I know it for granted and its certainty can never be questioned.

The ulterior aim of Descartes' Metaphysics or Natural Philosophy is to demonstrate two thesis: -

- (1) Material bodies do exist, and
- (11) Material bodies in nature are really and completely different from minds.

According to Descartes a direct causal interaction between mind and body is necessarily impossible. Because both the mind and the body possess mutually exclusive properties. Body is in space and public. It is extended and can be mechanically explained. Mind, on the other hand, is not in

space but only in time. It is private and has consciousness as its attribute. It is not extended and therefore, can't be inspected. However, Descartes accepts that there is some sort of connection between the two, i.e. between the mind and the body. Thus he is laid to answer the following questions :

(1) How do we know that there is a connection?

(11) How is the connection known to be described?

His answer to the former epistemological question is that "the union of the soul to the body is intuitively known". In his reply to the second question he says that whenever something happens in the mind is a case mental occasion and with the body is a case physical occasion.

According to Descartes, the animated 'body' or 'machine' or the inanimate matter are of the same kind but they differ in degrees. The animated body is complex and exhibits greater homogeneity among its constituent corpuseles. Descartes says that the body of a man is nothing but a statue or machine made of earth, which was later endorsed by Leibnitz when he said: All that take place in body of a

man or any animal is as machanical as that which takes place in a watch. It implies that the body which has motion can be animated and hence is destroyable. Human bodies are animated because we move from one part of space to another part of space, and that inanimated body cannot move, e.g. stone, etc.

Further, Descartes defines substance in two different ways namely, (i) Whatever that has complete existential independence from any other substance is a primary substance, and (ii) Whatever that has existential independence from any other substance, except from Absolute substance is a secondary substance. For example, 'Mind' and 'Body' are secondary substances having two different mutually exclusive properties or attributes, for instance, 'consciousness' and 'extention' respectively. Again, he recognises three kinds of distinction between mind and body, which are : (i) Real, (ii) Modal, and (iii) Rational.

(i) **Real:** There is a real distinction between mind and body because 'mind' (a substance) can be conceived without the logical necessity of conceiving from any other substance, e.g body. Hence it is based on the principle of logical

conceivability.

(11) **Modal:** There are two kinds of modal distinctions, namely (a) The distinction between the earth's revolutionary motion (mode) and its matter (substance). (b) The distinction between the two modes of the same attribute of the same substance. For example, the distinction between the revolutionary motion and the spherial shape of the earth.

(111) **Rational :** There are two types of rational distinction namely (a) the distinction between substance and its attributes (b) the distinction between two essential characters of the same substance. For example, the distinction between matters' duration and its extension. It may be noted that according to Descartes what is distinguishable in thought, though not separated in existence, is to draw a distinction of reason.

Descartes believes that matter or body acts on mind and the mind acts on matter or body, the question now is: How are we to explain the apparent action of matter on mind, or of mind on matter? Let us consider the question how matter acts on mind. First in order to answer the question we can

take Descartes' account of sense perception in consideration which is mainly divided into consecutive stages namely:

(i) Series of causally connected events comprising both those occurrent in the existing 'body' and those stimulating the nerve-endings and sense organs of the perceiver's own body.

!

(ii) A conclusion of the series of movements propagated from the affected sense organs along the nerves and terminating in the pineal gland, located in the centre of the brain.

(iii) On the gland an impression is produced on the occasion of which physical impression a conscious act occurs.

Let us now consider the latter question, i.e. how are we to explain the apparent action of the mind and the matter. Descartes tries to answer this question by:

(a) Selecting the pineal gland as the single, ultimate and central recipient to which all the apparent movements in the human body converge and from which all effectual

ones depart.

(b) Identifying that gland with 'the sit of the soul', Descartes says that the pineal gland being simple in structure and hence not duplicate was appropriate to the unity of the mind's operations, synthesizing of all datas into one centre of consciousness.

(c) Distinguishing purely mechanical movements which explain physical change from the flow of animal spirits which explain physiological change.

Descartes remarks in the Sixth Meditation:

"I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am besides so intimately conjoined, and as it were intermixed with it, that my mind and body compose a certain unity. For this were not the case, I should not feel pain when my body is hurt, seeing I am merely a thinking thing, but should perceive the wound by the understanding alone, just as a pilot perceives by sight when any part of his vessel is damaged" .

This proves that though a human being is primarily a thinking thing, it stands in substantial unity with body.

Hence Descartes did not quite deny interaction between the two, i.e. the mind and the body, but tried to ascertain interactionism.

Descartes, we know gives a mechanistic explanation of the body which is different from scholastic mechanism, where soul or the mind is conceived as the essence of the body, and at the same time where activity is totally or partly denied to body. Hence body cannot be acted upon. They hold body does not have intrinsic activity but only extrinsic activity and can be defined only in terms of locomotion. Descartes, on the contrary, conceived mind not as the essence of the body but a substance in its own right. A human being is thus a combination of two individual things namely of a body and a mind. Moreover, the relationship between the two is not the relationship of the substance and the essence, rather relationship of the two independent individual substances having their own essences namely in the form of 'extension' and 'consciousness', respectively.

In other words, Cartesian Dualism is the dualism of substances, where substance is the basic notion. And because of the due consideration of this basic notion we find that

this dualism of substances, i.e. of the mind and the body is not acceptable. Not because we have improved and refined our objections clearly but because we want to understand mind at least as well as we understand the world around ourselves.

Now, to understand the Cartesian notion of the mind, however, we have to examine the concepts which emerge as central to his distinction between 'mind and body'. These concepts can be treated as the criteria establishing the distinctness of the mind.

When we consider the arguments by which Descartes establishes the distinction, we find two key claims about mind.

One is about the 'privacy' of mind and the other is 'Intentionality' of mind and its direct and indubitable knowledge. Let us now examine the two key claims about mind in detail.

It is evident that the two main candidates of the criteria of the mental, which have received considerable attention

today, are 'privacy' and 'intentionality'. We find that both these criteria reflect the aspects of consciousness.

It may be clear that here we are discussing 'Privacy' as the criterion of the mental and not as such anything 'mentally private' to avoid any logical fallacy of pre-supposing prior notion of the mental. On the other hand, we are concerned here with the ownership of the mental state which comes as a kind of access to it, which is not available to others. Intuitively it seems there is a sense in which mental states and events are private.

Descartes has suggested this criterion of the mental 'Privacy' which claims that one has 'direct access' to the modification of one's own consciousness. The access to one's own mind or consciousness can also be seen as privileged to another's mind, except when it is known analogically from one's own case. No one else can know my conscious states, I am privileged to know what conscious states I have or I am in. It is such consideration about the way one has access to one's consciousness that leads to the belief that consciousness is the private domain of mental states, processes and events which are fundamentally different from

any feature of material things, conceived in terms of 'extension'. As J Wisdom puts it, "The peculiarity of the soul is not that it is visible to none, but that it is visible to one"<sup>3</sup>. Descartes believes that mind is private, inner, immaterial, have no window, etc. It also implies that none of the modifications of one's own consciousness will deceive him. It is that mental state which necessarily owned by and ascribed to only one owner, namely the one whose states they are. This unique relationship between the owner and the owned is that what gives an owner direct access to what he owns, and which in turn give sense to their 'privacy'.

Hamlyn observes that the notion of privacy is difficult to spell out. The following quotation from him brings out the crucial points very successfully:

"The notion of the private is of course wider than that of being the object of the direct, indubitable access that Descartes had in mind; for to say that a sensation or thought is private is not necessarily

---

3. Agarwal, M M, *Consciousness and the Integrated Being*, National Institute of Advanced Study, National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1991. (1st ch. on Consciousness).

to say that we have indubitable or incorrigible awareness of it. It is to say that we have access to our own mental states in a way that others do not, but it need not imply anything about the epistemological status of that access. To make that point is to begin the task of sorting out the appropriate sense in which mental items can be said to be private. For, as has been pointed out by others, the sense in which pains, for example, are private not in the sense in which my property, my voice or even information that I may possess may be private.

Don Locke even specifies a sense of 'private' which he calls 'mentally private', defined by saying that something is mentally private 'if only one person can perceive it'. But he has to go on to say that, while by that criterion pains are mentally private, conscious processes (i.e. such things as perceiving and thinking) are not, since they 'cannot be felt or perceived at all, by anyone'. Moreover, by that criterion certain things may be mentally private for merely contingent reasons, such as that nobody else can get in quite the same position as I can to perceive the thing in question. One suspects that the definition of 'mentally private' could rule out such contingent impossibilities only by begging the question --- only by presupposing a prior notion of the mental.

This is the crux. Intuitively it seems obvious that there is a sense in which mental states and events

are private, in that there is a way in which we have access to them which others cannot have. It may indeed be the case that for a large class of such items we are the ultimate authority about them; certainly, if we feel pain it is not up to others to maintain that we do not, although the situation is less clear in the case of more complex mental states. The reason why we have this kind of access to our mental states, etc is that they are ours. A mental state cannot be mental as far as concerns whose it is. With the ownership of a mental state comes a kind of access to it that is not available to others. It is impossible, however, to define in such terms, the sense of 'privacy' in which mental states are private without circularity. For we should in effect be saying that mental states are private in the sense that mental states are, i.e. in the sense that their owners have access to them by reason of that ownership in a way that is not open to others. Hence, while privacy may be a necessary condition of being mental it is not an independent sufficient condition, which enables us to decide simply by its means what is mental and what is not - or not without circularity' 4".

Hamlyn points out that it is not possible to define the notion of privacy in terms of ownership, etc. without

---

4. Hamlyn, D W, *Metaphysics*, Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 171-172

circularity. He maintains that though privacy may be a necessary condition. It is not a sufficient condition, according to him, there is no special sense of privacy available which could be used to separate the mental from the non-mental. He comes to the conclusion on the basis of some powerful arguments that privacy cannot be considered as a valid criterion.

Wittgenstein in his book, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, rejects the Cartesian view of the the self/mind and redefines it by saying that the Cartesian self/mind or Cogito is reducible to the psychological self. And thus the psychological self is part of the world and therefore it becomes subject of the empirical experience. It implies that there is a thinking self for every act of thinking. For Wittgenstein both mind and body belong to the world and are not domain of facts but are parts of the domain of facts<sup>5</sup>. Wittgenstein maintains that mind is nothing but a set of activities & not a mental entity though it is real. What, Wittgenstein does not admit is that there is no possibility of there being any private language. Each language

---

5. Wittgenstein, L., Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans, D F Pears and B F McGuinness, Roulledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961.

is to be publicly intelligible and if it is so then 'Privacy' will no longer be an independent criterion of the mental as there is no mental representation which can be said to be the sole repository of our access to the world ".

Further, though consciousness is necessarily private we can say very little about this relationship of the owner and the owned, and consequently we are led with the view that 'privacy' cannot be used as an independent criterion of the mental.

The other criterion of the mental is intentionality which in modern times stems from Franz Brentano. Intentionality, the criterion of the mental, states that consciousness is always directed to an object as such and such. According to Brentano, all the mental acts are related to a particular object which has intentional existence. It means that an act is internally related to an object ignoring whether or not there is anything corresponding to it (*rerum natura*). This explanation of Brentano of intentionality as criterion of the mental seems to be some special and arguable too. It is so because of the fact that there is no correspondence

---

6. Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, trans G E M Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1953.

between what is stated through a proposition (or an act) and the actual world (the thing as it is). More precisely, by the term 'intentionality' Brentano mainly understands two things that consciousness is always directed towards an object as such and such and that consciousness always makes reference to a content. It implies that consciousness is always and of something. The idea of intentionality states that 'consciousness' being a subject must have an object to be directed upon. A seeing is always a seeing of something. For example, when we perceive an animal in a farm, we notice that the animal out there is the object towards which our seeing consciousness is directed. Although, sometimes it also seems that there are a number of mental states where our consciousness is not directed as there is no any object. For example, 'pain' as it is not about anything. Here Brentano maintains that this fact is expressed by saying that the object in question is intentionally 'inexistent'. And in the case of some psychological phenomena, such as melancholy, depression, etc. where one does not find an object, Brentano holds that a 'secondary' referent exists which he identifies as the psychical phenomena, ignoring the fact that the object in question has to exist, independently of the act which involves consciousness. For

example, depression cannot be conceived to exist independently of the act of feeling it.

It is clear that there are some processes and events which need not have objects at all. We can also point out that intentionality not necessarily always involves consciousness. In other words, direction upon an object can exist in an activity without necessarily involving consciousness. But one may be inclined to agree with the fact that 'direction upon an object' is possibly non-existent is a very reliable mark of the mental. However, from the above discussion, it appears that 'direction upon an object' is not a necessary condition of a conscious event or state.

The another important feature of consciousness, according to Brentano is the idea of 'reference to a content'. Brentano here claims that all mental acts, states and events do necessarily have some kind of content. Consciousness does not exist as mere consciousness without something given to it or represented into it. It is believed that the content can be described independently of any reference to the object of consciousness. For example, 'pain' is both a qualitative content and a proportional content which are understood as

or felt as phenomenological quality of the painful sensation and that one believes that such and such is true or false, respectively. It is also believed that on a given occasion, the content of an act of consciousness may not correspond to the object intended to the act.

One can also understand intentionality by saying that it is that property of the mental events by which they are directed at objects and states of affairs in the world. According to M J Harney,

"Brentano's intentionality thesis states that, for any mental activity, there is always some object to which that activity is directed. I cannot think without thinking something, I cannot hope without hoping for something. But the peculiarity of the objects of mental activities is that they need not exist. No physical phenomena exhibit this characteristic. If I kick a stone or eat an apple, there must exist some stone that I kick or some apple that I eat. But if I think of a stone or wish for an apple, it does not follow from this that such objects exist."

Brentano makes a distinction between 'Mental phenomena'

---

7. Harney, M J, Intentionality, Sense and the Mind,  
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1984, P 15.

and 'physical phenomena' in terms of dichotomy of act and object. The fact behind this thesis of intentionality is that the objects of mental phenomena to which they are directed need not exist, and as a result, what distinguishes mental from physical phenomena is that object of a mental act which is possibly non-existent. For instance, there are objects of wanting, fearing and other mental phenomena or psychological phenomena which need not exist. And this is what has been called by Brentano 'intentional inexistence'<sup>8</sup>. But we see that this way of characterising mental phenomena falls short in order to give us a mark which distinguishes mental from the physical phenomena. Since, as we have seen, certain mental states such as depression, do not take any object about.

When we go by Brentano's understanding of 'reference to content' we see that a belief must have a content and so to say it is mental because knowing, believing and perceiving are mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon has a content the way a belief has. But again there are some mental states, processes or events, which, for instance, states of

---

8. Teichman, Jenny, The Mind and the Soul, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1974.

depression, euphoria, suffering, irritability, etc. need not have any specific content and hence it is very difficult to say whether these states fall into the category of physical or psychological/mental.

In other words, in the cases of perceiving their contents are not themselves propositional. Though they can be described in propositions. Now if we apply the same 'reference to a content' formula to those conscious states, processes and events which as stated earlier, do not have objects at all, and we again find that this feature of consciousness too can be levelled with the same problems, which as a result, mars it to be a necessary condition of a conscious state or event. For example, what contents do a state of depression or euphoria have? The answer to this question seems to be in negative ..... a depression is not of something, nor can the cause of depression provides the content. Thus, it seems that 'reference to a content' cannot be held as a necessary condition of the presence of consciousness. But if we follow the belief having the propositional content, it seems to be sufficient condition, because the notion of 'reference to a content', where the content is a proposition, is simply out of explaining physical events, processes or

states. To put in brief, the 'reference to a content'; doesnot propose an important feature of consciousness and also being limited in scope, it cannot be said to be an overall criterion of consciousness.

Roderick Chisholen<sup>9</sup>, while providing general criteria of the mentality makes a distinction between the 'intentional' and 'non-intentional' terms of the form of belief statements. According to him, there has been an assimilation of intentional to the intentional and non-intentional to the non-intentional.

It may be mentioned that the truth and falsity of an extentional proposition is solely dependent on the truth and falsity of its constituent parts or possible constituents. This is not the case with intentional sentences or propositions (acts).

It describes a state of affairs that can be characterised as mental. But this formulation of intentionality as the criterion of the mental is satisfactory to the linguistic

---

9. Chisholm, Roderick, *The First Person: An Essay on Reference and Intentionality*, The Harvester Press, 1981.

level only. So again, intentionality cannot be said to be the sufficient condition of the criteria of the mental.

Now the question arises: Should we infer from the failure of these two criteria of the mental (Privacy & Intentionality) that there is no such thing as mental? Can Cartesian dualism of mind and body as two independent substances be defended?

We have seen that the dualist propounds a version of the two component theory that our bodily component, our Cartesian Mind, is the true seat of mental phenomena as beliefs and desires, pains and visual experiences. But this initial characterisation of the dualist position looks extremely vague and thoroughly problematic when we start thinking seriously about it. The question now being asked: What is meant by 'non-bodily component? Where are they to be formed? What are they made of ?' How are such things supposed to interact with our bodies? Are we considered among the animals in having them? When and how did they emerge onto the evolutionary scene? These questions are not easily answerable. Yet, we find that dualism retains a very powerful appeal. And despite the sort of difficulties which we have just raised, some versions of dualism must be correct because

there are compelling arguments in its favour. So here we will try to unravel some of the considerations that seem to give dualism its undoubted appeal.

While motivating the dualist position, it has been considered that mental properties (like being conscious, for example) are so different from physical properties that they clearly cannot be had by the same thing. So the physical properties are had by the body and the mental ones by something else. The reason behind this consideration is that merely material things cannot think or feel. We can think and feel. It implies we are not merely material things/objects, but something else besides. The variation on the argument which appeals that there are some particularly deep or impressive thoughts and feelings which merely material things cannot have. For a merely material being could not appreciate, fall in love, believe in god. But we can appreciate, fall in love, believe in god and therefore, we are not mere chunks of physical stuff, but something else besides.

Here if we grant for the sake of argument that there is some good sense in which mental properties are radically

different from physical properties then why on earth should we accept, it follows that the two sorts of properties cannot be had by the same thing? But normally it is thought that one and the same thing can have a wide variety of properties. A material thing, for example, a house may be built of a lime stone, be several months or years old, be of great beauty and so on. Yet the house has a temporal characteristics. So what hinder us to accept that the mental properties and physical properties are likewise very different in type. Now .... Why should not things have properties of the two diverse kinds? For instance, the properties of being in pain and of understanding quantum field theory where one can easily be mistaken whether one understands a scientific theory, and understanding quantum field theory would seem to be a state only open to a rational language - using creature, while even a mouse can feel pain. It implies that mental properties can in turn be divided into distinct classes notably that a person consists of a body plus an intellect plus a centre of sensation <sup>10</sup>

But these remarks do not show that there is anything actually wrong with dualism, but they do show that the argument

---

10. Smith, P & Jones, O R, Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press, 1986.

mental and physical properties are different as they are possessed by mind and body, respectively, is not enough by itself to establish the dualist case.

With the dualist we can all accept that 'merely material things cannot think or feel' while we human beings can think or feel, and consequently we are not merely material things/beings. The above stated argument that 'material things cannot think or feel' tries to reach to the much stronger conclusion that we are not merely material things but something else besides. But this argument of dualistic approach doesnot justify its claim rather it supports to its naturalistic rival. It entails the desired dualist conclusion but is unacceptable because though it can freely be granted that material things are made up of physical stuff but doesnot imply dualism and moreover this argument seems to be more persuasive.

We may accept Spinoza as he opined 'experience has not yet taught any one what the body can do from the laws of nature alone in so far as nature is only considered as corporeal <sup>11</sup>. It remains true to say that experience has not

---

11. Ibid, p. 21.

yet taught us that a purely corporeal being could not exhibit the behavioural complexities of a human being. On the otherhand, as the research is going on in the biological sciences and in the field of artificial intelligence, we increasingly get to understand how purely physical system is capable of more and more complex behaviour. Therefore, the anti-dualist can rightly protest that the argument 'thinking and feeling that underlie our behaviour must be one to some non-physical component' is not obviously true as it stands. The reason is there is some possibility in saying that mental and physical properties are very different from each other. The dualist must not assume that one and the same thing cannot have both kinds of property.

Again, we are not merely material things in the sense of being brute unthinking lumps of stuff, but that doesnot mean that we are a combination of some brute physical things with a special kind of additional entity which does the thinking, namely the Cartesian Mind. The anti-dualist will not obviously agree that we are unthinking physical objects, his view is that we are thinking - physical beings and nothing shows that this view is untenable. Again we can agree that there is some mystery about the nature of our

aesthetic experiences (and likewise for many other aspects of our mental lives). But we cannot simply assume with that the argument 'immaterial things can appreciate, fall in love, believe in god' establishes the dualist case. For we need to investigate what is involved in our aesthetic responses (or whatever) and we have no business to prejudge the results of such an investigation by supposing that it must turn out that only immaterial minds could have such responses. Finally, the dualist cannot just assume what needs to be argued, namely that complexity of human behaviour is to be explained by ascribing it to non-physical causes<sup>12</sup>.

The more interesting argument which seems to have a considerable attraction is that 'dualism must be true because people sometimes have experiences in which they perceive themselves from a point outside their bodies'. But in that case we can hardly be the something as our bodies --- for a thing cannot leave itself<sup>13</sup>. This argument however, might merely be a kind of illusion to which people are rather prone because of the fact that the person in question, perceiving his body from a point located outside it, is

---

12. Ibid. p. 21.

13. Ibid, p. 22.

somewhere other than where his body is. In short, it plainly does not follow from this that he really is out of his body.

Therefore, seeming to perceive the world from a place outside the body proves nothing at all. We have no good reason to suppose that anyone ever does better than seem to have out of body perceptions. Even if we did apparently encounter a case of thoroughly reliable perception of events from a point of view remote from the body, this still would not conclusively demonstrate that a person had left his body. So this argument also collapses to support dualism.

A much more substantial argument, whose treatment requires more care, where in an ordinary discourse we say both things about a person. For example 'John is thinking about Mary' and 'John weighs sixty kilograms. Here we ascribe both mental and physical characteristics to the something, as a two component picture of a person. In former case, it refers the Cartesian Mind or soul that constitutes the inner man, and latter his body. But here again for the anti-dualist the terms 'John' and 'John's body' do pick-out the something, but the latter expression is conventionally reserved for one when one is focussing on the more obviously

bodily aspects of 'John'. In other words, the phrase 'John's body' functions rather like a longer phrase 'John, so far as his more obviously corporeal aspects are concerned'. Thus when one asserts 'I admire John's body' he is thereby conveying the carnal nature of his appreciation of John. He is not saying he admires something distinct from John himself, but he is revealing on what aspects of John his admiration is based on (it might be said he admires John body-wise). Here it can be said that the expression 'John's body' does not merely denote John but instead has a double function. It both picks out the living organism which is John and also focuses our attention on John's more evidently corporeal aspects. It can well be understood by the assertions that 'I met John's body and John's body solved an equation' are distinctively odd and the phrase 'John's body' looks ill-formed. The expression 'John's body' does not pick out something quite distinct from John himself like the phrase 'John's house', as it picks out and simply denotes an object quite distinct from John himself, the latter phrase is indeed a pure designator.

All the above arguments do not support dualism in any way. But the basic thought underlying is that 'I can imagine

myself surviving the destruction of my present body'. But of course I cannot imagine my body continuing to exist even when it has been destroyed -- that supposition is simply non-sensical. So there is a difference between myself and my body. The first has the property of being imaginable-by-me--existing-after-the-destruction of my body, and the second lacks this property. This means that we have found a feature, albeit a complex one, which distinguishes myself from my body. Hence as the dualist maintains, they must be distinct things' is that we can easily separate ourselves from our body in thought <sup>14</sup>, and thereby inferring the possibility to clearly prove that they are (myself and mybody) distinct items in reality. The importance and basic interest of this idea is that it is one that Descartes himself is standardly interpreted as having used to support his dualism. It will be worth mentioning how Descartes develops the same underlying idea.

The opening pages of Descartes 'Meditations' set before us in marvellously compelling way, questioning like: How do you know that you are not dreaming now? How do you know that the whole course of your experience is not just one long

---

14. Ibid, P. 30.

hallucination? Descartes reaction to this crucial point is fascinating and deeply attractive once it is understood. Here we find Cartesian strategy has two stages, a temporary suspension of belief in those things in which we donot initially have a cast-iron proof, and then a constructive phase in which we seek to re-establish at least the bulk of our old beliefs <sup>15</sup>. And it is the second, positive, phase which causes the most trouble for Descartes because it is one thing to set certain beliefs aside for the sake of the argument, and is quite another thing to try to re-establish them on a firm footing. Now here if we follow Descartes in setting aside any belief that is initially open to sceptical challenge, then it seems that one belief that will temporarily have to go is our belief in our own bodies. But even if that belief has to be set aside, there is one quite crucial belief each of us shares that does seem to be resistant even to the most inventive.

Sceptics challenge, namely our belief in our own individual existence. One may be able to spin a tale according to which he is possibly deceived about the existence of his body, along with the rest of the world. But none of us can

---

15. Ibid, P. 31.

coherently suppose ourselves to be in error in holding that we ourselves exist. The very fact that I can so much as raise the question whether I exist proves conclusively that I do exist, because I must exist in order to think at all.

Descartes develops exactly this line of thought by pointing out:

"I have just said that I have no senses and no body. This is the sticking point: what follows from this? Am I not so bound up with a body and senses that I cannot exist without them? But I have convinced myself that there is nothing absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, ... no bodies. Does it now not follow that I too do not exist? No: If I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of Supreme power and cunning and who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me, and let me deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring me about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind"<sup>16</sup>.

In part Four of his Discourse on the Method, Descartes sums up the same point. :

---

16. Ibid, P. 35-36.

"I noticed that while I was trying thus to think everything false, it was necessary that I, who was thinking this, was something. And observing that this truth 'I am thinking, therefore I exist' was so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions if the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, I decided that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking" <sup>17</sup>.

In short, Descartes' belief in his own existence is absolutely secure and what goes for Descartes here goes for each of us.

Here it appears that if we follow Descartes in attempting to set aside any belief for which we do not currently have an absolutely rock-solid proof, then we are going to have to suspend judgement about the judgements of our own body, on the other hand, we can retain our belief in our own existence. But in doing so one must be distinct from one's body. It shows existence of one's own body could be doubled but not the existence of one's ownself. Here at least we seem to have the makings of a sophisticated argument for dualism, and one which looks as if it can indeed be attributed to Descartes.

---

17. Discourse on the Method, Descartes writings 1:127.

Descartes writes :

"I saw that while I could feign that I had no body and that there was no world and no place for me to be in, I couldnot for all that feign that I did not exist. I saw on the contrary that from the mere fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it followed quite evidently and certainly that I existed, whereas if I had merely ceased thinking, even if everything else that I had ever imagined had been true, I should have had no reason to believe that I existed. From this I knew I was a being whose whole essence or nature is simply to think, and which doesnot require any place, or depend on any material thing, in order to exist. Accordingly this 'I' -- that is, the soul by which I am what I am -- is entirely distinct from the body, and indeed is easier to know than the body, and would not fail to be whatever it is, even if the body did not exist" <sup>18</sup>.

Descartes' argument in favour of dualism is intrinsically fascinating and worth discussing for defences of dualism.

His arguments as follows:

"(a) I can feign that my body doesnot exist.

(b) I cannot feign that I myself donot exist.

---

18. Ibid.

Hence, (c) I myself an entirely distinct from my body."<sup>1</sup>

Now whether or not this argument of Descartes is a valid one we could be able to summarise his argument in an analogous way as follows:

"(a) I can imagine myself surviving the destruction of my body,

(b) I cannot imagine my body surviving the destruction of my body.

Hence, (c) I myself am an entirely distinct from my body."<sup>20</sup>

Though here it appears that this argument is not exactly of the same form as Descartes', but there is a close relation between the two. In each case we are invited to infer the distinction between the body and the self from the observation that there is something we can imagine or feign with respect to the one which we cannot imagine or feign with respect to the other. As far as the validity is concerned, it is reasonable to suggest that the move from the premises to the conclusion in the last argument is legitimate if and only if the parallel move in Descartes' argument is

---

19. Smith, P & Jones, O R, The Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press, 1986.

20. Ibid, P. 38.

acceptable. The arguments differ not in their point of validity or lack of it, but in respect of the plausibility of their premises. For instance, premise '(a)' involves dispute. But if Descartes' premise '(a)' properly understood, is not about what is imaginatively possible, but about what is required in a certain intellectual project. More precisely '(a)' makes hold of positive claim about what we can imagine, it encapsulates a much more modest negative claim about the difficulty of defending one's belief in the physical world against sceptical challenge. Here Descartes '(a)' looks a lot more attractive than the analogous '(a)'; and the arguments seem to be on a par as far as validity is concerned.

Leibnitz, with his typical logical acumen saw that this argument of Descartes is not logically valid and therefore will not work. He writes:

"It is not valid to reason", 'I can assume or imagine that no corporeal body exists, but I cannot imagine that I donot exist or donot think. Therefore, I am not corporeal, nor is thought a modification of the body'. I am amazed that so able a man (as Descartes) could have based so much on so flimcy a sophism ... Some one who thinks that the soul is

corporeal . . . . will admit that you can doubt (as long as you are ignorant of the nature of the soul) whether anything corporeal exists or doesnot exist. And as you nevertheless see clearly that your soul exists, he will admit that this one thing follows: that you can still doubt whether the soul is corporeal. But no amount of torture can extort anything more from this argument".<sup>21</sup> To put more precisely, Descartes' premises about what we can feign that we are distinct from our bodies is not sufficient to show that we really are separate from our bodies. There seems to be no avoiding Leibnitz's conclusion that Descartes argument is simply invalid. Descartes idea is that since he can feign that his body doesnot exist but he cannot feign that he himself doesnot exit, it follows that he is something distinct from his body. Descartes thinks that since the expressions 'I myself' and 'my body' cannot be freely interchanged in the context 'I can feign that . . . . . does not exist' it follows that they pickout different things. But 'I can feign. . . . . ' is, of course a psychological context, and designators which occur in this setting function as part of the specification of a mental state. As we see here, we cannot infer from the fact that two designators cannot be

---

21. Ibid, P. 44.

interchanged in this sort of setting that they donot pick out one and the same thing in their standard use.

And consequently, in short, Descartes' argument is obviously a bogus argument, and therefore, invalid. "

**DESCARTES VERSUS GILBERT RYLE**

**CHAPTER III**

## DESCARTES VERSUS GILBERT RYLE

The dualist seems to face certain difficulties. The difficulties are: If mental states are in principle unobservable then how can I know that we are justified in ascribing them to other people at all? Even if you have mental states, how can I know that the co-relations between them and behaviour or states of the brain are the same in you as in me? How are we to describe the link between mental states and other states? If they are causal, how does the causal process operate?

As I have noted in the last chapter, a number of initially attractive pro-dualist arguments fail to establish the existence of Cartesian minds, as entities distinct from our bodies.

The dualist conception of the soul or self or mind is an immaterial entity distinct from body. Every human being even the infants in arm have both body and mind. Both mind and body are two different, individual independent substances. Body is understood or explained in terms of 'extension' while "consciousness" is the essence of the

mind. We cannot here say, for a while, that this dualist conception is non-sensical, for the dualist idea is that there are certain entities of a kind that are not recognised by physics (the science of matter) : and it would surely be outrageous to dismiss as nonsense the thought that there could perhaps be more thing in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in the physicist's philosophy. So here I am not going to damn dualism as meaningless just because it speaks of entities which are not recognised by physics, rather I shall concentrate first on the even more basic dualist assumption that minds are genuine entities in their own right.

While going by the subject matter, the first main question that arises is: What is it to be a genuine entity? To answer this question the dualist claims that Cartesian minds are the genuine entities in their own right, entirely distinct from bodies. In other words, it seems that he must grant that on his view it makes some sense to ask 'how many Cartesian minds are associated with this particular human body?' and also 'is the mind, which is now associated with the body is the same one as was associated with it a few moments ago, or is it only (more or less) an exactly similar

replacement?' '.

The dualist respond to the question, 'how many minds?' by saying that there is one and only one mind associated with each normal human being. But the answer is still questionable as 'what entitles the dualist to this view?' while developing a variation on a theme on Kant, Strawson argued:

"Suppose I were in debate with a Cartesian philosopher, say Professor X. If I were to suggest that when the man, Professor X, speaks, there are a thousand souls simultaneously thinking the thoughts his words express, having qualitatively indistinguishable experiences such as he, the man, would currently claim, how would he persuade me that there was only such soul? (How would each indignant soul, once the doubt has entered, persuade itself of its uniqueness?).<sup>2</sup>"

Here it can be argued that if minds are genuine entities in their own right then why can't there be many minds associated with a given body and thinking away more or less in parallel? Strawson says it is very difficult to see how the dualist could claim to know that his 'one mind' theory

- 
1. Smith, Peter & Jones, O R, The Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press, 1986.
  2. Ibid, p. 47.

is true. How can one claim that his own mind is unique or is one of a community of similar minds attached to the same body? Experientially there is no way of deciding between the official Cartesian story and its fanciful 'many minds' rival. Now the question is asked : Has Descartes any right to insist that his tale is the correct one? And we see that the dualist cannot simply protect that a normal human being has one mind 'by definition'. It appears that his claim that a person such as himself consists of one body plus one mind now has a status of a rather chancy hypothesis which is at most a reasonable bet.

Difficulties for the dualist are now beginning to mount up which seem fundamentally challenging and yet also pretty intractable. According to the dualist view, an absolutely sharp distinction can be drawn between (1) being merely a physical entity, and (11) having both a physical body and an immaterial mind. We human beings fall into the second category whereas stones, trees, etc. fall into the first category. It may be mentioned here that in the part five of the Discourse, Descartes bluntly supposes that animals being in the first category of mind-less, purely physical things despite the fact that non-human animals can perceive the

world around them and have desires for food and sex. Some times we see many animals with quite a rich mental life.

Descartes opines about animals:

".....they have no intelligence at all, and ... it is nature which acts in them according to the disposition of their organs. (Writings 1:141)."<sup>3</sup>

To put it precisely, Descartes argues that they (animals) are indistinguishable from automata. Here, Descartes' attempts to draw an absolutely clear line between us and the brutes by reference to the presence and absence of minds looks utterly misguided --- there just doesnot seem to be that sort of all-or-nothing different between us and other animals. Leibnitz protested that:

"....the opinion of those who transform or degrade beasts into pure machines .. goes beyond appearances, and is even contrary to the order of things. (Papers: 454)."<sup>4</sup>

Locke wrote:

".....in all the visible corporeal

3. Ibid, p. 50.

4. Ibid, p. 50.

world we see no chasm or gaps. All quite down from us the descent is by easy steps and a continued series of things, that in each remove differ very little one from the other.... There are some brutes that seem to have as much knowledge and reason as some that are called men: and the animals and the vegetables kingdoms are so nearly joined that, if you will take the lowest of one and the highest of the other, there will scarce be published any great difference between them, and so on, till we come to the lowest and most organical parts of matter, we shall find every where that the several species are linked together and differ but in almost insensible degrees. (Essay III. IV 12)."<sup>5</sup>

Here it appears that Descartes' own placing of a sharp divide between humans and all other animals is unsatisfactory. It would have been better if the dualist had replied that all physical things have incorporeal entities associated with them, so there is after all no divide anywhere between things with and without Cartesian components.

Another general difficulty with the theory of dualism is that how some particular immaterial event causes a physical upshot. In other words, similarly we can ask that how

---

5. Ibid, p. 50.

physical happenings can have immaterial consequences. In order to answer this question whatever tale the dualist spins for us can only mention further happenings that fall squarely on one side or the other of the great divide between physical events and events in immaterial minds. If we ask the dualist how the realm of the mind can influence the physical realm, nothing the dualist can say will make matters any way clearer. Descartes, though recognised and suggested that mind brings its influence to bear on the body in the pineal gland. But to specify the location of the putative mind-body interface is not to specify how the causal interaction is supposed to work. Here it seems to be a puzzle-creating and not problem-solving where we are faced with just the sort of complexity which cries out for further causal explanation and there we are simultaneously told that no such explanation is possible. And therefore, until we get a clearly developed response from the dualist which makes some physiological sense, it is tempting to agree with Ryle's blunt assessment to some extent:

“....the connection between [events in the mind and bodily events] is .... a mystery. It is a mystery not of the unsolved but soluble type, like the problem of the cause of

cancer, but of quite another type. The episodes supposed (by the Cartesian) to constitute the careers of minds are assumed to have one sort of existence, while those constituting the careers of bodies have another sort, and no bridge status is allowed. Transactions between minds and bodies (in order to be explicable) involve links where no links can be."<sup>6</sup>

It appears that the dualist theory of the mind seems to have a serious and intractable puzzle at its very heart. It is a fundamental principle deeply entrenched in the practice of science that the physical world is 'causally closed'. There are no causal influences on physical events besides other physical events. This is not accepted by the Cartesian who believes in the mind/body interaction. All these already noted difficulties leaves the Cartesian model of mind in a hopeless state.

Ryle, for instance, sums up his polemical attack on Descartes with the 'deliberately abusive' slogan: 'Dualism is the theory of the Ghost in the Machine'.

Gilbert Ryle's objection to the theory of Cartesian dualism

---

6. Ibid, p. 57.

is two fold. Firstly, 'If a person says that he is picturing his nursery, we are tempted to construe his remark to mean that he is somehow contemplating, not his nursery but another visible object, namely a picture of his nursery, not only a photograph or an oil-painting but some counterpart to a photograph, one made of a different sort of stuff'. And secondly, '..... there exist a quite general tendency among the theorists and laymen alike to ascribe some sort of an other-worldly reality to the imaginary and then to treat minds as the clandestine habitats of such fleshless beings? The supposition that the body or 'machine' is inhabited by a self-subsistent non-physical entity the soul or 'Ghost' purports to explain action, sensation, thought, emotion and the will, it cannot, in fact, explain any of these things. Whatever difference is between a living person and a lump of inanimate matter, it cannot be that the former is inhabited by, and activated by a non-physical entity, for there can be no causal or other laws connecting the physical and the non-physical, so that even if the Ghost existed it could not activate the machine. Nor could the machine affect the Ghost. No interaction between them is possible and as an explanatory hypotheses, the existence of the Ghost is useless and absurd. Lets have an another

outlook, in so far as Dualism is a theory about the nature of human beings in general, it contains the seeds of its own destruction as an examination of Dualism shows that it collapses into solipsism, the theory that one's own mind is either the only knowable or the only existing one. There is no proof in the physical world, possibly serving as a reason that another mind existed or that the other 'machines' of human form which we meet contain 'Ghosts'.

In The Concept of Mind, Ryle has tried to reclassify the words and proposition we use in talking about the mind, words like 'feeling', 'emotion', 'thought', 'thinking', 'act of judgement', 'in the mind', 'reason', 'mental image', and as on. According to him, when we talk of minds we do not mean to refer to the mind as a special kind of thing or place where mental acts take place', a hidden source of all that people do as thinking feeling beings -- nor to mental acts of such a thing, or to events and processes 'in' it. To him mind is the topic of sets of testable hypothetical and semi-hypothetical proposition. He writes in The Concept of Mind:

"To talk of a person's mind... is

---

7. Ryle, G., The Concept of Mind, Hutchinson, London, 1949.

to talk of the person's abilities, liabilities and inclinations to do and undergo certain sorts of things, and of the doing and under going of these things in the ordinary world."<sup>8</sup>

Before we go into details let me put Cartesian Dualism once again in the front. The official doctrine of Descartes states that every human being has both a body and a mind. Human bodies are extended; bodily processes and states can be inspected by external observers. But minds are not extended, the workings of one's mind are not witnessable by other observers, its career is private. Only I can take cognisance of the states and processes of my own mind. A person, therefore, lives through two collateral histories, one consisting of what happens in and to his body, the other consisting of what happens in and to his mind. The first is public, the second private. The events in the first history are events in the physical world. Those in the second are events in the mental world.

Underlying this representation of the bifurcation of a persons two lives (inner and outer) there is a seemingly more profound and philosophical assumption. It is assumed

---

8. Ibid, p. 190.

that there are two different kinds of existence or status: some existing is physical existing, other existing is mental existing. What has physical existence is in time and space and is of matter; what has mental existence is in time only and is of consciousness. Thus there is a polar opposition between mind and matter.

Ryle speaks of the Official Doctrine with deliberate abusiveness, as 'the Dogma of the Ghost in the machine'. It is namely, a category mistake. It represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category, when they actually belong to another. The Dogma is therefore, a philosopher's myth. In attempting to explode the myth Ryle aims at doing nothing more than rectifying the logic of mental conduct concepts. Category Mistake: A foreigner watching his first game of cricket, what are the functions of the bowlers, the batsmen, the fielders, the umpires, and the scorers. He then says, 'but I donot see whose role is to exercise *esprit de corps*'. Here it is to be understood that team spirit is not another cricketing - operation supplementary to all of the special tasks. It is, roughly, the keenness with which each of the special tasks is performed, and performing a task keenly is not performing

two tasks. Another example of category mistake: John Smith and William Brown are both men but the average man is not the third man if someone believed that the average man was a third man he would be making a category mistake. For the average man, on the one hand, and Smith and Brown on the other belong to different categories of being. Similarly manifestation of the 'esprit de corps' is not another role on a par with these and if anyone thought these to be so, it will be a category mistake. In other words, so long as the person continues to think of the team spirit as an elusive insubstantial operation or thing, he will tend to think of him as an elusive insubstantial man, a ghost who is everywhere but nowhere.

Ryle's destructive purpose is to show that a family of radical category mistakes, is the source of the double life theory. It is a logical error to explain people's actions in Cartesian terms. It is a category mistake, that is to say, it is not a kind of mistake that can be corrected by psychology. According to Ryle the Cartesian category mistake is to confuse cause and law, or to classify as categorical statements which are in fact hypothetical or semi-hypothetical statements, or to classify as assertions

sentences that actually function as inference rules.

The main theory to consider here is that of Behaviourism, as a philosophy of mind developed as a consequence of the rejection of Descartes 'Mental Substance Theory'. Behaviourism is a term with many meanings. [Psychological behaviourism maintains that human body is a variety of material body. They completely deny the existence of human mind as a separate entity from the body]. In this chapter we are mainly concerned with Philosophical or Analytical or Logical Behaviourism.

There are many thinkers who do not have difficulty with the concept of the physical body, but their difficulty lies in the mental term of the alleged relation. The core problem here in fact is that there are expressions referring to the mental which have a different meaning and the expressions referring to the physical which have a different meaning. This is simply assumed to be the case and shown to be true and consequently, this assumption has been powerfully attacked in recent times by Gilbert Ryle. One of Ryle's main theses expressed in an extreme form is as follows:

"It is being maintained throughout this book that when we characterise people by mental predicates, we are not making untestable inference to any ghostly processes occurring in streams of consciousness which we are debarred from visiting: We are describing the ways in which people conduct parts of their predominantly public behaviour. Thus we go beyond what we see them do and hear them say, but this going beyond is not a going behind in the sense of making inferences to occult causes; it is going beyond in the sense of considering in the first instance, the powers and propensities in the first instance, the powers and propensities of which their actions are exercises." °

Ryle in his famous book 'The Concept of Mind' has made a considerable attack on Descartes' Mental substance theory. Philosophical behaviourism as is advocated by Ryle seems to hold that the meanings of mental predicates must be explained in terms of overt behaviour or that statements about mind can be completely analysed in terms of statements about what other people can or could observe him doing. When we attribute some mental predicates to someone, we are attributing to him some kinds of behaviour or a disposition towards some behaviour or both. Now if we consider Ryle's assimilation to the mental to physical is legitimate or

---

9. Ibid, p. 50.

valid, then mind and body are not different in principle, and thus the conventional dualistic theories rest upon a confusion. The philosophical behaviourist like Ryle assimilates all mental predicates to dispositional terms like intelligent or obstinate, noticing that their ascription to a person does not imply anything about his "current experiences".

Reacting against Descartes' belief that there are actions like doubting, willing, feeling and so on which necessarily require the existence of something, the mind, which acts. Ryle writes:

'..... it is one thing to say that certain human actions and reactions exhibit qualities of character and intellect. It is .... quite another thing to say that there occur mental acts or mental processes.

It will be an unfortunate linguistic fashion to consider something existing and occurring in the physical world and that something existing and occurring in the physical world is not something existing and occurring in that world but in another metaphorical place.'<sup>10</sup>

Ryle, in his book, 'The Concept of Mind' sets out to show

---

10. Ibid, p. 130.

that there are no mental acts by examining psychological concepts but rather each falls into one of three broad classes:

(a) Dispositional Concepts, (b) Adverbial Concepts, and (c) Achievement' Concepts.

The word 'disposition' literally means an ability, tendency, capacity, habits, liability to do certain things. Wherever we say that an object is possessing dispositional property, we mean that the object is liable or capable of doing or producing something. In other words, we are ascribing certain dispositional properties to him, when we call someone genius or considerate. However, sometimes we are mistaken when we ascribe certain property to an object which seem to be non-dispositional. For instance the colour of an object is a "non-dispositional property". Inclinations, motives, moods, and agitations, which are sometimes called mental states, are not really states at all, but propensities.<sup>11</sup>

In his book, The Concept of Mind, Ryle gives a dispositional analysis of mind by holding that mind is simply the

---

11. Teichman, Jenny, The Mind and the Soul, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974, p. 43.

disposition of the body and thereby a person is not composed of two independent individual substances i.e. body and mind. With regards to disposition Ryle writes :

"When we describe glass as brittle or sugar as soluble, we are using dispositional concepts, the logical force of which is this. The brittleness of glass doesnot consist in the fact that it is at given moment actually being shivered. It may be brittle without even being shivered. To say that it is brittle is to say that if it even is, or ever had been, struck or strained it would fly, or have flown, into fragments. To say that sugar is soluble is to say that it would dissolve, or would have dissolved, if immersed in water."<sup>12</sup>

Going by the Ryle's account it appears that dispositional properties are non-occurant because when we say that 'a glass is brittle' we donot mean that the glass is at a given moment actually being shivered. To say here is that it may be brittle without ever being shivered. A thing is said to be brittle if and only if, under suitable circumstances it shatters. The behaviourists like Ryle, uses this feature of dispositional properties and define thoughts, feeling and

---

12. Ryle, Gilbert, The Concept of Mind, Hutchinson, London, 1949, p. 43.

wishes, etc. not in terms of actual behaviour but of disposition to behave. Here it becomes obvious to note that a man who hides his thoughts, feeling, wishes, etc. would still have a disposition to behave in certain ways. And therefore, to attribute consciousness or any particular states of consciousness to a person is to attribute a disposition to behave in certain ways, as for Ryle, dispositional properties refer to capacities, liabilities and tendencies. In the worlds of Ryle,

"To talk of a person's mind is not to talk of a repository which is permitted to house objects that something called, 'the physical word' is forbidden to house; it is to talk of the persons abilities, liabilities and inclinations to do and undergo certain sorts of things, and of the doing and undergoing of these things in the ordinary world".<sup>13</sup>

For Ryle, to talk of person's mind is to talk of persons abilities, inclinations, capacities, liabilities, etc. For instance, to be angry is to behave in an angry way: to be flushed, abusive, banging the table, trembling, etc. Here we cannot say to be angry is to have a mental state, something private. We should note that mental states are

---

13. Ibid, p. 190.

names of particular pattern of behaviour and thereby the attribution of intension, desire, intelligence, excitement and fear and so on are to be understood as attribution of a disposition to behave in a characteristic manner in suitable circumstances.

Now, however it appears that the Rylean behaviouristic account of mental states suffers from some difficulties. The logical behaviourist fails to show how one can account for the way one uses one's mental states to explain behaviour. The obvious difficulty is, as far as our common experience is concerned, that there can be mental processes going on although there is no behaviour at all. For instance, a man may be angry but giving no bodily sign. To put it differently, to say that some one is trembling because he is angry would not explain anything, it being angry simply consisted in the behaviour to be explained. It is possible that a man who is angry, may think but say or do nothing. Again there is problem of accounting for my knowledge of my own mental states, as I do seem to know, at least in some ways, about my mental states differently from other people also to know about them in different way. It is difficult here for the behaviourists to say something clearly about this. In order

to meet this objection that there can be mental processes going on, although there is no relevant behaviour or in Rylean terminology, disposition to behave. The logical behaviourist like Ryle, argue that though a man who is angry, may not do or say anything but he has the disposition to behave in some relevant way. Similarly, the glass doesnot shatter, but still it is brittle. In other words the subject is not behaving in any relevant way but it is disposed to behave in some relevant ways.

A man is angry but giving no bodily sign but he does have a disposition to behave. Here we can say that he thinks but he doesnot speak or act because at that time he is disposed to speak or act in a certain way. It implies, he could have spoken or acted in certain way if required. According to Ryle, one may be angry but still doesnot behave angrily because he is disposed so to behave. In Ryle's words:

"To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change, it is to be bound or liable to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change, when a particular condition is realised."<sup>14</sup>

---

14. Ibid, p. 43.

It appears from the above view that to be angry does not mean to be in a state of anger. To possess a disposition does not mean to have a particular state but to possess a capacity to behave according to the need of the circumstances. Britleness is not to be conceived as a cause of the breakage or a factor bringing about the breaking. Britleness is to be conceived only as the fact that things of that sort break easily.

Behaviourism is a profoundly unnatural account of mental processes as it is not at all natural to speak of one speech or action as identical of one's thought. The thought is distinct from the speech and action. It is thought, which under suitable circumstances brings speech and action about. Mental processes can occur even in the absence of behaviour. Rylean behaviourism denies this and so it is unsatisfactory as a theory of mind as it has tried to establish that speech or action, or behaviour in general, is identical with thought.

Let us now analyse the logical behaviourists' reaction to those cases in which it appears that an essential feature of the case, mental processes is the inner occurrence of something where we find the most plausible candidate

sensation, mental images, i.e. visualising a scene, and thoughts that I am watching television. Let us discuss first the sensation, especially a sensation of pain. A person will obviously feel pain when a heavy object fall on his foot as we see him turn pale, grimace, cry out, clutch his foot, jump up and down and so on and so forth. There is a sensation of pain. Now, the question is: Why do we feel pain? Because under given circumstances, it is just to behave so because we are disposed so to behave. This is what the logical behaviourists' analysis is. This analysis of the Logical/Analytical behaviourists involves many difficulties as it leaves out the essential feature of consciousness. It is the inner sensation which is the immediate cause of the outward behaviour of grimacing, crying out and limping about. This inner cause has been ignored by the logical behaviourists as one can imagine or feel pain so great or slight that there is no disposition to behave. Here it appears that feeling pain is one thing and being disposed to behave in certain ways is another. The feeling of pain in one's own mind may produce disposition to behave in certain ways but this particular behaviour or dispositions to behave are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for sensations. We can never say that the feeling

of pain and the behaviour are identical to one another. This way we find that logical behaviourists have tried to analyse all mental predicates behaviouristically.

As we know there are distinction between mental occurances and mental disposition. Mental dispositions are those predicates which are applied to a person when he is disposed to behave in certain ways, viz hunger, love, feeling, hatred etc. To be jealous of someone to be disposed to show certain types of behaviour towards him or her. Then there are mental predicates like dreaming, imagining, thinking, etc. which are called mental occurances and these cannot be understood completely in terms of behaviour or physical expressions. Ryle has committed a mistake by denying not only the mental substances but also mental events and occurances. It is possible for a person to indulge in thinking without showing any outward sign for it. Here it appears as in the case of feeling, the reports of the thoughts are not translatable into reports of behaviour or tendencies towards behaviour. When a person says, "When I entered the classroom a terrible thought occurred to me", or "After watching a particular movie thoughts surrounded me". Here reporting of these occurances of thoughts mean

reporting the occurrence of an event which took place at a particular time. Now it can be seen that occurrences and their physical expressions, however complicated the attempted reduction of the one to the other might, differ and are not identical in meaning. Thoughts are not translatable into reports of behaviour because reports of the thoughts are genuine occurrences and not overt behaviour.

Another difficulty with Rylean account is that, to say a person is vain is to be disposed to behave in certain ways. That is to say a person who is vain is disposed "to talk a lot", to cleave to the society of the eminent, 'to reject the criticisms, to seek the footlights and disengage himself from conversation about the merits of others. Here it can be pointed out that when a person is talking a lot, rejecting criticisms, etc, there are some mental processes going on in himself. Ryle ignored this fact and tried to prove that feelings and emotions can be described in terms of behaviour. The feeling or emotion can be described only in terms of the situation and thoughts which occasion them.

The dispositional account of mind presented by logical behaviourists, especially Ryle, is that mind is reducible

to behaviour. But it can be definitely stated that for every statement there cannot be behaviour statement or a set of behaviour statements which will be strictly equivalent to it. In other words, it seems doubtful, to give physical description for each and every mental act. For instance, the physical description of happiness or thinking if given, the listener will not surely understand these, however descriptive the descriptions may claimed to be. How one can give the dispositional analysis of the mental concept, say 'intelligent'. If the logical behaviourists say that 'A is intelligent' because A is quick in answering, fast in understanding, attentive, and so on. Are we satisfied with the answer? No, because we still have not got the meaning of the word 'Intelligent'. We already know that these sorts of behaviour are regarded as intelligent behaviour. Ryle is repeating the presupposed intelligent behaviour of some sorts but giving no clear meaning to the word 'intelligent'. This way, Ryle's logical behaviourism or his dispositional account of mind can be said to involve the fallacy of *Petitio Principii*, i.e. begging the question. So, it would be instructive to Ryle to give other instances to prove his dispositional account of mind ensuring that they donot include descriptions like 'one is intelligent because one

is behaving intelligently', 'one is angry because one is behaving angrily', 'one is feeling pain because one is pale, grimace, crying out, jumping up and down', and so on. If not, then Ryle should either exclude mental occurrences from his theory or should stop explaining them by expounding dispositional analysis.

Of the three broad classes of psychological mental concepts shown by Ryle, I have explained only dispositional concepts thinking that dispositional analysis of mind by the logical behaviourists was important to be discussed as the main focus of my theses is concerned around this. I would like to end up this discussion with a quotation by Paul M Churchland:

"In fact, philosophical behaviourism is not so much a theory about what mental states are (in their inner nature) as it is a theory about how to analyse or to understand the vocabulary we use to talk about them. Specifically, the claim is that talk about emotions and sensations and belief and desires is not talk about ghostly inner episodes, but is rather a shorthand way of talking about actual and potential patterns of behaviour ..... philosophical behaviourism claims that any sentence about a mental state can

be paraphrased, without loss of meaning, into a long and complex about what observable behaviour would result if the person in question were in this, that, or the other observable circumstances".<sup>15</sup>

As we have seen so far, philosophical behaviourism fails to give a clear account about our mental states by ignoring and denying the inner aspect of it (mental states). To have pain, for example does not mean merely a matter of being inclined to moan, to wince, to take aspirin, and so on. Pains also have an intrinsic qualitative nature that is revealed in introspection. For this reason philosophical behaviourism is hardly a philosophical theory of mind.

---

15. Churchland, Paul M, Matter & Consciousness, A Bradford Book, 1984, p. 23.

THE IDENTITY THEORY  
AND FUNCTIONALISM

CHAPTER IV

## **THE IDENTITY THEORY AND FUNCTIONALISM**

In this chapter, I shall discuss another philosophical theory of mind, called The Identity Theory and is also sometimes referred to as reductive materialism. The central idea in this theory of mind is that each type of mental state or process is numerically identical with some type of physical state or process within the brain or central nervous system. Because of great advances in the empirical disciplines of psychology and neuro-physiology, it is maintained that mental states and processes are nothing more than very complicated states and processes in the brain.

The Identity Theory maintains that mental processes and brain processes are not two different kinds of events but are identical. It is put forward as a scientific discovery to show the identity between the two different states and processes (mind & body). Though this theory is practiced in many ways but all versions of the theory deny the existence of mind as a separate substance claiming that mental processes, events, etc. are strictly identical with brain processes and events.

Before I go further, once again I would like to concisely put that for Descartes the mental and physical cannot be identical because they are two separate and distinct individual substances. On the other hand, the Identity theorists' stand is that though we cannot know *a priori* that the mental and the physical are identical yet anything which is a mental state turns out to be a brain state, and accordingly, there is only one set of substances, physical substance, and that some of the members of this set can be referred to by both physical and mental expressions. The identity claimed here is universal one and not that a particular mind-state is identical with a particular brain-state. The identity claimed here is that mind-states in general are identical with brain-states, and that the states of a mind are apprehended with those of a physical object.

The Identity Theory maintains that the mind-body problem arises due to our conceptual confusions as we learn from others the use of mental or 'subjective' terms for communicating our moods, feelings, emotions sentiments, thoughts, images, dreams etc. among human beings. For instance, the mother tells the child 'you feel tired', 'you have a headache', etc and consequently the child learns the


phrases 'feeling tired', 'having a headache', etc. Once we have these subjective terms in our vocabulary we apply them to states or conditions to which as individual subjects, have a 'privileged access'. When I am sharing my experiences of feelings, emotions, thoughts, etc. with others, here I am not referring to my behaviour, rather I am referring to those states or processes of my direct experience which I live through, to the 'raw feels' of my awareness accessible to other persons only indirectly by inferences. On the other hand, there are some philosophers especially Ryle, Strawson, Hampshire, etc. who have persuasively maintained that one can talk about the mental life of 'persons', that is, dispositions, actions, intentions, motives, purposes etc. without being involved in the mind-body puzzle. But we hardly notice in their approach any reference to the facts and regularities of neurophysiology.

In his article, 'Mind-body, not a pseudo-problem', Herbert Feigl has tried to render an adequate account of the relation of the 'raw feels' (states or conditions where I have a 'privileged access') and other mental facts, such as intentions, thoughts, volitions, desires, etc to the corresponding neurophysiological processes. He divided the

mind-body problem into scientific and philosophical components. By the term scientific component he meant psychophysiology, an exploration of the empirically ascertainable correlations of 'raw feels', phenomenal patterns, etc. with the events and processes in the organism, especially in its central nervous system. On the other hand, the philosophical task consists in a logical and epistemological clarification of the concepts as empirically establishable or refutable, and hence as logically contingent.

For Feigl, the Identity Theory claims that "raw feels" are identical with "brain states". It is a technical expression covering impressions and images pertaining to the external senses as well as bodily expressions and feelings in a more usual sense. This identity between 'raw feels' and 'brain states' is not logically necessary one. The 'raw feels' are realities-in-themselves though we know very little about their relations to our brain states. It can also be said that Feigl is trying to strengthen an epiphenomenalist position when he says.

"But I admit that for the ordinary purpose of psychology, psychophysiology and psychiatry an epiphenomenalist position is entirely adequate, if only the



traditional, picturesque but highly misleading locutions (eg 'substantial material reality and its shadowy mental accompaniments') are carefully avoided".<sup>1</sup>

Feigl, (basing his theory on Frege's distinction between sense & referent, opines that the identity between 'raw feels' and 'brain states' are logically contingent. He says:

"The identification of the objects of this two fold reference is of course logically contingent, although it constitutes a very fundamental feature of our world and we have come to conceive it in the modern scientific out look".<sup>2</sup>

Now the question arises: Is 'rawfeels' or consciousness or more simply awareness a brain process? The answer given to this question by U T Place is in yes. U T Place, in his article, 'Is consciousness a brain process?' writes:

" 'Consciousness is a process in the brain' in my view is neither self-contradictory nor self-evident

- 
1. Feigl, Herbert, (Article) Mind-Body, not a Pseudo-Problem, a collection of papers, adited by C V Borst, The Mind-Body Identity Theory, McMillan, St Martina Press, 1970. p. 34.
  2. Ibid, p. 41.

it is a reasonable scientific hypothesis, in the way that the statement 'lightning is a notion of electric charges' is a reasonable scientific hypothesis".<sup>3</sup>

Here saying that 'consciousness is a process in the brain' does not mean whether it is reducible to or analysable into statements about brain processes. Consciousness is different from dreams, fantasies, and sensational processes in the brain. Place shows three reasons in order to support his claim that 'Consciousness is a process in the brain', however his claim is not necessarily true and is not necessarily false. The reasons are:

"(a) by the fact that you can describe your sensations and mental imagery without knowing anything about your brain processes or even that such things exist.,

(b) by the fact that the statements about one's consciousness and statements about one's brain processes are verified in entirely different ways, and

(c) by the fact that there is nothing self-contradictory about the statement 'X has a pain but there is nothing

---

3. Ibid, p. 38.

going on in his brain' "4.

Place admits that there remains a number of our mental concepts, of consciousness, of sensation and mental imagery where a dispositional analysis fails and an acceptance of inner processes become unavoidable, but it does not entail dualism and at the same time cannot be dismissed on logical grounds that 'Consciousness is a process in the brain'.

Originally, the identity theory of J J C Smart is applicable to the case of sensations only. He is influenced by the Place's article 'Is consciousness a brain process'. Smart's article 'Sensations and brain processes' has put the Identity Theory firmly on the current philosophical map. Smart argues that each and every process reported in sensation statements are in fact processes in the brain. To put it more clearly, a sensation statement is a report of brain process. Smart writes:

"When I say that a sensation is a brain process or that lightning is an electric discharge I do not mean just that the sensation is somehow spatially or temporally continuous with the brain process or that the

---

4. Ibid, p. 44.

lightning is just spatially or temporally continuous with the discharge" <sup>5</sup>.

A person who knows nothing about neurophysiology talks about his after-images, or about his aches and pains as these sensations cannot be processes in the brain. While replying an objection that the things we are talking about when we describe our sensations cannot be processes in the brain, J J C Smart says:

"Considering lightning. Modern physical science tells us that lightning is a certain kind of electrical discharge due to ionisation of clouds of water vapour in the atmosphere. This, it is now believed, is what the true nature of lightning is. Note that there are not two things: a flash of lightning and an electrical discharge. There is one thing, a flash of lightning, which is described scientifically as an electrical discharge to the earth from a cloud of ionised water molecules. The case is not at all like that of explaining a foot print by reference to a burglar. We say that what lightning really is, what its true nature as revealed by science is, is an electrical discharge. (It is not the true nature of a fool print to be a burglar)" <sup>6</sup>.

---

5. Ibid, p. 56.

6. Ibid, p. 57.

It is possible that we do not know anything about our brain processes but are able to talk about our sensations just as an illiterate peasant knows nothing of electricity but can talk about lightning. At the same time, it is evident from the above fact that when we have a certain kind of sensation there is a certain kind of processes in our brain. In other words one can think or imagine anything that whatever we see around ourselves are false or are so and so and are having images, aches, pains, and so on. 'Experience' and 'brain-process' do not have the same meaning. Smart is not arguing that the after-image is a brain process but the experience of having an after-image is a brain process. In other words, experience is the introspective report of a sensation which is nothing over and above brain process.

Though Smart somehow rightly attempts to show that there are no cogent philosophical arguments against the thesis that sensations are identical with brain processes and hence irreducible psycho-physical laws. But Smart does not make it clear what 'sensation' is as such? Whether 'sensation' means 'brain processes' or it can be translated as 'brain processes' or it is synonymous with 'brain processes'. Moreover, assumption of only a single kind of entity or process

takes Smart towards materialism.

For Smart the logic of the 'Mind' and 'Brain' may be different but they are exactly identical.

While claiming that sensation is a brain process, Smart instead of accepting it as a contingent identity he remarks it as a pure identity. Mind is to be identified with the stimulus aspect of the brain. Or, in other words, it can be rightly said that the presence of 'Mental states' implies presence of 'brain states' in the sense Smart puts 'lightning is an electrical discharge'. This materialistic Identity Theory of Smart is not up to the mark to completely deny dualism.

We shall now move further towards another important identity theory propounded by D M Armstrong slightly different from that of Smart's Identity Theory. Armstrong proceeds in his claim to solve the puzzle with established scientific doctrine that the nature of man, or what a man is, can be best understood in physio-chemical terms. He puts.

"I conclude that it is the scientific  
vision of man, and not the

philosophical or religious or artistic or moral vision of man, and that is the best clue we have to the nature of man. And it is rational to argue from the best evidence we have" .

Unlike Behaviourism, according to Armstrong mental processes or thoughts cannot be identified with behaviour, thoughts or mental processes lie behind behaviour. Behaviourism may be a satisfactory account of the philosophy of mind from a other person's point of view. It will fail when we will apply behaviourism to our own case. It is possible that there is no behaviour but there are mental states. Mind can be defined as the inner cause of our behaviour and it can be surely identified with the states of central nervous system. It is possible that there is something going on in our mind and there is no corresponding act either in speech or gesture. This something 'going on' is the thought which the behaviourists wrongly identified with behaviour. In order to produce a satisfactory theory of mind, Armstrong suggests.

"Perhaps mind can be defined not as behaviour, but rather as the inner cause of certain behaviour. Thought is not speech under suitable circumstances, rather it is something within the person which in suitable circumstances, brings about speech.

And, in fact, I believe that this is the true account, or, at any rate, a true account, of what we mean by a mental state" <sup>8</sup>.

Armstrong admits behaviourists' stand that our notion of mind and of individual mental states are logically tied to behaviour but we should not ignore the fact that mind is something which stands behind and brings about our complex behaviour. Armstrong synthesises two statements: mind stands behind behaviour, and that the behaviourist's dispositions, which under suitable circumstances, brings about behaviour. He puts:

"Putting these two together, we reach the conception of a mental state as a state of the person apt for producing certain ranges of behaviour. This formula : a mental state is a state of the person apt for producing certain ranges of behaviour, I believe to be a very illuminating way of looking at the concept of a mental state. I have found it very fruitful in the search for detailed logical analyses of the individual mental concepts" <sup>9</sup>.

Mind as an inner principle is for bringing about certain sort of behaviour and Armstrong thinks that this description

---

8. Ibid, p. 72-73.

9. Ibid, p. 77.

of mind fits well to explain satisfactorily mental states from both an other person point of view and as a first person account. The reason behind this is that a very sophisticated sort of behaviour differs from the behaviour that ordinary physical objects display. And therefore, it can be assumed that there must be something 'going on' behind each and every sort of behaviour. This inner state that lies behind as an inner principle (mental states) is a purely physical account of man and hence can be identified with purely physical states of the central nervous system. Mind is such sort of inner state that produces in man a capacity to bring about such and such behavioural expressions.

Taking the Identity theorist's stand that mental states are identical to the brain processes, or that 'sensation is a brain process', or in Feigl's terminology there is one to one 'simultaneity - correspondence between the mental and the physical', Jerome Shaffer points out that if mental states are identical to the physical states then presence of the one must be a necessary condition for the presence of the other. If it is so that two conceptually different processes are identical, then empirically it must be possible to show this identity by certain evidence. Shaffer believes

that it is some how reasonable to think that there are some physical events intimately connected with our particular mental states and also they have some definite location in the brain, but it will be ridiculous or unreasonable to think that our 'thoughts' are also located in the brain or somewhere in the body. He, in his "Recent work in the Mind-Body problem" argues:

"The physical events which are intimately connected with my having particular mental events have some definite location, probably in the brain .... However, so far as thoughts are concerned, it makes no sense to talk about a thought's being located in some place or places in the body" <sup>10</sup>.

What Jerome Shaffer meant here is that this problem of location is a genuine problem which must be solved before the identity theory can be regarded as a satisfactory theory of mind.

Norman Malcolm in his article 'Scientific Materialism and the Identity Theory', talks about the particular example of

---

10. Shaffer, Jerome A, "Recent Work on the Mind-Body problem", American Philosophical Review, Vol, 2, April, 1965, p. 97.

sudden thoughts, example; "Suddenly remembering an engagement would be an example of suddenly thinking of something". According to Malcolm, a sudden thought cannot be a brain process. Smart holds that mind is brain, or in other words, sensation is a brain process and this identity he uses in the sense of 'strict identity'. But it is difficult to answer the question thoughts are 'strictly identical' with certain brain processes. Brain process has spatial location and here the meaninglessness of the Identity Theory as having 'strict identity' between mental and physical can be falsified by asking the question: 'Could a brain have thoughts, illusions or pains?'<sup>11</sup>

We also come across another form of Identity Theory known as 'disappearance form' which Richard Rorty defends in his article 'Mind-body identity, Privacy and categories'. Our ordinary thoughts and speech in contrast to the 'translation' form of our mental concepts. C V Borst, in his editorial, 'Editor's Introduction' comments:

"The distinctive feature of this

---

11. Malcolm, Norman, Article 'Scientific Materialism and the Identity Theory', The Mind-Brain Identity Theory, edited by C. V. Borst, MacMillan and Co Ltd, London 1970, p. 179.

form is that no attempt is made to defend our ordinary thought and speech. On the contrary, the incompatibility of our ordinary mental concepts with scientific discoveries, and projected discoveries is stressed: sensation and sensation-talk, for example, will simply disappear from a scientifically oriented language, much as demons and demon-talk have already disappeared".<sup>12</sup>

However, it appears doubtful whether the disappearance form of the identity theory where it tries to defend our ordinary mental concepts is really a identity theory or not. And that is why I have not considered this theory worth-discussing, though from another point of view it does have some truth in it.

Now, at this juncture, it can be pointed out that Identity theorists while claiming the identity between the two independently characterizable items donot deny pre-supposing of mental states. The identity between mental states and physical states are contingent, not a logical one but a factual identity. It lays too much emphasis on future findings. Identity theorists are not certain in describing

---

12. D M Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968, p. 79.

mental states than in describing the corresponding physical states. As in the words of Armstrong:

"The concept of a mental state is the concept of that, whatever it may turn out to be, which is brought about in man by certain stimuli and which in turn brings about certain responses. What it is in its own nature is something for science to discover" <sup>13</sup>.

According to Identity theorists mental states are identical to "something going on, which is like what is going on when ....., " of Smart and "the concept of a mental state is the concept of that, whatever it may turn out to be". Here it seems that Identity theorists are talking to one of the samething. To put in other words, the only way left for describing mental states is in a trivial or question begging way that mental states are something or other which tends to produce empirically observable bodily changes in specified physical situation. It is still a mystery that what is the exact relation between mental and physical. Moreover, it seems somehow awkward that there is one to one correspondence between mental and physical.

---

13. Ibid, p. 82.

Let us examine one of the arguments in favour of the Identity theory by Armstrong. He argues:

"The concept of a mental state is primarily the concept of a state of the person apt for bringing about a certain sort of behaviour" <sup>14</sup>.

From the above argument it appears that Armstrong is against a purely physicalist theory of mind. He talks about the identity but not a necessary identity between mental and physical. He gives causal analysis of all the mental states. Mind or mental states, as an inner principle, "apt for bringing about a certain sort of behaviour" implies that the cause of our behaviour is the 'inner principle'. Now the question arises, whether this inner principle is physical, spatial, traceable from the effect (behaviour), etc? In what way, are we to accept the view that mental states are the same as physical states?

Functionalism is a theory of the nature of mind according to which mental properties are defined in terms of their typical patterns of cause and effect, including their

---

14. Churchland, Paul M, 'Matter and consciousness', a Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 1984, p. 36.

characteristic stimuli, their interactions with other mental states and their characteristic effects in behaviour. It is of the opinion that brain state determines a mental property provided the brain state has causal role definitive of the supervening mental property. This doctrine of functionalism is exactly opposite from panpsychism, a doctrine which regards the mind as radically non-physical and holds that traces of the mental are to be found in all matter. In short, panpsychism claims that every material thing has mental properties in addition to physical ones. I am not going to discuss this theory as its claim that 'every material particles enjoy an inner conscious life' is not acceptable on the ground that it puts us again on the same point from where we had started to find out a better theory of mind.

Churchland in his book "Matter and Consciousness" writes:

"According to functionalism, the essential or defining feature of any type of mental state is the set of causal relations it bears to (1) environmental effects on the body, (2) other types of mental states, and (3) bodily behaviour. Pain for example, characteristically results from some bodily damage or trauma; it causes distress,

annoyance, and practical reasoning aimed at relief; and it causes wincing, blanching, and nursing of the traumatized area. Any state that plays exactly that functional role is a pain, according to functionalism. Similarly, other types of mental states (sensations, fears, beliefs, and so on) are also defined by their unique causal roles in a complex economy of internal states mediating sensory inputs and behavioural outputs" <sup>15</sup>.

Though functionalism is the heir to behaviourism but still they differ from one another. The functionalist denies the behaviourist's account of mental states solely in terms of environmental input and behavioural output. The functionalist finds it quite impossible that a reductive definition solely in terms of publicly observable inputs and outputs is not an adequate characterisation of mental states. They argue :

"..... the adequate characteriazation of almost any mental state involves an ineliminable reference to a variety of other mental states with which it is causally connected, and so a reductive definition solely in terms of publicly observable inputs and outputs is quite impossible" <sup>16</sup>.

---

15. Ibid, p. 36.

16. Carruthers, Peter 'Introducing Persons', Croom Helm, London and Sydney, 1986. p. 112.

Here, the functionalists not only reject behaviourism but also the traditional mind-body Identity Theory on the ground that the physiological constitution of each and every being is based on different chemical elements. For instance the physiological constitution of a being from another planet based on the chemical element silicon, different from ours as on the element carbon. It is also possible that the physical structure of that being from another planet and ours will be different, but it may be equally possible that his brain will well sustain a functional economy of internal states as our own mental states are defined. He also may have a pain state, but it could never be identical to a human pain state.

It should be noted here that it is not the matter, of which the creature is made, important for mentality but what is important is the internal activities which is sustained by that matter.

Now, it appears that there can be different types of physiological constitution to put together a thinking, feeling and perceiving creature. In short, there are many different kinds of physical systems. And this raises a

problem for Identity Theory. Since there are different physical systems (physiological constitution) how will it be possibly right to find out one-to-one correspondence between the mental and the physical states.

From another point of view, we see that there are possibly feelings of completely unexpressed pains arising at different occasions. For example, if someone is feeling a twinge of pain, we ask how you feel, he will reply 'I feel a twinge of pain'. The fact behind such a 'a twinge of pain' for the behaviourists is that certain hypothetical sentences become true of them at the time and that the pain itself merely consists in the disposition to make such a reply. But this account is not correct because the pain is a positive state which causes the disposition and not that (as the behaviourists claim) the disposition being the pain. On the other hand, the behaviourists claim that acquisition of any disposition to behave is a change which takes place in the brain. We do not know in detail what this change is. Another difficulty is what is it about the glass which makes it brittle.

The behaviourists claim that the statement 'It must be

time to get up' what a person thinks to himself is a thought unexpressed in either speech or action. In fact, the person did not do anything while having this thought as there no observable behaviour took place.

But ordinarily we believe that any hypothetical sentence (if asked.... then they will reply ....') involves act of thinking which explains the disposition. In short, thinking/ thought explains disposition and not that thinking itself being the disposition as maintained by the behaviourists. It is some how incorrect to say that when a person is thinking about something and no observable behaviour takes place implies that there nothing really happens. Generally, when a person feels a pain or screams out of it, we believe that the pain itself is not the behaviour rather it is the cause of the behaviour. Normally, ordinarily, we also have in our mind that conscious states are causes of our behaviour or behavioural dispositions, and therefore, conscious states cannot be said to be identical with behaviour or behavioural disposition. And even if the behaviourists construe that all those unexpressed pains and acts of thinking are identified with their behaviour or disposition, but also with the private states (inner principle) which causes the

behaviour, is still not satisfactory as the aim here too is reductive. Here too all the words referring to mental states are analysed into purely behavioural terms.

And this is the point where functionalism differs from behaviourism and the identity theory (whether it is type-identity theory or token-identity theory). [Type-Identity theory states that mental events are identical with physical ones or all physical states of particular type are mental states of particular type. For instance, a thought about weather is a particular state of the brain. Token-identity theory, on the other hand, is slightly different from the type-identity theory, which states that thoughts of the same type need not all be brain states of the same type. For instance, my thought about something today need not be of the same type when I had thought that thought yesterday, and thus to have thought of the same type doesnot involve the same brain state].

Functionalism, a different approach to the mind-body problem, concentrates much on the functional role of the mental states mediating between a specified input and output. Here it can be said that functionalism studies mental states

in terms of their normal causal role as well as their normal behavioural effects. Here the concentration is made on input (injury), output (pain behaviour) and the relation between inner states (or with private states). Here it is to be understood that "the normal function of pain is to be the causal intermediary between a specified bodily cause and a specified sort of behavioural effect" <sup>17</sup>.

It may be said that when rise of a particular thing/or behaviour is seen, it involves various factors. Physical events in terms of bodily movement and characteristic cause of it involves other mental states such as thoughts and desires. Unlike behaviourism, functionalism admits that mental activity is usually linked with behavioural disposition but also that mental events are, in fact, causes of behaviour.

To clearly understood the functionalists' approach to the mind-body problem, let me examine the relationship of a computer with its programs. A computer is constituted of hardware and software. The hardware implies of what the computer is actually made out of, and software, on the

---

17. Ibid, p. 113.

other hand, implies the system of operations which is seen being carried out by the hardware. The software is a complicated system of instructions to the computer hardware. The hardware carries out this complicated system of instructions in different ways and as a result, the same result is achieved. Here we can say that in order to achieve the same result both the hardware and the software are functionally involved.

The causal interaction of many different states taking place at some distance and by the impact of the physical environment on the body result in human behaviour. It can be rightly said that while describing the function or the normal causes each and every state employed or involved here is of equal importance. In short, a function can be described in conjunction with other states (both physical-mental). And unlike, behaviourism, the functionalism can provide us satisfying solution to the problem of other minds as through the knowledge of correct input and output. We have been able to suppose that there really exists causal intermediary (causal link) between the input-injury and output-pain.

In his book 'Introducing persons', Peter Carruthers remarks:

"If 'Pain' means 'state which is normally caused by tissue damage and which normally causes a disposition to pain behaviour', then we can surely know that other people have pains. But because of the occurrence of the term 'normally' in the definition, there can be no valid deduction from observations of tissue damage and ensuing pain-behaviour to the existence of pain: for it is always possible that this is one of the unusual cases. So we can still explain how it was that we became ensnared by the problem of other minds in the first place" <sup>18</sup>.

Moreover, all our utterances are not mere behavioural manifestations of the corresponding states unlike the behaviourists view that every utterance is a piece of behaviour or disposition to such behaviour. In no way it seems reasonable that I am to reason from my utterance to my pain that 'I am in pain' as far as my own conscious states are concerned. We do not infer knowledge of our own minds, they are immediately known to us. And not that observing my own physical circumstances and behaviour I come to know that I myself is in pain.

---

18. Smith & Jones, The Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 189.

Now, what appears here is that functionalists have succeeded somehow to make us understand the functional role of mental states by concentrating its approach on inputs, outputs and the relation between inner states. But it has failed to deal with the phenomenon of consciousness. Take the example of a computer or a machine. A machine or a computer can have internal states with functional properties but a machine or a computer can never be said to be conscious the way we human beings are <sup>19</sup>. The functionalist's approach to the mind/body problem ignores an adequate account of conscious experience and sensations.

In his book "Matter and Consciousness", Paul M Churchland writes:

"By attempting to make its relational properties the definitive feature of any mental state, functionalism ignores the 'inner' or qualitative nature of our mental states. But their qualitative nature is the essential feature of a great many types of mental state (pain, sensations of color, of temperature, of pitch and so on), runs the objection, and functionalism is therefore false" <sup>20</sup>.

---

19. Ibid.

20. Churchland, Paul M 'Matter & Consciousness', A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 1984, p. 38.

Man is not similar to machine. A machine just manipulates symbols but never understands what they refer to. Functionalism ignores the conscious states like what is it like to be happy, what is it like to be in pain, what is it like to be having pleasure, what is it like to be forming a hypothesis, and so on. This is what is the mostly posed objection against functionalism. While perceiving a particular thing, it may be the case that the something may appear to us differently. It may be the case that a highly sophisticated computer can play the functional roles of pain, pleasure, and sensation-of-color but would it have intrinsic qualia as ours?

One point can be noted here that functionalism too maintains some type of reductive approach to the mind-body problem. The versions of functionalism, it can be said, suggest reductions of mental states to physical states, despite the fact that they have nowhere mentioned that mental states do not exist as private states. The definition of mental states purely in terms of causal relations, which cannot account for the qualitative feel of mental states is the central problem with functionalism. The functionalist, because of their preference in the learning of materialism

cannot help themselves to become dualists, and therefore recognize the deficiencies of straight forward identity theory. One can well say that while perceiving a particular thing, say a tomato, when two persons, say John and David, are in identical functional states, but still it may be the case that these two persons are seeing the same thing differently because of the spectrum inversion, i.e. one seeing the tomato being red, and the other might be seeing it as being blue. It is possible for a computer or a certain number of people to functionally organize and work like a human brain. But this organization can never become a subject possessing consciousness. This phenomenon of consciousness, which is supposed to be the essence of mind, is lacking in the functionalists doctrine. And therefore, this doctrine fails to adequately deal with the mental states.

THE CONCEPT OF PERSON

CHAPTER V

## THE CONCEPT OF PERSON

In the preceding chapter I have shown that though this standard arguments against Cartesian dualism are difficult to meet yet this has not led to a complete rejection of dualism. The dualism of mental and physical states still remains as it is.

I wish to see in my thesis whether some form of dualism is inevitable in trying to make sense of the human reality. And, if it is so, what accounts for its 'inevitability'? Is it some feature of the mental itself or is it a feature of our conceptual framework as a whole?

One important difficulty with the mind-body problem is the problem of understanding the concept of a person.

There are two different sorts of existences namely 'mental' and the 'physical'. The physicalist or the materialist believe that matter is the only reality and the whole universe is made of matter, and thus a person too. For the physicalist or materialists 'person is a body' while for the Rationalists the person is mind. For some philosophers

the person is a unitary concept, and therefore made up of both the physical and the mental.

According to Plato, what is immortal is the 'self' or 'person'. The mind or the soul is immortal, therefore, mind or the soul is a 'person'. Plato does not deny the existence of the body rather he conceives that every human being consists of two fundamentally different things; the 'mind' and the 'body' but the 'body' is a subject of destruction/death whereas the 'mind' or the 'soul' survives destruction or death. Therefore, an immortal soul/mind is a person. Aristotle too regards the soul/mind as something divine and immortal and that "something substantial that enters into the body from without and exists apart from the body".<sup>1</sup>

This traditional conception of the self (soul/mind) has exercised a tremendous influence on later western thought. Descartes was the first one to define clearly that mind and matter (soul and body) are two independent individual substances.

It may be noted that for Descartes mind and body have

---

1. Roy, Kamala, 'Concept of Self', Firma K L Mukhopadhyay, 1966, p. 8.

mutually exclusive properties. He held that there are some properties such as weight, height, colour, shape, etc. which are more or less permanent attributes, which can only be ascribed to bodies. There are another set of properties such as thinking, feeling, willing, or consciousness which can only be ascribed to mind. Descartes argues here that if we ascribe/attribute both sets of properties or qualities to the something, there would be a linguistic illusion.

But it should not be ignored here that Descartes conception of mind as something private, immaterial, invisible, etc. has made mind as something mysterious. And therefore, this 'mysterious' conception of mind has led Moritz Schlik, Wittgenstein, and others to think that this mysterious mind, as advocated by Descartes, is really not capable of owning all our experiences. For them, mind is something like an unexplained thing which is anything but mysterious. As per the logic of the no-ownership theory (a view discussed by Strawson which goes against the Cartesian view) mental states or experiences cannot be owned by anything because only those things whose ownership is logically transferable can be owned. My 'pain' or my 'thought' or my 'feeling' are necessarily mine no one the account that one cannot borrow

these from me. In short if anything is owned it can logically be transferable too.

Here in order to give a clear picture of the concept of 'person', Strawson asks two fundamental questions: (i) Why one's states of consciousness are ascribed to anything at all? and (ii) Why are they ascribed to the very something as certain corporeal characteristics, a certain physical situation, etc.<sup>2</sup>

Now the question arises: How do we determine whether these questions are genuine or pseudoquestions? According to Descartes or the Cartesian view the former question is genuine or deserves some answer as that states of consciousness are ascribable only to, and can be owned only by minds. The second question 'why do we ascribe certain states of consciousness to the very something to which we also ascribe certain corporeal characteristics' simply doesnot arise because bodily or physical characteristics have a similar relation to something different, for instance, the body. It is only a linguistic illusion on this view

---

2. Strawson, P F, Individuals, An Essay: London, Methuen & Co. Ltd. II New Fetter Lane, ECU. 1959, p. 90.

that two different sets of attributes (or predicates) are ascribed to one and the same thing. But philosophers like Schlick and Wittgenstein would not accept either of the questions on the basis of no-ownership theory. For them both these questions are pseudo ones. To ascribe one's states of consciousness to anything at all is nothing less than a mistake, and similarly the question of ascribing these states of consciousness to the very same thing 'to which we also ascribe some corporeal characteristics' does not arise at all. To some extent, it seems that the theory really states some facts that all ownership is transferable ownership. And therefore, my feeling of a 'pain', my thought about 'being in particular situation', my thoughts about today's 'weather' cannot be taken away by anything else. Ordinarily, we presuppose that mental properties or predicates are owned in just necessarily non-transferable way. It is wrong, a mistake, as far as the logic of ownership is concerned, to own is to transfer. The theorists also maintain that it would be somehow meaningful if we consider 'body' to be the owner of all our experiences. They maintain that states of consciousness do not belong to anything, although they may be causally dependent on the body. If this will be the case then still the question remains the

same. Identification of experiences what I had and the experiences which had by other individuals. To put concisely, possession of two different sets of attributes is not admissible to one and the samething, but is so due to nothing else, but confusion.

Strawson treats this no-ownership thesis as something incoherent in the sense that it denies the very basis of our experiences or mental states at all. But as a matter of fact experiences can be referred to only as experiences or states of consciousness of some already identified person.

Strawson argues:

"It is not coherent, in that one who holds it is forced to use of that sense of possession of which he denies the existence, in presenting this case for the denial. When he tries to state the contingent fact, which he thinks gives rise to the illusion of the 'ego', he has to state it in some such form as 'All my experiences are had<sub>1</sub> by (i.e. uniquely dependent on the state of) boy B'. For any attempt to eliminate the 'my' or any expression with a similar possessive force, would yeield something that was not a contingent fact at all. The proposition that all experience are causally dependent on the state of a single body B, for example, it is just false. The theorist means to

speaking of all the experiences had by a certain person being contingently so dependent. And the theorist cannot consistently argue that 'all the experiences of person P' means the something as 'all experiences contingently dependent on a certain body B', for then his proposition would not be contingent as his theory requires, but analytic. He must mean to be speaking of some fact contingently true that they are all dependent on body B. The defining characteristics of this class is in fact that they are 'my experiences' or 'the experiences of some person', where the idea possession expressed by 'my' and 'of', is the one he calls into question".

Strawson believes that though mental and the physical processes are exclusively different from one another yet these two diverse kinds of predicates are in fact attributes of the 'something', or are ascribed to or belongs to one and the something. Contrary to the view of no-ownership theory, Strawson maintains that 'I' does refer to something and in fact I am a person among others. He argues that the concept of a person is a primitive concept, and therefore, the states of consciousness could only be ascribed to a person. And that the concept of person is logically prior to that of 'pure ego' or individual consciousness which has

---

3. Ibid, pp. 96-97.

only secondary substance. This cannot be explained, analysed as not the case with the concept of a person. 'Pure ego' or individual consciousness can be explained or analysed by the concept of a person itself. And since, ego or individual consciousness having secondary existence only not primary according to Strawson, might be a disembodied person, and not that a person is an embodied ego, or individual consciousness. A person is not only mind or body, but both. To put it concisely a person is a compound of two diverse kinds of subjects: a subject of experience, for instance pure ego, and subject of corporeal, characteristics, for instance, body. In order to avoid any further difficulty we should rather say, Strawson suggests, a person consists of a 'subject' and a 'non-subject. And this primitive concept of a person frees us from the difficulties of both Cartesian and the no-ownership theory. Strawson further makes a distinction between 'M-perperties' and 'P-perperties' which he thinks are equally applicable to a person. He writes:

"There would be no question of ascribing one's own states of consciousness, or experiences, to anything, unless one also ascribed, or were ready and able to ascribe, states of consciousness, or experiences, other individual entities of the same logical type

as that thing to which one ascribes one's own states of consciousness. The condition of reckoning oneself as a subject of such predicates is that one should also reckon others as subjects of such predicates. The condition in turn, of this being possible, is that one should be able to distinguish from one another, to pick out or indentify, different subjects of such predicates, i.e. different individuals of the type concerned. The condition in turn, of this being possible is that the individual concerned, including oneself, should be of a certain unique type: of a type, namely, such that to each individual of that type there must be ascribed, or ascribable, both states of consciousness and corporeal characteristics. But this characterization of the type is still very opaque and doesnot at all clearly brings out what is involved. To bring this out, I must make a rough division, into two, of the kind of predicates properly applied to individuals of this type. The first kind of predicate consists of those which are also properly applied to material bodies to which we would not dream of applying predicates ascribing states of consciousness. I will call the first kind M-predicates: and they include things like 'weighs 10 stone', 'is in the drawing-room' and so on. The second kind consists of all the other predicates. P-predicates, of course, will be very various. They will include things like 'is smiling', 'is going for a walk', as well as things like 'is in pain', 'is

thinking hard', 'believes in God'  
and so on".<sup>4</sup>

Now, like any other philosopher, Strawson tries to answer the following questions: (i) why are one's states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all? and (ii) why are they ascribed to very something to which certain corporeal characteristics are also ascribed? In fact, he wanted to answer both the questions. But undoubtedly, his 'thought experiment' shows that both M-properties and P-properties can be ascribed to a person only and thus a person is a unitary concept or unitary entity having two different kinds of attributes. In accordance with Strawson's theory it can be rightly said that a person is a combination or is constituted with two diverse kinds of attributes. It can also be argued that this concept of a person does not make a dual sense. I shall come to this point latter.

We see that Strawson rejects dualism because, according to him the pure ego - the concept of the pure individual consciousness cannot exist. In other words, the pure ego doesnot have a primary concept and therefore it is secondary and at the same time can only be explained or analysed in

---

4. Ibid, P. 104.

terms of the concept of a person. Now the question can be raised: what is a person? Is person a body?, and so on. As we have discussed earlier, Strawson distinguishes between two classes of predicates namely M-predicates and P-predicates and tries to show that a person is a subject to which both these M-and P-predicates can be ascribed. This implies that a person is a sort of thing but the use of the terms like, 'can be used', 'ascribable', etc. by Strawson doesnot give it (person) a clear meaning.

Now, if Strawson maintains that these two sorts of predicates (M-and P-predicates) are ascribable to a person only because the concept of a person is primitive. But the question arises: Is person an only primitive concept? Strawson does not make it clear. Bernard Williams, in his book 'Problems of the Self' comments:

"But suppose that we say that persons are just picked out as those to which (as well as M-predicates) any P-predicate is ascribable. Then material bodies will be those things to which no P-predicate is ascribable. And we both M-predicates and some P-predicates are ascribable, namely other animals. And this point seems to me to show a difficulty in Strawson's approach which is not merely minor. Strawson's view was,

it seems, that the concept of a person was unique in admitting the joint ascription to things that fall under it of the two sorts of predicates, and this seems important to his thesis in terms of the explications he gives of the possibility of such joint ascription which connect that possibility intimately with the possibility of self ascription. There must, it now seems, be something wrong with this, and if the concept of a person is, with regard to the ascription of the two sorts of predicates, primitive, then it looks as though there will have to be other such primitive concepts, or at least on such".<sup>5</sup>

According to Strawson the concept of a person is logically primitive and irreducible kind of thing to whom two kinds of properties are ascribed. He argues that the concept of a person is not that of embodied mind, or animated body, and therefore, it is not to be understood in terms of minds and bodies. For Strawson M-predicates are those predicates which are ascribable both to person and to material objects, like 'is tall', 'is heavy', 'weighs 10 kg', etc. P-predicates are those which are ascribable to persons and in certain cases to other animals other than human beings, for example, 'is thinking', 'is watching television', 'is in pain', etc.

---

5. Williams, Bernard, Problems of the Self, Cambridge University Press, 1973, p. 66.

And it is the peculiarity of these P-properties (predicates) which appear to distinguish person from inanimate things. And consequently, it is not wise to talk of properties shared by all material things and properties peculiar to human beings in terms of 'mental' and 'physical' properties. Thus, the distinction between mental and physical properties is not equivalent to the distinction between M-properties and P-properties.

On the contrary, it may be mentioned that Descartes made a distinction between mental and physical as the two distinct independent individual substances having 'thinking' and 'extension' as the essential attributes respectively. For Descartes a person is his mind or is identical to his mind only as he is nothing other than 'a thinking being'. It implies that mind is reducible to 'thinking' and body is reducible to 'extension'. Now the question arises: Is 'thought' the only attribute of mind? No, there are certain other characteristics of mind such as memorising, imagining, etc. and are not to be ignored as the attributes of mind. It is in fact true that thinking is one of the main characteristics of mind. Yet 'mind' cannot be said to be exactly identical with 'thought'. Descartes has ignored these characteristics

(intending, imagining, memorising etc.) while attributing mind. Similarly. Is 'extention' the only attribute of body? No doubt 'extention' can be understood as one of the chief characteristics of body, yet there are other certain attributes too such as weight, senses, motion, etc. and the qualities which help us to distinguish physical-body from material-body. There is a distinction between physical body and material body but for Descartes there is no such distinction, as it appears to our understanding.

In his book 'What is a Person?' Mrinal Miri comments:

"It must, however, be admitted that for Descartes a doctrine of category distinction between mind and body was more a matter of implicit, half formulated assumption, than one of explicit concern".<sup>6</sup>

Strawson's distinction between M-predicates and P-predicates is not as clear as it should have been. This can be said so because there are some predicates which donot fit nicely into either groups of predicates. For instances, there are certain biological predicates like 'is growing',

---

6. Miri, Mrinal, What is a person?, Shri Publishing House, Delhi, India, 1980, p. 7.

'is mature', 'is an adult', etc. are the predicates which do not fit well into either of the groups. If we say that 'a tree is growing' is an M-predicate but when we apply it to a human being it is P-predicate. But this difficulty in Strawson's theory can be simply ignored by concentrating on that M-predicates are matter-involving and P-predicates are, directly or indirectly, consciousness-involving in the way in which action, intention, thought, feeling, perception, memory, sensation, etc.

By making a distinction between M-predicates and P-predicates, Strawson argues that the concept of a person is necessarily a 'primitive' concept. Because of the main fact that both M-and P-predicates are equally applicable to persons. Strawson writes:

"...the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation & c. are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type".<sup>7</sup>

---

7. Strawson, P. F, Individuals : An Essay, University Paperbacks, Methuen, London, 1964, pp. 101-102

But we don't see any conclusive argument among his striking arguments to prove that the concept of a person is primitive, logically. He simply gives the impression that such a claim is primarily a panacea for all our philosophical ills in this area. He says:

"What we have to acknowledge, in order to begin to free ourselves from these difficulties, is the primitiveness of the concept of a person".<sup>8</sup>

What the claim implies here is that if one really wants to have the idea of a person then he must have this idea of the concept of a person, primitiveness, from the start. If not then he can never build up to it from any combination of ideas, like those of experience, material body, causality, etc. The primitiveness of the concept of a person is as a presupposition of all the traditional questions in the philosophy of mind to which both M-predicates and P-predicates are ascribed. Now if the concept of a person is primitive, as Strawson claims, then we are free from all the difficulties of Cartesianism, behaviourism, materialism, etc. But we see this definition is only a kind of reminder or helpful

---

8. Ibid, p. 101.

to those who already know what a person is.

Further, Strawson believes that though mental and the physical processes are conclusively different from one another yet these two diverse kinds of predicates are, in fact, attributes of the 'samething'. Or are ascribed to or belong to one and the samething. He believes that a person is not only mind, or body but both. It can be said that a person is a compound of two diverse kinds of subjects: as subjects of experience, for instance, Pure ego, and subject of corporeal characteristics, for instance, body. In order to avoid further difficulty and put it to a proper platform, we can say that according to Strawson, a person consists of a 'subject' and a 'non-subject'. Or in otherwords, Strawson makes a distinction between M-predicates and P-predicates thinking that these two different properties or predicates are equally applicable to a person because person is a primitive concept. For Strawson person is a Unitary concept, or unitary entity having two different kinds of attributes. A person is a combination or is constituted with two diverse kinds of attributes, and thus the concept of a person doesnot make a dual sense.

But this view of Strawson is somehow not acceptable to us as far as the above discussions and his belief in the disembodied existence are concerned. Strawson seems to admit that persons are categorically distinct from material bodies. It seems that Strawson is favourably inclined towards the Cartesian position. He is convinced that persons must have bodies. These two views of him land him in certain difficulties and inconsistencies. In this connection, it is worth quoting M. Miri. He says :

"Here I shall merely point out that Strawson's inability to free himself from Cartesian predilections, coupled with his position that persons must have bodies, again leads him to difficulties and inconsistencies".<sup>9</sup>

He further points out:

"For such a theory persons would be categorically distinct from material bodies, and yet personal identity would be dependent on bodily identity and a disembodied would not even be logically possible".<sup>10</sup>

---

9. Miri, Mrinal, What is a Person?, Shree Publishing House, Delhi, India, 1980, p. 15.

10. Ibid, p. 21.

And thus we see that Strawson's theory fails to destroy dualism. Infact, he himself advocates dualism though not the Cartesian form of dualism, i.e., the dualism of substances. But dualism of person and body.

Dualism emerges from the understanding of the concept of a person. Dualism of person and body remains, and of course dualism of mind and body through the understanding of the concept of a person.

In fact, a dualism of or a dualism between self and mind can also be conceived. Some philosophers, for instance, recently McGinn, in his booll. 'The Character of Mind', points out that self is a simple, mental substance. At the same time, he denies substantiality to mental phenomena such as sensations, perceptions, thoughts, desires, action.

McGinn points out:

".....that it is simple indivisible substance; that it is not ontologically reducible to other sorts of entities and their relations; that its presence is all-or-nothing, that its survival can consists in nothing otherthan its identity over time; that its survival

is not a matter of degree (since it is simple in nature)".<sup>11</sup>

This raises a question of the relationship between the self and the mental phenomena since mental phenomena are ascribed to selves and they cannot be explained in physicalistic terms. In other words, the ontological status of mental phenomena is neither mental nor physical. If I deny mental phenomena substantiality then mental phenomena have no existence in their own right. This is what the ontological status of the mental phenomena is. On the other hand, from my discussion it is clear that mental phenomena cannot be given a physical being. This is what is meant by saying that the ontological status of mental phenomena is not clear. All that we can say is that mental phenomena are attributed to the self in a way different from the attribution of the physical phenomena to the self. And the self is not a physical phenomena. So the question of the relationship of the mental and physical phenomena still remains. To put it concisely, the ontological status of the mental phenomena is neither mental nor physical, yet it is attributed to the self which is a mental substance. So there is a dualism between self and the mental phenomena. However, I have not

---

11. McGinn, Colin, The Character of Mind, Oxford University Press, New York, 1982, P. 161.

pursued this line of thought. I mention this only to point out that in the broader perspective of mind-body problem other versions of dualism are also possible even after rejecting Cartesian dualism.

On the other hand, dualism of mind-body in some form remains conceptually alive. By conceptual distinction we mean the fact that in our language mental concepts and physical concepts are incommensurate. At the sametime, it doesnot imply that both mental and physical have two distinct kinds of being. That is, their ontological status remains uncertain. Conceptually, the distinction remains. But whether a parallel ontological distinction can also be made is a question which remains largely unsettled. Concepts donot pick out anything. A concept is satisfied when it picks out an object of reality, for example, trees, chairs, etc. contrary to these there are concepts like the concept of pure sponteneity or absolute freedom. Now, is there any sponteneous action to satisfy this concept?

Mental concepts cannot be reduced to non-mental concepts. But the question that mental concepts pick out something in reality is a separate question. It is an empirical question, a factual one.

## CONCLUSION

### CONCLUSION

Though psychologists have claimed to have understood mind yet a lot needs to be further explored if the mystery of the relations of mind to body has to be fully exposed. As I have shown in the earlier chapters, all the so-called theories of mind namely, Behaviourism, Identity Theory, Functionalism, have ignored the essential feature of consciousness. Undoubtedly the word consciousness with the suffix 'ness' seems to suggest the property 'of being conscious'.

When we go by scientific understanding of this there is a general consensus that there is no intrinsic, conceptual or metaphysical difficulty as to how consciousness depends on the brain. Variations in the physical properties of the brain might correlate with changes in consciousness, yet we are ignorant of the character of the connection between the two. But the problem still remains the same. How are we to understand the correlation where one is purely physical, and the other purely non-physical? In order to meet requisite theoretical understanding to this question even if we grasp atomic and molecular theory, a kind of reductionist approach, we find ourselves unable to precisely spot the point where the answer to this particular problem exists.

Thus, consciousness is considered to be something mysterious, non-existent not because it is invisible but

because we hardly have any trace of it in terms of physical evidence. Today it is a matter of common knowledge that we cannot doubt the invisible parts/waves of electromagnetic spectrum, they are there even though not open to our naked eyes. Similarly, 'cognitive closure' with respect to consciousness does not imply that it does not exist or is unreal.

As McGinn argues :

".... such closure does not reflect adversely on the reality of the properties that lie outside the representational capacities in question; a property is no less real for not being reachable from a certain kind of perceiving and conceiving mind. .... cognitive closure with respect to *P* does not imply irrealism about *P*. That *P* is (as we might say) *noumenal* for *M* does not show that *P* does not occur in some naturalistic scientific theory *T* -- it shows only that *T* is not cognitively accessible to *M*. .....Nothing, at least, in the concept of reality shows that everything real is open to the human concept-forming faculty -- if, that is, we are realists about reality."<sup>1</sup>

The reason/idea behind this consideration is that we may remain in complete ignorance of our own mentality yet we

---

1. McGinn, Colin. The Problem of Consciousness, Blackwell publishers, Oxford, UK, Cambridge, USA 1991, pp 3-4.

cannot deny the fact that people are linked with at least two different aspects i.e. the mental & the physical. Though these two are not identical yet they have always been with us. The knowledge of consciousness is perceptually closed and because of this cognitive closure no form of inference can enable us to have proper understanding of consciousness.

The situation calls to mind Locke's view (in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding) that our God-given faculties do not equip us to fathom the deep truth about reality. In fact, Locke held precisely this about the relation between mind and brain : only divine revelation could enable us to understand how 'perceptions' are produced in our minds by material objects.

To continue, there seems to be no compelling reason to suppose that the properties needed to explain the mind-body relation should be in principle perceptible. And therefore, perceptual closure does not entail cognitive closure as it is possible to conceptualize unobservables with the help of suppositions, assumptions, etc. Still there may be some problem because consciousness is considered to be something non-physical, immaterial, and therefore, any assumption or supposition based on purely physical data can never take us outside or beyond the realm of the physical. It seems to me if knowledge about consciousness is something noumenal in kind then it becomes evident that knowledge of this

(consciousness) is an impossibility just by the empirical studies of the brain alone. It is difficult because we employ the same methods, different cognitive faculties of perception and introspection, to know our acquaintance with consciousness by which we have our acquaintance with the brain. And thus, we are left with the view that mind-body problem is unsoluble since we are unable to apprehend the nature of the psychophysical nexus so long as the inavailability of an appropriate faculty to *account* for consciousness is there.

To reiterate, in our language mental concepts and physical concepts are incommensurable. But that does not imply that both mental and physical have two distinct kinds of being. In other words, their ontological status remains uncertain.

The conclusion what I have tried to draw is that though the mind-body theory considered as the theory of the relationship between two completely different substances, as conceived by Descartes is unacceptable, yet it has not been sufficiently refuted. Dualism of mind-body in some form or other remains conceptually alive.

In all the chapters of my thesis, I have tried to find out whether there is any philosophical solution to the mind-body problem. I find no solution to this problem because the solution offered by different theories seem to be rather

inadequate. Therefore, I have come to the conclusion that this problem has not been settled to any philosopher's satisfaction. Mind-body problem is a problem-perennial in philosophy.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY****BOOKS**

- Agarwal, M M, Consciousness and the Integrated Being, National Institute of Advanced Study, National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1991.
- Armstrong, D.M., A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd, 1968.
- Armstrong, D.M., Bodily Sensations, New York : Humanities Press, 1962.
- Armstrong, D.M., Perception and the Physical World, London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961.
- Ayer, A.J., The Concept of a Person, London : MacMillan and Co., Ltd, New York : St. Martin's Press, 1963.
- Borst, C.V., The Mind-Brain Identity Theory (ed), MacMillan, St Martin's Press, 1970.
- Broad, C.D., The Mind and Its Place in Nature, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd, 1968.

- Campbell, Keith, Body and Mind, MacMillan, 1970.
- Carruthers, Peter, Introducing Persons, London and Sydney : Croom Helm Ltd, 1986.
- Chalmers, David J, The Conscious Mind, New York : Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Chappell, V.C., The Philosophy of Mind (ed) Prentia Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962.
- Chatterjee, Margaret, Our Knowledge of other Selves, Asia Publishing House, 1963.
- Chakraborty, Alpana, Mind-Body Dualism : A Philosophical Investigation, D. K. Printworld, N Delhi, 1997.
- Chisholm, Roderick, The First Person : An Essay on Reference and Intentionality, The Harvester Press, 1981.
- Churchland, Paul M., Matter and Consciousness, A Bradford Book, 1984.
- Cornman, James. W, Materialism and Sansations, Yale Univ. Press, 1971.
- Descartes, Rene, Meditations on the First Philosophy, Translated by John

- Veitch, Introduction by A D  
Lindsay, London : Aldine Press  
1912.
- Descartes, Rene, Meditations, trans by E S Haldane  
and G RT Ross, Cambridge University  
Press, 1969.
- Feigl, Herbert, The 'Mental' and the 'Physical',  
University of Minnesota Press,  
Minneapolis, 1967.
- Flew, Antony, Body, Mind and Death, MacMillan,  
1964.
- Flew, Antony, Essays In Conceptual Analysis, St  
Martin's Press, New York, 1966.
- Geach, Peter, Mental Acts, London : Routledge  
and Kegan Paul, Ltd, 1957.
- Glover, Jonathan, The Philosophy of Mind, (Ed),  
Oxford University Press, 1976.
- Graham, George, The Philosophy of Mind : An  
Introduction, U. K. Blackwell  
Publishers, 1993.
- Gustatson, Donald, Essays in Philosophical  
Psychology, (Ed), MacMillan, 1967.

- Hagel, C.W.F., The Phenomenology of Mind,  
Translated with an introduction  
and notes by J. B. Baillie,  
London : George Allen and Unwin  
Ltd, 1949.
- Hamlyn, D.W., The Theory of Knowledge,  
MacMillan, 1970.
- Hamlyn, D.W., Metaphysics, Cambridge University  
Press, 1984.
- Hanspshire, Stuart, Philosophy of Mind, New York :  
Harper and Row Publishers, 1966.
- Hanny, Alaister, Mental Images A Defence, London :  
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1971.
- Harney, M J, Intentionality, Sense and the  
Mind, Martinus Nijhoff  
Publishers, The Hague, 1984.
- Hook, Sidney, Dimensions of Mind (Ed), Collier  
Books, New York University Press,  
1961.
- Hospers, John, An Introduction To Philosophical  
Analysis, Routledge and Kegan Paul  
Ltd, 1967.
- Jones, O.R., The Private Language Argument

- (Ed), MacMillan, St Martin's Press, 1971.
- Kim, Jaegwon, Philosophy of Mind, Colorado (USA): Westview Press, A Division of Harper Collins Publisher, 1996.
- Lewis, H. D., The Elusive Mind, London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1969.
- Locke, Don, Memory, MacMillan, 1971.
- Locke, Don, Myself and Others, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968.
- Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Edited & Abridged with an Introduction by A D Woozley, Fount Paperbacks, 1964.
- Lockwood, Michael, Mind, Brain & the Quantum, U K : Blackwell Publishers, 1991.
- MacIntyre,  
Alasdair C., The Unconscious, London : Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1958.
- Malcolm, Norman, Dreaming, London : Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1959.

- McGinn, Colin, The Problem of Consciousness,  
U K : Blackwell Publishers, 1991.
- McGinn, Colin, The Character of Mind, New York :  
Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Miri, Mrinal, What is a Person?, Shri Publishing  
House, Delhi, India, 1980.
- Nelkin, Norton, Consciousness And The Origins of  
Thought, Cambridge University  
Press, 1996.
- Noam, Chomsky, Language and Mind, New York :  
Harcourt Brace and World, 1968.
- Pitcher, George, The Philosophy of Wittgenstein,  
Englewood Cliffs, N J, 1964.
- Pitcher, George  
and Wood Oscar, Ryle (Ed), MacMillan, 1970.
- Rescher, Nicholos, Studies in the Philosophy of Mind  
(Ed), Basil Blackwell, 1972.
- Rorty, Richard, Philosophy and the Mirror of  
Nature, Oxford, Basil Blackwell,  
1980.
- Roy, Kamala, Concept of Self, Firma K L  
Mukhopadhyay, 1966.

- Russell, Bertrand, The Analysis of Mind, London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1949.
- Ryle, Gilbert, The Concept of Mind, London : Hutchinson's University Library, 1949.
- Sayre, Kenneth M, Consciousness, New York : Random House, 1969.
- Shaffer, Jerome A, Philosophy of Mind, Prentice - Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N J, 1968.
- Shoemaker, Sydney, Self-Knowledge And Self - Identity, Cornell University Press, 1963.
- Smythies, J R, Brain and Mind (Ed), Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965.
- Spiker, Stuart F, The Philosophy of the Body (Ed), Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1970.
- Strawson, P F, Individuals, University Paperbacks, Methuen : London, 1964.
- Swinburne, Richard, The Evolution of The Soul, Clarendon Press : Oxford, 1986.
- Smith, Peter  
and O R Jones, The Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press, 1986.

- Taylor, Charles, The Explanation of Behaviour,  
New York : Humanities Press, 1964.
- Teichman, Jenny, The Mind and The Soul, Routledge  
and Kegan Paul, London, 1974.
- Vessey, G N A, Body and Mind (Ed), New York :  
Humanities Press, 1964.
- Vessey, G N A, The Embodied Mind, New York :  
Humanities Press, 1965.
- White, Alan R., The Philosophy of Mind,  
New York : Random House, 1967.
- Williams, Bernard, Problems of the self, Cambridge  
University Press, 1973.
- Wisdom, John, Other Minds, Oxford : Basil  
Blackwell and Mott Ltd, 1952.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations,  
Oxford : Basil Blackwell and Mott  
Ltd., 1953.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,  
Translated by D F Pears and B F  
McGuinness, Routledge and Kegan  
Paul, London, 1961.

ARTICLES

- Adams, E. M., "Mind and the Language of Psychology", Ratio, IX (1967), 122-40.
- Addis, Laid, "Disposition and Explanation and Behaviour", Inquiry, Vol., XXIV, No. 1-4, 1981.
- Armstrong, D M, "Introspective Knowledge", Philosophical Review, 1963.
- Armstrong, D M, "The Nature of Mind", The Mind-Brain Identity Theory, (Ed) By C V Borst. Macmillan, 1970.
- Armstrong, D M, "A Materialist Theory of Mind", Mind, Vol, LXXVIII, 1969.
- Aune, B, "The Problem of Other Minds", Philosophical Review, LXX (1961), 320-29.
- Bair, K, "The Place of Pain", Philosophical Quarterly, 14 (1964), 138-50.
- Bergman, G, "The Logic of Psychological Concepts", Philosophy of Science, XVIII (1951), 93-110.
- Bird, G, "Minds and States of Mind", The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol., XXI, No. 82-85, 1971.
- Biswas,  
Prasenjit, "What is it like to be a Bat? Mental

States, Brain Processes and Janus Face of Consciousness, National Institute of Advanced Studies, 1999, 296-319.

- Bloor, David, "Is the Official's Theory of Mind Absurd", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 21, 1970.
- Blose, B L, "Materialism and Disembodied Minds", Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, Vol., XXXXII, 1982.
- Borowski, E J, "Identity and Personal Identity", Mind, Vol, LXXXV, 1976.
- Bradley, M C, "More on Mind-Body Problem and Indeterminacy of Translation", Mind, Vol., LXXXIX, 1980.
- Budd, Malcolm, "Wittgenstein on Sensuous Experience", The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol, XXXVI, No. 143, April, 1986.
- Burke,  
Michael B. "Persons and Bodies : How To Avoid The New Dualism", American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol, 34, No. 4, Oct' 1971.
- Candish, S, "Mind, Brain and Identity", Mind, Vol, LXXIX, 1970, 502-18.
- Carter, W R, "Death and Bodily Transfiguration", Mind, Vol, XCIII, July, 1984.
- Chakraborty,  
Alpana, "The Theory of Complementarity and

- Mind-Body Dualism : A Critique",  
Indian Philosophical Quarterly,  
Vol, XVIII, No 2, April, 1990.
- Clarke, J J, "Mental Structure and The Identity  
Theory", Mind, Vol, LXXX, Oct'1971
- Dennett,  
Daniel C. "Current Issues in the Philosophy of  
Mind", Philosophical Quarterly, Vol,  
XV,1978.
- Feyerabend,  
Paul, "Materialism and Mind-Body Problem,"  
Review of Metaphysics, Vol, XVIII,  
1963-64.
- Ginnane, W J, "Thoughts", Mind. Vol, LXIX, 1960.
- Grandy, R E, "The Private Language Argument", Mind,  
Vol, LXXXV, 1976
- Hazalton, W D, "Strawsons and Persons and Their  
Bodies", Philosophical Studies,  
Vol, XXX, No. 1-6, 1976.
- Hintikka, J, "Wittgenstein on Private Language",  
Mind, Vol, LXXVIII, 1969.
- Jackson, Frank, "The Existence of Mental Objects",  
American Philosophical Quarterly,  
Vol, 13, No 1 Jan 1976.
- Kampe, C, "Mind-Body Identity : A Question  
of Intelligibility", Philosophical  
Studies, 25 (1974), 63-9.

- Levine, Joseph, "Recent Work on Consciousness",  
American Philosophical Quarterly,  
Vol, 34, No 4, Oct' 1997.
- Lingis,  
Alphonso, "Intentionality and the Imperative",  
International Philosophical Quarterly,  
Vol, XXXIV, No 3, Issue No 135 (Sept'  
1994).
- Nagel, Thomas, "Phisicalism", The Philosophical  
Review, Vol, LXXIV, No 3, July, 1965.
- Nagel, Thomas, "Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-  
Body Problem", Philosophy Journal, Vol,  
73, No 285, July 1998.
- Nelson, R J, "Behaviourism is false", Journal of  
Philosophy, Vol, LXVI, 1969.
- Parfit, Derek, "Personal Identity", The Philosophical  
Review, Vol, LXXX, January, 1971.
- Rorty, Richard, "Mind-Body Identity, Privacy and  
Categories", The Review of Metaphysics,  
Vol, XIX, 1965-66.
- Russell, B, "What is Mind", Journal of Philosophy,  
LV (1958), 5-12.
- Sellers, Wilfid, "Is Consciousness Physical?", The  
Monist, Vol, LXIV, No 1-4, 1981.
- Sellers, Wilfid, "Mental Events", Philosophical Studies,  
Vol, XXXIX, No. 1-4, 1981.

- Shaffer,  
Jerome A, "Recent Work on the Mind-Body Problem",  
American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol,  
II, April, 1965.
- Shoemaker, S, "Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity",  
L R Reinhardt, Mind, Vol, LXXIV, Jan,  
1965.
- Smith, Aron, "Brain-Mind Philosophy", Inquiry,  
Vol, XXIX, No 1-4, 1986.
- Swinburne,  
Richard, "Are Mental Events Identical with Brain  
States?", American Philosophical  
Quarterly, Vol, XIX, 1982.
- Teichman, J, "The Contingent Identity of Minds and  
Brains", Mind, Vol, LXXVI, 1967.
- Vessay, G N A, "The Location of Bodily sensations",  
Mind, LXX, Jan' 1961.
- Vessay, G N A, "Wittgenstein on the Myth of Mental  
Processes", Philosophical Review,  
LXXVII (1968), 350-55.
- Winkler, E R, "Scepticism and Private Language", Mind,  
Vol, LXXXI (1972), 1-17.
- Wisdom, J, "The Concept of Mind", Proceedings of  
Aristotalian Society, L (1949-50),  
189-204.
- Zemach, E M, "Pains and Pain-feelings", Ratio, XIII  
(1971), 150-7.

## BIO DATA OF THE CANDIDATE

**NAME** : **Bachcha Prasad Tripathi**

**FATHER'S NAME** : **Shri Ram Naresh Tripathi**

**DATE OF BIRTH** : **24th August, 1970.**

**AGE** : **30 years**

**SEX** : **Male**

**MARITAL STATUS** : **Married**

**NATIONALITY** : **Indian**

**RELIGION** : **Hindu**

**ADDRESS** : **C/o Deptt. of Philosophy  
NEHU, Nongthymmai, Shillong - 14**

**EDUCATIONAL  
QUALIFICATION** : **M.A. (Philosophy) NET**

NEHU LIBRARY  
Acc No..... 103728  
Acc By.....  
Date..... 29-8-07  
Class by.....  
Sub.Heading by.....  
Enter by.....  
Transcribed by.....