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SUPERVISOR'S CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation, "SUBALTERN APPROACH IN THE STUDY OF NAGA SOCIETY" submitted by T.Moatemjen Longkumer in partial fulfillment of the degree of Master of Philosophy is a record of bonafide research work carried out by him under my supervision.

The results embodied in this dissertation has not been submitted in part or full to any other University or institution for the award of any other degree or diploma, to the best of my knowledge.

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Supervisor.

Shillong,
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1994.

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION[1]

The demand for Naga Independence by the Naga National Council (NNC henceforth), an organisation representing a number of hill 'Tribes' in the North-Eastern part of the erstwhile British India adjoining Burma (Myanmar), resulted in a violent confrontation between a small number of poorly armed 'Tribals' against the superior forces of the post-Independent Indian Government in the early fifties, which has till date, eluded a comprehensive resolution. The confrontation has resulted in a number of often contradictory accounts trying to make sense of the welter of events and illustrates the pervasive presence of diverse theoretical/ideological orientations, in these projections aimed at shaping our present understanding of the past.

The bulk of writings on Naga 'insurgency' (the word 'insurgency' incidentally, reflects the presence of a consciousness implacably opposed to the existing order) can be broadly categorised into three groups, reflecting their basic orientations in the context of present practical and academic interests. While they do not constitute mutually exclusive categories, they may be briefly described as political/strategic, cultural/historical, and Marxist approaches.

The first type of approach can be seen as being constituted of two polar viewpoints, reflecting a concern, on one hand with administrative order and therefore opposed to forces which threaten the legitimacy of the Indian Constitution or its territorial

integrity. These accounts, generally written by civil administrators, police and military officials, result in a tendency to depict the ordinary Naga villagers as innocent children of nature, tragically led astray by either or both modern educated, or traditional, malevolent leaders for their own selfish ends. Writings by Y.D.Gundevia, K.R.Singh, V.K.Anand best exemplify this genre. The overt alignment of such discourse with the concerns of State however precludes its categorisation as objective history.

Accounts by Naga Nationalists and others sympathetic to the Naga Nationalist cause (the other polar end of the political/ strategic approach), can be seen as countering such approaches by presenting a diametrically opposed perspective. These accounts, which sympathise with the Naga Nationalists, though not necessarily with their aims (seen as unrealistic), tend to see Naga society as personified by their educated, single-minded, determined leaders, cast into roles of tragic heroes by the accident of history, misunderstanding, or the perfidity of the British Colonialist. Nirmal Nibedon, Udayon Mishra, among non-Nagas; and M.Alemchiba, M.Horam, A.Youno, et al., among Nagas; represent this perspective.

The historical/cultural perspective views the same phenomenon with some academic concerns, emphasising Ethnicity, Nation-building, Nationalism, etc., and examines cultural and historical aspects to determine what went wrong; to isolate factors seen as crucially instrumental in bringing about the existing state of affairs. These approaches do not hesitate in apportioning blame

to both sides of the conflict, from a position of assumed distance and objectivity. However, following Guha, perhaps it would not be very difficult to see through this impassive facade, and read in the attempts to investigate and understand causes, an attempt not very different from the concerns of even colonial administrators - that is, to control through knowledge, similar events in the future (1983a:30). The detachment of such studies as an ideological facade is most apparent, when it imperiously assigns itself a role as arbitrator, and diagnose that such aspirations for Independence, by a rather backward community, do not constitute Nationalism proper, but represent rather immature versions like `Infra-Nationalism', `Proto-Nationalism', and thereby aligns itself with the more mature `Nationalism' of an established order (Roy-Burman.B.K. 1972:82-4). Similar conclusions are also arrived at, through an understanding of identity from a narrow modernist and formal perspective as an imposition from outside. Thus demands for Independence on the basis of such flimsy identity can be discarded without much compunction or remorse, or by the displacement of such uncomfortable demands by the authoritative assertation that what the people actually wanted was something entirely different from that stated, ie., economic security, autonomy, etc.,(Chaube.S.K.,Das.N.K., Datta-Ray.B, et al.).

The attempt to control through knowledge is also evident in some Marxist approaches which try to locate the prime cause/ rationale of such phenomena in hidden economic factors, (at times, apparently hidden, even from the protagonists themselves)

in the economic structures and corresponding relations of production, of a social formation within a determinate conjuncture, or in short, within the structures of colonialism and also post-colonial Governance which maintains the same economic structures. These accounts, in their indictment of the exploitative structures, tend to place the blame squarely on the entire system,(rather than local malfunctions) and in the process give the occurrence of revolts, insurgencies, an air of inevitability. Most Marxist approaches align themselves with the rebels in their fight against the colonial Government, but significantly seem to reverse themselves in post-Independent India, while at the same time expressing sympathy for the hapless victims of history, impelled for reasons beyond their own volitions, in a conflict which they did not understand. This results in a similar displacement as in the earlier approach, attributing autonomy, both cultural and regional, as what the people really wanted (cf.,Mishra.U:46:ff).

It does not require much elaboration to see that the consciousness of the real historical personality is entirely lost in all these accounts, through the focus on another history with another subject. They remain accounts where the real actor and his/her consciousness of the events is shunted into the background, in the concern of these various perspectives, at articulating their various political and academic interests. (Based on Guha,1983a :31-3).

It is a strategic interest in exposing the manner in which

contemporary historical discourse attempts to shape our understanding of the past, that forms the basis of the 'subalternists' intervention, with a project of recovering the peasantry's consciousness of the historical moment of rebellion. This juxtaposing brings into sharper relief the distance between real historical events and contemporary accounts. Guha however admits that attempts at representation of a past consciousness, can only remain approximations, but approximations which are preferable to the ideological constructs, which at present pass for historical discourse. The establishment of an insurgent consciousness, in fact, the very attempt itself, reveals the apparent totality of historical discourse as constructs, akin to the Emperor's new clothes, however in this case without the Emperor himself!

It is in this context that this present study attempts to retrieve the consciousness of Naga 'insurgency', following the 'Invarient Structures' isolated by R.Guha in his *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India.* It must be pointed out that these 'Invarient Structures' are rather heuristic and open-ended in nature, and admit of the possibility of accomodating research in various fields, in the representation of the past. This is true particularly of the Althusserian 'structuralism' and the textual analysis of the Frankfurt School which at present, constitutes two (at times antagonistic), standard bearers of Marxism.

Guha locates a basic invariant structure of 'Negation' in peasant consciousness, which provides the motive force for spur-

ring poorly armed peasants into a confrontation against superior forces. This he points out was no blind outburst, but a very conscious action carefully directed against those considered as enemies. However as this `Negativity' did not develop immediately, there was a great deal of `Ambiguity' even in the minds of the peasantry, which has led to a confusion between crime and insurgency in official eyes, particularly in the initial phases. Guha however establishes a `Code of insurgency' which distinguish between crime and insurgency. Insurgency is seen as `Public', `Collective', `Destructive', in its `Modalities'. Pre-existing forms of `Solidarity' which combine the peasantry into communities, on the basis of Kinship and Contiguity are also seen as having a major role in shaping the very forms adopted in an insurgency. The presence of pre-existing bonds which link the peasantry into communities, indicates that forms of communication adopted by these communities would also be employed in an uprising. The search is thus directed towards the nature of `Transmission' which presents a more concrete evidence of the presence of the peasantry's consciousness. The nature of such insurgent `Transmission' networks would then reveal whether the peasant's actions were the result of manipulation by modern, educated elites or a result of their active and conscious actions. The results of all these inquiries seem to indicate the presence of a common factor: `Territoriality', which determined the shape of peasant solidarity, its intensity and spread. Guha points out that this `Territoriality' can be understood in terms of its ethnic and geographical aspects. (T.K.Oomen's term `primordial collectives' also seems to be addressed to this same

rdial collectives' also seems to be addressed to this same aspect. From Doshi.S.L,1990:5). Even a cursory examination of peasant risings reveals that these were not rampaging hordes sweeping through the countryside, *a la.,* Attila or Genghis Khan, but were bounded by a notion of 'Territoriality' which however, did not take cognisance of officially demarcated boundaries. It is through the examination of these imprints, that Guha outlines his attempt at representing, peasant consciousness of their activities. Or in other words, the representation of a historicized consciousness at the moment of rebellion.

The fact that this type of inquiry is at present, in an incipient stage, without any established methodological outline, and the lack of experience on my part at attempting an independent framework; has resulted in the adoption of Guha's frame of analysis. An approach which however has a number of advantages. First of all, Guha's framework was based on the study of peasant movements before the advent of modern political ideas and leadership. The Naga movement with a very visible leadership, has largely obscured the fact that Naga society at the onset of insurgency was still largely illiterate. It would be only too natural that the degree of manipulation or voluntary participation on the part of the people would be indexed in the presence or absence of traditional forms of communication and mobilisation. Secondly, the application of this framework on concrete historical events, would perhaps lead to a better refinement of these theoretical tools, and enable the emergence of a more accurate representation of a highly elusive aspect, which never-the-less form an integral part of history.

However my primary interest in attempting this study was a result of, and also a reaction to, the way in which the history of Naga `insurgency' has been constituted at present; with emphasis on formal events like peace talks, negotiations, agreements, etc., aspects which are easily amendable to verification and objectification, but which, it must be stressed, remains only a partial account, endowed with a false sense of totality. While these accounts are undoubtedly a part of the history of Naga `insurgency', they remain just that, partial accounts.

This attempt at representation of a historicized Naga consciousness of `insurgency', however does not purport to fill up the void indicated but also remains a partial account. An adequate treatment would require the elaboration of variations in consciousness, in the context of a social stratification system and thus this attempt at best remains only an overview, running roughshod over many aspects, of which perhaps the most important, is that of women's consciousness of the moment of rebellion, shaped by virtue of their gender.

The time-frame adopted for this study, given the constraints of the framework, has not been delineated; but generally follows the advent of British administration to the outbreak of rebellion, however with different moments of time juxtaposed for emphasis, and thus does not follow a chronological order. Such an approach obviously presents a somewhat `frozen consciousness' static and unchanging over time, and obviously distorts, but at the same time reveals a `consciousness' different from that displayed in accounts of formal or official history. Perhaps

revealing the presence of this `insurgent consciousness' will compensate for its distortions. An unavoidable outcome effected by the very act of representation, but at the same time a distortion which can be minimised under more skilled hands.

This study has been divided into two chapters. In the first, again divided into two sections, I have tried to give a theoretical overview of the `Subaltern Studies' project. This includes constraints, limitations and contradictions, the probable objectives and interests, and also interests present in their work. In the second section, an attempt has been made to prepare the grounds for adopting their approach in the study of Naga `insurgency', and also indicate some similar approaches.

The second chapter which forms the bulk of the study has also been sub-divided into six sections, according to the `Invarient structure' isolated by Guha, ie, `Negation', `Ambiguity', `Modality', `Solidarity', `Transmission' and `Territoriality', as briefly described above. Without going into each aspects seperately, the basic findings can be summed up in this way. Firstly, an `insurgent consciousness' can indeed be found, sharing more or less, the same `Invarient structures'. Secondly, the articulation of this consciousness differed, due to the influence of modern elements, and also due to the fact that the Nagas did not form part of the larger social stratification system, generally called the mainstream. In other words, due to the presence of a discon tinuity in the `Tribe'/Caste continuum.

The conclusion remains to some extent, inconclusive. On one hand, Guha's characterisation of colonial and post-colonial India as a dominance without hegemony stand vindicated, as the very act of rising up in rebellion shows. However the problem emerges when we try to characterise the precise nature of Naga `insurgency' in the context of this revealed `insurgent consciousness'. To put it more candidly, an accusation of schizophrenic reasoning would almost certainly be imputed, if the demands for Independence by the educated sections, was seen as being genetically derived from a project of power, launched by this `traditional insurgent consciousness'. Or even a glorification of tradition, by assimilating even highly improable aspects of a metropolitan political culture (in this case political Sovereignity, the notion of which was absent in the mind of most of the populace) to a `traditional political consciousness'. Such reasoning therefore would be seen as evidence of the presence of political and strategic interests.

It is in this context that a comparision of existing ideas on `nation building' has been undertaken, to show that they consti tute two opposing perspectives derived from two opposing para digms, reflecting the basic relations of power. In other words, from the fact that they derive from different positions in a relation of domination and subordination.

THE SUBALTERN STUDIES-1.1

The `Subaltern Studies' approach represents a departure from existing Indian historiography of peasant movements by distinguishing two domains of politics: `People's politics' and `Elite politics' - A structural dichotomy resulting from; "the historic failure of the Nation to come to its own". `Subaltern' historiography regards as its central problematic, the study of this `failure' and represents an attempt at developing an alternate discourse, emphasising the co-existence and interaction of these two relatively `autonomous' domains (Guha,1982:7).

This approach seems to reflect the perception of a hiatus between real historical events and existing Marxist theory as is evident in P.Chatterjee's mention of "elements of indeterminacy" (1984b:xxxiv); the "Contingency" of power relations,emphasised by Guha as the site where the (Hegelian) "human passions... mediates the concept of power and turns it into real history" (1989:230). Althusser's contention that "real-humanism" could and should be displaced by "Theory", ie., Dialectical Materialism[2] (1965:242-7), seems to have given rise to ideas that `Subaltern Studies' represent a "retreat from theory"[3] (Bayle.C.A:110ff). However, It must be pointed out that Althusser did not rule out *"the theory of the specific effectivity of the superstructures and other `circumstances'* (including even; "traditions which haunt human minds", which at present)*...largely remains to be elaborated"* (1965: 112, fn. 28, 113, italics in original). He also saw these

elements as having "an existence largely specific and autonomous" and that Marxist political practice constantly comes: "up against that reality known as `survivals'". `Subaltern studies' then can be seen as an attempt at elaborating the specific effectivity of these `survivals' in the context of colonial and even post-colonial Indian history - Guha's attempt at isolating `Invariant structures' of insurgent consciousness representing a theory of the essence of these `survivals', which resisted colonial penetration in the Indian context. `Subaltern studies' therefore is not "a rejection of western categories but signals the beginning of a new and autonomous relation to them" (Das.V, 1989:310). It would be somewhat premature to attempt a formal theoretical elaboration of this approach as it "is by its very nature still rather precocious, incomplete and generally endowed with all the immaturity of a thing in its formative stage" (Guha,1989:222).

However a beginning can be seen in P.Chatterjee's attempt at elaborating "modes of power", and also Guha's attempt at creating a model of insurgent consciousness as an objectified system of representation, as well as his characterisation of domination and subordination and its constituents, based on a principle of differentiation, in terms of an indigenous Indian `structural' model. The incorporation of both humanistic as well as `structural' approaches, discontinuous with each other has been noted by G.C.Spivak: "one must see in their practice a repetition as well as a rupture from the colonial predicament". A result of the `subaltern collective' to be "fully moved" by the crisis of anti-humanism. However, she views such "cognitive failures" as irred-

ucable and therefore does not suggest any formula for correct cognitive moves (1985:337-8)

Establishing the centrality of the historical moment of rebellion, in understanding the `subalterns' as subjects of their own histories, appears to be the central concern in `subaltern-studies' (Das.V.1989:312). But there seem to be some divergence in approach. *D.Hardiman finds Subaltern studies at a cross-road* with two directions:

> One road leads towards greater concentration on textual analysis and a stress on the relativity of all knowledge; another towards the study of subaltern consciousness and actions so as to forward the struggle for a socialist society (1986:290).

"Dominance without hegemony" results from the "discrepancy between the universalizing tendency of capital as an ideal and the frustration of that tendency in reality" (Guha,1989:225). This perspective has "the advantage however of emphasising the fundamental relationships of power, of domination and subordination" (Sarkar,S.,1984:237).

Resistance to domination as particularly expressed by insurgency yields an access to the relatively autonomous domain of peasants' consciousness. This however does not mean that the autonomous domain of consciousness comes into being only in times of open defiance of authority. It also exists even in times of apparently hegemonic sway, though in a fragmented, individually inarticulate, obscure and undocumented forms; but which allows deep insights into apparently spontaneous revolts. Resistance in

this context includes:

> footdragging, dissimulation, false-compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so forth, These Brechtian forms of class struggle have certain things in common. They require little or no co-ordination or planning; they often represent a form of individual self help; and they typically avoid any direct symbolic confrontation with authority or with elite norms (Scott,J.C.,1986:6).

The `Subalternist' focus on the relatively autonomous domain of peasant consciousness, originates from Gramsci's observations on studying the subaltern classes:"the objective formation of the subaltern social groups...

> their qualitative diffusion and their origins in pre-existing social groups whose mentality and ideology and aims they conserve for a time; ...those new formations which assert the autonomy of the subaltern groups, but within the old framework... (A consciousness which) is always subject to the activity of ruling groups, even when they rebel and rise up: ... every trace of independent initiative on the part of the subaltern groups should be of incalculable value for the integral historian"(1971:52.55).

It is the neglect of these traces of independent initiatives which the `Subalternists' have objected to, strongly. It is according to Guha; "an appropriation of (their) past" (1989:212). Similarly, P.Chatterjee says, "it is to merge their life into the life-history of the dominant class ... indeed to destroy its history" (1983b:59).

It would be quite naive however, to see the `subaltern' and `insurgent consciousness' as a homogeneous, un-differentiated and static entity, impervious to the activities of the elites, as evidenced in some accounts of the `subaltern studies' group. S.Sarkar attributes it to a structuralist approach with emphasis

on synchrony (1984, fn. 8, 317-8). A point affirmmed by S.Dube (1985:445). E.J.Hobsbawm's caution on model building, (particularly in the case of societies subject to rapid social change), and his criterion for such models (to be based on how their components fit together and provide a guide to both the nature of collective action in specifiable social situations and their limits), seem pertinent here (1974:16). The use of single terms like `collaboration' has also been found wanting in accomodating complex relationships between people and State, elites and subaltern, in empirical situations by David Arnold (1985:50-1).

However this emphasis on the `autonomy' of the `subaltern domain' must be seen as an attempt at isolating:

> the ideological invariants of peasant consciousness and their relational unity, that is to say, its paradigmatic form ... he (Guha) has not attempted to give us a history of this consciousness as a moment of self-transformation ... having found an access into the structural form of this conscious ness in its aspects of autonomy has given us the theoretical basis to ask the appropriate questions about its history (Chatterjee,P.,1988:8-12).

While `subaltern consciousness' is seen as, "contradictory, fragmented"; it is:

> held together in a more or less haphazard whole - the common sense, ...is the contradictory unity of two opposed elements which expresses the common understanding of the members of the subaltern group (Chatterjee,P.,1989:170-71)...

(*ie.*, through the notion of belonging to a group, in relation to the others.) Hegemony is also seen at work within a `subaltern' group reflecting an acknowledgment of differentiation, as also seen in Gramsci's writings: "Among the subaltern groups, one will



exercise or tend to exercise a certain hegemony through the mediations of a party" (1971:53). The acknowledgment of differentiation within the 'subaltern domain', though not strongly emphasised, can be seen as reflecting on one hand, a political gesture on the part of the 'subaltern studies' group. However, it also reflects the recognition that, in concrete empirical situations, economic differentiations are often masked by ideological factors like ethnic considerations. The surface resemblance of such a conception has however led to accusations of Populism. Tom Brass dubs the 'subaltern studies' as "neo-populist revisionism", due to the displacement of 'class' in favour of: 'tribe' as an ethnic category[4] (1991:191).

While the 'subalternists' acknowledge the fact that, "the subaltern groups are always subject to the activities of the ruling groups even when they rebel and rise up". Sarkar finds the roles of the elites marginalised in many essays of this group. He therefore stresses the need for: "an ideal of totality" (Sarkar,S,1984,fn8, 317), so as to develop into social history in the broadest sense. Perhaps it would not be very inaccurate to see this 'totality' encompassing the two domains, resembling L.Althusser's "Pre-given Complex Structured Whole", though shorn of its economic determinism[5] (1965:193ff).

The 'subaltern project' then appears to be based on assigning to the three instances: the economic instance, the political instance, and the cultural/ideological instance, their relative importance in reproducing social relations. An approach which however seems to reject the base/super-structure dichotomy. They

seem to be saying that, the economic instance might dominate in a capitalist mode of production, the legal-political in the`feudal' mode, the cultural ideological organisation of kinship in another and the possibility of the co-existence of these modes in a single historical period -a possibility which accounts for the variations in the exercise of power[6] (Chatterjee,P.,1983:348-9).

Partha Chatterjee quotes from Etienne Balibar, the possibility, of other histories than those of the mode of production, histories whose objects remains to be constituted:

> The determination of the objects of these histories must await that of the relatively autonomous instances of the social formation, and the production of concepts which will define each of them by the structure of a combination... Attempts like those of Foucault gives us a good example of this (1984b:xxxiii, from Althusser, L and Balibar, E, 251).

That this project is still un-realised, is evident in P.Chatterjee's statement:

> we need to produce adequate concepts of the modes of transition, (and again,) ... our conceptual apparatus is at present incapable of charting out this problematical area ... the exercise must end by designating a very large area of problems as theoretically indeterminate (ibid.xxxiv).

Perhaps establishing the subaltern domain, via a symptomatic reading of elite discourse - to reveal it's `other' (Guha, 1983a: 1-40, 1983b,14-17) (a process which severely circumscribes an approach to `totality'), also reveals the bind in which the `subalternists' find themselves . There are however different perceptions regarding this : P.Chatterjee appears confident that, "one day the vast storehouse of Indian social history will become

comprehensible to the scientific consciousness,"(1988:5). Others like Kaviraj, Guha, and Spivak appear to agree with Gramsci's view on the relativity of all knowledge, including even Marxism - an approach strongly criticised by Althusser (1968:119-44). On the other hand, "Ranajit Guha argued that it is futile to try to discover the `real-truth' of the past, for our understanding will always reflect the time in which we write and thus be subjective" (Hardiman,D,1986:289).

This divergence appears to reflect the debate in western Marxism; The `Humanistic' approach of the Frankfurt school, which stresses the relativity of all knowledge, and on the other hand, the Marxist `Structuralists', epitomised by Louis Althusser's belief in the scientificity of Dialectical Materialism as a real "Theory". The resultant `victory' by the relativists at the textual level, (while leading to what G.C.Spivak calls the "crisis of anti-humanism"), does not appear to lead to fresh initiatives (Gouldner,A.W, 1973: 425ff). The second subaltern studies conference (Calcutta, 1986) saw Pranab Basu raising questions on the apparent lack of interest in finding answers to problems of subaltern consciousness, relations of domination and subordination; Problematics raised by the `subaltern studies group' themselves (Hardiman.D,1986:289). Ranajit Guha's opinion, on the other hand was; "that subaltern studies had to seek first to attack and break down existing historical paradigms ... only after a prolonged critical exercise can attempts be made to construct an alternate paradigm"(Hardiman,D,1986:289-90). History was ~~now~~: "a game for two to play as the alien colonialist project of

appropriation was matched by an indigeneous nationalist project of counter-appropriation" (Guha,1989:212). The 'subaltern historians'can then be seen as interventionists with their own counter-counter-appropriation project. History can now be seen as a three way game with its own brand of complexity. A fact disliked by the two earlier players

An approach to social history, based on the division of society into two domains - of domination and subordination - does not deny the existence of complex structures in society; it merely seeks to highlight the major contradictions in society by relegating other contradictions to the background. This emphasis should not be construed as their concept of 'totality'. It becomes one-sided as the "elitist-historiography" they reject. This emphasis should be seen as a 'strategy' to bring to crisis what is perceived as a narrow one-sided history. They apply 'deconstruction' so as to create the grounds for a new paradigm for the study of society in its totality - not just as the study of systems - A paradigm which can accommodate the possibilities of a multiplicity of histories of a given society and the ways in which they inter-relate with one another, and also in relation to the 'whole', not just in terms of synchrony but also in diachronic terms.

From the perspective of epistemology, the 'subaltern studies' group appears to be elaborating at two levels, the study of society. On one hand, there seems to be an affirmation of finding "universal regularities" in society, as evident in Ranajit Guha's isolation of 'invariant structures' of insurgent consciousness,

applicable it seem to a trans-historical, trans-societal context (his extensive usage of European materials to relate it to Indian peasant movements). In this context, human passions seems to be the crucial intermediary between fundamental associative operations and actions of man. Here, passions are seen as motive springs, analogous to uniform systems of nature, which shapes human actions conjoined in all places and time, due to the fundamental constituents of the human mind. On the other hand, they (subalternists) also seem to subscribe to R.G.Collingwood's position that, thoughts attributed to people of other cultures may only be our own projections of what we perceive, and therefore not amendable to scientific inquiry - an assumption of basic difference which makes it difficult or almost impossible for one to share the ideas, beliefs, values, etc., of a different culture or period (Rex, Martin, 1977:introduction). The `subalternists' also seem to subscribe to this view as seen in R.Guha's belief in the relativity of all knowledge. Perhaps S.Sarkar's approach, viewing history as an attempt to create an "as if true" narrative,and not a positivistic one, claiming for this "as if true" account, an accurate and unmediated correlation with reality, should perhaps be seen as underlying subaltern studies. From this perspective, Guha's apparently contradictory positions - the admission of the relativity of knowledge, while at the same time attempting to isolate "invarient structures" - should perhaps be seen as elaboration at two levels. On one hand, creating an "as if true" history, while accepting that these projections are based on our own perceptions[7]. The outcome is that even subaltern

studies is not immune to 'deconstruction' as seen in O'Hanlon's hints that behind the deconstructed subject of the subaltern studies project, necessarily lurks another (or 'an other') subject, potentially or actually reconstituted (Brass,T, 1991: 191). Tom Brass also argues that R.Guha has "reconstructed" the 'tribe' - A colonialist construct, which Historical Materialism had deconstructed (ibid). R.Guha, on the other hand, sees in the classification into 'tribes' an index of the social organisation (1983b:312), and not, therefore, a purely colonial construct or arbitrary action.

While the majority of 'subaltern studies' have dealt with related themes of the failure of colonialism to establish 'hegemony' in India - A failure yet to be surmounted in post-independent India - and the consequent existence of two domains of politics. Subalternity arising out of relations of domination and subordination is perceived as a loose concept to cover; "the general attributes of subordination... in terms of class, age, gender, and office or in any other way." (Guha,R, 1982: preface). This approach appears to open up many avenues for inquiry, and establish subalternity in many instances, eg., women's subalternity, or even within the subaltern groups themselves.

One of the important results of the 'subaltern' approach has been to bring into sharp relief, aspects marginalised by traditional (seen as elite) historiography; The ways in which 'traditional' or pre-existing culture shape the countors of 'modern' movements. The Tebhaga movement, celebrated as one of the first class based movement in India, is shown as determined by other

loyalties as well. Class loyalty are shown to be displaced by ethnic loyalties, when the nature of mobilisation is examined, giving many class based movements a "duplex character" and in the process exposing the limitations of a purely class based analysis in the study of society (Guha,1983b:169-70).

`Subaltern studies' is then a radicalised development of Althusser's view that, "the theory of the specific effectivity of the super-structures and other `circumstances' largely remains to be elaborated" (1965:113), however, an elaboration radicalised by the very rejection of the base/super-structure dichotomy.

This elaboration of subaltern history from what seems to be a "rag-bag of assumptions and beliefs with little internal consistency or cohesion... A conception which, even in the brains of one individual, is fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential" (Arnold,D,1984:159), This has resulted in a lot of polemics, as anticipated by E.Balibar (1988:251). T.N.Madan similarly voices the problem of establishing the subaltern;

> we do not get the subaltern's point of view in subaltern voices but rather by inference. The suppressed voice, too, has obviously to be constructed ... it seems to me to be an echo rather than an independent or complementary voice. The prevalence of the dominant voice is not easy to overcome. (1991:350).

G.C.Spivak also finds a certain dissonance in the approach to subaltern consciousness: The"...bestowal of a historical specificity to consciousness in the narrow sense, even as it implicitly operates as a metaphysical methodological presupposition in the general sense" (1985:339). She also finds suggestions, "that

`subaltern consciousness' is subject to the cathexis of the elites, that it is never fully recoverable", even in the works of the subalternists themselves (ibid.)

Spivak reads in Guha's usage of "demographic differences" ; two different ways of locating the subaltern. One emphasising on the "demographic" to differentiate `elites' from the `subalterns' (an approach she finds positivistic), and the other emphasising on "difference", "which opens the doors to deconstructive gestures" (ibid:340-1). In this case, the attempt to retrieve an emergent `subaltern'(collective) consciousness can be seen as a political strategy to "undo a massive historiographic metaplesis and `situate' the effects of the subject as subaltern[8] (ibid: 342-3). Another aspect of the `subaltern project' pointed out by G.C.Spivak is that "the emphasis upon the `sovereignity,... consistency and logic' of `rebel consciousness' can be seen as the deployment of `affirmative deconstruction'" if embraced as a strategy. But if the project is seen as "the establishment of an inalienable and final truth of things, ...inevitably objectify the subaltern and be caught in the game of knowledge as power" (ibid:345). The lack of any clear `subaltern' Theory was seen as strength rather than a weakness:

> `subaltern theory' lacks a clear cut model and is not attempting to set up one. Only after considerable work has been done can we even begin to construct an alternative historical paradigm which can replace the older paradigm (Hardiman,D 1986:290).

This perhaps reflects the present status of `subaltern studies' - a strategic practice to bring existing historiography

to a crisis. This political strategy is also evident in Ranajit Guha's location of the `studies' in, "another, and historically antagonistic universe," (1989:220). The `subalternists' while admitting their complicity with their subject, also point out the same in `elitist' historiography, as evidenced by blanks in their approach.

NAGAS AS `SUBALTERN'-I.2.

The present study is an attempt to see whether the`invarient-structures'of insurgent consciousness isolated by Guha can be located in the `consciousness' informing Naga`insurgency'. Guha establishes the `autonomous' subaltern domain by locating discontinuities:

> Between the politics and culture of the elites and subaltern sections of pre-industrial society (including even colonial and post-colonial India) ...E.P.Thomson like Guha,dissents from Gramsci's hegemony theory in so far as it suggests an almost total political, cultural and ideological control by the elites over the subaltern classes (Arnold.D,1984:165).

`Elitist' historiography, which tended to ignore these discontinuities was seen as endowing a false hegemony and thereby const ituted a one-sided account. It was, according to Guha:

> A serious misrepresentation... of the power relations of colonialism in historical discourse. *The crux of that misrepresentation is that dominance in colonial conditions has quite erroneously been endowed with hegemony*(1989:228, italics in original).

T.V.Sathyamurthy points out Guha's neglect of the structuring of the"*actual* consciousness as elaborated through rebellion and also the points at which false consciousness asserted itself (1990: 228, italics in original). However, considering Guha's objectives, it perhaps would be outside his concern to specify the actual structuring of insurgent consciousness as a historical phenomenon. False consciousness however, has been amply dealt with by the `subaltern studies', and gives vivid insights on how

even false consciousness can give the insurgent peasant, confronted by superior forces, the strength to rise up and rebel[9].

Naga `insurgency' and the `consciousness' behind it has been seen as the result of British policies of isolation, which hampered assimilation and thereby the process of nation-building. Naga identity also, has been seen from the narrow perspective of an imposed identity. Imposed on isolated village based communities, by educated elites and the encouragement of British administrators (cf.,Das,N.K.,1982:39-40). These approaches ignores all subjective parameters; an important and integral component of identity formation and is thereby one-sided. S.K.Chaube's approach, centered on the emergence of differentiation in the traditional social structure, results in a crude dichotomy between the `modern'(educated, progessivist and national) and the`traditional' (illiterate, reactionary and secessionist) elements. The then contradictory presence of `modern' elements among the Naga `insurgents' is explained away in terms of employment problems (1982:32-6).

A narrow behavioural approach has also been called up to explain the `problem' of Naga `insurgency' in the work of Phillip Mason. Mason attributes `insurgency' to the contrast between the `paternalism' of British administrators and the `authoritarian' Indian administrator's attempt to "drag such people as these quickly into the 20th century... and their impatience with a culture utterly different from their own but not so remote as to be idealised" (1971:173-4). This perspective ignores the fact

that the demand for self-determination dates back to 1929, and also the rejection of the `crown colony' under the same `paternal' British administrators, by the Nagas.

These incongruities in existing accounts of Naga `insurgency' can perhaps be better understood by positing the existence of an `insurgent consciousness' based on the mentality, ideology and aims of pre-existing social groups. "an autonomous domain... traditional only in so far as its roots could be traced back to pre-colonial times,but it was by no means archaic in the sense of being outmoded" (Guha.,1982:4). Such a genealogical, historical approach perhaps represents at present, the best approach for understanding many aspects of social history neglected by contemporary historical discourse.

Naga `insurgency' and the `consciousness' informing it therefore, is seen embedded within the parameters of Naga culture and ideology in this study. It is seen as emerging from within "fairly well established structures of defiance over the centuries... operative in a weak and fragmentary manner even in every day life and in individual and small group resistance" (cf.,Guha.1983b:12). A domain,`autonomous' in the sense that it did not originate from modern elite politics (Guha.,1982:4).

Naga `insurgency' perhaps best reflect Guha's characterisation of colonialism, and even post-colonial Governance in India as a "dominance without hegemony". An instance where the process of nation-building (or dominance) was resisted by a culture which did not recognise the legitimacy of an authority regarded as alien. The Nagas were not organically assimilated as a strata

into the larger social- stratification system of Indian society. A state of affairs maintained by the British as a result of colonial expediency and the lessons from `tribal' insurrections in mainland India. It was also the demands of the Nagas that they be excluded from the politics of the mainland.

Relations of domination and subordination therefore greatly differed in this case from the `feudal' type of societies as studied by Gramsci and also by Guha. The peasantry in these cases constituted a class or social classes within a highly differentiated social stratification system where the identity of the subaltern and the `consciousness' informing `insurgency' was "imposed by those who had power over him by virtue of their class" (Guha.,1983b:18), and which resulted in the `negation' of the properties and attributes of his superiors (ibid). This aspect seems to be limited in the Naga case, due to the relatively few points of contact with the larger society. The Nagas as `subalterns' seems to be more accessible from a positively grounded approach, more in line with P.Chatterjee's "modes of power" (in this case, the "communal" mode, with emphasis on the `community'. From this framework, identity is seen as resulting from the subjective perception of belonging to a community.

Following G.C.Spivak, it would be "most useful" to see `negative consciousness' as by definition incomplete. `Consciousness' becomes useful when seen in a narrow and positive sense as `self-consciousness' and not, `consciousness in general' (Spivak, G.C, 1985: 339):

> It is within the framework of a strategic interest in the self-alienating displacing move of and by a consciousness of collectivity, then, that self-determination and an unalienated self-consciousness can be broached (ibid).

It is in this context that she prefers re-writing `inversive' as `displacing', so as to accomodate the two-fold meanings:`maintain' and `sweep-away'. Insurgency is an attempt to `sweep away' the domination of the ruling class. But at the same time, there exists within the subaltern classes, an acceptance of subalternity. The use of the term `displacement' appears to offer a less stark alternative to Guha's `inversion' in which those who: "...chooses to continue in such subalternity is regarded as hostile towards the inversive process initiated by the struggle and hence as being on the enemy's side". (cited by Spivak, G.C, 1985:342). Guha's stark categorisation also does not seem to fit Naga `Insurgent consciousness' due to the relative absence of dominance particularly in the erstwhile "Tuensang area" which remained outside the ambit of colonial administration.

Guha's approach to `insurgent consciousness' based on `nega tion'appears more pertinent to highly stratified societies of the `feudal' type where extensive codes of dominance/deference are long established. Negation alone does not appears to account for the spread and character of Naga `insurgency'. Extensive structures of power relations could not develop due to historically specific reasons; The late entry of the British into the Naga inhabited areas; The war-like disposition of the Nagas, resulting from a culture which placed a high premium on `head-hunting'; The `inner-line' and other administrative and legislative measures adopted by the British; The hostile terrain; Conversion to

Christianity and also `modern' education, which fostered ideas of Naga Nationalism, self-determination, etc., all contributed in maintaining a discontinuity in relations with the larger Indian society and culture. Naga `insurgency' therefore did not `negate' any pre-existing code of domination and subordination derived from a caste based cultural context, unlike in `society' studies by Guha. However the fears of an imminent imposition of these alien cultural codes was very much existent, and its negation was expressed in an inverted manner; by the `positive' `appropriation' of symbols of British dominance and British culture as understood by the Nagas.

The absence of an `organic' assimilation with the larger Indian society, coupled with the inculcation of `modern' ideas of nationalism, shaped a highly focused and articulated demand for self-determination.

`Negation' in Guha's study was an aspect of insurgent consciousness in a relatively "pure" state (as mentioned earlier) within a highly stratified `feudal' type of society before the advent of ideas of nationalism and socialism (1983b:13). Here `signs' had been systematised into elaborate codes of authority and deferential response. A result of "centuries of recursive practice at the grassroots level... (and had) congealed into a naive tradition" (ibid:37). `Negation' in Guha's study was expressed through `discrimination' against certain social classes, `extended' it's range of violence against objects and classes of people through the `atidesa' function, and `inverted' by acts of `appropriation' and/or destructruction of all symbols

which traditionally marked the distance between the subaltern classes and the elites (ibid:18ff). It was in other words, a semiotic break (ibid:36).

`Negation' and its modalities: `discrimination' and `inversion' were therefore qualitatively different in Naga `insurgency' though certain structural similarities can be discerned. There was no tradition of dominance and subordination as part of a stratified society. Naga `insurgency' therefore did not express itself by appropriating cultural markers of the dominant group. However `appropriation' can be read even here; The formation of the Naga Federal Government (henceforth NFG), "...on the model of the Constitution of India" (Luthra,P.N.,1974:3). There also was a demand that the Prime Minister of India, "...should pay a reciprocal visit to Kohima and hold the next rounds of talks in Nagaland" (Horam,M:129).

It was a `negation' of dominance and also a `positive' act of `appropriation' of an alternate authority and legitimacy. However it would be wrong to over-estimate the maturity of this `consciousness'. The inability to fully `discriminate' and `extend'itself against the symbols anti-thetical to its existence, indicates the relatively weak quality of `negation', and also perhaps, the `positive' presence of ethnicity and other `primordial' loyalties in shaping this `consciousness'.

Finding parallels in the structuring of Naga insurgency with the `elementary aspects' of insurgent consciousness derived from,

"...politically less sophisticated agrarian uprisings of the per iod before 1900" appears to agree with Guha's view;"...the actual career of this consciousness extends well beyond the nineteenth century. Many of the mass movements which have swept through our land since then bears at least some of its hallmarks...one cannot help noticing the structural similarities between their articulation and some of the `elementary aspects' discussed above" (Guha.,1983b:170,334). However it is natural to expect differences in `insurgent consciousness' much influenced by `modern politics' in its articulation, as is the case with Naga `insurgency'.

The problems of an approach based solely on `negation' is more evident in attempts at retrieving Naga `insurgent consciousness', due to the obscuring presence of `modern politics' on both sides of the conflict. It however would be wrong to read the presence of `modern politics' alone in shaping this `consciousness' as it amounts to denying the role of Naga villagers- without knowledge of ideas of `Sovereignity', `Independence 'etc.,; of their consciousness of their own actions. `Negation' does not explain why people without much ideas of `Independence' joined in a conflict over the same. It also does not explain why resistance to domination took on a mass form, unless a `positive' approach, as a logical counter-part of `negation' is also incorporated; in terms of ethnic identity and ethnicity, which made possible the fusing of `modern politics' with the `traditional'.

However the problem of adopting a `positive' approach in locating `subaltern consciousness' is evident in that it violates the theoretical framework of `subaltern studies'. David Hardiman

mentions that, "...`negation' is inscribed on the subaltern banner" (1986:290). Similiarly, G.C.Spivak points out that the position of the `subaltern project' is heterogeneous to the subaltern classes. One can only speak `for' the subaltern, and not `with' the subaltern. `Subaltern consciousness' "...is always askew from its received signifiers" (Spivak.G.C,1985:339).

The `positivistic' attempt to objectify the `subaltern', paradoxically has the effect of controlling the subaltern, according to G.C.Spivak, "...to control him through knowledge even as they restore versions of causality and self-determination to him." On the other hand, `failure' and the acknowledgement of adopting the `subaltern studies approach', as an attempt at displacing existing discursive fields - an attempt destined to `fail' due to `historical' reasons - aligns `subaltern studies' with deconstruction (Spivak,G.C,1985:336ff). If seen from this perspective, the emphasis on the grounding `positive' view of consciousness, stressing the `sovereignity', `consistency' and `logic' of rebel consciousness, "...can be seen as `affirmative deconstruction': knowing that such an emphasis is theoretically non-viable, the historian then breaks his theory in a scrupulously delineated `political interest'" (ibid:345). This approach then employs `negation' in two senses. Firstly, the `resistance to domination' approach; the peasant negates domination by launching a project of `turning things upside down'. Secondly, `subaltern-studies' in its `affirmative deconstruction' mode, negates existing accounts of peasant uprisings, employing the very tools seen as `elitist'.

`Subaltern studies' in its objectifying, positivistic mode

can be bracketed along with recent trends in peasant studies which focus on the peasantry as 'conscious actors', the 'subject' of history. An approach that moves away from structuralism by emphasising that 'culture' and 'consciousness' should not be isolated as an abstract realm of thought, but analysed as a concrete social force. The evidence of peasant consciousness is seen as lying less in intellectual or cultural propositions but more in actions. Peasants are being seen as being able to draw upon and transform historically inherited elements of culture and also use consciousness of cultural distinctiveness for purpose of resistance and in this way give new ideas and social forces the legitimacy of tradition. this approach not only emphasises the study of fixed and structured sets of systems and values, cultural institutions and their continuity, but also less articulated, fragmented, every-day elements of popular culture, stressing the moment of creativity, the recreation and re-inter pretation of inherited elements in the face of new experiences and in particular, the emergence of new ideas and practices which are not only critical within, but also go beyond existing cognitive and ideological paradigms (Ranger,T.,1986:562-3).

These trends, reflecting a growing disillusionment, with anti-humanist approaches as best exemplified in L.Althusser's statement that there is no such thing as history in general- Only specific structures which have specific history (Jones,G.S.1975: 96-115), or the Straussian, "...categorising system, unconnected with a thinking subject" (Das.V,1989:311).

This disillusionment however, is still unresolved as alterna-

tives to this approach is still rooted in the western tradition, even when it rejects an eurocentric perspective. The `subaltern studies' can then be bracketed together with the `elitist' historiography it attacks as seen from Ashis Nandy's perspective; "The west has not only produced modern colonialism, it informs even this interpretation of interpretation" (1983:xii).

On the other hand, `subaltern studies' in its deconstructive mode, has not opened new alternate frameworks for the study of social phenomena, and therefore, a `failure' in this sense. What they have managed to do is to expose the `failure'of contemporary historiography - how `elitist' accounts `successfully' shielded this `cognitive failure' on their part. The exposure of this `successful cognitive failure', however does not lead to the `consciousness'of the subaltern groups, except by harnessing the `successful cognitive failure' of `elitist' historiography to posit the existence of this `consciousness' (Spivak,G.C,1985: 334-5).

NEGATION-2.1.

The first of the `Elementary aspects',`Negation'is based on Gramsci's observation that," the lower classes, historically on the defensive, can only achieve self-awareness via a series of negations, via their consciousness of the identity and class limits of their enemy" (1971:273).

Guha also finds that the subalterns in colonial India, "learnt to recognise himself not by the properties of his own social being but by a diminution, if not negation of those of his superiors" (1983b:18-20). However, Naga identity was derived not only through negation, but also through a positive affirmation of identity. At a formal level, negative identity is evident in the memorandum to the Simon Commission (10th Jan, 1929), Which highlighted the difference in language with the people of the plains, exacerbated by the absence of a common Naga language; the fears of dominance by a Hindu and Muslim majority, perceived as detesting them for the consumption of both beef and pork, and low level of education. A positive affirmation of an emergent political identity can also be discerned in the demand to leave the Nagas alone, if and when the British relinquished power (Youno,A.1974:132-33).

`Negation' worked in terms of two principles:`Discrimination' and `Inversion'. Discrimination, or selective violence was `extended' by a process of `analogy' and `transference', to all symbols of dominance (`Atidesa' function, according to Guha) includ-

ing people and things - Even those of the same ethnic group who `collaborated' with the enemy and thus seen as hostile to the project of insurgency (Guha.1983b:23-6).

This logic of `Negation': discrimination and extension, by analogy and transference, can also be seen in Naga `insurgency'. It can be seen in acts of passive resistance; the boycott of schools by students, resignation by School teachers, return of red-blankets by Do-Bashis and Gaon-Burras (DBs and GBs hence-forth), - some under duress - symbolised a generalised rejection of what was perceived as an alien Government. This was also extended to boycott of official Government functions, refusal to sell food or supply porters to Government officials or Armed force personnels (this despite the Assam Government regulation of 1953) and even violence and sabotage, on communication networks, Government Schools, Offices and residences. Again there was a widespread campaign against Nagas serving the Indian Government: through threatening letters, public condemnations, posters and occasional kidnaping, and even killing (Elwin,V.1961:54, Youno.A, 206). These acts of violence thus ranged over a wide spectrum, but was at the same time, a discriminating selection, aimed at all symbols of what was perceived as an alien Government. This seems to confirm the presence of Guha's principle of `Negation', even in Naga `insurgent consciousness'.

This `negative' consciousness, was based on Gramsci's observation of the peasants' understanding of the State, as being only in terms of "officialdom", or "Sahibs" in the Indian context (from Guha.1983b:28). It was not abstract ideas of `Sovereignity',

understood only by a few educated Nagas, but more importantly, a `negativity' towards an alien officialdom, which shaped Naga `insurgent consciousness' and led to a `positive' attempt at establishing an alternate form of `officialdom', peopled by those of the same ethnic group.

This negative consciousness resulted from real experiences of domination under the British - memories of punitive expeditions, house taxes, collective village fines, forced porterages etc., and also the innumerable restrictions and changes imposed on their traditional way of life, all which created great dissatisfaction. All this continued even under the post-Independent Indian administration,which at the same time did not have much knowledge or familiarity at a personal level, with the Nagas. This `Negativity' also resulted from fears of an imminent end to a way of life already subjected to much changes; fears of domination, conversion to an alien religion, loss of land, traditional rights etc., under a vast Indian population with whom they had no feeling of affinity. It was this `negativity' which was to form the basis of their rejection of the Indian Government.

The other principle of `Negation'- `inversion', formed the logic for "...attempts to destroy or appropriate for themselves the signs of the authority of those who dominated them (of) ...turning things upside down." (Guha.1983b:28-9). `Inversion' did not figure in the forms as depicted by Guha, but the same structural principle can also be discerned here. The formation of the NFG on similar lines to that of the Indian Government:

appointment of "Rajapeyu" (the equivalent of GBs) in every village, The establishment of courts to try cases, issue of Gun licenses, collection of taxes, etc. (Dev,S.C.1988:90). These aspects clearly show that Naga `insurgency' was not simply based on the destruction of symbols of dominance, but was at the same time an attempt at undermining these symbols through `appropriation' and `inversion' (or `displacement').

However, unlike in Guha's study where the peasants' experience of exploitation at the local level, was in terms of a collusion between the State (as represented by its officials), Landlords and Money-lenders (1983b:7-8); the Naga's experience of exploitation and domination differed due to the operation of the `inner-line', which prevented disruption of the traditional agrarian relations of production, or land alienation on any significant scale. Thus the Nagas could clearly distinguish between the dominance by the State through its officials as distinct from, and superior to, the exploitative power of the plainsmen. `Appropriation' and `Inversion' were therefore directed only at the symbols and attributes of `officialdom' and not that of the plainsmen.

Guha deploys `Semiotics'- the study of signs and systems of signification - to reveal extensive structures of dominance and subordination, which permeated all aspects of culture and politics in a highly stratified society. Here, signs consisting of words, gestures, and symbols, tended to merge by the process of accretion into systematic codes of authority and deferential responses, signifying dominance and subordination in society as a

whole. Insurgency therefore represented a `semiotic break'; "...a massive and systematic violation of these words, gestures and symbols which had the relations of power in colonial society as their significata" (Guha.1983b:39).

The relatively late entry of the British into the Naga hills, (the first of a series of hostile contacts was in 1832, climaxed with the killing of the political officer, Mr.Damant in 1879, and retaliation against the Khonoma led alliance of thirteen villages, by the British (from Mackenzie,A.1981:101ff), shows that elaborate semiotic codes could not develop. However, a beginning is perceptible in the attempts to collect `tributes' as early as 1844, which triggered a rash of Naga raids into the adjoining British controlled districts of Assam. Punitive expeditions backed by superior arms however led to the submission of some Naga chiefs who paid `tributes' in the form of ivory, cloth and spears (Mackenzie,A:108).

The next major development was in 1874, when two Naga villages, under threat from other Naga villages, were taken under British protection, on their payment of `revenue', an act described as the only one "...consistent with honour, justice and sound policy" (Mackenzie,A:127). By 1876, this was extended to sixteen villages on payment of `revenue'(ibid:132), and by 1880 included the whole Angami, Zeliangrong, Rengma and Lotha `tribes' (ibid:141 and Ghosh,B.B.1982:151).

The status of the `protected' area was changed in 1881 by converting the Naga hills into an administered British district,

headquartered at Kohima (Reid,R.1983:99). The unadministered areas upto Burma in the east, and Manipur in the south was being slowly incorporated into the Naga hills district and was considered as part of British India, even as early as 1866 (Mackenzie,A:119).

Perhaps it should not be too difficult to see in the collection of 'tributes' and subsequently 'house-tax' within the district, the establishment of a code of authority and deference. This was also explicitly stated by the then Chief-Commissioner of Assam: "...the measure was important rather from a political than from a fiscal point of view; ...a public and well understood symbol of obedience" (Mackenzie,A:140).

Another closely related development was the institution of forced labor required for the construction of roads. (There was a total of 621 miles of bridlepath with rest-houses every 10 miles by 1909. (source, Ghosh,B.B:152-3). Villages near the road were "unduely pressed" according to A.Mackenzie, "wages were paid at the full rate of four annas a day, instead of the subsistence rate of two annas"(140). This "full rate" appears to have caused great distress to the Nagas as to find mention in the Chief-Commissioner, Mr. C.A.Elliot's memorandum on the administration of the district, in 1881 (Chakravorty,B.C.1981:103).

Money to pay 'house-tax', as well as 'fines' resulting from occassional inability to supply porters to the British, and also to trade in the foothill markets, compelled Nagas within the district to serve as laborers in these road-constructions, tea-

estates in the neighbouring plains and also as porters in survey and punitive expeditions. Relations of domination and subordination, however did not lead to the formation of alliances with the subjects in the plains of Assam. Instances of evasion of payment by Contractors, cheating by shop-keepers resulted in a "...vivid fear of exploitation by the people of the plains" (Hutton,J.H.1946:107). This fear was also shared by the members of the NNC during the period prior to the British departure from India, as evident in the NNCs Joint-Secretary's accusation: "you also must be aware of the proposal from the high circle in Delhi to settle thousands of refugees in the Dimapur area[10] ", While addressing the members of the Sub-Committee of the Constituent Assembly in Post-Partition India (Imti,A.1988:61). The demands for Naga Independence was therefore an understandable outcome of the uncertainties of the period marked by communal riots; leading to partition on the basis of religion.

It is interesting to note that the system of `house-tax' was still retained in post-Independent India. The institution of forced porterage was also maintained, but on a larger scale to cope with the increase in administration, the deployment of Army outposts in the interior, and the lack of proper road communication. (The only means possible in the Naga hills and Tuensang Area.) The maintenance of Army outposts in the interior was casually brushed off as evident in an Army General's statement: "...if the worst comes to the worst they can live off the land like the tribal people" (Rustomji,N.K.1973:266). It is not very difficult to see an increase in forced porterage, and in its

absence, cases of hungry troops taking food from Naga villages, by any means possible in these circumstances. N.K.Rustomji, the then Advisor to the Governor, also noted the deep resentment felt by the Nagas over this forced porterage (ibid.83). It is not very surprising that people who did not know the meaning of `Independence' could be drawn into an armed struggle against an authority which they could see, and which affected their daily lives.

`Appropriation" of symbols of dominance can also be seen in the Nagas' desire to possess fire-arms, easily the most conspicuous symbol of dominance, particularly in the early days of contact with the British. Capt.John Butler, Jr. writes in 1875 that:

> an Angami will give almost anything he has for a gun,and if he cannot get it by fair means,will run almost any risk to get it by foul. In several cases of gun-thefts,some of which have been accompanied by murder,they have certainly proved themselves wonderfully bold and dexterous (1969:544-45).

Fire-arms were seen by the Nagas as a means of enforcing authority, and the desire for its possession - the possible motives behind it - does not need much elaboration. In latter years, there was also a desire for modern education after a missionary Rev.E.W.Clark started an informal school at Mulungyimchen village in 1878 (Ghosh,B.B:245). British reaction to the establishment of Schools appears to have been reticent; "...14 schools handed over to the Government had failed, but the mission re-opened them. In 1931, the Kohima Sadar and Mokokchung sub-division had 42 and 52 schools respectively" (Alemchiba,M.1970:159). These were mostly managed by the Christian Missions. There was no matriculate

schools in the district till 1938 (ibid). The demand for higher level schools was viewed with serious concern by the British administration, as is evident in J.H.Hutton's 1945 address to the Royal Anthropological Institute, in which he attributed this demand - referring to Hogbin's comments on the Solomon Islanders - to the belief that knowledge of the three R's leads to almost unlimited wealth, associated with Europeans and the power and influence attributed to wealth. Secondly, as due to the vivid fears of exploitation by people of the plains, and finally as to have an administrative staff of their own kith and kin. He also laid great stress on their racial pride, love of liberty and Independence and at the same time a desire for `Home-Rule' resulting from Jinnah's claim of Assam for Pakistan (1946:104-8).

The fact that J.H.Hutton started the idea of a "Crown-colony" (later known as the "Coupland Plan") along with some other officers of the district (Youno, A:139-40), may probably explain his reluctance to educate the district, particularly in higher education, as also his belief in the Naga's desire for "Home-Rule" under the British. The Nagas also perceived this attitude of the British and strongly resented it. It was the educated Nagas who vigorously resisted the "Crown-Colony" scheme, and also opted for complete Naga Independence (Youno, A:166-70).

'Inversion' was seen by Guha as having a positive aspect too, not very prominent in his period of study but never-the-less present as seen in: "...but the process was taken a step further in some instances by the rebel trying, **positively**, to appropriate the sign of writing for himself"(Guha.1983b:53. emphasis added).

Perhaps we can see the Nagas' demand for education as a more mature version of this appropriation of authority, but now extended to not only education but also to some extent, in the emulation of other symbols of the west: clothes, hair styles, as well as Christianity, and also ideas of nationalism, self determinism, liberty, freedom, etc., ideas which were to be stated forcibly in conjunction with ethnic identity in latter years by educated Nagas.

Education appears to have occupied an important position in the Naga mind, as evidenced by the destruction of many Government schools. Again when the Kohima high school (taken over by the Assam Government) was closed down, following the prevention of students from participating in an Independence day celebrations by the NNC, (Youno,A:212); one Naga National high school was opened at Kohima, followed soon after by another at Mokokchung. Both schools were significantly situated, side by side, with the Government schools (Alemchiba,M.1970:182). Guha's remark on insurgent consciousness appears to fit in with this aspect of Naga 'insurgency':

> It was this fight for prestige which was at the very heart of insurgency. Inversion (displacement in this case) was its principal modality. It was a political struggle in which the rebels appropriated and/or destroyed the insignia of his enemy's power and hoped thus to abolish the marks of his own subalternity (1983b:75).

Certain incidents involving the Nagas and the Indian Government as represented by Public leaders, Civil administrators, and Armed forces personnels also appears to have aggravated the situ-

ation, by reinforcing the sense of distance between the Nagas and the administration,and thus aiding the development of `insurgent consciousness'. An order by the Deputy Commissioner of Kohima, barring any form of address to the Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, on the 30th of March,1953, led to a walk-out by representatives of tribal Councils and other public leaders,assembled from all parts of the Naga hills district, some even smacking their bottoms; a gesture of utter contempt in Naga traditional idioms (Youno,A:204-5, Alemchiba.M:181, Horam,M:51). This gesture can perhaps be seen as indicative of the presence of traditional idioms even within the NNC leadership. Naga leaders were also refused interviews with the Congress party President and also the President of India (Youno,A:205).

A procession against the alleged torture of a Naga boy by the Police was disrupted, when a Police officer on a Motor-cycle hit one of the processionist. In the mob violence that ensued, an Angami tribal Judge who tried to rescue the officer was shot dead through Police firing. This event on the 18th of October 1952, is also indicative of the distance between the Nagas and officialdom (Alemchiba,M:180). These incidents when seen from the perspective of a small insular society, with a higher intensity of social relationships, resulting from closer face to face interactions in multiple role settings (Sinha,A.C.1984: 114-5), could easily be construed as outrages against the community, not isolated aberrations, and easily heighten the already existing sense of alienation from officialdom.

The ignorance of the customs, language, viewpoints and psychology of other cultures was initially a major handicap for the British in their colonialisation of India. This was sought to be overcome by the conquest of knowledge of other cultures, according to B.S.Cohn: "...to be converted into instruments of colonial rule" (1985:288). The nexus of "know ledge and power" in the establishment of British rule is evident in Warren Hasting's letter to the Chairman, Board of Directors in 1784, where he links the accumulation of knowledge - as obtained by social communication with the subject people- to the benefit of the State in that it attracts and conciliates distant affections and lightens the weight of subjection (paraphased from Cohn,B.S :315).

Similarly, J.H.Hutton, anthropologist/administrator, with nearly twenty years of service in the Naga hills district as a sub-divisional officer and later, Deputy Commissioner, (1915-35) mentioned Lord Hailey's views that `Anthropology' had a greater role to play in administration, and in particular, that branch which investigated the manner of societal functioning and the fundamental impulses determining human activities within the culture studied (1946:104). In short, Structural-Functional anthropology was deployed as an instrument of colonial domination.

Naga raids on the plains of Assam as the British expanded its dominion was found prohibitively expensive to curb through force, and led to attempts at understanding the raiders' motives. Expeditions to the hills brought a wealth of information on Naga

culture: social and political organisations, military strength, food habits, clothes, etc. Relations between the Nagas and the former Ahom empire was also examined. The `inner-line' was made in 1873 to prevent friction between the Nagas and the people of the plains. Tea planters and other classes of people were restricted from encroaching beyond the line, compensations paid to the Nagas whose traditional land grants were now incorporated within the `inner-line' (Mackenzie,A:53-6,94-5). A Naga raid on a guard house in Gelaki, 1867, is instructive of attempts made by the British to understand the Naga mind, based on their existing knowledge. One forwarded a relationship with the recent prohibition on carrying spears to the markets in the plains, a second was the encroachment by tea-planters, while a third saw the survey expeditions to the hills as rousing the suspicions of the Nagas (Mackenzie,A:97).

However by the turn of the century, much was known and written about the Nagas, now classified into `tribes'. This knowledge was put to use in securing the compliance of the Nagas. The Naga hills district was governed by British administrators like J.H.Hutton, J.P.Mills, both renown anthropologists,and also C.R.Pawsey, all acquiring great knowledge of Naga culture and traditions. These administrators who stayed in close proximity to the district through-out their service careers, came to know the Naga `tribes' intimately, and even managed to get their compliance, as seen in the recruitment of two thousand Nagas for a labour corps in France during World War I. A war loan was subscribed to the amount of Rs.65.264. between 1917-18 (Reid,R: 162-3), from the district. During World War II, the Japanese advance

through South-East Asia was repulsed in the Naga hills, with Kohima bearing the brunt of the assault. Even during these trying circumstances, the Nagas under the then Deputy Commissioner, C.R.Pawsey, extended help to the Allied cause in such a way as to find gratitude in many accounts of the battle.

The acceptance of dominance as a "naive tradition" (Guha. 1983b: 37), by the Nagas can be understood from the manner in which the British administrators incorporated local customs and also introduced new administrative structures by modifying traditions. The nature of administration in the case of the Ao/Naga `tribe' clearly demonstrates this. The traditional village council of elders was retained to deal with day-to-day village administration, including misdemeanors according to customary laws; except for cruelty to animals. Headmen or `Gaon-Bura' (GBs) who acted as a go-between were chosen by the village and approved by the Sub-Divisional Officers; the number ranging between one, to five or six in large villages. These GBs being highly respected village elders, facilitated the collection of house-tax, (twelve and half percent, being retained by the GBs as commission) and also made arrangements for traveling officials, ie., food, shelter, and porters etc. The traditional respect was also reinforced by the administrations' practice of presenting every few years, a red blanket, which soon acquired great symbolic value (Mills,J.P.1926:404-7). The selection of a red blanket appears to have been a particularly judicious choice, considering the Naga tradition of shawls as an indicator of one's social status - A fact which was not unknown to the administrators (Mills,J.P.1926:34-41).

The administration also maintained a staff of paid interpreters, or `Do-Bashi' (DBs) at the Sub-division and District headquarter, to translate the various Naga language into Assamese and to advise on local customs. These DBs were carefully hand-picked men, representing every `tribes' interests as perceived by the British administrators. Among the Ao's, this consisted of the Christians and Ancients, the three main linguistic divisions: (Chongli, Mongsen and, Changki), the three phratry: (Pongen, Lungkam and,Chami) within which the various clans were grouped. DB Courts, based on customary laws were also set up. More serious cases and appeals were tried by the SDO and the DC in consultation with the DBs. These DBs had great respect, and their posts eagerly sought due to their position as Judges and communicators of the Governments will to the villagers (Mills,J.P.1926:404-6).

The intimate knowledge of the customs by administrators and its incorporation in day to day governance was facilitated by keeping the district beyond the purview of the Assam Provincial Legislature, and under the Governor's discretionary powers as; "Backward Tract" (Montague-Chelmsford Reforms,1919), and later as "Excluded area" (Government of India Order,1936.) (from Luthra.P.N:8-9). Keeping the District beyond the Assam provincial legislature was a result of the Nagas demand and also the British fears of exploitation by the plainsmen; seen as the cause of many `tribal' uprising. this resulted in the maintainence of a semblance of hegemony in the district under the British.

The administrators of the district - Officers of the Indian Civil Services - spent most of their service life within the district. J.H.Hutton, as mentioned earlier, served for nearly twenty years, as an SDO and later DC. Similarly, J.P.Mills who joined in 1916, spent his service career in Assam as SDO, and later DC of the Naga hills district, and Adviser to the Governor of Assam for Tribal Areas and States (Mills,J.P.1926,preface:ix). C.R.Pawsey also joined as SDO in 1924 (CLC,1991,:105) and as DC 1937-1947 (Alemchiba,M:258). They all had a deep knowledge of the people of the district and were familiar to the Nagas as well. This knowledge, derived from close interaction, frequent tours of the district, incorporation of Naga customary laws and the presentation of red blankets to the DBs and GBs, as well as the trans-frontier Nagas all combined to create a `Father-figure' image of these administrators in the popular Naga mind. A construct greatly facilitated by the DBs and GBs, emminent personalities in their own rights, and highly respected by the villagers.

However the fact that the British did not achieve hegemony over the Nagas is amply demonstrated by the fact that modern weapons scattered all over the Naga hills during the war were not surrendered. The administrators, who naively believed that Nagas never lied, took them at their words. Oaths (considered a serious undertaking by the Nagas) were administered by the British, to extract unaccounted arms. Yet the Nagas hid their weapons in secluded places and could quite truthfully aver that they did not have any weapons at home. (Youno.A:149). Apparently, a case of `passive resistance', revealing a domain not incorporated into

the hegemony of the British. What B.S.Cohn wrote about the British in India, also seems to apply to the Nagas:

> The Indians who increasingly became drawn into the process of transformation of their own traditions and modes of thought were, however far from passive. In the long run the authoritative control which the British tried to exercise over new social and material technologies was taken over by the Indians and put to purposes which led to the ultimate erosion of British authority. The consciousness of Indians at all levels in society was transformed as they refused to become specimens in a European-controlled museum of an archaic stage in world history (1985:329).

The knowledge of the Nagas, their customs and traditions, which to some extent, was put to effective use by the British was totally lacking in the initial years of post-Independent India, due to the district's "excluded" status and the "inner-line" which restricted entry into the district. This along with suspicions on both sides- The Nagas as well as the plainsmen- and also an administration separated from the Nagas allowed the development of an `insurgent consciousness' in both its `negative' and `positive' modes.

Guha has noted the importance of the `written word' in insurgent consciousness of the past; "Negatively" as in the destruction of written or printed matter, based on the fear, "... that official papers could be used by clerks, judges, lawyers and landlords to rob him of his land and livelihood" (1983b:52). It was also expressed "Positively" by giving it an authority on an elevated plane; "The apotheosis of writing could not be more explicit nor indeed its use by the insurgents to justify turning the world upside down..." (ibid:53-5). This can also be seen as component of Naga `insurgent consciousness'.

The fears underlying the negative reaction to the written word, also seem to have been present in the Naga mind. The non-inclusion of the `Hydari Agreement' arousing the fears and suspicions of Nagas, appears to have been pivotal in the rise of Phizo in the NNC. The comments of Mr Cadogen of the Simon Commission also seem to indicate the presence of this basic structure of fear: "They have a very shrewd suspicion that something is being done to take away from them their immemorial rights and customs." (Youno.A:132-4). The positive appropriation of writing was very much in evidence in the demands for education and the use of printed words by the Naga `insurgents'.

Thus the "negativity" informing the Naga `insurgent consciousness' can be seen as resulting not only from the imposition of colonial administration, but also from the codes of dominance and subordination concomitant to colonial administration which to some extent had been accepted by the Nagas too. It was also the fear of the displacement of this system by a more pervasive structure - a fear which appeared to come true by the increase in police forces to counter violence - which only seems to have provided much of the impetus for escalated violence[11].

AMBIGUITY-2.2.

`Ambiguity' refers to the ways in which, violations of law are interpreted in opposite directions, particularly during the twilight phase separating the actual outburst of insurgency from its precursor. While the official point of view: "...would tend to lump all forms of defiance of law as crime, the peasant would tend to lump them togather as perfectly justifiable - even honorable - acts of social protest." (Guha.R,1983b:89). This tendency to lump togather, by the official as well as the peasants, results from the inability to distinguish between two very diffe rent codes of violence from which insurgency and crime emerges. From the official's perspective, insurgency is mistaken for that larger type of crime produced by conspiracy, while the peasant tends to identify with these `crimes' (Guha.1983b:79-80).

It is the sudden increase in `crime' of a particular type, at this phase, before the actual outbreak, that brings about a change in the perception of the peasants:

> the beginnings of the peasants' sense of themselves as a social mass defined not only by a common grievance but also by the possibility of obtaining redress through militant and collective action- the beginings, if no more than that, of a recognition of their identity as a class-for-itself. (Guha.1983b:92-3).

Accounts of Naga `insurgency' also seems to indicate a "code-switching". The period prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities, featured the NNC led `Plebiscite', `Civil-disobedience', `Non-Cooperation and boycott of the 1952, general elections. There also was a spurt of violence- the sabotage of Government

property: burnt schools, destroyed bridges, burning of Government offices, residences, as well as threats and attacks on Naga officials, sometimes even killing (Elwin.V,1961:54, Youno.A:206).

The visit of the Assam Chief minister, B.Medhi in December, 1950, to the Naga hills witnessed much hostility. His tour was sought to be aborted by the destruction of a bridge on the road to Mokokchung; Student demonstration when he arrived there. True to Guha's description, the Assam Government tended to see in all this, the hands of the NNC - a widely orchestrated conspiracy, as is also seen in B.Medhi's speech in the Assam Assembly, 1954- "We cannot allow them under the cloak of non-violence to resort to the murder and various crimes. The anti-Indian activities of the NNC must be curbed to some extent" (Youno.A:208-9,Ramunny,1988:56-7).

The other type of interpretation is evident in the assessment of the Assam Pradesh Congress Committee President B.P.Chaliha, after his visit which was accorded a warm welcome by the Nagas, in September 1953. He found that the demand for Independence was sincere and popular, although based more on sentiments than reason. He also noted that the civil administration was on its last legs (Ramunny.M:67). This assessment of public sentiment is also recounted vividly by Dalle Namo:

> In those days this little cosmopolitan town (Dimapur) a meeting place of Nagas and non-Nagas became a hotbed of politicking and people's minds worked up to a state when they were carried away only to find satisfaction in watching the local Indian official's residence on fire or by indulging in some acts of violence as was being done elsewhere (1987:81-82).

This phenomenon marking the passage from crime to rebellion according to Guha:

> is not fully comprehended yet, there is a tendency - almost universal on the part of the authorities at the outset of an insurrection - to interpret the increased intensity and incidence of violence in quantitative terms alone by attributing it to a small number of malefactors rather than the initiative of individual offenders against the law (Guha.1983b:80).

The assessment of the NNC leaders, on hearing about their impending arrest - following the Prime Minister's vitiated Kohima visit - is also revealing about the extent of their control over the people.

> They (NNC leaders) thought that the people had not yet been organised strongly enough to stand for any eventuality on the demand for independence and their separation from the people would demoralise the people and weaken the organisation (Alemchiba,1970:181).

Following a police raid on the house of the NNC secretary, T.Sakhrie, on the night of 4th April, 1953, the entire NNC leadership went into hiding. Police raids on a number of villages surrounding Kohima resulted in Nagas going "...underground from all over Naga hills. To cope with the situation, police force was strengthened and by the end of 1953 there were as many as 9 police outposts opened in Naga Hills" (ibid).

These acts of Naga villagers going underground following police raids, therefore do not appear to be part of a set game plan of the NNC, but the result of initiatives at the level of the village.

This type of initiative resulting from a switching of codes on the part of the populace is greatly obscured by the existence of the NNC - a monolithic organisation, which theoretically included all Nagas. Every Naga family paid a contribution ranging from rupee one, to a hundred or even more.(Youno.A:161) Thus a change in the mood of the people in the Tuensang division during the early part of 1953, was reported as "the development of pro-NNC feelings" by the then political officer (Ramuny.M:61). But again the existence of a rift within the NNC makes it doubtful as to its ability to initiate on a large scale: violence and the mobilisation of people to go underground, from all over the Naga Hills. This was at a time when the NNC was still committed to a peaceful means of agitation to secure their ends as seen in their programme of organising the `Plebiscite', `Civil-Disobedience'and `Non-Cooperation' and `Boycott' of the general election.

Phizo has been singled out as the mastermind behind Naga `insurgency' in most accounts, with a conjurer-like ability to produce armed insurgents, from differen `tribes' without any common language, without taking into account, secondary leaders from the various `tribes' who obviously played a major role in aligning the various `tribes' with the NNC policies. However this `chain of command' structure also was obviously divided in terms of the major rift within the NNC, which makes it doubtful as to its ability to mobilise on such a large scale. Perhaps N.K.Rustomji was correct in opining that :

> the seeds of unrest were already deeply laid. The movement might have taken a different shape in the absence of Phizo's personal leadersahip, but it would be a foolish oversimplification to suppose that it would have fizzled out.
> (Rustomji.N.K.,102-3)

Phizo was released unconditionally on the 5th of August,1949 on the recommendation of the then adviser, N.K.Rustomji, (after a parole of seven months) following the death of a son and wife's injury in a vehicle accident, during which the Nagas did not take much notice of him, prompting Rustomji to say, "The real thunder of the Independence move has spent its force" (Ramuny.M:54-5). Republic Day which ushered in the Constitution of India, with aspects of the Hydari agreement included in the sixth schedule, was seen by the Nagas as a betrayal and apparently brought about a revival of apprehensions. According to Ramuny:

> They found it difficult to believe that a document containing the agreement which the late Governor (Sir Akbar Hydari) and the Hon'ble Premier had assured in writing that it would be fully implemented, should now have no more value. (Ramuny.M:49).

Phizo was elected as President of the NNC in December, 1950, defeating Visar by one vote (ibid.:55) reflecting a sentiment that was amply evident during the visit of the Assam Chief Minister during this period. It may not be very difficult to see the sudden shift in the mood of the Nagas - from one of indifference towards Phizo to one of support - as reflecting the real driving force behind Naga `insurgency' also.

This prelude to Naga `insurgency' perhaps can be seen as indicating that the spate of violence following the promulgation of the Indian Constitution, was not simply a case of conspiracy, as suggested in most accounts, resulting from manipulation upon an inert and pre-political mass. There was according to Ramuny, "...a genuine feeling of regret and disappointment among the Nagas when they were told that their nine-point agreement was

fully embodied in the Constitution" (48-9). This type of reading would lead to the conclusion that it was not simply a case of conspiracy, but acts of individuals initiative as a result of the situation of uncertainty. It was also this `switching of codes' on the part of the Nagas which facilitated Phizo's rise within the NNC. Perhaps it would not be difficult to see in this code switching, the ease with which mobilisation of armed `insurgents' could be undertaken by a badly split organisation. A switch of codes, which made it perfectly justifiable to take up armed struggle against what was perceived as a great injustice, as opposed to the earlier ambivalence.

However, in Guha's study,`acts of violence' stemming from the code of insurgency was often mistaken by the authorities as `ordinary crimes, due to the form it assumed: looting and attacks on landlords, money-lenders etc., `crimes' which existed even in ordinary times. It was the concentration of such `crimes' which created a synonymy and helped dispel `ambiguity' about these crimes as, not ordinary crimes but acts of violence, stemming from a different code - that of insurgency. In the Naga case, these `acts of violence' were not mistaken for ordinary crimes from the outset due to its overtly political character. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to see the `switch in codes' - not as a transition from `crime' to `insurgency', but perhaps more of a `switching-on' of the `code of insurgency'. A code characterised by its being, `public', `open', `communal', (or mass) in contrast to the `conspiratorial'(or secretive),`individualistic' (or small group) character of `crime' (Guha.1983b:79).

Naga insurgency can be seen as resulting from this `switching-on' of the code of `insurgency', from an initially ambiguous or ambivalent attitude to one of identification, which facilitated the mobilisation of Naga villagers, to take up armed struggle, without much prompting from outside.

MODALITY-2.3.

Insurgency, even if mistaken for crime, soon establishes itself as a violence which is `public', `collective', `destructive', and `TOTAL' in its modalities. It's antithesis is seen as crime or conspiracy, in a binary contrast: Public/Secretive, Collective/Individualistic, Destructive/Appropriative, and Total/Partial. Following this schema Naga `insurgency' can be seen as `Public', `Collective', `Destructive' and `Total' (based on Guha. 1983b:107).

The `Public' character of Naga `insurgency' was never in doubt. They (the Naga `insurgents') saw the `Plebiscite' as a public affirmation of their undertaking. It was thus a `Public' Authority which was its *raison d'etre.* They saw themselves as a Government doing its public duty, and it was only natural that they should collect from the public: `Tax' in the form of food, clothes, money and also porters as and when required. The `public' character of Naga `insurgency' is clearly seen in their comprehensive political system, with duely constituted Government, Party, an Armed force with a graded system of pay, a Constitution, Judicial system, National Flag, Ambassadors etc, (Youno, A:215-6). This `Public' character, sharply distinct from crime could not be overlooked even by its opponents, as is evident in the then Adviser, M.Ramunny's account:

> Finally, at a public meeting held at Seneksami from the 30th October to the 4th November, 1956, the terms of surrender offered by General Thimaya were turned down by the representatives of the different tribes (109).

The `Collective' nature of Naga `insurgency' also follows from its`open' and `public' character, differentiating it from the typically individualistic or small group operation of crime. Guha notes that:

> We know little of the actual mechanics of such autonomous mobilizations - the pull of the primordial ties of kinship, community and co-residence, the compulsions of customs and religion - all which might have combined in various degrees to make up for the absence of any formal machinery of call-up standing outside and above the rural communities. No real understanding of insurgency in colonial India will ever be achieved without a proper study of this phenomenon (1983b: 118).

The fact that Naga `insurgency' also followed certain patterns of solidarity seems to indicate the presence and interaction of this non-formal machinery. The existence of a formal political structure in Naga `insurgency' has obscured the autonomy of mass mobilisation to a great extent, but this other mobilisation is also evident in the way village khels have been described as `friendly' and `hostile'. The fact that the NNC was a divided house even at the outbreak of hostilities, unsure of its ability to mobilise the people, seems oddly at variance with the nature of solidarity evidenced in the early phase of Naga `insurgency'.

The coming togather of various groups of `insurgents' from different `tribes', under the Naga Federal Government, (NFG, henceforth) seems to indicate the presence of `modern politics' in Naga `insurgent' mobilisation. On the other hand, the fact that Kaito Sema, who had already organised an armed band, was elected as C-in-C, by his `Naga Safe Guards' (NSG), and whom

Phizo had to accomodate as the same within the NFG, also seems to indicate the presence of a different mobilisation. Kaito's appointment as a result of pressure from below, is more obvious, considering that Phizo wanted Thungti Chang (who had also organised the `Naga Home Guards') in the same position within the NFG (Ramunny.M:86). These multiple mobilisations, and the fact that Kaito's band was predominantly from his own Sema `tribe' seems to indicate the presence of relatively autonomous mobilisations even when ultimately subsumed under the formal political machinery of the NFG. A horizontal mobilisation, based on the community, but largely obscured by the prior presence of the NNC, and later, the NFG, which consolidated these discrete mobilisation within itself.

The structure of the NNC gives an insight into the routes along which ideas of `Independence' reached the community. J.P.Mills writing on the Ao/Naga noted the absence of unity as a `tribe', with each village practically conducting its own affairs. He however mentions the existence of a `tribal' feeling with a sharp distinction drawn between Aos and those so unfortunate to be born of another race (1926:176). This type of feeling appears to have been at work in the formation of `Tribal Councils' as exemplified by the formation of the Lotha Tribal Council in 1923. The Ao Tribal Council was formed in 1928, dissolved in 1930, and re-formed in 1939. Most of the other `tribes' had their Tribal Councils by the mid-forties (Alemchiba, M:165).

The Aos were divided into five Range-Councils, with the Ao Tribal Council representing all Aos at the Mokokchung central Council. A similar Central Council at Kohima represented all the `Tribes' in that sub-division. The NNC as the apex body, represented all the Naga `tribes' in the district, and also, some of the `tribes' in the erstwhile "Tuensang Area" in proportion to their population (Imti,A.appendix:11). There were five Ao representatives in the NNC.

The feeling of identity noted by J.P.Mills is evident in the shape of the Ao Range - Councils, based on a previously existing division of the Ao country into four self demarcated ranges (Mills,J.P.1926:4). (Now divided into five: The Langbangkong, Asukong, Changkikong, Chapvukong and later Ongbankong). The organisation of Tribal Councils and Range Councils, at least in the case of the Aos, therefore largely took on the form of traditional patterns of solidarity adapted to meet the exigencies of modernity.

The NNC was initiated by the then Deputy Commissioner Mr.C.R. Pawsey, who organised the Naga Hills District Tribal Council in April, 1945. This changed into the Naga National Council in a meeting of Tribal representatives at Wokha, February, 1946, with twentynine members, representing all the `tribes' (Alemchiba,M. 1970:165, Youno,A:161). It was due to the utilisation of traditional patterns - a process that also coalesced the incipient feeling of `tribal' identity that the NNC could reach the entire Nagas, as vividly demonstrated by the `Plebisite' and other mass movements. The NNC can perhaps be seen as mobilising at two

analytically distinct levels; one based on `modern' organisational lines, while the other on pre-existing `traditional' forms of solidarity.

In practice, the NNC tried to mobilise through extensive tours and public meetings. The `Plebiscite' in which thumb impressions and signatures were taken, along with the administration of oaths (according to Naga customs and law) that they (the signatories) would put in their last breath to struggle for Naga Independence (Youno,A: 202); marking an important watershed in allegiance to the NNC. Counter attempts at getting signatures and thumb impressions by the Police, were of no avail and caused unpleasant incidents, including rioting and other offenses and were consequently stopped. (According to K.R.Singh, a senior Police officer of the District (Singh,K.R: 1987:62)).

The NNC being dominated by educated Christians, Naga Nationalism was sought to be spread through Schools and Churchs. Besides the Naga National Schools, even Government Schools were used for this purpose, according to K.R.Singh (65). While religious difference may also have been highlighted in the pulpits, no such evidences have been specified in accounts that blames the Church of inciting the Naga (eg.,Singh,K.R. Anand,V.K). The church however occupied an ambiguous position in Naga `insurgency' (as will be mentioned later). The NNC played a major role in sensitising the Naga populace on `Independence', though the ways in which it was understood remains largely unexplored. Positively, the NNC emphasised `Naga' identity, as a collective, and Negatively, in

terms of difference with the people of the plains. A difference which combined with traditions of dislike and suspicion for the plainsmen, now reinforced by a heightened awareness of religious difference, fears of immenent loss of land, imposition of alien customs, religions, taxes, etc.

Traditional forms of mobilisation is evident more in terms of actions, in the Nagas relations with the authorities, which gives insight into the nature of `Naga consciousness'. K.R.Singh mentions some Ao "Okra" villages which illustrates the `collective' character of Naga `insurgency'. "Okra" according to K.R.Singh meant "tough", "Jungli", "without common sense, strange and peculiar in behavior, rough, backward and tactless etc" (75).

K.R.Singh mentions `Mokongsu ' as one such `Okra village' about three or four furlongs from Mokokchung; the sub-divisional headquarter since 1889. (The fact that the villagers deeply resented the name `Mokongsu'- imposed by the British - and had adopted the name Ao-Mokokchung, with the departure of the British was apparently unknown to the author.) In 1953, this village had set on fire a house belonging to a Naga Government official, on land given by the village. When the culprits, including some GBs were arrested, the village would not have new GBs, and when forced, produced some,"...old useless people (or)...notoriously bad youngsters" for appointment as their headmen. This village refused to pay house-tax in 1955 and the GBs just disappeared. According to K.R.Singh: "...they behaved queerly in the face of punishment itself. Even when an outpost was established in the

village it had no corrective effect. Its Kheti suffered, men suffered, women and children suffered, everything went from bad to worse. But it continued in its `Okra' way" (76-77).

Sangratsu village, short on land and dependent to a large extent on hiring out its labour, similarly was opposed to anything coming from the Government. They would accept lesser positions and lesser wages from the contractors rather than deal with the Government" (Singh,K.R:78).

These `Okra' villages demonstrates in a rather graphic way, J.P.Mills view that the village was the real political unit among the Aos. This two factors, village based politics and extended ties beyond the villages, can be seen as shaping the collective character of Naga `insurgency'. `Okra' villages represents a good example of the `autonomous' behaviour of a `collective', based on the decisions of the village community, as a corporate group in reaction to outside forces.

The `collective' character extending beyond the village is evident in the similarity of methods adopted by different Ao villages. "Epitaphs" with words like; "Killed by the Indian Army" "We gave our today for your tommorrow" were found in almost all Ao villages. The then Civil SDO, S.C.Dev noted that the villagers deliberately arranged meetings with the authorities near these graves, and that efforts by his predecessor had failed, "...because the villagers were anxious to preserve these sad remainders of the conflict." (Dev,S.C:85-6).

Religion has been portrayed as being instrumental in instigating the Nagas into conflict, due to what was seen as NNC control over the Church. K.R.Singh's account of the `Okra' village `Mokongsu, seems to indicate an ambiguous (or neutral) position of the Church in the Naga consciousness; "...it was odd that it (`Mokongtsu' village) had taken regular permits for C.I.sheets, timber, and artisans* etc., from the Government for its Church which was being constructed in the village at a time when all menfolk were in jungle! " (*permits were required to bring in people from the plains, Singh,K.R:77). That an obdurate and `Okra' village, consistent in rejecting any dealings with the Government, even if for their own benefit, would deign to approach the Government for its Church, perhaps reflect their perception of the Church (and religion) as `other-worldly' and hence outside the domain of conflict.

However with Christians constituting the majority of the Naga `insurgents', it was inevitable that a religious undertone would permeate the conflict, by heightening a religious identity and also the perception of religious difference. One Naga `insurgent' leader was reported as saying that, only if India became Christian, could Nagas go along with India (Singh,K.R:64). It is in the context of this ambiguity and heightened religious identity, that religion, in Naga `insurgency' must be situated.

The `collective' character of Naga `insurgency' is also seen in certain aspects incorporating both `modern' and `traditional' forms. The co-ordination of dispersed `insurgent' groups was

based on an extensive communication network, with people passing messages from village to village (Dev,S.C:90). Inter-village communication was not a new feature, resulting from the exigencies of `insurgency', but existed even in the past. J.P.Mills mentions that certain age-sets among the Aos, were entrusted with the responsibility of passing messages from one end to the other end of the Ao area, by day or night[12] (Mills,J.P.1926:178fn-1). Again, M.M.Clark also mentions, how news of the attack on Kohima, by the Khonoma led alliance, reached even the then unadministered Aos - crossing several `tribal' boundaries - and raised the Aos to a state of "high tension" (1978:116-7). The existence of these `traditional' networks of `transmission', seems to indicate the presence of the `traditional' and `modern' as distinct analytical categories. In practice, it can be seen as the adaptation of `tradition' to the exigencies of a modern `insurgency'. (Traditional forms of `transmission' is discussed below).

The participation of women, not only in the villages but also in training camps as nurses, cooks, tailors etc., also reflects the `collective' aspect, involving different sections of the Naga populace. Women participated in large numbers under the Naga Women's Society with one village alone sending two hundred women as volunteers [13] (Elwin,V.1961:57).

The other two modalities: `Destructive' and `Total' were also linked togather, like the first two, (`Public' and `Collective'). Guha finds that the `destructive' modality employed four main forms or methods: `Wrecking', `Burning', `Eating', and `Looting', giving rise to the fourth modality: `Total' and integrated

violence. This `Totality' gave insurgent violence its distinctive stamp as opposed to crime. This distinctiveness could not be overlooked even by the authorities, due to the combination of a vertical and horizontal plurality: It employed one particular type of violence directed at a variety of objects, and also, different types of violence against a particular class of objects. This "multiformity" (The coming together of many different forms) of insurgent violence gave it its comprehensive character (Guha. 1983b:136,157-8).

Naga `insurgency' differed from Guha's model in its `destructive' modality - The large scale use of modern weaponry and the class of objects against which they were deployed gave rise to a `modern' variant of the `Total' and integrated violence. However, even here, the `destructive' modality expressed in the form of `wrecking' and `burning' can be seen, deployed against Government property like offices, residences, schools, communication facilities (like bridges) etc. These violence were not mistaken for ordinary crime due to its overt political nature, even though suspected as resulting from a conspiracy[14].

A common thread linking both Guha's model of insurgent consciousness, and the `consciousness' informing Naga `insurgent' violence was the `Code of insurgency', reflecting the rejection of dominance, and the presence of a project of changing the existing relations of power, through the demolition of things symbolising authority (cf.,Guha.R,1983b:146). This basic political character of `insurgent' violence has been obscured in elitist

(or `vulgar') accounts which tries to read peasant uprisings, often featuring attacks on economic exploiters, like land-lords, usurers, etc., in economic terms alone. Guha takes on this issue as essentially missing out the spirit of `insurgency'. (Spivak's `successful cognitive failure'). These `failures' of `elite' historiography has the effect of erasing the `subaltern' and thereby `succeeds'. The retrieval of the `subaltern' also thus `succeeds' in bringing `elite' historiography to a crisis, but `fails' in displacing this historiography, without adopting an objectifying, positivistic posture - a stance that results in controlling the `subaltern' through knowledge as pointed out by Spivak.

Many accounts of Naga `insurgency' exhibits in varying degree, a tendency to `read' cause in terms of economic determinism. This type of reading is largely fostered by the relatively backward state of the Naga economy, when viewed from a certain vantage-point, as seen in B.Datta Ray's statement: "The tribal insurgency is a militant assertion for a share of limited economic resources (1989:vii). However, this assertation seems to be absent in the Naga `insurgent consciousness', as seen in the refusal by `Okra' villages to accept any economic/developmental assistance, and also in the refusal to hire out their labour to the Government, even when facing severe economic hardships. Naga `insurgent consciousness' as expressed through the `destructive' modality, including `wrecking' and `burning' does not seem to offer much economic insights either. The inability/dereliction by the `economic' to explain the process by which `insurgent consci-

ousness' (signifying a generalised rejection of authority) develops - perhaps reflects the dominance of other non-economic factors in Naga insurgency.

'Eating' and 'looting' have been seen by Guha as complementing 'wrecking' and 'burning', giving 'insurgent' violence its distinct and comprehensive character. It also marked a modality based on 'total' and integrated violence; the first pair accomplishing by expropriation what the latter did by demolition. The function of both, however, was to assist insurgency by destroying. Guha refers to Mao-Tse-tung's observation on 'eating' as a method by which peasants hit the landlords. It was therefore used as: "...an instrument of inversion and/or as a penalty imposed on their foes in order to renumerate themselves for 'public services' rendered in the cause of insurgency bears testimony to its political character." (Guha.1983b:146-7).

Eating as a means of inverting the authority of dominance, did not figure in Naga 'insurgent' violence due to the unstratified nature of Naga society (there was hardly any rack-renting, land alienation or usury), and also due to the fact that Naga 'insurgent' violence directed at non-ethnic, civil and military representatives of the Indian Government, was of a non-economic nature.

'Looting' noted by Guha as a political expression of insurgent violence can also be seen in Naga insurgency. 'Gun-thefts' noted even in the past, appears to have greatly increased, reflecting a qualitative difference brought about by the code of

insurgency. Besides the snatching of weapons, compelling sentries patrolling the streets to chain it to their bodies, there were attacks on police and military outposts, with the Naga `insurgents' making off with huge quantities of weaponry after successful raids (Nibedon,N:73-4). These activities, while sharing some similarities with the past in its form, differed in that the latter-day incidents resulted from an `insurgent consciousness', openly defiant of existing power relations, and reflected an attempt at bringing a change in dominance, which fundamentally differentiated it from the small-group, secretive character of `Gun-thefts' of the past.

Guha insists on deleting `killing' as a modality of `insurgent' violence, due to the relatively low number of deaths in `insurgencies'. Primary sources are seen by Guha as being based on hysterical accounts with a tendency to exaggerate. "Five killings in a town that took four days to sack is perhaps a fair approximation of the incidence of murder as compared to that of the other forms of struggle" (1983b:162).

Guha notes two governing principles behind `insurgent killing': `punitive' and `retributive'. `Punitive' killing derived its rationale from the exigencies of an ongoing insurrection. Its victims were those who resisted indirectly, by collaborating with the enemy, or directly by armed opposition to the insurrection. `Retributive' killing did not derive from the actuality of an uprising but from its context: "...the servant killing the master epitomised the reversal indexed by this violence" (Guha. 1983b:

164). The paucity of killings in an insurgency was seen by Guha as resulting from an inert and negative insurgent consciousness.

Naga `insurgent' killings also appear to conform to some extent with this characterisation. Most of the killings by the `insurgents' appear to be of the `punitive' type, and not an indiscriminate killing. Murkot Ramuny also corroborates by pointing out that there were only two cases in twenty years when non-Naga civilian officials were killed or injured as a result of `insurgent' violence, with both occurring when the victims were travelling in military jeeps (36). The existence of head-hunting at the time of Naga `insurgency' among some of the Naga `tribes' tends to obscure killings resulting from `insurgency' with that resulting from traditional practice, particularly when an `insurgent' also happened to belong to these `tribes'. However the initial actions following the formation of the NFG including the capture and release of seventy-eight men of the Assam Police, after relieving them of their weapons and uniforms, appear to be consistent with Guha's non-inclusion of `killing' as a modality of insurgent violence (Ramuny,M:102-3). Naga `insurgent' violence at the initial stage appears to have stopped short of killings, and to a large extent featured mainly violence on inanimate objects associated with dominance, like burning of Government offices, residences, schools, bridges, etc. Again there was a disruption of existing power relations, as seen in the return of red blankets by GBs and DBs, and the establishment of an alternate Government. Opposition towards representatives of the Indian Government often stopped short of actual violence and took on the

form of threats, as seen in the Naga who used to brandish a dagger at the then DC, Imdad Ali, in his office at Kohima every morning (Rustomji,N.K:78).

However, as pointed out by Hobesbawm, model building creates problems of pertinence, particularly in the context of societies undergoing rapid change. This caution ~~also~~ seem to apply here too. Over time, Naga `insurgent' violence featured many innovations outside Guha's typology. `Terrorism' as evident in the bombing of a number of trains, resulted in the death of many innocent people, and runs counter to Guha's depiction of insurgents' killings. These acts were however more of an isolated aberration, and was strongly condemned by the NFG. It incidentally indicates the presence of relatively autonomous groups within the insurgent camp and also of independent initiatives (Youno,A:285-7).

Guha's typology of insurgent violence appears to be more pertinent to highly stratified `feudal' type of societies, with insurgency resulting from a negation of highly developed codes reflecting dominance. Naga society without this type of dominance resulted in an `insurgency' based on the more positive assertion of an ethnic identity, without much handicap from a tradition of servility or deference. This was directed against a Government and its symbols, represented at the dawn of insurgency by predominantly non-ethnic officials.

It would be a case of missing the woods for the trees, if variations in forms of insurgent violence obscured the underlying principle common to both Guha's study and Naga `insurgency'.

Guha's depiction of the forms of insurgent violence resulted from an attempt at retrieving its political character, which fundamentally set this violence apart from crime. The attempt at establishing a political character was necessitated due to the `successful cognitive failure' of `elite historiography' which could/did not distinguish between crime (including crime of an economic nature) and insurgent violence, characterised by its `public', `collective', `destructive' and `total' modalities; modalities which with some variations, were also present in Naga `insurgent' violence, as described above.

The political character of Naga `insurgent' violence, including `terrorism', was not doubted due to the presence of a visible `modern' leadership and politics, but has been seen narrowly as resulting from this `modern' politics alone. The participation of Naga villagers who did not understand much of this `modern' politics is then seen as resulting from `elite' manipulation. It is in this context that Guha's establishment of a `politics' from what was seen as `pre-political' peasant insurrections, and its relevance, even in `modern' insurgency, becomes obvious. It is by complementing `modern politics' with this other politics that a deeper insight can be had in the study of Naga `insurgency'.

Thus while there are divergences from Guha's modalities in the case of Naga `insurgent' violence, reflecting the presence of `modern' politics (as seen in the relative preponderance of killings in relation to burning, wrecking, eating, and looting). It however does not detract from Guha's contribution towards an understanding of the "politics of the people" and establishing them as subjects of their own history.

SOLIDARITY-2.4.

Guha saw insurgency as being based on two closely related patterns of corporate behaviour: Emulation and Solidarity. Emulation was the process by which insurgency spread from one area to another area. The ways in which people imitated others and turned insurgent themselves. It was emulation which gave rise to metaphors in the official mind of contagion, infection, etc., and also the related notion of spontaneity (Guha,1981b:167-8).

Guha emphatically rejects the notion of spontaneity, affirming Gramsci's view that pure spontaneity did not exist in history (Gramsci:196, in Guha.1983b:4-5). The mistake about spontaneity was seen as resulting from the idea that consciousness is limited to the consciousness of modern political concepts, and/or modern political organisations. The absence of this type of conscious ness and/or political organisation in an insurrection, results in its relegation to a category as unconsciousness or pre-political. A tendency which is both elitist and mistaken (Guha,R.1983b:4-5). Ironically, Guha has been accused of espousing spontaneity as a method. Spontaneity is seen in this view as, "...action on the basis of traditional consciousness" (Sangeeta Singh,*et al.*4), reflecting an elitist modernist bias.

Guha sees in emulation a political consciousness, expressed as solidarity. It (emulation) represented the rebel's consciousness of his own activity: "solidarity is in other words a figure of his self consciousness." Secondly, emulation reflects a consc-

iousness of this activity (insurgency) as a consciousness, separate and distinct from that of his enemies (Guha, 1983b:169).

Solidarity was thus a categorical imprint of peasant (subaltern) consciousness, and its nature had to be understood to account for the apparent spontaneity of many peasant uprisings. Solidarity, however, was seen to vary from one event to another in quality, and again from phase to phase within the same event, depending on its content. Subaltern studies thus had its problematic in relating the nature of solidarity to the character of peasant uprisings.

In Naga `insurgency', solidarity has been obscured by the existence of both modern political concepts and organisation. The NNC has been seen as solely responsible for Naga `insurgency' as seen in K.R.Singh's statement: "Right in the interior where a Naga knows little about anything in the outside world, he knows the word Independence now well enough in his own way" (62-3).

Knowledge of the word Independence is then seen as a confirmation of ideas of elite manipulation. But a closer examination reveals chinks in this formulation. Like in Guha's study the inability to explain the actual mechanics of mobilisation leads to the recruitment of metaphors in many accounts of Naga `insurgency' also. Phizo comes across in these accounts as a farmer, sowing the seeds of violence and discontent (Ramuny,M:70), or an evil scientist, culturing germs of discord through the Church and Schools (Singh,K.R:62-3).

However, one is also informed that people's idea of Independence was vague:

> He little understands its meaning, because he would always say in the same breath that he was most loyal to Government and at the same time wanted independence for the Nagas. He could discover no contradiction in his position. (Singh,K.R:63)

Apparently Phizo could not get his ideas across to the people. It would be quite ridiculous to belive that people armed with this idea (or ideas) of Independence could be mobilised as K.R.Singh obviously belives; "With the word Independence sunk into every Naga's mind any how, Phizo's task became easy. He had only to nuture and bring up the germs to spread the diseases the way he liked" (ibid).

Phizo is seen as instigating `insurgency' by using traditional inter-village disputes, and diverting it into a fight against the Indian Armed forces (Elwin,V.1961:55, Ramunny,M:72-3). The question as to whether this diversion also reflected a shift in the `consciousness' of Naga villagers is rendered non-problematical due to a belief in elite manipulation. The opposed thesis where `popular politics' aligns and also deviates from elite (modern) politics, in terms of aims, methods, etc., hardly finds mention despite certain aspects which seems to indicate this possibility. Somewhere around 1956, after `insurgency' had resulted in the induction of the Army, moderate Naga leaders sent an Ao- "...Imti Onen to the Ao area to convince the people about the futility of violence. Imti Onen was not very successful" (Ramunny M:92).

This was despite the fact that the villagers desired an end to the suffering. The inability of most accounts of Naga `insurgency' to account for this kind of incongruities can perhaps be seen as resulting from a neglect of the other type of politics seen in solidarity; its interaction with `elite' or `modern' politics over time. It would perhaps be more useful to see Naga `insurgency' as being shaped by the interaction of this `traditional' and `modern politics, with both interacting upon each other in many ways, and also changing over time. At times complementing, or at times leading the other, while at times antagonistic, and also at times, featuring both complementary and antagonistic aspects simultaneously.

Two positive ethnic processes can be discerned among the Nagas, consequent to the extension of British administration over a part of the Naga inhabited areas. Firstly, it can be seen as arresting a process of ethnic fusion and fission. Incipient `tribal' feeling (like that noted by J.P.Mills among the Aos) was concretised into relatively distinct and stable `tribal' identities, and represented the now objective reality of `tribes': Angamis, Aos, Lothas, Semas, etc. This was also overtly manifested by the emergence of individual `Tribal' Councils. Secondly, facilitated by the similarity of their situation and the existence of interactions at various levels between these `tribes'; a composite Naga identity could emerge. The emergence of these two levels of identity can be seen as resulting from certain objective characteristics and also the subjective selection of symbols around which identity was organised. This consolidation of iden-

tities at the two levels was a reaction as well as an expression of solidarity, to changes brought by colonialism, and in this sense, was imposed from outside. (Based on Jah, S.N.1983: Ch.12).

Identity and solidarity at these two levels differed in terms of intensity, exhibiting a relatively stronger quality at the level of `tribe' than at the composite Naga level. This can be seen as reflecting the relatively increased interaction (both qualitatively and quantitatively) at the level of `tribe' than at the secondary level `Naga' identity. It also seems to indicate the importance of subjective parameters, based on traditional interactional networks: kinship ties (both real and ritual), language, myths, and also ties resulting from co-residence, etc., in determining the quality of identity at the two levels. These factors, which to a large extent shaped the contours of Naga `insurgency', is however largely neglected in approaches which views identity narrowly as an imposition from without. Perhaps it would not be too difficult to see the strength of the Naga identity as to a large extent, dependent on the alignment within it, of the various `tribal' identities. An alignment facilitated by the absence of much differentiations, common cultural ideological features and features and shared political history of domination.

The positive assertion, in terms of a composite Naga identity, was relatively weaker than that based on the more primordial referent of `tribe' due to the relative paucity of interactions at this level. Interaction here was mainly between

adjoining `tribes', which was reinforced by the emergent educated Nagas, Mission activities, and the support of British administrators. Naga solidarity was therefore composite, determined by the convergence of solidarities at various levels. It is from this perspective that the occassional breaks in Naga solidarity (seen as tribalism), as well as those within the `tribe' (in terms of villages, khels, etc.), resulting from `counter-insurgency' operations, can be better appreciated.

A negative process of identity formation can also be discerned, both at the composite Naga as well as the `tribal' level. While the boundaries demarcating the `tribes' was not so exclusive, nor permanent over time, as pointed out by Edmund Leach in his critique of the `tribal' assumptions in Hutton's and Mill's monographs. (From Chaube,S.K.1972:30). This classification was based on the then subjective perception of the Nagas themselves. In the case of the Aos, J.P.Mills noted the existence of a "tribal feeling" which excluded even those who shared the same myth of origin, or again even those who spoke a dialect closely related to Chongli. He noted that; "...a very sharp distinction is drawn between Aos and those so unfortunate as to be born of another race" (Mills, J.P. 1926: 2. 176). N.K.Das, while subscribing to Fried's hypothesis "...that most tribes have developed as distinct socio-political entities in reaction to the formation of complex political structures around them", qualifies it, pointing out that schisms and breaks in unity at several stages in its development, strategy and tactics, does not fit into this framework (1972:41). An incongruity which perhaps reflect the neglect of the subjective selection of options.

Guha, noting the alliance between the Santal "tribals" and the "non-tribal" Dom caste in the hool of 1855, reads it as an instance of class solidarity triumphing over ethnicity. He also points out that class solidarity and other solidarities are not mutually exclusive. "Their boundaries overlap in most cases." The predominance of one or the other elements, tends to determine the basic character of any given movement (Guha, 1983b:188,169). The convergence of different Naga `tribes' then can be seen as being overdetermined by Naga ethnic solidarity, which overlapped with `tribal' level solidarities.

In addition to the sharp distinction drawn between different Naga `tribes', there was another negative definition of identity based on "the outsiders" ("the British" and "the Indian plainsmen") a common factor both at the level of the tribe as well as the secondary Naga level (Das,N.K. 1989:127). N.K.Das however does not elaborate as to whether this conception of the "Outsider" was uniform throughout the Naga `tribes', or again, on whether there was any qualitative difference in perception, towards the British vis-a-vis the "Indian plainsman".

Perhaps it would not be very inaccurate to posit the existence of two different categories of the outsiders in the Nagas' cognitive system, reflecting the nature of interaction within the colonial relations of power. In the first place, the Indian plainsman as outsider would have been shaped by the numerous instances of exploitation, and also the plainsman's attitude towards them, reflecting the caste ideology[15]. On the other hand, the British as outsider would have registered as the

dominant social class in colonial India, dominating even ~~over~~ the plainsman. Exploitation by the British as in the tea gardens almost invariably would have been mediated by the Indian contractors. In this context it is not very surprising that appropriation of symbols of dominance was directed mainly against the British, while there was a strong antipathy on the part of the Nagas towards the people of the plains, described by J.P.Mills as: "...contempt - not unmixed with fear of his (the plainsman's) exceeding cunning" (1926:5). Conversion to Christianity and also the British administrator's deep knowledge of Naga culture, therefore brought about a contradictory perception of British dominance in the Naga mind[16]. Again the sense of identity, based on a negation of the outsider would have been relatively weaker among the Nagas in the unadministered area, than that of Nagas in the Naga hills district with a longer and more sustained exposure to colonial dominance.

Following Guha, the negative definition of identity, in terms of the `otherness' of the outsiders can be seen as representing one polar end of ethnicity, with the other end represented by the assertion of a positive self-identity in terms of the primary level `tribal' identities (i.e., Angami, Ao, Sema, etc)., which aligned with the secondary level Naga identity (Guha,1983b: 173-4). The expression of ethnic solidarity was seen as assuming the form of armed collaboration, located between these two polar ends (ibid).

The depiction of Naga society in terms of hostile, isolated villages, perpetually at war with each other, runs counter to

evidence of inter-village networks, as seen in the loose knit leagues of villages which helped out each other in head-hunting days, or the intensive network of kinship ties, both real and ritual; Networks which facilitated inter-village solidarity, as seen in the Khonoma village led alliance of thirteen villages in response to colonial extension. According to N.K.Das: "Whenever a situation to defend all or several tribal groups arises, they join to deal with the situation in a co-operative manner" (1989: 124). The horizontal nature of this mobilisation and its political character has also been acknowledged. N.K.Das, in his description of ritual kinship among the Aos, notes its function of developing potential alliances and economic ties. These links existed not only within the village, nor confined only within the Aos, but also beyond the tribe. Again he also notes that these ties were not only between individuals, but also between clans and even entire villages. (1989:115) In the context of this `traditional politics', it is not very difficult to understand invitations by Aos to Changs, Yimchungers,"...to lay ambushes, terrorise their people and fight in their area with Government and loyal Nagas." (Singh,K.R. 42) These seem to reflect the horizontal type of mobilisation featured in Naga `insurgency', in contrast to the `top-down' type of command structure of modern organisations. The imbrication of this type of politics of the NNC can perhaps be seen as giving Naga `insurgency' its mass character.

Solidarity in Naga `insurgency' did not develop on the basis of class consciousness, though objectively, the Nagas constituted

a class in itself. The strong emphasis on ethnic identity prevented the emergence of alliances with the neighbouring tribes. This however is seen by Guha as,"...the beginnings, if no more than that, of a recognition of their identity as a class-for-itself." (1983b:93) This type of approach seems to be consistent with the fact that different `insurgent' groups have been co-ordinated in the region at present, reflecting the growth of a more mature consciousness.

Solidarity based on the `tribe' can be seen in the dispersion of insurgent groups, and the tendency to operate within their own tribal areas. (Varma,B:138) On the other hand, Naga `insurgency' also featured large scale convergence of `insurgent' groups at a particular tribal area,particularly at the initial phase, as seen in the attack on Kohima (Ramuny,M:99-101). This duality clearly reflects the co-existence of traditional patterns of solidarity, as well as the co-ordination on modern lines, effected by the NFG.

Solidarity did not lead to armed collaboration on a mass scale. Naga villagers though largely behind the `insurgents', did not resort to armed struggle en-mass, but gave food, clothes, money, etc., and also informed the `insurgents' of raids (Namo,D:56-7). The absence of a mass uprising can perhaps be seen as resulting out of problems of feeding and sheltering large forces without sacrificing mobility and speed (cf,Arnold,D.1982: 133). Again, it can also be seen as reflecting the limited objectives of resisting domination as perceived at the level of the village, due to the thinly spread administration. In this

context, it is interesting to note that six of the seven `Okra' Ao villages, mentioned by K.R.Singh are those in close proximity to the sub-divisional headquarter, Mokokchung, established in 1889-90, and hence, according to him should have been more, "...loyal, advanced literate and disciplined, more so than other villages" (73).

Ethnic considerations can also be seen in the NFG policy. Different`tribal' names were used for naming various positions in the NFG; The word `Oking' (Headquarters) was derived from the Lotha/Naga, `Tatar' (Parliamentarian) from the Ao/Naga,`Ahng' (Governor) from the Konyak/Naga, etc (Ramunny.M:87). Again it was mainly Sema/Nagas who broke away from the NFG, to form the `Revolutionary Government' near Satakha, within Sema inhabited area (Nibedon,N:228). An instance where `tribal' solidarity diverged from the secondary level Naga solidarity.

Solidarity at both the Naga and `tribal' level derived its strenght from ethnic identities, perhaps it would not be very inaccurate to see politics at the Naga level as predominantly based on modern politics, and `tribal' politics from tradition. This convergence can perhaps be seen as giving Naga `insurgency' its comprehensive and at times divisive character.

Solidarity was seen by Guha as producing an ethic - an instrument as well as an expression of communal solidarity - based on the "will of the many"; a representation of popular conscience, on the basis of which communal sanction were applied in either cultural or physical forms. (Guha.R,1983b:188-91). Accounts of

Naga `insurgency' also seems to indicate the presence of both types, directed mainly against the DBs and GBs, but at times even on entire khels and villages. Sanctions which did not draw the line at killing, particularly during the height of `insurgency', reflecting a lowered threshold of tolerance and outrage brought about by violations of this ethic. These sanctions were applied not only by the `insurgents' themselves, but also by Naga villages, or number of villages (see K.R.Singh, part iii for instance of sanction application)[17].

Solidarity was sought by the insurgents in the form of "insurgent peasant communication" (IPC) and, according to Guha, expressed both a call for help and also a threat, in the event of a negative response. It was open and public, addressed to potential allies, in which the addresser and the addressee were linked in a non-antagonistic relationship. IPC was seen as,"...a public demonstration of the will of an armed mass of the peasantry to impose itself peremptorily and by force if necessary, on vacillators and fence-sitters" (1983b:193-4). IPC was therefore sharply contrasted with its binary pair: "anonymous threatening letters" (ATL) which was secretive and directed at enemies. The two therefore constituted seperate domains.

The text of communication between Naga `insurgents' and villagers has not found mention and, thereby prevents the corroboration or otherwise with IPC. Most accounts of Naga `insurgency' mentions the use of force to gain compliance from the villagers. K.R. Singh mentions that the youths had upsurped the authority of

the elders in the village (78). M.Rumunny also mentions that: "they (the NNC) cut at the roots of Naga traditional society" (75). The use of force to generate solidarity, however, was not a new feature brought by 'insurgency'. M.M.Clark mentions the prevention of about a hundred persons from Merangkong village, from joining their newly established christian village, through what she described as: "shut the door". A result of the many external threats faced by Merangkong at that time (21).

Thus appeals for solidarity, backed by force as a function of the corporate character seems to have been present in the past as well as in the present context of 'insurgency'. It would be a one-sided reading to see solidarity as resulting solely through the use of force. While cases of conscription and kidnapping was not unknown, this mode of recruitment was abandoned in favour of "persuasion" and voluntary enlistment (Horam,M:71). N.K.Das writing in 1989, noted the persistence of traditional village authority structures (121), which seems to preclude any major dislocation.

The use of posters with message like; "Outsiders (Indians) let us seperate as friends and let us live like good neighbours", "Indians it is better to go home from Nagaland without delay", "Nagaland is for Nagas" (from, Imti.A:70), appear to have combined aspects of Guha's IPC and ATL. It can be seen as seeking solidarity among the Nagas by stressing the positive and negative aspects of ethnic identity, while at the same time conveying a veiled threat to outsiders. Nagas in Government offices were singled out and threatened through posters and letters, (somewhat

in line with Guha's ATL) and also publicly denounced at meetings, sometimes attacked and killed (Elwin,V.1961:54). However, these Naga Government employees appears to have occupied an ambigious position in `insurgent consciousness', as evident by the absence of any consistent policy towards them. Again,the fact that many of these employees were sympathetic towards the `insurgents' cause (Anand,V.K:105), precludes a clear-cut categorisation in binary terms like solidarity/betrayal. (A fact pointed out by David Arnold on "collaboration").

"Pressing" as a means of solidarity, was based on a show of large numbers, moral prestige of solidarity and public authority, to get vacillators on their side and thereby had an unifying function, not punishment (Guha.1983b:195ff). Naga `insurgency' also seems to have adopted `pressing' to build up support. Representatives from all Ao villages were invited for a meeting at Longmisa village (20th Oct, 1964), by the NFG. Prime Minister, Khugato and six hundred guards in uniforms (GBs were asked not to bring the red-blanket). A vote for Independence was called by asking all the representatives favouring it to stand. All stood, and were later shown the arms and equipments of the NFG (Ramunny, M:187). `Solidarity' here seems to have been achieved by the combination of large numbers, moral prestige and public authority, while appealing to the mutuality of interest through a mixture of intimidation and persuasion.

The use of force to generate solidarity, seen by the peasants enemies solely in terms of coercion, is according to Guha, a one-

sided mis-representation. He points out that even the most revolutionary classes are never uniform in their readiness for armed insurrection, and that the "...difference in the degree of militancy between the advanced and backwards sections determines the extent to which rebel solidarity is likely to be more or less voluntary" (1983b:197-98). He also points out that in the event of an uprising, it is the radical elements who initiates action and builds up support, and in this context is primarily an instrument of solidarity, of unification, not punishment (ibid).

However, these public meetings were not entirely one-sided with the addresser and addressee clearly defined as in the case of the IPC. Naga villagers who did not participate in the armed struggle, did not remain passively as addressees, to be addressed by the armed `insurgents'. They also often addressed the `insurgents', even on issues regarding the conduct of the `insurgents' themselves. They at times questioned the acceptance of foreign assistance, and also at times defied the writ of the `insurgents' themselves, regarding their relations with the Indian Government (Ramunny,M:187,219). The moral authority engendered by this form of public involvement is most clearly seen in the imposition of quotas for "volunteers", food, clothes, money, etc., by the `insurgents upon the villagers. There was at one time an unwritten rule that every family offer a son to join the movement (Horam,M:71).

It is in the context of a popular conscience, that Guha locates the "insurgent's notion of betrayal", resulting from `passive' or `active' collaboration with the enemy. Passive coll-

aboration was the refusal to resist the enemy and/or refusing to join the insurgents. Active collaboration, was exemplified by the persistence in relations of subalternity, or the acceptance of new relations of dominance - a "double displacement". (the displacement of an old relations of dominance through insurgency and the emergence of a new relations of dominance, ie.,the position of a collaborator, resulting from the context of the insurgency itself. Guha.1983b:203ff). However, in concrete situations, these analytic divisions fail to fit convincingly[18].

The strong opposition by the NFG towards the continuation of the posts of DBs and GBs, led to the surrender of red-blankets by many of the incumbents, and also the killing of many recalcitrant DBs and GBs (reflecting Guha's notion of active collaboration). However,the `Okra' village `Mokongsu' presents an odd spectacle. This village, according to K.R.Singh would not have any new GBs- in line with the NFG wishes - but when forced by the Government, "...produced some old useless people or notoriously bad youngsters for appointment as their headmen" (76). A situation which can be understood as `passive collaboration' (by the `insurgents') or even, passive resistance.

`Double displacement' can also be seen in the acceptance of new relations of dominance; The acceptance of Statehood by a section of Nagas, in direct opposition to the will of the insurgents. This `active collaboration' however did not evoke a consistent response on the part of the Naga `insurgents'. The killing of Dr.Imkongliba, the Chairman of the interim body, Naga Peoples'

Convention (Youno.A:244), while corroborating Guha's depiction of the insurgents' notion of active `collaboration' as betrayal, does not explain the absence of much response on the part of the Naga `insurgents', to the wide-spread entry of Nagas into the State Government, or, the paradoxical situation of Naga Government employees, supporting the `insurgents'. Reality does not appear to have been sharply polarised in the Naga `insurgent consciousness', unlike in Guha's account.

On the other hand, these contradictions seems to indicate the presence of `traditional politics' and its restraining effect on `modern politics'. M.Horam also notes the cognition of these contradictions by the `insurgent' leaders:

> When impatient nationalist youth wonder loudly and angrily why traitors and renegades are allowed to go scot-free the older nationalist leaders have soothed them by making them see that it does not pay in the long run to alienate one's own people by needless savagery when they have the heart of most of them (73).

Considering the specific context of domination and resistance in Naga `insurgency', it can be said that Nagas serving under the State Government would not be seen as collaborators, from the perspective of `traditional politics', unlike from a `modernist' vantage. Acting on the basis of this modern political outlook then would have resulted in a split between the `modern' and `traditional' forms of politics, which can be seen as modifying Naga `insurgent' actions. The leniency of Naga `insurgency' then can be seen as reflecting the presence and moderating effect of `traditional' politics.

TRANSMISSION-2.5.

A rebellion is seen from two polar positions- as a collective enterprise, or, in terms of an infection and/or conspiracy. This difference, "...symbolised an epistemological and political opposition between ruler and ruled" (Guha,1983b:231). The authorities tended to view the rapid spread of insurgency over disparate groups without any common grievances through metaphors of diseases, infections, etc. Again, this rapidity gave insurgency a `spontaneous' character which was at times, was mistaken for `simultaneity' and therefore conspiracy. This mistake of "preconcertation" (as Gramsci puts it) was present in many peasants revolts, including the Sicilian Vespers; the Great - Fear over France as noted by Lefebvre; and also India. The Sepoy Mutiny saw the British trying to establish a relationship between the large scale peasant participation and the earlier mysterious circulation of chapatis over most North Indian villages. A result of the mistaken reading of a symbol for an index to a conspiracy.

Naga `insurgency' also has been seen in similar terms, as is best exemplified in V.K.Anand. There is according to Guha, "...an element of truth in this fantasy of `preconcertation'" reflecting an intuitive recognition of an organising principle at work behind insurgency, but due to its `top-down' perspective, results in the false attribution of conspiracy (1983b:224-5).

It is a "truism" as Andre Bettille says, that "...people who are divided in every respect cannot be made to feel that they are one by the mere will of the leaders of a political party" (1974:

192). The participation of a large numbers in peasants revolts, without any links to the original cause of a revolt, would then point to an organising principle other than conspiracy. Guha points out Mao-Tse-tung's observations on peasant's `localism', and agrees that disparate elements entered the conflict for no other reason than the open and overbearing presence of colonial power, in a sharply polarised rural society (1983b:225-6), marked by a highly charged atmosphere, social ferment and the anticipation of yet to be defined portents.

Violence in this sort of situation tended to generalise through a process of "encapsulation": "No pre-existing tension or dispute remains outside the scope of the insurrection ...all antagonism starts functioning as if in an altogather new context" It was this process which gave rise to ideas of contagion (Guha, 1983b:223-4).

In a way `society' as studied by Guha closely resembled Naga society at the onset of `insurgency', and perhaps indicates the probable presence of similar modes of `transmission'. Both were `pre-literate'cultures slowly transiting towards literacy, and implied that `insurgent' communication depended more on the spoken than, written mode.[19] Again it depended not only on speech, but also on other `aural' and `visual' mediums, some which complemented speech, while others were independent, acting as a surrogate of human speech.[20] They also varied in terms of `time', indicating the past, present, and, as in the case of `omens' had a predictive function (Guha,1983b:228,242). The fact

that these mediums, embedded within the culture that produced them, rendered it totally unintelligible to the authorities, emphasised the distance between ruler and ruled. In this kind of situation an apparently innococous factor (as seen by the authorities) can easily spark off an insurrection.

The lack of much knowledge of Naga culture by the administrators and armed forces of the newly Independent Indian Government, have circumscribed detailed accounts of the modes of 'insurgent transmission',and also, the hopes and fears as projected through rumours, omens etc., in the 'collective consciousness' of the Nagas. However, a symptomatic reading seem to yield insights on the 'consciousness' behind Naga 'insurgency'.

V.K.Anand mentions the use of:"...bugle like noise to confound the ISF." (Indian Security Force:210), and also other 'aural' and 'visual' modes of communication by Naga 'insurgents'. Aural means included;"bird-calls": which could be distinguished and decoded only by another Naga; The village Xylophones (Log-drums) which triggered off a chain-reaction in other villages. Visual signs included : certain patterns of arranging branches, leaves, twigs, etc., and also smoke-signals and heliography. There also was a system of dispatch, including relays, however without much accounts of the message carried, except that at times it was unsigned - implying a written mode - and again oral messages. All these were lumped togather as: "...coded messages to be understood by the Nagas alone" (Anand.V.K:106-7).

This description reflects an attempt at understanding the unfamiliar in terms of familiar conventions, and indicates the

divide between the contestants. The bugle like noise, seen in military terms as a means of demoralising the opponent, perhaps reflected its effect, not the intentions behind it. Such aural instruments were often a means of mobilisation for communal hunting, fishing, etc., in many `tribal' cultures and were often adopted in insurrections to mobilise or warn people of approaching troops (Guha,1983b:228-9).

The use of the Village Xylophones, found among some Naga `tribes' appears to be more opaque as to the nature of message transmitted. However, its religious and communal significance is obvious considering its close association with head-hunting in the past. It was also sounded during ominous events like the rare eclipse of the sun or moon, events which vividly exposed their helplessness and vulnerability, when confronted by the unknown (Mills,J.P,1926:76ff,299). In this context, perhaps it can be seen as indicative of the sense of crisis brought about by the confrontation. The chain-reaction triggered off by its use in other villages during Naga `insurgency' also reflects the expression of intra, and inter village solidarity somewhat reminiscent of of the `Night cries' in the Pabna bidroha of 1873 (cf.,Guha,1983b:250).

Some of the visual signs mentioned by V.K.Anand closely resembles oracles consulted by the Nagas to determine the viability of a planned attack. These oracles included watching how small wood chips fell, as practiced by the Chang and Lotha Nagas (Mills.J.P,1926:294). Again branches, twigs etc., were laid on village paths to prevent malevolent spirits, (and

apparently the British too) from coming to their villages (Woodthorpe,R.G,1969:58). It would appear that the forces of `counter-insurgency' were accorded the same treatment too.

While symbols of the predictive type (Omens) has not found mention in accounts of Naga `insurgency', preventing a detailed analysis (a la, Guha's analysis of chapatis in relation to the mass character of the Sepoy Mutiny), this type of omens were not unknown in Naga traditions. J.P.Mills mentions a case which resulted in a wide spread fear, and the observation of `amungs' (sabbathicals) by many Naga `tribes'. This incident which started among some persons of the Chang `tribe' spread rapidly over the Aos, Semas, and others before it died down (1926:255). B.B.Ghosh notes that the Nagas were mentally prepared for the eventuality of war, evidenced by the fact that every Naga home had large stocks of salt, enough to last for years. He also mentions that this started a few years prior to 1952, long before the actual outbreak of violence (Ghosh.B.B:166), but unfortunately, does not mention how this `hoarding' began. It therefore remains unclear as to whether it resulted from an organised campaign to hoard salt by the Naga `insurgent' leadership! or from other reasons like rumours, symbols of the predictive type, etc. (see Guha, 1983b:238ff, for predictive symbols). However this type of preparedness, indicates the state of `consciousness' which facilitated the creation of a fifteen thousand strong army within a short period, following the formation of the NFG (Alemchiba, M. 1970:184).

The presence of traditional rituals and practices does not warrant the inclusion of Naga `insurgency' along with other Millenarian or Messianic movements (e.g.,Fuchs.S:17-18,127). Naga `insurgency' did not result from the remembrance of a `Golden-Age' or a renewed interest in traditional religion, or a desire for spiritual goods from heaven[21] (ibid : 1). David Arnold cites C.Levi Strauss that religion and myths are not devices to turn back on reality, but functions as a way of storing information about the world and rationalising the situation around them. `Oracles' did not lead to any excessive `semantic slides' but was firmly based on the pragmatic mission of resisting the enemy. Religion also helped in positively strenghtening a sense of identity and infused new courage as well as solidarity. It also heightened, negatively the difference with the plainsmen, and in this way promoted `insurgency' (based on Arnold.D,1982:121, and Guha,1983b:243ff).

Guha has noted that `pre-literate' people often related to the written word in ways as to destroy its original motivations, deverbalising it and providing the resultant opacity with new signifieds (1983b:248). Thus the written word and at times, even articles related to it, figured prominently in many peasants' revolts, endowed with a magical or occult quality similar to the spoken utterances of possessed oracles. The Santal Hool of 1855, derived its authority and mobilised on the basis of blank pieces of paper, believed to have fallen from heaven (1983b:248-9).

A leaflet issued by the NFG on the 22nd of March 1956, mentioned the approval by the "Free Nagas of Nagaland, (ie.,the

previously unadministered Tuensang Area) as well as by the NNC on behalf of the "British subject Nagas" and even The "Father of the Indian Nation, Mahatma Gandhi" towards the claim of Independence. It also mentioned that the news of the creation of the Naga federal Government had been sent,"...directly and immediately" to the UNO and also the Indian Government (Anand.V.K,99). While these leaflets gave a big boost to mobilisation from various sections of the Nagas (Horam.M:69), the manner in which this was accomplished, considering the largely illiterate Naga population, has not found much mention. Anand however mentions that the signature of these leaflets by a "Hongkin",(head of the NFG) unfamiliar, even to most Nagas caused much excitement and wild speculations, as if it was, "...a Tarzan or Superman who had just landed on the surface of the Earth" (ibid). This attempt at conveying the impact of these leaflets on the Naga mind, seems to indicate the existence of a similar structure of attitude towards the `written word', even in Naga `insurgency'.

The attitude of the Nagas towards the `written word' was more complex than in the `society' as portrayed by Guha. This complexity resulted from the varying levels of exposure to formal education of a small but significant section, again unevenly spread over the various Naga `tribes', and their interaction with the larger Naga society. It must be pointed out that most of these `educated' Nagas had only a rudimentary exposure to formal education. In this context, the NFG leaflets referring to Mahatma Gandhi, the UNO, etc., must have had a far greater authority than the mere information it conveyed, in the minds of the Naga

populace. However, the ways in which they related to it is not documented at present.[22]

Oral transmission, both authored and anonymous, probably was one of the most important medium shaping the consciousness of the Nagas. Guha points out that `speech' was one of the major component of a leader's charisma, and often comprised, "...words and expressions which had their referents in a universe beyond the lived, practical domain of an insurrection...". This attempt at changing the conditions of this world was also seen as a kind of `other-worldliness'. Most leaders spoke in the inspired languages of prophets and reformers, couched almost invariably in sacred idioms (1983b:250-51).

At a formal level, Naga insurgency was not `spontaneous' due to the presence of the NNC, theoretically including all the Nagas within its ambit (Youno.A:161). Gramsci used this term to indicate peasants rising where leadership could not be determined due to their inability to transcend their social stratum, and thereby leaving behind no documentary evidence (196-97). This concept perhaps, can be extended, retaining the original meaning used by Gramsci even in the case of a `modern' party led movement, with identified leadership and also much documentation. This perhaps can be achieved by showing aspects which at times deviates, or contradict the expected patterns of behaviour of a `modern' part led movement and reading it as indicative of `an other' embedded movement, overlooked or unaccounted, in most documentations of the event. It is this `spontaneity' which is



sought to be dispersed by uncovering the `logic' behind it.

The predominance of Christian leaders in Naga `insurgency', often with mission school backgrounds, and their involvement in Church activities has resulted in accusations against the Church. This has also been reinforced by the mass conversion to Christianity during this period (V.K.Anand, K.R.Singh, et al.). This idea of a Church led conspiracy resulted from its contingent position in the spread of education among the Nagas, and the interaction of educated Nagas from different `tribes' in Church activities. Udayon Mishra's study of Imkongmeren, the NNC Vice-President clearly shows that the Church and religion was not the basis for Naga politics, even though it imparted a certain religious outlook (1988:41-2). The large participation of `traditionalists' in Naga `insurgency' also seems to preclude religious chauvinism.At the same time there was a `religiosity' in the attitude of Naga leaders stemming from the deep inner convictions about the justness of their undertaking[23] (ibid). This same conviction is also evident in a small verbatim compilation of Phizo's speech, and seems to echo Guha's characterisation of insurgent leaders as reformers and prophets.

Phizo's speech can be said to have struck a chord in the audience, going beyond the words uttered. A feeling which was complemented by his dramatic presence- a very visible inner conviction, heightened by a paralytic face, resulting from British imprisonment. Phizo spoke in a captivating allegorical manner, drawing upon vivid examples. At times he stressed the contrast between "...a nation of idol worshipers" with the Naga's

Christian and traditional religions, cultural practices, at times alluded to hard times and sacrifices, from which the Nagas would emerge a better nation, "...just as gold has to be refined by being burned again and again." He would also write down the names of people in his diary, whenever he saw an impressive tree or boulder in their land, saying: "Trees are our wealth, Rocks and boulders are our wealth, take care not to destroy them." (From a collection between 1955-56, by Angami,F:86-90).

However, the ways in which his popularity among the Nagas was shaped, or in other words, the ways in which he registered in the Naga mind is at best sketchy.

The fact that most Nagas did not understand `modern' political ideas and issues, but which at the same time, partly determined their actions, has also strenghtened ideas of conspiracy and/or manipulation, by the emergent elites. However this perspective results in an inability to account for inconsistencies caused by the initiatives of the Nagas, and reflects an ideological view of peasants as basically innocent, inert, passive, etc.

It would be more accurate to see the relation between the Nagas and their leaders in bi-directional terms, rather than the uni-directionality implicit in manipulation. The leaders also articulated not just in terms of a nexus with the traditional elites (cf.,Datta Ray.B,1989:43-4), but also that, which many Nagas felt but could not express (cf.,Mishra.U,1988:26-7). While an element of manipulation can be imputed (as in Phizo's theatrics of writing down names of owners of trees and boulders), he

was also articulating a primeval feeling, resulting from a close inter-relationship with the environment. It is highly possible that his emphasis could have touched on a deeply seated fear of imminent loss of all that was familiar.[24]

Naga `insurgency' has been located at various levels. Some have seen it as usurping the traditional authority structures, by modern elements (M.Ramunny, K.R.Singh. et al). However, S.K.Chaube saw it as a traditionalist's reaction to change, in sharp opposition to modern elements! B.Datta Ray, on the other hand reads it as a nexus between the traditional and modern elites. However, all these contradictory versions seems to share an underlying ideological view of the peasantry as an inert and innocent object, incapable of acting on their own and helplessly subject to the schemes and manipulations of the elites.

Udayon Mishra points out that the educated Nagas did not come from any particular strata, but represented a cross-section of the traditional Naga society, who retained strong traditional links with their ancestral villages (1986:26-7). Mobilisation by the educated Nagas then would have been articulated at various levels of the traditional structure, based more in terms of traditional politics: of solidarity and corporate behaviour. This approach to modernisation appears more consistent with the inability of educated Nagas, at times, to secure the compliance of the Naga villagers as mentioned above.

Naga identity, then can be seen as being shaped simultaneously by two main process. Manipulation and also articulation by the

Naga leadership (cf.Kakar.S, 1992); a result, and also outcome of the situation in which both leaders and followers found themsel ves (cf.Fuchs,S.1965:5), but at the same time, the result of a conscious selection from available options (cf.Downs,F.S, 1983:11ff).

The other type of spoken messages was anonymous in terms of origins, but at the same time was greatly instrumental in the `transmission' of `insurgency'. Guha notes the obsession of the authorities with rumours: In the Roman Empire; (an entire cadre of officials collected and reported rumours) The Kautilian State; the Colonial bureaucracy (1983b:251-52), and also in post-Independent India. This obsession attests to the subversive power of rumour, besides creating panic, but also in sparking off riots and intensifying it. Rumour thus had, besides its alarmist aspects, a positive function in mobilising, frightening those against whom it was aimed and also spreading the message of revolt among the people.

> Rumor proved to be a powerful vehicle of the hopes and fears, of visions of doomsdays and golden ages,of secular objectives and religious longings, all which made up the stuff that fired the minds of men (Guha.1983b:256).

Guha attributes rumour an identity as a type of popular discourse, due to its origins, in places where people meet and correspond, with popular acts of insurrection, as best exemplified by the Sepoy Mutiny (258-9). Due to its anonymity, (even though sources are often assigned) there is no distinction between sender and receiver -from a teller to a hearer, who himself becomes a teller. Rumour is, in other words characterised by

absolute transitivity with the encoding and decoding, collapsed, unlike news, at each point of relay (ibid:257). It is thereby characterised by a "free form" - is subject to considerable modification by each speaker - and therefore, is an:

> immediate unpremediated utterance ... improvised within the rebel community not as a conscious device to rally the people but spontaneowsly, without deliberation, that is by the force of ideology alone, so far as the insurgents themselves are concerned (Guha,1983b:262).

The limits of improvisation was bounded by the relevant codes of the culture in which it operated and was explicitly political in character reflecting the rejection of domination, though shaped by pre-existing ideological codes. Rumour was seen by Guha as lying between the straussian poles of `tale' and `myth'- an intermediate form in which the mediators could be purely mythical, or empirical with mythic functions attributed to them[25] (1983b:260ff). From this perspective, Phizo can also be seen as an empirical mediator, attributed with `mythic' functions; like the ability to appear simultaneously, at more than one place. A (perhaps counter) `rumour' that half-a-dozen Nagas had undergone facial surgery was not belived (Anand.V.K:75). The second `rumour'/report can perhaps be seen as an attempt to demythify Phizo by authorities without much knowledge of the popular Naga mind, as is evidenced by its cultural and ideological dissonance.

Rumour despite its political motivation was based on a false consciousness, generating a certain kind of alienation. The subject's destiny was not seen as dependent upon his own will and actions, but as that of forces from outside, independent of

himself. The kind of thinking that filled this resultant void,was of a religious and magical or mythic type; "a product of self-alienation". Rumour reflected a consciousness that was too feeble to cope with its own project of overturning the existing relations of power, and depended on the intervention of a superior wisdom (Guha.1983b:268ff).

Guha considers rumour to be "immediate unpremeditated utterances" and thereby does not enter into the nexus between rumour and propaganda, on how rumour can be `created' (i.e., a meditated plan) and transmitted consciously, as a device to mobilise, though with the source of origin deliberately kept anonymous, as opposed to news. He also does not enter into the possibility of propaganda turning rumour, by its modification at points of relay. The NFG circulated leaflets stating that the Naga issue would soon be reviewed by the UNO, that Phizo's letter to the UN Secretariat had been acknowledged. These types of leaflets succeeded in raising hopes and also mobilising many waverers, reflecting an expectation which was not too realistic, resulting from the attribution of `mythical' functions of the `monarchial' type (Guha classifies these `Mythic' functions as: `divine',`martial', `monarchial' and `sacredotal'). The false consciousness behind rumour is vividly demonstrated by instances of propaganda which seem to have mis-fired. V.K.Anand mentions some Naga villagers burning their houses in expectation of better building materials, from aid sent by the UNO and UK, and the consequent disillusion-absence of any such aid (175). Apparantly a case of propaganda turned rumour by its modification at points of relay. On the other

hand, it could also be a case of `counter-insurgency' efforts, to create disillusionment in the Naga mind, or even a cover-up alibi for their own deeds. This ambiguity however shows that rumour does not always fit into neatly defined domains.

However, in the Naga case, the possibility of such mediations existed. Real help in the form of arms, training, and money was rendered by the erstwhile East Pakistan and China. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to see the role of mediators in modern insurgencies, as a combination of both real and mythic functions. It would be wrong to see the hopes of UN intervention, purely as an example of this mythic component, as none other than Winston Churchill, Britain's Prime Minister of World War II fame, was "...a great promoter of the Naga cause" (Anand,V.K:234). Thus, the dependence on outside mediators, even if it finally did not materialise, was not entirely without basis. However, the extent of exaggerated hopes and belief in imminent relief, was to that extent, the function of mythic, `monarchial' abilities, attributed to empirical agencies like the UNO. This false-consciousness dependent on mediators endowed with mythic functions, was a compensation for their lack of arms, organisation, etc., while facing a formidable opponent, "...a pathetic device by which a poorly armed peasantry compensated themselves in fantasy..." (Guha.1983b:270).

Naga society at the time of insurgency was slowly transiting from a `closed' to `open' state - the notion of cyclical time yielding to linear time, thus featuring aspects of both - prophe-

sies coexisting with rational discourse. Discourse in Naga `insurgency' (including rumour) thereby featured both the characteristics of `text' and `non-text'. In other words, discourse had different levels of meaning and implications, was understood differently according to the `closed' or `open' cultural orientation of the interlocutor. Thus visual signs like arrangements of twigs, branches, the village Xylophones, etc., which were `meaningful'and `sacred' in a closed culture, because they were a `text' characterised by an "absolutization of prophesy and hence of eschatology", were understood in terms of the `text' of an `open' culture (`non-text' for a `closed' culture) as having "a definite sense that defines its functional value and results in an absolutization of historical experience." (Based on Lotman & Pjatigorskij in Guha.1983b:276-7).

TERRITORIALITY-2.6.

The inability of many peasant revolts to extend in a spatial sense creates problems from the perspective of bringing about a socialist state through armed revolution. The want of co-operation between armed peasantry of neighbouring regions leading to defeats on many occasions. This problem, `Localism' has been raised by Trotsky, Mao-Tse-tung, Engels among others. Guha also points out the existence of `localism' in India, based on a consciousness derived from, "...a sense of belonging to a common lineage as well as to a common habitat - an intersection of two primordial referents", or in other words, "Territoriality" (Guha,.1983b:279). He also agrees with anthropological approaches that view the twin principles of consanguinity and contiguity as interlinked - a practice followed in sociological studies of Indian villages, which Guha tries to apply in the study of peasant risings. While peasant risings differed in terms of the combination of these two factors (consanguinity and contiguity), a common thread linking them all was "...the manner in which the rebels view of the enemy as an alien provided the domain of an uprising with its subjective determinations" (ibid.280). This subjective determination was made up of two concepts of space: `ethnic space" and `physical space', each again with negative and positive aspects, depending on the definition of the domain in terms of the `otherness' of the aliens, or in terms of self-identity of the insurgents themselves (ibid.261).

Following this format, the Nagas' negative ethnic space can be seen as being based on 'difference' in terms of kinship, economic position and also in terms of morality. The plainsmen was seen as belonging to an 'out-group', not only from the perspective of kinship, but also in terms of economic roles as rural capitalists: merchants, shop-keepers, contractors, overseers in tea-estates, etc. With the extension of British administration over a part of the Naga hills, the Nagas adjoining the plains were encouraged to enter the foothill markets, and the previously small barter economy was now converted into a market economy based on cash, with articles like salt, iron, threads, glass-beads, stationery, rum, opium, etc. The Nagas were engaged as coolies in constructions and tea-estates, as porters in survey and punitive expeditions, not only to pay for those newly introduced wants that were fast becoming indispensable articles of daily use, but also to pay house-tax, and fines often imposed upon entire villages, for failure to supply porters, etc.

The introduction of a cash economy and modern education, besides altering the traditional status structures and introducing new standards of social recognition, also exposed the Nagas to the wiles of the plainsmen: numerous cases of cheating (particularly in tea-estates), by contractors and overseers who often did not pay the agreed wages, and also merchants and shop-keepers who manipulated the markets. J.H.Hutton reports short duration inflations after the Nagas returned from the Abor expeditions and also from France, with large sums of back-wages (1946:102-3). These all convinced the Nagas of the rapaciousness

of the plainsmen, besides violating the moral-economy of the Nagas. Conversion to Christianity also strenghtened this `otherness' of the Hindus- "idol-worshippers", according to Phizo (Angami,F:87) - an `otherness' which was to define the domain of conflict.

A positive ethnic space which also helped define this domain, was located at various levels of identity. `Insurgency' was located at the level of the `Naga', based on an identity of self, the domain of which was considered to be as large as the Naga `tribes'- it was not only the Nagas within the administered Naga-hills district, but also the adjoining Nagas who did not have much experience of administration or contact with the plains. (Except in the form of punitive British expeditions and a strict injunction not to carry out head-hunting in the administered areas). However this Naga identity was only a secondary level identity of a relatively weaker quality than the more intense `primordial' identity at the level of `tribe'.

Guha has contended that many tribal insurrections - seen by both the British and also Indian historians as being mainly revolts of the underdog against their rural capitalists: money lenders, landlords, or in other words their native oppressors - had a strong anti-colonialist content too; a fact also stressed by K.S.Singh in his account of the Birsaite ulgugan (Guha,.1983b:26,284-5). Naga `insurgency' however does not face such problems of characterisation. Its political character has been recognised in most accounts as a fight for power, but largely seen from the viewpoint of elitist manipulation. The fact

that Naga `insurgency' did not express itself by a generalised attack on non-Nagas, despite the presence of a large number of `outsiders' settled in Kohima and Mokokchung, can perhaps be seen as due to the strong assertion of an ethnic identity in its positive mode - as a demand for independence which subsumed all grievances, and distinguished it sharply from other `tribal' risings. However, a strong current of hostility towards outsiders was also present. This hostility is evident in D.Namo's experience - the fear of police antagonism towards Nagas compelled him to hum a Hindi song one night in Kohima, and was instead challenged by some Naga boys, offended by the audacity of what they took to be an `outsider' (Namo,D:75-6).

Physical space in its negative form did not figure much in Naga insurgent consciousness due to the relatively small alienation of land among Nagas adjoining the plains. However, the basic structure of fear can be inferred from the strong emphasis on the absence of landlords by the Naga `insurgents'. Negative consciousness of physical space in Naga `insurgency' can be therefore seen in predictive terms - a fear of imminent alienation of land.

Physical space in its positive form predominated Naga `insurgent consciousness' as seen in the assertion of a `Naga-land' based not in terms of existing administrative and international demarcations, but in terms of all Naga inhabited areas, considered to be their traditional land. Guha mentions that the tribals' fight for land:

> assumed, by a series of transformations, the character of a struggle for a homeland....Whatever its precise geographical boundaries (as a country of the mind it didn't need any) its presence as an ideological factor in their rebellion was obvious (Guha,1983b:287,290).

The Naga fight for Independence also obviously had these characteristics, and perhaps can be seen as a more mature version of the `territoriality' found even in tribal insurrections of the past - a maturity based on the incorporation of `modern'political ideas into a `primordial' sense of `territoriality'.

A correlate of the category of space was a sense of time, which also entered into the subjective determination of territoriality as one of its elements and helped a rebellion to define its domain in terms of the insurgents' relation to the outsider; expressed in its most generalised form as a contrasted pair of times (then/now), a project of recovering the past as future (Guha, 1983b:291).

Naga `insurgency' however did not follow this form. There was no remembrance of a `Golden Age' in the distant past, characteristic of millenarian movements (Fuchs,S.1965:11-3), or a "...watershed dividing the happy past and a poor present" (Guha,1983b:293). The Naga village - the principle political and social unit of the `tribe' - was affected in a number of obvious and some not so obvious ways by the twin assault of coercion by administrative measures banning head hunting and what they perceived as `cruelty' to animals (not to mention the very presence of administration in itself); and on the other hand, the conversion to Christianity by American Baptist

Missionaries. The outcome was an ambiguous attitude towards the past. There was no yearning for a return to the head-hunting days of the past, but the abolition of a number of traditions and institutions built around it, including the `Morung' (or Bachelors' hall in which a boy was trained to become a useful citizen of the village); all resulted in a decline of the corporate character of a village.[26] J.P.Mills also noted that conversion had a strong link to a decay of communal life, and the feeling of despondency, and lack of interest in life. (Mills,J.P.1926:419ff) or in other words, `anomie'.

The Nagas also belived that diseases had greatly increased, following British administration - a contention true to a large extent, as the imposition of peace had facilitated greater interaction with the plains, and also due to the entry of girls into prostitution with the opening of the Manipur road, thereby spreading venereal diseases (Mills.J.P,1946:158ff).

Time as an aspect of Naga `insurgent' consciousness can perhaps be seen as a dissatisfaction with the present, both under the British as well as under India. However with a return to the past being unrealistic due to conversion, Naga temporality can be seen as a projection towards the future. A `future' which was seen in terms of two polar possibilities. On one hand, there was the possibility of staying within India and be subjects to the whims of an unsympathetic Hindu majority. A fear to an extent not entirely unjustified, given the extreme religious chauvinism as seem in cow-protection campaigns, introduction of prohibition in some States, communal clashes, and also the fate of other

dispossessed `tribes', which formed the immediate landscape of post-independent India.

The other `future' - Independent Naga Land, was seen in sharp contrast to the first - depicted all that was perceived as good qualities of the Nagas in the present. Qualities that were under threat by an ominous future under India. It is also in this context that the emphasis on Christianity and traditional Naga beliefs were contrasted with Hinduism. (The emphasis shifted to Christianity later on). The future ahead of the Nagas was portrayed in terms of two diametrically opposed alternates, with one leading to the end of all that the Nagas took for granted, and the other preserving the virtues and ways of life of the Nagas as seen in an idealised form. Thus it was not a `Golden Age' of the past that the Nagas tried to bring about or a backward looking reaction as depicted by S.K.Chaube. It was an attempt to bring about change, with a strong orientation towards the future as perceived by the Nagas which shaped the domain of Naga `insurgency'. Time was thus seen as linear, not cyclic, with the ego moving forward, instead of the future coming towards an eternal present.

While the village was the main political unit of the Nagas, it differed in terms of organisation, ranging from the hereditary chieftainship of the Konyaks - the `Ahngs' with extreme powers; to the village Council of elders - `Tatars' among the Aos; or an extreme form of democracy among the Lothas and Angamis, with a chief to represent them (Elwin,V.1961:6-7). The nature of

`territoriality' therefore varied from `tribe' to `tribe', and was not uniform among the Nagas as a whole. Broadly speaking, a villager's self-identity in terms of his region(s) was defined positively as solidarity, and negatively as exclusion; the latter having many determinants, depending upon the context in which it operated. It could take on the form of opposition against all considered as `outsiders' in terms of a self denied region (cf.,Guha,1983b:302).

Guha feels that this consciousness of `territoriality' was an element common to all rural populations and points out A.C.Meyer's description of a "sub-caste's region", the Patidar's "ekada" (marriage circle) mentioned by David Pocock, as indicative of its presence even in Caste society. He felt endogamy helped reinforce a seperate identity in both kinship and territorial terms (ibid.297-99). Similarly, N.K.Das corroborates J.P.Mills mention of the Ao's "tribal feelings"; the entire Ao as an endogamous group. The affiliations within and outside the three Ao phratries as resulting from "...some special social unity that arose from the geographical proximity, co-operation in warfare and other such social situations in the past" (1989:114).

`Territoriality' as an element of consciousness was not limited to this level, but operated at relatively autonomous levels within the`tribe'. All Ao villages had a notion of belonging to one or the other of the four (five at present) ranges into which the entire Ao area was divided (Mills,J.P.1926:4-5). Again the sense of belonging to a village was reinforced by the existence of common village land and morung

land (ibid.187). Though khels each had their seperate organisation, they generally united during important village amungs and times of war (ibid.176). However, village solidarity was not monolithic as seen in the khel divisions. Land was also divided in terms of clans within the village (ibid.188). These clans living as "isolated self-governing units" according to N.K.Das, "...could always independently establish ritual kinship and political alliances with similar units of other neighbouring tribes"[27] (1989:118).

At a wider level, the existence of a "Naga Land" as a geographical entity was noted as early as 1874 by S.E.Peale, based on the recognition of certain commonalities which distinguished them from the other surrounding people, while at the same time recognising that they were divided "into literally innumerable independent tribes" (1969:103). `Territoriality' in the Naga cases then can be seen to have consisted of `sub-territorialities' at various levels, from the clan, khel, village, tribe, and finally the Naga level. The establishment of ritual kinship ties ensured that the entire Naga `tribes' were all inter-linked within a contiguous area (Robinson,W.1969:84).

Negative `territoriality' is evident in the Naga hostility towards those seen as `outsiders', attacks on symbols of a Government seen as alien to their region. The reaction to `outsiders' in terms of `territoriality' was not simply a measure of exclusion. It was also a positive factor of mobilisation and promoted solidarity among neighbouring villages against their

common foe. Rural violence directed at oppressors invariably were peasant drawn from neighbouring villages (Based on Guha, 1983b: 304-5).

Naga `territoriality' also seems to have adhered to Guha's depiction as seen in N.K.Das' remarks on the tendency of uniting together against a common foe. `Sub-territoriality' within the `tribe' can also be seen in his description of segmentation within the Aos- a feature common to most Naga `tribes'. "The segmentary clan lineage structure had been an effective device for mobilising people at various levels of conflicts in the past" (1989:114).

The uneven nature of colonial extension into the Naga hills resulted in variations in the strength of `negative territoriality' among the different Naga `tribes'. The extension of tea gardens into what was considered Naga territory resulted in innumerable disputes as well as Naga raids, leading to the `inner line' (Barpujari,H.K.1981:2). The British also encouraged Kuki settlerments in the North Cachar hills to act as a buffer, preventing Naga raids into the plains - a measure which resulted in shortened jhum cycles, land degradation and famines (Mackenzie,A.146-7; Bower,U.G.44-5). Again large numbers of Nepali ex-soldiers were settled in the Merapani area (Sinha,A.C. 1982: 91-2) as well as in the townships of Kohima and Mokochung.

From the early period of contact, the Nagas believed that the British faced land shortage and thereby intended to usurp their

land (Clark,M.M.17). In this context, it is not very difficult to see the strong hostility towards `outsiders' as being partly determined by a `negative territoriality'. The fact that this consciousness was not uniform among the Naga `tribes', resulted from the fact that land alienation and colonial domination was largely confined to the erstwhile Naga hills district. Murkot Ramuny mentions the formation of the `Village Guards', composed of Nagas from the previously unadministered Tuensang district armed by the Indian Government to counter the NFG (107-8). This aspect of Naga `insurgency' does not seem to fit Guha's depiction of `collaboration' with the peasant's enemies, seen as resulting from: "...the servility, fear of change, fatalism, and urge for self-preservation at any price which go with the bourgeois mentality everywhere" (1983b:198). Incidentally,this aspect also does not fit comfortably with elitist readings of Naga `insurgency' as manipulation of innocent, naive and gullible villagers by the leadership. The fact that most of the relatively `advanced' Nagas of the Naga hills district were drawn into the domain of `insurgency' in relation to the Nagas of the previously unadministered areas (Anand.V.K:109-10; Singh.K.R.:69-70), seems to indicate variations in the quality of `territoriality' in its `negative' form.

The Nagas have exhibited a tendency to unite at various levels, sinking traditional disputes in the face of outside threats,even in the past, as is most vividly exemplified by the two warring khels of Mozemah village, uniting against Bhogchand Darogah's intervention into their dispute! The alliance of

thirteen villages with Khonoma to fight against the British also shows this tendency to unite in reaction to outside threats (Mackenzie.A:109-10,135ff). From this perspective,perhaps we can see the relatively weaker level of solidarity in the previously unadministered areas as indicative of the relative absence of a negative sense of `territoriality'.

The concrete articulation of `insurgent' violence in terms of `territoriality' was expressed at the intersection of geographical and ethnic space. Guha therefore saw the jacqueries of 1857-8 as generally local affairs: "they operated within discrete local vicinages and had their social bases in local units with clearly recognised boundaries" (1983b:308). Naga `insurgency' also seems to have followed this pattern to some extent, though there was also divergences, reflecting the influence of modern leadership.

The articulation of `territoriality' in geographical terms is seen in the coincidence of the domain of conflict, at the localised level in terms of the peasants' relation with their local enemies. The attacks on village GBs and other officials of the Indian Government perceived to be `pro-India',as also destruction of Government building within the village, indicates the presence of/and determination in terms of local perceptions of who and what constituted enemies and the enemy's symbols. Conversely the counter-insurgent actions against particular villages/khels also testify to this aspect of `territoriality'.

`Territoriality' in ethnic terms resulted from the predominance of a single caste claiming a common ancestor, whether real or mythic. In a positive mode, this made village act as a single unit, while negatively, it led to discrimination against those seen as `outsiders'. The principle of segmentation noted by N.K.Das in the Naga case, results in a complicated picture of `territoriality'. Thus while a number of different `tribes' often claimed a common ancestry and origin, which reinforced by ritual ties, formed the subjective basis of ethnic identity at the Naga level; there was also segmentation at varying levels which gave the concrete articulation of `territoriality' a multiformity. Perhaps it would not be very inaccurate to see this factor in the positive expression of solidarity, therefore sometimes led to its negative mode when those outside a particular segment were considered as `outsiders', even within the Naga entity - an aspect which at times is seen as `tribalism'. Guha does not provide us a formula to understand the specifics of insurgent mobilisation. While he also recognises the importance of village based primordial ties as a factor in mobilisation, the actual mode is left wide open, varying; "according to idioms and occasions specific to particular localities." Sometimes it was through the initiative of the peasants alone, while at times it was through their landlord masters (Guha,1983b:315).

The actual mechanics of mobilisation has not been adequately examined due to the belief in NNC activities. This however does not shed any light on the matter, considering the fact that every Naga was theoretically an NNC member.

Perhaps a way out of this impasse would be to examine the dependence on the formal organisational structures of the NNC in relation to other traditional structures. While the two overlapped to a great extent, the fact that the NNC was seen as usurping the traditional village authority structure, says a great deal about the type of mobilisation that operated in Naga `insurgency'. Ironically, it was precisely these traditional authority structures that constituted the framework of the NNC organisation.

While Guha notes that: "The jacqueries of 1857-8 were strictly local affairs: they operated within discrete local vicinages and had their social bases in local units..." (1983b:308). At the same time he considered `territoriality' as a positive factor in the context of nineteenth century India, due to the existence of a "decalage: ...There were territorial units which were home to more than one ethnic group and there were ethnic regions which extended over more than one territorial unit" (ibid.330). Naga `insurgency' was also bounded within a small area, and largely operated within `tribal' areas; but at the same time did not lead to the mobilisation of non-Nagas residing within the territory on any large scale. Following Guha, perhaps we can also affirm that ethnicity was no substitute for class consciousness in uniting diverse groups of people (ibid.331). The present co-ordination of different `insurgent' groups in the area, then, perhaps can be seen as the beginning of a more mature class consciousness.

CONCLUSION

The existence of rulers and ruled, leaders and led, as a basic irreducable fact (Gramsci,A.144) forms the basis for a relation of power, of domination and subordination in any given society. The subjugation of the Nagas under the British colonial administration displaced the old power relations with a more pervasive power structure, one which linked the administered Naga `tribes' to a single common source of domination. The resultant negativity, however, was not unambiguous; an outcome of the unfamiliarity with the `metropolitan political culture' introduced. This `ambiguity' of `negation' forms the context within which the attempt at bringing about the mutual substitution of the dominant by the dominated in the power structure was enacted.

The dispersion of power was expressed in a multiplicity of cultural/ideological attributes, (besides the overt political and economic structures), all which reflected the basic relations of power. Insurgency then was an expression of the awareness of this dominance and the will to bring about a change. Insurgency therefore reveals its identity as a project of power, based on a political consciousness. One which attempts to bring about a change in an established political power structure. (These two paragraphs were based on Guha,1983b:8-9).

In the Naga context, the `Negation' of dominance can be seen even at the time of British rule, expressed in terms of `negation' and `inversion' (or `displacement'), in attempts at

acquisition, of the attributes of dominance, and included firearms, western clothes, fashions, education and thus ultimately, the very machinery of dominance: sovereignity, seen by educated Nagas as the ultimate basis of dominance.

While the demand for political sovereignity was articulated by educated sections of the populace, it was a result of this `traditional' (`subaltern') consciousness, now transformed by the acquisition of education. That this demand originated from the project of bringing about a substitution in the power structure is evident in the fact that `collaborators' as seen from a `metropolitan political culture' were often at variance, when observed from a traditional cultural perspective. A factor which facilitated the entry of many educated Nagas into the Indian administrative system, without much reprisals, as compared to DBs and GBs, easily recognised even by the Naga villagers, as constituting a part of the instrument of dominance. A fact which shaped the very nature of reprisals or sanctions in Naga `insurgency' itself. In other words, `metropolitan political culture' had to bend to the dictates of tradition.

Such a perspective, following T.N.Madan would be seen as an inference, a construct in which certain political and strategic interests creates a mountain out of a molehill. However, this comment also reveals an opposition, a political interest, based on the presence of an opposing paradigm, flowing from the relations of domination and subordination. (Guha,.1983b:335) The very refusal to read between the lines, on scrutiny can be seen as being derived from a political/strategic interest, in

opposition to a `subaltern' political/strategic interest, and therefore reflects two different, indeed anti-thetical viewpoints through which the same subject is represented in different ways. This aspect becomes most evident from the ways in which the nature of Indian society, and also the nature of "Unity in diversity", is constituted.

The `subaltern studies' approach constitutes an attempt at elaborating an alternate paradigm, to bring together other identical perspectives, which at present lack a comprehensive paradigmatic grounding. A basis from which the present one-sided monologue can be interrogated. That such views are not limited to `subaltern studies' is evident in P.S.Datta's comments on the nature of the present discourse on Insurgency in North East India:

> The authors (at least most of them) appear to have been more concerned with the question of the territorial integrity of the country and without analysing the ethical or unethical contents of our official integration policy, identified insurgency as a disintegrating trend and a danger to the future of the country. In this there appears to be no distinction between the academicians, politicians of the ruling parties and civilian and military administrators (1990:46-7).

To return to the question of how the `Indian Nation' and `Unity in Diversity' have been constructed, a juxtaposing of the `subaltern studies' along with a paper on political development in the hills of North East India in the context of Nation-building has been resorted to; to reveal their oppositional unity, from the manner in which they have been constituted.

M.N.Srinivas and R.D.Sanwal have sought to present "National integration" in terms of Administrative/political integration and Emotional integration. Terms which seem to be paradigmatically opposed to what Guha suggested: Nation building (or conversely Domination) is seen as being exercised through Administrative/ Political integration (or Coercion) and Emotional integration (or Persuasion). They also note that India at present though integrated in an Administrative/Political sense, lacks this Emotional integration. Or, alternately following Guha, we can say that the nature of Governance in India is one marked by a "dominance without hegemony." (Based on Srinivas, M.N. and Sanwal, R.D. 1972, & also Guha.1989).

In a very striking manner, they also seem to have touched on many similar themes as Guha. They too have stressed the `ethnic' and `geographical' aspects of `territoriality', in securing this `Emotional integration', warning of events outside in Burma, Thailand, Cambodia; in sparking off reactions in the North East and vice and vice versa. Again they also speak of inter and intra community relationships as points to be watched, and notes the widespread belief among the Nagas, of the interest by foreign powers' in them. An article in the Observer on May 1967 by Clayton was translated into several Naga languages, which seems to confirm Guha's observation on the effect of the printed word, and also of the belief in mediators, both empirical, with mythic functions attributed to them or mythic mediators, to come to their rescue, as mentioned earlier (Srinivas,M.N. and Sanwal,R.D. 1972, & Guha.1983b:248,269).

The only difference between the two types of approach, thus appears to reflect two divergent, but mutually interlinked positions: one from a position of dominance, while the other from a position, somewhat askew, but for the dominated, and thus linked together in a relationship of domination and subordination. Both reflecting mutually irreconcilable political/strategic interests.

It is in the context of the Sociology of knowledge, that the question as to what constitutes `History', should perhaps, be posed. Should the selective (mis-)representation of the past be seen from a forgiving attitude as perhaps an oversight, or should it be seen as indicating the pervasive presence of ideological interests? While the first option is still firmly grounded in the notion of arriving at an `objectified' (and positivistic) historical discourse (Wood,D.193-4), the second, on one hand, admits of a crippling immobility, but also perhaps, the possibility of a self-conscious activity of history writing, painfully aware of one's own limitations in the representation of the past.

NOTES

1. I am indebted to my supervisor, Prof. A.C.Sinha for his advice to study the Naga as an unstratified society, and also indicating the two main variants of Marxism - The `Althusserian' and the `Frankfurt School'- which has shaped the contours of `Subaltern studies' itself. It goes without saying that errors of facts and interpretations are entirely mine alone.

2. Althusser actually considered `real humanism', (which claimed to have the non-abstract `man' for its content) as a periphasis. `Man' can only be understood as the "ensemble of social relations".(1965: 242-3)

3. This charge of `retreat' appears to be based on a position close to Althusser's. That Marx never regarded a mode of political behaviour as directly assimilable to a historical category, that is, to a concept derived from the theory of Dialectical Materialism.(1965:240)

4. Prof. D.N.Dhanagare appears to view `subalternity' as indicating a position close to, `Revolution of rising expectations', as forwarded by T.Di.Tella, and also Ernesto Laclau's framework for the study of `populist' movements. (1989:14-5) This however runs counter to the `subalternists' premise based on `negation'. The `neo-populist' label also seems to be based on an understanding of `tribal' identity as simply an imposed or colonial construct.

5. Althusser describes the `Marxist whole' as:

> constituted by a certain type of complexity, the unity of a structured whole containing what can be called levels or instances which are distinct and `relatively-autonomous', and exists within the complex structural unity, articulated with one another according to specific determinations. (from Chatterjee,P.1984b: xxxiii-xxxv)

He however saw history as the history of systems: the mode of production, due to the determination in the last instance by economic systems. Gramsci's, (and also`subalternists',) study represented the study of ideologies and philosophy, which were not the history of systems, but of concepts organised into `problematics'. (cf.,Balibar,E.,1968:251)

6. G.C.Spivak points out that P.Chatterjee missed Foucault's eurocentric presentation of a self-contained version of the west which ignores the fact that the west itself was largely influenced by its colonial experiences in the third world. (1985:348-9)

7. The feeling of certitude in disciplines like history, in recent times seems to have been shaken by the growing realisation that " no text is innocent". Thus Sumit Sarkar says:

> my primary interest was never in the reconstruction of what may really have happened. The Rankean past `as it actually was' is methodologically dubious. (1989:5)

Ashis Nandy Gives an even more radical version by presenting his essays as, "an alternate mythography of history which denies and defies the values of history." (1983:xv)

8. G.C.Spivak describes the `subject-effect' as:

> that which seems to operate as a subject may be part of an immense discontinuous network (`text' in the general sense) of strands that may be termed politics, ideology, economics, history, sexuality, language, and so on (each of these strands, if they are isolated can also be seen as woven of many strands) different knottings and configurations of these strands, determined by hetrogeneous determinations which are themselves dependent upon myraid circumstances, produce the effect of an operating subject. (1985:341)

The tendency to create "order out of chaos" (Das,V.,1989: 310-11) present even in the `subalternists', results in the requirement of a continuist and homogeneous cause for this effect, and thus leads to the positing of a sovereign and determining subject. `Subaltern consciousness' then results from what Spivak calls (in post-structuralist terminology,) the `subject-effect'. (1985:341)

9. R.Guha actually affirms the presence of, and effect of false consciousness in `subaltern'practise:

> with all their practical involvement in a rebellion the masses could be still tricked by a false consciousness into trusting the magical faculties of warrior heros to win it for them.(1983b:270)

10. A look into the population growth rate seems to indicate that such fears were not entirely without basis. In the period between 1901 and 1961, population registered a growth of 199.5 percent in rural areas, and 519.35 in urban areas. The period between 1951 and 1961 alone recording a growth of 364.41 percent for urban areas. This seems to suggest an influx of outsiders, concomitant with the post-Independent administrative expansion. (Alemchiba,M,1972:483)

11. According to M.Alemchiba and others, the sudden show of a strong police force in the area particularly from the early part of 1953, a result of certain localised incidents, was seen as a challenge by many Nagas:

> At one time the presence of an armed force in their land was seen as a display of the authority of the Government, problem was not only of law and order or political but it was something more than that. (1972:484)

This shift in perception also seem to corroborate Guha's ideas about a "code switching" (mentioned in AMBIGUITY)

12. B.K.Roy Burman also points out that even those Naga `tribes' without an educated middle class actively participated. He also points out the integrative function of the age-set system and the bachelor's dormitory which brought togather the various clans and phratries, as providing the "operational base for the hostile activities in many Naga areas". (1972: 73-75) The active role of Naga youths then appears instead, to have had an integrative function in Naga insurgency.

13. G.C.Spivak points out women's `subalternity', (seen as a "red-herring" detracting from the single minded quest for `subaltern consciousness') as a cognitive failure on the part of both `elite' and `subaltern' historians. She also notes that this neglect occurs even as the crucial instrumentality of women as symbolic objects of exchange, underpinned much of `subaltern' concepts like solidarity, territoriality, mobilisation, etc.,(1985:356) The limited objectives,

unfamiliarity as to how women `subalternity' should be constituted in studies of social movements, precludes such an attempt here.

14. Guha's analytic classification of forms of insurgent violence was mainly aimed at revealing the political character of what was seen as: `pre-political',`social-banditry',etc. This classification has not been adhered to here,as the political character of violence is explicit in the Naga case.

15. Edmund Leach noted that in Hindu eyes,"people of different caste are, as it were, of different species," (cited in Furer-Haimendorf,C.V,1967:188) On the other hand, the Nagas while fearing the wiles of the plainsmen, regarded stealing from them (implying the ability to outfox them) as a meritorious action. (Hutton<J.H.,1921:166) Thus it is not very surprising that the `Tribe/Caste continuum was absent in the Naga hills, similiar to that in the Mizo hills, as noted by B.B.Goswami, which was attributed to Christianity. (1972:279)

16. The contradictory position of the British in the Naga mind is best seen from the presence of a belief, (among the Angami `tribe') that a king would return to drive away the British and rule over all who eat from the wooden platter.(i.e.,all Nagas.) Yet despite this belief, the Nagas stood by the British, even when the fall of the British Empire appeared imminent, during the Japanese advance over South-East Asia upto the Naga hills. (Hutton,J.H.,1921: 252, and 1946: 105.)

17. Cultural sanctions are most vividly seen in the case of DBs and GBs, who acted as the intermediaries between the villagers and the administration. It varied from calling derogatory names like 'Indian dog' (probably in the sense of following his Indian masters) to stoning, looting, or burning the houses of those seen as 'collaborators'. Physical sanctions ranged from beating to outright killings. (Singh,K.R: 127, 162-3, 156.)

18. Guha appears to have moved towards a more dynamic usage of 'collaboration", now seen as resulting from the interplay of two different political traditions; one derived from the metropolitan political culture of the colonisers, the other from the pre-colonial traditions of the colonised. (1989: 233) 'Hegemony' is also understood as a condition of Dominance, to the extent that securing collaboration is achieved through persuasion, rather than through coercion. A position which leaves open the possibility of rebellion even under the most persuasive structure of Dominance (ibid.231.).

19. The extent of 'modernisation' can be seen from the literacy rates in the administered Naga hills district: 5.09 percent in 1941, 10.39 percent in 1951, and 17.91 in 1961. Literacy in the Tuensang district was negligible during this period. (Alemchiba,M. 1972: 483.)

20. J.H.Hutton affirms the presence of a highly developed 'language' of signs, gestures, and symbols which could convey complex messages from one Naga to another, despite numerous linguistic barriers. (1921: 291ff.)

21. The idea of a millennium was not entirely absent among the Nagas. The Aos had a `Golden Age' in the mythic past, where life was without toil or suffering. (Mills,J.P., 1926: 108.)

22. This type of attitude towards the written word, however has been noted in relation to Rani Gaidilui's rebellion against the British. Julian Jacobs however tends to view this combination of tradition and modernity in millenerian terms, imlying a backward looking movement (1990, 61-2 and ch.14,fn,32). In sharp contrast, Guha endorses this appropriation of the written word, positively; as a vehicle through which new ideas and social forces are accorded the legitimacy of tradition (1983b:52ff).

23. Prof.D.N.Dhanagare seems to have missed Guha's understanding of religion in the peasantry. When Guha claimed that by and large, the secular idiom of village communal activity characterised insurgency in colonial India, he did not mean that these activities were devoid of religious undertones. In fact he affrims the presence of a pervasive religious undertone in all that happened in village society. (Dhanagare,D.N.,1989:8, & Guha,R.,1983b:124.)

24. Sudhir Kakar's insight on socially shared fantasies (rather than ideas) as the moving force behind most social movements, accords with Guha's conceptual scheme, as seen in his depiction of a leader's charisma (1983b: 250-1) and also the `mytho-poeic' imagination of the peasantry. (ibid.270.) S.Kakar outlines fantasy in the construction of identity,

through first marking off the community's boundaries, making the community aware of a collective cultural loss, (imminent loss in the Naga case), countering internal forces which disrupts community cohesion, idealising the community by contrasting it with a bad `other', which is depicted as persecutor, and highlighting the inability of the community to counter it (bringing out a sense of inferiority) resulting in the surfacing of a resolve to take up a course of action (1992, 19th July).

25. G.C.Spivak points out that Guha's depiction of rumour as `absolutely transitive' is contradicted by his admission that rumour is restricted by the insurgent camp from excessive semantic slides (1985: 354).

26. M.Alemchiba points out that the migration of educated youths to urban centers, frees them from social sanctions and also exposes them to new ideas. He also pointed out that these youths affected the Villages deeply (1972:483-4).

27. Village solidarity appears to have been over-emphasised, in most accounts of Naga society, and in the process neglecting other levels of solidarity, both within and outside the village. Even in the past, khel solidarity have resulted in divided villages, and its presence in Naga `insurgency' does not imply any new development.

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