


LANGUAGE AND REALITY :
A STUDY IN THE METAPHYSICS
OF WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS

by

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DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY



THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT OF THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

To



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A B S T R A C T

LANGUAGE AND REALITY : A STUDY IN THE
METAPHYSICS OF WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS

Wittgenstein's Tractatus has played a crucial role in twentieth century Anglo-American philosophy. The Logical Positivists in the beginning of this century treated the book as their Bible. It inspired the positivistic movement in philosophy. This book ushered in a new era in philosophy. Surprisingly, the positivists who were influenced by this work were anti-metaphysicians whereas the Tractatus itself is a metaphysical treatise par excellence. If one is asked to name a work of metaphysics of high rank, at once Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico - Philosophicus comes to mind.

Though Wittgenstein wrote two important books, it is commonly believed that there are two Wittgensteins, namely, the early and the later Wittgenstein, yet it can be shown that in a very deep sense there is a continuity between the two Wittgensteins. In both the works, Wittgenstein was concerned with finding out the relationship between language and reality. However, in my work I have not spelt out the nature of relationship between the two works except cursory reference to the later work. I have concentrated only on the metaphysics contained in the Tractatus.

The dissertation consists of nine chapters. In the first chapter, I have spelt out in detail, the nature of metaphysics. The English word 'metaphysics' originated from the Greek words 'meta ta physika'. It was coined by the librarian who was trying to classify the works of Aristotle. There was a work of Aristotle which was unnamed. The librarian wanted to classify it. Out of disgust he threw the book and accidentally it fell after Aristotle's work on physics. Since it came after physics the librarian named it metaphysics. Though the coinage of the term owes its origin to an accident, the title is suggestive of the subject-matter contained in the work of Aristotle. Metaphysics literally means a discipline which comes after physics. Physics here stands for all sciences including mathematical and formal ones. Different sciences employ certain categories, concepts and methods of their investigations of reality. Metaphysics seeks to examine critically these categories and concepts. According to Aristotle, metaphysics is the 'First Philosophy'. It studies the basic assumptions and concepts used in different sciences. That is why Aristotle defined metaphysics as the study of 'Being qua Being'. Aristotle was very much ambivalent on the distinction between philosophy, metaphysics and ontology. Strawson has classified metaphysics into two types -

(i) descriptive metaphysics and (ii) revisionary metaphysics. Descriptive metaphysics seeks to describe the actual structure of thought. Kant and Aristotle may be regarded as descriptive metaphysicians. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant was concerned with unearthing the structure of human thought. In other words, descriptive metaphysics concerns itself with description of actual structure of thought. Revisionary metaphysics, on the other hand, seeks to propound a better structure. In other words, revisionary metaphysics seeks to revise or modify the structure. Hume, Leibnitz and Hegel may be treated as revisionary metaphysicians. However, both the types of metaphysics present before us a vision or a total picture of reality. Metaphysics is concerned with a vision. Descriptive metaphysics presents before us a vision of the actual structure of thought. Revisionary metaphysics presents before us a revised vision or a picture. In this respect, metaphysics resembles poetry or literature as a whole. A poet sometimes presents before us a vision of reality. The only difference between metaphysics and poetry is this: a metaphysician gives us arguments in support of his theory, whereas the poet presents his vision with the help of similies and metaphors. In this connection, I wish to mention that Wittgenstein's metaphysics is a unique type in itself.

It does not lend itself either to the category of descriptive or revisionary metaphysics.

The second chapter is entitled 'Methods of Metaphysics'. In this chapter, I have discussed in detail the methods of science and those of metaphysics. I have argued that broadly speaking, the method of science is hypothetico-deductive in nature, whereas the method of metaphysics is always a priori in nature. This means that the method of metaphysics or philosophy in general is always conceptual and not empirical. Different Sciences except mathematics depend on observation and experiment, whereas metaphysics does not take resort to either observation or experiment. In this chapter, I have shown how Wittgenstein has arrived at his metaphysics through philosophical study of language. Language is a means of communication. Wittgenstein probably thought that the best method of studying reality is through the study of language. He accepted the extensional or truth-functional analysis of language as envisioned in the Principia Mathematica of Russell and Whitehead. A truth-function is a compound proposition whose truth-value is determined by the truth-value of its constituent propositions. Ultimately one reaches, in the process of analysis, elementary propositions.

All these elementary propositions are the pictures of fact, I have pointed out that this is a novel way of philosophising. Metaphysical conclusions have been arrived at through an analysis of language.

The third chapter is entitled 'The World as the Totality of Facts'. In this chapter, an attempt has been made to spell out in detail Wittgenstein's view of the world as the totality of facts. In this connection, I have elaborated certain key concepts such as 'world', 'object', 'fact' and 'thing'. According to Wittgenstein, the world is the totality of facts. A fact consists of objects. In other words, a fact is a concatenation of objects. This might look strange to say that the world consists of facts. On the level of commonsense, we believe that the world consists not of facts but of things in general. The world consists of human beings, animals and plants. But contrary to commonsense belief Wittgenstein believes that the world consists of facts. The ontology of facts is derived from his extensional view of language. According to Wittgenstein, the description of the world in terms of facts can only present a complete picture of the world. I have shown that by describing the world as the totality of facts and not of things, Wittgenstein has drawn attention to an

unnoticed feature about the world. A metaphysician sometimes presents before us, draws our attention to unnoticed aspects of the world. In this sense, the philosopher or the metaphysician resembles a poet. I have shown in this chapter that the concepts 'world', 'fact' and 'object' are metaphysical entities.

The fourth chapter is entitled 'Sentence and Proposition'. In this chapter, I have spelt out in detail, the distinction between sentence and proposition. A sentence is language-bound, whereas a proposition is not language-bound. The same proposition can be expressed by means of different sentences belonging to different languages. I have critically examined, in this chapter, the nature of an elementary proposition. Elementary propositions have been treated as the building blocks of human thought by Wittgenstein. They are the limiting cases of propositions. In other words, they are the rock bottom of propositional thinking. But what are they? Why did Wittgenstein believe in such entities? In what sense such entities are possible? In answer to such questions I have suggested that the elementary propositions were demands of a particular type of analysis. An elementary proposition is not the result of a discovery but the result of a particular

philosophical demand. If one applies the truth-functional analysis of language one will come across three types of molecular propositions. They are tautologies contradictions and contingents. A tautology is true in all possible cases. A contradiction is false in all possible cases. A contingent proposition is sometimes true and sometimes false. In other words, the truth-value in the main line of a tautology is all 'Ts'. The truth-value of a contradictory proposition in the main line is all 'Fs', whereas the truth-value for a contingent proposition in the main line are some 'Ts' and some 'Fs'. To be consistent, Wittgenstein should have treated the constituent propositions of both tautology, contradictory and contingent as elementary ones. On the other hand, he gave the status of elementary proposition only to the constituents of the contingent one. I have also argued in this chapter that the elementary proposition cannot be treated as proposition worth the name. An elementary proposition has been defined by Wittgenstein as consisting of mere names cannot work as a proposition. Theoretically speaking a proposition must have some descriptive content. An elementary proposition does not have any descriptive content. Ipso facto an elementary proposition cannot be treated as a genuine proposition.

The fifth chapter is entitled 'Names and Meaning'. In this chapter, I have spelt out in detail Wittgenstein's views on names and meaning. In this connection, I have distinguished between a grammatical proper name and a logical proper name. A grammatical proper name is not a name in the strict sense of the term. On this point, Wittgenstein agrees with Russell. Both of them argued that grammatical proper names have descriptive content, whereas logical proper names are only indicators. A logical proper name is just like a Euclidean point in geometry. A logical proper name only indicates but does not describe. An elementary proposition consists of names. These names have meanings. The meaning of a name is the object. Propositions do not have meaning. They have only sense. I have argued in this chapter that Wittgenstein has used both name and meaning in a strange sense. I have shown that the extensional view of language together with elementary propositions forced him to such a view of name and meaning. If an elementary proposition consists of names and if names are mere indicators then meanings cannot be more than designations.

The sixth chapter is entitled 'Relation of Language to Reality'. In this chapter, an attempt has

been made to discuss in detail the picture theory of language as envisaged in the Tractatus. Language has been treated as picture by Wittgenstein. It is a logical picture not a physical one. I have argued in this chapter that a picture theory of language was a necessary outcome of his extensional view of language. The extensional analysis of language ultimately ends up in an elementary proposition. These elementary propositions consist of logical proper names. Names are mere indicators. They do not have any descriptive content. If at this stage one asks the question what is the relationship between language and reality, in answer to this it can be said that it is a kind of picturing. Elementary propositions at this stage can be said to be picturing it. This picturing is a type of showing. Language at this stage does not say, does not describe. It indicates, designates or pictures.

The seventh chapter is entitled 'Limits of the World'. In this chapter, an attempt has been made to describe in detail the idea of sayable and showable with reference to both Kant and Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein claimed that there is a limit to thought. This limit is set by our language. That is why he asked us to remain silent where we cannot speak. Whereas one cannot speak

thereof one must be silent. This dictum of Wittgenstein has puzzled subsequent commentators. Some of them discovered mystical element in the Tractatus. I have argued that the extensional analysis of language commits him to such a position. The elementary propositions are the limiting cases of human thought and they are constituted by logical proper names. A proposition consisting of pure names cannot be used in linguistic communication. A proposition in order to be used in linguistic communication must have some descriptive element howsoever minimal it may be. This ultimately compelled Wittgenstein to take resort to silence. ✓ Where linguistic communication fails all communication fails. Therefore, one has to take resort to silence. On the other hand, for Kant when we transgress the boundaries of phenomena we end up in antinomies. But there is a sense in which both Kant and Wittgenstein can be said to be dealing with the same subject. Both of them were concerned with exploring and delimiting the conditions of Thought. Kant made a distinction between the phenomena and the noumena. We can talk about phenomena. But noumena is unknown and unknowable. For Wittgenstein, only compound propositions can be talked about, whereas elementary propositions cannot be put to any use.

The eighth chapter is entitled 'Language, World and Value'. In this chapter, I have spelt out in detail Wittgenstein's views on value. In this respect, Wittgenstein resembles Kant. As Kant put value in the sphere of noumena, similarly Wittgenstein put values beyond the world. The phenomenon of Kant is the world for Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein claimed that values cannot be put into words. Ethics and aesthetic fall beyond the world. I wish to point out that Wittgenstein is not a naturalist. He does not want to reduce and explain values in terms of fact. Both Kant and Wittgenstein are opposed to this. This might have inspired the logical positivists to treat value judgements as a variety of emotive expressions. Value judgements are not pictorial. There are no elementary propositions in the sphere of values. This is fact-value dichotomy. The fact-value dichotomy is endemic to western thought. Truth-functional or extensional analysis does not apply to value judgements.

The ninth chapter is entitled 'Conclusion'. In this chapter I have tried to summarise the findings of different chapters. Besides, I have pointed out that Kant and Wittgenstein concern themselves with finding out the nature of the world. Both of them tried to delimit


the bounds of language, thought and communication. For Kant, the world is intelligible in terms of categories. We describe the world, talk about the world by means of these categories. The categories are given to us. They constitute the ultimate building blocks of human thought. For Kant, whatever is can be described, can be talked about. Whatever cannot be talked about belongs to noumena. That is why Kant claims that the noumenon is unknowable. If by knowability it means application of thought, categories, the noumena cannot be known. But Kant was ambivalent on this point. On the one hand, he maintains that noumenon is unknowable. On the other hand, he puts values in the world of noumena. As we have already said the phenomenon of Kant is the world of Wittgenstein, but with a difference. At the core the world is indescribable. We cannot talk about it. According to Wittgenstein, our categories of Thought ultimately fails to describe the world. This indescribability of the world springs from his extensional view of language. Wittgenstein mistakenly thought that language is a truth-function, particularly the descriptive language. Moreover, his nagging obsession with clarity forced on him such a conclusion. This he partly owes to the influence of Russell. Both of them at a certain stage of their philosophical career were amazed by precision, exactitude and non-equivocation in

mathematical reasoning. This made them think that there is a method of exact description of the world. Wittgenstein proceeded in the direction of elementary proposition. Both Kant and Wittgenstein were metaphysicians par excellence in the sense that they were concerned with totality. Both of them tried to present a synthetic vision of reality. Kant succeeded in describing the ultimate nature of the world. He unearthed the basic categories that underlie the basic structure of thought. Kant was not obsessed with mathematical precision. On the other hand, mathematical precision and clarity landed Wittgenstein in elementary propositions, names and objects. As the Euclidian world consists of geometrical points, similarly Wittgenstein's world consists of points and pointers. In the level of Thought the ultimate constituents are logical proper names. In the level of the world the ultimate constituents are the objects. Both language and reality meet at this stage. Their structure is isomorphic. Language cannot be treated as picture. As I have already pointed out this was not a discovery by Wittgenstein about the world, rather it was a demand of a particular type of analysis of language. The truth-functional and the extensional view of language can be accepted only with certain conditions. May be, in formal logic where we are interested to find out truth-values

of propositions we may accept the truth-functional analysis as a suitable method. But this does not tell us whatsoever about the ultimate nature of language or world. I wish to point out that Wittgenstein surely went wrong on this point. He thought mistakenly that truth-functional analysis throws light on the ultimate nature of both language and reality. I wish to maintain that it does neither. Though both Kant and Wittgenstein were concerned with the world yet both of them have different axe to grind. Kant wanted to give a metaphysical defence to the Newtonian world view and ultimately to Newtonian mechanics. For Kant, the world is not only describable by means of categories but can be explored and investigated with the help of Newtonian mechanics. Kant's method heralds the limitless possibility of scientific exploration. On the other hand, Wittgenstein (knowingly or unknowingly) tried to give a defence to truth-functional logic, and thereby treating the world as indescribable. Both Kant and Wittgenstein were metaphysicians. Kant can be treated as a descriptive metaphysician. But it is difficult to categorise Wittgenstein. However, it can be shown that he has leaning towards revisionary metaphysics

It is sometimes argued that Wittgenstein first had his view of the world as consisting of facts and then

applied truth-functional analysis of language to justify it, I can only point out the following in this connection. What came first and what came last is of no philosophical importance. But the point remains that the view that the world is the totality of facts and the view that the descriptive language ultimately consists of elementary propositions are complementary to each other. If one starts from the extensional view of language one will end up in facts and vice versa.




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
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"Language and Reality : A Study in the Metaphysics of
Wittgenstein's Tractatus" by Sri Samarendra Kumar Roy
has been done under my supervision and is fit for
submission for Ph. D. degree. To the best of my
knowledge and belief it has not been submitted else-
where for a degree.

SHILLONG
THE 12/10 1984


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PREFACE

Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-philosophicus is a unique product in the history of philosophy. It reflects his profound reasoning and brilliant imagination. The ideas of the Tractatus are so deep and concealed that it is very difficult to comprehend them. It was published over sixty years ago. But the interest in it seems to be increasing day by day. This is due to the fact that it had enormous impact on the philosophical thought during the last half century. The Tractatus profoundly influenced the major contemporary philosophical movements like logical atomism, logical positivism and the ordinary language philosophy. Even the analytic philosophers who remained apart from these groups have been greatly influenced by the ideas of the Tractatus.

Just after the beginning of this century the Tractatus was written. In it one gets a clear account of the position that Wittgenstein reached in logic, theory of knowledge and metaphysics. He was strongly influenced by the ideas of Russell and there are many points of affinity with Russell's philosophy of logical atomism. Later on Wittgenstein abandoned many assumptions on which the Tractatus was based. His two works, the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations mark an important stage in the development of his philosophy and indeed in the philosophy of twentieth century. It is indisputable that in this century no other philosopher has contributed more in the realm of philosophy than Wittgenstein did. It remains to be seen what the appraisal of posterity will be concerning the value of the Tractatus. But the spirit of the Tractatus pervades the current philosophical thought. There can be no doubt that it will continue to exert its influence for many years to come.

Since the Tractatus forms a milestone in the history of philosophical thought, a critical study of it is philosophically worth-rewarding. Therefore, I have chosen this topic for my dissertation. In this I have made a humble attempt to dig out the metaphysical foundation of the Tractatus.

The dissertation consists of nine chapters including introduction and conclusion. Briefly, each chapter runs as follows :

In the Introductory Chapter, an attempt has been made to delineate, in brief, the nature of metaphysics. The possibility of alternative types of metaphysics has been discussed. All these discussions are necessary to determine Wittgenstein's place as a metaphysician.

The Second Chapter is entitled 'Methods of Metaphysics'. In this chapter, the distinction between the methods of science and that of metaphysics has been discussed in detail. The bearing of extensional view of language on Wittgenstein's metaphysics has also been discussed. On this point, I have compared Wittgenstein's method with that of Russell's. In sum, Wittgenstein's method has been distinguished from his classical counterpart.

The Third Chapter is entitled 'The World as the Totality of Facts'. In this chapter, an attempt has been made to spell out, in detail, Wittgenstein's view of the world as the totality of facts. In this connection, I have tried to elaborate the nature of fact, certain key concepts such as 'world', 'object', 'fact' and 'thing', have been discussed and examined in detail. I tried to explain how Wittgenstein used his key terms, and supply the basis for understanding his thought.

The Fourth Chapter is entitled 'Sentence and Proposition'. In this chapter, different views relating to the nature of sentence and proposition have been discussed. Moreover, Wittgenstein's views on the nature of elementary proposition have been critically examined. Because elementary propositions play a crucial role in Wittgenstein's metaphysics.

The Fifth Chapter is entitled 'Names and Meaning'. In this chapter, Wittgenstein's views on names and meaning have been discussed and examined in detail. His views on meaning and metaphysics are interconnected.

The Sixth Chapter is entitled 'Relation of Language to Reality'. In this Chapter, Wittgenstein's picture theory of language has been discussed in detail. An attempt

has been made to bring out the bearing of the picture theory on Wittgenstein's metaphysics.

The Seventh Chapter is entitled 'Limits of the World'. In this chapter, Wittgenstein's views on 'sayable' and 'unsayable' have been discussed and examined. In this connection, an attempt has been made to compare and contrast different views on the limits of the world.

The Eighth Chapter is entitled 'Language, World and Value'. In this chapter, I have discussed Wittgenstein's view that ethics and religion fall outside the world. The fact-value dichotomy as envisaged by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus has been examined in detail.

The Ninth Chapter is entitled 'Conclusion'. In this chapter, I have summed up my findings. In other words, my objective throughout the dissertation has been to highlight the mutual connection between his views of Language and the World.

My study is selective in the sense that I have concentrated solely on Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and reality. In exploring the metaphysical foundation of the Tractatus I have almost ignored those parts of it which deal with the technical problems of logic and the philosophy of mathematics. My principal endeavour has been to demonstrate the continuity of Wittgenstein's thought. In doing so I have hoped to avoid superfluity.

In writing this dissertation, I am indebted to many people for their generous help without which it would have been an extremely difficult task for me.

I am exceptionally grateful to my guide Dr. N. Malla, Reader and Head of the Department of Philosophy, North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong for his searching comments and invaluable guidance at every step of my work. For first suggesting the idea of writing a thesis, I am indebted to my cousin sister Late Srimati Sukriti Das in whose memory the work is dedicated. I owe an enormous debt of thanks to my colleague-friends Dr. G. Kumar, Sri J.K. Borkakoti, Sri Alemba and Sri C. Khalong for their constant encouragement and anxious enquiries about the thesis.

I wish to express my respectful gratitude to my brother-in-law Sri Radhesh Das for providing me with an ideal and friendly setting for writing and thinking during my stay at Shillong. I am deeply indebted to him for his unfailing love and affection for me. To Sri I Yanger, Principal, Fazl Ali College, Mokokchung, I am grateful for kindly granting occasional leave of absence during my study.

SHILLONG

The 12th Oct '1984

Samarendra Kumar Roy
SAMARENDRA KR. ROY

ABBREVIATIONS

BB	:	The Blue and Brown Books
PG	:	Philosophische Grammatik
NB	:	Notebooks 1914-1916
PB	:	Philosophische Bemerkungen
PI	:	Philosophical Investigations
T	:	Tractatus Logico-philosophicus

CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

It is very difficult to suggest any clear and precise definition of the term 'metaphysics'. It has been used in a variety of senses.

The term 'metaphysics' is derived from the Greek words 'meta ta physika' which literally means 'after the things of nature'. It is an expression used by the Hellenistic and later commentators to refer to Aristotle's untitled group of texts. Aristotle himself called the subject of these texts 'first philosophy', theology and sometimes wisdom. The phrase 'ta meta physika biblia' which literally means 'the books after the books on nature' was not used by Aristotle himself. It was actually the librarian who classified and categorised Aristotle's works apparently introduced the phrase.

Aristotle's conception of 'first philosophy' is very difficult to ascertain. Andronicus Rhodes who edited Aristotle's writings (approximately 70 B.C.) decided to place the treatises dealing with 'first philosophy' 'after the physics'. As a result the term 'metaphysics'

meaning 'after physics' came into being as a synonym for 'first philosophy'. Aristotle made frequent contrast of things 'prior and better known to us' with things 'prior and better known in themselves'. In order to explain why the treatise on 'first philosophy' should come 'after the books on physics' the later classical and medieval philosophers took this title to mean that the subject discussed in the metaphysics came 'after the things of nature'. And because the subjects discussed in metaphysics were further removed from sense perception they are more difficult to understand.

Thus the term 'metaphysics' signifies many things. In the medieval and modern philosophy it has been taken to mean the study of things transcending nature. It is a study of thing or things which exist separately from nature. This particular conception of metaphysics gave to 'meta' a philosophical meaning which it did not have in classical Greek. Since Kant metaphysics has come to mean a priori speculation which cannot be answered by scientific observation and experiment. That it is anything abstruse and highly theoretical was a popular and common notion of metaphysics in the eighteenth century. In Hume's terminology, metaphysics means anything 'excessively subtle'. The

association of metaphysics with the spiritual, the religious and even with the occult has also been a popular notion of metaphysics.

In modern philosophy, the term 'metaphysics' has often been taken to mean that it generally deals with questions about the kinds of things that there are and about their modes of being. The subject-matter of metaphysics not only includes the concepts of existence, things, property, event; but it also includes the distinctions between the particulars and universals, individuals and classes. It also includes the nature of relation, change, cause; and the nature of mind, matter, space and time. In the last two centuries, the subject-matter of metaphysics mainly includes questions about the reality of the external world, the existence of other mind, the possibility of a priori knowledge, and the nature of sensation, memory, abstraction and so on. In recent philosophical usage, however, these are included in epistemology or theory of knowledge.

The very word metaphysics generates a lot of controversy, and almost all the problems discussed in metaphysics are controversial. It is, therefore, quite natural that there is little agreement among the

metaphysicians in regard to their aim and purpose.

Metaphysics claims to tell us what the real nature of thing is or what really exists. A metaphysician is preoccupied with 'reality' as opposed to mere 'appearance'. In the language of Bradley, metaphysics is,

an attempt to know 'reality' as against mere 'appearance' or the study of the first principles or ultimate truths, or again the efforts to comprehend the universe not simply piecemeal or by fragments, but somehow as a whole.¹

The interest of the metaphysicians in these concepts springs from two sources. First, it springs from the reflection that the surface-show of things very often lends misinterpretating to them. As a result, we are led to determine their real constitution as opposed to their apparent constitution. Secondly, their interests spring from the need to specify what different kinds of things are there in the world. It is a need which presses itself upon our attention when we wonder whether, for example, minds or numbers are independent existents. The first of these tasks seems to belong to the scientists. For, science also makes constant use of the distinction between the apparent and the real. But the metaphysicians do not accept this proposal to minimise

their labours.

Metaphysics is commonly presented as the most fundamental and also the most comprehensive of all the branches of study. It is fundamental because the question about what there is and about the ultimate nature of things underlie all particular enquiries. For example, if we want to assess the results of mathematical investigations it is necessary to determine the ontological status of mathematical object. And accordingly, this leads to discussions in which the metaphysician may take interest. The claim that metaphysics is to be comprehensive, follows from the reflection that questions about existence and reality, about actual and potential being and also about causation cut across the boundaries of particular sciences. Such kind of reflection arises in connection with every sort of subject matter. The point of view of science being selective it neglects what it does not select. Hence its knowledge is not full and complete. Our environment is such that its different aspects cannot be separated from one another. Facts criss-cross the field of one science to that of another science. Thus, they transcend the limits of any given science. This character of science points to a more comprehensive

knowledge of the world from all possible points of view. By combining the results of all sciences we get a synthetic view of the world which is the task of the metaphysicians. Thus metaphysics is comprehensive just because of its vast generality.

The claim that metaphysics is comprehensive can be justified in another way. It is customary to say that sciences like physics, chemistry, mathematics, etc. are departmental studies. Each of them deal only with a part or a particular aspect of reality. Each particular science investigates into a definite portion or a cross-section of reality. It looks at the world of facts from a particular angle of vision. But metaphysics by contrast, is concerned with the world as a whole. This is the reason why the metaphysicians are unwilling to accept the suggestion that the scientist must be left to determine the real nature of things. For example, a scientific theory may, no doubt, explain the real constitution of matter or the fundamental mechanisms of the human body. But it cannot draw a distinction between appearance and reality in an entirely general way. Moreover, the scientific theory cannot give us an instance whether matter is the ultimate reality as materialist supposes or whether it is itself a manifestation of spirit as Hegel tried to argue.

The contrast between science and metaphysics is sometimes developed yet in another way. It is popularly said that the particular sciences are carried out under certain assumptions. And it is the business of metaphysics to make these assumptions explicit in order to justify them or to correct them. It is also said that whereas particular sciences are in part credulous, metaphysics is itself critical. Metaphysics is self-critical because it proceeds without assumptions. The reason for making this contrast between science and metaphysics is that the results of all the sciences taken together cannot satisfy human intellect. The various reports given by different sciences must be co-ordinated and harmonised with each other. Metaphysics is a critical reflection on sciences. It seeks to harmonise the conflicting results of the sciences.

Further, all sciences make certain assumptions in common. For example, human reason can truly comprehend the world of facts and their causal relations in nature, the discovery of which is the end of scientific explanation. Again, they assume the existence of some fundamental realities such as, mind, matter, time, space, etc.. But though for science the assumptions are necessary it itself cannot justify these

assumptions. Metaphysics submits the assumptions of the sciences to a critical examination and enquiries into their rationality.

since metaphysics claims to be uniquely self-critical, its propositions must be free from intellectual challenges. Metaphysics leaves nothing unquestionable.

"The only propositions with which a metaphysician could properly be content were propositions whose truth could not be denied, or whose truth was seen to be involved in their own attempted denial."²

Particular sciences, on the other hand, are not self-critical, since their propositions are not free from intellectual challenge. The findings of all other sciences are regarded as provisional as they are in need of revision and rectification by the metaphysicians.

Descartes tried to offer a demonstration in order to provide a guarantee for the findings of the sciences which were open to doubts. For Descartes, the truths of metaphysical propositions were guaranteed, by their connection with the cogito which could not be intellectually questioned. Thus, according to Descartes, since metaphysical propositions are intellectually impregnable

they contrast with the beliefs of common-sense. The metaphysical propositions also contrast with the pronouncements of the sciences when these are considered as devoid of metaphysical guarantee. The metaphysical propositions being the products of reason derive their unique certainty when the faculty of reason is put to work in the fullest and freest way. Thus, according to Descartes, metaphysics is not only fundamental of all enquires, it also relies on reason alone for its results.

But whatever claims metaphysics may have the reaction against it is also not less important. Many critics of metaphysics are of the opinion that the above mentioned claims of metaphysicians could be justified if metaphysics were a factual science providing us with knowledge of things or aspects of reality, which lie beyond the purview of senses. Such knowledge can be had only on the strength of rational insight. This view is supported by practising metaphysicians. Plato made a distinction between 'things seen' and 'things unseen'. He maintains that the only 'things unseen' are the proper object of knowledge. From his time a strong tendency has developed to identify the province of metaphysician with that of

supersensible or the realm of the intellect. Aristotle also drew a contrast between sensible and insensible substance and he assigned the investigation of the insensible substance to the 'first philosophy' or metaphysics. Since then many of medieval and early modern philosophers conceived of God, the being of being, as an entity without bodily extension. Popularly it is believed that behind the phenomena which present themselves in day to day experience, there are realities whose nature and existence can be established only by the intellect. These realities can be described as noumena of intelligible objects. According to their view, the proper concern of metaphysics is to give us knowledge about the noumena. Plato thought that by the exercise of our rational faculty we can know the reality without the help of sense perception.

The study of being or existence as such is known as ontology. Metaphysics, according to Aristotle, is the science of being and of the first-principle. Metaphysics or ontology starts with the reflective distinction between appearance and reality. Our reflection shows that things are not always what they seem to be. Thus, we mean by 'appearance', objects as they are given in our immediate experience. By reality we

mean objects apart from and independent of our experience of them. Ordinary science can give us only the knowledge of the characters of existent facts but not of their existence or reality itself. Natural sciences tell us what a thing is or how it is related to other things.

But once we make this distinction between appearance and reality we cannot but invite troubles. If the objects of sense experience are appearances or phenomena then they cannot be regarded as things in themselves or reality. The distinction between things as appear to us and things as they are in themselves seems to be inevitable. In our experience things may appear to our perceptions as very different from what they are in themselves. If this is the case, then whatever character appears to our sense perception is an appearance. Yet sense appearances must be appearance of some reality or other which is given to our sense-perception. But since reality must be different from what it appears to be, we have no means to know the reality as it is in itself which is independent of sense-perception. Now, if we have no means to know things directly except through the sense experience, then it is quite possible that reality or noumenon,

being supersensible runs the risk of being unknown and unknowable. If by metaphysics we mean the knowledge of things as they are in themselves, and if such knowledge is not possible, then the very possibility of metaphysics as a science of pure being will be at stake. So it must be abandoned.

"The rejection of metaphysics as such is not a new phenomenon which occurred for the first time in the present century. Even in the ancient world the sceptics and the empiricists had considered the gaining of metaphysical knowledge to be impossible...."³

It was in the eighteenth century that the classical criticisms of the claims of metaphysics were first developed by Hume and Kant. Since then much ingenuity has been displayed in showing the untenability of their position. The motive behind the many attacks on metaphysics which were developed by these thinkers and others were various.


Hume, who believed that all knowledge of facts are derived from sense-perception and Kant who also took sense-perception to be the basic though not the whole of human knowledge, rejected the possibility of metaphysics outright. Hume said that all books written on the nature and character of supersensuous realities like God, soul or immortality must be committed to

flames for such books contain nothing but "sophistry and illusion."⁴ Kant was not so thorough-going in his rejection of metaphysics. He held that metaphysical speculation about the supersensible is only natural to human reason. This is because all true knowledge, based on sense-perception, is confined within the world of actual and possible appearances. And our reason naturally forces us to speculate about the realities that appear in these sensible appearances. In Kant's opinion, no true knowledge of the supersensuous thing-in-itself is possible. Because such knowledge can never be based on sense-perception. It is impossible to come to any decision as to the proper nature of the things-in-themselves for their being supersensuous. And nothing can be proved or demonstrated about them which leaves no scope for doubt. Hence metaphysics as the science of the supersensible is impossible.

The contention that there might be science which is at the same time factual and purely intellectual has always been supported by metaphysics. Hume was of the opinion that the sole concern of mathematics is only with the relation of ideas but not with matters of fact. His concern is to make explicit what is implicitly there in the premises. Mathematical

propositions are no doubt necessary, but they fail to give us any information about the world. If any inquiry is to be pronounced on matters of fact its method must be empirical. It cannot be conceptual. And the results of such inquiry can possibly be impregnable. This is because anything established on the basis of experience may be amended or may be withdrawn in the light of further experience. Thus there cannot be any final empirical truth.

In reply to this argument it can be suggested that even if every factual enquiry must begin with experience it is not necessary that it should necessarily terminate in experience. And if so, then it is not unreasonable on the part of metaphysicians to argue from the characteristics and nature of things sensible to the existence and the nature of things supersensible. Kant was very much concerned with the question why should not the metaphysician argue from the characteristics of things sensible to the existence and nature of things supersensible. Here he seemed to show more sympathy with the metaphysicians than with the empiricist. According to Kant, such concepts as cause and substance, as figure primarily in the inference from the phenomenal to the noumenal, have a necessary



character. In Kantian language, they are a priori, as opposed to empirical concepts. But at the same time he denied that they can be used to carry us beyond the range of possible experience. The question 'what brought them about' is a necessary question. It is such a question which we cannot rationally refuse to ask. But the answer to such question must not always be sought within experience. If we try to maintain that there must be first cause, we fail to attach any clear meaning to the concept of cause. For it is an essential idea on the part of a cause that a cause precedes its effect. We can talk about cause so long as we are in the temporal sphere. But once we step outside the sphere of temporal, the concept of cause loses its significance or its determinate character. And what is true of cause here is also true of substance. The concept of substance gets meaning if it is understood as something permanent which persists through change. But if the reference to time is eliminated from the concept of substance we get only the logical notion of that which is always a subject and never a predicate. And in that case we shall be left with an idea which in its pure form is too indeterminate to be put to metaphysical use.

Kant actually did not reject metaphysics as such.

What he really condemned is transcendental metaphysics which claims that knowledge of the super-sensuous reality or noumenon is possible.

The most serious attack on metaphysics as the supposed science of intelligible reality was made by the logical positivists. Wittgenstein was the source of inspiration to modern logical positivists. The positivists' criticism of metaphysics had a tremendous effect on philosophical thinking in the years before and immediately after the second world war. If a metaphysician claims to tell us that what really exists is not chair or leaves but as for instance, monads, then no test will be available to determine the truth of his statement. Such a statement can never be encountered within experience even if the monads are defined as entities. Even their premises will not have particular empirical consequences. But the premises about electrons and other similar unobservable entities which are postulated by the natural scientists are supposed to have particular empirical consequences. Thus metaphysical pronouncements will be compatible with any state of affairs what-so-ever just like the propositions of logic and mathematics. But in that case it will not be possible on the part of a metaphysician to maintain that

metaphysics supplies us with the information about the world, even the unseen world. The positivist thesis is that if metaphysical pronouncements are to make sense, they must, in some way be related to every day experience. But metaphysics is unable to satisfy this test. And the result is that the news it claims to bring is really a news from nowhere.

The positivist attacks against metaphysics have missed the target and metaphysics is not as despicable as they seem to say. Of course, a knowledge of the super-sensible behind the sensible reality will take the form of a mystic insight and controversy in the field will naturally be chronic. But that cannot be the sufficient ground for rejecting metaphysics outright. One must consider carefully what the metaphysicians have to say before one rejects them.

In short, metaphysicians want to say that their propositions possess a peculiar certainty and that they are also significant, as purely analytic propositions are not. In Kantian terminology they pretend to the status of synthetic a priori truths. Against this many critics of metaphysics have made the assumption that a proposition can be synthetic a priori only if it

at once states a truth of fact and can be established by conceptual means alone. But the combination of both is impossible. For, facts must be established empirically. And pure thinking can lead us to the knowledge only of analytic truths. But if we examine carefully Kant's alleged synthetic a priori judgements we find that they make no claims to state facts, not even general facts. The principle of causality is not a very wide empirical truth. It is known in a non-empirical way. And at the same time it is the expression of a rule of procedure which does not tell us what properties things have. Rather it serves to tell us how to interpret them. According to Kant, the principle of this sort has a special kind of necessity, though they do not have the logical necessity. In Kant's opinion, they owe this to the fact that they are prescribed by the human mind as principles specifying what is to count as objective in our experience. Thus we take the principle to be a feature of what is objectively there that no quality is present except in a determinate degree, that nothing ever goes entirely out of existence, that nothing happens except for a reason and so on.

Kant intended his doctrine to have limited

application. Kant is of the opinion that the principles of understanding prescribe the form of the phenomenal world. But according to Kant, there are other aspects of experience also. For example, the activities of the moral agents in regard to which the principles of understanding do not have legislative force. But it is possible to extend the doctrine of Kant. And we can imagine a set of principles which would prescribe the form not of this or that department of experience, but of experience as a whole. This set of principles will tell us how to organise the materials of our ~~exper~~ experience. And in this way we shall be in a position to give a unitary account of them. The concepts of these sort will not only resolve the apparent inconsistencies of science and common-sense, it will also resolve the conflicts between science and religion, and science and morality. We then have a synoptic view of the world. We also have the concepts which will enable us to distinguish the real nature of the world from the surface show of it.

It is an undeniable fact that many of the classical metaphysical systems conform to this sort of scheme. Thus we see in Aristotle's system, the key concepts are teleological and their articulation is

found in the doctrine of four causes. Aristotle's ambition was to find the point of each phenomenon and then specify its place in the articulation of the whole. He carried his task not only at the biological level, but also above and below it. He applied his doctrine in moral, political and social life, on the one hand, and physical sciences on the other.

Finally, in the system of Hegel we find a conscious attempt to produce a metaphysics which claims to be an overall or a synoptic reading of experience. The key notion in Hegel's philosophy is the notion of spirit. And the alleged thesis of Hegelianism is that everything can be understood and explained in terms of this concept. The spirit cannot fulfill its potentialities without working on and against something other than itself. Hegel sought to establish a real connection between one self and the other by conceiving them as manifestations of an all-inclusive Absolute Spirit in which finite selves live and move. So the world constructed by my mental activity naturally corresponds to the world constructed by some other mind and thus the ground of the objectivity of the world of knowledge is the Absolute self. Hegel showed that the

concrete experience requires an object of knowledge as well as the knowing mind. The object depends upon the subject. It cannot exist without being perceived. But mere subject is also an abstraction. The subject for reality depends upon the object or the not-self. And thus the subject and object are strictly correlative aspects of a concrete knowledge situation.

Thus we see that we can make sense of the existence of the world of nature in the system of Hegel. The existence of the world is needed to serve the purposes of spirit. Basing on this concept we make sense of the social world also. Because many of the characteristics of mind are intelligible only when people are aware of one another and know that others are aware of them.

The different metaphysical systems mentioned above seem to show us decisively that to be a metaphysician does not necessarily mean claiming the ability to reveal the truths about the world which lies beyond the reach of human experience. Each of the systems mentioned seem to rest on certain basic ideas or intuitions. The idea is articulated in a series of concepts which are taken as definitions of reality. And they

are applied to the whole range of experience to give an overall reading of experience.

From the above discussion it seems to be clear that the most standard claims for metaphysics can be understood and appreciated with this account of the matter. Since the first principles of a metaphysical system have prescriptive force, they can be thought to compel any rational thinker. And though their certainty is not the certainty of logic, yet it exceeds that of any particular statement of fact. This is because the facts are described only within a framework which is provided by these principles. The system of this sort may not tell us precisely what is there is in the world. Nevertheless, it pronounces on the real character of the world as opposed to the superficial aspect of it.

The metaphysician is mainly concerned with consequences and consistencies. He has a theory to put forward. And this indicates that he must be preoccupied with the logical connections between the concepts which constitute his system. But to say this is not to deny his preoccupation with fact or with probable arguments. Unlike empirical scientists he does not establish new facts. But then he has double

interest in fact. His first task is to see similarities in different areas of fact. It is required for the formulation and application of his theory. And this involves him in reasoning by analogy. His second task is to pay constant attention to the state of factual knowledge in working out and pressing home his central insight. He promises to make sense of all data of experience. Thus, it is improper to say that metaphysicians are indifferent to facts. Rather they have primary interest in fact, though they do not originate any factual proposition.

Metaphysics can be compared with literary text. The interpretations of controversial literary works are sometimes found to be harder than interpretations of metaphysics. There are no definite criteria for deciding among the different conflicting theories. In such cases the best way to follow by each critic is that he should explain his way of looking at the text first. After that he should marshal the points in support of his explanation. And then he can invite the reader to test the matter for himself. But from this we should not conclude that it is a mere chance or simply a matter of psychology which theory will win the approval of the reader. Placing the situation before him the reader will ultimately be in a position to decide the

authenticity of a particular reading than its rivals. And accordingly he will get more enlightenment. For he is now convinced of the fact that this particular theory gives the central points more satisfactorily and does better justice than the others.

The argument of metaphysics like that of literary text reaches no apparent end. It terminates into an insight which is more personal than public. But it will be wrong to think that the notions of truth and falsity leave no application in metaphysics. At least, we can describe a particular type of metaphysics as more illuminating than other. And ultimately we must decide for ourselves which one is really illuminating and which one is not.

According to Wittgenstein, Philosophy is "purely descriptive". (B.B; p-18) He held that philosopher must not take it upon himself to explain anything (B.B; p-125). In philosophy there is no deduction. "We must do away with all explanation", he wrote, "and description alone must take its place." The point of description is the solution of philosophical problems. They are solved not by the amassing of new empirical knowledge, but by the rearrangement of what we already know. (pI, p-109). "Philosophy", he wrote, "simply puts everything before

us, and neither explains nor deduces anything" (pI, sect. 6.126.27, 408).

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein reserved the term metaphysics for misleading philosophy. "metaphysics is philosophy misinterpreted as natural science" (T, 6.53; 6.111). Wittgenstein held that the principal source of philosophical error is the idea that the primary function of language is to describe. What is really the case is that we engage in different 'language games'. Each game serves its own purpose. And each game is authentic in its own level. There is no question of ruling any such game out of court. The fact that the game is played is sufficient evidence that it is appropriate. The different language users are not rivals. We cannot say, for instance, physics or chemistry gives a truer picture than common sense. If we keep these different languages apart, we see that each language has its own point and utility. The idea of finally correct language which would cover and replace them all is really absurd. Therefore, metaphysics in its revised form is nothing, better than the metaphysics in the shape of news from nowhere.

But the above analysis is also based on

questionable assumption. First, it does not seem to us clear whether language games or areas of linguistic activity are as distinct as Wittgenstein thinks to be. Wittgenstein's point is not clear as far as the language games of science and common sense are concerned. For most scientists and many common men think that the scientific account of the physical world gives a truer picture of it than that embodied in the ordinary man's everyday belief. We also cannot agree with the thesis that sufficient authentication is found for language game when we observe that it is actually played. There are, after all, games and games. Enough has been played in the ancient world in a form of game. To appease god many formulas were devised by those who were about to embark. As a result, certain ways of talking had wide use and it was approved. But that fact alone was not sufficient to show that it was legitimate. It could not have been legitimate had there been no god and the people reached their destination safely. To do this is to make the propriety of a language game subject to the tenability of the factual assumptions upon which it is based. This is not to claim that the only use of language is to describe. It is simply to claim a certain priority for the language game in which we say

how things are.

Metaphysics as we have expounded resolves conceptual conflicts by finding a way of speaking which enables us to express the true nature of the world. If we possess such a way of speaking we have a yardstick by which we can determine the ultimate tenability of particular language games, such as, the language of religion, science and so on. It is not axiomatic that each of these language games is in order. The fact that they are constantly used and understood is enough to show that they serve some purpose. But it does not show in itself that they are suitable for the purpose.

Even if the foregoing account of the nature of metaphysics are accepted as generally unquestionable, there are many philosophers who are not ready to accept it. Their contention is that it fails to cover everything that metaphysicians have attempted or are attempting to do. According to them, the above account fails to accommodate the activity pursued by many contemporary analytic and linguistic philosophers. But the activities of these philosophers have a clear affinity with the work of some of the classical metaphysicians.

The classical metaphysicians were sometimes

puzzled about the status of numbers and quantities. As a result, they were compelled to ask the question what there is. Plato, for example, produced argument to show that these must be independently real. Aristotle formulated the doctrine of categories as an answer to them. There are parallels to this controversy in contemporary philosophy. Particularly we find this in the discussion among logicians about names and descriptions. And the same can be noticed in the arguments about the relation between mind and body. The peculiarity of these issues as opposed to issues of classical metaphysicians is that matters of fact do not have any relevance to their solution. We can solve them only by thinking.

Thus we see that there are philosophical activities which are traditionally connected with metaphysics. These activities cannot be brought under the schema given above. These activities are in essence logical or analytic. And in so far as they are confined to them metaphysics cannot be distinguished from analysis. But it is not necessary that metaphysics should confine itself to such enquires.

Metaphysicians have traditionally been speculative

theorists as well as ontologists in restricted sense. It is not possible to set aside speculation as regrettable. And we also cannot say that ontology is arbitrary. It is also not true that we can make an entirely clear-cut distinction between the two. In the recent work of mind-body problem we see that much of it is logical. But the consideration of substance also comes in. Particularly it appears when we discuss the nature of consciousness or the nature of thought. That logical problems are fascinating cannot be denied. But it also should be admitted that interest in them cannot be sustained for long without some external stimulus. And it is metaphysics of the broad kind which can provide us such a stimulus.

In the light of above discussion we can conveniently consider, in brief, different types of metaphysics which will enable us to determine Wittgenstein's place as a metaphysician.

Metaphysical theories are generally divided into two main types, namely, transcendent and immanent. The system of Plato promises that human reason can move beyond the confusing world of sense to the unchanging realities which underlie it. This is a process of enlightenment as well^{as} of liberation. By contrast, the
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materialists and some idealists like Hegel and Bradley show no disposition to turn their backs to every day experience. For them, the opposition between appearance and reality is the opposition between less and more adequate ways of talking which fall within experience. The possibility of transcending experience altogether is set aside as not worth discussing.

Thus it is clear that pure cases of transcendent and immanent metaphysical theories are very difficult to find. Plato is predominantly a metaphysician of transcendental type. But then his thought has a different side to it. Again, the system of materialism is wholly concerned with experience. But many of its opponents, like Bradley, condemned it on the ground that it involves an unjustifiable claim of knowledge of the supersensible. Moreover, the philosophy of Aristotle does not belong to any of these type. There are still other philosophical systems such as analysis which cannot be brought under this classificatory system.

In recent discussions modern analytic philosophers have made a distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics. The descriptive metaphysician attempts to "lay bare the most general features of our

conceptual structure." In other words, the descriptive metaphysician wants "to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world,"⁵ which language reveals. Aristotle and Kant can be bracketed together as practitioners of descriptive metaphysics. Because both of them have very definite weltanschauungen. Both of them carried out systematic enquiry to lay bare the most fundamental and pervasive feature of the world around us. Revisionary metaphysics, on the other hand, is "an attempt to reorder or to reorganize the set of ideas with which we think about the world."⁶

Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus Logico-philosophicus' is considered as a serious metaphysical enterprise. Following Russell, we may call Wittgenstein's metaphysical doctrine 'logical atomism' though this is not a name which he used himself. It is said that Wittgenstein himself was pursuing a metaphysical enquiry when he wrote the Tractatus. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein sought to determine the conditions in which meaningful discourse is possible. He was there primarily concerned with the relations between what is said and the reality which is talked about. In this connection Wittgenstein made a distinction between 'atomic' and 'molecular'

sentences or propositions. According to him, molecular sentences can be reduced to atomic sentences with the help of logical constants. A logician is concerned with the complex formulae. And in order to build it up he requires the notion of : simple letters like 'p' and 'q'. Similarly, Wittgenstein assumed that there must be atomic sentences if there is to be any meaningful discourse about the world.

Obviously the Tractatus is a thoroughly metaphysical work. And the metaphysical tendency which it contains is not a minor one, though it contains some antimetaphysical strain. Yet it is sometimes considered as being antimetaphysical in its outlook. There is some excuse for this interpretation. Because in the end of the Tractatus Wittgenstein himself expressed the view that the correct method would be to prove to any one who wants to say something metaphysical that he has failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his sentences. (T.6.53).

Whereas Aristotle and Bradley persisted in their metaphysics, Wittgenstein repudiated his own doctrine in his later work. In the history of philosophical thought this development is notably unique.

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations contains a detailed criticism of the central doctrine of the Tractatus. A considerable portion of the Investigations is an attack either explicit or implicit, on the earlier work. And in doing so Wittgenstein suggested a new and subtle way of attacking the whole metaphysical enterprise.

In the Investigations, Wittgenstein was convinced of the fact that language should be treated as a viable working institution, or a series of such institution. For, according to him, language is a social phenomenon. It is a cooperative achievement. And it is absurd to think of a purely private language. Language-games like games, need have no external goal, they can be autonomous activities. (P.G., 184) & (201). But the comparison of language to a game was not meant to suggest that language was a pastime, or something trivial. On the contrary, it was meant to bring out the connection of speaking of language and non-linguistic activities. Indeed, the speaking of language is part of community activity, a way of living in society which Wittgenstein calls a 'form of life' (PI., p, 23). It is through sharing or the playing of language-games that language

is connected with our life. (P.G. 65) The very fact that people engage in Linguistic activities knowing what to say or reply in particular context, is sufficient evidence that they are in order as they stand. To consider language from outside and to make an attempt to judge it by abstract principle is a mistake. To pronounce about language in general is not only one-sided but also misleading. It is one-sided because any such pronouncement must be based on a survey of a restricted range of examples. It is misleading because it encourages dogmatism. These difficulties can be avoided in two ways. First, by recognising the multifarious nature of linguistic phenomena, as we actually meet them in real life. And second, by paying proper attention to this diversity. The important thing to be noted in this connection is that not only the meaning of individual words and phrases vary according to the different contexts in which they occur, but the purposes to which language is put ^{are} also extraordinarily diverse.

The above arguments have definite bearing on metaphysics. The metaphysician as presented in the preceding discussion promises an account of experience which is coherent and at the same time comprehensive.

And the circumstance which compels people to seek such an account is the fact that apparently conflicting things can be said of a single situation. This is based on the assumption that each of the different persons concerned is at bottom engaged in the same task. Each of them seeks to characterise and explain what is going on. Wittgenstein's reflection on language becomes relevant here. First, Wittgenstein argued that any comment on linguistic situation as a part of a language-game, which is actually played, must be in order. And if it is so then the question of dismissing them as improper does not arise at all. And second, he argued that the belief that all the speakers in a situation are engaged in the same task, that is, in saying how things are, is unfounded. Instead of trying to decide between the different parties or instead of producing a synthesis of what they all say, we should concern ourselves with the question what each of them are intending to do while saying what he does. And as a result, the presumed conflict disappears, since the point of different utterances are not the same. The different speakers, instead of being rivals, become complementary to each other. Naturally, therefore, the question of choosing between them or reconciling them will be irrelevant and

unnecessary. Even if we choose between them or reconcile them, the result will be something like choosing between or reconciling between the activities of cricketers and baseball players.

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CHAPTER - I I

METHODS OF METAPHYSICS

'Metaphysics' is an ambiguous term. It denotes both subject-matter and method. As a method, it has primarily been speculative.

In ancient Greek, metaphysical speculation was considered as subordinate to moral consideration. Empiricism, scepticism and mysticism were the main philosophical traditions in that period. The sole concern of the Stoics and the Epicureans was to define good life for man. Both Stoicism and Epicurism contained metaphysics even though they sought to define the life of virtue or the life of pleasure.

In the same manner, scepticism and mysticism were predominantly concerned with the practical which was prevalent in the Graeco-Roman world. Scepticism subjected the possibility of knowledge to irreducible doubt. It prevented speculative philosophy by means of universal suspension of judgement. But Mysticism was more tolerant than scepticism so far as speculation is concerned. Whereas the sceptic expected to save men from error, the mystic expected to save men from deficiency of being for communication with one by means of the mystical method of dialectic

and intuition.

The recovery of the speculative philosophy was done by Descartes. He established the rationalist ideal in philosophy. Descartes' primary aim was to discover the secure foundation for science and philosophy. Accordingly, he reconstructed philosophy in accordance with his conception of the mathematical model. The method he followed was the axiomatic deductive method of the seventeenth century mathematics. He considered it as the only valid method of any inquiry. He insisted upon the unity of sciences. According to him, sciences must have their foundation in metaphysics.

Spinoza also followed the rationalist ideal in philosophy. He presented Cartesian philosophy in geometrical model. He put practical content to speculative thought which was absent in the Cartesian philosophy. Spinoza, thus, realised the rationalist ideal in speculative philosophy more perfectly than Descartes had done it.

The rationalist ideal, however, degenerated into various incompatible systems. They are mainly the dualism of Descartes, the monism of Spinoza and the pluralism of Leibnitz. Each of the systems ultimately resorts to dogmatism in order to safeguard his own system against the rival alternative systems.

The rationalist ideal was undermined by the empiricists. The rationalists employed the mathematical model in philosophy. They also believed in innate ideas. The rationalists, thus, sought to form the structure and content of our knowledge about the world out of basic human concepts. The empiricists, on the other hand, maintained that all knowledge originates in experience. The empiricists, thus, relegated the study of nature to physics. To Hume, man himself is the centre of study. Accordingly, he thought it proper to study man by the same empirical method as that of natural sciences. The germ of scepticism spread from Locke's denial of the possibility of knowledge of substance in general. It also spread from Hume's conception of human reason itself. According to Hume, reason cannot explain the principle of causality. The principle of causality was considered by him as mere natural beliefs, as products of experience and as mental disposition. Thus it can be explained only psychologically. Hume also said that speculative metaphysics does not consist in abstract reasoning which is concerned with quality and number. It also cannot consist of empirical reasoning which is concerned with matter of facts. So it should be committed to "the flames for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion."¹

Traditional rationalism led to dogmatism in

speculative philosophy. And traditional empiricism, likewise, led to scepticism. Kant considered it as deadlock which blocked metaphysics from becoming a science. To establish metaphysics as science, Kant put forward a new method in philosophy. This is popularly known as the critical method. Kant critically examined the knowledge given by the mathematical and natural sciences. His aim was to extract the a priori forms, categories, principles and cognitive faculties which are presupposed by these sciences. Hence metaphysics becomes a science when it becomes a critique. In other words, metaphysics becomes a science when it systematically presents, analyses and justifies the a priori elements in all our knowledge.

Kant's critical method resolved Hume's scepticism. Because it revealed an a priori element which has its source in pure understanding. Empiricism rested its philosophy exclusively on percepts. But the percepts are blind without concepts. The pure concepts, on the other hand, are agents the function of which is to synthesise. Their function is to unify the data of experience. By maintaining that experience conditions all human knowledge Kant avoided dogmatism of the rationalist philosophy.

Kant's critique showed that all genuine knowledge is bounded by experience. That is to say, it is conditioned

by sensibility. Kant tried to show that any attempt to get knowledge transcending nature and experience gives rise to fundamental fallacies or it may result in antinomies. These fallacies can be corrected and the antinomies can be resolved only by the application of the critical method. And this forces reason to withdraw from speculation.

After Kant, speculative philosophy was renewed in both reason and experience. Hegel represents nicely the case of speculation from the standpoint of reason. And Bergson represents it from the standpoint of experience. Kant checked reason for he thought that if concepts are extended beyond experience it leads to contradiction. But Hegel is of the opinion that the philosophy of reason treats contradiction as a starting point only. It cannot treat it as stopping place. Hegel said that contradiction can be overcome dialectically. In a higher synthesis reason can assimilate the original opposites. The course of thought and the course of the world reveal dialectically. It culminates in an absolute which includes both substance and subject. The truth is the whole to which all the special sciences make their contributions. The whole is more than its parts which it contains.

Both Bradley and Taylor opposed Hegel on this point

though both of them were Hegelian. Both of them agreed with Hegel on the point that the task of metaphysics is the resolution of the contradictions of appearance and reality. But they repudiated the dialectical method and disregarded speculation. Followers of Bergson withdrew from speculation to experience. But those who preferred experience to reason revived speculative metaphysics. Bergson appealed to intuition to go beyond the abstract concept of reason and to penetrate into the concrete continuous succession of changes of experience. Bergson's method of intuition resembles the mystic attempt for immediate communication with being or reality. The Bergsonian intuition, however, does not grasp the fixed structure of reality which is unchanging. The speculative philosophy which Bergson builds up is popularly known as creative evolution which is based on the intuition of duration.

Traditional empiricism has been sceptical from the start. And since nineteenth century it has been associated with positivism. After Kant, different conception of experience was developed and it was widely accepted. Both traditional empiricists and traditional rationalists regarded experience as a mere collection of discrete sense-data. These sense-data are devoid of genuine relatedness. To provide sense-data, their

relatedness, Kant appealed to a priori reason. Since, Kant, the philosophers came to regard experience as an integrated whole of qualities and relations. This new approach was termed by William James as 'radical empiricism'.

Whitehead developed a different conception of speculative philosophy. His theory reconciles the claims of both reason and experience. It meets the genuine demands of both rationalism and empiricism. According to him, speculative philosophy is both rational and empirical. It is rational because it has internal criterion of coherence. And it is empirical because it has external criterion which interprets every element of our experience. Whitehead, in fact, gave more emphasis on the empirical side of speculative philosophy. He viewed that since speculative philosophy is rooted in experience it must be descriptive. At the same time it must generalise also. Thus he said, "the primary method of philosophy is descriptive generalisation."² Whitehead compared his method to the flight of an aeroplane. As he said, "It starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative generalisation; and it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by rational interpretation."³

The recent thinkers are suspicious of and hostile to speculative philosophy. The logical positivists of this century have vigorously criticised the cognitive claim of speculative philosophy. They argued that if metaphysical statements are guaranteed by the rules of language then they are logically true. In that case they do not say anything of reality since they belong to logic and mathematics. And if they are verifiable in experience, then they belong to empirical sciences. According to the logical positivists, metaphysical statements are neither logical nor empirical statements. On further analysis they turn out to be confused statements. Carnap treated all metaphysical statements as linguistically confused and confusing. Carnap intended to eliminate speculative philosophy altogether. Analytic philosophers agree with the positivist thesis that metaphysical statements contain linguistic confusions.

An appeal to common sense is also regarded as a method to deal with philosophical theories. Moore is the great exponent of this method in recent thought. Moore said that all philosophers get together in subscribing to the beliefs which comprise the common-sense view of the world. Of course, there are disagreements about the logical analysis of these beliefs. Because these logical analyses

are sometimes found to be internally inconsistent. Sometimes they are inconsistent with ordinary meaning of the commonsense beliefs. Sometimes they cannot be supported logically by the commonsense beliefs. In such case, the philosophers must reject the logical analysis. And they should do it by an appeal to commonsense as their touchstone.

Being influenced by the work of Freud, the linguistic philosophers applied the psychoanalytic theory to speculative metaphysics. According to John Wisdom and Moris Lazerowitz, speculative metaphysical theory is a 'verbal dream'. However, Lazerowitz's intention is not entirely therapeutic. Both Wisdom and Lazerowitz admit that metaphysical theories also serve the cognitive purpose. Because they serve the purpose of revealing the features of language which is concealed in familiar formulas.

There was a great change in the conception of philosophy which spread from Cambridge just after the beginning of this century. It was initiated by Russell and Moore. Philosophy was no longer considered as the direct study of thought. It was regarded as the study of thought through the medium of language. Later, Vienna became the centre of this linguistic philosophy. Wittgenstein not only followed the new method but also developed it in

his philosophy. With the help of this method he made great contribution to philosophy, particularly in his later period.

Wittgenstein produced two different philosophies. The first one is the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus which was published in 1921. The second one is the Philosophical Investigations which was published in 1953 two years after his death. Though the two works are different yet there are many lines which connect his early and later philosophy. Wittgenstein considered philosophy as an extraordinarily difficult subject. Naturally, therefore, he was always concerned with the question what is philosophy and how it should be done. It is because of this peculiar attitude of mind we notice changes in doctrines and methods not only in his early philosophy but also in his later works.

Wittgenstein's aim in both the periods was to explain the structure and limits of thought. The method he followed was intended to study the structure and limits of language. He wanted to build up a critique which is similar to Kant's Critique of thought. Because the scope and purpose of both the Critiques are almost the same. Like Kant, he believed that philosophers always make attempt to cross the limits of thought and language. And thereby they fall into a kind of nonsense which seems to give

them genuine thought. But in fact, such attempts do not give us genuine knowledge. Wittgenstein tried to make a clear-cut distinction between sense and nonsense. With this aim in view he sought to discover the exact location of the line which separates sense from nonsense. His purpose was to make the people realise when they had reached it and stop. The right method, he said, consists in putting a stop to metaphysics. This he did by showing that the metaphysicians have given no meaning to their expressions. His intention was not merely to formulate instructions which can save people from trying to say what cannot be said in language. His purpose was to succeed in understanding the structure of what can be said in language. He believed that we can achieve such understanding only by plotting the limits of language. The very nature of language is such that it dictates not only that what we can say. It also dictates what cannot be said in language.

We find two main changes in Wittgenstein's doctrines of his early and later philosophy. First he abandoned the idea that the structure of reality determines the structure of language. Then he held the opposite view. He argued that our language determines our view of reality. This is so because we see things through language. Thus, according to him, it is not possible to deduce the structure

of reality from the premise that all languages have certain common structure. This doctrinal change undermines the theory of reality which he developed in the Tractatus. It also disapproves any theory which is based on a pattern of thought or a pattern of linguistic practice.

In his theory of language Wittgenstein made his second doctrinal change. In the Tractatus, he argued that all languages have an uniform logical structure. Such uniformity may not be revealed on the surface. But it can be revealed by philosophical analysis of language. He also argued that the difference between the linguistic forms is mere superficial variation. It is based on a simple theory which is dictated by logic. But in his later philosophy, Wittgenstein held a diametrically opposite view. He thought that the diverse linguistic forms actually reveal the real structure of language. He abandoned the view that language has common essence. He was convinced of the fact that language has no common essence or form. Wittgenstein also argued that even if languages have common essence, it is a negligible one. For it does not explain the connection between the different forms of language. The different forms of language are connected with one another like games, or like faces of people belonging to the same family. Wittgenstein's later philosophy can best be understood in the light of this new theory. Because

this theory necessitated the radical change in his method which is the key to the understanding of his later philosophy.

Wittgenstein thought that in the Tractatus he has given a final solution to ^{all} the problems of philosophy. Soon he realised that his theory is based on erroneous ~~view~~ of language. This realisation led him to make a fresh start. He no longer deduced the structures and limits of language from the abstract logical theory. He now wanted to discover the limits and structures of language through empirical observation.

Another important feature of his later method is that he regarded his new philosophy on the structure and limit of language as a continuous struggle against the bewitchment of the intellect. (PI, sect. 109). According to him, philosophical theories are products of our imagination. They give us profound pictures. But the pictures offered by these philosophical theories make us blind to the actual complexities of language. According to Wittgenstein, this picture-embodied features of language generate all philosophical puzzles. His new philosophy was intended to give resistance to this bewitchment. And this method was to bring us back to the linguistic phenomena with

which we are familiar. But this cannot be obtained if we philosophise in a traditional way. Wittgenstein compared his new method to the treatment of an illness. (PI, Sect. 225). Philosophy is, thus, therapeutic. (PI, Sect. 133). Its aim is to derive intellectual health. But if philosophy is like an illness, then this illness must be a necessary one. This follows from the fact that unless it is a necessary illness the empirical observation of language loses its significance. This means that in order to achieve philosophical understanding we must experience temptation to misinterpret language. The limits of language can only be understood by those who have felt the temptation to go beyond them and who have made the attempt to cross them but have been forced back.

Philosophy is a vast subject with extreme generality. It ranges over many subjects. So it is difficult to give a clear answer to the question what philosophy is. Any subject which is sufficiently general must have a branch of philosophy. As Taylor said,

"... that metaphysics deals in some way with everything, thus it is quite right to say that you cannot specify any particular class of objects as its subject-matter."⁴

So the distinctive feature which distinguishes philosophy from other subjects cannot be its omniscience. Philosoph

seeks to describe any subject which comes in its way. The distinctive feature of philosophy lies in the way in which the philosophers perform their business. It lies in their method and the manner of thinking which they employ.

Regarding the origin of philosophy many philosophers agree with the view that philosophy begins with wonder. They also say that it is a kind of study which refuses to take anything for granted. Though there is some element of truth in this view it is not universally accepted. Like philosophy, science has also the same origin. Science also may be regarded as a kind of thinking which refuses to take anything for granted. But philosophy cannot be regarded as science even though it begins with the same feeling and attitude as the sciences begin.

Science and philosophy differ in many ways. They are distinguished by the methods which they employ. Science uses observation and experiment. But philosophy does not use any of them. Though this is true, it only gives a negative description of the method of philosophy. Such description leaves us in darkness. Philosophy cannot be regarded as arm chair science. The scientists can achieve the results of their inquiry simply by working in a laboratory. But the philosopher's aim is not to achieve

such results. The nature of understanding ~~made~~ differs from the nature of understanding ~~by~~ the scientists. Though this is true, it also gives a negative characterisation of philosophy. For it does not tell us where the philosopher who makes attempt to go beyond the boundary of sciences will go. What it only tells us is that the philosopher will not work within the limits of sciences. Though it tries to establish relation between scientific and philosophical thought, it says nothing about the way in which philosophical thought is related to other kind of thoughts.

Philosophy, in Whitehead's word,

"embodies the method of working hypothesis ... such an hypothesis directs observation, and decides upon the mutual relevance of various types of evidence. In short, it prescribes methods."⁵

But the resemblance between science and philosophy should not be treated as identity. According to Whitehead, construction of philosophical system involves philosophic intuitions. So he described philosophical system as an attempt to co-ordinate such intuitions. Speculative philosophy, he said, presents comprehensive working hypothesis. But the main purpose of science is to offer specialised theories. Such theories are required to co-ordinate the correct expressions of human experience.

Kant made a contrast between science and philosophy. He held that whereas the results of sciences are certain, the results of philosophy are uncertain. But according to Whitehead, Kant's contrast is based on mistaken assumption. It is not philosophy alone which undergoes change. Science like speculative philosophy undergoes radical revision of its ultimate categories. Whitehead, however, did not want to say that truth cannot be attained in science and philosophy. He held that the quest for true principle is a very hard task. It is a never-ending universal pursuit of human intellect. The system of philosophy, thus, can never be closed. They must remain open for revision, addition and alteration. As Whitehead said, "The proper test is not that of finality, but of progress."⁶ His definition of speculative philosophy combines the methodological virtues of empiricism and rationalism. By submitting itself to the discipline of self-criticism it fulfils the demand of critical philosophy. He located science in the development of philosophy and thereby succeeded in upholding the case of speculative philosophy.

Kant was in favour of making a distinction between metaphysical philosophy and critical philosophy. By metaphysical philosophy Kant meant speculative metaphysics. He suggested reform in philosophical thinking. He believed that speculative metaphysics was founded on nothing. This

can be done by a critical examination of the scope and limits of human thought. The speculative metaphysicians tried to know the world of thought and experience from outside the limit of thought. But according to Kant, this kind of transcendence is not possible. For if philosophy tries to go beyond all possible experience it can go nowhere. So the proper task of philosophy is a systematic criticism which will show that the metaphysical speculation is impossible. A true philosophical thinking must examine itself. This is the negative side of critical philosophy. A similar attitude has been shown in this century by linguistic philosophy which may be regarded as the species of critical philosophy.

Kant was right in putting this criticism against the speculative metaphysician. For philosophy is a kind of extension of the system of factual knowledge. Kant held that a truly philosophical thinking has no affinity with science. He said that metaphysicians of the past crossed the dividing line between science and philosophy and they were not aware of the implication of such crossing. For example, the metaphysicians carried the concept of cause beyond the limits of factual knowledge. Kant tried to show that it is impossible to use it outside the limits of factual discourse for there is no genuine and appropriate material to which it can be applied.

The speculative metaphysician claims that it is a necessary truth that there is a first cause. Kant did not agree with this thesis. He said that some necessary truths are empty tautologies. He also said that the supposed necessary truth of the speculative metaphysician are about matters of substance. They are classed by Kant as synthetic a priori truths. The concept of cause is necessary. But it is applicable only within the boundary of factual knowledge. It is not possible to apply the concept of cause beyond experience.

Kant's critique though challenging is not at all destructive. For he said that the ideas of speculative metaphysics have a proper function which they perform. Kant only attacked the attempt of the metaphysicians which make them perform another function which they cannot perform. According to Kant, the proper function of the ideas of speculative metaphysics is to serve as a notional point of reference. They do not lie within the bounds of factual knowledge. They, in fact, lie outside the limit of factual discourse. Though they are used to construct a system they are not parts of the system. They are mere ideals which are presupposed by the system. For example, we may construct a theory in which everything can be explained. But such theory is neither necessary nor it is possible. But the idea of such a theory serves as a guide

in our construction of theories. Such metaphysical ideas have no objective basis outside the system of factual knowledge. They are only ideals which guide the development of human knowledge.

The linguistic philosophers maintain a similar attitude to the theories of the great metaphysical systems. It becomes destructive when such attitude takes the form of positivism. But there are many linguistic philosophers including Wittgenstein who showed much sympathy to the speculative metaphysics. Both Kant and Wittgenstein regarded metaphysics as a natural and inevitable transgressor. Both of them believed that many things can be learned from metaphysical theories.

Philosophers of the past considered causality as the objective feature of reality. But Kant considered causality as mere projection of human mind. Kant admitted two types of projections. According to him, speculative metaphysics simply examines its own ideas in the void. This means that it projects ideas to nothing. But science and other factual thinking use different kind of projection. Because their ideas operate within the bounds of human experience. So they have something upon which they can project their ideas. Kant's Copernican Revolution extended the scope of the idea that human mind may create what it is supposed to discover. Kant did not

condemn the projection as such. What he condemned is the projection on to void or nothing. For him, proper study of philosophy is projection of the real and appropriate material.

Similar approach can be found in Wittgenstein's analysis. According to Wittgenstein, words make sense only when they are applied to genuine and appropriate material. But if they are not applied to proper material then they are mere idle cogs in the machine. So it is wrong to think that since language is a creation of mind, it cannot be used as a guide to the general nature of reality.

Kant's intention was to separate religion and morality from speculative metaphysics. Because they are not based on the same kind of material as science. He rejected Hume's psychological theory which says that morality is simply based on human feelings. Hume's thesis, in Kant's opinion, makes moral beliefs dangerously subjective. He also condemned the attempt to find a transcendental basis for religion. For he believed that the traditional arguments for the existence of God carried the concepts of science beyond their proper limits and thereby met with contradiction.

The central truths of religion and morality, according to Kant, are postulates. We are required to make these postulates when we reflect on our moral life and thought. So the metaphysicians make a wrong attempt when they try to establish them on theoretical grounds. Kant said that when we look within ourselves and examine our moral thinking we can see beyond the limits of the system of factual knowledge. Kant's thesis leaves religion and morality in an exposed position. The Kantian solution of the problem of morality can be found in Wittgenstein's Tractatus also. Like Kant, Wittgenstein said that the central truths of religion and morality cannot be caught in the net-work of language. But they can be apprehended through language. The way to see beyond the limits of factual knowledge does not mean to look beyond them. It means to look back on the world of facts and see it as a whole.

The theory of language which Wittgenstein developed in the Tractatus is a very general and systematic theory. It cannot be regarded as a scientific theory of language. He realised that because of its general character the results of its range and scope cannot be achieved by the methods of science. So he decided to base his early theory of language on the general ground of intuition about the essential nature of proposition. But in his

later philosophy he changed his view on the ground that it offers a theory which is metaphysical in nature. But a critical philosophy must eliminate such theory. Wittgenstein said that his theory of language cannot be true, since, according to him, metaphysical theories can never be true. Metaphysical theories are attempts to say what can be shown only. So they cannot be true, since only what can be said can be true. Wittgenstein's condemnation of philosophical propositions as senseless applied, as he realised, to the propositions of the Tractatus itself. At the end of the book he compared it to a ladder which must be climbed up and then kicked away if one wants to get a correct picture of the world. (T, 6.54) But at the same time he maintained that metaphysical theories are not nonsense. They may be good because what they try to express may be valid. In this sense his early theory which he developed in the Tractatus is a good metaphysical theory.

Wittgenstein's contention was that the critique must be applied to itself. It should not be allowed to carry the language beyond the proper limits where it is not applicable. So the proper method of philosophy must be to avoid theorising about language. Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A philosophical work consists

essentially of elucidations. The result of philosophy is not a number of 'philosophical propositions' but to make propositions clear. Philosophy should make clear and delimit thoughts which are otherwise opaque and blurred (T. 4.111; 4.112). And the best way to avoid theorising about language is to concentrate on assembling facts about language. Thus, according to Wittgenstein, philosophy is more like an art than science.

Russell and some other linguistic philosophers criticised Wittgenstein for his shift from the first to the second view of philosophy. Russell pointed out that when Wittgenstein proceeded from the first to the second view he made a deliberate step towards the third possibility. He is of the opinion that philosophy may abandon its claim to an intuitive apprehension of the essential nature of language. And this can be done without abandoning any attempt to theorise. On this ground, Russell criticised Wittgenstein's mystical attitude to language. Russell said that Wittgenstein's new method leads to unscientific results. He argued that linguistic philosophy must be systematic and scientific. There is nothing wrong if philosophy seeks to theorise about language. But the purpose of this theorising must be to reveal the general nature of the material to which language is applied. Moreover, it is not universally accepted view that theorising

necessarily leads to falsification. In fact, Wittgenstein himself could not avoid implicit generalisation while he developed his later philosophy. In his later thought Wittgenstein actually proceeded from philosophical generalisation to fact which falsify them. For, according to him, citing a fact about language falsifies them.

Russell said that philosophy must be scientific like mathematics and physical sciences. It must be exact and rigorous. Most of the metaphysicians derived satisfaction from their theories which they devised. This, Russell said, is very much unscientific. Because in that case the results of such inquiry are bound to be influenced by the personal needs and wishes of the inquirer. Against this kind of inquiry, Russell wanted to build up the scientific ideal which must be a neutral and disinterested inquiry. It must be free from irrelevant factors such as religious beliefs, moral convictions or emotional implications. As Pears said,

"Russell's ideal was a sort of context-free language like scientific language, only containing particular statements instead of the general statements that one finds in the text books of science. This ideal language was somehow thought to lie beneath ordinary language."⁷

The philosopher's aim, according to Russell, is to give an account of the world of science and daily life. In

order to fulfil this aim he should employ the most rigorous methods of logic. And he should be completely free from personal needs, wishes and beliefs. The method to be followed must be that of analysis.

There are philosophers who hold that the language of everyday discourse is perfectly suitable for philosophical purpose. They say that the mischief lies in deviating from ordinary language without providing any way to make sense of the deviation. Ordinary language of our times is an example of this sort. We find it in its strongest form in the later works of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein held that philosophers have misused certain key terms such as 'see', 'free' and 'reason'. Because they departed from the ordinary use of these terms without putting anything intelligible in their place. As a result, they have become entangled in insoluble puzzles. These puzzles are of the form whether we can know what other people are thinking. Whether we ever really see physical objects. Whether there is any reason to suppose that one thing rather than another will happen in future. The proper role of the philosopher is that of a therapist. He must help us who are perplexed by guiding us to see the steps by which we have stepped from sense to nonsense. He must lead us back to the ordinary use of these words

on which their intelligibility depends. And by doing so he can reveal the conceptual cramps into which we have fallen.

In contrast to the ordinary language philosopher, there are others who held that the difficulty lies in the fact that ordinary language is inadequate for philosophical purpose. Because ordinary language is vague, ambiguous and context-dependent and also inexplicit. The leading members of this group are Leibnitz, Russell and Carnap. Their task was to construct an ideal language in which these defects do not appear. Russell said that the chief metaphysical features of reality can be read off from such a language. His logical atomism is based on the assumption that there is a similarity between the grammatical structure of ideal language and the metaphysical structure of the world.

Russell offered a 'metaphysic' and propounded an ontological doctrine. Because he wanted to say what ultimately in the final analysis exists in the world. Moreover, it cannot be regarded as an empirical doctrine. Because it was arrived at as a deduction from non-empirical analysis of language. His aim was to do away with the surface complexities of the world. For he wanted to arrive at and isolate the last residue of analysis. But

the last residue of analysis is not ordinary things with which we are familiar. So he wanted to analyse facts not things.

Both Russell and Wittgenstein came to the problems of general philosophy from study of mathematical logic and philosophy of mathematics. Russell considered that the whole of mathematics can be derived from logic. And that logic must be an adequate skeleton of language which will be capable of expressing all that can be said accurately. Russell thought that the world has the structure of this logic whose grammar is perfect. It is unlike the grammar of misleading natural languages. Logic requires individual variables in its vocabulary. Likewise, the world contains a variety of particulars. Logic requires only extensional, truth-functional connectives between its elementary propositions. Similarly, the world consists of facts which are independent and extensionally connected. As the technique of logic can define the concepts of mathematics, so the same technique can be employed to give the general account of the world.

A statement or proposition may be either true or false. This is the basic presupposition of the formal logician. Formal logic also presupposes the existence of

extra-logical ways (e.g. observation) for determining whether they are true or false. A formal logician takes indifferent attitude to all statements whatever their contents and structures may be. So they do not use any specific statements. They use variable such as p, q, r, s , which stand in place of any possible statement. Thus to consider the conjunction 'p and q' the formal logician considers the conjunction of any two statements. Again, for example, if we are to say that 'p and q' is true if and only if p and q are separately true, the formal logician will say that if we conjoin any two statements, this conjunction will be true if and only if the conjoined statements are severally true.

We may consider any two statements whose truth or falsity can be determined extra-logically. For example, 'he is young' and 'he is active'. By means of logical connective we can make a complex statement out of these two statements. With the help of the logical connective 'and' we may get the conjunction 'p and q' ('he is young and he is active'). By the use of the connective 'or' we may get 'p or q' ('he is young or he is active'). By introducing negation we can construct many more complex statements containing p and q. Thus we can have 'not p and not q' ('he is not young and he is not active'), 'p or not q' ('he is young or he is not active') and so on.

still we can regard the negation 'not \sim p' as a complex statement containing 'p'. To know whether these statements which we have formed by negation and logical connectives are true or false we are to know whether p and q taken separately are true or false. This means to say that if p is true then not \sim p is false; if p is false then not \sim p is true. The content of p and q is irrelevant. So we can treat them as variable which can be replaced by any statement. They are not mere abbreviations for 'he is young' and 'he is active'. We can add to it any number of variable since it does not make any real difference atleast theoretically. Thus 'p and q and r' is true if and only if, all the three are true. And 'p or q or r' is true if atleast one of them is true.

When the truth or falsity of a complex statement is determined by the truth and falsity of its constituent statements it is called a truth-function of its constituent statements. In logic the connectives 'and' and 'or' are given minimum meaning. So any complex formed by them is a truth - function of its constituents. These connectives have richer meaning only in ordinary discourse. The connectives 'and' and 'or' are, with the help of negation, interdefinable. So one may be eliminated. Thus 'he is young and he is active' is clearly different from 'he is

young or he is active'. But 'he is young and he is active' can be replaced by 'It is not the case that either he is not young or 'he is not active' without changing the meaning. Symbolically it can be stated thus :

$$(p \text{ and } q) = \text{not } (\sim p \text{ or } \sim q).$$

Most of the truth-functions are under certain circumstances true and in others false. Thus 'he is young or he is active' will be false if he is old and inactive. Otherwise, it will be true. Logicians have no means to determine the truth or falsity of the constituents of their truth-functions. They have no means to determine the truth or falsity of these truth-functions which may be true or which may be false. So they are not interested in them. But there are some other kind of truth functions in which logicians have special interest. The truth-function 'p or ~~not p~~' is a function of the single constituent 'p'. It is a truth-function of 'p' because its truth can be determined by the truth or falsity of this constituent. But in this case, it is true whether the constituent be true or false. That is to say, its truth can be determined logically. Similarly, the truth-function (p and q) or (~~not p~~ or ~~not q~~) is a logical truth. For it is true in all the four conceivable circumstances. That is to say it is true when p and q both true; when p true, q false;

when p false, q true; and when p and q both false. Truth-functions which are true for all possibilities of truth and falsehood of their constituents are called tautologies. Similarly, truth-functions which are false, irrespective of the truth or falsity of their constituents are called contradictions. For example, 'p and $\neg p$ '.

On the basis of our short account of the logic of truth-function we can sketch intelligibly the bearing it has on the metaphysics of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein held that the artificial language of truth-function is the skeleton of the language of ordinary discourse. He also said that the true logical structure of ordinary language is sometimes concealed by grammatical conventions which we employ. He held that as there are variables in logic, there must be simple propositions in ordinary language which have no logical complexity. Any propositions containing 'and' and 'or' must ultimately consists of propositions which do not contain them at all. Other propositions can be regarded as truth-functions of the elementary propositions. All necessary propositions take the form of tautology and all impossible propositions assume the form of contradiction. All other propositions including elementary propositions are empirical propositions. They are true under certain conditions and false in others. There are no logical means to determine the truth or falsity of

such propositions.

According to the Tractatus, every genuine proposition is a truth-function of elementary proposition. If two non-elementary propositions 'r' and 's' are truth-functions of some of the same elementary propositions, then 'r' and 's' will be internally related. That is to say, one may logically follow from the other. Or they may be contradictories or contraries. The relationships which hold between them can be seen from the internal structure of propositions. No knowledge of logical principles is required for that. And actually we can do without the formal principles of logic: "for in a suitable notation we can in fact recognise the formal properties of propositions by mere inspection of the propositions themselves." (T,6.122).

According to Wittgenstein, tautology and contradiction are two limiting cases. A tautology is true for all the truth possibilities of the elementary propositions. And a contradiction is false for all the truth possibilities. Though tautologies and contradictions are called propositions, they are actually degenerate cases. They are actually degenerate cases. They are not genuine propositions, according to Wittgenstein. Because they do not determine reality in any way. A tautology is unconditionally true. And a contradiction is unconditionally false.

They do not tell us anything about the world. To know the truth of the complex propositions it is necessary to know the truth or falsity of the elementary propositions of which they are truth-functions. And their truth or falsity can be ascertained by observation and other means. But the same is not the case with tautologies. We know their truth merely by seeing that they are compatible with all states of affairs. That is to say, we know them by seeing that they are compatible with all combinations of truth and falsity of their elementary propositions. We do not know their truth by non-empirical insight into facts. Hence they cannot tell us anything false. They are mere offshoots of our symbolism which tell us nothing.

According to Wittgenstein, a proposition is a picture. He compared a proposition to "a solid body that restricts the freedom of movement of others." Whereas a tautology (for example, It is raining or it is not raining) "leaves open to reality the whole of logical space." In tautology no restriction is imposed on anything. A contradiction (for example, It is raining and it is not raining) "fills the whole of logical space and leaves no point of it for reality." (T, 4.63).

According to the Tractatus the so-called propositions of logic are tautologies. They express no thoughts

at all. They say nothing. But they are not nonsense. Because the fact that certain combinations of propositions yield a tautology reveals something about the structure of constituent propositions. As he said, "That the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal-logical-properties of language and the world". (T, 6.12).

Wittgenstein believed that the thesis of extensionality serves as a clue to the metaphysical account of the nature of the world. A language as conceived by him consists of an indefinitely large collection of simple, elementary or atomic propositions. We know their truth by extralogical empirical methods. Any statement which does not consist of a single atomic proposition is merely a truth-function of such atomic propositions. Its truth or falsity can be determined by determining the truth or falsity of the atomic propositions which it contains. Thus Wittgenstein said that there is nothing to be said except what can be said in atomic propositions. But a proposition is true if it corresponds to fact. Therefore, the world must consist of an indefinitely large number of atomic facts to which the true atomic propositions correspond. And as these propositions are logically independent so these facts must be metaphysically independent. Without such correspondence between language and fact

it is impossible to talk about the world. Just as any non-atomic or a molecular proposition is an extensional or truth-functional combination of atomic propositions, so any non-atomic or molecular fact is nothing, but a group of atomic facts. And if language consists essentially of atomic propositions then there can be nothing to say about the world except to report in atomic propositions those facts to which the atomic propositions do correspond. Thus, in the Tractatus he said, "The world is all that is the case". (T, 1). "What is the case - a fact - is the existence of states of affairs." (T, 2).

Philosophy of Wittgenstein belongs to two different periods. His work in both the periods has the character of critical philosophy. He framed the Tractatus in Kantian model. Though he modified this framework in his later thought he did not destroy it altogether. Wittgenstein's early philosophy begins as an investigation of the foundation of logic. He thought that Russell's explanation of logical necessity is not adequate. He also believed that an adequate explanation of logical necessity can be given only by going back to the very beginnings of logic. Russell failed because he attempted to explain logical necessity without examining its source.

Wittgenstein's approach in the Tractatus resembles

Kant's critique. Kant's task was to mark the limits of thought. Similarly, Wittgenstein's task was to mark the limits of language. Wittgenstein had two main tasks before him. First, the task of the demarcation of language. And second, the task of investigation of the foundation of logic. There is a close connection between the two tasks. He thought that logical truths are all necessary truths. We can know them without experience. They are a priori. For example, it is a contingent fact that the sun is bigger than the earth. And to know this fact we require experience. But it is a priori or necessary truth that the sun is either bigger or not bigger than the earth. And we can know this fact without experience. Like the limits of thought, the limits of language are also necessary limits. And according to Wittgenstein, it is logic which marks the limits of language. Thus we see that his investigation of the foundation of logic involves an inquiry into the limits of language.

Though Wittgenstein's system resembles Kant's systems in many respects, there are some important differences also between them. Whereas Kant's critique is a direct investigation of thought, Wittgenstein's critique is an indirect investigation of thought through the intermediary of language. And second, though both of them

believed that philosophical propositions are necessary propositions their views about philosophical truth and necessity differ considerably. Wittgenstein held that all necessary truths of logic are empty tautologies. Basing on this thesis, he said that there cannot be any necessary truth about matters of substance. There cannot be any synthetic a priori truths. But Kant maintained that there are substantial necessary truths. They hold within the bounds of possible experience. For example every event has a cause. This statement is a necessary truth and at the same time substantial. The concept of cause cannot be applied beyond experience. Whereas Kant marked the boundary of factual knowledge, Wittgenstein marked the boundary of factual discourse.

Kant held that the task of the philosopher is to establish the substantially necessary truths. Because these necessary truths form the ground work of the systems of factual knowledge. They are applicable within the system and not outside it. The early view of Wittgenstein was that the philosophers must analyse the meanings of various kinds of statements in order to clarify them. Given that a word has a certain meaning, analysis can reveal to us what exactly will necessarily be the case if a statement containing that word is true. Here the necessity is tautological or it is true by definition.

The necessity which has been shown in the above example is a conditional necessity. Because if a word has a certain meaning, then something must be necessarily true. And if it has that meaning, the fact that it has it must be a contingent fact. Thus, he tried to establish the absolute necessity by deducing it from the essential nature of language not from the contingent feature of language. He argued that the essential feature of language can be found in any actual language. And it follows from this essential nature that any actual language can be analysed into a language of elementary propositions. This elementary proposition serves as a starting point. And from this starting point philosophers, with the aid of logical device, can calculate the limits of any possible language.

Now a problem arises from the above argument. It is that Wittgenstein considers every step in the argument as absolutely necessary. Outwardly he does not consider them as empty tautology. The problem arises when it is asked how the essential nature of languages can be apprehended. It may be supposed that Wittgenstein does not want his account to be considered as tautology. But in

that case they must be substantial. But if the truths are taken as substantial they cannot be apprehended. And since they can be apprehended they will be substantially necessary truths. But according to Wittgenstein there is no substantially necessary truth.

The argument raises another problem also. It is this. Wittgenstein tries to deduce the structure of reality from the network of elementary propositions. This question is ontological. It cannot be considered as empty tautology about reality. For it can be caught in the network of language. So, either it is a substantially necessary truth about reality as it can be caught in the network of language or it is a substantially necessary truth about reality which cannot be caught in the network of language.

It seems that Wittgenstein did not see any real difference between the two interpretations. Kant introduced substantially necessary truths for the construction of framework of his system. But Wittgenstein did not consider it necessary to use them in his own system. So the problem remains the same. In the Philosophical Investigations she suggested that there cannot be any effective way of removing this difficulty. In the Tractatus he said that philosophical propositions do not lie within the limit

of knowledge. And what lies outside the limit of language cannot be caught in language. It can only be shown. It is to be remembered that when Wittgenstein speaks of the limits of language he actually means the limits of factual discourse. So, for him, philosophical propositions are neither factual nor contingent. His theory of language and theory of reality are not two different theories. They are, in fact, one and the same theory. They cannot be considered as tautological. And if Wittgenstein wants to be consistent then he cannot consider philosophical propositions as substantially necessary truths.

Philosophy begins in puzzlement. When a man is in the grip of philosophical problem he becomes intellectually sick. Being perplexed his understanding becomes tied up with knots. The aim of philosophy is escape. As Wittgenstein said, "To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle." (PI, sect. 309). Philosophy, thus, begins in intellectual illness. It seeks cure of such illness. A man in the grip of philosophical troubles is intellectually imprisoned. Philosophy, thus, begins in imprisonment and seeks freedom. Such cure requires location and removal of the real source of the difficulty. According to Wittgenstein, the most important source of the difficulty is the misconception about language. And this is generated from philosopher's perpetual

craving for unity. Wittgenstein suggested ^acure. He said that we must examine the language-games which we play with certain crucial words. Only then we can discover the significant uses they have there. The philosopher must make a detailed study of what goes on in different language games. He should not do it in random manner. He must select his example carefully one by one in order to throw light on a particular philosophical perplexity.

Wittgenstein said that there cannot be any rule for solving philosophical problem. Rules are helpless in dispelling philosophical puzzlement. All the philosophical problems are not of the same kind. Different conceptual areas have different problem and they present special difficulties of their own. The philosopher should deal with them differently. Wittgenstein suggested certain techniques or devices which are very much helpful to deal with philosophical problem. As he said, "There is not a philosophical method, though, there are indeed methods like **different therapies.**" (PI, Sect. 133). These devices are not actually methods but mere aids to philosopher. The philosopher's job is to discover the different uses of word. It is certainly a creative task which requires skill, insight and imagination. Philosophy is purely descriptive. So the job of the philosopher is not to put forward a theory. According to Wittgenstein, there is no point in

propounding philosophical doctrine or thesis. That is why he did not hold any opinion in philosophy.

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CHAPTER - I I I

THE WORLD AS THE TOTALITY OF FACTS

Metaphysics is generally characterised as an attempt to discover the most general and pervasive facts about the world. Since Plato, many philosophers tried to discover such facts about the world through the consideration of language. For it is a language through which we talk about the world. Plato argued that when many individuals have a common name, they must have a corresponding idea or a form. Here Plato wanted to draw our attention to the pervasive feature of our language. For example, the words such as 'cow' or 'hard' can be asserted of many individuals and things. Plato assigned metaphysical significance to such facts. Because he thought that it can be possible only if there is some entity which can be named by the general term 'cowness' or 'hardness'. Aristotle also began with linguistic facts while dealing with metaphysical questions. He argued that we use verbs only in conjunction with nominative subjects. We say 'he is eating' or 'she is reading'. We do not simply say 'eats' or 'reads'. From this consideration, Aristotle derived his metaphysical assumption that substances have an independent existence but actions do not have.

Wittgenstein developed a metaphysical system in the Tractatus. He developed his system from the consideration of language. His metaphysical and linguistic doctrines are closely connected. So it is difficult to understand the one without the other. The Tractatus contains a series of metaphysical pronouncements. In the beginning of the Tractatus Wittgenstein wrote: "The world is all that is the case" (T,1). "The world is the totality of facts, not of things." (T, 1.2). These statements are obvious metaphysical pronouncements. Like Russell, Wittgenstein thought that it is an obvious truism that the world contains facts. Both of them believed that there must be correspondence between the structure of language and the structure of the world. This means that facts are required to give proposition or sentence something to reflect. An atomic fact makes an atomic proposition true. Wittgenstein's metaphysical doctrine may be regarded as 'Logical Atomism'. Wittgenstein did not use this name himself. It is a name which Russell used for his own metaphysical doctrine. Though Russell was the propounder of 'Logical Atomism', it was Wittgenstein who developed and modified it significantly. But ultimately he rejected it thoroughly.

According to Wittgenstein, the world consists of

facts. Facts cannot be defined. But we can explain them. Facts are what make propositions true or false. There are some facts which contain parts which are also facts. And there are some facts which contain parts that are not facts. For example, 'Tagore was a wise Indian' consists of two facts. They are: 'Tagore was wise' and 'Tagore was Indian'. A fact whose parts are not facts is an atomic fact. That does not mean that an atomic fact does not contain parts. It means only that the parts of atomic facts are not themselves facts. If we regard 'Tagore was wise' as an atomic fact we see that it contains the constituents 'Tagore' and 'wise'. When we fully analyse an atomic fact we ultimately reach the constituents which may be called 'simples' or 'objects'. Wittgenstein's contention was not that we can isolate the simple or we can know it empirically. For him, it is a logical necessity that there are simples or there are objects. He argued that since every complex presupposes a fact, so there must be simple. The complexity of fact is not finite. Even if every fact consists of an infinite number of atomic facts and even if every atomic fact consists of an infinite number of objects there will still be atomic facts and objects. To assert that there is a certain complex is to assert that its constituents are related in a certain way. And this itself is an assertion of fact. If we give a

name to the complex the name has only a meaning because of the truth of a certain proposition. And it is the proposition that gives meaning. For it is the proposition which asserts the relatedness of the constituents of the complex. The naming of a complex presupposes proposition. But the proposition presupposes the naming of simple.

We can give a complete description of the world if we know all the atomic facts and also if we know all of them. But we cannot fully describe it simply by naming all the objects. Mere knowledge of objects is not enough for a full description of the world. It is necessary also to know the atomic facts. For objects are constituents of these facts. Given the totality of atomic facts all true propositions can be inferred theoretically. A proposition which asserts an atomic fact is called atomic proposition. An atomic proposition may be true or may be false. Atomic propositions are logically independent of one another. One atomic proposition does not imply any other proposition. None of them is inconsistent with any other. Thus logical inference is not concerned with atomic propositions. It is concerned with only non-atomic propositions. Non-atomic propositions are called molecular propositions.

According to Wittgenstein's metaphysical doctrine, there is one and only one fact corresponding to each pair

of propositions. The fact makes one proposition true and other false. The world is the totality of such facts. Facts may be either positive or negative. A positive fact is the existence of a state of affairs. And a negative fact is the non-existence of a state of affairs. (T. 206). A state of affair is the combination of objects. An object is the positive constituent of a state of affairs. The very nature of the object is its possibility to occur in combination with other objects in states of affairs. This possibility constitutes its internal properties and its forms. Thus Wittgenstein argued that since every object contains the possibilities for its combination with other object in states of affairs, if any object is given, then all objects are also given. And if all objects are given, then all possible states of affairs are also given. Objects are simple. They do not have parts. Objects are neither generable nor destructible. For the object in any possible world must be the same. It is true that object changes. But change in object does not mean destruction. It only means an alteration in the configuration of objects. Objects may differ from each other. That is to say, they may occur in different possible states of affairs. Objects may differ in external properties also. There may be numerical difference in them. This means that though they

are not discriminable they are not identical. The objects constitute the substance and content of the world.

Wittgenstein held that the objects combine into states of affairs. And in states of affairs they stand in determinate relation to one another "like the links of a chain." (T, 2.03). The way they are connected is the structure of the state of affairs. The possibility of the structure of the state of affairs is the form of the object. States of affairs (things) are independent of one another. From the existence or the non-existence of states of affairs it is impossible to infer the existence or non-existence of another state of affair. Since the facts are existence and non-existence of state of affairs, it follows that facts too are independent of one another. The world is thus the totality of facts. Wittgenstein did not say that the world is made up of facts. He also did not want to say that facts are the stuff of the world. What he really wanted to say is that "Objects make up the substance of the world". (T, 2.021).

From the point of view of commonsense it may be argued that not only the things that make up the world, but also that the world is the totality of things. For whatever we see and experience in the world are things. And this is really the case just because objects do make up

the world. But objection may be raised against the common-sense view. It may be argued that the world may be the totality of anything. Whatever the case may be, a full list of them must tell us what the world is like. In any case, it must provide us a full description of the world. But this is not possible if we take the world as the totality of things. From a list of all objects that there are, we can form only a very vague and inadequate idea of the world, not a full description of it. Let us suppose, we are required to describe a room. To do so if we simply list all the articles that are there in the room we shall be doing our job very poorly. For our actual job is not to furnish just a list of all objects. But along with it we must give an account of what they are and how they are arranged in the room. And giving an account of the object does not mean giving a list of object. It means giving a list of facts. As wisdom said, "

"To say of a thing that it is a house is not to say of it only that it is a set of bricks arranged in a certain way. But the arrangement is not part of what the house is made of. A family is not Bill, Betty and Bob. It has an arrangement. Betty is Bill's wife and Bob the child of both."¹

Thus it is wrong to say that there are such and such objects. On the contrary, we should say that there are such and such facts. And this is the truth about the world.

We can put the same point in another way. If we break the world into objects the result will be only a list of object. And this will not correspond to this actual world. The same result will follow even if we break any possible but non-actual world. Let us suppose, for example, we are required to build a model of a certain car. And for that purpose we are supplied with a list of objects which the car contains. Obviously there are so many possibilities of combining and arranging these objects. And there may be so many possible qualities which the objects may possess. Naturally, therefore, our task of building a model will be an endless one. But the same is not the case with facts. We can perform our task well if we are given a list of facts about the car. This makes it clear that there can be innumerable possible worlds which are composed of just the objects. And the same objects also compose the actual world of ours. For it is possible for these objects to be arranged and combined in any way. Thus it follows that it is the facts that there are, not the objects that there are. And it is the facts that there are which determine the actual world as distinguished from other possible world. Wittgenstein thought of fact as a complex entity existing in the world. It is a group of things arranged and combined in a certain way. For example, the fact that the book is on the table. It is a complex

consisting of the book and the table. Their arrangement says that the former is on the latter. Wittgenstein's statements about facts and state of affairs make it clear that in the Tractatus he thought of facts in this way. For example, he wrote: "A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things)" (T. 2.01). "In a state of affairs objects fit into one another like the links of a chain." (T, 2.03). "In a state of affairs objects stand in determinate relation to one another." (T, 2.031).

We have seen that facts cannot be so strictly defined. For if we want to define a fact it must be done by the method of intuitive induction. In such method we define a term by its essence or common characteristic. We grasp the essence of triangularity from the examination of several triangles. In the same manner we must be able to grasp the essence of fact from an examination of several facts. But unless facts have common characteristics and unless they share an essential characteristic called 'being a fact', the method of intuitive induction cannot be applied. Moreover, for its successful application this characteristic must be introduced as the definition of a definition. But facts do not possess anything in common. They do not have constituents or components in common. For example, if fact F has a, b etc. as constituents and

R as a component, and fact F' has r, s etc. as constituents and S as a component, then F and F' have nothing specific in common. There is no reason to call a, b, r, s , by the common name 'object'. There is also no justification in calling R, S by the common name 'structure'. In order to formulate a definition it is necessary to use these terms. But these terms do not have connotation. For they denote things only which have nothing in common. And since they have no connotation, they cannot be introduced in a definition. And Wittgenstein himself said that 'object' is a pseudo concept and it occurs in discourse solely as a variable name. (T, 4.1272). This proves that definition of fact is impossible. Even if it is possible to define a fact, it is difficult to justify the definition. We may conceive of many definitions of fact and they may not be necessarily self-contradictory. From the fact that some definitions be possible it does not follow that only one and one particular definition is possible. And it is also not possible to demonstrate that only a particular definition is the correct one. This proves that the possibility of defining a fact is always questionable.

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein thought that facts are real complexes existing in the world. He believed that they have the most basic kind of reality. This is indicated by his assertions "The world divides into facts".(T, 1.2).

"Objects make up the substance of the world". (T, 2.021). A fact, then, is not a simple entity. It is always a complex of objects. Objects, on the other hand, are conceived as a possible constituent of facts. The objects contain the possibility of those facts of which they are possible constituents. The objects 'hang into one another' to form a fact. The objects are held together not by a further entity. They must combine immediately with one another to form a fact. This specific mode of combination is the structure of objects. For the way in which objects hang together is internal to objects. Objects, thus, cannot exist apart from facts.

According to Wittgenstein, The world divides into facts. Majority of the facts are highly complex. Analysis reveals that these highly complex facts are composed of less complex facts. These, by further analysis, can be seen that they are composed of still less complex facts and so on. When it is fully analysed we reach ultimately such facts which cannot be analysed or reduced any further. Such facts do not consist of any less complex facts. These are called atomic facts. Atomic facts are the ultimate stuff of the world. This is so because the world divides into them ultimately. They are the most simple thing which are self-subsistent. Wittgenstein did not arrive at

atomic facts by any empirical investigation of complex facts. His consideration was not simply to observe that there are complex facts or that they are composed ultimately of atomic facts. He actually arrived at atomic facts from the side of language. He thought that certain consideration and reflection about language demanded that there are atomic facts. He wrote;

"The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts the existence of a state of affairs."(T, 4.21)

And the assertion of the existence of a state of affairs means the assertion of an atomic fact.

Wittgenstein used the term situations (Sachlage) and states of affairs (Sachverhalt) in technical sense. He used them in such a way that they may be either actual or merely possible and non-actual. They may be either existent or non-existent. He used the term 'possible situation' in T, 2.202 and T, 3.11. He also wrote:

"The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality, (we also call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence is a negative fact" (T, 2.06).

A state of affairs asserts an atomic situation. They are elementary. For they correspond only to elementary propositions. Like elementary propositions, they cannot be

reduced further into basic states of affairs. As an elementary proposition consists of names only, so also a state of affairs consists of objects only. As he said: "A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things)." (T, 2.01).

We are to limit our discussion to states of affairs to see how these are related to facts; (Tatschen) and reality, as Wittgenstein used these terms in T, 2.06. He said that a state of affairs is a combination of objects. (T, 2.01). And he also said that some combinations of objects exist and some combinations of objects do not exist. The former are associated with positive facts and the latter are associated with negative facts (T, 2.06). But the two passages of the Tractatus, namely, "The world is the totality of facts, not of things." and "The totality of existing state of affairs is the world," (T, 2.04) seem to identify facts with existing states of affairs. From these two passages it is possible to think that facts are existing states of affairs. But the part two of the Tractatus 2.06 clearly suggests that states of affairs can be identified with positive facts only. They cannot be identified with all facts. And since states of affairs are atomic, it naturally follows that only a positive atomic fact is an existing state of affairs. The world, thus, finally divides into positive atomic facts. It includes all the positive

atomic facts. That means it includes all the existing states of affairs in their state of existing. But the Tractatus 2.06 also says that reality includes more than this. Reality is wider than the totality of all positive facts. It includes not only positive facts, but also negative facts. That is to say, it includes all the existing and non-existing states of affairs in their respective states of existences and non-existence. From this interpretation it follows that the states of affairs are all positive. But they can reside in two domains. They can reside either in the domain of existence or in the domain of non-existence. In the domain of existence they are positive atomic facts and they are parts of the world. But in the domain of non-existence they are not parts of the world. They are merely parts of the reality in general.

But this interpretation raises a fundamental difficulty. The Tractatus 2.04 says that the world is the totality of existing states of affairs. And we have interpreted this to say that the world is the totality of positive atomic facts. But there is another passage in which Wittgenstein said: "The sum-total of reality is the world". (T, 2.063). This passage implies that the world also includes both positive and negative facts. It seems that Wittgenstein is not consistent here. It is also difficult to give a convincing account of this inconsistency. But

we can suggest a possible explanation in the light of Wittgenstein's own remark which he made in the Tractatus. He said: "The totality of existing states of affairs also determines which states of affairs do not exist." (T, 2.05). So if all the positive facts are given then all the negative facts are also given. This clearly indicates that there is a sense in which positive and negative facts can be considered as inseparable. When Wittgenstein said that the world consists of both positive and negative facts he probably meant that when all positive facts are given, negative facts are also given, since they are inseparable. But it is only the positive facts which are parts of the world.

It may be argued that since we have admitted the non-existent states of affairs, it is possible that there may be some non-actual arrangement of non-actual objects. But Wittgenstein's view is that it is absurd to think of non-actual arrangement of non-existent object. For, according to him, existent as well non-existent states of affairs must be arrangements of existent objects. And that there cannot be any actual arrangement of non-existent object is obvious. This follows from his thesis that the meaning of a name is the object it denotes. (T, 3.203). According to this doctrine we cannot make any significant statement

about non-existent object. For any proposition which tries to do so will be non-sensical. According to Wittgenstein, objects are eternal. So both the real and the possible worlds must be composed of the same objects. There is difference amongst possible world since there are different ways of configuration of objects. Thus, Wittgenstein said: "It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something-a form - in common with it." (T, 2.022). "Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form." (T, 2.023).

Wittgenstein's contention that the world divides into nothing but atomic fact follows as a consequence of the theory of truth-function. His theory is a theory of truth-function as well as a metaphysical theory. According to Wittgenstein, there are no irreducibly general facts. But Russell admitted irreducibly general facts. He argued that universal propositions are not truth-function of propositions about individuals. We must, therefore, admit some universal propositions as basic which are not reducible to any other kind of propositions. Hence, he said that there must be irreducibly general facts which are needed to explain general propositions. These general facts are not complex facts constructed out of atomic facts. General facts are those to which only universal propositions correspond. So he said, "It is clear, I think, that you must admit general

facts as distinct from and over particular facts."² But Wittgenstein did not agree with Russell's view. He said that universal propositions are ultimately analysable into basic elementary propositions. So, for him, there is no need to admit irreducibly general facts. He did not consider it necessary to explain universal propositions. Russell also admitted negative facts to explain negative propositions. But Wittgenstein rejected this suggestion also. For him, all propositions are molecules of elementary propositions. And non-atomic situations or facts are molecules or structure of states of affairs and atomic facts. So it is not at all necessary to admit negative facts to explain negative propositions.

There is a lot of controversy as to the question whether Wittgenstein's objects include particulars or whether they include both particulars and universals. This is a basic issue in philosophy. Particulars and universals are two different sorts of things, though it is very difficult to characterise the difference very precisely. In Wittgenstein's technical sense such things as 'Tagore', 'my table' and the 'State Library' are particulars, although they are complex and hence do not qualify as objects. They are individuals whose existence is limited by space and time. All particulars are not both temporal and spatial. Mental particulars (images) are not spatial, though temporal. But

we cannot think of any particular which is spatial but not temporal. Particulars cannot be attributed to anything. That is to say, they cannot be predicated of anything. We cannot give instances of particulars. But we can give instances of universals. In the statements 'The crows are black' and 'Ram is left to Sita' two universals are attributed to particulars. The first statement expresses the property and the second statement expresses the relation. There may be many instances of universals throughout space and time. They are repeatables. They include properties and relations. There are instances of universals. They include mainly properties and relation. But there cannot be instances of particulars. They can only be reproduced or copied.

According to Copi and Anscombe, Wittgenstein's objects are particulars only. Copi said that objects are "bare particulars having no material properties whatever".³ Professor Stenius, on the other hand, maintained that Wittgenstein's objects not only include particulars, they also include simple properties and relations. Stenius regarded objects as genus of which particulars, qualities and relations are species. Russell explained Wittgenstein's ideas of 'logical atomism' and said that his 'logical atom' includes both particulars and universals. Thus we see that

commentators of the Tractatus differ among themselves in regard to this question.

The ultimate constituents of the world, according to Russell, are particulars, qualities, relations and facts. He regarded relations and particulars as components of facts. He also said that one component may occur in several facts. From this it follows that two different facts may contain the same components. This can be illustrated if we think of two human being as particulars. The fact that Ram loved Sita is different from the fact that Sita loved Ram. But both the facts contain the same component. But a question which arises here is: how do these two facts differ? A possible answer to this question is that the relation is related to two particulars differently in the two cases. But Russell did not agree with this suggestion. He said,

"if we mean - as opponents of external relations suppose us to mean - that the relation is a third term which comes between the other two terms and is some how hooked on to them, that is obviously absurd, for in that case the relation has ceased to be a relation, and all that is truly relational is the hooking of the relation to the terms."⁴

Russell's theory, it seems, contains this absurdity. Because Wittgenstein's theory stands in contrast to Russell's theory. The ultimate constituents of the world, according to Wittgenstein, consists of two elements instead of four. They are objects in configuration. So the puzzle which



occurs in connection with relation disappears. Since Wittgenstein did not count relations as objects. For Russell, an atomic fact consists of particulars and a relation (quality) in relation. Thus relation occurs twice. They occur both as a component of fact and also as joining the components of fact. Whereas, for Wittgenstein, an atomic fact consists entirely of objects. An object is neither a quality nor a relation. Thus, for Wittgenstein, relation occurs only once. And since a configuration of objects must contain at least two objects, monadic relations or qualities disappear altogether.

There is no doubt that Wittgenstein thought of some facts as particulars. But he is not very much clear whether simple properties and unanalysable relations are objects or not. This question arises in connection with elementary proposition and states of affairs. Let us suppose that the propositions Fa (e.g., a is red) and $a R b$ (e.g., a is next to b) are two elementary propositions. The point to be considered here is that whether the signs 'F' and 'R' designate objects just as the signs 'a' and 'b' do designate objects. That is to say, whether the property of redness and the relation of being next to that are objects or not. In other words, we are to see whether simple particulars are related to simple universals to form states of affairs or not. We are also to consider whether states of affairs are

formed by the configuration of simple particulars only or not. Wittgenstein said that only simple particulars are objects. His view is that all states of affairs are formed by the combination of simple particulars only. There is some evidence that he counted simple properties as objects. As he said:

"...(This shade of blue and that one stand, eo ipso, in the internal relation of lighter to darker. It is unthinkable that these two objects should not stand in this relation) ..." (T, 4.123).

Here Wittgenstein refers to a property as an object. In this parenthetical remark he has applied the term object to this blue colour. But in the next sentence of the same passage he acknowledged a certain looseness in his employment of these key terms. As he said: "... (here the shifting use of the word 'object' corresponds to the shifting use of the words 'property' and 'relation')..." (T, 4.123). Here he regretted for his use of object for property. He seemed to warn us against being misled by his loose use of the term 'object' for property. However, except this passage, throughout the Tractatus he maintained that objects are particulars only. And he also maintained that they do not include universals.

There are many evidences in the Tractatus which support the view that Wittgenstein's objects are particulars. His way of talking about objects and states of affairs

clearly show that his objects meant only particulars. He said: "A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects." (T, 2.01). "The configuration of objects produces states of affairs." (T, 2.0272). "In a state of affairs objects fit into one another like the links of a chain." (T, 2.03). "The determinate way in which objects are connected in a state of affairs is the structure of the state of affairs." (T, 2.032). Unless he thought of objects as particulars he would not have talked in these ways. For they are appropriate only to particulars. They are not applicable to both particulars and universals. For it is not possible to think of two particulars being combined or configured. But a particular cannot be combined with universal. It is impossible to think of an individual 'a' being combined with the universal 'redness' or 'roughness'.

There is one passage in the Tractatus which gives a symbolic evidence that objects are not properties. Wittgenstein said that "Names are simple symbols; I indicate them by single letters ('x' 'y' 'z')" (T, 4.24). Here names of objects are symbolised by individual variables. 'x', 'y' 'z' are individual variables. They are not relation or property. Their values are 'a' 'b' 'c' and so on. These values are the names of particulars only. They cannot be the names of universals. Again, if simple universals are

objects then they should be named by signs of the forms 'f' and \emptyset in fx and $\emptyset(x, y)$. Such propositions will take the form of elementary propositions. Each proposition, then, will be "a nexus, a concatenation, of names." (T, 4.22). But, for Wittgenstein, the propositions of the forms fx and $\emptyset(x, y)$ are not names. They are only functions of names. (T, 4.24). And a function of name is different from a nexus or a concatenation of names.

Copi put forward a strong argument to show that Wittgenstein's objects are only particulars and not universals. His argument is based on the passage in which Wittgenstein said :

"The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material properties. For it only by means of propositions that material properties are represented - only by the configuration of objects that they are produced." (T, 2.0231).

Here the term 'material properties' is used as a contrast to 'formal properties'. Copi tried to show that objects can neither be formal nor material properties. And hence they cannot be properties at all. In the Tractatus formal properties are identified with logical properties. As Wittgenstein said: "The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies show the formal - logical-properties of language and the world." (T, 6.12). Copi argued that objects are not forms or formal properties, for they can be represented. (T, 3.22; 3.221; 4.03120). But formal or logical

properties cannot be so represented. Because,

"In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic that is to say outside the world" (T, 4.12).

"Propositions cannot represent logical form, it is mirrored in them." (T, 4.121). So objects cannot be formal properties. They cannot be material properties also. For material properties are produced by the configuration of objects. And an object cannot be formed by the configuration of other objects. Because they are simple. The second sentence of T, 2.0231 is a deviation from Copi's account. Copi's argument runs thus:

"the second sentence of the Tractatus 2.0231 ... asserts that material properties to be 'first formed by, the configuration of the objects'. Now if objects were material properties, that passage would assert material properties to be first formed by the configuration of material properties, themselves first formed by the configuration of material properties, and so on. Here it seems to me, would be a regress more vicious than any ever dreamed of by Bradley. The alternative to the vicious regress is to deny that objects can be material properties. And from these considerations it follows that objects cannot be properties, either formal or material."⁵

And since neither formal nor material properties are objects, it follows that no properties are objects.

There is also another passage that supports the view that only particulars are objects. The passage says:

"Instead of, the complex sign 'a R b' says that a stands to b in the relation R, we ought to put, That 'a' stands to 'b' in a certain relation says that a R b."(T, 3.1432).

Here signs 'a' and 'b' are counted as names of objects. They are clearly distinguished from the sign 'R'. And since 'R' is different from 'a' and 'b', it cannot be a name of an object. Wittgenstein made this explicit when he said:

"Symbols are not what they seem to be. In 'a R b' 'R' looks like a substantive but it is not one. What symbolizes in 'a R b' is that 'R' occurs between 'a' and 'b'. Hence 'R' is not the indefinable in 'a R b'." (NB, p-99).

Thus it is clear that relation among objects are not themselves objects. The way he speaks of states of affairs and objects clearly shows that relations are not objects. He said that objects are configured in a state of affairs. "The configuration of objects produces states of affairs." (T, 2.0272). If relations are made objects then the relation amongst the particulars will be another object over and above the particulars. That is to say, the configuration of two or more particulars, which is a relation will be an object. But this will lead to infinite regress. Because the configuration of the particulars and the first configuration will also be objects. In the same manner, the configuration of the particulars and the first and the second configuration will also be objects and so on ~~and~~ infinitum. So Wittgenstein denied relation in the first place to avoid the regress.

It is true that early Wittgenstein thought of objects which includes not only particulars but universals also. For, in the Note Books he wrote: "Relations properties etc. are objects too." (NB, 16.6.15). But he did not make any such statement in the Tractatus. And this gives us sufficient evidence that he considered his early opinion wrong. Stenius's argument which supports Wittgenstein's early view is based on mistaken assumption. He claimed that "Wittgenstein counts as 'things' (Gagestande) not only individual objects but also predicates with different number of places."⁶ But this claim is a mistake. His mistaken assumption is based on the idea that an object's having a property is a matter of its being configured with the universal. Stenius put his argument thus: A state of affairs is a configuration of objects. An object a's being red is a state of affairs. In a state of affairs of objects a's being red, redness must be counted as an object. For there is no other object with which a can be configured. And since redness is universal some objects must be universal. But it may be pointed out that Stenius's argument is based on unwarranted assumption. For there is no need to make the assumption that an object's having property must be a matter of its being configured with a universal (property). Wittgenstein's view is that an object's having a property is not a matter of its being configured with a universal. It is a matter of its being configured with other simple particulars which are also objects.

Objects are configured to form states of affairs. There are different modes of configuration of objects. Some objects may be configured in some ways. And some other objects may be configured in some other ways. So Wittgenstein said that the modes of configuration are limited. The different ways of configuration of objects are the forms of objects. An object's having a colour is one specific form of object. And an object's having a pitch is another specific form of an object. The sort of object which has colour is not the same sort of object which has pitch. Two objects may have the same form if they occur in some kind of configuration. But they cannot be said to have the same form if they occur in different mode of configuration. A speck in one's visual field cannot have a colour. A colour is one specific form of object. It is one basic mode of configuration of an object with others that produces its colouredness. Similarly it is one specific mode of configuration of an object with others that yields pitch. For Wittgenstein, space, time and colour (being coloured) are forms of objects.

The above interpretation may encounter two difficulties. We know that Wittgenstein thought that objects have properties. And we have also said that his objects are simple. But if they are simple they cannot possess properties. And if they do possess property they cannot

be simple. That is to say, if they possess property they cannot be colourless again. But it may be pointed out that these difficulties are only apparent and not real. For an object's having a property does not mean that it has inherent ingredient of that property. It simply means its being configured with other objects. We ordinarily think that the quality of an object is something different from the object. For we can distinguish the property of an object from the object itself. Our natural way of looking into things makes us to think that what is involved in a thing having a property is the complexity in the thing. And this leads to the view that if Wittgenstein admits that objects have properties, he cannot at the same time constantly claim that they are simple. But Wittgenstein actually rejects this ordinary way of looking at the matter. His view is that an object's having a property is to be considered only as its being configured with other objects and not as the complexity in the thing. Thus we see that simplicity of objects is not inconsistent with their having properties. When Wittgenstein said that objects are colourless, he meant that an object in isolation from other objects has no colour. That is to say, an object in itself has no colour. It is unthinkable that, apart from the configuration with other objects, an object has a colour. An object has a colour only when it is configured with other objects. According to Wittgenstein, relations are not properties. It is a mistake

to explain relation as being properties of individuals. Many philosophers wrongly thought that relations can be reduced to properties. Accordingly they thought that in the propositions, 'Ramkrishna is shorter than Vivekananda' and 'Ramkrishna is the teacher of Vivekananda' the properties (being shorter than and being the teacher of) are attributed to the subject Ramkrishna. But Wittgenstein took the opposite line and said that these properties should be attributed not to the subject. He reduced properties to relations. For an object's having a property is simply a matter of its being related with other objects in a certain way. As David Keyt said, "Although objects have no qualities they do have properties, where 'property' is used in a broad sense that covers relations."⁷

An object has two kinds of properties - its essential properties and its accidental properties. The formal properties are its internal properties and the material properties are its external properties. The formal properties are essential properties and the material properties are accidental properties of objects. For example, a speck in one's visual field is an object. Its having some colour or being coloured is one of its internal properties. But its annoying or delighting the person who sees it is one of its external properties. Its having some colour is one of its internal properties. But its having a determinate

colour is one of its external properties. When Wittgenstein speaks of the forms of objects he actually means logical form. The form of an object determines its essential or internal properties. It is the formal property of an object that it is possible for it to stand in a certain relation to some other objects. It is a sort of property which an object must have in order to be the kind of object. But the material properties of objects are those properties which an object just happens to have. It is a material property of an object that it stands in a certain relation to some other object. For it is a property which an object just happens to have. For example, a speck in the visual field must have some colour or other. But it is not necessary that it should be red. It can be of any colour. As Wittgenstein said,

"A speck in the visual field, though it need not be red, must have some colour; it is so to speak, surrounded by colour - space. Notes must have some pitch, object of the sense of touch some degree of hardness, and so on." (T, 2.0131).

From the above consideration it follows that the possibility of configuration of objects is the form of objects. The form of an object is the possibility of its occurring in states of affairs. (T, 2.0141). That is to say, the mode of configuration that an object can enter into are

limited. It means that if an object is of such form that it must have some colour, then there is a limited range of states of affairs in which it can occur. The possibility of its occurring only in this range of states of affairs is one of its forms. When one of these possible states of affairs exists it acquires a determinate external or material property. For it is one specific mode of configuration of an object that determines colouredness which is its external or material property. Wittgenstein thus said,

"The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material properties. For it is only by means of propositions that material properties are represented only by the configuration of objects that they are produced." (T, 2.0231).

Wittgenstein's view seems to be that every object must occur in some existent state of affairs. We cannot think of an object that occurs in no existent state of affairs. He made this claim explicit when he said: "A spacial object must be situated in infinite space..." (T, 2.0131). This claim seems to be plausible for it is natural to suppose that if an object exists it must have some actual properties. We cannot think of an object apart from all its properties. To have an idea of object we must think of it as having certain properties. And an object's having a property is a matter of its being configured with other objects to form states of affairs. We

can think of an object only as a constituent of states of affairs. For an object's having a property is a matter of its being either configurable or actually configured with other objects to form states of affairs. The internal property of an object is the possibility of its being configured with other object. That is to say, it is its possibility of occurring in a state of affairs. And the material property of an object is the possibility of its actually occurring in existent states of affairs. Thus an object cannot be thought of apart from the states of affairs. As Wittgenstein said,

"Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside space or temporal objects outside time, so too there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others. If I can imagine objects combined in states of affairs, I cannot imagine them excluded from the possibility of such combinations." (T, 2.0121).

So the knowing of an object implies the knowing of the modes of configuration of objects. And unless we know its configuration we do not know it. Thus he said: "If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs. (Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object. A new possibility cannot be discovered later." (T, 2.0123). It is not necessary that to know an object one must know its internal and external properties both. To know an object one is required to know

only its internal properties. This he made clear when he said, "If I am to know an object, though I need not know its external properties, I must know all its internal properties." (T, 2.01231).

Objects are simple particulars. They assume different forms. Objects are configured or combined to form states of affairs. And there are different ways of configuration. From this it follows that objects are eternal. Anscombe described Wittgenstein's objects as "eternal and changeless simples."⁸ Objects are eternal because they are simple. Only a complex can change. And objects are not complex. So objects are changeless. A complex is formed by the configuration of objects. And it is the configuration that changes. And since the configurations change, some states of affairs go out of existence, and new ones come into existence. Since states of affairs are nothing but combinations or configurations of object, it is only the configuration that can come into or go out of existence. But objects being simple are changeless. And hence, they are indestructible. For objects do not come into or go out of existence. A change means only an alteration in the configuration of objects. As Wittgenstein said: "Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent, their configuration is what is changing and unstable." (T, 2.0271). Since objects do not change, they are permanent. They are

ungenerable and indestructible. They are permanent because they come into being by any sort of configuration. Being simple, they cannot be destroyed by any sort of separation of their configuration. Objects are eternal because it is logically possible to describe everything destructible in the world. But this description will contain names. And what the names denote cannot be destructible. For what the names denote constitute their meaning. Now if the objects are destroyed the names will not have any meaning. Therefore, description will not have any sense at all. Wittgenstein presented this argument in the Philosophical Investigations. He put the argument thus:

"What the names in language signify must be indestructible; for it must be possible to describe the state of affairs in which everything destructible is destroyed. And this description will contain words; and what correspond to those cannot be destroyed, for otherwise the words would have no meaning. I must not saw off the branch on which I am sitting." (PI, Sect. 55).

Some commentators did not approve the thesis that since the objects are simple, they must be changeless. And since they are changeless, they must be eternal. They are of the opinion that though objects are changeless for being simple, it is not sufficient to prove that they are eternal. David Keyt argued that "from the fact that the objects are

changeless, it does not follow that they are eternal. For passing into and out of existence completely cannot, on the above analysis, be counted as change."⁹ In support of his argument Keyt cited Wittgenstein's passage which says, "So too at death the world does not alter, but comes to an end." (T, 6.431). Keyt gave separate grounds to prove the eternity of objects. Wittgenstein used the term 'eternity' in two senses. In one sense it means endless temporal duration. And in another sense it means simply timelessness. As he said: "If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who leave in the present." (T, 6.4311). Basing on this, Keyt tried to show that Wittgenstein used 'eternity' in the sense of timelessness. And an object is eternal because it is timeless. To say that something is timeless is to say that temporal predicates do not apply to it. And since the concept 'object' is a formal concept, not a proper concept, temporal predicates cannot be attributed to it. For example, we cannot say 'There are objects'. But we can say 'There are books'. Since the concept 'book' is a proper concept temporal predicate can be attributed to it. Thus, Keyt argues,

"According to the theory of the Tractatus, one can neither say 'a exist' nor 'objects exist'. Wittgenstein in his use of the word 'exist' in the Tractatus is guided by the use of the existential quantifier in

logic. The existential quantifier never appears in front of an isolated name, so 'a exist' cannot be said. And 'objects exist' cannot be said since 'x is an object' is not a genuine function and, hence, not a function in front of which an existential quantifier may be placed. Therefore, existence cannot be predicated of objects either individually or collectively. And if 'exist' is not a predicate of objects, 'has existed' and 'will exist' are not predicates of objects either. This, however, is precisely what is meant by saying that the objects are timeless."¹⁰

We see, then, for Wittgenstein, objects are simple particulars which are permanent, eternal and indestructible. He did not discover them by any kind of empirical observation. He simply said that there must be such objects. Their existence was demanded by logical necessity. It is not necessary to produce examples of objects. Wittgenstein was certain that there must be such things as objects though he admitted that he cannot give any example of one. It is certain a priori that they exist. Finding actual example of them is simply an empirical matter. And in this Wittgenstein was not at all interested. As Malcolm reports,

"I asked Wittgenstein whether when he wrote the Tractatus he had ever decided upon anything as an example of a 'simple object'. His reply was that at that time his thought had been that he was a logician, and that it was not his business as a logician, to try to decide whether this thing or that was a simple thing or a complex thing, that being a purely empirical matter. It was clear that he regarded his former opinion absurd."¹¹

Though Wittgenstein was not concerned with the question what things are objects, we can know many things about them from his remarks and doctrines. In the Tractatus he speaks of the forms of objects. For example, space, time and colour are different forms of objects. (T, 2.0251). This means that objects may have different characteristics. Some may have temporal characteristics. Some may have spatial characteristics. And some may have both temporal and spatial characteristics. From this one can infer that Wittgenstein's objects are observable. But he himself was not interested to see whether objects are observable. Though he was not concerned with the observability of object, his picture theory of proposition certainly commits him to the view that at least states of affairs are observable. According to the picture theory, an elementary proposition is a picture of reality. And an elementary proposition describes state of affairs and names. The picture theory allows us to understand an elementary proposition to read off the states of affairs which it describes. But if states of affairs are not observable then we cannot understand an elementary proposition. So Wittgenstein has to admit that at least states of affairs are observable. In fact, he admitted this. And this is indicated in the passage in which he wrote: "In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality." (T, 2.223).

This clearly suggests that an elementary proposition is a picture of a state of affairs. So to be able to compare with what it pictures, the states of affairs must be observable.

Even if we say that states of affairs are observable, that does not in any way indicate that objects themselves are observable. From the observability of states of affairs we cannot infer the observability of objects. For states of affairs are configurations of objects. And objects and configurations of objects are two different sorts of things. Only the configurations are observable. But the objects are not observable. From the fact that states of affairs are observable, it does not follow that objects themselves are observable. But the central doctrine of the Tractatus that the meaning of a name is the object it denotes loses its force if the objects are not observable. For the sense of a proposition involves the correlation of names and objects. And the possibility of such correlation is based on the observability of objects. For, in an elementary proposition the name 'a' cannot designate any object unless that object can be observed. There is also one passage which indirectly suggests that objects are observable. For example, he said,

"Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects. The limit also makes itself manifest in the totality of elementary propositions." (T, 5.5561).

Here the term 'empirical reality' may be taken to mean

observable reality, though the meaning of 'empirical reality' is not very much clear to us. Wittgenstein's objects are, thus, observable.

This interpretation encounters certain difficulties. First, Wittgenstein's objects are simple particulars. And since they are simple they are not observable. Certain simple qualities such as redness or roughness may be observable. But objects are neither qualities nor universals of any sort. In fact, all observable individuals are complex. Thus he said, "we have no acquaintance with simple object." (NB, 24.5.15; 25 5.15). And if objects are not simple, then they cannot be immortal also. And if they are observable, then they cannot be simple. As Pitcher said, "the observability of objects involves the sacrifice of their simplicity, and along with it of their immortality."¹² The second difficulty which it encounters is that if we accept the thesis that objects are observable then an object's having a property cannot be a matter of its being configured with other objects. But according to Wittgenstein, an object's having a property is a matter of its being configured with other particulars. It is not a matter of its being configured with other universals. Suppose, for example, a speck in the visual field is an object. Now, if objects are observable then it does not make any sense

in saying that the speck being configured with other objects yields its having a red colour. For, according to Wittgenstein, a proposition which attributes a colour to a point in one's visual field cannot be an elementary proposition. (T, 6.3751).

The above consideration leads us to the view that objects themselves are not observable. Only the configurations of objects, i.e., the states of affairs are observable. This interpretation seems to be more plausible for much of what Wittgenstein said in the Tractatus can be accommodated in it. His important hypothesis is that no object can have observable properties. So the observable properties cannot be attributed to the objects which are simple. They can be attributed only to the complex. If objects have observable properties then they will be observable which will contradict his hypothesis. Only the complex can have observable properties. For example, tables, chairs, books which are complexes can be coloured or shaped. But this cannot be said of Wittgenstein's objects. His objects being simple cannot be said to be shaped or coloured. Following this interpretation, it can be maintained without contradiction that object though simple can have properties which are non-observable. His distinction between internal and external properties also can be maintained without difficulty. The internal property is the possible configuration of objects

and the external property is the actual configuration of objects. Basing on this view we can also plausibly interpret other important passages of the Tractatus. For example, Wittgenstein said that "Space, time and colour (being coloured) are forms of objects." (T, 2.0251). According to our interpretation, the different ways of configuration of objects are the forms of objects. The two objects are said to have the same form when they occur in the same kind of configuration. For example, colour is one form of objects. It is one basic mode of configuration that yields its colouredness. What this passage actually means is that though the objects are simple, they cannot combine into complex. And if an object is configurable with others to yield colour^e_^ness of a complex, then colour^e_^ness will be one of the form of object. And the same is the case with other forms of objects. Thus we see that this interpretation of the Tractatus 2.0251 is consistent with the non-observability of objects. This is also not inconsistent with the view that "empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects." (T, 5.5561). This passage says that states of affairs which are configuration of objects are observable. And hence empirical reality is limited by them. But in T, 2.0124, Wittgenstein clearly said that if all objects are given, all possible states of affairs are

also given. Because every object contains within its nature all the possibilities for its combination with other objects. That is to say, its possibility to enter into states of affairs is its very nature. And this does not depend on the observability or non-observability of objects. Thus we see that the T, 5.5561 does not entail that objects are observable.

But this interpretation raises another problem. The thesis of unobservability contradicts the central doctrine of the Tractatus. We have interpreted that Wittgenstein's objects are unobservable. But according to his central doctrine, the meaning of a name is the object it denotes. These two positions seem to be incompatible with each other. For, if object is the meaning of a name then we must know the object. But this is not possible if we accept the non-observability of object. Thus we see that unobservability of objects cannot be reconciled with the central doctrine of the Tractatus. But we can conveniently prefer the thesis of unobservability since it is consistent with most of the main lines of thought of the Tractatus.

Russell was concerned about the status of the existence of objects. According to him, "The whole question of what particulars you find in the real world is a purely empirical one which does interest the logician as such!"¹³

But Wittgenstein's view differs from that of Russell. According to him, what objects are there is neither a logical matter nor an empirical matter. It is an empirical matter what configurations of objects are actual and what are not. Thus what objects are there is not an empirical matter. It is not logical matter also. For the application of logic can decide only what elementary propositions are there. But logic cannot anticipate what belongs to its application. (T, 5.557). Therefore, what objects are there, logic cannot anticipate. This means that what objects are there is not a logical matter. According to Wittgenstein, anything that can be said is a proposition. Propositions can say only how things are. They cannot say what they are. So all that can be said is how objects are, not what they are. Nothing can be said about what they are. (T, 3.221). Thus, it seems, Wittgenstein is not committed to any view whatever about the metaphysical status of objects.

In the Investigations, Wittgenstein raised certain objections against the two related theses of the Tractatus. They are: that the world divides ultimately into atomic facts. And that each proposition ultimately, by analysis, can be reduced to elementary proposition. That is to say, each proposition has one and only one final analysis. Both these theses were based on the assumption that ultimate constituents of anything are fixed in the very nature of

things. But the later Wittgenstein said that it is an unwarranted assumption. For what the parts or the components of a thing are cannot be determined 'by reality'. So we cannot say that one account of the world is right and others are wrong. From a particular point of view, one account of the world may be better for certain purpose. And from another point of view, another account may be better for some other purpose. This shows clearly that the early Wittgenstein was wrong in saying that the world divides up not into things, but into facts. For there may be many more equally valid alternative ways of dividing up the world. One particular alternative may be more appropriate and illuminating for certain reasons. And other alternatives may be more appropriate and more illuminating for certain other reasons. Thus one can also say that the world divides into facts or that the world divides into objects or that the world divides into events. It may even divide into many other ways. John Wisdom summarised this point in this way:

"An account of the world in terms of things,
 an account of the world in terms of facts
 and an account of the world in terms of
 events is just an account of one world in
 three languages."¹⁴

So it is wrong to suppose that there is one and only one final analysis of anything. Moreover, it is not likely that all these analyses will produce the same result. For it is possible to specify the constituents of a thing in different ways.

Wittgenstein, thus, in the Investigations, subjected his idea of analysis to severe criticism. Let us consider the proposition 'The broom is in the corner'. This proposition may be analysed into three propositions: 'The broomstick is in the corner, and brush is in the corner, and the broomstick is attached to the brush'. Wittgenstein said that none of the analysed propositions says what the original proposition says. So he said,

"If we were to ask any one if he meant this he would probably say that he had not thought specifically of the broomstick or especially of the brush at all. And that would be the right answer, for he meant to speak neither of the stick nor of the brush in particular" (Pl, Sect. 60).

Wittgenstein did not want to say that analysis is useless. He did not say that analysis never serves any useful purpose. What he actually means to say is that analysis is not the only way or the only important way of giving us the meaning of words.

In the Investigations, Wittgenstein criticised the notions of absolute simplicity and absolute complexity. In the Tractatus he made the assumption that the difference between the simple and the complex is an absolute one. But for later Wittgenstein, the notions of absolute simplicity and absolute complexity are groundless. Simplicity and complexity are not inherent qualities of a thing. In a certain context, a thing may be simple. And in other context, the

same thing may be called complex or composite. So it is the context which determines the simplicity or the complexity of a thing. A thing in itself is neither simple nor complex. Whether a thing is simple or complex depends on the context in which it is considered. Apart from any context a thing is neither simple nor complex. Wittgenstein thought that to talk of things in absolute terms is a mistake. And philosophers generally commit this mistake. Admittedly, he committed the same mistake in thinking of objects as absolutely simple.

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C H A P T E R - I V

SENTENCE AND PROPOSITION

A proposition may be said to be either true or false. It is the constituent of reasoning. The basic unit of logic is proposition. A proposition is a statement. A statement is any sentence that says such and such is the case. A statement is a sentence which makes a statement. By sentence here we mean only indicative sentence. Because any sentence other than indicative sentence does not state anything. A sentence is a collection of verbal symbols. In a sentence, these symbols are interdependent and stand in harmony and also in close succession. A sentence is a meaningful combination of words. According to some logicians, a mere collection of words need not be meaningful. According to them, a statement is a group of words, set together according to the rules of grammar and syntax of language. For example, "The square root of three is blue". It is a grammatically correct sentence. But it is meaningless.

We have said that a statement is a kind of sentence. Sentences are of various kinds. For example, interrogative sentence, imperative sentence, optative sentence, exclamatory sentence and indicative sentence. It may be noted here that exclamatory, interrogative, optative and imperative sentences

are not statements. Because a statement is a sentence that states that such and such is the case. But the sentences other than indicative sentences do not state anything. For, interrogative sentences simply ask question. Imperative sentences only command or make request. Optative sentences only express wishes or desires. And exclamatory sentences simply explain and draw attention of others to something. Of the different kinds of sentences only the indicative sentences state something. So a statement is nothing but an indicative sentence.

It is customary to use the word 'statement' to describe the constituent of reasoning. Most logicians, however, prefer the word 'proposition' to statement. There are certain characteristics by means of which we can identify a proposition or a statement. First, whatever is believed or disbelieved is a proposition. Second, whatever can be said to be true or false is a proposition. Third, a proposition is an assertion. It either affirms or denies something of something. Fourth, a proposition is a sentence.

Let us consider these marks of proposition. A proposition is either believed or disbelieved. That is to say, whatever can be an object of belief or disbelief is a proposition. Things and qualities are not propositions. For they cannot be believed or disbelieved. There is nothing

in them which can be believed or disbelieved. But statements about facts and events are propositions. For they may be believed or disbelieved. For example, table, chair, house, blue pencil are not propositions. But statements about them are propositions. It may be pointed out here that a proposition cannot be characterised simply by belief and disbelief. A proposition is believed or disbelieved. But we may be undecided about the truth of a proposition. We may simply consider a proposition. And considering is neither believing nor disbelieving. For example, we may simply consider the statement "All virtuous are happy". Here the statement is neither believed nor disbelieved. The statement here is just taken for consideration.

A proposition is true or false. And whatever may be said to be true or false is a proposition. Applying this mark of proposition it may be seen that things and events are not propositions. Believing, disbelieving, considering etc. are events in the mental life. And hence, they must be distinguished from propositions. The same proposition may be believed by one and disbelieved by another.

A proposition is an assertion. It either affirms or denies something of something. But all propositions are not assertions. In a proposition we generally assert something. That is to say, we either affirm or deny something

of something. Thus "Ram is happy" is an affirmation. The corresponding denial is 'Ram is not happy'. The verbs 'is' 'are' and other grammatical devices mark the distinction between facts and events. They mark the distinction between assertions about them. But all propositions cannot be said to be assertions. For there are propositions which are not assertions. The propositions that are simply considered are not assertions. That is to say, propositions which are neither believed nor disbelieved cannot be said to be asserted propositions. The verb 'is' is the sign of assertion. It is an assertive tie. But it may act simply as a connective tie. This means that the 'is' in a statement may simply connect two expressions without implying that such connection is asserted. Thus when we say that "The proposition 'Ram is happy' consists of three words", the proposition 'Ram is happy' is not asserted. But when in objection to one's statement that 'Ram is happy', we say, 'No, Ram is happy', the proposition is asserted. Again, the 'if clauses' and 'then clauses' in sentences are unasserted propositions. Thus, in "If Pakistan attacked India, then Pakistan would have been defeated", the if - clause 'Pakistan attacked India' and the then - clause 'Pakistan would have been defeated' are unasserted propositions. A proposition, then, is not assertion. It is an assertible.

A proposition is a sentence. But all sentences are not propositions. Every proposition is a portion of discourse. But it cannot be said that a sentence is a proposition. First, all sentences are not propositions. Sentences are indicative, interrogative, imperative, optative and exclamatory. Of them, only indicative sentences can be true or false. And hence, only indicative sentences are propositions. Secondly, a meaningless sentence is also a sentence. Any set of verbal symbols arranged according to the rules of grammar and syntax is a sentence. They can be meaningful or meaningless. But only a meaningful indicative sentence can be termed as proposition. Thirdly, the view that propositions are indicative sentences is not, strictly speaking true. There are two aspects of indicative sentence and they are to be distinguished. They are the linguistic aspect and the meaning aspect. The linguistic aspect is the sentential expression of proposition. It is the verbal symbols used in proposition. The meaning aspect is the meaning of a sentence. It is what the set of symbols is used to mean. We have said that a proposition is either believed or disbelieved. We have also said that a proposition is either true or false. By applying these two characteristics it can be seen that the indicative sentence as an ordered set of symbols - as the sentential expression of meaning, is not a proposition. For symbols are things or sounds or written marks. They cannot be said

to be true or false. They also cannot be said to be believed or disbelieved. They cannot be said to be true or false. They simply are, what the indicative sentences express or mean is capable of truth or falsity. And what the indicative sentence expresses can be believed or disbelieved. A proposition, then, what an indicative sentence means or expresses. Fourthly, the difference between indicative sentence and proposition can be shown thus: A proposition need not be expressed in a sentence. Exclamatory assertions like 'fire!', 'thief!' express propositions. But they are not sentences. Such propositions are the most primitive form of statements. They are called primitive or exclamatory propositions. Again, expressions like "that Mrs. Gandhi is the present Prime Minister of India", "that Socrates drank the hemlock" are not sentences. But they express propositions. Moreover, the same sentence may express, in different situation, different propositions. Thus, the sentences: Ram is a boy, Ram ek larka hai, Ram ekjan manush, express the same proposition. On the other hand, the sentence "I am sick" uttered by different persons express different propositions. Cohen and Negal summarised the whole point thus:

"A proposition is not the same thing as the sentence which states it. The three sentences, 'I think, therefore, I am', 'Je pense, donc je suis', 'Cogito ergo sum', all state the same proposition. A sentence

is a group of words, and words, like other symbols, are in themselves physical objects, distinct from that to which they refer or which they symbolise. Sentences when written are thus located on certain surfaces, and when spoken are sound waves passing from one organism to another. But the proposition of which a sentence is the verbal expression is distinct from the visual marks or sound waves of the expression. Sentences, therefore, have a physical existence. They may or may not conform to standards of usage or taste. Truth or falsity can be predicated only of the propositions they signify."1

It must, however, be remembered that though a proposition is not identical with its linguistic expression, it must be expressed in some language. So for all practical purpose, a proposition may be defined as a sentence indicative. Modern formal logicians identify sentences with propositions. They prefer two-level reference to three-level reference. The two-level reference is a direct reference of sentence to fact. The three-level reference is an indirect reference of sentence to fact through proposition. By 'sentence' they mean only indicative sentence. According to them, a sentence is the name of a fact. We use sentence and mention fact. Many logicians, therefore, prefer 'sentence' to 'proposition'. It is to be pointed out that by 'sentence' is generally meant meaningful sentence. So, if proposition is the meaning of sentence, 'sentence' may be substituted for 'proposition'. When we say that a proposition is what a sentence means and it is different

from sentence, then a sentence and its meaning are to be distinguished. But if we want to define 'sentence' as a meaningful combination of words, the distinction between a sentence and its meaning no longer holds. The elimination of proposition introduces a symmetry between word - fact relation and the sentence - fact relation. As a word is the name of a thing, so also a sentence is the name of a fact.

We have applied the distinction of use and mention to sentences. On this distinction, we use a sentence when we want to make a statement about a certain state of affairs. But we also talk about the sentences themselves. In that case, we do not use them, but mention them. In a sentence s^1 , about a sentence s , we do not use s but mention it. And this is possible by using the name of s . All words are symbols. Our language is a system of verbal symbols. We use verbal symbols in statements. But by using them we make statements not about the symbols used, but about what they signify. We use word but mention things. Similarly, we use symbols but mention the symbolised. For example, when we say "virtuous are happy" we use the word 'virtuous' but we mention and assert something about certain individuals. It is certainly meaningless to say that the word 'virtuous' is happy. Particles like conjunction, preposition, adverbs

are also verbal symbols. But by using them we cannot state anything what they signify. For example, we may say 'on' is a preposition. But it cannot be said that 'on' is a relation, though 'on', in fact, stands for a certain relation. If we want to say something about what on signifies we are to use a set of words including 'on'. That is to say, we are to say that the relation signified by 'on' is different from the relation signified by 'to'. Names are those words by using which we may mention what they signify. Words such as 'on', 'to' etc. are not names. But we can use names for such words. Thus we see that prepositions, conjunctions etc. are not names. For they cannot occur as subject or predicate. But when we are interested in words as such they may be made subjects of grammatical or linguistic discussion. For example, 'slowly' is an English word, 'to' is a preposition. Here 'slowly' and 'to' are mentioned. We have mentioned them. Similarly, every name such as 'Ram', 'logic', may be used in propositions. Sometimes we confuse between the use and mention of words and statements. To avoid such confusion some devices are commonly used. For example, when we mention a word, the word is either put between inverted commas or written in italics or it may be prefaced by the expression: the word or the expression. For example, "The word 'Ram' is a proper name."

We have seen that not all propositions are sentences, and not all sentences are propositions. A proposition is an indicative sentence which is capable of standing on its own whether or not actually doing so. Sentences and propositions are, thus, two different sorts of things. Sentences are composed of words in accordance with syntactical rules. So they belong to some definite language. But propositions are not composed of words. Hence they do not belong to any language. For example, 'Ram is a man', 'Ram ek admi hai', 'Ram ekjan manush' are three different sentences. The first one is an English sentence, the second one is an Hindi sentence and the third one is a Bengali sentence. All the three sentences mean the same thing in three different languages. They cannot be regarded as three different propositions. For, here three different sentences have been used to express the same proposition. And this proposition itself is neither English, nor Hindi nor Bengali. That means it does not belong to any language at all. Again, propositions are sorts of things which can be true or false. But sentences cannot be true or false. Only propositions include reference to time and place. And it is the reference to time and place that makes a proposition true or false. But sentences do not include any such reference. Hence they cannot be said to be true or false.

Wittgenstein used the word 'proposition' (Satz) which he took over from philosophical usage. It may mean either sentence or proposition. In common German usage the word 'Satz' means either sentence or proposition. Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, used the word 'Satz' in both the senses. So the word 'Satz' can be translated by either English word. When he wrote the Tractatus, he did speak of sentences and propositions. But he did not speak of sentences as expressing propositions. Naturally, therefore, there will be variation in our translation of the word 'Satz'. This becomes clear when relevant passages are examined. On many occasions Wittgenstein used the word 'Satz' to mean true or false (T, 4.06; 4.25; 4.26). In these passages, we must take 'Satz' to mean 'proposition'. But there are also passages in which the word 'Satz' has been used as being composed of words. In those passages we must take the word 'Satz' to mean 'sentence'. But in most of the cases, by 'Satz' Wittgenstein meant proposition.

Pears and McGuinness have translated Wittgenstein's German term 'Elementarsatz' as 'elementary proposition'. Anscombe, a leading expert on Wittgenstein, agreed to this translation.² But Stenius was not satisfied with this translation. He translated the term as 'elementary sentence'.³ From these two translations, it is clear that so far as the term 'elementary' is concerned there is no difference

of opinion. But the commentators differ as to whether the German term 'Satz' should be regarded as proposition or sentence. Some commentators are of the opinion that Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, confused the two notions of 'Satz'. Moore raised this point. He said that Wittgenstein sometimes made explicit distinction between sentences and propositions. Moore also pointed out that Wittgenstein sometimes spoke of things which imply that both sentence and proposition can be used to mean the same thing.⁴ But it is wrong to think of Wittgenstein in this way. It is not the fact that he was unaware of the distinction between sentence and proposition. In fact, he rejected the view that a proposition is a kind of special entity. According to him, a proposition is not an idea or thought which is separated from a sentence. It is not something which the sentence somehow expresses. A proposition, for him, is a sentence in a certain relationship. Hence a proposition is not exactly identical with a sentence. But there is a sense in which it is similar to its. For example, a brother cannot be simply identical with a man. But since a brother is a man in certain relationship, a brother is just nothing more than a man. It is a fact that Wittgenstein believed in the ultimate connection between a sentence and a proposition. And this leads one to the impression that he did not carefully distinguish them.

Wittgenstein's use of 'Satz' may be considered from another side also. The German word 'Satzzeichen' has been translated by Pears and McGuinness as 'propositional sign'. To understand what the term 'propositional sign' means let us consider the two sets of words written on the line below :

Ram is a man.

Ram is a man.

The word 'sentence' may be used in two senses. In the first sense, there are two sentences written on the above line. The set of words on the left side is a sentence. The set of words written on the right side is also a sentence. But there is also another sense of a sentence. And in this sense there is only one English sentence written twice on the line. Sentences, then, can be categorised into two. The sentences of the first kind may be called sentence - tokens. And the sentences of the second kind may be called sentence - types. Basing on this classification, we can say that two sentence - tokens are written on the line. But there is only one sentence - type. Sentence-tokens are the actual inscriptions which are written on a particular occasion, in a particular place. They are composed of inkmarks, chalkmarks, sound waves and so on. But sentence-types are universals of which particular sentence - tokens are instances. They are not composed of actual

inkmarks or chalk - marks or sound waves. They are composed of shapes of ink or chalkmarks, structure of sound waves and so on. When we speak of the English sentence "Ram is a man" we are speaking of sentence - type. It is meaningless to say that the English sentence "Ram is a man" is composed of inkmarks or of chalkmarks or of sound waves. The distinction between sentence - token and sentence-type resembles the distinction between use and mention which we have explained earlier. A sentence-token has a physical existence. But a sentence-type does not have any physical existence.

Wittgenstein made a distinction between ordinary language and the language of logic (symbolic logic or notation). In case of ordinary language, he used 'Satzzeichen' or 'propositional sign' to mean sentence-token. But in case of logical language, by 'Satzzeichen', he meant a sentence-type (T, 4.442). In the Tractatus, then, where ordinary language is concerned, 'Satz' may mean either proposition or sentence-type. And 'Satzzeichen' may be taken to mean sentence-token. In the Tractatus, however, Wittgenstein was more interested in proposition than sentences themselves. For he was more concerned not with the sentence but with what the sentence is used to express.

! We have to examine now, the concept of elementary

proposition. Elementary proposition plays a crucial role in his philosophy. For it is elementary proposition through which Wittgenstein reached the ultimate constituent of the world. That is to say, through elementary proposition he reached states of affairs and from states of affairs to atomic fact which is the ultimate constituent of the world.

We are now in a better position to examine elementary proposition which plays a crucial role in Wittgenstein's metaphysics. According to Wittgenstein, an elementary proposition is a combination of genuine names. It is not analysable into other propositions. Just as an atomic fact is one that does not consist of further more basic facts; similarly an elementary proposition is one that cannot be analysed into further more basis propositions. ✓
He said,

"It is obvious that the analysis of propositions must bring us to elementary propositions which consist of names in immediate combination." (T, 4.221).

In his theory of description, Russell tried to show that certain types of propositions are there which can be analysed into other simpler propositions. And these simpler propositions can presumably be analysed further. But according to Wittgenstein, the analysis of non-logical word must come to an end at some level. He argued that the naming of complexes presupposes propositions. And the naming of

propositions presupposes simples. Basing on this assumption, he tried to show that there is a class of absolutely basic propositions of which no further analysis is possible. And these are elementary propositions. An elementary proposition is one which entirely consists of names only. As he said: "An elementary proposition consists of names. It is a nexus, a concatenation, of names." (T, 4.22). It is to be noted here that Wittgenstein used the term 'name' in a technical sense. He did not use it in ordinary sense. In our everyday discourse we use the terms such as 'Triangle', 'Elephant', 'Tagore', etc. as names. We say: 'Triangle' is the name of a plain figure bounded by three straight lines. 'Elephant' is the name of an animal. 'Tagore' is the name of a famous Indian poet. In Wittgenstein's technical sense, these terms, however, cannot be counted as names. By a name he meant only such term which cannot be verbally defined. So, a genuine name should be distinguished from one which can be verbally defined. A name is one that cannot be analysed or defined. Thus he said: "A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition; it is a primitive sign". (T, 3.26). Hence, such terms as triangle and elephant cannot be counted as names. For they can be defined verbally. That is to say, each of them has definition. One may think that ordinary proper names like 'Tagore' must be regarded as a proper name. Because the

definition of such terms are not available in the dictionaries. On this point, Wittgenstein agreed with Russell that they are abbreviated descriptions and not genuine proper names. Since a name cannot be defined, so there is no possibility of analysing it in any way. There is no verbal means to define a name. If a term designates something observable, only then it can be defined. That is to say, it can be defined by pointing to what it denotes and saying 'The word - means this'. This kind of definition is called ostensive definition. The definition of a name is possible only by ostensive definition. It is possible only when the name denotes something observable.

A name, then, must denote something simple. The 'simple' which the name denotes must be something without parts. That is to say, it must be without any components. If a name denotes something complex, then it can be defined in terms of its constituents and structures. And hence, it cannot be a name at all. Wittgenstein used the term 'object' to mean something simple. In Wittgenstein's technical sense "A name means an object. The object is its meaning. And objects are simple." (T, 3.203; 2.02). A name, then, occurs in elementary proposition. An elementary proposition is one that consists entirely of terms that denote simples. Wittgenstein did not give any example

of elementary proposition. Certain consideration led him to the view that there are elementary propositions. Wittgenstein did not discover elementary propositions by empirical observation. He was certain that there must be such propositions and hence names and objects. He also said that he could not think of a single example of elementary proposition. It is certain a priori that they exist. Seeking example of them is a mere empirical detail. And the fact that Wittgenstein was least interested in the empirical detail of elementary proposition is evident from Malcolm's report which we have already cited in the previous chapter.

The consideration which led Wittgenstein to the view that it is certain, a priori that there are elementary propositions, is the consideration about meaning. According to Russell, a correct analysis of proposition expresses what the original proposition means. On this view of analysis, Wittgenstein shared with Russell. He also said that the correct analysis of a proposition gives its real meaning. And the meaning of any term, except the logical constants, is whatever it denotes. He was also of the opinion that the terms of a proposition does not signify anything directly. They signify only indirectly. If any term signifies anything

directly, then the terms like golden mountain, unicorn, round square will refute the doctrine at once. So the term of a proposition must signify something indirectly. It signifies something via the terms of a simpler proposition into which it is analysed. The terms of the analysed propositions mean what the terms of the simpler propositions mean. If it is so, then the meaning of terms of analysed proposition depends on the meaning of the meaning of terms of simpler propositions. Thus, in ordinary definition, the meaning of the defined terms depends on the meaning of the terms of definition. So Wittgenstein wrote: "Every sign that has a definition signifies via the signs that serve to define it; and the definitions point the way." (T, 3.261). But if the terms of the simpler propositions are themselves definable in other more basic terms, then their meaning will depend on those other terms. And so long as the terms of the analysis will remain definable, their dependence will continue. But their dependence cannot be infinitely long. For, if it is so, then no ordinary term can designate anything. And if the meaning of a term is what it denotes, then no ordinary term will have a meaning - which is absurd. For example, the terms of proposition 'A' do not designate anything directly. They designate only via the terms of the proposition 'B'. The terms of the proposition 'B', in

tern, designate only via the terms of the proposition 'C', and so on. But unless in this process we reach propositions whose terms denote something directly, none of the propositions will mean anything - which is absurd. The ultimate propositions we reach consist of names only. They are unanalysable. Such propositions are elementary propositions which cannot be analysed further. Thus, the analysis of proposition must come to an end. As Wittgenstein said: "If it is true that every defined sign signifies via its definition then presumably the chain of definitions must sometime have an end." (NB, 9.5.15).

Wittgenstein made a distinction between determinateness and indeterminateness of the sense of proposition. When the proposition is simple, its sense is determinate. But when the proposition is complex, its sense is indeterminate. And he proved the existence of indefinable signs from the determinateness of sense of proposition. Wittgenstein believed that there is a necessary connection between the existence of proper names and the determinateness of sense of a proposition. He said: "The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that sense be determinate." (T, 3.23). He considered the connection between the existence of proper names and the determinateness of senses of a proposition a necessary connection. For he believed that the indeterminateness of a proposition is a

result of the fact that one of its terms signifies a complex.

"When a propositional element signifies a complex, this can be seen from an indeterminateness in the propositions in which it occurs. In such cases we know that the proposition leaves something undetermined. (In fact the generality - sign contains a prototype)". (T, 3.24).

This passage suggests that generality is involved in a proposition which deals with a complex. And it is generality which is responsible for the indeterminateness of a proposition's sense. The same point he put in the Note Books also.

"It can be seen that a name stands for a complex object from an indefiniteness in the propositions in which it occurs. This comes of the generality of such propositions". (NB, 21.6.15).

According to Wittgenstein, a term which designates a complex cannot be its real name. It is always a description of it. Two types of indeterminates are involved in it, since there are two kinds of generality. The first kind of indeterminateness occurs when we are not sure which description, of all possible descriptions, is the correct one. For there may be many possible descriptions. For example, let us consider the proposition "The watch is lying on the table." Here, if we say that the expression 'the watch' designates something complex, then it must be an

implicit description of the watch. At this point, one kind of generality is involved. And hence one kind of generality enters into it. For we are not sure what kind of description of what kind of watch is involved in the proposition "The watch is lying on the table." There are different varieties of watches. And all kinds of watches may come under the same name 'watch'. Thus the proposition does not say specifically what kind of description is to be used for analysing the general term 'watch'. In describing a complex another type of generality is also involved. And hence, another type of indeterminateness enters into it. It occurs in case of the description of individuals. Suppose, for example, we want to describe an individual. There are infinite number of different individuals actual or possible. And, if so, then the description is inherently general. The proposition containing such description is also indeterminate. For, here we are not sure which individual is actually meant by the description. Now, if all the terms designate the complex, then all propositions will necessarily be indeterminate. Such indeterminateness can be avoided only if there are terms which only designate the simples. Such terms are not descriptions of what they designate. They are terms which directly and uniquely name them.

Wittgenstein not only thought that simple signs are possible, he also claimed that they are actual. As he said:

"What a proposition expresses it expresses in a determinate manner, which can be set out clearly: a proposition is articulate." (T, 3.251). He did not say that the determinateness is always explicit. Normally this determinateness is not apparent in the sentence which expresses a proposition. But what is meant by the sentence is perfectly determinate. That is to say, the proposition which is expressed by the sentence is determinate. For it is proposition which a person means to express by the sentence. A sentence may be vague, but the thought behind it is not so. For example, while looking at the watch we say, "The watch is lying on the table", we do not simply mean that some kind of watch stands in some kind of relation... which may be called 'lying on' to some kind of table. What we actually mean by the sentence is that this particular watch stands in that determinate relation to that particular table. This shows that the thought behind the sentence, on each occasion, of its use is not vague but perfectly determinate. (NB, 20.6.15; 22.6.15). So when the proposition is analysed its real sense is spelled out. And thereby all indeterminateness vanishes. But in that case the analysis must come to an end in elementary proposition which consists of names only. For anything other than names will contain indeterminateness.

Wittgenstein believed that language disguises thought.

The real form of our thought becomes apparent only when the language in which it is expressed is analysed and broken down into its ultimate components. And these ultimate components, according to him, are elementary propositions. His idea was that the assertion of an ordinary proposition is a gross move. It contains within itself, a large number of smaller moves. For example, we assert that the watch is lying on the table. This assertion implies many other propositions which may be about the mechanism of the watch. This may be regarded as the gross move. Because these propositions themselves will imply other propositions which will still imply others and so on. This process will continue till we reach the final, ultimate component of the original proposition. And at this point the analysis will be completed. Wittgenstein's point was not that the assertion of each of these implied propositions are separate move in everyday life. His point was that an exact account of what they mean can be given only if they are analysed into elementary propositions which are their ultimate components.

According to Wittgenstein, then, any meaningful language must be founded on names. It must be founded on indefinable signs which directly denote objects. And it is the combination of such names which forms an elementary proposition. But there is one passage which seems to be inconsistent with this account. It is this:

"Even if the world is infinitely complex,
 so that every fact consists of infinitely
 many states of affairs and every state of
 affairs is composed of infinitely many
 objects and many states of affairs."(T,4.2211)

One may think that Wittgenstein has allowed the possibility of an infinite regress in the analysis of proposition. But it is wrong to interpret the passage in this way. A little reflection shows that the passage is perfectly consistent with the claim that the regress of analysis must come to an end with elementary proposition. What he really wanted to mean here is that there is possibility of infinitely many objects, when the final state of analysis is reached. He did not mean to say that the regress of analysis is infinite. So there is no incompatibility between our account and the Tractatus (4.2211). Wittgenstein sought for an independent ground in support of his thesis that there are simples or objects. This is stated in the passage which says: "If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true". It is false to say that whether a proposition has sense depends on whether other proposition is true. For in that case we cannot get the picture of the world, which is absurd. And this absurdity follows from the hypothesis that there are no simple objects. This proves that there must be simple objects.

Let us consider the above argument in an elaborate

form. We know that for Wittgenstein, a term has meaning only when it refers to something existent, either directly or indirectly. And a proposition is meaningful or has sense only when it is composed of terms which have meaning. Therefore, if a proposition is to have sense, its terms must designate something existent. Let us suppose we express a proposition "The broom is in the corner". The kind of analysis which Wittgenstein followed has been indicated in the passage: "Every statement about complexes can be resolved into statement about their constituents and into the propositions that describe the complexes." (T, 2.0201). In the Investigations, Wittgenstein illustrated this kind of analysis thus: (a) The stick is in the corner; (b) The brush is in the corner; (c) The stick is attached to the brush in such and such a way. Now, if the sense of the proposition 'a' depends on its terms having reference to something existent, then a's having sense depends on whether or not 'the broom' ultimately refers to something existent. But what we have meant by 'the broom' is specified by the proposition 'c' of the analysis. Hence it may seem that whether 'the broom' refers to something depends on the truth or falsity of the proposition 'c'. That is to say, if the broom refers to something, the proposition 'c' is true. And if it does not refer to something, then the proposition 'c' is false. But this assertion would be justified if simpler

propositions constituted the final analysis of the original propositions. But the simpler propositions do not constitute the final analysis of the original propositions. If so, then the truth or falsity cannot be attributed to them. It is enough for the proposition 'a' to have sense, that the proposition 'C' has sense. Thus, we must admit that there are simple objects. If there are no simple objects then the regress of analysis will be endless. For the proposition 'C' can be further analysed. And this in turn can be analysed further and so on *ad infinitum*. In such case, the reference to existent can be secured only by the truth of some propositions which occur in the analysis. This shows that the sense of the original proposition depends on the truth or falsity of other propositions. But this, according to Wittgenstein, is unacceptable. For the endless regress of analysis does not arise if we admit that there are simple objects. The regress of analysis comes to an end in elementary proposition which consists of names only. The names refer to something existent. And since the terms of the original proposition are names, so it must have sense. The reference to existent on the part of elementary proposition is enough guarantee that the original proposition has sense. It is not necessary that the elementary propositions must be true though they must have sense. If the elementary proposition asserts that

objects are configured in such ways in which they can be configured, it is enough guarantee that the elementary proposition has sense. No matter whether or not they are actually configured. And since the elementary proposition has sense, the original proposition must have sense.

There may be an obvious objection to the above argument. One may argue that an indefinable sign can be a name only if there exists an object, which will imply another proposition. So the sense of the elementary will depend on the truth of other proposition. For example, an indefinable sign 'a' which purports to name can really be a name only if there exists an object 'a' which it names. Therefore, whether an elementary proposition containing 'a' has sense or not depends on the truth of another proposition i.e. 'a exists'. And since we are always required to make reference to existence, the sense of a proposition must always depend on the truth of other propositions. No matter, whether or not there are simple objects. But this argument is not acceptable to Wittgenstein. His answer to this objection is that the expression 'a exists' where 'a' is the indefinable sign, is not a genuine proposition at all. His argument for this claim has already been described in the previous chapter. Hence the sense of an elementary proposition cannot depend on the truth of any proposition like 'a exists'. And since 'a exists' is not a proposition,

the objection based on it loses its point.

The above consideration shows that every genuine proposition has one and only one complete analysis into elementary propositions. (T, 3.25). This is so even if every fact consists of infinitely many states of affairs. And this is also true even if every state of affairs is composed of infinitely many objects. (T, 4.2211). The completely analysed proposition will consist of simple names only. The meaning of simple name will be simple object. The particular way in which the names are combined in the proposition will say that the simple objects in the world are related in the same way. To understand the completely analysed proposition one need only to understand the names. That is, one need only to know what object they stand for. What their combination seems will be immediately evident. Understanding a proposition requires merely understanding its constituents. (T, 4.024). As Rush Rhees has remarked, the idea that there are elementary propositions is not an arbitrary assumption. Wittgenstein was trying to solve the question how language and thought can be related to reality. His basic intuition was that language depicts reality. If this is true, then there must be something in the propositions which can show their sense immediately. This does not mean that

their truth is self-evident. Wittgenstein had no means for identifying elementary propositions. He could not give any general account of the subject-matter of elementary propositions. He based his theory only on intuition. But if his intuition is correct then there must be elementary propositions. That is, there must be propositions which show their sense immediately. And all other propositions are truth-functions of such propositions. If this is not so, then no proposition will say anything. And hence, no proposition can be understood at all.⁵

According to Wittgenstein, then, sense of any proposition can be stated and understood by means of elementary propositions and propositional connectives alone. Non-elementary propositions are just combinations of elementary propositions. They are molecular propositions which are ~~composed~~ of atomic or elementary propositions. All molecular propositions are truth-functional compounds of elementary propositions. This is one of the central doctrines of the Tractatus. "A proposition is a truth-function of elementary proposition." (T, 5). A connection is a truth-functional one if it compounds propositions into truth-functional compounds. All propositions, then, are truth-functions of elementary propositions. Given all the elementary propositions if we know which are true and which are false, we know everything which is there to know.

Because the truth-value of any other proposition is entirely determined by the truth-value of its component elementary propositions. The truth of the world is completely determined solely by the truth-value of the elementary propositions.

"If all true elementary propositions are given, the result is a complete description of the world. The world is completely described by giving all elementary propositions, and adding which of them are true and which false." (T, 4.26)

A truth-function of a single proposition 'p' is a proposition whose truth or falsity is uniquely determined by the truth or falsity of 'p'. For example, $\neg p$ is a truth-function of 'p'. A truth-function of two propositions p, q is a proposition whose truth or falsity is uniquely determined by the truth or falsity of p, q. For example, "p, q are both true" is a truth-function of p, q. According to the Tractatus, every genuine proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions. If two non-elementary propositions 'r' and 's' are truth-functions of some of the same elementary propositions, then 'r' and 's' will be internally related. For example, one of them may logically follow from the other. If we know the internal structure of two propositions, we know what logical relations hold between them. We do not need, in addition, a knowledge of logical principles. We can do without the formal principles of logic. For in a suitable notation we can recognise the

formal properties of propositions merely by inspecting the propositions themselves.

Wittgenstein's view, then, is that given all possible elementary propositions, one can construct any proposition whatever from them by using nothing but truth-functional operators. He employed an effective device for making manifest the truth-conditions of a proposition. This is known as truth-table method. With the help of this method he could manifest the truth-conditions of a proposition. The truth-connectives which hold among propositions are: 'not', 'and', 'not both', 'and', 'or', 'implies', 'is', 'neither nor', 'equivalent to', 'one but not both', 'one and not others', etc.. Now, all the truth-functional connectives can be defined in terms of one primitive truth-functional connective or operators. This means that, on Wittgenstein view, any proposition can be constructed by the use of the one primitive truth-functional connective. One may choose 'equivalence' or 'mutual rejection' or incompatibility.

There are two limiting cases among the possible groupings of truth-conditions of propositions. One case will be when a proposition is true for all truth-possibilities of elementary propositions. Such proposition is a tautology. And other case will be when a proposition is false for all the truth-possibilities of elementary

propositions. Such proposition is a contradiction. Though ordinarily tautologies and contradictions are regarded as 'propositions', they are actually degenerate cases. They are not genuine propositions. For a tautology is unconditionally true and a contradiction is unconditionally false. According to Wittgenstein, a genuine proposition is a picture of reality. He compared a proposition to "a solid body that restricts the freedom of movement of others." In contrast, a tautology "leaves open to reality the whole of logical space". No restriction is imposed on anything. A tautology, for example, 'it is raining or it is not raining' does not say anything about reality. A contradiction, for example, 'it is raining and it is not raining', "fills the whole of logical space leaving no point of it for reality." (T, 4.462; 4.463). It also does not say anything about the world.

Thus, according to Wittgenstein, the so-called propositions of logic are tautologies. They express no thoughts. We can do without them. But they are not nonsense. For, the fact that certain combination of propositions yields a tautology reveals to us something about the structures of the constituent propositions. As he said: "The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal - logical - properties of language and the world." (T, 6.12).

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CHAPTER - V

NAMES AND MEANING

The notion of a name is basic not only to proposition but also to language in general. A name is defined as a 'simple sign' which is used in a proposition or a sentence. A sign may be either simple or complex. A complex sign is composed of other signs. But a simple sign is not composed of other signs. A simple sign must denote something simple. It must be without parts or component of any sort. For example, the phrase 'The king of Nepal' is not a simple sign. For it is composed of other signs. And hence it cannot be a name. The word 'Ram' though appears to be a simple sign, cannot be counted as a name. For it does not stand for a simple thing, which may be called an 'object'. It is easy to determine whether a sign is composed of other signs. But it is exceedingly difficult to determine whether it stands for something simple. Wittgenstein used the term name in a technical sense. According to the Tractatus, the object for which a name stands is the meaning of name. "A name means an object. The object is its meaning." (T, 3.203). A name is a primitive sign which cannot be verbally defined or analysed further.

Wittgenstein conceived of objects as something absolutely simple. They do not have parts. Objects make up the substance and content of the world. They are ungenerable and indestructible. Objects combine into states of affairs. A fact is a complex of objects. Objects are possible constituents of facts. A name is not a picture of the object for which it stands. And therefore, it does not say anything. A picture in language i.e. a proposition, can be formed only by a combination of names. This combination pictures a configuration of objects. The combination of name is like a tableau vivant. (T, 4.0311). A name is a substitute for an object. And a combination of names portrays a configuration of objects. That is to say, objects are combined to form states of affairs.

We do not find any example of names and objects in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein only said that names occur in elementary propositions. But he did not give any example of elementary proposition also. He actually did not consider it necessary to give examples of them. He only said that it is a logical necessity that demanded the existence of names and objects. His conviction that there are objects is purely a priori. In the Notebooks, he wrote,

"It seems that the idea of the simple is already to be found contained in that of the complex and in the idea of analysis, and in such a way that we come to this idea quite apart from any example of

simple objects or of propositions which mention them, and we realise the existence of this simple object - a priori - as a logical necessity." (NB, p.60).

This logical necessity follows from his assumption that propositions have a definite sense. "The demand for simple things is the demand for definiteness of sense" (NB, p.63). As he put in the Tractatus: "The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that sense be determinate." (T, 3.23). A proposition may be ambiguous or indeterminate. This is due to the fact that one of its terms signifies a complex. But when it is analysed its real sense is spelled out and all ambiguity vanishes. In this sense, the sentences of every day language are in perfect order. For the real meaning expressed by these sentences becomes clear when they are analysed into their ultimate components - elementary propositions.

According to Wittgenstein, meaning of a simple name is the simple object. And a completely analysed proposition consists of names only. Wittgenstein's basic intuition was that there must be propositions which show their sense immediately. From this it follows that the meaning and intelligibility of a proposition are independent of its truth and falsity. To understand a proposition we need to know the names only. We need to know only what

objects they stand for. What their combination means will be immediately evident. He wrote: "To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true. (One can understand it, therefore, without knowing whether it is true." (T, 4.024). This passage clearly shows the important difference between the meaning of a name and the meaning of a proposition. A proposition may have meaning even if there is no fact corresponding to it. But a name cannot have meaning if there is no fact corresponding to it. Because the meaning of a name is the object it denotes. (T, 3.003). So we cannot say that in order for a sentence to have meaning it must denote a fact. As a solution to this problem. Frege had to discover something else for sentences to denote. According to him, there are two things which sentences can denote: 'True' for true sentences and 'False' for false sentences. But Frege's solution was not acceptable to Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein made a distinction between the meaning of a name and the meaning of a proposition. He said that a name has 'Bedeutung' and a proposition has 'Sinn'. Pears and McGuinness translated Bedeutung as 'meaning' and Sinn as 'sense'. Frege also used these two terms Bedeutung and Sinn. Frege held that names and sentences can have Sinn as well Bedeutung. But Wittgenstein held that names have only Bedeutung and no Sinn, and the propositions have only Sinn and no Bedeutung. As he said: "Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name

have meaning." (T, 3.3). A proposition, therefore, does not have a situation. On the contrary, it is a proposition that describes a situation. (T, 3.144; 4.023). According to Frege, the sense of a sentence is the thought it "contains" and the thought is "not the subjective performance of thinking but its objective content, which is capable of being property of several thinkers."¹ So, for Frege, the sense of a sentence is a strange kind of entity which is apprehensible by mind. But Wittgenstein was opposed to such view. He did not want to assign reality to such things. He said that the sense of a proposition is the situation it describe. As he said: "Instead of 'This proposition has such and such a sense', we simply say, 'This proposition represents such and such a situation.'" (T, 4.031). A proposition is a 'logical picture' and "what a picture represents is its sense." (T, 2.221).

Wittgenstein was profoundly influenced by Frege's logical work. Like Frege, he also believed that propositional connectives like 'if', 'then', 'not', 'and', 'or' and the quantifiers have fundamental role in logic. Including the sign of identity, these connectives were called by him 'logical constants'. Like Frege, he used the terms sense and reference in technical sense. But he disagreed with Frege's theory of meaning. In Frege's system some formulae were given the status of axioms. But Wittgenstein considered his choice of axioms arbitrary. For there are

equally powerful and consistent alternative axiom-sets which are applicable to these formulae. For example, the truth-table method is applicable to all formulae alike. Thus, according to Wittgenstein, all logical truths are of equal status. None of them is essentially primitive and underivable. As he said: "All the propositions of logic are of equal status, it is not the case that some of them are essentially primitive propositions and others essentially derived propositions." (T, 6.127). Moreover, Frege considered primitive propositions as self-evident. But Wittgenstein was always opposed to the idea of self-evidence. Instead of self-evidence he offered a method of calculation which can be carried out by a machine. (NB, p-3; T, 1271).

According to Wittgenstein, the word 'is' in ordinary language signifies in three different ways. Sometimes it appears as a copula. That is to say, it serves as a connecting link between subject and predicate. For example, "Ram is singing". In Frege's notation, it can be translated by function sign '... is singing'. The word 'is' sometimes appears as a sign of identity. For example, 'twice two is four'. It can be translated by the equal sign, as in ' $2 \times 2 = 4$ '. Sometimes the word 'is' appears as an expression for existence. For example, 'There is a ghost'. This can be translated by the particular quantifier as (For some x , x is a ghost). Here 'is' is simply a part of the

predicate '... is a ghost'. (T, 3.323).

According to Wittgenstein, we must distinguish between different modes of significance. Otherwise, it leads to confusion about what we mean and also about the drawing of false inferences. Copula should be distinguished from the sign of identity. And it also should not be confused with the sign for existence. For inferences from the proposition 'S is P' differ according to the differences of significance of the word 'is'. In every case we cannot infer 'P is S' from 'S is P'. If 'is' is the sign of identity, only then we can infer like that. For example, we can infer 'four' from twice two. But if 'is' is the copula we cannot infer so. For example, we cannot infer 'singing is Ram' from 'Ram is singing'. Wittgenstein held that the mistake lies with the ordinary language which is vague and ambiguous. In order to avoid such errors we must need a language which does not use the same sign with different modes of significance. We must need an ideal language whose grammar is governed by logic. Such a language uses logical syntax instead of the superficial syntax of ordinary language. Its grammar is unlike the grammar of misleading natural language.

Wittgenstein held that Frege failed to make a distinction between names and descriptions. In Frege's system, 'Ramkrishna', 'the master of Vivekananda' are treated

as the same kind of symbols. Frege treated them as names with sense and reference. Before Wittgenstein, it was Russell who pointed out that this is a mistake. Russell argued that if a name like 'Ramkrishna' is a genuine name it has meaning solely by having reference. And the expression like 'the master of Vivekananda' should not be called a name at all. For it is a complex symbol. And unlike genuine name it has parts which are significant symbols in their own right. It is an incomplete symbol or abbreviated description and not a genuine name. For Frege, a sentence containing definite description, e.g. 'The author of Geetanjali was genius' shares the same form of 'Tagore was genius'. But for Russell, it is of quite different form and it has a hidden complexity. In an unanalysed sentence the expression 'the author of Geetanjali' looks like a complex name. And Frege has treated it accordingly. But in an analysed sentence no such expression appears.

One consequence of the description is that existence is treated as a property of propositional function. Russell agreed with Frege on this point. Frege took existence to be a property of concept. Russell said that a logically proper name cannot be expanded into a propositional function. So an object which is named in this way cannot be meaningfully

said either to be or not to be. If we want to say that a named object exists, then we shall have to say that it has some property or other, or that it is identical with itself. Russell's conclusion was disputed by Moore. In an article Moore discussed the question whether existence can be treated as a predicate.² Moore argued that Russell used demonstrative 'this' as an instance of logically proper name. And he has used it to refer to an object. If this is so, then one can significantly say that it might not have existed. But to say this is to imply that the proposition 'This does not exist' may be true. From this it follows that the sentence 'This does not exist' must be significant. Consequently, the proposition that 'this exists' is a true proposition. And from this it follows that the sentence 'This exists' is also significant.

Russell's theory of description was initially received very favourably by the philosophers. It was considered by Ramsey as "a paradigm of philosophy."³ But recent thinkers raised strong objection to Russell's theory. They say that the theory failed to give accurate account of the sentence in which descriptive phrases are used. Strawson argued:

"That in sentences like 'The author of Waverley was Scott' or 'The present King of France is bald' the existence of an object, to which the descriptive phrase purports to refer, is not implicitly asserted, but rather presupposed, so that

If the object does not exist the sentence should be regarded as having been used to make not a false statement but rather one that is lacking in truth-value".⁴

One more serious objection to the theory of description is that the assumption that the meaning of a name is to be identified with the object which it denotes, is itself an incorrect assumption. It may be argued that in case of ordinary proper name, the name makes the same contribution to the meaning of the sentence in which it occurs. It does not matter whether or not the object which it purports to denote exists. For example, our belief that King Ravana is a historical figure may be false. It is for this reason that Russell treated such names as concealed descriptions. But even in case of demonstrative 'this' Russell's original assumption has the same consequence. For the meaning of these demonstratives varies from user to user. This is to say, their meaning may vary with every occasion of their use. Ordinarily, the function of the word 'this' is not to name object. Its purpose is to serve as an aid to orientation. Russell himself came round to such view in his Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. There he said that all logically proper names can be characterised as denoting egocentric particulars. And all of them can be defined in terms of simple demonstrative 'this'. Russell, then assigned to this word a constant meaning.

The distinction between saying and showing is fundamental in Wittgenstein's philosophy. He said: "What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by language.

Propositions show the logical form of reality.

They display it." (T, 4.1211)

"Thus one proposition 'fa' shows that the object 'a' occurs in its sense, two propositions 'fa' and 'ga' show that the same object is mentioned in both of them". (T, 4.1211) "What can be said cannot be shown" (T, 4.1212).

As an illustration of Wittgenstein's thesis that tautologies show the logical or structural properties of their components we can consider the following three propositions, 'If it rains, the ground is wet', 'It rains', 'The ground is wet'. We can form a tautology out of these three propositions thus: 'If it rains the ground is wet', and, it rains, then the ground is wet'. As Wittgenstein said: "The fact that the propositions 'p \supset q', 'p', and 'q', combined with one another in the form '(p \supset q). (p) : \supset : (q)', yields a tautology shows that q follows from p and p \supset q. The fact that '(x). fx : \supset : fa' is a tautology shows that fa follows from (x). fx. Etc. etc." (6.1201). It is clear that the tautology does not say about the world in the way in which the constituent propositions do say about the world. But Wittgenstein said that it does show something about the formal properties of language. It shows that 'The ground is wet' follows from 'If it rains, the ground is wet and

it rains'. Here one can say that what has been shown can be said also. For we have said it just at this moment. Wittgenstein's answer to it is that for anyone to understand what we have just written, he must take the expression in quotation mark as English sentences. He must not take it as a succession of meaningless marks. And if he takes it in that sense, he must already know English. And if he knows English then he already knows the rules for the use of the English expressions of which the quoted sentence is composed of. But if he knows the rules then he already knows that the third sentence follows from the other two sentences.

In order to clarify this point Wittgenstein made a distinction between signs and symbols. We can consider a word or a proposition in two ways. When we consider its perceptible qualities, such as its shape or sound, we are considering the sign of the word or proposition. But when we consider the meaningful use of it, its rule for application, then we are considering the symbol. The same sound or mark can be used in language in different ways. For example, 'den' is an article in German. But it is used as noun in English. Similarly, the word 'bear' is used as noun as well as verb in English. In such case we have the same sign but different symbols. In order to specify the symbol we do not have to say anything about semantics. That is, we do not have to say anything about its reference

or the kind of the object it stands for. As Wittgenstein said: "In logical syntax the meaning of a sign should never play a role." (T, 3.33). This is what is wrong with the theory of types. Russell was wrong because he had to speak about things which the signs mean. What belongs to a certain type is something that cannot be said. We cannot speak of types. We can speak of symbols only. The theory of types is an attempt to say what the symbols can show. (T, 3.332; 3.333; NB, p108).

To illustrate this let us consider the sentence 'Tagore is a different type of thing than mortality'. This is surely a piece of nonsense. But what it tries to say can be stated in the following manner. In 'Tagore is mortal' 'Tagore' is a proper name. What it symbolises is not only the expression 'mortal' or 'is mortal'. But it also symbolises the fact that '... is mortal' stands to the right of a proper name. Similarly, in 'Ram loves Sita', 'loves' alone is not a symbol. But the fact that 'loves' stands between two names in a certain order is what symbolises. 'If 'loves' alone is the symbol, then 'Ram loves Sita', 'Sita loves Ram' and 'loves Sita Ram' will all be the same proposition. For all of them are composed of the same symbols. And what this shows is what we try to express in the theory of types. The theory of types tries to say that there is a difference of types between

objects, properties and relations. (NB, pp, 108-9).

According to Wittgenstein, every symbol has accidental and essential features. So we must make a distinction between accidental and essential features. In English language the order of names flanking the verb 'love' is significant. It is its accidental feature. In Latin language it is the termination of names which is significant. Thus in Latin, 'Marian amet Joannes' and 'Joannes amet Marian;' say the same thing. But every language must have essential feature also. Its essential feature is what distinguishes between the subject and the object of the verb. The essential feature of symbols "is what all symbols that can serve the same purpose have in common." (T, 3.341). The accidental feature of a proposition can be said by another proposition. But its essential feature cannot be said by another proposition. For example, 'Ram loves Sita', shows but does not say that 'Ram is to the left of Sita'. This makes it clear that a proposition shows but does not say about itself. The essential or logical feature of language cannot be said by any proposition. (NB, p.110).

Propositions of logic show these logical properties clearly. But the propositions of ordinary language show these properties only vaguely. Because the signs used in ordinary language belong to different symbols. But in logical syntax of language the same sign is not used to

signify different symbols. In an ideal notation 'is' signifies in three different ways and 'identical' has the linguistic but not logical syntax of an adjective. As Wittgenstein said: "In the proposition, 'Green is Green' - where the first word is the proper name of a person and the last an adjective - these words do not merely have different meanings; they are different symbols."(T, 3.323).

Thus we see that ordinary language uses signs which look alike but belong to different symbols. It also contains signs which look different but belong to the same symbol and have the same meaning. This is true not only of ordinary language but also of the formalised language of Frege and Russell. (NB, p. 100). To illustrate this let us consider the two propositions 'not both p and not p' and 'either not p or q'. Both the propositions have the same truth-table. Both of them are true or false under same circumstances. And according to Wittgenstein, the sense of a proposition is determined by elementary propositions and propositional connectives alone. If so, then we can say that 'not both p and not p' and 'either not p or q' have the same sense. One can be substituted for the other. And their common truth-table cannot itself be used as a propositional sign with the same meaning. (T, 4.4; 3.344; 4.44).

According to Wittgenstein, compound propositions are

nothing more than the expression of agreement and disagreement with the truth possibilities of elementary propositions. In order to prove this he offered a number of arguments in the Tractatus and also in the Notebooks. He said that it is wrong to think that words like 'not' 'or' have some independent meaning. It is a general temptation to think that 'not' denotes some negative fact and 'or' expresses a relation between two states of affairs. But in his letter to Russell, he said: "Logic is still in the melting pot but one thing gets more obvious to me ... there are no logical constants." (NB, p. 119). In the Tractatus, he said that 'logical constants' do not denote anything. (T, 4. 0312). They are not proxies for something as other words are.

Following Frege's terminology Wittgenstein said that the same fact corresponds to both p and not p . So there is nothing which corresponds to the negative sign 'not'. He said that both p and not p correspond to the same reality. Because both p and not p have the same reference or denotation. It is the same fact which makes one false and another true. If it is the case that ' p ', then the positive fact that ' p ' both makes ' p ' true and false. But if it is not the case that p , then ' p ' is made false and 'not p ' is made true by the same negative fact. (NB, p.94; T, 2.06). If 'not p '

corresponds to a different fact then 'not not p' will be different from 'p' which is absurd. 'p' and 'not not p' say exactly the same. Wittgenstein also argued that the connectives like 'or' 'and' etc. do not denote any relations. For unlike real relations they need brackets to express their scope. For example, as we distinguish '(either p or q) and r' from 'either (p or (q and r))'. Moreover, with the aid of negative sign, all these connectives are interdefinable. For example, 'if p ... then' can be defined 'either not ... or'; 'p and q' can be defined as 'not either not p or not q' and so on.

Thus, according to Wittgenstein, propositional connectives cannot appear in ideal notation. For they are interdefinable either by equivalence or by mutual rejection. These connectives should not be regarded as primitive signs as Russell and Frege have conceived. Like propositional connectives, the quantifiers are also interdefinable. For example, 'for all x' = 'not for some x not'; and 'for some x' = 'not for all x not'. Therefore, they also should be eliminated from ideal symbolism. (NB, p. 103; T, 5.441). Wittgenstein also said that even the sign of identity is also superfluous for ideal notation. It is not a relation between objects. To say that two things are identical is nonsense. And to say of a thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all. (T, 5.53; 5.5303). Thus

the sign of identity should be excluded from ideal notation. (NB, p.34). He also said that there is no need for a sign of identity. For one man may have many names. And many men may have the same name. But the principle of ideal notation says that there should not be signs which belong to more than one symbols. And if so, then every object will have a different sign. As he said: A proposition like 'A = B' is always incorrect and a proposition like 'A=A' is always pointless. (T, 5.5303).

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein held that the meaning of a name is the object it denotes. For he believed that the names of his simple objects are the only genuine proper names. In the Investigations, he criticised this conception of meaning. He said that it is wrong to speak of absolutely simple objects. So his early view that the names of absolutely simple objects are the only genuine proper names is also wrong. Later Wittgenstein, thus, destroyed the thesis that the meaning of any word which is a genuine proper name is the object it denotes. He now claimed that it is a misuse of word 'meaning' to use it to signify the thing that corresponds to the name. (PI, sect. 40). What corresponds to name is the bearer, not its meaning. In the Tractatus, he had confused the bearer of the name with the meaning of the name.

At different times Wittgenstein used different

criteria about meaning. Sometimes he said that a proposition has meaning in virtue of being a picture. Sometimes he held that the meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification. He also said that the meaning of an expression is its use. It is true that the symbols by themselves are inert and dead. They become meaningful only when they are meant by speakers and writers and understood by hearers and readers. This is the general notion of meaning. But Wittgenstein said that such conception of meaning is always misleading. For it gives a confused picture of meaning and understanding.

We generally think of understanding, meaning and thought as mental processes. These processes accompany speaking, hearing, writing and reading of language. The elements of these processes are not material. They occur in the spiritual realm of mind. Against this view, Wittgenstein argued that meaning and understanding are not processes at all. He said that the criteria by which we understand sentences are quite different from the criteria by which we understand mental processes. (PG, p.148).

Let us explain this point. Suppose we say on a particular occasion 'The meeting is successful'. And we also mean and understand what we are saying. Again, we also mean and understand when we climb up stairs with silent counting of our steps. Our mental processes in both

the cases are not of the same kind. Similarly, a man who knows the rules of chess will have different experiences when he watches a game from some-one who does not know the rules. (PG, p. 41; 49-50). These experiences vary from person to person, from case to case. From this it is clear that these experiences themselves do not constitute the meaning or understanding. It is wrong to think of understanding as a process like the translation of it into another language. (PG, p.74). If anyone is tempted to think of meaning as a process which accompanies speech should try to perform that process without speaking. (PI, Sect. 332; BB, p.42; PG, p.155). Wittgenstein said "Make the following experiment; say 'It's cold here' and mean 'It's warm here'. Can you do it? And what are you doing as you do it?" (PI, Sect. 510).

The term 'understanding' itself covers many different cases which Wittgenstein examined in detail in the Grammatik.

"We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense it can be replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by another. ... In the one case the thought in the sentence is something common to two different sentences; in the other something that is expressed only by these words in these positions."(PG, p.69).

Wittgenstein said that these kinds of use of 'understanding' constitutes its meaning. It also constitutes the concept of

understanding. There are many cases which may be covered by the concept like understanding. From this it does not follow that there must be some common property in them, which form the concept. The different cases may be related to one another through intermediaries. They may be related in a way that links of a chain are related to distant links in the same chain. Two members of the same family may be closed to each other. The distant ones may have nothing more in common with each other and yet belong to the same family.

Wittgenstein introduced the notion of family likeness in the Grammar. But he developed this notion in Blue Book. He said that a general term has nothing in common. As he said:

"They form a family the members of which have family likeness. Some of them have the same nose, others the same eyebrows and others again the same way of walking and these likeness overlap. The idea of a general concept being a common property of its particular instances connects up with other primitive, too simple, ideas of the structure of language". (BB, p. 17; Pl, Sect. 67; PG, p. 85).

Ordinary language uses words as standing for properties. It is because of the fact that words are conceived on the pattern of common noun and proper name. But this, according to Wittgenstein, is wrong for two reasons. First, it concentrates too much on names. And as a result it ignores other kinds of words which are used very differently

from names. It is something like describing chess by ignoring the case of pawns. (BB, p.77). Secondly, it takes the meaning-relation wrongly. It considers that the meaning of a name is the object it names. And it regards that the name is correlated with the object by means of ostensive definition. But Wittgenstein was opposed to such conception of meaning. He assigned limited role to ostensive definition. He gave more stress on multiplicity of different types of words and different uses of language.

According to Wittgenstein, it is wrong to suppose that words always function in one way. For example, a word like 'five' functions differently from the word like 'apple'. To know what 'five' means one must be capable of counting. But this is not required to know the meaning of 'apple'. (BB, p.79). One may be tempted to say that 'apple' and 'five' are two different types of objects. Apples are touchable, whereas numbers are not touchable. But this way of saying things is quite wrong: For a number may be defined by pointing as a word like apple. But the use of the words after they have been used is totally different.

As opposed to his early view, Wittgenstein now gave emphasis on two conceptions of meaning. Firstly, he said that the meaning of a word is its use in a language. And secondly, he said that the meaning of a word is what

the explanation of the meaning explains. Sometimes he said that the meaning of a word is its use in a calculus or in a language-game. And according to him, language-games are the ways of using signs similar than these in which we use the signs of our highly complicated language. (BB, p. 17). Thus, to understand the meaning of a word we should not look for an object for which it stands. We should rather study the diversity of their functions.

In the Blue Book, Wittgenstein made a distinction between verbal and ostensive definition. He said that verbal definition takes us from words to words. So it cannot give us the real meaning. But it seems ostensive definition can take us to the real step towards learning the meaning. (BB, p.1). It appears that one can learn the meaning of the word simply by acquaintance with what the word stands for. It may also seem that we learn language by giving names to objects. From this one may think that the essential part of the learning process is the acquaintance with the object. Others may make us learn what words mean. But this they can do only by putting us in a position where we ourselves can be acquainted with the object which is the meaning of the word. After acquaintance with the object we are to fix our attention on the appropriate object. And then we are to associate the word with it. Once such association is made we feel that we know the meaning. We also feel that we understand it and know its use.

Later Wittgenstein severely criticised this view of ostensive definition. He said that the acquaintance with the object for which the word stands does not mean the knowledge of the word. The meaning of the word is not the thing which 'corresponds' to the word. We must not confuse the bearer of a name with the meaning of a name. (PG, p. 63-4). It is a misuse of the word 'meaning' to use it to signify the thing that corresponds to name. (PI, p. 40). What corresponds to name is its bearer, not its meaning. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein had confused the bearer of a name with the meaning of a name. It can be made clear from the following consideration. When Mr. N.N. dies, it is correct to say that the bearer of the name 'N.N' dies. But it is absurd to say that the meaning of the name 'N.N' dies. Again, if the name 'N.N' really loses its meaning when its bearer goes out of existence, then it follows that it makes no sense to say 'Mr. N.N. does not exist', or 'Mr. N.N. is dead'. But we can significantly make all these statements. (PI, sect. 40). In fact, a person's name does not lose its meaning when he is no more. The bearer of a name is one thing and the meaning of a name is another. So one should not be confused with the other.

Wittgenstein is right in rejecting his former opinion. Because the meaning of a name and what it applies to are

quite different. And one cannot be identified with the other without absurdity. For example, the word 'slab' is a kind of piece which is used in the construction of buildings. If the meaning of the term 'slab' is the actual slabs themselves, then we ought to be able to say such things as "I broke part of the meaning of the word slab" or "I laid a hundred parts of the meaning of the word 'slab' today." But these sorts of utterances are absurd and meaningless.

Thus the meaning of a name should be distinguished from the bearer of a name. But the ostensive definition explains the meaning of name by pointing to its bearer. But the successful application of an ostensive definition depends on two conditions. First, the learner must be acquainted with the bearer. And second, he must also be acquainted with the role in language of the word to be defined. Thus if we know that some one means to explain a colour word to us, the ostensive definition 'That is called sepia' will help us to understand the word. But the ostensive definition is not sufficient to explain the meaning of the word. Because it can always be interpreted in various ways. Suppose, for instance, we explain the word 'tove' by pointing to a pencil and say that "This is called 'tove'". This type of explanation will be quite inadequate. Because we might have meant, 'This is pencil' or 'This is

round' or 'this is wood' or 'This is one' or 'This is hard' and so on. (PG, p.60; BB, p.2). This shows that to understand a word acquaintance with the word's bearer is not so important. Russell searched for a 'logical proper name'. It is a name which should refer to something by nature unanalysable. And he said that the demonstrative 'this' is the only 'logical proper name'. But Wittgenstein pointed out that it is not a name at all. According to him, there are no logical proper names.

Wittgenstein's theory of meaning as use is closely connected with the concept of language-games. There is no mention of language-games in the Tractatus. But the connection between meaning and use has been made there. Though what he meant by use in the Tractatus is radically different from what he meant by it in his later works. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein made a distinction between sign and symbol. The sign is what is perceptible in the symbol. And two different symbols may have their sign in common. When two different symbols have the same sign, we can recognise a symbol from its sign only by observing how it is used with a sense. (T, 3.326). If a sign has no use, then it is meaningless. The logical syntax is the part of its use. As he said: "A sign does not determine a logical form unless it is taken together with its

logical-syntactical employment". (T, 3.327). But mere form cannot determine the meaning of a sign. So the employment of logical syntax must involve something in addition to logical form. But in a logical syntax the meaning of a sign does not play any role (T, 3.33). In order for a sign to have meaning there must be correlation between signs. This means that there must be correlation between signs with their logical syntactical properties and the reference of signs. This correlation is a matter of psychology. It is not the task of philosopher to discover it. (NB, p. 129).

The early Wittgenstein regarded the correlation of names with named objects as a trivial, extra-philosophical matter. His early view was that the connection between language and reality consists of only two elements. That is to say, it consists of the name-relation and the pictorial nature of the proposition. Now he realised that to regard the connection between language and reality in this way is an oversimplification of the fact. And from this realisation he developed the theory of meaning as use and explored the notion of language-games. Wittgenstein thought that as there are varieties of games, so there is diversity of linguistic usages. So he considered the concept of game a useful one to study the diversity of linguistic usages.

Wittgenstein compared the use of the words to the playing of games. (PI. p.23). He said that using language means playing language-games. The idea of the 'language-games' first came to his mind from the observation of a foot-ball game. This is evident from Malcolm's report:

"One day when Wittgenstein was passing a field where a foot-ball game was in progress the thought first struck him that in language we play games with words. A central idea of his philosophy, the notion of a language-game apparently had its genesis in this accident."⁶

For later Wittgenstein, words are not pictures. They are pieces in various language-games. He said that the significance of a piece in chess depends on its role in the game. That is, it depends on how it can be moved, how one behaves with it and so on. Similarly, the meaning of a word depends on its role in various language-games. This means that the meaning of a word is a kind of behaviour which surrounds its use. And these modes of behaviour are nothing but different language-games. An expression or a word gets its meaning from these modes of behaviour. Wittgenstein himself once said: "An expression has meaning only in the stream of life."⁷

There is a great plausibility in the suggestion that the meaning of a word is its use. A word gets its meaning only when it is used. It is natural to think that

when we teach a child the meaning of the word 'ball', what we teach is its use. We teach him to play different language-games with it. And if teaching him meaning is teaching him the use, then the meaning of the word must be its use. Wittgenstein's assumption was that if anything is to refer beyond itself, then it can be done only by its use. That is, if anything has to have conventional meaning, it can have it only by virtue of being used. A sign by itself is dead. It gets life only in use in language.

Wittgenstein, then, identified the meaning of a word and the sense of a sentence with their use in language. This identification seems to be misleading. That there are some connections between the meaning of a word and its use is an undeniable fact. But that does not mean that these connections between meaning and use are sufficient to identify them as Wittgenstein did. His identification seems to be implausible for two reasons. First, there are things which have uses, but normally they do not have meanings. For example, tools, instruments etc. Secondly, there are things which may sometimes have meanings, but normally do not have uses. For example, black clouds on the horizon, footprints in the snow etc.. So one may not accept the view that the meaning of a word or a sentence is the same thing as its use in language. This also proves that the connections between meaning and use are neither universal nor necessary. It is true that if one knows

the meaning of a word he also knows its use. And if he knows the use, he also knows the meaning. But that does not mean that there is a necessary connection between meaning and use. For it is quite possible to know the meaning of a word without knowing its use. And it is also possible to know the use of a word without knowing its meaning. For example, if someone tells us that 'ultus' means 'revenge' in Latin, we immediately know the meaning of the word. But we have no idea how or when we are to use this word. Again, for example, many people know how to use the word 'amen'. But only few people know its meaning. But to say this is not to say that they are meaningless.

Most of the proper names have use. But they do not have any meaning. We cannot ask what is the meaning of 'Rabindra Nath Tagore?' We can only ask 'who is Rabindra Nath Tagore?' One may say that here we are just asserting that Rabindra Nath Tagore was a famous Indian poet who was awarded the Nobel prize. Even then we are not defining Rabindra Nath Tagore. It also does not give its meaning. For it has neither meaning nor definition. Here we are simply identifying Rabindra Nath Tagore or describing him, according to circumstances. Wittgenstein's identification of meaning and use misused the words 'meaning' and 'definition'. These two words are not used

in connection with proper names. Some proper names have meaning. But in majority of the cases the meaning has nothing to do with the use.

Perhaps Wittgenstein was under the impression that the job of the philosopher is to give us the real meaning of certain important words. He was telling us that the meaning is neither the object nor any kind of spiritual entity. It is rather the use of the word in language. His concentration was not on meaning but on use. So he should have said that it is not the task of philosopher to give us meaning of philosophically difficult words. His job is rather to give us ~~their~~ use or uses. As Wittgenstein said: "Don't ask for the meaning ask for the use." And this is what he followed in actual practice. He investigated the use of words. He was not much concerned about their meanings. Naturally, therefore, his error in identifying meaning and use is not of much significance.

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CHAPTER - VI

RELATION OF LANGUAGE TO REALITY

The Tractatus is mostly concerned with the nature of language and its relation with the world. And this was his major philosophical concern throughout his life. The Tractatus offers us the famous picture theory of meaning. According to this doctrine, language consists of propositions which picture the world. He said that the propositions are perceptible expressions of thoughts. And thoughts are nothing but logical pictures of facts. Thus the picture theory of meaning is the theory of the nature of proposition. The Tractatus gives a general theory of language in relation to the world. It gives an answer to the question how is language, and so thinking possible.

In the Note-Books he said that his whole task is to explain the nature of sentences. (NB, p. 39). He wanted to explain how it is possible for a combination of words to represent a fact in the world. He was concerned with the question how it is possible that by producing a sentence we can say something. That is, what makes it possible for a sentence to tell us that such and such is the case? Wittgenstein's explanation consists in the idea that a sentence is a picture. He meant that a sentence is

literally a picture. He did not mean to say that a sentence is like a picture in certain respects. His Note-Books records how this idea first appeared in his mind. This occurred to him during the war when he was reading a magazine. In that magazine he saw an account of how a motor-car accident was represented in a law court by means of small models. This he explained in the Notebooks thus: "The general concept of the proposition carries with it a quite general concept of the coordination of proposition and situation. The solution to all my questions must be extremely simple." (NB, p.7)

warnock describes Wittgenstein's picture theory of language thus:

"In a picture of an object or scene, there is a kind of correspondence between the parts of or elements in the picture, and the parts of or elements in the objects or scene. But these elements must not only be present; their structure, form or arrangement must be the same - according of course to some system of projection, whether simple perspective or something more elaborate. Now, 'an atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things) ... The configuration of objects forms the atomic fact'. (Tractatus 2.01, 2.0272). But the 'essential sign' is itself also fact; it too is a combination of elements, namely words. This sort of fact is therefore capable of 'picturing' those other, non verbal facts; and it is thus that language can refer to the world, can mean something other than itself."¹

The dolls and Toy cars can be used to represent

ways in which an accident may take place. They can be used to construct different propositions about the accident to give different accounts or different models of what takes place. Wittgenstein's general conception is that when we put propositions together we construct a model of reality. As he said: "In a proposition a situation is, as it were constructed by way of experiment." (T, 4.031).

Wittgenstein's theory is that a proposition is a picture. This is based on the consideration on the nature of proposition in general. His conception of picture not only includes two dimensional pictorial relationships like paintings, drawings etc.. It also includes maps, sculptures, three-dimensional models, musical scores and gramophones records. This shows that Wittgenstein used the term picture in a technical sense.

A picture is representation. A representation can be either accurate or inaccurate. And it can give us a true or false picture of what it represents. Wittgenstein sought to explain the nature of proposition by means of a general theory of representation. Two things are to be considered in case of any representation. First, we are to see what it is representing. And second, we are to see whether it is representing accurately or inaccurately. Similarly, we are to consider two features of a proposition. First, we must see what is the meaning of a proposition.

And second, whether what it means is true or false. The distinction between the two features of representation corresponds to the distinction between the two features of proposition.

A collision between a lorry and a car can be represented by placing together a toy lorry and a toy car. This gives a three-dimensional picture or model of the accident. Wittgenstein thought that such procedure can throw light on the theory of representation and on the theory of proposition. A particular positioning of the toy car and the toy lorry may represent the relative positioning of the car and the lorry at the time of accident. In order to make such representation possible the toy car must stand for the real car and the toy lorry must stand for the real lorry. That is to say, the different parts of the model must stand for the elements of the situation which is to be represented. Wittgenstein said that it is the pictorial relationship which makes a picture a picture. Mere existence of the elements of the model is not enough for a representation. The elements of the model must be related to each other in a particular way to make a proper representation. The spatial representation of the real car and the real lorry can be made by the spatial

representation of the toy car and the toy lorry. But if the toy car and the toy lorry are just lying in the box or in the show case of a businessman, they will surely be in spatial relationship with each other. But this will not represent the situation involved in the accident. To represent the situation involved in the accident the toy car and the toy lorry must be related in a particular way.

According to Wittgenstein, the relationship between the elements of a picture is a fact. That is to say, the fact that the elements of a picture are related in the way they are is itself a fact. This led Wittgenstein to say that a picture is a fact. According to him, every picture has a structure. But it is not identical with its structure. He called the elements in the picture the structure of the picture. A picture consists of structure plus pictorial relationship. A picture is a relation between the elements which have pictorial relationship with objects outside. In case of any representation, to consider only the actual structure of pictures is not enough. We must also consider the elements which make such structure possible. The possibility of structure is called by Wittgenstein, 'Pictorial form' of picture. And the possibility of this relationship is the element which the model in the court and the actual accident have in common. In this particular

case the possibility of this relationship is the traditional character of the elements. And it is this common element because of which the model in the court has been able to represent the real accident in the road. According to Wittgenstein, the fact and the picture must have the same form. Wittgenstein called this common form the 'pictorial form' of pictures. As he said: "There must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to enable the one to be a picture of the other at all". (T, 2.16). He also said that "what a picture must have common with reality ... is its pictorial form." (T, 2.17).

Thus we see that the pictorial form is the possibility of relationship between elements of the picture. And the pictorial form is common to picture and what it depicts. From this it follows that the way the representing elements of the picture are related, in the same way the things represented are also related. Because the pictorial form is also the possibility of relationship of the things represented. (T, 2.151). A picture, then, represents a possibility in the real world. It is just like a drawing or a model of an architect which shows a possible arrangement of buildings.

Now the question arises how does the picture connect with the reality. To this question Wittgenstein seems to give inconsistent answers. (T, 2.51 - 2.1515). Immediately

after explaining the pictorial form he said: "That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it" (T, 2.1511). This suggests that it is the pictorial form by virtue of which pictures touch reality. But after a few passages he said that it is the pictorial correlation between elements of the picture and the things, through which the picture touches reality (T, 2.1515). These two passages seem to contradict each other. Because in one case he said that it is the pictorial form which connects with the reality. But in another case he said that it is the correlation with which the picture connects with the reality.

But this inconsistency in Wittgenstein's answer is only an apparent one. We can select a set of toys as three-dimensional proxies for three-dimensional objects. The purpose of selection is to make their three-dimensional properties the pictorial form of the picture. And it is the selection of an object with certain pictorial form which makes the connection with reality. Here the shape or colour or weight of the toys is insignificant. Though in a different case their colour or shape or weight may be significant. Wisdom puts the point in this way:

"Just as an arrangement of patches of paint on earth might by chance be identical in structure with a scene in heaven without being a picture of it, so might an arrangement of marks happen to be identical in

structure with fact without picturing it. Just as we require someone to make the patches with intent to paint the scene, so we require someone to make the marks with intent to express the fact."2

Therefore, the connection with reality is made by the person who makes the correlation between the elements of the picture and the elements of reality. But again the question arises how does a person do it. In Wittgenstein's opinion, this is purely an empirical matter which is of no importance for philosophy. This was his opinion when he wrote the Tractatus. But later he changed his opinion and said that the matter is closely connected with the nature of representation. But in the Tractatus he was more concerned with the pictorial form than in discussing pictorial relationship.

Wittgenstein perhaps thought that for A to be a picture of B, A must not be exactly like B. For, if A is exactly like B, then A will be simply B. And in that case A will not be a picture of B. And A must not be totally unlike B. For, if A is totally unlike B, then A cannot be picture of B at all. (NB, p. 15). What makes A like B is called by Wittgenstein A's pictorial form. What makes A unlike B and makes A the picture of B may be called A's representational form. Thus, for example, in a two dimensional pencil-sketch of landscape the pictorial form is the

spatiality of the picture. For it is the spatiality which the picture has in common with the landscape. But the representational form of the picture is the black-and-white miniature two-dimensionality. This two-dimensionality is peculiar to the picture with the conventions of scale, perspective, shading etc. (T, 2.171-3). In the three-dimensional law court model the three dimensions are part of the representational form.

↓ Pictures are not something concrete. They are more or less abstract. They are more or less what they picture. But there is a minimum which the reality and the picture must have in common. This is true not only of true pictures but also of false pictures. According to Wittgenstein, this minimum is the 'logical form' of the picture. (T, 2.18). What this logical form means is that the elements of the picture must be capable of some combination with other. And they should combine in such a way that they must correspond to the relationship of the elements of what is pictured. But this way of combining will differ from representational form. For example, in a score the ordering of the notes on the page from left to right represents the ordering of the sounds in tone. The spatial arrangement of the notes is not a part of the pictorial form. It is a part only of the representational form. Because sounds are not in space. This ordering is common to both. According to Wittgenstein,

this common ordering is the logical form. Every picture must have logical form in common with what it pictures. So every picture is a logical picture. The spatiality of picture is an additional element which may or may not be common with what it pictures. The logical form is part of the pictorial form of every picture. Every picture represents a possible state of affairs which may be called its sense. It is a true picture if its sense agrees with reality. And it is a false picture if its sense does not agree with reality. No picture by itself is true or false. "It is precisely Wittgenstein's point that a picture by itself does not say anything."³

Wittgenstein applied his general theory of picturing to propositions and thoughts. Normally one may not think that a proposition printed on a page is a picture. But according to the Tractatus, it is really a picture of what it represents, even in the ordinary sense. It is a fact that words which we have not previously encountered have to be explained to us when we meet them for the first time. But a proposition which is composed of familiar words, can be understood without further explanation. As Wittgenstein said: "I understand a proposition without having had its sense explained to me." (T, 4.021). This appears to one as a remarkable fact. If it is a fact, then the only possible explanation seems to be that a proposition without

having its sense explained to us, shows its sense. It shows how things are if it is true. (T, 4.022). This is exactly what a picture does. A proposition composed of old or familiar words is able to communicate a new state of affairs by virtue of being a picture of it.

In every picture, according to Wittgenstein, there must be one to one correspondence between the elements of a picture and the thing in the state of affairs which it represents. For example, if one element of a picture stands for a boy and another element stands for a ball, then the relationship between the picture element may show that the boy is playing with the ball. A picture is a fact. It is a fact that picture elements are related to one another in a definite way. A picture fact shows that the things the picture elements stand for are related in the same way as the picture elements are related. Since a proposition is considered to be a picture, the elements of the picture must correspond to the elements of the state of affairs which it depicts. The two must have the same logical form. From this it appears that the picture theory is not applicable to ordinary sentences. "He admits that the picture theory of meaning does not seem to be immediately applicable to ordinary language."⁴ But according to Wittgenstein, this means not that it is not true. It only means that our ordinary sentences possess a concealed complexity which can be revealed by analysis.

The pictorial nature of proposition was not just assumed by Wittgenstein. It was inferred by him from the essential characteristic of proposition. According to him, it is the essential nature of proposition that a person who knows the language can understand a proposition which he has never seen or heard before. As he said: "It belongs to the essence of a proposition that it should be able to communicate a new sense to us." (T, 4.027).

The three different formulations of the inference are as follows: First,

"In order to understand the essential nature of a proposition, we should consider hieroglyphic script, which depicts the fact that it describes. And alphabetic script developed out of it without losing what was essential to depiction. We can see this from the fact that we understand the sense of a propositional sign without its sense having been explained to us." (T, 4.02; 4.016).

Second,

"A proposition is a picture of reality : for if I understand a proposition, I know the situation that it represents. And I understand without having had its sense explained to me". (T, 4.021).

Third,

"A proposition must use old expressions to communicate a new sense. A proposition communicates a new situation to us, and so it must be essentially connected with the situation. And the connection is precisely that it is its logical picture. A proposition states something only in so far as it is a picture". (T, 4.03).

A picture has just the same features which a proposition has.

It represents some situation beyond itself. And we can tell which situation it is merely by looking at the picture. None is needed to explain to us what situation it depicts. We can 'read it off' from the picture itself. A picture shows us what it represents. And a proposition being a picture shows its sense. (T, 4.022).

We have already noted that a proposition does not at once appear to be a picture of a situation. Ordinary pictures look like what they represent. And a proposition surely does not look like a situation. But Wittgenstein did not want to say that a proposition is an ordinary spatial picture of the situation which it depicts. For him, a proposition is a logical picture of it. (T, 4.03). In order for 'A' to be a logical picture of 'B' three conditions must be fulfilled. First there must be one to one correspondence between the components of 'A' and the components of 'B'. Second, the feature of the structure or form of 'A' must correspond to the feature of the structure or form of 'B'. Third, there must be rules for projection for connecting the components of 'A' and 'B'. The rules of projection are rules by means of which given 'A', 'B' can be constructed^{out} of it. And given 'B', 'A' can be constructed^{out} of it. The rules connecting a musical score and an actual performance of it is a good example of projection. For given either the score or the actual performance, the other can be formulated. As

Wittgenstein said:

"There is a general rule by means of which the musician can obtain the symphony from the score, and which makes it possible to derive the symphony from the groove on the gramophone record, and, using the first rule, to derive the score again. That is what constitutes the inner similarity between these things which seem to be constructed in such entirely different ways. And that rule is the law of projection which projects the symphony into the language of musical notation. It is the rule for translating this language into the language of gramophone records." (T, 4.0141)

A picture can depict reality. But it cannot depict its own form of representation. A picture represents its subject from outside. But it cannot get outside itself to depict its own form of representation. A picture of another form may depict the representational form of a given picture. For example, a picture in sound may depict the representational form of a picture in colour. But in order for one to represent the form of other, there must be something which is the same in both. Wittgenstein said: "There must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to enable the one to be a picture of the other at all." (T, 2.161). Therefore, the logical form, the form of reality, which all pictures must possess in common, cannot be depicted by any picture.

The same consideration is applicable to proposition also. We make assertion by means of propositions. With a

proposition we say something. And by proposition we say how things are in the world. Things that there are in the world are related to one another in a certain way. And we try to describe that. But we cannot describe how propositions succeed in representing reality, either truly or falsely. We cannot say what the form of representation is. That is to say, we cannot say what is common to all propositions that makes them pictures of reality. We cannot say how language represents the world. For we cannot state in any proposition the pictorial form of all propositions. As Wittgenstein said: "What can be said only be said by means of a sentence, and so nothing that is necessary for the understanding of all sentences can be said." (NB, p. 25).

This doctrine implies that in a sense we cannot say what is the meaning of a proposition in. With regard to the proposition 'a is larger than b', we can explain to a person what 'a' and 'b' each refers to and what 'larger' means. But no explanation can be given about what 'a is larger than b' means. We can understand the elements of a proposition. And we also see how these elements are combined. But we cannot say what this combination means. Yet we can grasp its meaning. In some sense we can grasp what it means. Because the proposition shows its meaning. Anything that can be said can be said clearly. But anything that can be understood cannot be said.

Wittgenstein's picture theory of proposition is at the same time an account of the nature of thought. He applied the general theory of picturing to thought. He said: "A thought is a proposition with a sense." (T, 4). And he also said that a logical picture is ^a thought. In a proposition a thought is expressed in a manner which is perceptible to senses. According to the Tractatus, a painting, a sculpture, a musical score are expressions of thoughts. The view that a thought is a proposition seems to imply that the words of a sentence can be the constituents of a thought. But in a letter to Russell, he explicitly denied it. He said that a thought does not consist of words. It consists of psychical constituents which have the same sort of relation to reality as words. And these constituents correspond to the words of language. (NB, pp. 129-130). From this it appears that Wittgenstein's view was not that a thought and a proposition with a sense are one and the same thing. They are two different things with corresponding constituents of different nature. According to him thinking is a kind of language. For, a thought is a logical picture of a sentence. And therefore, thinking is a kind of sentence. (NB, p.82).

To say that state of affairs is conceivable means that we can make a picture of it. (T, 3.001). A thought contains the possibility of

a state of affairs. For the logical form of the thought is the possibility that the things in the world are combined in the way the constituents of the thought are combined. Anything which is conceivable is also possible. In a written or spoken proposition a thought is made perceptible to senses. All thoughts can be stated in proposition. And what cannot be stated cannot be thought too.

A consequence of this view is that the form of representation of propositions which cannot be stated, cannot be thought also. The form of reality, the logical form cannot be thought. For it cannot be stated. Our language shows us something which we cannot think. It is the task of philosophy to indicate what cannot be said or thought by presenting clearly what can be said. According to the Tractatus, therefore, there is a realm of the unthinkable which is the foundation of all languages and all thoughts. It is mirrored in our thought. But it cannot be an object of our thought. Wittgenstein said that only possible states of affairs can be thought of (T, 3.02). The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world. (T, 3.01). Since any picture needs to be compared with reality to tell whether it is true or false, there cannot be thought whose truth is recognisable from the thought itself. Hence no thought can be a priori truth. (T, 3.04; 3.05).

In the Tractatus, thought appears as connecting link between propositions and states of affairs. To

illustrate this Wittgenstein used the metaphore of geometrical projection. He said that the propositional sign, when used, is a projection of a possible state of affairs. The method of projection is to think of possible state of affairs. That is to say, the method of projection is to form a logical picture of the possible state of affairs. (T, 3.5; 3.12). It is the thought which makes the propositional sign a proposition. It is for this reason that Wittgenstein sometimes regarded proposition as a thought. (T, 3.5-4). It is not just the expression of thought. (T, 3.2). The projection line goes from the sentence to the state of affairs via the thought in the mind. In an ideal language the elements of a sentence will correspond to the elements of the thought. These elements of thought will correspond to the objects involved in the possible states of affairs. (T, 3.2). Here the projection line will be very simple. But in every day language, the form of thought is disguised in the sentence. The understanding of ordinary language depends on conventions. The projection line here is not simple. It is a complicated one. Philosophical analysis is needed to make the elements of propositions to correspond to the elements of thought. And it is analysis which reveals the real form of thought which is hidden in ordinary speech. (T, 4.0031).

The picture theory is based on the contrast between propositions and names. According to Frege, names and

propositions have both sense and reference. And he treated the truth-value of the proposition as its reference. But Wittgenstein disagreed with Frege on this point. He treated as reference of a proposition not its truth-value, but the fact that corresponds to it. (NB, p. 94; 111). Thus for Wittgenstein, the reference of 'p' if 'p' is true, is the fact that p. The reference of 'p' if 'p' is false, is the negative fact that not p. Wittgenstein, thus made a contrast between names and propositions. According to him, the relation between names and what they refer to is different from the relation between the propositions and what they refer to. As Copi said:

"The connection between words and objects is conventional and arbitrary, and must be learned. But the connection between the structure of a proposition and the structure of a fact is not wholly conventional."⁵

For example, to understand a proper name like 'Tagore' we must know whom or what it refers to. But we can very well understand a proposition without knowing whether it is true or false. That means we can understand a proposition without knowing its reference. (NB, p.94). Wittgenstein, thus, said that the propositions though they have reference must be distinguished from names.

Wittgenstein said that when we understand a proposition, what we understand is not its reference. What

we really understand is its sense. (NB, p.94; 111). In order to understand a proposition we have to know what will be the case if it is true and what will be the case if it is false. As he said: "Every proposition is essentially true ^{or} false. (corresponding to case of its truth and case of its falsity); we call this the sense of a proposition." (NB, p.94). The sense of a proposition differentiates it from a name. A name can have only one relation to reality. A name can only name something. If it does not name something then it is not a significant symbol at all. But a proposition has two relations to reality. In one case when it is true and in other case when it is false. A proposition is meaningful in both the cases. A proposition is not meaningless when it is not true. Wittgenstein cryptically said: "Names are like arrows". (NB, p.97). The truth or falsity of a proposition constitutes the relationship of the proposition to reality. And this relationship is its meaning. (NB, p.112).

Thus we see that to understand a name is to understand its reference. And to understand a proposition is to understand its sense. But there is also another important difference between the two. We can understand the reference of a name without having its reference explained to us. But we cannot understand the sense of a proposition without having its sense explained to us.

Only when we deal with unfamiliar language we take the meanings of proposition as single units. The real understanding of propositions depends on the understanding of their constituent parts. The constituent parts of propositions are words of which they are composed. For example, if we know the meaning of 'a' and 'b' and if we know what 'xRy' means for any xs and for any ys, then we also understand 'a R b'. (NB, p.94).

We have seen that the correlation constitutes the pictorial relationship of the picture. And this correlation is made between the elements of a picture and the elements of what has to be pictured. Elements of the propositions are simple unanalysable signs. They are names. A name has for its reference an object. A name in a proposition stands for an object. The connection between a name and what it names is a matter of arbitrary convention. (NB, p.25, T, 3.315; 3.323). But the correlation between a name and what it names is a matter of psychology. (NB, p. 104; 111; 99). The choice of sign is always arbitrary. So if a certain combination of signs fails to make sense, it does not mean that there is something wrong with the sign itself. It fails because we have failed to make correlation between it and reality. This is the reason why 'Socrates is Plato' or 'Socrates is identical' is nonsensical.

According to Wittgenstein, a proposition is not just a set of names. And a mere correlation of names with the object is not enough. He said that we must also correlate the relationship between names in a proposition with the relationship between objects in facts. This correlation is also made by arbitrary conventions. (NB, p. 99). He said that names are representatives. One name stands for one thing. Another name stands for another thing. (NB, p. 26; T, 4.0311). The names can be representatives only if they have syntactical form. The correlations of names and objects are arbitrary. And the condition that certain relationship between names will represent a certain relationship between objects is also arbitrary. But once these conventions are made no further explanation is necessary to understand the correlation between names and objects. This makes it possible to understand a proposition which we have never seen or heard before. But the case is different with names. For each new name requires explanation. (T, 4.026).

According to Wittgenstein, a proposition stands in an internal relation to possible state of affairs. He said that a proposition communicates a situation to us. And it is essentially connected with the situation. (T, 4.03). Every proposition has accidental as well as essential features. The accidental features of propositions are

determined by the arbitrary conventions of the particular language to which they belong. But the essential features of propositions are those without which they cannot express their sense. (T, 3.34). The essential features are the logical form which a proposition must have in common with the situation it represents. The logical form of a proposition always remains unchanged. But the constituents of proposition may be changed. The relation between the proposition and situation is internal. It is not causal or contingent. According to Wittgenstein, an internal property is something which it is unthinkable that a possessor should not possess. (T, 4.123). The logical structure of a proposition is an internal property of it. For it is unthinkable that a proposition will remain the same and have a different structure. Like propositions, possible situations also have internal properties. For, in a proposition there are as many distinguishable parts as in the situation presented. The internal properties of the situations are expressed by the internal properties of the corresponding proposition. Wittgenstein thus said that the proposition describes reality by its internal properties (T, 4.124).

Wittgenstein said that the internal relationship between proposition and reality can only be shown. But it cannot be stated informatively. For, according to him,

something can be said only if we are able to grasp the content of what is being communicated without knowing its truth-value. From this it follows that an internal property is something which cannot be said. If it is unthinkable that a thing should lack certain property, then it cannot be informatively be said that it has that property. The relation between the proposition and the situation is an internal relation. So it can only be shown, but cannot be said. (NB, p. 25). The proposition that the cat is on the mat says that the cat is on the mat. But it cannot say that it itself says that the cat is on the mat. (T, 4.022). Here one may say that the proposition "The cat is on the mat" says that the cat on the mat. But this way of saying thing is not at all informative. Moreover, the proposition can represent the cat's being on the mat. But it cannot represent what is common between that situation and itself, which is its logical form (T, 4.12). Logical form is mirrored in propositions. It cannot be represented by propositions and it is shared by them also. (T, 4.121).

Wittgenstein thought that a proposition must be independent of the actual state of affairs. And it is the actual state of affairs which makes it true or false. He said that the proposition must contain the possibility of its truth. But it cannot contain more than that possibility (NB, p.16). For, according to him, a proposition has two

poles, of truth and falsehood. This will be impossible unless the proposition is independent of the actual state of affairs. As he said: "What a picture represents it represents independently of its truth and falsity." (T, 2.22). Truth or falsity is the sense of a proposition. And a proposition actually does not contain its sense. For, if contains its sense, then it cannot be false. The sense of a proposition is what makes it true (T, 3.13).

From this it follows that a proposition cannot be true a priori. A proposition can be true a priori only if it is possible to recognise its truth by mere inspection of the proposition itself without comparison with the reality. (T, 3.05). But this is never possible unless a proposition itself contains the state of affairs which can verify it. According to Wittgenstein, a proposition is independent of the state of affairs. It does not contain its sense. So a proposition cannot itself contain the state of affairs. As he said: "In order for a proposition to be capable of being true it must also be capable of being false." (NB, p.55). Thus, according to Wittgenstein, all genuine propositions are contingent propositions. They are not logical propositions. For logical propositions can be seen to be true from the symbols alone. (NB, p.127) T, 6.113). This shows that they are only propositions by courtesy. Wittgenstein did not recognise analytic

propositions. He said that all analytic propositions are tautologies. (T, 4.44602). Propositions of logic do not say anything about the world. (T, 6.1; 6.11). A tautology is not a picture. To be a picture a proposition must describe certain possible situation. But a tautology does not describe any situation at all. If a tautology describes a situation then it may be turn out to be false. And in that case it will not be a tautology. A genuine proposition can be called true or false. Because it is compared with reality for its truth. But a tautology cannot be called 'true'. For a tautology is made true without comparing it with reality. Therefore, a tautology is not a picture of reality.

Wittgenstein was fully aware of the fact that a proposition does not seem at the first sight like a picture. It is true that the elements of a proposition do not look like the elements of reality which they represent. And there is not one-to-one relation between the elements of a proposition and the elements of reality. Wittgenstein considered the first point to be comparatively unimportant. For, according to him, there are other cases of pictures where the elements do not look like what they represent. For instance, musical notation does not look like notes and phonetic notation does not look like phonemes. Notes and phonemes are sounds. So they do not look like anything.

at all. The pictorial relationship between phonetic signs and sounds is established by a rule. It is the rule for projection which constitutes the inner similarity between the two. (T, 4.014; 4.0141). It is clear from Wittgenstein's example that outward similarity is irrelevant to picturing. To say that there is an internal similarity is not to claim that we see that the two are similar. It means only that there is a rule by means of which we can derive the other. Though this example is a useful one, it is not very much clear. For it does not clearly indicate what is supposed to be the picture of what. Score, record and sound are not doubt connected by the derivation rules. But from this we cannot say that each one of them is the picture of the other. It may be that there is one-way relation. But Wittgenstein did not explain it in the Tractatus. In this connection Wittgenstein faced another difficulty. He said that pictorial nature of proposition becomes clear when we imagine proposition consisting of spatial objects only. That is to say, its pictorial nature will be clear if it does not consist of words. Because spatial relationship of objects expresses its sense. (T, 3.1431) If it is so, then it will be difficult to distinguish the picture and the pictured fact. For example, we may have a convention which uses an ink-pot as my name, and table as the name of my chair. Now, the sentence that this ink-pot is on the table may express that I sit in this chair.

(NB, p.98). In such a case it is not clear how the convention establishes which is to be the picturing and which is the pictured fact. So regarding the character of the rules we do not get any clear idea. Wittgenstein had to consider this problem which ultimately led him to modify the picture theory in a significant way.

Wittgenstein considered the second point to be an important one. He thought that the non-pictorial appearance of the proposition is due to the fact that its real form is disguised in a sentence. The real form of a proposition need not be its apparent one. Its surface grammar need not be its logical grammar. (T, 3.325; 4.003).

"Wittgenstein's solution very briefly is that this is revealed by logical analysis, that the vehicle of logical analysis is a perspicuous notation along the lines of that of Principia Mathematica, and that upon analysis a proposition of ordinary language is resolved into a number of elementary propositions plus some logical constants."⁶

If a proposition is fully analysed or articulated, as an ideal language, then each elements of the propositional sign will correspond with each element of reality. "Sentences of ordinary language can be said to picture only in so far as they can be translated in this language (though Wittgenstein does not explain how such translation can be made."⁷

In the Tractatarian period, Wittgenstein was convinced

of the fact that all languages have a common structure. That is, language has a common essence. He thought that Russellian notation, like ordinary language, is in perfect logical order. (T, 5.5563). For they can be used successfully for a certain purpose. He also believed that our ordinary language is perfectly in order, provided we are clear how it symbolises. An ideal language which differs from ordinary language is valuable in the sense that they reveal to us the common features of ordinary language. For a limited purpose an artificial language is very useful. It is particularly useful in bringing out inference relationship. Wittgenstein said that Frege's function and argument symbolism is very good to illustrate simple logical relationships. But to deal with the real states of affairs we find this symbolism is inferior to our language. Because it is wrong to think that there is only one subject-predicate form. Actually there are innumerable such forms. Substantives and adjectives would be substitutable for each other if there were only one form. But the form of ordinary language shows that it is not so. For example, we can say "The pen is red" and "The surface of the pen is red". But if we replace 'red' by 'costly' then only the first one will be a significant sentence and not the second.

Wittgenstein no longer believed that language has common essence. He devoted himself to the study of idioms

of ordinary language. He now thought that the diversity in language reveals the actual structure of language. He said that even if the language has a common essence it does not explain connections between its different forms. Thus it appeared to him now that the rules for the connection of sentences into truth-functions play a minor role of the logical syntax. (TRK, p.80). So Wittgenstein became more concerned about the other part of the syntax. It is this part of syntax which governs the construction of the units to which the truth-functional connectives apply. Wittgenstein continued to believe that there are elementary propositions. Because it is elementary propositions which are an immediate linking of objects without the help of logical connectives. Throughout his life Wittgenstein was prepared to define a proposition as something to which the calculus of truth-function can be applied. (PF, sect. 136). He ceased to believe that elementary propositions are independent of each other. For he now realised that the rules for truth-functional combination of sentences must be supplemented by the rules for inner syntax of language. (TRK, p.80). The study of these inner rules and the study of the internal relations between elementary propositions led him to the theory of language-games. This new theory played an important role in his later philosophy.

Wittgenstein ultimately rejected the doctrine of logical atomism thoroughly. For he rejected the independence

of elementary proposition. His view about the nature of objects also changed. But the rejection of logical atomism does not carry with it the abandonment of the picture theory. The picture theory was not regarded by him as incompatible with the new doctrine that propositions form systems. He used the picture theory to prove that doctrine. Professor Stenius is of the opinion that there is nothing in the Investigations to suggest that Wittgenstein rejected the picture theory. Stenius said: "... his remarks on the subject seem only to emphasise that the picture theory does not explain the essence of language to nearly so great an extent as he had believed in the *Tractatus*." ⁸

Thus we see that Wittgenstein continued to believe that a proposition is a picture. A proposition must have the same multiplicity as the state of affairs it depicts. It must be composite. And for its truth and falsity it must be compared with reality. He also continued to believe in the distinction between saying and showing. The existence of internal relations between propositions can only be shown but cannot be said. But he ceased to believe in the independence of elementary propositions. He no longer believed in the possibility of representing generality solely by means of truth-functions. And his conception of the nature of objects which form the structure of the world also underwent a change. The consequence of these

changes made the Tractatus more closer to ordinary language.

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein thought that notions such as naming, comparing, thought, rule are not important for particular philosophical investigation. By this he did not mean to say that they are uncomplicated notions. What he really meant is that the complications involved in them belong to empirical psychology. But later he came to realise that the study of such notions belong to the study of symbolism. So the investigations of such notions must belong to philosophy and not to psychology. In the Tractatus he considered the notion of reality as an un-mixed comparison for the pictorial nature of proposition. (T, 4.011). But in the Investigations he made a detailed examination of this concept. This led him to the view that the framework on which language rests is not given by the structure of unchanging atoms. (PB, p.72). The framework on which language rests is given by the shifting pattern of forms of life which can be applied to a basic common human nature.

From this it is clear that Wittgenstein did not cease to investigate the essence of language. But he came to think that in the Tractatus he was wrong in looking for the essence as a common structure running through all propositions. He said, that general terms like 'game'

'language', propositions are applied on the basis of family likeness. They are not applied on the basis of common features.

We have seen that the picture theory survived even though logical atomism was abandoned. Even after repudiating atomism, Wittgenstein used to maintain that the essential thing in a proposition is a picture. The development of the notions of language-games and family likeness necessitated the radical modification of the picture theory. But he did not abandon it. Wittgenstein's observation in the Grammatik is that the harmony between thought and reality can be found in the grammar of language. He said:

"Instead of harmony, agreement of thought and reality one could here say: the pictoriality of thought. But is pictoriality an agreement? In the *Tractatus* I said something like: it is an agreement of forms. But that is misleading [cf. PG. 212] Anything can be a picture of anything else, if we extend the concept sufficiently. If not, we have to explain what we call a picture of something, and further what we want to call the agreement of the pictoriality, the agreement of form.

For what I said comes just to this: that every projection, no matter what the method of projection, must have something in common with what is projected. But that only means that I am here extending the concept of 'having in common' and making it equivalent to the general concept of projection I am therefore 'only drawing attention to a possibility of generalisation (which ofcourse can be very important)." (PG, p.163).

The idea he had in the Grammatik was reproduced in the

Investigations. As he said:

"The agreement, the harmony, of thought and reality consists in this: If I say falsely that something is red, then, for all that, it isn't red. And when I want to explain the word 'red' to someone, in the sentence 'That is not red', I do it by pointing to something red." (Pl, Sect. 424).

In the Grammatik he also said that one can say that a sentence must be a picture, if it can show us how to act. But this only means that one can act on a sentence as one can act on a picture. To say that a sentence is a picture means that we are giving stress on certain features in the grammar of the word 'sentence' (PG, p.163). This clearly indicates that Wittgenstein wanted to draw our attention to the various kinds of pictures such as historical paintings, genre paintings and so on. (PG, p.164).

Later on in the Grammatik he said that there is another side of picture which is more important to be considered. He said that there are different ways in which pictures can be employed. He made a distinction between a picture's showing what is the case, and a picture's showing what is to be the case. The same point was carried in the Investigations also. He said:

"Imagine a picture representing a boxer in a particular stance. Now, this picture can be used to tell someone how he should stand, should hold himself; or how he should not hold himself; or how a particular

man did stand in such and such a place; and so on. One might (using the language of chemistry) call this picture a proposition-radical." (Pl, p.11).

Again in the Grammatik he went on to say that,

"We could say that a working-drawing serves as a picture of the object that the workman is to manufacture from it. And one could here call 'method of projection' the manner in which the workman is to convert such a drawing into work. One could then put it in this way: the projection method is an intermediary between the drawing and the object, it reaches from the drawing to the product. Thus the method of projection gets compared with lines of projection which go from one picture to another. But if the method of projection is a bridge, it is a bridge which is not built until the drawing is employed." (PG, p.213).

A picture must be in lines of projection. That does not mean that it is restricted by it. A picture always leaves different modes of employment open. The line of projection belongs to the picture. It does not belong to the method of projection. (PG, p. 213; cf. T, 2.1513).

Wittgenstein's considerations clearly suggest that the picture theory is not false. What he really wanted to say is that the picture theory needs supplementing. His theory of meaning as use is not a rival to the picture theory. It is rather a compliment to it. All his remarks quoted above stress the point that the signs by themselves are dead. What they need is the use which can make them alive. (PG, p. 132; BB, p.4).

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CHAPTER - V I I

LIMITS OF THE WORLD

It is said that spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul. The content of man's thought or belief is capable of expressions in language. Some people have believed that there are thoughts which are not expressible in words. But whether this is so or not, it is obvious that the major chunk of our thoughts are expressible in language. So the study of the nature of language will throw light on the nature of thought. Wittgenstein summed up the aim of the Tractatus thus: "The aim of the Tractatus is to set a limit of thought - or rather, not to thought, but to the expressions of thoughts." (T, preface). The aim of the Tractatus, thus, is to show what is thinkable by showing what is sayable. The philosophy of the Tractatus is to mark the limits of thought by setting the limits of language.

According to Tractatus, a fully analysed proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions. That is to say, every elementary proposition occurs in the truth-function. And every name occurs in the language. This seems at the first to be impossible from the propositions of everyday life. Wittgenstein, however, insisted that all

the propositions of everyday language are in perfect logical order. What occurs in the full analysis of them is already present in the thought of someone who expresses them with understanding. Because a fully analysed sentence will contain a name for every object in the thought which it expressed. (T, 3.2). But they are not present in thought in such a way that they can be the object of consciousness. In fact, we produce our sentences without any idea of how each word symbolises or what its meaning is. We produce them without having any such idea. Normally we speak without knowing how the individual sounds are produced. (T,4.002)

Every sentence, however, cannot be regarded as propositions. Many of the sentences are not genuine propositions. They are only pseudo-propositions. And analysis will reveal them as nonsensical. According to the Tractatus, propositions of logic, mathematics, the a priori part of natural sciences, ethics and philosophy are all pseudo-propositions. They are considered by Wittgenstein as attempts to say the unsayable.

The distinction between saying and showing is fundamental in Wittgenstein's philosophy. All the truths of logic are classed by him with tautologies. This follows strictly from the truth-functional analysis. All the propositions of logic are tautologies. Their nature is shown by the truth-tables. They say nothing about the world.

Because they are true in every possible state of affairs. And consequently they cannot select one state of affairs rather than another. They are propositions of a unique kind. Because their truth can be discovered by a mere study of the symbols which express them. They say nothing about the world. But they reveal the structure of the symbols which make them up. Thus 'It is raining or it is not raining' tells us nothing about the weather. But the fact that it is a tautology shows that 'It is raining' and 'It is not raining' contradict each other. (T, 6.1 - 6.201). Tautologies say nothing. They simply exhibit the logical properties of genuine propositions. In making such assertions we are not excluding some genuine possibilities. While making such assertions we are simply drawing attention to a feature of our symbolism, to something which the symbolism itself should show. It is the characteristic mark of logical propositions that we can perceive in the symbol that they are true. Tautologies are superfluous even in ideal language. From this it follows that we can do without logical propositions. For in a suitable notation we can in fact recognise the formal properties of propositions by mere inspections of the propositions. Other propositions of logic like axioms of infinity are mere attempt to say the unsayable. Because their truths can only be shown, but not said. All nonsensical propositions follow either from bad symbolism or from the confusion between the logical and grammatical

syntax of language. According to Wittgenstein, propositions such as 'For all x , $x = x$ ' and 'There is only one zero' are not genuine propositions. Even the laws of inference like modus ponens are pseudo-propositions, according to him.

According to Wittgenstein, then, the theory of inference is to be eliminated from what is sayable. If 'p' can be inferred from 'q' this must make itself clear in the propositions 'p' and 'q' themselves. The nature of the inference can be gathered from the nature of the two propositions. The laws of inference such as modus ponens (from 'p' and 'if p then q' infer 'q') are superfluous. Such propositions cannot be expressed as genuine propositions.) Again, for example, the logical truth that 'p or q' together with 'not p' implies 'q'. Given the truth-conditions for p or q and not p we can immediately read off that 'p or q and not p' cannot both be true except in the case where q is true. This fact can be alternatively expressed by saying that the sense of q is included in the sense of (p or q) and not p. This will be obvious in an ideal language. All the propositions of logic are thus tautologies. And the proof of one logical proposition from another consists in calculation which turns one tautology into another. The proof that one non-logical proposition follows from another consists in showing that in certain combinations they yield a tautology. For example,

we can show that 'q' follows from 'If p then q, and p' by combining them to form the tautology 'If, if p then q, and p, then q'. (T, 6.1221). But the calculation of tautology is a superfluous mechanical device. In an adequate symbolism the formal properties of propositions and their logical relations can be recognised by mere inspection of the propositions themselves.

It may be argued that if logic consists entirely of tautologies then why it is necessary to construct proofs of the propositions of logic. Wittgenstein's answer to it is that 'proof' in logic is nothing but a mechanical device for recognising tautologies more rapidly. Thus the view that there are primitive propositions of logic from which all other propositions are to be deduced is a delusion. All the propositions of logic, Wittgenstein said, stand exactly on the same footing, i.e., they say nothing at all.

Wittgenstein considered next the propositions of mathematics. According to him, mathematics consists of equations. And in equations signs on either side of the '=' can be substituted for one another. If this is so then it must be manifest in the two expressions themselves. In that case they do not say anything. They only reveal the structure of the signs which make them up. Hence the equation is an attempt to say what shows only. Therefore, mathematical propositions are not genuine propositions.

They are pseudo-propositions.

According to Wittgenstein, there cannot be any genuine propositions in ethics and aesthetics. For no proposition can express the meaning of life or the world. All genuine propositions are contingent. Propositions of ethics and aesthetics are concerned with values. But if there is any genuine value its value cannot be a contingent matter. (T, 6.41). There can be propositions which express the pleasant and unpleasant consequences of our actions. But such propositions are irrelevant to any genuine ethical imperative. For ethical imperatives are not concerned with a mere contingent sanctions of morality.

Wittgenstein said that though the propositions of mathematics and logic are senseless they are not nonsensical. But what the metaphysicians talk is nonsensical. For he held that metaphysics arises out of the fact that the philosophers do not understand the logic of our language. In most of the cases, according to Wittgenstein, philosophers are misled by the fact that apparent grammatical form of our proposition does not always reflect their real logical form. Let us take, for example, two propositions 'millionaires are non-existent' and 'millionaires are non-cooperative'. Just because the two propositions resemble in grammatical form philosophers are generally led to suppose that

'non-existent' is a predicate. And as a result they start philosophical enquiry into the nature of 'non-existent'. But in a logically perfect language such confusion vanishes. For in an ideal language every sign immediately indicates its logical function. In an ideal notation the sentence 'millionaires are non-existent' is expressed in such a way that the 'non-existent' does not appear as a predicate at all. For an ideal language-logic is unconnected and metaphysics is an impossibility.

Wittgenstein was fully convinced of the fact that metaphysics arises out of the attempt to pass beyond the boundaries of language. It particularly arises when the philosophers talk about the relation between language and the world. But Wittgenstein said that no proposition can represent what it has common with the world. No proposition can represent that form in virtue of which it is an accurate picture. To do this a proposition will have to include within itself a portion of the world in a non-pictorial form. Only then it will be able to make the comparison between the world and the picture. But this, according to Wittgenstein, is impossible. For to talk about the world is at once to picture it. To suppose that it is possible to have a picture of the world is to imagine that we can somehow say what lies beyond language. That is to say, we can say what lies beyond anything that can be said.

This shows that philosophers can say nothing at all.

The propositions of philosophy along with that of Tractatus itself fall under the class of pseudo-propositions. Wittgenstein thus said:

"The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said i.e., propositions of natural science i.e., something that has nothing to do with philosophy - and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions." (T, 6.53).

Philosophy, on this view, is not a body of propositions. It is not a theory but an activity. It is an activity of analysis which makes our thought clear and sharply bounded. The objective of such an activity is to make it to us clear about what we can and cannot say. The propositions of everyday discourse and the propositions of natural sciences are not philosophical propositions. The analysis of non-philosophical propositions reveals that they are meaningful discourse. But the analysis of philosophical propositions reveals them as nonsensical. A proposition becomes nonsensical when it contains a sign to which no meaning has been given. For example, the propositions 'The good is more identical than the beautiful' and 'Socrates is identical'. Here no meaning has been assigned to 'identical' as a property-word or as an adjective. (T, 4.003; 5.4733). The meaninglessness of such propositions can be revealed only by analysis. The activity of analysis applied to

philosophical propositions and the Tractatus itself reveals them as non-sensical. The meaningless propositions of the Tractatus are attempts to say the unsayable. But that does not mean that they are useless. They are very much useful in the sense that their very failure is instructive. As he said:

"My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognises them as non-sensical, when he has used them - as steps - to climb up beyond them. (He must so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it." (T, 6.54).

According to Wittgenstein most of the propositions of natural sciences are genuine propositions. He said that the totality of true propositions is identical with the body of natural sciences. Here one may be tempted to assert that there are at least non-metaphysical, sensible philosophical assertions. And these are assumptions which arise out of the analysis of scientific method. But Wittgenstein denied this. He said that such propositions are not philosophical propositions. They are either propositions of psychology or they are propositions of logic. The most common example of the first type is the 'so-called law of Induction.' Induction, as defined by Wittgenstein, "consists in accepting as true the simplest law that can be reconciled with our experiences." (T, 6.363). He argued that "... there are no grounds for believing that the

simplest eventuality will in fact be realised." (T, 6.36311)

He said that it is only an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow. We do not know that it will rise. (T, 6.36311)

We should only know if it is a logically necessary consequence of our experience. But there is no necessity except logical necessity. So there is no inference except logical inference. Wittgenstein said that we cannot make an inference from the existence of one state of affairs to the existence of another entirely different state of affairs. (T, 5.135). It follows that the law of induction is not a proposition of logic. According to him it merely says that people generally prefer simpler to more complex explanations. So it is a proposition of psychology, not of philosophy. The law of induction is a genuine proposition the falsehood of which is thinkable. For the happening of one event never necessitates the happening of another event. It is merely an uncertain hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow. (T, 6.31).

The law of causality, according to Wittgenstein, is a proposition of logic in disguise. It is a general law of an a priori kind. It is not really proposition. It is actually a priori insight into which genuine proposition can be cast. (T, 6.32; 6.3431; NB, p.42). The law of causality is an attempt to say what can only be shown in our symbolism that 'there are natural laws'

Wittgenstein argued that we do not discover that there are

uniformities by inspecting the world around us. These uniformities show themselves in our talk about the world. And they show it in the mere fact that we are able to think. Similarly, the a priori laws of mechanics are mere descriptions which our symbolism should show. We think of sciences as an attempt to describe the world by means of a fine network, a priori laws. But according to Wittgenstein, these laws are not part of the results at which we thus arrive. On the contrary, they are characteristic of the network. He said that although they show us something about the world, they can be described in such-and-such laws. We have seen that according to Wittgenstein, the only necessity that exists is the logical necessity. And the only impossibility that exists is the logical impossibility. But there are impossibilities which look like non-logical impossibilities. For example, the impossibility of a thing's being red and green. The language of physics shows us that it is a kinetic impossibility. According to the law of physics, a particle cannot have two velocities at the same time. This is, in fact, a logical impossibility which says that a particle cannot be in two places at the same time. For we should call particles that are in two places different particles. (NB, p. 81).

Propositions can be classified in different ways. One particular way of classifying them results in three

classes. First, the class of proposition which cannot under any describable circumstances be false. Second, the class of proposition, although they happen to be true (or false), it is conceivable that they should be not so. And third, the class of proposition which can never under any circumstances be true. The propositions of the first sort are necessarily true propositions. The propositions of logic and mathematics belong to this group. The propositions of the second sort are usually placed in the class of empirical propositions. And the propositions of the third sort can be placed in the class of necessarily false propositions.

We have seen that according to Wittgenstein, a compound proposition is a truth-function of its constituent propositions. Given the truth-values to its constituents the truth-value of the proposition is uniquely determined. There are usually several possible truth-values. Their number depends on the number of different constituent propositions. Since all propositions, according to Wittgenstein, are truth-functions of their constituent propositions, the truth-value of any proposition is theoretically determined in a similar way. We need only know the truth-functional structure to which we are interested. Presumably most propositions will turn out to be true under some assignments of truth-values to their constituent propositions and false under others. But

Wittgenstein saw that there is a special case which turns out to be true under all assignments of truth-values to its constituents. Such propositions he called tautologies. The notion of a tautology gives a clear meaning of the word 'necessity'. A necessary truth must have two characteristics. First it cannot under any circumstances be false. And second, it is inconceivable that it should be false. A tautology also must have these characteristics. So all necessary truths are tautologies. For, in any tautology, it does not matter what assignment of truth-values is made to its constituent propositions. As a result, it always receives the assignment 'true'.

The truths of logic, like all necessary truths, are tautologies. All logical propositions can be shown to be tautologies. Given the definitions of logical constants in their respective truth-tables, the truth of a logical proposition at once follows automatically. It does not matter what the truth-values of the constituent propositions are. A mechanical application of the definitions of the logical-constants as given in their truth-tables, always yields a truth-value of the true for logical propositions. They are true solely by virtue of the definitions of the basic logical constants as given in their truth-tables. And since we ourselves frame those truth-tables in the first place, it is obvious that we can know

a priori that logical propositions must always be true.

Thus we see that Wittgenstein's view of logical propositions as tautologies explains the kind of knowledge which we have about them. He said that since the propositions of logic are tautologies the truths of logic are completely empty, for they say nothing. Logical propositions are not substantial necessary truths about any kind of entity. They are not substantial truths at all. Our knowledge of them is secured only by putting them to emptiness. A tautology is empty and says nothing since it is true under all conditions. It does not matter what the reality is like. When we express a non-empty or substantial proposition, such as 'It is raining', we make a certain claim about reality. Such a proposition claims that the facts are such and such. It also claims that the facts might not be so. It is true, no matter what the facts are, and therefore it says nothing. For instance, as Wittgenstein said: "I know nothing about the weather when I know that it is either raining or not raining." (T, 4.461). A non-empty proposition such as 'It is raining' describes a certain situation. It says something about the possible aspect of reality and asserts that it exists. But a tautology, unlike a non-empty proposition, does not describe any situation at all. It does not describe a certain situation and asserts that it exists.

For if it does assert a situation then it may turn out to be false. And in that case it will not be a tautology at all. Since the sense of a proposition is the situation it describes, and since a tautology describes no situation, it follows that a tautology lacks sense. (T, 4.4611).

In the domain of compound propositions, a tautology is at one extreme. Since a tautology is always true, it leaves the entire field of facts completely open. It is a case where no combination whatever is ruled out. The opposite extreme in the range of proposition is what Wittgenstein called Contradiction. A contradiction, like any other proposition, is a truth-function of its constituent propositions. But unlike a tautology, it does not come out true under any possible assignment of truth-values of its constituents. A contradiction comes out false under all possible assignments of truth-values of its constituents. A contradiction closes down the entire field of facts. It is a case where every combination is ruled out. It leaves no possibility open. For example, the proposition 'It is raining' closes down the possibility that it is not raining. Likewise, the proposition that 'It is not raining' closes down the possibility that it is raining. Therefore, the proposition 'It is raining and it is not raining' which is a contradiction, closes both the possibilities. It leaves no possibility open. A contradiction is thus at the

opposite extreme of tautology. Since a contradiction does not describe any fact, so like a tautology, it also lacks sense. (T, 4.461). This is not to say, however, that they are nonsensical. They are part of our symbolism. Wittgenstein only said that neither a tautology nor a contradiction is a picture of reality.

According to Wittgenstein, most of the ordinary propositions describe some definite situation and assert that it does or does not exist. Hence, we cannot tell a priori whether they are true or false. To do that we must investigate or make experiment or we can adopt some other means to find out which is the case. Such propositions, though significant, are neither tautologies nor contradictions. They may be called descriptive propositions. For they describe, unlike tautologies and contradictions, some definite situation. Wittgenstein, thus, said that the only kind of proposition which says something about reality is a descriptive proposition. A descriptive proposition says certain states of affairs exist or do not exist. In other words, it says that certain truth-functional combinations of them exist or do not exist. And this is all that can be said. All significant discourse is, therefore, limited to assertions about states of affairs. All thought is also limited in the same way as intelligent discourse. For according to Wittgenstein, "A thought is a proposition with a sense." (T, 4). This does not mean

that thinking is nothing but internal speech. In fact, thinking operates with signs of some sort. So thinking can be done only in words. But these mental signs (words) must fulfil certain conditions. That is, they must be intelligible and significant. Wittgenstein's theory of propositional sign is a general theory. He did not say that a sign must be a written or verbal or of any particular kind. Thus he said that whatever is applicable to propositional sign is also applicable to mental signs (words). From this it follows that any thought can be expressed in words. A thought which cannot be put into words is no thought at all. One may claim that he has some sort of inexpressible feeling. But he cannot really claim that he has a thought which is inexpressible. Inexpressibility of feeling does not entail inexpressibility of thought. We may have a thought which we cannot express it in words. For instance, we may forget the appropriate word or words in a particular situation. But that does not mean that as a matter of principle we cannot have thought which can be put into words.

Wittgenstein's doctrine limits significant discourse to statements of natural science. Descriptive propositions assert the existence and non-existence of states of affairs. They assert that certain truth-functional combinations do or do not exist. The propositions of natural sciences also describe the world in the same way. (T, 4.1; 4.11). As

the descriptive propositions assert all that can be said, so the propositions of natural sciences assert all that can be said. (T, 6.53). It must be mentioned that according to Wittgenstein, descriptive propositions include propositions of natural sciences and ordinary propositions of everyday life. They are reducible to elementary propositions. This view of descriptive propositions sets a very rigorous limit on what can be said. This thesis rules out all philosophical and metaphysical propositions about things such as metaphysical entities. On this view, metaphysical entities are neither objects nor complexes of objects. This rejection follows from his doctrine that every descriptive proposition must be either an elementary proposition or a truth-function of elementary proposition.

Thus, according to the Tractatus, we are restricted by whatever language we use. We are restricted to a kind of reality about which we can talk and think. We may say that limits of language imposes corresponding limits of the reality that can be described or thought. Wittgenstein said that in the phrase 'reality that can be described or thought' the qualifying clause 'that can be described or thought' can be eliminated. We can simply say that the limits of language are the limits of the world. In fact, the qualifying clause must be eliminated. For we cannot say 'The limits of language are the limits of only reality that can be described or thought but there may be some

other reality beyond this limited reality'. This cannot be said because the proposition 'there may be some other reality' is not a genuine proposition at all. If it is a genuine proposition then it must be a truth-function of elementary proposition. But the very nature of this proposition indicates that it cannot be a truth-function of elementary proposition. This point can be explained in another way. The proposition 'there may be some other reality beyond this limited reality' is self-refuting. For it talks about reality and at the same time claims that it cannot be talked about. This shows that in the phrase 'reality that can be described or thought' the qualifying clause 'that can be described or thought' is redundant. And so it must be dropped. Moreover, by an appeal to the principle of significant negation it can be shown that the phrase 'reality that can be described or thought' is nonsensical pseudo-proposition. For this cannot be applied to anything. The reason for this is as follows: Any genuine proposition must have a significant negation. If the sentence 'S is P' expresses a genuine proposition then its negation ' \sim (S is P)' must also express a genuine proposition. And if 'S is P' is nonsensical then its negation ' \sim (S is P)' must also be nonsensical. For example, it makes sense to say that an apple is red. And therefore it makes sense to say that an apple is not red.

But it does not make sense to say that honesty is red. And therefore it makes no sense to say that honesty is not red. The sentence 'honesty is red' expresses no proposition at all. And therefore, the sentence 'honesty is not red' does not express any proposition at all. Thus Wittgenstein wrote: The positive proposition necessarily presupposes the existence of the negative proposition and vice versa." (T, 5.5151). The same point he put in the Notebooks also: "In order for a proposition to be capable of being true it must also be capable of being false." (NB, 5.6.15). Thus we see that according to the principle of significant negation the phrase 'reality that can be described or thought must be nonsensical. Instead of saying that the limits of language are limits of reality that can be described or thought we must say simply that the limits of language are the limits of reality, of the world.

Wittgenstein said: "we cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either." (T, 5.61). The limits of language, thus, are limits of the world. He said that language is just the totality of proposition which can be expressed in it. (T, 4.001). But it is highly doubtful whether any man can know the whole of language. In order to know the whole of language one needs to be omniscient. In any case, one will need an enormous amount of knowledge. A few persons collectively

may be in a position to understand all the propositions in language. But it is impossible for a single person to know the whole of language. A language is thus an ideal of which no one can claim to possess complete knowledge. Everyone of us possess only a limited portion of the ideal whole. The portion of language which I know can be called my language. And my language is only a limited portion of language in general. For my knowledge is limited to only certain terms, certain states of affairs. And hence I know only a limited number of elementary propositions.

According to Wittgenstein, the limits of language means the limits of my language. That means the limits of my language is not broader limit than the limits of my language. The limits of language and the limits of my language are the same limits. The limits that occur in connection with language are the same limits that occur in connection with my thought. So the limits of my language are the limits of my thought. And since the limits of language are the limits of the world, so the limits of my language are the limits of my world. As he said: "The limits of my language means the limits of my world" (T, 5.6). Wittgenstein's claim that the limits of language are the limits of the world directly leads him to the topic of solipsism. Solipsism may be defined as the view that only one's own self and what one experiences exist. On

this view, what is not experienced by oneself including other selves does not exist. In a sense Wittgenstein agrees with solipsism. One natural way of expressing solipsism is to say 'the world is my world'. And this statement according to Wittgenstein, is quite true. He argued that the expression 'reality that can be described or thought' simply reduces to reality. And in the same way, 'my world' reduces to 'the world'. For my world means 'the world which I can describe, or talk or think about.' Just as the reality which can be described or thought means simply the reality, so my world simply means the world. Therefore solipsism is to be considered as a correct view.

But there is a trouble with solipsism. Wittgenstein said that what the thesis of solipsism says cannot be expressed. In other words, what it wants to say cannot be said. Solipsism wants to say two things: First, it says that 'only what I experience exists'. And secondly, it says that 'what I do not experience does not exist'. But, according to Wittgenstein, neither of the assertions seems to be a possible proposition. For we know that every proposition is truth-function of elementary proposition. But if we analyse the two expressions we will reach the utterances such as 'States of affairs $a R b$ exist', 'Object 'a' exists', and 'Object 'c' does not exist'. But all these utterances are pseudo-propositions, not genuine propositions.

This clearly shows that what solipsism wants to say cannot be said.

Wittgenstein's opinion about solipsism is that though what it wants to say cannot be said, it can be shown. He said that solipsism shows itself. By this he meant that there is one to one correspondence between the elements of my language and the elements of my world. I cannot say that my world is all that there is. But though this fact cannot be said, it can be seen readily. Let us suppose, for example, that I see three things in my visual field. I will be wrong if I say that I know this by a successive process of experiences. One may say that I know it by first looking into my visual field and then looking outside it. And then I make observation that all that I see lies within my visual field and that there is nothing outside it. But this way of saying things is quite wrong. Because we know things without such process. When I say that I know these three things I know it from the fact that they are the only objects that I see. Their being the only objects I see i.e. their being limited in this way shows its truth. In the same way, my language being limited shows the truth of solipsism. Wittgenstein, thus, criptically remarked:

"For what the solipsism means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest."

In the same passage he again remarked that "the world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world." (T, 5.62).

We have said that solipsism may be defined as the view that only one's own self and what one experiences exist. The most popular interpretation of this view is that there are two radically different things in the world. First, the subject of experience and second, the object of experience. The subject of experience is the self - the knowing, thinking, experiencing self. And the object of experience is that which the self experiences. But Wittgenstein insisted that solipsism should not be interpreted in this dualistic way. He, thus did not accept this popular interpretation of solipsism. As Hintikka said:

"What Wittgenstein thought solipsism intends to say is entirely different from what philosophers usually take it to say. When he says that solipsism is correct he means his peculiar interpretation of solipsism which can only be understood in the context of other doctrines of the *Tractatus*."¹

Solipsism, properly understood, is the doctrine that only what oneself experiences exists. The dualistic interpretation that there is also a thinking, knowing, experiencing metaphysical self must be rejected. For there is no such entity. As he said: "There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas". (T, 5.631). In saying

saying this Wittgenstein is no doubt trying to say which can be said in language. But what he really meant by this is that the word 'I' in 'I see - ', 'I think - ', 'I feel - ' etc. are not the name of an object. (NB, 7.8.16). It is only the accidental grammatical form of language which misleads us to suppose that there is an I. For we usually think that every word in a sentence designates an object which is not necessarily so. Therefore, the only way to avoid such confusion is to abandon this particular grammatical construction. Moore reports: "... he quoted with apparent approval Lichtenberg's saying 'Instead of 'I think' we ought to say 'It thinks' (it being used, as he said, as 'Es' is used in 'Es blitzer'..."²

It is an obvious fact that 'I' is not observable. It is never perceived by the senses. I see the colours or shapes. I hear the sounds. But I never see or hear the 'I'. Therefore, the I or the self is not an observable object. (T, 5.633; 5.6331). In the field of vision there are various colours, shapes physical objects etc.. But there is no seeing I, no visual subject. Similarly, in the field of reality there are different experienced situations. But there is no experiencing subject or self. Wittgenstein argued that if the self exists then it should combine with some other objects to form states of affairs. If so then the states of affairs will be observable by the same self which is supposed to be the one of their

constituents. But this leads to an absurd consequence. For an object in a state of affair cannot observe the very state of affairs. So we must reject the hypothesis which leads to this absurd result. That is to say, we must reject the hypothesis that the self must exist. The self, thus, cannot be a part of reality. It is "the limit of the world - not a part of it." (T, 5.641). The implication of Wittgenstein's view of solipsism is that we cannot transcend the boundary of language. There is no way of getting beyond language. So the only way of setting the limits of metaphysical subjects is to identify them with the limits of my language. If self is eliminated from dualistic interpretation of solipsism then what remains is only the object of experience i.e., that which one experiences. Solipsism, properly interpreted, becomes the view that these are all that exist. This view is in agreement with the view of the commonsense realist. Solipsism is, thus, indistinguishable from realism inspite of the fact that they are antithetical in character(T, 5.64).

Miss Anscombe interpreted the Tractatus 5.62 as follows: "That the world is my world shows in that the limit of that language (of the language that only I understand) means the limits of my world."³ And her explanation is that "That language' refers back to 'my language' (§.6), which is therefore, 'my private' language."⁴ But Anscombe's interpretation seems to be unacceptable. According to Anscombe, Wittgenstein held that "... there are ... many 'languages' one of which I alone understand".⁵ This proposition clearly

indicates two things. First, it says that there are many languages. And secondly it says that the objects that lie behind one language differ from those that lie behind another language. So according to this line of interpretation, it follows that there are other objects beyond those of my acquaintance. But according to Anscombe, Wittgenstein, on the other hand, held that "the limits of my world and of the world are one and the same."⁶ Wittgenstein also said: "Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects. Hence my world and the world contain the same objects. So according to this line of interpretation, there are no objects beyond those of my acquaintance. Therefore, if we accept anscombe's interpretation then we must conclude that Wittgenstein's theory is utterly inconsistent. But it is not necessary to reach this conclusion. For, Wittgenstein clearly denied the first half of Anscombe's interpretation. That there are objects beyond those of my acquaintance is something that can be neither said nor shown. It is nonsensical for it attempts to say something about the other side of the world. Wittgenstein's position here is that there is only one language, my language.

stenius's comment on this passage is that "Wittgenstein ought to have used the word 'idealism' rather than 'solipsism'."⁷ This interpretation is also wrong. For in the Notebooks, Wittgenstein clearly distinguished idealism from solipsism. He said: "Idealism singles men out from the world as unique, solipsism singles me alone out..."

(NB, 15.10.16). The parenthetical remark in the Tractatus 5.62 has been translated by the commentators in two ways. Stenius, as opposed to Anscombe, translated the remark as "which is the only language I understand".⁸ There has been a long controversy over the proper translation. Most of the authorities, however, did not agree with Anscombe. They have preferred Stenius's translation.

Though Wittgenstein denied the existence of metaphysical self he did not deny the subject matter of psychology. He distinguished the metaphysical self from the soul. According to him, the soul certainly exists and there can be natural science of it which may be called psychology. As he said: "The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world - not a part of it." (T, 5.641). The psychological self is nothing but series of thoughts, pains, desires and so on. The world divides into facts. Hence the psychological self is just the facts which have as constituents the thoughts, pains, desires and so on.

We have seen that no other propositions except descriptive propositions can say anything. Now, one of the central doctrines of the Tractatus is that the structure or form of an elementary proposition is identical with the structure and form of the states of affairs. (T, 2.15; 2.161;

2.18). But this statement cannot be a truth-function of elementary propositions. For it does not assert the existence or nonexistence of states of affairs. The statement simply asserts a relation between all states of affairs and something other than the states of affairs. This means that the statement 'the structure and or form of an elementary proposition is identical with the structure or form of its states of affairs' cannot be a descriptive proposition. And since it cannot be a tautology, the thesis cannot be anything that can be said at all. The same point can be illustrated in the following way. We know, an elementary proposition is a picture of reality. It is a picture of a state of affairs. A picture depicts a situation. And a picture has the same structure as the situation has. But we cannot make a picture which depicts the fact that a picture has the same structure as its situation. We can make a picture of a picture. And we also can make a picture of its situation. But we cannot make a picture of a picture's having the same structure as its situation. This shows that the thesis 'the structure or form of an elementary proposition is identical with the structure or form of its states of affairs' cannot be anything sayable. (NB, p. 107).

Wittgenstein seems to identify the thesis of solipsism with the thesis of the Tractatus. For he said

said that what solipsism says is true. And like solipsism, what the Tractatus says is quite true. But also like solipsism, what the Tractatus means to say cannot be said. And what both of them mean to say can only be shown. The truth of solipsism is shown by the fact that the limits of my language mean the limits of my world. And the truth of the thesis of the Tractatus is shown by the fact that the structure of the elementary proposition is identical with the structure of the states of affairs. This view leads Wittgenstein to a paradoxical situation. "The very form of the Tractatus reflects this paradox."⁹ In the Tractatus he stated the thesis. At the same time he also claimed that what he said cannot be said. And since the thesis of the Tractatus is not different from the thesis of solipsism, so it also cannot be stated. The statements of the Tractatus cannot be considered as truth-function of elementary propositions. For they are not descriptive propositions about states of affairs. That is, they are not propositions of natural sciences. Wittgenstein said that descriptive propositions which simply state empirical fact have no place in philosophical book. He accepted the paradox with a definite purpose. He said: "My propositions serve as elucidations," (T, 6.54). He did not mean to say that what he said in the Tractatus is useless or sheer nonsense. They are not confused nonsense like the pseudo-propositions of the metaphysicians. He

intended to say that his philosophy is an indispensable nonsense and not just idle nonsense like metaphysics. Wittgenstein considered his philosophical propositions to be illuminating nonsense. What he intended to is quite true, only it cannot be said. His instruction is that we must grasp what it is that he intended to say. We must learn the lesson - climb the ladder. By climbing up the ladder we will learn the lesson that we should not make any attempt to say such things which cannot be said. After realising this fact we will throw away the ladder through which we have reached this insight. This insight will not only prevent us from saying the unsayable, it will also show the right path of saying the sayable.

Wittgenstein's position here does not seem to be a sound one. Gilbert Ryle and others have criticised this peculiar look of the Tractatus. Ryle said:

"... it is true that philosophical clarity is achieved in the acts of appreciating arguments rather than in propounding theorems. But it is false that all philosophical talk is nonsensical talk. Wittgenstein had himself said very effective things, and talking effectively is not talking nonsensically."¹⁰

In the Tractatus he said certain things about the relationship between propositions and situations. One is the logical picture of the other. And they have the same structure. We understand these doctrines. We judge their merits and demerits. We also take stand on them by accepting them or

by rejecting them. But surprisingly in the end we are told that they are all nonsense. We are also told that such doctrines cannot be stated. For they are mere attempts to say something which cannot be said. This type of evaluation seems to be wrong. Wittgenstein has said these things and therefore they can be said as well. It is nonsensical to deny that what has been said cannot be said. As Ramsey said: "What we can't say we can't say, and we cannot whistle it either."¹¹ Thus what we should abandon is not only the ideas that those things cannot be said but also the theory which implies that they cannot be said. But Wittgenstein was unwilling to accept this suggestion. For the theory of what can be and cannot be said is so fundamental to his system that he could not abandon it without abandoning the whole Tractatus.

The paradoxical character of the Tractatus was criticised even by those who were influenced by the book. Carnap, for example wrote:

"I as well as my friends in the Vienna Circle, owe much to Wittgenstein, especially as to the analysis of metaphysics. But on the point just mentioned I cannot agree with him. In the first place he seems to me to be inconsistent in what he does. He tells us that one cannot state philosophical propositions and that whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent; and then instead of keeping silent, he writes the whole philosophical book. Secondly I do not agree with his statement that all his propositions are quite as much without sense as metaphysical propositions

are. My opinion is that great number of his propositions (unfortunately not all of them) have in fact sense; and that the same is true for all propositions of logical analysis."¹²

In both the periods of his philosophical activity Wittgenstein's aim was to understand the structure and limits of thought. His philosophy is a critique of language which is similar to the critique of Kant. According to Wittgenstein, we cannot significantly ask questions and also we cannot make statements which involve only formal concepts. Therefore it is not possible for us to ask questions about the origin of things or events unless we specify things or events of a particular kind. Formal concepts are empty unless some empirical concept is added to them. This distinction between formal and material elements of thought and everyday language is Kant's distinction. Kant also thought that concepts are empty if they are considered apart from all application to experience. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein said that we fall into nonsense if we consider questions or statements apart from actual context of human life in which questions are asked or the statements are made. The sense in thought and language cannot be achieved only by mere dictionary definition of words, the rules of grammar and the laws of logic. The significance of any statement presupposes a constant background of ordinary human experience. To use words in some

context without the background of experience is to play with words in void. Both Kant and Wittgenstein were against speculative metaphysics. According to both of them speculative metaphysics crosses the limit of language and seeks to tell us about the timeless realities. It also tries to explain the existence of the universe or the purpose of human life by reference to them. Wittgenstein's advice to the metaphysician is that he should come to stop at this point. And Kant's instruction is that he should realise that he is trying to comprehend the incomprehensible.

Like Kant, Wittgenstein believed that philosophers step over the limits of language and try to explain things which lie beyond the limits. As a result they fall into a kind of nonsense which seem to give them genuine thought, but in fact, do not do so. He wanted to discover the exact location of the line which distinguishes sense from nonsense. He wanted to point out to the metaphysicians the mistakes of their ways. This is the negative side of his philosophy. But his philosophy has a positive side also. His purpose was not merely to formulate instruction to save people from trying to say what cannot be said in language. His purpose was to succeed in understanding the structure of what can be said in language. He believed that the only way to achieve this understanding is to plot the limits. Because the limits and the structure have the common origin. Thus the very nature of language determines

what is sayable and what is unsayable.

Kant made a distinction between speculative and critical philosophy. He wanted to reform traditional metaphysical system. Kant believed that a critical study of the scope and limits of thought will show that metaphysics is founded on nothing. Metaphysicians of the past tried to go beyond all possible experience. But according to Kant this sort of transcendence is not possible. He argued that all meaningful discourse and thought presuppose a certain context or background. And they lose all significance when they are applied outside this context. When philosophy tries to cross the limits of experience and at the same time tries to maintain the outlook of experience, it cannot go anywhere. So the proper task of philosophy, according to Kant, is not speculation, but a systematic criticism of human thought. And it is only the critical examination of thought which can show the impossibility of metaphysical speculation.

Kant's philosophy has a positive side also. Kant held that the ideas of speculative metaphysics have legitimate function to perform. What he condemned is the metaphysician's attempt to perform another function which they cannot perform. Kant said that the ideas of speculative metaphysical system lie outside the system of factual knowledge. According to him, their proper function is to

serve as a point of reference which guide the human thought. They lie outside the system of factual knowledge. They can be used only to construct a system. They are only ideals which the system tries to achieve. They can be used in a system to orient it. But the metaphysicians committed mistakes by supposing that such ideas have objective basis outside the system of factual knowledge. Wittgenstein showed similar attitude to the great metaphysical systems. The grounds he gave against any metaphysical system are almost same as Kant's. Kant treated metaphysics with respect and affection. And he considered metaphysics as an inevitable temptation to the human intellect. Like Kant, Wittgenstein's treatment of metaphysics is sympathetic and understanding. It is true that Wittgenstein's attitude to metaphysics is not the same as Kant. But both of them regarded metaphysics as a natural and inevitable transgressor. And both of them believed that much can be learnt from it.

A systematic study of language is a difficult task. The difficulty lies in the fact that any study of language involves the study of facts. It also involves the construction of theories. The theory of language which Wittgenstein developed in the Tractatus is a general and ~~scientific~~ theory. But at the same time it is a critical attempt to fix the bounds of possible development of

language. As such, it is not concerned with what is humanly possible. And this makes it a philosophical rather than a scientific theory. Kant wanted to plot the absolute limit of thought. Wittgenstein for the same reason wanted to plot the absolute limit of language.

According to Wittgenstein, there is no necessity except logical necessity. And as such, all necessary truths of logic are tautologies which say nothing. Thus Wittgenstein denied that there are any substantial necessary truths. So for him there is no synthetic a priori truth. On this point we notice conspicuous difference between Kant's system and the system of the Tractatus. Kant's conception of necessity not only includes logical necessity, it also includes substantial necessity. "Kant's notion of necessity is wider than that of the logical necessity which covers analytic judgements only."¹³ Kant was not very much concerned with tautology. He held that there are certain necessary truths which hold within the bounds of possible experience. The statement that every event has a cause is an example of a necessary truth of this sort. It is a necessary truth and at the same time holds within the bounds of experience.

Thus we see that both Kant and Wittgenstein agreed that the philosophical truths are necessary truths. But they disagreed about the nature of necessary truths.

Naturally, therefore, there are differences between the views of two philosophers. The framework of Kant's system is based on the concept^{of} substantially necessary truth. He said that the task of the philosopher is to establish the substantial necessary truths which form the framework of his system. And such necessity, unlike logical necessity, holds within the system, not outside the system. Wittgenstein's view is that philosophers seek clarifications of different kinds of statements. And for that they must analyse their meaning. He believed that the necessity that the limits of language are the limits of the world is an absolute necessity. Wittgenstein did not establish this absolute necessity from the empirical feature of language. He established this from the essential nature of language. It follows from the essential nature of language that any actual language can be reduced to the language of elementary propositions. These elementary propositions serve as a starting point from which philosophers with the aid of logical principles can fix the limit of any possible language.

According to the Tractatus, philosophical propositions do not lie within the limits of possible language. He held that what lies beyond language cannot be asserted in language. It can only be shown. By the limits of language he meant only the limits of factual discourse.

So, for him, philosophical propositions are neither
factual nor contingent.

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CHAPTER - V I I I

LANGUAGE, WORLD AND VALUE

We generally expect philosophy to tell us what things are of value. We also expect to know from philosophy what good life is and how we ought to act. But according to the philosophy of the Tractatus, we must stop looking for such things. The most common ethical terms are 'good', 'value', 'ought' and so on. If they have meaning, they must be analysable into elementary proposition. That is to say, they must be analysable into states of affairs.

Ethical propositions, as ordinarily understood, do not state what happens to be the case. They do not state facts. Some moral philosophers, however, hold that the propositions of ethics do state facts. According to them, propositions containing such concepts as 'good', 'bad', 'ought', 'duty' and so on, are really descriptive propositions. They state nothing but empirical facts. In this group are some who tried to define 'good' in terms of pleasure alone. They say that propositions containing that concept are purely descriptive. G.E. Moore charged them with committing 'naturalistic fallacy'¹. Wittgenstein would agree with Moore on this rejection.

Ethical propositions, as we ordinarily understand

them, try to say that certain situations are good or bad. They try to say that certain situations ought or ought not to exist. They pass judgement on what happens to be the case. Ethics is primarily concerned with values and not with facts. Ethical propositions, then, purport to say something 'higher' than descriptive propositions. For descriptive propositions merely state facts. But according to Wittgenstein, such things cannot be said. Descriptive propositions say all that can be said. Hence ethical propositions do not exist and consequently they share the same fate with the metaphysical propositions.

According to Wittgenstein, everything in the world is accidental. Therefore, there is no value in the world. He said:

"In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen, in it no value exists - and if it did exist, it would have no value. If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental. It must lie outside the world."
(T, 6.41).

This view is not an absolute denial of the existence of value. What it absolutely denies is its existence in the world. What belongs to ethics cannot be stated. Propositions can state only what is in the world. What belongs

to ethics is transcendental. (T, 6.421). The world and what is there in the world is neither good nor bad. Good and evil are purely subjective. They exist only in relation to the subject (ego). But Wittgenstein said that the 'subject' is also transcendental. It is not in the world. It is the limit of the world. (T, 5.5632).

According to the Tractatus, there is a variety of things that cannot be stated. They are: the form of representations, the simple objects, the existence of metaphysical subject, the good and the evil. All these things are unsayable, according to Wittgenstein. It is true that one cannot say anything on these metaphysical topics. But this does not mean that they are absurd. He said: "There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words." (T, 6.522). This itself is something unsayable. It is one of those statements of which Wittgenstein declared that although they can produce philosophical insight, they are actually nonsensical. And eventually they must be thrown away. (T, 6.54). Wittgenstein's conclusion that "what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" is not a truism. What it means is that there is a realm about which we can say nothing.

One of Wittgenstein's famous concepts is 'das mythische'. It appears in the Tractatus 6.522, 6.432, 6.44, 6.45. Through these passages he tried to define this concept.

"There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical". (T, 6.522). "How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world." (T, 6.432). "It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists." (T, 6.44). "Feeling the world as a limited whole - it is this that is mystical." (6.45). From these definitions it is clear that the 'mystical' is not how the world is, but what the world is. The 'fact' that there is a world, is not itself in the world. Because this fact is a 'formal fact' which cannot be mirrored by other facts. But it can only be shown by them.

According to Wittgenstein, there is no logical connection between the will and the world. There is nothing in the world except facts. Facts are objective. Hence they are independent of our will. Nothing can happen according to our sweet will or wishes. Even if anything happens which is in harmony with our will, it is only a favour granted by fate. So everything happens according to the law of natural sciences. Inductive reasoning cannot establish necessary connection between facts. According to Wittgenstein, it is the factuality of fact which makes the world a world. And it is the factuality of fact which

Wittgenstein named God. He said that our will enters into the world completely from outside. And for that reason we feel that we are dependent on an alien will. Wittgenstein called this alien will God. In this sense God is simply the fate, the alien will which is independent of our will. It is the factual character of reality. (NB, 8.7.16). According to Wittgenstein, God is the meaning or limit of the world. (NB, 11.6.16). God being the factuality of facts cannot be in the world. For he is not a part of the world. He may be called the meaning or essence of the world.

According to the Tractatus, language and thought can represent everything which is or can be a fact. But they cannot represent the factuality of fact. Because the formal property of fact is not itself a fact. So language cannot describe it. Philosophy, thus, cannot be expected to provide us with any answer to the problem of life. There cannot be any genuine propositions on matters like 'freedom of will', 'survival after death', and so on. These are all concerned with the meaning of life. But no proposition can express the meaning of life or the world. All genuine propositions are contingent. Propositions can show only how things are. But how things are in the world is in no way connected with finer aspects of life. God or the meaning of life is the mystical, the

inexpressible, the unsayable. Therefore, any problem that arises in connection with the meaning of life cannot be put into words. Wittgenstein argued that there cannot be any questions on the meaning of life. Because there are no propositions which can be answer to this problem. And where there is no answer there cannot be any question also. (T, 6.5). In this connection Wittgenstein criticised the universal doubt of the sceptics. He said that the view of the sceptic is not only refutable but nonsensical too. Because sceptics generally raise doubts on such topics where no questions can be asked. This, according to Wittgenstein, is wrong. Because doubt is possible when a question is possible. A question is possible when an answer is possible. And an answer is possible only when something can be said. (T. 6. 51) And since nothing can be said about the problem of life, so no question can be raised on these matters. People normally think "that even when all possible scientific questions are answered, the problems of life remain untouched." But Wittgenstein said that it is wrong to think in this way. For, according to him, when all scientific questions are answered, then "no questions left, and this itself is the answer." (T, 6.52). Therefore "the solution of the problem" lies "in the vanishing of the problem". (T, 6.521).

Wittgenstein identified the form of the world with the sense of the world. It follows, then, that the sense

of the world is also the meaning of the world. The problem of life arises when we view the world not as it is but as it should be. Viewing the world in this way involves the question why the world is thus and not otherwise. But this question can only be answered by showing that life cannot have sense beyond life. Because life means the world (T, 5.621). And world means the totality of facts. And since life is the totality of facts, it cannot refer to any fact beyond itself. Therefore, the problem of life can be answered only by the removal of the problem. And to view the world in this way does not involve such questions.

The sense of the world, therefore, is not contained in the world. The sense of the world is something 'higher' than the world. A proposition cannot express anything higher. The sense of the world is, therefore, higher than the totality of facts. This is the reason why Wittgenstein considered God to be something 'higher', and which cannot reveal himself in the world. Thus he said that "the meaning

of life" and "the meaning of the world" is same. And this is what "we can call God." (NB, 11.6.16).

According to the Tractatus, then, God is the essence of the world. He is world's meaning and form. Now, the essence or form of the world is nothing but the general form of the proposition. Wittgenstein said that the general form of proposition is the essence of a proposition. (T, 5.471). To describe the essence of a proposition is to describe the essence of all description. And to describe the essence of all description means to give the essence of the world. (T, 5.4711). "The general form of a proposition is : "This is how things stand". (T. 4.5). Similarly, in the Notebooks he said: "How things stand in God. God is how things stand." (NB, 1.8.16). The generalised proposition gives us a description of a certain domain as a limited whole. Therefore, 'the mystical' is the feeling of the world or a limited whole. (§. 6.45). The mystical or God is something inexpressible. It is not how the world is, but that it is. Therefore, God, the essence of the world, cannot be in the world. He is the limit of the world. Just as the general form of the proposition cannot be described by any proposition so also the essence of the world cannot be stated by any proposition. God is, thus, ineffable.

In the previous chapter we have seen that according

to Wittgenstein, the propositions of logic are tautologies. They are true in every possible states of affairs. So they say nothing about the world. They are propositions which it is inconceivable that they should be false. They are empty, because they have form but no content. They are necessarily true propositions. So propositions of logic are not genuine propositions at all. Propositions of Mathematics are likewise pseudo-propositions. Because mathematics consists of equations. From this it follows that mathematical propositions are also without sense. For it is nonsense to say that two things are identical. And to say of one thing that it is identical is to say nothing at all. Thus we see that the propositions of logic and mathematics belong to the class of pseudo-propositions. Most of the propositions of natural sciences are genuine propositions. There are certain propositions of science which do say something about the world and at the same time claim to be necessarily true. For example, the law of induction. But the law of induction is a genuine proposition. For it is possible that it can be false. Again, the law of causality is a general law of an a priori kind.

The aim of the Tractatus is to show that the questions with which ethics and religion are concerned cannot be answered by natural sciences. For there are no genuine

propositions in ethics and religion. On the matters such as the freedom of will, the meaning of life, there can be no questions. Because there are no propositions which can be their answers. The propositions of natural sciences are all contingent propositions. And being contingent propositions they can state nothing but empirical facts. So they cannot provide us any solution to the problem of life.

Ethics, as ordinarily understood, is primarily concerned with values. Values are not facts. Ethics is not concerned with what is the case. But it is concerned with what should be the case. All genuine propositions are contingent. They state nothing but empirical facts. But if anything has value that fact cannot be an empirical matter. For a value cannot be a given feature of a fact. Value is the essence of fact. So it is something higher than fact. Whatever is there in the world is a fact. And since value is not fact, so value cannot be in the world. (T, 6.41). Whatever is there in the world is accidental. And since values are not accidental, ~~so they are~~ they cannot be in the world.

Wittgenstein held that ethical attributes like duties, values, obligations and tasks are projected by the world through the will. This will may be called my will. My will is the ethical subject. The ethical attributes exist only in relation to the subject. But the subject is also transcendental. It is not in the world. Therefore,

it is impossible to talk about the will. For a language can only state facts.

Wittgenstein made a distinction between 'alien will' and 'my will'. The 'alien will' is the name of God. And 'my will' is the ethical subject. This is known as his 'double godhead' theory. As he said: "There are two godheads: the world and my independent I" (NB, 8.7.16). On this view, the world is the first God and the Willing-I is the second God. The I-God, unlike the world-God appears when we believe that facts are not everything in the world. (NB, 8.7.16). Wittgenstein held that the world qua the understanding, duties, values, obligations and tasks projects "the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes." (T, 6.432). From the point of view of ethics, facts constitute for us a duty and a task. But Wittgenstein said that the subject qua will is not a fact. The subject as the experiencer of facts in the world is identical with the world. As he said: "I am the world." The 'I' makes its appearance when we believe that the world is my world.

Thus we see that from one point of view the limit of the world can be named God. Because God is the form of

the world. And the concept of form is identical with the concept of limit. And from another point of view it can be named the thinking-I. The form of the world is given by the thinking-I. But the sense or significance of the world is given by the willing-I. Both the thinking-I and the willing-I are transcendental. They fall outside the world. Wittgenstein said that things get significance only when they come in contact with 'my will'. (NB, 15,10.16). And 'my will' is projected only by the world through ethical attributes. In this sense 'my will' is not different from the thinking-I or the world. Because a will is common to the whole world. Only in a higher sense we may call this will my will. Thus he said that just as my idea means the world, so my will means the world-will. (NB, 7.10.16). The will is an attitude to the world when the subject is the willing subject. And the subject is the limit, not a part of the world. According to Wittgenstein, the willing subject is the value-endower. It cannot exist in the world. He said that my will appears in the world completely from outside. (8.7.13). Ethical attributes, thus, enter into the world only through the subject. And the subject is not a part of the world, it is the limit of the world. To pass value judgements on facts is to place oneself outside the world where no facts may hold. So ethical propositions are not possible. What belongs to ethics cannot be said.

The notions of goodness and badness, then, are qualities of the willing subject. For they cannot be the qualities of the world. The world and what is there in the world is neither good nor evil. So good and evil cannot be attributed to the facts of the world. And since they belong to the willing subject, so they do not exist in the world. The subject is not a part of the world. So good and evil cannot be the predicates of the world. They are really the "predicates of the subject". (NB, 2.8 16). It is the will which is good or bad. (NB, 11.6.16). It is not the fact which is either good or bad. Wittgenstein thus said that a man is either happy or unhappy, and that is the end of the matter. According to him, only the happy life is good and the unhappy life is bad. (NB, 30.7.16). It follows that good or evil is simply an attitude towards life. "Living the good and living the bad life are matters of view-point."² This leads Wittgenstein to say that the only motto of life is to 'live happily'.

On the basis of this thesis Wittgenstein developed a theory of reward and punishment. And he considered it to be his first law of ethical theory. Ethics, as ordinarily understood, has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms. It is concerned with the value of an action performed by an agent. It is the consequence of an action upon which the judgement of reward or punishment is inflicted. These consequences are

not facts or events. They are values. And no proposition can state anything concerned with values. Because the consequences concerning value do not reside in the actions themselves. But Wittgenstein said that some kind of ethical reward and punishment is possible if the consequences of our actions reside in the actions themselves (6.422). The consequences of our actions must be facts. And facts as such have nothing to do with values. In that case "reward and punishment must reside in the action itself." If so, then "reward must be something pleasant and the punishment something unpleasant." (T, 6.422). A sinner is an unhappy man who lives in an unhappy world. And a happy man is he who lives in a happy world. Sin, therefore, is its own punishment. Likewise, merit is its own reward. A man commits sin only by being unhappy. Wittgenstein, thus said that "The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man-" (T, 6.43). Wittgenstein's conclusion seems to be that a happy life is self-justifying. A proposition is self-justifying if it can show itself a tautology. He applied the same principle when he said that the question why one should live happily is itself a tautological question. For Wittgenstein, life means being happy. Happy life is thus justified by itself. (NB, 30.7.11).

According to Wittgenstein, then, good is happiness. Here he is in agreement with Spinoza. Spinoza said that because of our passions and inclinations we become unhappy

and victims of evil. But we can avoid evil and become happy only by philosophical understanding of the natural order of which our passions and inclinations are parts. Similarly, Wittgenstein said that being happy means to be in agreement with the world. That is to say, to live a happy life one must be in agreement with the natural order. Wittgenstein's definition of happiness provides us a solution of the problem of free will. He said that there is only one way to be free, happy and independent. It is just to accept fully the brutality of facts of the world without any restriction and reservation. In that case there will be no difference between my will and the world-will. We are, then, in agreement with the alien will on which we are dependent. Everything happens in the world according to natural order. Nothing happens according to our sweet will or wishes. There is a general tendency in man to wish some events to happen rather than another. And thereby he becomes separated from the world-will and breaks his harmony with God or the natural order. To wish means to wish the impossible. And to wish the impossible means to be unhappy. Even if any desire is fulfilled it is not by any actual agency but by a favour granted by fate. There is no necessary connection between one's will and what happens in the world. Even if there is any connection it is merely an accidental correlation. The good is, therefore, the will that wishes nothing. The good is

the will which agrees with whatever happens as it happens. It is completely free from desire and wishes. It follows that man can acquire happiness only by total submission to the will of God. And in that case, the difference between my will and the world - will disappears. In this way Wittgenstein reconciled the independence of thinking-I with the absoluteness of willing-I. A happy man simply fulfils the purpose of existence. (NB, 6.7.16).

According to Anscombe, "Wittgenstein thought that the world is good ... the goodness of the world, however, is not anything in how it is but in its being at all."³ But Anscombe's interpretation does not seem to be plausible. For Wittgenstein, the world is as it is. And that is all that can be said. The world consists of facts and that is the end of the matter. He said that good and evil are not qualities of the world. They are the qualities of the willing subject. What is good and evil is the I. It is not the world. Good and evil are purely subjective notions. They cannot be attributed to facts which are objective. The world in itself can neither be good nor evil. So such qualities cannot be predicated to the world. They can only be predicated to the willing subject. Because good and evil make their appearances only in relation to the subject. But the subject is not a part of the world. It is a pre-supposition of its existence. So good and evil do not exist in the world. (NB, 2.8.16).

In this connection Wittgenstein made a distinction between 'to will' and 'to wish'. He did not say that the will is bad in itself. His point was that when it takes the form of wish with desire and expectation it becomes bad. Willing may be free from desire, hope and expectation. For it always accompanies the event. So it does not make any attempt to change the happenings. It is always in agreement with facts. But wish always precedes the event. It is always followed by desire, hope and expectation. It is the nature of the wish to see things different from what they are. Wish implies action. And to wish means to will to change the happenings of the world. That is to say, a wish is followed by action to alter the facts. But it is impossible to change the facts. For the natural order is independent of our will or wish. Though we cannot change the happenings of the world, being powerless, we are capable of willing the good. For it is possible for us to make ourselves independent of the world. And we can achieve that independence only by renouncing any influence on happenings. (NB, 11.6.16). It follows that we can acquire freedom by a conscious surrender to fate. Wittgenstein said that man can be happy only through the life of knowledge. And one can lead a life of knowledge only by acquiring good conscience which consists in seeing the world rightly. And seeing the world rightly means proper understanding of the natural world order. It follows that

inspite of our absolute dependence on inevitable facts we can make ourselves independent of fate by living a life of knowledge. (NB, 8.7.16).

According to Wittgenstein, it is the temporal character of the wish which is responsible to make ourselves dependent on fate. And since a wish is necessarily temporal it is always directed towards the future. Because to wish means to will to fulfil the desire, hopes and expectation. This implies its reference not to the present but to the future. So to attain freedom one must be freed from time. To live in time means to live in the sphere of wishes. A wish may appear in two forms. It may appear either as a form of fear or as a form of hope. One who lives in time is always the victim of fear and hope. But will is free from time. It is always a thing of the present. Because it is without desire, hope and expectation. Here Wittgenstein is in agreement with the German poet Goethe who said that fear and hope are man's greatest enemies. Likewise, Wittgenstein said that whoever lives without fear and hope lives in the present. (NB, 14.7.16). And a happy man is he who does not live in time.(NB, 8.7.16). To live in time means to have fear and hope. And wherever there is fear and hope there is expectation. But hopes and expectations cannot be satisfied by the world of facts. Time is dynamic, but the world of facts is static. So the fulfilment of desire is an impossibility. Living

in time means not to be in agreement with facts. And disagreement with fact results in unhappiness. And to be unhappy means to live in sin. But Wittgenstein said that one can avoid sin and live an eternal life by living only in the present. By eternity Wittgenstein did not mean infinite temporal duration. Eternity, for him, is timelessness. According to him, there is only one way by means of which we can avoid the temporal character of our existence. And this is just not to wish, to be content. Living this kind of life means living in eternal present. Therefore, he who lives according to the will of God lives for ever.

Wittgenstein's comment on death will be of much significance here. He said that death cannot be an event of life. For it is not a fact of the world. (T, 6.431; 6.4311). If death is an event of the world then the willing subject will be a fact of the world. But no willing subject exists in the world. It is not a part of the world. It is the world's limit. So no willing subject can die. Moreover, the willing subject is the significance-endower. To acknowledge death means to create significance. In that case it cannot be a significance-endower. The fear of death appears when we mix facts with the willing subject. It generates from our wish which expects some facts to happen or not to happen. This leads Wittgenstein to say that the fear of death is a clear sign of false hope. (NB, 8.7.16).

Wittgenstein identified ethics with aesthetics. According to him, ethics and aesthetics are really one and the same. This idea comes very closer to Schopenhaur's theory of art. According to Schopenhaur, art is something like philosophy. It is to bring man to see the 'Ideas' which are eternal forms. And observation of these ideas is the only non-frustrating occupation in which man can be engaged. This theory of aesthetics is very much similar to Wittgenstein's theory of the basic truths of ethics. According to Wittgenstein, ethics is a theory which tells us how a man can be happy. It is a theory of how the purpose of human existence can be fulfilled. So ethics deals with how man's life should be conducted. The only purpose of life is to be happy. Now, happiness depends on our particular way of viewing the world. Ethics, therefore, is a theory of how we should look at the world, if we really want to be happy at all. Art also plays the same role. Wittgenstein said that the essence of art lies in the fact that it looks at the world with an happy eye. (NB, 20.10.16). And to view the world with an happy eye is to live a happy life. (T, 6.43). Thus we see that the aim of ethics and aesthetics is the same. The end of art is beautiful. And the beautiful is that what makes a man happy.

We have seen that living a happy life means living in the eternal present. Now, both ethics and aesthetics

seek happy life. So both ethics and aesthetics are theories of eternal present. A happy life is the life of knowledge. And a life of knowledge consists in viewing the world rightly. It is to renounce the wish. And to renounce the wish means to accept voluntarily the inevitable given facts of the world. A happy life is the life that can renounce the amenities and comforts of the world. Wittgenstein also said that happiness means good conscience. And it can be achieved only through the proper understanding of the natural world order. Wittgenstein equated good conscience with the voice of God. Because life of knowledge means the knowledge of the essence of the world. But the essence of the world does not exist in the world. It is the limit of the world. It is a representation of the world as a limited whole. And to see the world as a limited whole is the mystical. Art also views the world as a limited whole. In this sense ethics and aesthetics are identical.

Wittgenstein held that ethics is transcendental. For it deals with value rather than facts. And any significant discourse can state only what is the case. But ethical statements refer only to what ought to be the case. It follows that ethical statements must be meaningless. But once Wittgenstein considered the possibility that since we are constantly tempted to speak in ethical terms they cannot be dismissed as meaningless. So it

might be due to the fact that he had failed to discover the correct analysis of the meaning of ethical terms. To this kind of opinion Wittgenstein replied that he considered ethical terms as nonsensical not because he has not found correct analysis of their meaning. He called them nonsensical. To talk on ethical matters is to go beyond the world and to say something which lies outside significant discourse. The general tendency of all men is to cross the limit of language while they talk on ethics. But this kind of attempt is absolutely futile. Ethics, as ordinarily understood, springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolutely valuable. But there cannot be any science on such matters. Because any such attempt on these important matters does not add to our knowledge in any sense.⁴

Wittgenstein's reply clearly suggests that ethical statements are meaningless. But it is difficult to be sure that Wittgenstein was, in fact, drawing that conclusion. Rush Rhees interpreted this remark thus:

"...if there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is, the case ... because of what judgements of good and evil do mean ... it is pointless to look for their meaning in any events or facts that might be found in science."⁵

On this interpretation, ethical statements, according to Wittgenstein, cannot be designated as meaningless. For according to Rush Rhees, Wittgenstein was simply clarifying the meaning of ethical statements. And his purpose was to draw a line between the moral discourse and the scientific discourse. It is no doubt tempting to interpret Wittgenstein in this way, especially in the light of his later doctrine. But if the picture theory is accepted then it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that ethics is transcendental. And it is transcendental because it is meaningless.

All the doctrines of the Tractatus are related to Wittgenstein's idea that language has a limit. This limit is imposed by its internal structure. The internal structure of propositions shows what can and cannot be said in language. Only descriptive propositions say something about the world. So Wittgenstein's doctrines limit all significant discourse to the statements of natural science. Like his theory of the limits of language he developed a theory of logic in the Tractatus. And he deduced it from the nature of proposition. He said that all the truths of logic are empty tautology. They say nothing about the world. The very structure of tautological propositions shows that it does not describe any situation. Since only descriptive propositions assert all that can be said, so

the propositions of natural sciences assert all that can be said. This view of descriptive propositions sets a rigorous limit on what can be said. This thesis rules out as unsayable many things like religion and morality. Wittgenstein thus placed religion and ethics outside the limits of language. Because regarding the matter of religion and ethics nothing can be said in language. We are restricted by whatever language we speak. This means we are restricted by a kind of reality we can talk or think about. Thus we see that the limits of language impose corresponding limits on the reality or the world. But any talk on morality and religion implies a reference to such entities which lie outside the limit of factual discourse. If we want to say something about these matters we are to cross the limit which is impossible. Thus Wittgenstein wanted to keep them outside the world.

The natural tendency of philosophy is to cross the limits of factual discourse. And when it crosses the limit of thought it includes within its scope not only metaphysics but also religion and morality. Kant wanted that religion and morality should be separated from the system of factual knowledge. Philosophy is a critique of thought. It also includes within its scope other modes of thought, including scientific thought. But science or religion or morality cannot be regarded as critiques of other modes of

thought. Because all of them have their independent subject matter. The material on which science is based is not the same material on which morality or religion is based. So there cannot be any association between them. And all of them cannot be given the same treatment. Evidently, religion and morality are not based on the same material as that of science. So Kant wanted to preserve them by separating them from the system of factual knowledge. He thus rejected Hume's psychological theory of morality. Hume gave psychological treatment to ethical terms. His theory says that morality is based entirely on human feelings and inclinations. But Kant said that Hume's theory makes moral belief dangerously subjective. He also condemned any attempt to find a transcendental basis for religion and morality. For, according to him, it is wrong to suppose that the ideas of religion and morality have objective basis outside the system of factual discourse. Kant thought that the traditional arguments for the existence of God took the concepts of science beyond their proper limits. The traditional metaphysicians extended their concepts where they cannot be applied. As a result, their arguments met with contradictions.

According to Kant, basic truths of religion and morality cannot be known. Because they lie outside the system of factual knowledge. They are postulates which are

necessary to reflect on our moral life and thought. But to reflect on moral and religious experience of ours does not necessarily mean to go beyond factual knowledge. According to Kant, when we look within ourselves and examine our moral and religious experiences, we see beyond the limits of factual discourse. But the metaphysician of the past tried to establish morality and religion on theoretical grounds. Kant said that to establish them on theoretical grounds is a mistake. Because in that case we have to carry the concepts outside where they cannot be applied. Thus we see that Kant's theory places religion and morality in an exposed position. When it takes a psychological form it becomes dangerously subjective. But when it takes linguistic form it becomes meaningless.

According to the Tractatus, the central truths of religion and morality cannot be caught in the framework of language. But Wittgenstein said that their truths can be apprehended through language. Although what religion and morality say cannot be said in language, it can be seen, it can be indicated in language. Just as the truths of logic can be seen from the structure of tautology, so also the truths of religion and ethics can be seen from the limits of language. For the limits and

the structure have the same origin. So the way to see beyond the limits of factual discourse is not to look beyond them. It is to look back on the world of facts and see it as a whole. Wittgenstein did not place the truths of religion and ethics outside the factual discourse. In some way he placed them inside the factual discourse without being a part of it. For him, the only categorical imperative is 'live happily'. God is the factuality of facts - the inevitable fate. These are not themselves facts. But their significance can be apprehended in facts. Their significance can be seen, but cannot be said. And since they cannot be said they are nonsense. But according to him, all nonsenses are not of the same kind. He made a distinction between good and bad nonsense. Though he refused to locate religion and morality within significant discourse, he did not reject them. They are nonsense because they lack factual sense. But to say this is not to condemn them as unintelligible. It is to take first step towards understanding them.

According to Wittgenstein, philosophy, religion, morality and aesthetics - all of them lie outside the system of factual discourse. He said that philosophy has nothing else in common with the other three. For religion and morality are not critiques of any further modes of thought. So if we want to preserve them then they must be studied independently. Wittgenstein even said that the

point of the Tractatus is ethical. He believed that the more important part of the book is the part which he did not try to put into words. For him, religion and morality are more important than philosophy which he did try to put into words. From this point of view, the demarcation of the limits of factual discourse is very much important. Religion and morality can be preserved only by preventing the encroachment of science. And this is possible by plotting the limits of factual discourse. Wittgenstein's intention was that religion and ethics should be made free from the pseudo-scientific treatment.

Wittgenstein said that ethics is concerned with value and not with fact. And if anything has intrinsic value, its value cannot be contingent fact. A value is neither empirical nor contingent. Value cannot be the quality of the world. Facts have nothing to do with value. According to him, ascription of intrinsic value is a deep tautology and not an ordinary tautology. For him, happiness alone is intrinsically good. And this ascription of intrinsic value does not contain any significance about the world. Wittgenstein said that to be happy is to see the world with expanding limits. But an unhappy man is oppressed by the same limits which give rise to his frustration. Thus we see that only happy man's view of the world has intrinsic value. It follows

that there is a necessary connection between one's being happy and the limits of the world. And since intrinsic value does not exist in the world so it is neither an ordinary tautology nor a factual proposition about anything in the world. Ascription of intrinsic value is, therefore, a transcendental judgement. Wittgenstein's final conclusion is that the truth of the world cannot be expressed as a substantial thesis. It can only be shown as a deep tautology. For a happy life is self-sufficient and self-justifying. So it is not a factuality.

Wittgenstein said that there cannot be any necessary connection between will and the action willed. If there is any connection at all, it is merely an accidental correlation between one's will and what happens in the world. So he pointed out that it is not logically necessary that willing should produce the action willed. If the intrinsic value of good willing occurs to it from the action willed, then it will belong to it contingently. But intrinsic value never belongs to anything contingently. Wittgenstein thought that if anything has value, this fact cannot be accidental. The thing must have that value. It follows that the intrinsic value of good will cannot occur to it from the action willed. It appears that if any will has intrinsic value, it cannot be the psychological will. Because it will then be accidental matter. What

makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world. So the endower of the intrinsic value must be the transcendental will which is not a part of the world.

Both Kant and Wittgenstein wanted that ethics and religion should be separated from the encroachment of science. Because they have their independent materials on which they are based. So they should be dealt with separately. Both of them wanted to safeguard them from the pseudo-scientific treatment. Kant preserved them by plotting the limits of thought and Wittgenstein preserved them by plotting the limits of language. In spite of their similarity in attitude there are some differences between the ethical views of the two philosophers. According to Kant, certain ethical theses which can be applied to ordinary human experience are substantial necessary truths. Though they are necessary truths they are rooted in experience. The truths of ethics are synthetic a priori. They are a priori, but hold only within the bounds of experience. So Kant treated value as an ordinary tautology. But Wittgenstein did not like to treat value as an ordinary tautology. He gave value the status of empty tautology. And gave them transcendental treatment. Thus we see that though Kant and Wittgenstein agree that the truths of religion and morality are necessary truths, they differ in respect of the nature of necessity.

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CHAPTER - IX

CONCLUSION

Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is a metaphysical treatise par excellence. Though this book inspired anti-metaphysical movements like logical Positivism, by itself it is a well-articulated work in metaphysics. There is absolutely no doubt that the work is a high water-mark in metaphysical thinking. It is philosophically worth rewarding to dig out the metaphysical foundations of this work. Many commentators, both expositors and explanators have written on the Tractatus. But no full length discussion on the Tractatarian metaphysics has been done. Wittgenstein can be ranked among the astute metaphysicians like Plato, Kant, Hegel and Bradley. He had tremendous metaphysical insight. What distinguishes Wittgenstein from other metaphysicians is that he arrived at his metaphysical insight through logical analysis of language. This is not to suggest that other metaphysicians have not indulged in analysis of language of whatever kind. In fact, all the metaphysicians more or less have done some kind of analysis. Plato, for example, examined the prevalent categories and objects of knowledge and concluded that particulars cannot be treated as the genuine subject-matter of

knowledge. Kant critically examined the categories of knowledge and concluded that out of these only twelve are basic to knowledge. Hegel, in the similar manner, examined the different categories of knowledge and came to the conclusion that the basic category of knowledge is Being and it is dynamic in nature. Being dissatisfied with the usual categories of knowledge like space, time, causality, substance and attributes, Bradley ultimately pointed out the inadequacies of the categories and rejected them. What we wish to suggest is this: Metaphysicians have done some sort of analysis in order to arrive at their theory. However, this analysis cannot be treated as analysis of language in true sense of the term.

The intellectual milieu in which Wittgenstein was writing his Tractatus was that of mathematical logic of Whitehead and Russell. In their monumental work Principia Mathematica, Russell and Whitehead tried to explain mathematics, particularly arithmetic in terms of basic logical principles. Wittgenstein transferred this model to study and analysis of language. It could be safely said that the motive force behind this sort of analysis was to present a total picture of the world. We talk about the world by means of language. It is language which is used mainly as the medium of communication. Wittgenstein

thought that there must be some intimate relationship between language and reality. Therefore, the study of language might throw light on the nature of reality. These are some of the hidden assumptions behind the Tractatus.

We have argued out in the course of the dissertation that there is a difference between the method of metaphysics and that of science. Sciences usually employ what is known as the hypothetico-deductive method. Observation and experiment play a crucial role in sciences. A scientific theory is designed to explain facts. The acceptability or rejection of a theory in science is determined by facts. The more facts a scientific theory explains the more adequate it is. In other words, a theory is accepted or rejected in the light of facts. This explains the dynamic nature of sciences. Refutability is crucial to scientific theory. If a theory is irrefutable it is not a scientific theory at all. On the other hand, the method of metaphysics is a priori, logical or conceptual. This is, in general, the method of philosophy whether descriptive metaphysics or revisionary metaphysics. Both of them take resort to conceptual or logical method. There is a sense in which it can be said that a metaphysical theory is neither accepted nor

rejected in the light of facts. A metaphysical theory need not conform to facts. Rather facts have to conform to theory. In metaphysica facts are called upon to conform to theory. This explains the irrefutable character of metaphysics even in the face of facts.

In the contemporary period, it is Strawson who has made distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics. Descriptive metaphysics seeks to describe the actual structure of thought, whereas revisionary metaphysics seeks to present alternative structure. Kant and Aristotle may be treated as descriptive metaphysicians. Both of them tried to explore the basic structure of human thought. Kant made a successful attempt in this direction. According to Kant, there is a basic structure of human thought. Understanding is not possible without the application of categories. The categories constitute the ultimate building blocks of human thought. One can think away everything, but one cannot think away these concepts or categories. The categories are given to us. They belong to the very nature of mind. Revisionary metaphysician, on the other hand, seeks to revise or modify human thought. Somehow or other, he feels dissatisfied with the actual structure of thought. So he modifies it and presents it in lieu of the existing one. In this sense, metaphysics has a high propaganda value. Metaphysics appeals to sentiments and arouses passions.

It has action-guiding force. The history of metaphysics both eastern and western bears a testimony to it. In this sense, revisionary metaphysics comes closer to poetry and literature. The poet presents before us a picture of life and the world. Great pieces of poetry are attitude-builders. They affect our attitudes and guide us in our actions. They have great moving force. But there is a difference between poetry and metaphysics. The language of metaphysics is the language of arguments or ratiocination. The language of poetry is the language of metaphors and similies. Where the poet speaks through metaphors and similies, the revisionary metaphysician speaks through arguments. Though Wittgenstein is a metaphysician par excellence in the Tractatus, yet he does not lend himself easily to any one of these categories. His metaphysics is a unique type. There is a sense in which there are descriptive elements in his metaphysics. To the extent he accepts the truth-functional analysis of language, to that extent he conforms to the category of descriptive metaphysicians. This is true that the extensional analysis of language depicts certain form of life. As a matter of fact, in certain form of life language can be treated as truth-functional. The Language of mathematics and formal logic will conform to this. It is only in this sense that certain elements of descriptive metaphysics can be found out in the Tractatus. But as Wittgenstein

proceeds ahead he parts company with descriptive metaphysics. He presents before us a picture of the world which seems apparently to be following from his extensional view of language. One may think that the extensional view of language ultimately gives birth to such a picture of the world. But it is not so. The so-called elementary propositions are the foreign elements in extensional analysis of language. The metaphysical picture of the world that Wittgenstein presents is not a world that we deal with in the day to day commerce of life. It is a world purely revised and reconstructed. This gives the suggestion that Wittgenstein also is a revisionary metaphysician. One may point out that this is contradictory to say that Wittgenstein is both a descriptive and a revisionary metaphysician. We wish to point out that his is a unique type of metaphysics which combines the elements of both descriptive and revisionary metaphysics. Wittgenstein began with an attempt to describe the world with the help of truth-functional analysis. But ultimately he reached the conclusion that the world is indescribable.

Wittgenstein maintains that the world is the totality of facts and not of things. In this connection, we wish to maintain that this is not a factual description

of the world. As a matter of fact, there are things and events in the world. The world is populated by human beings, animals and plants. This is how we ordinarily understand the world. Nobody says that the world consists of facts. This is not as per the ordinary use. Wittgenstein stipulates this use. The Tractarian world is a world which consists of facts and not of things. Like other revisionary metaphysicians, Wittgenstein seeks to effect a change in our attitude towards the world. He asks us to treat the world as totality of facts. This is a new way of looking at old things. Metaphysicians and poets seek to present old things in a new manner. The sense of the proposition is treated as the fact in the world. But this is unacceptable. As a matter of fact, there are no facts in the world. It is from a particular type of linguistic convention that Wittgenstein derived the ontology of facts. We sometimes say that it is a fact that it rained yesterday. Raining is an event in the world. It can be a part of recorded history. This event is datable. This belongs to the spatio-temporal order. But facts are not datable. They do not belong to the spatio-temporal order. They are not part of the world at all. Wittgenstein unnecessarily assumed facts from a linguistic contingency. The sense of a proposition was treated by Wittgenstein as something existent in the

world. This has baffled philosophers for centuries together. This has compelled many philosophers to treat truth as eternal. Sometimes it has been argued that a proposition once true is always true, once false, is always false. Truth and falsity are not temporal properties like red and white. Red and white are spatio-temporal properties. As for example, we can ask when a particular table ceased to be red and became white? In other words, these events are datable. On the other hand, truth and falsity are not datable. We cannot ask such a questions as when and at what time a particular proposition began to be true or false? Our knowledge of the truth or falsity of a proposition is a datable event in our intellectual biography. One can very well ask the question, "When did you come to know the truth or falsity of a particular proposition?" But we cannot ask the question when did a particular proposition acquire truth or falsity. Our knowing something is contingent. But the truth or falsity of a proposition is not contingent. There might be truths or falsehoods which are not known to anybody. This sort of argument made philosophers identify truth with God. Since truth is eternal it can be no other than God. It led some classical sections of Indian philosophers think that truth is indestructible. Even at the time of Pralaya truth never gets destroyed. By arguing for facts and treating the world as the totality

of facts, Wittgenstein is advocating some such theory. Sometimes truth and fact are interchangeably used. As for example, we say, it is true that he has gone to Calcutta or it is a fact that he has gone to Calcutta. The phrases "It is true" and "It is a fact that" do not add any iota to the contents of the propositions which they qualify. These are used for the sake of emphasis. They do not have counterparts in the world. Wittgenstein mistakenly thought that the world is populated by facts. This is a type of Platonic ontology. As Plato's world was populated by ideas or universals, the Tractatarian world is populated by facts. What is the difference between Plato and Wittgenstein? Is Wittgenstein an idealist? In answer to these questions it can be said that Wittgenstein is an idealist. He definitely has idealistic leanings in the Tractatus. Facts are rarified beings like Platonic ideas. They are not the denizens of the world in which we live, move and have our being. They can be said to be belonging to a Platonic world. Plato made a distinction between the apparent world and the real world. Ordinary things and beings belong to this apparent world. Ideas and universals belong to the extra-mundane world. Plato made a bifurcation between this world and the other world in order to make rooms for ideas. But in Wittgenstein, there is no such

bifurcation between this world and the other world. Again, Wittgenstein claims that the world is the totality of both actual and possible facts. What meaning could possibly be given to 'possible fact'? It can be said that propositions do have infinite potentialities in certain sense. One can express different things by means of propositions. To the question "How many propositions are there?"; the answer is that it cannot be exactly numbered. This shows the infinite ways of expressing oneself. This potentiality for infinite ways of expressing oneself was misunderstood by Wittgenstein as facts in the world. If somebody has not stated anything, it is not a proposition at all. A concatenation of names can be said to form a proposition only when it enters into the form of human life. Possible fact is a logical myth. It was invented by Wittgenstein to complete the totality of facts in the world. In a formal sense, totality consists of both actual and possible facts. Wittgenstein draw the conclusion that there are possible facts too. The facts, according to Wittgenstein, consist of objects. Ultimately, the world can be said to consist of objects. But Wittgenstein does not say this. For him, only certain configurations of objects are facts. What is an object? An object is not a thing in the world. An object is the counterpart of a name in the world. There are names in the

propositions and there are objects in the facts. Wittgenstein used 'world', 'object', 'fact' and 'thing' in a very strange sense. The Wittgenstein^{ian}-world is not an ordinary world nor the Wittgensteinian objects ordinary objects.

The concept of elementary proposition has played an important role in Wittgenstein's metaphysics. Wittgenstein accepted the model of truth-functional analysis presented in the Principia Mathematica of Whitehead and Russell. Whitehead and Russell tried to present the skeletal features of human thought in the Principia Mathematics. This attempt is not new in philosophy. Leibnitz, too, embarked upon such a plan. He tried to design a universal language for all thought and communication. This philosophical programme was literally carried out by Whitehead and Russell. Wittgenstein subscribed to this view to some extent. He maintains in the Tractatus that what can be said can be said clearly. 'Clarity' possessed him for sometime. Both Whitehead and Russell thought that the world is describable in terms of simple, unequivocal atomic propositions. The language of day to day commerce of life is full of vagueness and ambiguities. The real language lies hidden behind this ordinary language. So they devised a method to eliminate this vagueness and ambiguities

from the sphere of language. Language has to be sterilized. Wittgenstein, too, carried on this programme to some extent in the Tractatus. If we apply truth-functional analysis of language, we come across three types of compound or molecular propositions. They are tautologies, contradictions and contingents. Tautologies and contradictions are not propositions worth the name. They do not speak anything. That is why they do not speak anything about the world. They are degenerate propositions. They are scaffoldings of the world. The genuine propositions are the contingent ones. They are the propositions which describe the world. The propositions of sciences belong to this category.

A truth-function is a compound proposition whose truth-value is determined by the truth-value of its constituent propositions. If 'A and B' is a compound proposition, 'A' and 'B' are its components. Russell treated these components of a compound proposition as a limiting case of truth-functional analysis. The atomic propositions, for Russell, are the ones which are devoid of vagueness and ambiguities. They constitute the ultimate building blocks of human thought. Wittgenstein accepted the truth-functional analysis but he did not treat the components of the compound propositions as elementary propositions. An elementary proposition,

according to Wittgenstein, consists of names. Names are mere pointers or indicators. A logical proper name is distinguished from a grammatical proper name. A grammatical proper name must have some descriptive content. To use Russell's word, a grammatical proper name is a truncated description. Wittgenstein was always unwilling to give an example of an elementary proposition. An elementary proposition, it can be said in this connection, was not the result of a discovery. It was a logical demand of a particular type of analysis. Therefore, Wittgenstein was hesitant to give an example of the elementary proposition. Had he treated the components of a compound proposition as elementary in nature he could have easily given an instance of it. His persistent reluctance to give an example of an elementary proposition goes to prove that Wittgenstein did not treat the components of a compound proposition as elementary ones. The components of a compound proposition could be said to be descriptive of the world. To this extent, Wittgenstein believed that the world can be described. But the elementary proposition cannot describe the world. An elementary proposition consists of names and nothing else. A name is just an indicator. It is like the Euclidian point which has only existence but no dimension. It can be said in this connection that Wittgenstein's name is a thought-construct. It is a Euclidian

counterpart of a point. The way Euclid defines a point nobody can come across it in the actual world. An elementary proposition is a string of these names. What can we do with these propositions? Can we use these propositions to talk about the world to describe the world? Wittgenstein rightly points out that these propositions cannot be used to talk about the world. In this connection, we wish to point out that a proposition is not a proposition if it does not have descriptive content. An elementary proposition does not have descriptive content. Can it be used to talk about the world? No. The elementary propositions show the structure of the world. At this stage only both language and reality meet. The structure of reality can be read-off from the structure of language and vice versa. Both language and reality can be said to have isomorphic structure. There is a complete isomorphism between language and reality. The multiplicity in elementary proposition corresponds to the multiplicity in the world. Wittgenstein treats language as a picture. What sort of picture language is? There can be different types of pictures. A sculpture, a painting, a piece of photograph are instances of pictures. These are all physical pictures. Language cannot be treated as picture of this type. Wittgenstein treats language as a logical picture of reality. At the stage of elementary proposition both language and reality meet. This picturing

cannot be put into words. That is why Wittgenstein asks us to remain silent. Whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent. The relationship between language and world cannot be described in terms of language. This is a type of idealism which Wittgenstein advocates in the Tractatus. This is reminiscent of Germanic idealism. It can be said in this connection that Wittgenstein is continuing the Germanic idealistic tradition which treats both thought and reality as different aspects of the same fact. The Kantian-Hegelian elements are clearly visible in Wittgenstein's metaphysics. But both Kant and Hegel claim that the world is describable; whereas for Wittgenstein the world is ultimately indescribable. Kant wanted to give a metaphysical defence or justification to Newtonian physics. The Kantian world is really a Newtonian world amenable to human understanding. There is an order in the world and it is ultimately describable. According to Kant, the world is not only describable in terms of thought-categories but it has a limit. He sets a limit to the world by distinguishing between phenomena and noumena. It is noumenon which sets a limit to the phenomenon. Though there is an eternal impulse to transcend the boundary of thought and communication, yet Kant warns us that any transgression of the boundaries of thought will ultimately result in antinomies. The noumenon is unknown and unknowable.

In Wittgenstein, one comes across some such elements when he says that ultimately the world is indescribable. It can be said that for Wittgenstein, the world is ultimately a noumenon. We can humbly suggest that this indescribability is Schopenhauerean in nature.

An elementary proposition is said to be consisting of names. Names are said to have meanings. Propositions do not have meanings. They have only sense. The meaning of a name is what it refers to. Objects are referred to by names. So objects are the meanings of names. This might look very strange on the surface. But these are some of the logical outcomes of his basic thesis. Wittgenstein uses both names, meanings and objects in a very strange sense. Ordinarily we do not say that an object is the meaning of a name. Even if we sometimes indicate things in the world by means of words, yet we do not say that the meanings of these words are the objects referred to by them. As the elementary propositions were the demand of a particular type of analysis, similarly names and objects were logical demands too. If a proposition is devoid of all sorts of description what remains of it in the end? It can have only pointers. And these pointers are names. They can only indicate objects in the world. This is the logical corollary of Wittgenstein's

doctrine of names and meanings. As the Euclidian points do not describe the world, they are just theoretical construct, similar is the case with Wittgensteinian names. Wittgenstein was very much obsessed with 'philosophical eideography'. In other words, he thought very much in the manner of Leibnitz, Whitehead and Russell that a universal language will solve all philosophical problems. Leibnitz tried to construct such a universal language. Russell and Whitehead presented the model of such a language in Principia Mathematica. Wittgenstein, through truth-functional analysis of language, tried to discover such a language. But ultimately this ideal language could not be discovered. It was the demand of a particular analysis employed on ordinary language. Analysis for Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, means breaking the complex into the simples. Analysis means decomposition. The complex propositions are decomposed into simpler ones. The logic of decomposition leads to the assumption of unbreakable units. If we go on breaking a complex proposition without assuming simples we will go in the direction of ad infinitum. The idea of simple has preoccupied the attention of philosophers from time immemorial. Not only Wittgenstein but philosophers like Kanada, Locke and Hume have tried to find out simples. The idea of simple ultimately compelled Wittgenstein to plead for names. By introducing the

notion of ideal language, Wittgenstein tried to transform our attitude. We have already pointed out that poets and metaphysicians very often try to transform and transmute the existing picture of the world. In this sense Wittgenstein is a metaphysician par excellence.

It is sometimes claimed by some scholars that Wittgenstein first had a vision of the world as the totality of facts and then from this he derived the notion of elementary proposition and ideal language. But we wish to point out that it is of very little importance in philosophy which doctrine came first and which came next. The fact remains that the theory of language and the theory of the world are intimately connected. Wittgenstein presents a surprising case of how metaphysical theories can be set up through analysis of language. A metaphysician concerns himself with study of such concepts and these concepts are expressed by means of language. Wittgenstein thought that a philosophical study of language might throw light on the nature of the world. Wittgenstein accepted analysis as a method of philosophising in the Tractatus. He accepted the truth-functional analysis of language as means of philosophising. But he did not end up in analysis. Rather, through analysis of language, he presented a vision of the world. Like many other metaphysicians, Wittgenstein tried to critically examine the logic of such

formal concepts as 'world', 'object' and 'thing'. A philosopher or a metaphysician studies very very general concept. That is why metaphysics or philosophy is called conceptual study. Wittgenstein, through this sort of conceptual study ultimately arrived at a picture of the world. In this respect, he resembles Kant. Kant, through his study of "human understanding" ultimately arrived at a particular picture of the world. The categories determine the picture of the world. These categories are obtained through a philosophical analysis of the apparatus of human understanding. Kant gave us a warning for transgressing the boundaries of the world. Wittgenstein gave us a warning for transgressing the boundaries of communication and speech. Human communication or speech, according to Wittgenstein, contains its own limitations. To use a Hegelian terminology, every positive concept contains in germinal form the seeds of self-annihilation. The limit of communication is the incommunicable.

Wittgenstein treats the contingent propositions as the only genuine ones. Tautologies and contradictions are degenerate propositions, for the simple reason that they do not speak anything. They do not have any descriptive content. That is why tautologies and contradictions are treated as scaffoldings of the world. What about

value-judgements, aesthetic judgements? Wittgenstein puts them beyond the world. How do we understand it? Wittgenstein is not a naturalist. He does not treat value-concepts as descriptive. He does not explain values in terms of fact. He does not even maintain that values are the expression of emotions. In other words, Wittgenstein is neither a naturalist nor an empiricist. He is a Kantian. As Kant puts values in the sphere of noumenon similarly, Wittgenstein argues that ethics and aesthetics fall beyond the world. This brings Wittgenstein and Kant very much close to each other. Value-concepts have their own logic. The language of description is different from the language of valuation. In evaluating something we do not describe anything. In fact, in evaluating we show our preferences etc.. The positivists tried either to dismiss the language of religion, ethics, aesthetics altogether or tried to explain them in terms of facts. Wittgenstein is a non-positivist. He does not do either. This view of Wittgenstein contains, in germinal form, his later view that there are innumerable forms of language-game.

We have not tried to find out the relationship between the earlier Wittgenstein and the later one i.e. between the Tractatus and the Investigations. There are

diverse views regarding them. One view is that the two works are poles apart. There is no relation between the Tractatus and the Investigations. The Philosophical Investigations, is a rejection of the Tractatus. The other view is that there ~~are~~ an affinity, a conceptual closeness between the two works. However, we have not indulged in this sort of dispute. But the fact remains that there are some textual evidences even in the Tractatus which can be accommodated in the Philosophical Investigations.

It is interesting to note that Wittgenstein's two works inspired two diverse philosophical movements: (i) Logical Positivism; (ii) Conceptual or Linguistic analysis. But Wittgenstein never associated himself officially with any of these movements. The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is not a treatise on logical positivism. Wittgenstein was always averse to positivism except some casual mention of certain terms which may be interpreted as having affinity with the principle of verification. The Tractatus does not contain any reference, direct or indirect, to the verification theory of meaning. Wittgenstein is a non-positivist. He is not an empiricist. He may be treated as a rationalist for the simple reason that he has accepted logical analysis of language as the chief method of philosophising. Further, he is not a

realist. He is an idealist of the Kantian type. Even though Wittgenstein worked and taught in England, British Empiricism, the official philosophy of Great Britain had no impact on him. Rather we come across the Germanic idealism in the Tractatus. The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is a metaphysical treatise par excellence and Wittgenstein is a metaphysician of high rank. He can be placed with those classical metaphysicians such as Plato, Kant, Hegel, Bradley and others.

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