

Aftermath of mutiny : Army Reform and the North East Frontier (1861-66)

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"Considerations of economy on the one hand and security on the other prevent us from garrisoning and defending India exclusively with British or exclusively with native soldiers", declared the Government of India on army reorganisation after the Mutiny. In the heat of the traumatic days impassioned pleas had been heard for an all white army². But Britain could not do without Indian regiments. British troops, experience had shown, could not long survive the harsh climate of India nor undertake its arduous military duties, even if Fort William could find the resources for them. The appalling horrors of the war were too recent to be forgotten; and the Panjab Committee of Sir John Lawrence, then Chief commissioner of the Punjab, sums up the apprehensions of the time:

As we cannot do without a large army in India our main object is to make that army safe; and next to grand counterpoise of a sufficient European force, comes that counter poise of Natives against Native.³

The Royal Army Commission which went into the whole question of army reform in India was to give it a fuller expression making it a fundamental principle of military policy. The Peel Commission, as the Army Commission was also known after its Chairman, Major General Sir Jonathan Peel, in its report of March 1859 recommended *inter alia*, an increase to the British troops and a corresponding reduction in the Indian element maintaining a 1:2 ratio between them; the latter composed of "different nationalities and castes and as a general rule, mixed promiscuously through each regiment"; and the removal of arsenals and

the artillery from Indian hands⁴.

I

Until 1861 Army Headquarters had little to do with the Assam or the North East Frontier. The provincial garrison, the 1st and 2nd Assam Light Infantry and the Sylhet Light Infantry were not regular regiments of the Presidency army but local corps entirely under the control of the provincial administration. This system which in Assam began in the course of the first Anglo-Burmese war (1824-26) dated back to the early years of the century when local battalions were raised for garrison duties in the extensive territory brought under the Company. Less expensive and "more rough and ready than the regular army" these battalions saved the regulars from being broken into ⁵endless detachments scattered over a wide region. In the early months of the campaign against the Burmese in the north east the importance of the locals became apparent. The regulars had suffered terribly from the effects of the climate and the service had become extremely unpopular⁶. The Governor General of the day, Lord Amherst, when the subject was brought up before him in early 1825, turned down the Commander-in-Chief Lieutenant General Sir Edward Paget's plans to bring in black overseas troops and laid down that the Eastern Frontier should be held by local corps.

After the war the Sylhet Light Infantry (SLI), raised in March 1824 from Manipur fugitives in Cachar and Sylhet was given the task of protecting the Sylhet frontier, and subsequently of Cachar and the Khasi and Jaintia Hills. The Rangpur Light Infantry which before the outbreak of hostilities was deployed around Cooch Behar and Goalpara (the latter then under Bengal) was localised in Assam, its title being changed to Assam Light Infantry (ALI). It became the 1st ALI in 1844 when the Assam Subordinate Corps raised nine years earlier from a host of irregular units was converted

into the 2nd ALI for the defence of Lower Assam and particularly of the Bhutan frontier. In addition a Local Artillery was raised in 1839-40 for frontier warfare and to man fortifications in the Khampati-Singpho tract. Except for submission of returns and an occasional inspection by headquarters, such as that by Brigadier-General Sir John Littler, Commanding Eastern Frontier, in 1839 following the Khampati uprising in Sadiya which claimed the life of Colonel Adam White, Commandant ALI and eighty of his men, Assam was left to itself to organise border defence and conduct its numerous frontier expeditions. Recruitment policies, increase or reductions and interior economy of the corps were determined by the local administration, Government of India's sanction or approval coming not from the Military but from the Foreign Department.

II

The Mutiny was to change all this. It all started with the demands of the tea planters for European troops when news of the massacres in northern India began to pour in. There was no trouble with the local regiments and the letters of Colonel Francis Jenkins, Assam's Commissioner and Agent to the Governor General for the Frontier since 1834, continued to be full of optimism. Yet the fact that the 1st ALI contained a large number of Hindustanis and the Local Artillery was composed wholly of that class was a source of considerable anxiety. Calcutta's tea lobby pressed by the companies in Assam persuaded the Government of India to send two detachments of European sea men from the Naval Brigade, no other white troops being available, during 1857-58. Fort William was anxious that further recruitment of Indians into the artillery should at once be stopped. Since guns were always considered necessary against the frontier tribes Assam took advantage of this order to press for an European artillery. Colonel Jenkins said that he would be satisfied with a Eurasian artillery, or even one composed partly of Eurasians and partly of

Africans if its non-commissioned ranks were filled up by Europeans. The important thing was to remove Indians from the artillery. If the demands for European artillery, one company in Dibrugarh and one in Cherrapunjee, were conceded there would be no necessity for any other European troops in the North East Frontier¹².

To add to Assam's anxieties the Abors, as the Adis were then called, descended upon the plains and sacked a riverine settlement within cannon shot of Dibrugarh, the principal civil and military station of Upper Assam and the hub of the tea industry. The customary punitive expedition moved up in March 1858 only to be drawn deep into the hills and ambushed. As the column commander quarrelled with his political officer on their retreat the Abors harassed the troops all the way down to the plains. A second expedition was mounted in the following winter under Lieutenant Colonel Simon Hannay of the 1st ALI to salvage British reputation and teach the Abors a lesson. Along with the nearly six hundred strong column which included five British officers went sixty two men of the naval Brigade and the local Artillery complete with 12 pounder howitzers and mortars. Hannay had this to say of his encounter :

A stubborn opposition to our advance, which the enemy's knowledge of the ground, his skill with bows and arrows and spears, and his formidable stockade rendered easy. Of these latter several were defended to the last, while in three cases it was necessary to use howitzers to open a way for the assault.¹³

The second expedition was no more a success than the first but it forcefully illustrated the importance of artillery in hill warfare on the Assam Frontier where the tribes invariably fought behind entrenchments. But from the dreadful mortality

in the Naval Brigade during the expedition, it was clear that an European artillery will not do. When the time came for orders on the Peel Commission's report the Government of India decided to retain Local Artillery. Explaining this departure from the Commission's recommendations the Secretary of State was informed that the Assam Artillery company was entirely local in character and was posted in a remote frontier where the climate was disagreeable to the health of Europeans. The employment of native gunners there was therefore not open to the objections which generally applied to the plains¹⁴.

The reorganisation of the Bengal army began in early 1861. In May, Army Headquarters issued orders for delocalising the Assam corps placing them in general roster of the regular regiments. The 1st and 2nd ALI became, respectively, the 42nd and 43rd (Assam) Native Infantry and the SLI the 44th (Sylhet)¹⁵. The same General orders also fixed the strength of all infantry regiments at 600 privates.¹⁶ Separate circulars to the commanding officers laid down guidelines on composition. The principle of counterpoise within regiments and brigades was to the overwhelming majority of official opinion, both civil and military, in the aftermath of revolt, crucial to future security. The object of the new recruitment policy is conveyed not much in the formal language of the Commission as in the outrageous comment of the Commander-in-Chief sir Hugh Rose to Secretary of State Sir Charles Wood:

I wish to have different and rival spirit in the different regiments so that Sikh might fire into Hindoo, Goorkha into either, without any scruple, in case of need.¹⁶

There were four systems of mixed composition. In the General Mixture of "Plum-pudding" system which had already existed in Bombay and Madras, men of different "races", religions and provinces

were mixed together in the same company or troops. The Bengal Presidency hitherto had largely followed the class company system by which regiments were recruited from three or more different races and recruiting grounds, the men of each class being organised in separate companies though not in any fixed proportion. Class Regiments were those drawn wholly from one district, caste or class, such as the Gorkhas and Sikhs. An extreme variation of this was the village system where regiments were composed of men drawn from a single village¹⁷.

Over the years the Assam local corps had developed a heterogeneous character. The 1st ALI which began life in 1817 as the Cuttack Region and became the Rangpur Light Infantry in 1822 when it was merged with the irregular Sylhet Provincial Battalion, was composed of men from Bihar, Bengal and Orissa. The greater portion of these took their discharge in 1827 when the regiment was localised in Assam, their ranks being filled by men from lower Assam, the *Jharuwas*, and two companies of Manipuris transferred from the Sylhet Corps. Thereafter its Commanding Officer Captain John Neufville introduced Gorkha companies. The SLI underwent a change in character too when during 1830-32 the Manipuris were no longer found suitable and Captain (later Lieutenant-General) Frederick George Lister, Commanding Officer of the Regiment for a record twenty seven years, like Neufville opened its ranks to the Gorkhas. In the 2nd ALI raised from local irregulars, men from Assam predominated. At the time of the reorganisation these regiments were therefore mixed: for example, the class composition, of all ranks, of the 1st ALI in June 1857 was:¹⁸

Hindustanis	- 600
Gorkhas	- 250
Manipuris/others	- 260

1,110

The regiments were not organised on any fixed principle some companies were exclusively Hindustani or Gorkhas while others contained a mixed fare. However, all three battalions were placed in the General Mixture category. The Government of India did not lay down any specific rules as to the proportion of each class to the enlisted. The military authorities were merely instructed that these regiments being intended primarily for service in the North East Frontier should recruit in their own neighbourhood but that the Hindustani element should be restricted to one-fourth of the total strength of the regiment.

III

It was in the reduction in the strength of the regiments where the greatest difficulty was encountered and one which was to have a lasting effect upon military policy in the north east. The strength of the local corps in 1857-58:

Ist ALI (42nd)	- 1000 privates
2nd ALI (43rd)	- 1000 privates
SLI (44th)	- 800 privates

At the time of the Jaintia disturbances in 1860, the last was raised to twelve hundred men. Under the new regulations the regiments were to be reduced, the first two by four hundred men each and the third by six hundred, a total in the provincial garrison by fourteen hundred men.

Retrenchments began almost immediately but not without protests from the commanding officers. One of them, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Campbell of the 43rd, reported in May, after he had discharged one hundred and thirty men, that further reductions would be possible only if his regiment were relieved from its frontier outpost duties²⁰. Nearly six hundred were holding nineteen outposts varying in strength from five to a hundred men and at a distance from forty

to two hundred miles from headquarters. Relief of the 43rd was in fact long overdue for some of the detachments were away from headquarters for years. The 42nd had already been withdrawn from the frontier of Upper Assam and the Naga Hills with the organisation during 1844-1851 of the ²¹Nowgong, Sibsagar and Lakhimpur Police militia just as the Kuki Levy in 1851-52 had enabled the return of the 44th from the Lushai Hills frontier. A proposal for raising a militia for lower Assam composed of Garos, Hajongs and Rabhas was before the Government of India from as long ago as 1853²². The policy of irregulars at the frontier with the local corps concentrated in their rear as supports had already been accepted²³ but A J Moffat Mills' *Report on Assam*, published in 1854, which contained adverse remarks on the militia probably led Fort William to have second thoughts on the subject. Since then Colonel Campbell had several occasions to complain against the excessive and protracted outpost duties his regiment had to undertake. On the last, in January 1860, he had declared: "I am firmly of opinion that considering all circumstances the Reg(imen)t is not strong enough by 200 men for all its duties and to²⁴ preserve that discipline that ought to exist". Army authorities saw the solution in the new police taking overall such "non-militart" duties as ²⁵station, treasury, and jail security and escorts.

The Police Commission of August 1860, whose report formed the basis of the Police Act V of 1861, had recommended the creation of an organised constabular and the abolition of all quasi-military units such as Bengal's Military Police battalions raised during the Mutiny or Assam Police militia²⁶. The Commission's preliminary resolutions also defined the role of the proposed constabulary *vis-a-vis* the army: the task of protection and repression, it was declared, was a military one where "the breakers of the law are strangers to the District". The outposts in the North East,

i.e. "protecting the frontier" was military function and in no way "chargeable to police"²⁷.

(they) are in every case intended to provide against the external aggressions not internal disorders. Each post is supposed to command some parts of a road or outlet by which... numerous tribes on the other side of the valley of Assam might descend to ravage the inhabitants of the plains.

The problem of garrisoning more than forty widely scattered frontier outposts requiring over fourteen hundred men reverted to the military. That the three regiments at their reduced strength could provide the numerous detachments, even if their commanding Officers were less diffident about the damaging effects of such duties on the discipline of their regiments, was clearly out of the question. Colonel Francis Jenkins who early in the year relinquished his 27 years charge as Commissioner and Agent to the Governor General to become Officer Commanding Troops, North East Frontier, at once protested:

If the orders (for reduction) are carried out in full the number of fighting men on the frontier will be reduced far beyond what I should consider safe, for, of course unless other means are taken many outposts hitherto considered important must be abandoned²⁸.

The following September saw the question of the provincial garrison reopened with the Government of India addressing Bengal on Assam's military requirements. But its reluctance to allocate additional regiments, either Indian or European, owing probably to the difficulty of rearranging the disposition of the Presidency army which the measure would have involved, was

plain enough²⁹. Bengal was to consider how far its needs could be met by the military police at its disposal.

In January, 1862, Bengal replied, after going over the problem with the local officers for over four months, that five regiments of native infantry and not militia or military police, and one of Europeans was "absolutely necessary" for the defence of the province. Unless this recommendation was accepted in its entirety the Lieutenant Governor emphasised "it should be well understood that we are trusting to uninterrupted good fortune such as lately saved us in so remarkable a manner from a great calamity at Nowgong". Sir John Peter Grant's resentment at being bypassed in the army reorganisation scheme was even less concealed:

the late measures of suddenly reducing the strength of the native troops in Assam and Sylhet and Cossya from 3200 men to 1800 men, without consultation with, and without the knowledge of the local Government or the Civil Authorities of the provinces affected, was a dangerous measure, such as it would not be prudent to repeat³⁰.

Two days later forwarding Assam's plans for the military control of the Abor marches following the sack of another village almost opposite Dibrugarh by the Meyong clan, Grant remarked: "it is no use to discuss the question of protecting Upper Assam if there is no possibility of obtaining an additional force for the purpose as part of the permanent Garrison"³¹.

Meanwhile on 17 January the Jaintias broke out a second time in two years and, as the commanding Officer of the 44th NI (responsible for the defence of the Khasi and Jaintia Hills) Lieutenant Colonel William Richardson laboured under

insufficient men, the insurrection quickly got out of hand³². Two additional regiments were at once inducted and the operations were placed under the experienced Colonel Henry Dunsford. On 24 February, the GOC Presidency Division, Brigadier General St. George Daniel Showers was directed by Army headquarters to proceed to the northeast to report upon its defences. Still the prospect of an increase to the number of regiments or the restoration to the three old corps of their former strength which was being advocated in some quarters, seemed remote. The orders to General Showers contained a directive to examine the feasibility of an armed police as the "chief guard" of the Assam frontier. European troops, if at all found convenient, was not to be more than two or three companies.

When Showers reached Jowai, the scene of the disturbances, news reached him of his appointment as Commissioner of the Khasi and Jaintia Hills with wide powers and larger forces at his disposal. The extreme difficulty of containing an extensive uprising with limited troops appeared to have dawned on the authorities in Calcutta. At any rate by the time he left the hills two months later, with the restoration of order still not in sight, Showers seemed convinced that three infantry regiments of six hundred men each and a small artillery detail was woefully inadequate for the vast region. In his long report on the North East Frontier submitted in September 1862 the GOC recommended five regiments of native and a wing of European infantry, an European artillery in addition to the native company and a company of sappers and miners under European officers, amounting to over four thousand Indians of all ranks and five hundred British Officers and non-commissioned officers and privates³³. Even if his scheme to hold the line of defence by combined military and police posts is left out of account Showers' garrison was undoubtedly

the largest so far proposed.

It took the Government of India a year and a half to settle the question. When in March 1864 a decision was arrived at it was for 4½ regiments of native infantry and the local artillery³⁴. Since one full regiment was located in Jowai on account of the disturbances, Assam's permanent garrison was in reality increased by only half a regiment. In the course of its rounds through the Bengal Secretariat Shower's report was already considerably whittled down:³⁵ but what most influenced the strength of the military was the report of Lieutenant Colonel John Haughton, officiating Commissioner during Hopkinson's absence on furlough, that the police was not only capable of maintaining the peace of the frontier but was actually the best force for the purpose³⁶. It was just the thing the Government of India wanted. Shower's recommendations on the police was therefore to stay, and the Commander-in-Chief's objection to mixed military and police posts as "fraught with evil" was to be met by placing the latter when needed under the operational command of the army:

All matters of importance such as raids by the hillmen or anything tending to disturb the security of the frontier (the Governor General-in-Council's directive said) should be promptly reported to the Military authorities of the nearest post or cantonment and in the event of actual hostilities breaking out the police holding such (outposts) must be in direct communication with and when necessary even under the orders of the Military Commander.

Any lingering doubts about the wisdom of leaving frontier outposts to care of the police was soon dispelled. The harmful effects of such static duties on the efficiency and discipline

of regiments was fully brought out during the Anglo-Bhutan War in the following year. The failure of Colonel Campbell's 43rd to hold Diwangiri against a wretchedly armed Bhutanese horde and its subsequent disastrous retreat to the plains³⁷ was attributed by the military Court of Enquiry which went into the whole affair, primarily to the regiment being broken up for years into numerous small detachments. Drill and discipline was impossible, for the fact was that the regiment had never been brought together since 1840. The resultant decision to curtail the number of military outposts was however not contested by Assam. The local administration had in the meanwhile come to the conclusion, that the army was inappropriate for the Assam frontier³⁸. The attitude towards the hill tribes, based on the concept of the frontier as a region, had undergone a change: the tribal people were no longer looked upon as "military enemies" or aliens but were regarded as subjects of the Government. The new policy was to "reassert British authority over these tribes and to bring them under a system suited to circumstances". This was a work for the police.

Notes & References

1. Quoted in Hiralal Singh, **Problems and Policies of the British in India**, London, 1963.
2. Some like Major General J B Hearsey urged the employment of overseas Christians such as Nestorians, Karens, Malays, Christian Chinese and Christians from the Phillipines and South America, "all, all; but they must be Christians, and then TRUST can be reposed in them". **Papers connected with the Re-organisation of the Army in India Supplementary to Report of the Commission**, p.173; Stephen P Cohen, **The Indian Army**, Bombay 1971, p.37.

3. Report Ch. III of the Panjab Committee, 1858 quoted, KML Saxena, **The Military System of India, 1850-1900**, New Delhi, 1974; pp. 89-90.
4. Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons, **Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Organisation of the Indian Army**; Vol.5, 1859.
5. The problem was not entirely solved. In 1825 Captain Walter Badenach in his **Enquiry into the state of the Indian Army, 1826**, suggested the creation of Military Police Battalions to relieve the army from all para-military or station duties.
6. M(ilitary) (Consultations or Proceedings, National Archives of India, New Delhi) 18 November 1825; No. 35; The 46th Bengal native Infantry in Rangpur in Bengal was on the verge of mutiny; and the Officer commanding the Eastern Frontier on enquiry found that the men "did not appear to be able to support the weight of their own muskets" and were "reduced in energy and in personal appearance were mere shadows of their former selves". The Medical Officer too reported that he "was frequently under the necessity of permitting members to proceed to their homes on medical certificate as the only means for the preservation of their lives". Amiya Barat, **The Bengal Native Infantry**, 1962, pp. 222 ff.
7. F(oreign) S(ecret) C(onsultations), National Archives of India 14 January 1825; No.5; Minute, Sir Edward Paget, 15 December 1824.
8. **Ibid.**, Minute, Lord Amherst, 3 January 1825.

9. Details, H. K Barpujari, **Problem of the Hill Tribe: North East Frontier**, 1970. vi,p. Sir Alexander Mackenzie, **History of the Relations of the Government with the Hill Tribes of the North East Frontier of Bengal, 1884**, p.59.
10. The Commissioner had informed Calcutta that the men of the local corps had expressed their loyalty to the government and some of them even offered their services against the rebels. Towards the close of the year, after the defection of Raja Kunwar Singh of Jagadishpur, the Hindustanis on the Ist ALI became restless, but any overt act of mutiny was prevented by the prompt despatch of the doubtful to the outposts and by mixing the rest with the Gorkhas and other local men in the regiment. See H K Barpujari, **Assam in the Days of the Company, Gauhati**, 1965, p. 165 ff.
11. B(engal) J(udicial) P(roceedings, West Bengal State Archives, Calcutta) 1 October 1857; No. 306; 19 November 1857; No. 2184; 31 December 1857; No. 736.
12. A(ssam) S(ecretariat) R(ecords, Gauhati), Letters issued to Government, V. 22, From Colonel Francis Jenkins, 12 June 1857.
13. Quoted, L W Shakespeare, **History of the Assam Rifles**, 1929, pp. 42ff, see also Barpujari, **Op.cit.**, V ii, 1976, pp. 52-54; Mackenzie, **op.cit** pp. 38-41; Captain St John F. Michell, **Report on the North East Frontier of India**, 1883, pp. 66-68.
14. General Orders of the commander-in-Chief, 3 No. 400 (3 May) 1861. These regiments were at first numbered the 46th, 47th and 48th respectively, but when the five Gorkha regiments' were withdrawn from the general list and numbered

- separately from 1st to 5th on the direction of Secretary of State, they were renumbered from 42nd to 44th. Although the old title "Assam" and "Sylhet" was granted officially it was not used in the army Lists until 1865. General Orders, No. 990(29 October) 1861; MP, Letter from Secretary of State, No. 80, 18 May 1861.
15. On 712 of all ranks, organised in eight companies, of one subadar, one jemadar, five each of havildars and raiks, two drummers and 75 private per company. See also F G Cardew, **A Sketch of the Services of the Bengal Native Army**, 1903, p. 300 ff.
 16. Quoted, Hiralal Singh, **Op.cit.**
 17. Details, K M L Saxena, **Op.cit.**, pp.92ff.
 18. B J P , 10 August 1857; No. 813.
 19. MP November 1862: No. 729; H W Norman to Adjutant General of Army, 25 November 1862. There was however a marked tendency towards the class company system. In December 1865 for example, the 42nd was composed of two Sikh companies; four Gorkha companies, twenty five percent of each of these four having Jharu was or local tribes and two of Hindustanis, one Mussalman and the other Hindu. From then on only Gorkhas came to be recruited until by January 1885 all three regiments became Gorkha regiments and were styled, the 42nd, 43rd and 44th Gorkha Light Infantry receiving the title "Rifles" a year later. Before the Great War (1914) these regiments were placed in the Gorkha Brigade and renumbered: the 42nd became the 6th Gorkha Rifles; the 44th, 1st battalion 8th Gorkha Rifles and the 43rd the 2nd Battalion, 8th Gorkha Rifles. These numbers continued till

- 1947 when in accordance with a tripartite agreement between Britain, India and Nepal the 6th Gorkhas, or King Edward's Own, was transferred to Britain, and the 8th remained in India, its present HQ being Shillong. See Colonel H J Huxford, **History of the 8th Gurkha Rifles**, Vol. 1, Aldershot, 1925.
20. BJP July 1861: Nos 252-253; Campbell to Hopkinson, 22 May; to Jenkins, 7 June.
 21. See Imdad Hussain, "Shan Militia: Origins of the Para-Military System in Assam", in J B Bhattacharjee (ed), **Studies in the History of North East India**, Shillong, 1986.
 22. AJM Mills, **Report on the Province of Assam**, Calcutta 1854, vide Appendix N, Jenkins to Mills, 21 May 1853.
 23. FPC 4 June 1852 : No. 98; Jenkins thus describes this policy: "with so many totally barbarous (tribes) on the border hills, one must maintain small detached military posts along the hills; but to employ on this duty men of the light infantry is very detrimental to their discipline and accompanied by much inconvenience in providing for them the supplies which sepoys of that class expect; it would be seen therefore far better that all small outposts should be garrisoned by local police corps".
 24. ASR, Series x; letters from Misc. Quarters, Vol. 24; 1860, Campbell to Jenkins, 25 January 1860.
 25. BJP June 1861 ; Nos 387-88; Showers to Adjutant General, 12 June.
 26. For details, B B Mishra **Administrative History of India**, London 1970, p.537; Sir Percival Griffiths, **To Guard**

My People: History of the Indian Police pp. 87 ff; **CE Buckland Bengal Under Lieutenant Governors**, Calcutta 1901, v im pp. 231 f.

27. BJP July 1861: Nos. 252-253; Hopkinson to Campbell, 5 June.

28. **Ibid.** Jenkins to Kendal Coghill, 10 June; also Showers to Deputy Adjutant General, Army Head Quarters, 24 June.

29. BJP December 1861, No. 182; Military Secretary to Bengal; January 1862, No. 271.

* In November 1861 in Phulaguri in Nowgong, the ryots rose up in strength and killed the Assistant Commissioner. The situation was, however, quickly brought under control. Details, Shrutidev Goswami, "Raij versus the Raj", in J B Bhattacharjee (ed) **Op.cit.**, K.N. Dutta, **Landmarks of the Freedom Struggle in Assam**, Gauhati, 1969, pp.27ff.

30. MP February 1862, Nos. 312-313, Lushington to Military Secretary, 23 January.

31. H(ome) P(ublic) P(roceedings, National Archives of India), 11 February 1862: No. 80; Lushington to Home Secretary, 25 January; **et.seq.**

32. **Selections from the Records of the Government of Bengal, No. XXIX, Part I, Papers Relating to the Disturbances in the Cossyah and Jynteeah Hills**, Calcutta, 1863. Colonel Richardson thus wrote of his problems: "for a less extensive disturbance (in 1860 we) had 500 or 600 at our immediate disposal, whereby opposition was at once put down. At present (against) 15,000 men capable of bearing arms, and everyone against us, I can with difficulty if at all, collect 200 men". To Assistant Adjutant General, Presidency, 29 January, 1861.

33. MP December 1862, Nos. 525-27, Showers to Adjutant General, 10 September. Other recommendations related to the creation of a new military Command, the Eastern Frontier District, and the appointment of a Brigadier General, construction of military roads, improvements in supply and transport.
34. BJP April 1863: No. 19, Military Secretary to Bengal, 23 March; Military Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 161, 8 April.
35. BJP April 1863: No. 211. Sir Cecil Beadon, Grant's successor as Lieutenant Governor, emphatically declared, for example, that he had "no wish to see an European soldier stationed anywhere to the eastward of Calcutta or Dum Dum".
36. BJP June 1863: No. 377; Haughten to Bengal, 16 April.
37. For details, H K Barpujari, **Problem of the Hill Tribes: North East Frontier, Gauhati**, 1976, V. ii, pp. 88 ff; Arabinda Deb, **Bhutan and India**, Calcutta, 1976; pp. 139 ff. The Secretary of State, Sir Charles Wood is said to have remarked: "it was disgraceful to the officers in command if bows and arrows drive armstrong guns out of the field, we shall be no longer looked up to as invincible". Ironically Colonel Campbell found his career ruined on account of this reverse. For a sympathetic account of the regiment's conduct see (Surgeon) D F Rennie, **Bhotan and the Story of the Dooar War**, London, 1866, p. 201.
38. FPP June 1866, Nos 36-39. Commissioner Lieutenant Colonel Henry Hopkinson called the frontier militarily "indefensible" as it was "a tract to which we can hardly convey troops, a tract into which, if we did get them, we

could not feed them nor move them in any direction, a tract void of roads, covered with forest having a dense undergrowth, and in which divisions or detachments a few miles apart must be lost to one another, a tract in which the most perfect army would soon become disorganised by sickness".