

CONCEPT OF LANGUAGE GAME  
IN  
*WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY*

By

Kalipada Mohanta

Philosophy Department  
School of Social Sciences



SUBMITTED  
IN  
FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT OF THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

To



THE NORTH EASTERN HILL UNIVERSITY  
SHILLONG-793 014  
INDIA

DECEMBER, 1984

This work undertakes a critical exposition and examination of the concept of language game as envisaged by Wittgenstein in his classic Philosophical Investigations.

In the first chapter an attempt is made to delineate the importance of language as a unique possession of man and the philosopher's concern with language in the analysis of concepts and meaning. All cases of communication presuppose the trichotomy of the speaker, hearer and the medium. Language as a medium is a carrier of ideas, concepts or meaning. Philosophy unlike other social and natural sciences is essentially a conceptual enquiry. Since concepts are nothing without the language in which they are couched, philosophers in their attempt to analyse concepts, concern themselves with language. Concepts are the subject matter of philosophical analysis: clarity about concepts is the goal of philosophical investigation. However, apart from analysis of concepts, the philosopher also builds metaphysical systems. The relationship between philosophy as an essentially analytic activity and as an activity consisting of constructing metaphysical systems is an interesting one. This relationship is explored in the light of Wittgenstein's views in the Philosophical Investigations.

In the second chapter there is a detailed discussion about language as an instrument to perform various speech acts. Man undertakes various activities to thrive and grow. Using a language is one of the most important activities, nay the most important activity, for it distinguishes man from other species. Human needs are multifarious and man seeks to perform various acts with language. A distinction has been drawn (in line with Austin's classification) among locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts which consists in saying something, doing something in saying something and doing something by saying something respectively. The distinction between the different aspects of a speech act viz., phonetic, phatic and rhetic has also been considered. This distinction tends to show that though language essentially consists of sound or the phonetic units, the meaningful combination of phonemes into meaning units e.g., morpheme or words is possible through the rules of syntax. But the transition from the phatic act to rhetic act consists not only in conforming to the rules of syntax but also taking note of the semantic rules. Wittgenstein's views about language game throw light on the different aspects of the meaning of an expression. The meaningful use of language not only requires that it should be

syntactically sound but also that expressions must be employed against the background of appropriate non-linguistic conditions. Language is context bound. Hence the use and understanding of an expression cannot be divorced from considerations relating to the semantic conditions.

The third chapter would contain a detailed analysis of the concept of language game and its intimate relation with the idea of a "form of life." Wittgenstein's use of the term 'language game' is highly suggestive. A game is defined by a set of rules. The rules are not only constitutive of games but also are regulative in so far as they determine their very conduct of the game. Similarly the use of language is rule governed. As the rules of games differ from game to game, similarly the rules that determine the meaningful employment of an expression in a descriptive language game may not prove valid in a religious or moral language game. But what is of paramount importance is, playing a game involves a sense of participation. Wittgenstein observes that using a language also amounts to participating in a mode of life. This follows from his recognition that language is intimately wedded to a form of life. In other words the legitimate use of an expression presupposes one's knowledge of not only the rules of syntax

by which the words are joined into a meaningful combination but also employing them in appropriate circumstances. One can clearly visualize a possibility of a parrot or a pet animal uttering certain sounds that are syntactically sound but that would not entitle one to say that they are using language. It is because of the fact that in case of the parrot or the pet animal the semantic conditions appropriate to the use of the expression are conspicuous in their absence. Hence Wittgenstein remarks - "To use a language is to enter into a mode of life," "If a lion could talk we could not understand him." This led him to advocate the use theory of meaning. The meaning of a word is the way it is used. Language is context bound. To find the meaning of an expression is to see how it functions in the language game in which it occurs. Wittgenstein shows with characteristic force that the chief mistake of philosophers consist in treating concepts in abstraction, that is, apart from the context of their occurrence.

The fourth chapter would be devoted to show that the problem of Essence in one form relates to the problem of classification of terms. In this connection we have tried to demonstrate the logical circularity involved in the platonic version of the doctrine of universals. The points of agreement and difference between Bambrough and Wittgen-

stein is thoroughly examined and we have tried to maintain that the Wittgenstenian solution to the problem is the most cogent.

The Fifth chapter contains in a nutshell Wittgenstein's views on the nature, genesis and solution of philosophical problems. It is in the 20th century that philosophers began to realise self-consciously the importance of language and its bearing on philosophical issues. Wittgenstein in particular, is responsible perhaps more than any other philosopher in giving what may be called the linguistic turn to philosophy. Philosophical problems, he observes, are of the nature of paradoxes and muddles, but are wrongly felt as problems. They arise with the philosopher's attempt to treat concepts in abstraction or isolation from the language games in which they occur. He traces the problems to a general feature of human mind that is the craving for unity which consists in finding similarity beneath dissimilarities. This leads one to assimilate words of different logical categories into one category because of their apparent grammatical similarities. For example, all nouns are taken as standing for substance and all verbs standing for functions. Wittgenstein therefore warns us not to be deceived by the grammatical form of expression, but to unearth the semantic conditions by looking into the actual ways in which it functions. The metaphysician in his attempt to build systems is not only misled by the

craving for unity to form pictures but his analysis is influenced by the tacit suggestions of the pictures. He is held captive as it were. Thus metaphysical problems arise in taking words beyond their context and therefore can be solved or rather resolved by bringing back expressions from their metaphysical use to their actual use. That again calls for commanding a clear view as to the functions of words in their different language games.

In the sixth chapter we attempt to argue that Wittgenstein is an idealist. In both the Tractatus and the Investigations he has developed his own form of idealism. Wittgenstein as a matter of fact continues the Germanic tradition of transcendental idealism as distinguished from epistemological and metaphysical idealism. Both epistemological and metaphysical idealisms are reductionist in nature.

Wittgenstein is an idealist in the Kantian sense. Idealism in Wittgenstein's work is there in a more or less implicit form. One has to dig out the idealistic stand point from the Tractatus as well as the Philosophical Investigations. The Tractarian world is a totality of facts. These facts correspond to elementary propositions. Facts again for Wittgenstein are both possible and actual. The ideal language in the Tractatus is not constructed rather it is discovered by a particular type of analysis. The structure of the world is reflected in the structure of the language. Like Kant,

Wittgenstein sets a limit to our meaningful discourse. Thus Wittgenstein claims the limits of my language are the limits of my world. But this is not a solipsistic position. He is not a subjective idealist. The subject here is not reduced to an object of knowledge. The 'I' here is treated in the manner of Kant's transcendental self. This is a position which is usually accepted by transcendental idealists.

On the other hand Wittgenstein treats the world as a totality of facts but not of things. And these facts are configurations of objects. But how did Wittgenstein arrive at this? Through an extensional analysis of language. He treats language as truth functional. In the process of analysis he reached what he calls elementary propositions. The elementary propositions in their turn picture facts. But what is the nature of this world without the elementary propositions. As the world for Kant cannot be made intelligible without the categories so also for Wittgenstein the world is unintelligible without elementary propositions. The elementary propositions in a way give a shape to the world. This is an idealistic position.

In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein treats language as a prism through which we look at the world. Without concepts the world is unintelligible. This is

really a Kantian position. Knowledge is conceptual. Wittgenstein would say it is through the networks of language games the world is intelligible to us. The difference between Kant and Wittgenstein is that Kant believed in a fixed number of categories whereas Wittgenstein did not believe in the fixity of categories.

Language, says Wittgenstein, cannot be understood without relating it to human contexts and situations. Wittgenstein in the manner of F.H. Bradley treats the world as an organic whole. This in short is the cardinal feature of idealism. One of the major themes of idealism is that the world is a system of ideas or concepts. These ideas are not subjective rather they are objective in nature. Hegel points out that the world is an externalization of ideas. Now the question is what is the nature of these ideas? Are the ideas context bound, language bound or are they independent of language and context? Answers to these questions open up new dimensions. Thinkers like Sapir and Whorf would argue that language not only determines reality but the world view as well. The structure of language and the structure of thought are intimately connected. Thus the views of Sapir and Whorf tie reality to specific languages.

To interpret Wittgenstein as a Sapirian is to commit a mistake. It is true that knowledge is conceptual and category based but these categories are not contingent upon specific languages. These categories and concepts are independent of any specific languages which embody them. In this sense Wittgenstein may be characterized as Kantian but not Sapirian. The twelve categories of Kant and seven categories of Kanada belong to this type. There is a sense in which these categories can be regarded as the bed rock of human thought and knowledge. These categories can be termed as basic, primary and fundamental categories. These primary categories are not language bound, context bound or culture bound. They are translinguistic and transcultural.

But accepting the Sapirian hypothesis one may argue that one cultural and linguistic group in principle cannot understand another for the simple reason that both of them have two distinct and different linguistic categories. But this position will not be acceptable to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein surely believes in infinite and innumerable number of language games and forms of life. The idea of linguistic privacy and solipsism goes against the very idea of language games. Language games are public. To say that language is a

'game' is to say that it is governed by rules, and to say that it is governed by rules is to say that others can understand it in principle. It is true that certain cultural categories prevalent in one group cannot easily be made intelligible to others. There might be difficulties and obstructions on the way but it does not go to prove linguistic and cultural solipsism.

In conclusion we shall dwell upon the concept of 'language game' by trying to dispel some of the confusions that might centre around the analogy of 'game.' The use of the term 'game' in the compound expression 'language game' is metaphorical. ~~As~~ As the very logic of metaphor suggests it is used to illustrate or highlight a particular point at hand and hence there remains a considerable risk in reaching it beyond a particular point. Wittgenstein likens games to language to highlight the functional and public character of language. Function is used here in a very general sense that is to say that to use language is to perform a speech act. By construing language as public Wittgenstein would like to stress the open texture of meaning and intelligibility. That is to say that a linguistic activity is in principle intelligible. Its significance, import and meaning can be appreciated by others, this may be a very

difficult task but not an impossibility. There is also an important respect in which language is different from a game. Game is played according to certain fixed rules. The players only conform to them. Hence there is no room for creativity. In other words one can say that a player plays well but it would be semantically odd to say that he plays creatively.

The thesis concludes with some remarks about the central importance of what I have called idealistic strand in Wittgenstein's thought in the understanding of man - man, - that is, as the subject of study of the science of man.


100 100  
 Acc 102475  
 Dec 11/11/92  
 Dr  
 Cl  
 Sub  
 Jan  
 100 100

CONCEPT OF LANGUAGE GAME  
IN  
*WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY*

By

Kalipada Mohanta

Philosophy Department  
School of Social Sciences



SUBMITTED  
IN  
FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT OF THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

To



THE NORTH EASTERN HILL UNIVERSITY  
SHILLONG-793 014  
INDIA

DECEMBER, 1984

Phil

DS  
149.94  
MOH

101742  
3/1/86  
172/186



Phone : 3890  
Grams : NEHU

# North-Eastern Hill University

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

Mayurbhanj House  
Nongthymmai  
Shillong-793001.

Certified that the subject matter of this thesis is the record of work done by Shri Kalipada Mohanta, that the contents of this thesis did not form a basis of the award of any previous degree to him, or, to the best of my knowledge, to anybody else, and that the thesis had not been submitted by him for any research degree in any other University.

In habit and character Shri Kalipada Mohanta is a fit and proper person for the degree of Ph.D.

*Mrinal Miri*

( Mrinal Miri )  
Supervisor

## CONTENTS

	Page
Acknowledgement	... (i)
Introduction	... 1 - 12
CHAPTER - I Language and Philosophy	... 13 - 23
CHAPTER - II ✓ Language and Speech Acts	... 24 - 35
CHAPTER - III ✓ Language Game and Forms of Life	... 36 - 59
CHAPTER - IV ✓ Language and Essence	... 60 - 74
CHAPTER - V ✓ Philosophical Problems: Their Genesis and Solution	... 75 - 96
CHAPTER - VI Wittgenstein and Idealism	... 97 - 119
Conclusion	... 120 - 128
Bibliography	... 129 - 136
Bio Data	... 137

(i)

### Acknowledgement

It is my unique privilege to have had Professor Mrinal Miri, Department of Philosophy, School of Social Sciences, North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong, as my Supervisor. His inspiration, guidance and goodwill was always with me, throughout the period in which I was engaged in the writing of the dissertation. I remain indebted to him for his invaluable suggestions which went a long way in shaping the dissertation.

I am thankful to Dr (Mrs.) Sujata Miri, Reader, Department of Philosophy, North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong, who encouraged me at every stage of my work.

I owe a special debt to my teachers Shree Ramesh Chandra Pattnayak and Shree Bijoy Kumar Mohapatra who were the silent inspirers in my entire academic career.

I would also like to record my special thanks to all my research mates, other friends and well wishers for their keen cooperation and help.

I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to Mr Joseph F. Khongbuh for his diligence in typing out this dissertation.

And above all, my affectionate thanks go to my mother, brothers and sisters who have sent me in undertaking a project which has been both greatly challenging and satisfying.

Shillong

Dated 5th December, 1984



(Kalipada Mohanta)

This work undertakes a critical exposition and examination of the concept of language game as envisaged by Wittgenstein in his classic Philosophical Investigations.

In the first chapter an attempt is made to delineate the importance of language as a unique possession of man and the philosopher's concern with language in the analysis of concepts and meaning. All cases of communication presuppose the trichotomy of the speaker, hearer and the medium. Language as a medium is a carrier of ideas, concepts or meaning. Philosophy unlike other social and natural sciences is essentially a conceptual enquiry. Since concepts are nothing without the language in which they are couched, philosophers in their attempt to analyse concepts, concern themselves with language. Concepts are the subject matter of philosophical analysis; clarity about concepts is the goal of philosophical investigation. However, apart from analysis of concepts, the philosopher also builds metaphysical systems. The relationship between philosophy as an essentially analytic activity and as an activity consisting of constructing metaphysical systems is an interesting one. This relationship is explored in the light of Wittgenstein's views in the Philosophical Investigations.

In the second chapter there is a detailed discussion about language as an instrument to perform various speech acts. Man undertakes various activities to thrive and grow. Using a language is one of the most important activities, nay the most important activity, for it distinguishes man from other species. Human needs are multifarious and man seeks to perform various acts with language. A distinction has been drawn (in line with Austin's classification) among locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts which consists in saying something, doing something in saying something and doing something by saying something respectively. The distinction between the different aspects of a speech act viz., phonetic, phatic and rhetic has also been considered. This distinction tends to show that though language essentially consists of sound or the phonetic units, the meaningful combination of phonemes into meaning units e.g., morpheme or words is possible through the rules of syntax. But the transition from the phatic act to rhetic act consists not only in conforming to the rules of syntax but also taking note of the semantic rules. Wittgenstein's views about language game throw light on the different aspects of the meaning of an expression. The meaningful use of language not only requires that it should be

syntactically sound but also that expressions must be employed against the background of appropriate non-linguistic conditions. Language is context bound. Hence the use and understanding of an expression cannot be divorced from considerations relating to the semantic conditions.

The third chapter would contain a detailed analysis of the concept of language game and its intimate relation with the idea of a "form of life." Wittgenstein's use of the term 'language game' is highly suggestive. A game is defined by a set of rules. The rules are not only constitutive of games but also are regulative in so far as they determine their very conduct of the game. Similarly the use of language is rule governed. As the rules of games differ from game to game, similarly the rules that determine the meaningful employment of an expression in a descriptive language game may not prove valid in a religious or moral language game. But what is of paramount importance is, playing a game involves a sense of participation. Wittgenstein observes that using a language also amounts to participating in a mode of life. This follows from his recognition that language is intimately wedded to a form of life. In other words the legitimate use of an expression presupposes one's knowledge of not only the rules of syntax

by which the words are joined into a meaningful combination but also employing them in appropriate circumstances. One can clearly visualize a possibility of a parrot or a pet animal uttering certain sounds that are syntactically sound but that would not entitle one to say that they are using language. It is because of the fact that in case of the parrot or the pet animal the semantic conditions appropriate to the use of the expression are conspicuous in their absence. Hence Wittgenstein remarks - "To use a language is to enter into a mode of life," "If a lion could talk we could not understand him." This led him to advocate the use theory of meaning. The meaning of a word is the way it is used. Language is context bound. To find the meaning of an expression is to see how it functions in the language game in which it occurs. Wittgenstein shows with characteristic force that the chief mistake of philosophers consist in treating concepts in abstraction, that is, apart from the context of their occurrence.

The fourth chapter would be devoted to show that the problem of Essence in one form relates to the problem of classification of terms. In this connection we have tried to demonstrate the logical circularity involved in the platonic version of the doctrine of universals. The points of agreement and difference between Bambrough and Wittgen-

stein is thoroughly examined and we have tried to maintain that the Wittgenstenian solution to the problem is the most cogent.

The Fifth chapter contains in a nutshell Wittgenstein's views on the nature, genesis and solution of philosophical problems. It is in the 20th century that philosophers began to realise self-consciously the importance of language and its bearing on philosophical issues. Wittgenstein in particular, is responsible perhaps more than any other philosopher in giving what may be called the linguistic turn to philosophy. Philosophical problems, he observes, are of the nature of paradoxes and muddles, but are wrongly felt as problems. They arise with the philosopher's attempt to treat concepts in abstraction or isolation from the language games in which they occur. He traces the problems to a general feature of human mind that is the craving for unity which consists in finding similarity beneath dissimilarities. This leads one to assimilate words of different logical categories into one category because of their apparent grammatical similarities. For example, all nouns are taken as standing for substance and all verbs standing for functions. Wittgenstein therefore warns us not to be deceived by the grammatical form of expression, but to unearth the semantic conditions by looking into the actual ways in which it functions. The metaphysician in his attempt to build systems is not only misled by the

craving for unity to form pictures but his analysis is influenced by the tacit suggestions of the pictures. He is held captive as it were. Thus metaphysical problems arise in taking words beyond their context and therefore can be solved or rather resolved by bringing back expressions from their metaphysical use to their actual use. That again calls for commanding a clear view as to the functions of words in their different language games.

In the sixth chapter we attempt to argue that Wittgenstein is an idealist. In both the Tractatus and the Investigations he has developed his own form of idealism. Wittgenstein as a matter of fact continues the Germanic tradition of transcendental idealism as distinguished from epistemological and metaphysical idealism. Both epistemological and metaphysical idealisms are reductionist in nature.

Wittgenstein is an idealist in the Kantian sense. Idealism in Wittgenstein's work is there in a more or less implicit form. One has to dig out the idealistic stand point from the Tractatus as well as the Philosophical Investigations. The Tractarian world is a totality of facts. These facts correspond to elementary propositions. Facts again for Wittgenstein are both possible and actual. The ideal language in the Tractatus is not constructed rather it is discovered by a particular type of analysis. The structure of the world is reflected in the structure of the language. Like Kant,

Wittgenstein sets a limit to our meaningful discourse. Thus Wittgenstein claims the limits of my language are the limits of my world. But this is not a solipsistic position. He is not a subjective idealist. The subject here is not reduced to an object of knowledge. The 'I' here is treated in the manner of Kant's transcendental self. This is a position which is usually accepted by transcendental idealists.

On the other hand Wittgenstein treats the world as a totality of facts but not of things. And these facts are configurations of objects. But how did Wittgenstein arrive at this? Through an extensional analysis of language. He treats language as truth functional. In the process of analysis he reached what he calls elementary propositions. The elementary propositions in their turn picture facts. But what is the nature of this world without the elementary propositions. As the world for Kant cannot be made intelligible without the categories so also for Wittgenstein the world is unintelligible without elementary propositions. The elementary propositions in a way give a shape to the world. This is an idealistic position.

In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein treats language as a prism through which we look at the world. Without concepts the world is unintelligible. This is

really a Kantian position. Knowledge is conceptual. Wittgenstein would say it is through the networks of language games the world is intelligible to us. The difference between Kant and Wittgenstein is that Kant believed in a fixed number of categories whereas Wittgenstein did not believe in the fixity of categories.

Language, says Wittgenstein, cannot be understood without relating it to human contexts and situations. Wittgenstein in the manner of F.H. Bradley treats the world as an organic whole. This in short is the cardinal feature of idealism. One of the major themes of idealism is that the world is a system of ideas or concepts. These ideas are not subjective rather they are objective in nature. Hegel points out that the world is an externalization of ideas. Now the question is what is the nature of these ideas? Are the ideas context bound, language bound or are they independent of language and context? Answers to these questions open up new dimensions. Thinkers like Sapir and Whorf would argue that language not only determines reality but the world view as well. The structure of language and the structure of thought are intimately connected. Thus the views of Sapir and Whorf tie reality to specific languages.

To interpret Wittgenstein as a Sapirian is to commit a mistake. It is true that knowledge is conceptual and category based but these categories are not contingent upon specific languages. These categories and concepts are independent of any specific languages which embody them. In this sense Wittgenstein may be characterized as Kantian but not Sapirian. The twelve categories of Kant and seven categories of Kanada belong to this type. There is a sense in which these categories can be regarded as the bed rock of human thought and knowledge. These categories can be termed as basic, primary and fundamental categories. These primary categories are not language bound, context bound or culture bound. They are translinguistic and transcultural.

But accepting the Sapirian hypothesis one may argue that one cultural and linguistic group in principle cannot understand another for the simple reason that both of them have two distinct and different linguistic categories. But this position will not be acceptable to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein surely believes in infinite and innumerable number of language games and forms of life. The idea of linguistic privacy and solipsism goes against the very idea of language games. Language games are public. To say that language is a

'game' is to say that it is governed by rules, and to say that it is governed by rules is to say that others can understand it in principle. It is true that certain cultural categories prevalent in one group cannot easily be made intelligible to others. There might be difficulties and obstructions on the way but it does not go to prove linguistic and cultural solipsism.

In conclusion we shall dwell upon the concept of 'language game' by trying to dispel some of the confusions that might centre around the analogy of 'game.' The use of the term 'game' in the compound expression 'language game' is metaphorical. As the very logic of metaphor suggests it is used to illustrate or highlight a particular point at hand and hence there remains a considerable risk in reaching it beyond a particular point. Wittgenstein likens games to language to highlight the functional and public character of language. Function is used here in a very general sense that is to say that to use language is to perform a speech act. By construing language as public Wittgenstein would like to stress the open texture of meaning and intelligibility. That is to say that a linguistic activity is in principle intelligible. Its significance, import and meaning can be appreciated by others, this may be a very


difficult task but not an impossibility. There is also an important respect in which language is different from a game. Game is played according to certain fixed rules. The players only conform to them. Hence there is no room for creativity. In other words one can say that a player plays well but it would be semantically odd to say that he plays creatively.

The thesis concludes with some remarks about the central importance of what I have called idealistic strand in Wittgenstein's thought in the understanding of man - man, - that is, as the subject of study of the science of man.

CHAPTER - I  
LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY

Man is considered to be the most superior of all living beings that inhabit this planet. In some quarters, it is believed that man and other living beings have been evolving from a common parental stock and the former has by-passed the latter in course of evolution. All human achievements and all that passes by the name of human excellence have been attributed to two fundamental peculiarities in them i.e., the capacity to use language and the capacity to make tools. Man unlike most other animate beings is gregarious in nature, and this basic tendency to live in groups and form society calls for a medium by which one could establish communication with others.

Though the primitive man, in the absence of a language might be communicating through gestures and postures, the evolution of language marks a fundamental departure in the evolution of human culture and civilization. Language is a set of conventional symbols, written or spoken that signify certain ideas or feelings. Though the reality, the ideas, and the experiences might be the same, they could be expressed through different languages as there could be different conventional signs to denote the same object and signify the same idea. Hence there is an obvious difference between ideas and feelings on



the one hand, forms of linguistic expressions on the other. The form consists of sets of symbols or words combined by certain syntactical rules and the content consists of the ideas or the concepts. To think is to have ideas or to conceptualize. It would appear that it is one thing to have experiences or ideas and quite another to communicate them through symbols. In other words, in order to make our experiences public that is to communicate them - one has to employ certain symbols in the accepted framework of conventional rules.

Philosophers down the ages have devoted themselves to the study of reality as a whole. They have addressed themselves to the most fundamental questions pertaining to man and reality in general. Unlike a layman or a scientist, philosophers have addressed themselves to the most general questions like what is ultimately real? What is matter? What is mind? etc. The peculiarity of these questions is that they are non-factual and of a most general kind. For when a philosopher seeks to answer the question "what is matter?", he is hardly interested in the analysis of particular pieces of material objects (in which of course a physicist might be interested), rather he is interested in knowing what matter

is as such. In other words, the philosopher is wedded to the task of drawing the logical geography of the concept of matter; which again consists in analysing the concept of matter, defining, finding its relation with other neighbouring concepts and thereby removing the ambiguity pertaining to the concept. This is how philosophers have thrown light on conceptual issues. Here it is significant to point out that a philosophical study of matter does not involve the study of the word 'matter' but the concept of "matter." The idea, or the concept of matter becomes meaningful only when it is related to a corresponding linguistic symbol, that is, the expression 'matter.' Hence the analysis of the concept of matter necessarily involves the use of language. Thus the conceptual analysis boils down to the analysis of the expressions that signify the concept. Of course, a philosopher is not interested in language as a linguist or a grammarian is interested in. Linguists study language as a set of data. They study language from the point of view of syntax, semantics and phonology. The syntactical rules of language concern the principles that permit a given combination of words or symbols to be meaningful and enables a speaker to generate a new set of expressions. This makes language creative and elastic. In semantics,

on the other hand, one studies the meaning components and the factors that have a bearing on them. Speaking involves articulation of sounds and in phonetics, one studies the genesis, and nature of proper articulation. This clearly goes to show that a linguist is concerned with matters of fact. But the philosopher studies words and expressions to the extent they signify concepts and ideas. Hence the philosopher's concern with language is indirect. Of course in analysis of the concepts, the philosopher has to take cognizance of the semantical and the syntactical rules governing language.

Thus philosophical activity, in short, consists in the conceptual investigation of reality as a whole. But any and every concept is not of philosophical importance. For example, there is hardly any philosophical speculation as to the concept of hair, dirt etc. It is only certain fundamental, basic and most general concepts that baffle human intelligence that philosophers are interested in. For example, the "problem of universals" or class essences was discussed by Plato and Aristotle in the past, and the contemporary philosophers also debate about issues pertaining to the concept of universal, with equal freshness. In natural science, we find

that one theory becomes obsolete with the emergence of another on the strength of the adequacy with which they explain facts. But in philosophy problems never become outdated. The Wittgenstenian treatment of the problem of meaning is obviously an improvement on earlier theories. The theory of family resemblances, which is part of this theory, throws light not only in problems of meaning, but opens up different ways of looking at philosophical problems as such. But it is usually not believed nor would it be justified to believe, that this provides the final answers to problems. Different philosophical theories throw light on philosophical issues from different perspectives and that is how philosophy grows.

This conceptual investigation of reality has taken various dimensions. Philosophers have propounded different metaphysical systems in their attempt to study reality. Sometimes, a philosopher, like Locke, insists upon investigation into the instruments, source, nature and extent of human knowledge. Thus the investigation becomes epistemic in nature.

Seventeenth century metaphysicians like Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz were bent upon rebuilding philosophy, after the deductive method in geometry, with the hope that

philosophical conclusions will be as definite as those of geometry. Accordingly, they started with some a priori assumptions and went on deducing conclusions and claiming these conclusions to be true of reality.

Again, philosophers may be interested in enumerating the rules that guide human thinking and the conditions that make discourse meaningful, whether it is in metaphysics, epistemology or logic. Invariably, a philosopher has clarity as his goal and analysis as the method. But a perusal of the history of philosophy would reveal that philosophers in their metaphysical flights have produced a host of paradoxes. Instead of bringing clarity to the concepts, they have made the issues more obscure. For example, Bradley, a pioneer of the idealistic movement, pronounced matter and time to be unreal - a conclusion which very much aroused the logical positivists and logical analysts into action. As the contemporary philosophers remark, in the name of philosophy they have harvested pseudo philosophies. The idealistic conclusions of Bradley not only appeared as absurd but also came as a shock to philosophers like Moore, Russell and the logical positivists. Moore sought to refute idealism in the interest of common sense and Russell in the interest of science.

Logical positivism started with the promised objective of proving the futility of metaphysical propositions and they sought to do so by taking verifiability as a criterion of meaning and since metaphysical propositions are shown to be non-verifiable either in practice or in principle, they were proved to be meaningless and devoid of significance. But logical positivism, because of its narrow conception of meaning, was almost a passing phase in the history of philosophy, though Prof. A.J. Ayer tried to sustain the positivistic spirit by reformulating the criterion of meaning.

Both Russell and Moore, the co-founders of the analytical movement, agree that the idealistic speculations spring from certain confusions about language and meaning. Russell maintains that the philosophical confusions can be eliminated if they are recast in the language consisting of symbols that are well defined in terms of the sensuous particulars. Both Russell as well as early Wittgenstein plead for the ideal language as the solution to philosophical problems. Russell would argue that by an analysis in terms of ideal language, the logical structure of a particular expression can be discovered, and consequently, the confusions arising out of the form (grammatical form) of the language will cease

to be there. Wittgenstein in the Tractatus also takes the language of science as his ideal and arrives at an atomistic view about the universe from certain considerations of language and meaning: Language gets meaning only by picturing facts. Since whatever can be said can be said clearly, descriptive language becomes the only meaningful language. Both Russell and Wittgenstein arrived at a pluralistic world view as a result of their analysis of language and meaning. Hence the view goes in the name of logical atomism. Moore, on the other hand, becomes critical of the idealistic conclusions for they militate against the common sense truths. Common sense truths being self evident and indisputable, he recommended that the validity of the philosophical systems are to be tested to the extent they conform to common sense truths. But while viewing the idealistic speculations Moore was against the age-old tradition of thinking philosophy to be synthetic. For, according to him, philosophical problems disappear only when they are analysed into different constituent aspects. Philosophy does not give us knowledge of new facts but provides illumination or clarity of basic concepts. The philosopher's goal being clarity, he must employ language which is clear,

distinct and does not generate further confusions. Ordinary language, for Moore, is sacrosanct. The words and expressions are distinctively clear, and have withstood the test of time through constant use. The metaphysicians run into muddles for they do not keep themselves alive to the ways in which the expressions are actually used and ascribe new meanings to them. In this respect there appears to be striking similarity between Moore and the later Wittgenstein. This might give the suggestion that Wittgenstein is anti-metaphysician. But we will argue out in subsequent chapters that there are idealistic streaks in his writings.

The later Wittgenstein's view in Philosophical Investigations brought about an epoch making revolution in the history of philosophy. It marks a turning point in the very mode of philosophical thinking. The views of Wittgenstein were no doubt novel and radical and a challenge to the traditional way of philosophizing. Certain philosophical paradoxes, according to Wittgenstein, are consequent upon certain confusions over the use of certain concepts. And they are linguistic in nature. These philosophical oddities arise because some philosophers take the concepts beyond their natural context and treat

them in abstraction. Ordinary language, according to Wittgenstein, is, as it were, the home of terms and expressions. A term becomes meaningful only in certain contextual configurations. When they are treated in abstraction, philosophical confusions ensue and he urges that these confusions could be removed by bringing back expressions from their philosophical to their home use. According to Wittgenstein, certain types of philosophical problems can be answered by showing that they are no problems, rather pseudo problems and these questions can be answered by showing that they are not genuine questions in spite of their grammatical form appearing to be so. And he develops his doctrine of language game to reinterpret and solve the age old philosophical enigma. Thus it can be summed up that language in general and concepts in particular are the subject matter of philosophy. The philosopher does not raise particular questions about specific languages, their grammatical, formation and transformation rules. Rather he raises very very general and broad questions about language. He raises such questions as, what is language? How is language related to reality? What is meaning? etc. In other words it can be said that the philosopher studies not particular languages but speech. Language is used for the purposes of speech and the philosopher studies speech activities.

CHAPTER - II -  
LANGUAGE AND SPEECH ACTS

The very survival of an organic species demands that certain acts or activities must be performed that are directed to reproduction and preservation. Animals move about in search of food and shelter. But in case of human species the need for survival calls for acts or activities that are, to a large extent different in nature and dimension from that of other living beings. In other words what makes an activity human-is that-certain <sup>a</sup>acts on the part of man are backed up by will and intention on the part of the doer of the action. Doing an action may involve the use of motor organs directly or doing something by and through the tools which are again the products of acts. The term "act" need not necessarily refer to the physical activities that are observable to people outside oneself for it also signifies the acts of the human mind or intelligence that are, though not perceptible to persons outside, are a reality for the person who performs mental acts. Of course mental acts may have external expression in behavioural or other manifestations. Human interests being multifarious human acts are also so. What renders man more privileged over other creatures is that, he is a language wielding creature. Human knowledge is cumulative and is a growing phenomenon. This is possible primarily because of language.

Through language man achieves a great variety of things. Group living requires that man in order to express ideas, to give information, and to achieve various other purposes needs an inter-subjective medium. That is language. As any movement does not count as a piece of human action, any utterance of sounds is not the wielding of language. In order to be so the sounds must be backed by certain intentions on the part of the speaker which he wants that the hearer should understand. Searle remarks --

"If we were certain the marks were a consequence of, say, water erosion, then the question of deciphering them or even calling them hieroglyphs could not arise. To construe them under the category of linguistic communication necessarily involves construing their production as speech acts."<sup>1</sup>

✓ Austin would distinguish a speech act into three distinct aspects viz., phonetic, phatic and rhetic. The phonetic act consists in producing certain acoustic blasts and the phatic act consists in arranging the sounds into words, phrases or sentence patterns and the rhetic act consists in uttering or using the symbols or expressions in such a way that they are meaningful to the hearer.

---

1. Searle, J.R., The Philosophy of Language, p.40.

Any speech act presupposes a speaker, a hearer and the utterance. As it has already been mentioned a speech act must be backed by the intention of the speaker. Thus the speaker is a necessary component of the linguistic activity. The speech activity is necessarily directed to a person at the receiving end i.e., the hearer. And in course of the communication between the speaker and the hearer what is transmitted is the meaning which the speaker intends the hearer to recognise. This shows that language is a carrier of meaning or ideas and the meaning is supposed to be related to the context of the expression so that a person conversant with the given linguistic convention and the context of the use of the language can grasp what the speaker intends to mean. Like many other activities such as playing a game, conducting oneself in a social gathering etc., speaking a language is also rule governed. It is the rules that make language objective and inter-subjective. What converts a phonetic act into a phatic act is that the sounds produced must conform to certain conventional rules pertaining to that language: they are the rules of syntax. In order to convey that "the cat is on the mat," it is not only necessary that I make use of the terms 'cat,' 'mat,' preposi-

tion 'on,' the verb 'is' and the article 'the;' it is also necessary that they must be uttered or written in an order that is, grammatically permissible, namely, "the cat is on the mat." And again what turns a phatic act into rhetic act is that one conforms to certain other rules over and above the rules of syntax. In other words any syntactically sound sentence may not be meaningful irrespective of the context of its use. For example, "His kindness is long" is syntactically a valid expression but the oddity of the expression is not so explicit. This goes to prove that the oddity of meaning cannot be overcome unless one abides by the semantic rules. The semantic rules refer to the set of conventions, linguistic or non-linguistic sufficient to make the use of an expression meaningful. This enables us to recognise the fact that apart from articulation of symbols, language gets its meaning from the context: the totality of the non-linguistic conditions constituting the context of the utterance imparts meaning to the expressions. As it has already been noted semantic conditions are not exclusive of the syntactical rules and therefore signify the linguistic and non-linguistic conditions necessary for the meaningful employment of

language. Philosophers make a distinction between regulative and constitutive rules of language. To take an example - the advice to walk on the left, to respect the elders are regulative in nature in so far as they tell us how to walk on the road and how to behave with the elders. Similarly there are also rules regulating a game. But what makes a game, a particular game, e.g., chess, is that there is a set of rules determining the moves of the knight, pawns, castle etc. These rules being there a game is said to be unique of its kind and is distinct from other games. If these basic rules are violated we are said to be at least not playing the game. So these rules are constitutive of the game of chess. So from this point of view semantic rules can be seen to be constitutive in so far as they are found to be indispensable for the meaningful employment of language.

Besides recording facts and communicating our thoughts; language is used for other purposes, as well. As Max Black puts it:

"A man may speak in order to impart information, to deceive his hearer, to show friendliness, to ease social tension, to relieve his feelings, to show sympathy or some other attitude - and so on indefinitely."<sup>2</sup>

---

2. Max Black, The Labyrinth of Language, P.123.

Wittgenstein's remark in this regard is equally illuminating. He writes in his Philosophical Investigations:

"But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question and command? - There are countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols," "words," "sentences." And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten."<sup>3</sup>

Hence there is found to be multiplicity of speech acts. There are some speech acts which are performed in saying something and those that are performed by saying something. The former is termed as illocutionary and the latter as perlocutionary speech acts. An illocutionary speech act is performed by mere utterance of expressions in appropriate circumstances and they include such acts as describing something, asking questions, giving informations, making promises etc. On the other hand the perlocutionary speech acts are performed only when the given expression produces the intended effect on the hearer. For example, persuading the child to take the medicine is an act which can be said to have been performed only in the event of the child actually being persuaded to take the medicine. Hence the semantic rules

3. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, Section 23.

determining the correct use of illocutionary and perlocutionary act are different. One can also make a logical distinction between the constative and performative speech act. Making a categorical statement is to perform a constative speech act. "The sky is cloudy," "the teacher is bad tempered" are examples of constative speech acts. These can be said to be either true or false. But unlike them a performative act implies that the person performing the speech act must indulge ~~on~~<sup>in</sup> self in action. For example, "I welcome my guest," "I swear to take revenge," "get out from my room," are cases of performative speech acts.

Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations is not so much concerned with the syntactical aspect of the use of words or with the classification of different speech acts as with their semantic aspects. He not only is painfully aware of certain paradoxes in philosophy but traces them to certain misunderstandings about language and meaning. Wittgenstein's caution "grammar is dangerous avoid it" is highly suggestive. He would make a distinction between the surface<sup>c</sup> grammar and depth grammar. The surface grammar roughly corresponds to the grammatical aspect of the putative expression. In fact as we have noted earlier,

the meaning of an expression cannot necessarily be read out from the external clothing of it for the meaning of it has to be discovered by looking to its use in its actual employment in a given context. Meaning of an expression - is the way it is used. Since language is wedded to a form of life the meaning of an expression is determined by the way it is used in a life situation. There is a distinction between the use of words to do something and use of them in doing something. By language, as it was indicated earlier, man performs various speech acts such as giving information, concealing them, to bless, to curse, to please, to annoy etc. But one may, while relating a story, may make use of more than one speech act such as giving information, asking question, uttering exclamatory sentences and so on. Thus the above speech acts are seen to be used in course of relating a story. Now one can still make a further distinction between telling a fictional story and describing something. Both these cases refer to a broader framework or rather to two different universes of discourse which may make use of speech acts such as giving information, asking questions etc. Wittgenstein would call them language games. Let us take the example of speech acts

which may be involved in, say, "giving information." A sentence which purports to give information in a fictional story may refer to a possible state of affairs having no actual cognitive context. But a corresponding statement in the descriptive language game does necessarily stand for some actual happening or state of affairs. Though an informative statement may have similar grammatical structures in two different language games they may have different meanings in the respective frameworks in which they are used. "An expression has meaning only in the stream of life."<sup>4</sup>

It is sometimes supposed that Wittgenstein advocates ideal language in the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus and ordinary language in the Philosophical Investigations. Further it is said that the two works differ mainly on this point. This point stands in need of clarification. There are surely passages in the Philosophical Investigations which lay emphasis on ordinary language. Wittgenstein says, "ordinary language is in order." But what is an ordinary language? What are its criteria of identity? Wittgenstein is not explicit on this point. He sometimes uses empirical criteria and at certain other

---

4. Malcolm, Memoir, P.93

times logical criteria to characterize ordinary language. Ordinary language is distinguished from scientific and technical languages. A language is ordinary which is used in day to day commerce of life. It is the language of common man. According to Wittgenstein ordinary language is the basis of all other languages. This is how other languages (both technical and scientific) are parasitic upon ordinary language. Thus ordinary language not only gives meaning to scientific language but it sustains it. But the following objections can be raised against this view of ordinary language. This takes for granted that the boundary of ordinary language is fixed for all time to come. But as a matter of fact this is not the case. There is always a mutual relationship between ordinary language and scientific language. In due course of time expressions from scientific discourse find their way to ordinary discourse. The scientific jargon of yesterday becomes the common platitude of today. Where to put the dividing line, between ordinary and non-ordinary or scientific language? To obviate the difficulties Wittgenstein advances another criterion known as logical one. It is based upon the principle of significant negation. This means that an expression is meaningful and its negation also is meaningful.

Sometimes philosophers use certain expression violating all rules of meaningfulness. A word is meaningful only when it is distinguished from other words. As for example, to say that this table is black, is to say that there are tables which are not black. The expression black is meaningful in so far as it is distinguished from not black. To say that everything is black is not to say anything at all. So it can be said that this use of language is not ordinary. In this sense ordinary is not opposed to 'scientific' or 'technical' but opposed to 'extra-ordinary.' Some philosophers use ordinary expressions in extraordinary way. As a result confusions emerge. This ambivalent attitude is very much present in the Philosophical Investigations as an exercise in listing out the actual uses of expressions. Any speech act has to satisfy minimally this logical criterion of ordinary language. If it fails to do so it can't perform its task.

CHAPTER - III  
LANGUAGE GAME AND FORMS OF LIFE

It has been rightly remarked that "to be deprived of speech is to lack the indispensable prerequisite for human community." Man is perhaps the only animal who articulates his thoughts and experiences by use of symbols namely words, pictures, graphs, numbers etc. He is surrounded by the social as well as the natural environment. So almost all his experiences are generated by a series of interactions between the individuals and the surroundings. If we go back in time, we might find the primitive man roaming about in search of food and communicating his feelings and experiences through gestures and postures. The necessity to communicate and share one's feeling arises only in a society consisting of many members. Practical exigencies might have led men to live in groups. As group living becomes more and more compact and well knit, there arises the inevitability of a medium through which one could communicate with another. Articulation through gestures, through picture drawings, through symbols, marks the different stages leading to the emergence of language in its full fledged form. It may be noted that language has not been invented by any individual at any specific point of time as it is the case with many other inventions. It rather grew out of the necessities of human existence as inevitably and as spontaneously as it could be.

It is rightly observed by Chomsky that it is man and man alone who has innate linguistic capacities. The invention of script added a new dimension to the use of language as it enabled him to communicate to posterity even in his absence. That is how knowledge becomes cumulative bequeathed from one generation to another so that the latter works with the knowledge of the former. Thus language in its spoken and written form has gone a long way in promoting the cause of man himself, or, rather in the making of man qua man.

Many thinkers about language tend to believe that the primary aim or use of language is to communicate the speaker's or the writer's thought. Language, like many other human activities, is purposive.

"A man may speak in order to impart information, to deceive his hearer, to show friendliness, to ease social tension, to relieve his feelings, to show sympathy or some other attitude - and so on, indefinitely. Yet there might, after all, be some principle underlying this superficial variety of actual purposes served. We may remind ourselves of the many ways in which even a relatively simple instrument, such as a hammer can be used as a door stop, a paperweight, a weapon, or in the sport of hurling the hammer. In spite of this variety of uses, there is a simple answer to the question, what is a hammer used for? Its standard or normal use is simply to hit things; and all the other uses mentioned are incidental to that single primary purpose that the tool that was designed to serve."<sup>1</sup>

---

1. Max Black, The Labyrinth of Language, P.123-124.

Language is wedded to experience. Knowledge in its ordinary sense is possible when there is an effective relationship between the percipient and the object of perception. The sense object contact (in case of external perception) or mind's contact with the inner feelings gives rise to certain ideas, notions, feelings, experiences in the observer. These ideas and experiences are personal and private to the extent that only the observer, has access to his own feelings and ideas. It can be made public by correlating it with certain symbols spoken or written. These statements are meant to be taken at a non-controversial level - a level at which they would appear to be rather obviously true. The phonemes constitute the minimal sound unit of language and morpheme the minimal meaning unit. The word which consists of one or more than one syllable is made to stand for a thing or an event or a person or a function. In other words except words like "the," "of," "and," "or" etc. i.e., the prepositions and the connectives, almost all words derive their meaning only in relation to the things they denote or the situation they signify. They derive their significance and sense from the situations around. But to make communication possible and smooth in a group or society consisting of a number of individuals, certain amount of uniformity in the form of

linguistic conventions is essential. The linguistic conventions signify a set of rules pertaining to the use of language so that the speech activity becomes intelligible to the speaker of the language, the hearer and the interpreter.

"The speech-art is directed, reversible, and self-regulating. Speech is a social activity: it requires, in Samuel Butler's phrase, a 'sayer' and a 'sayee'. (All speech begins in dialogue, though it easily declines into monologue) In this, it resembles, other social acts of cooperation or interplay, such as fighting, playing games, or making love. It differs from some such social acts, however, in being directed to a particular receiver. More important is the fact that the rules of speaker and hearer are interchangeable: we know what it would be like to be receiving the very same message that we send. Furthermore, we hear ourselves speak, while we speak are constantly subject to 'feedback.'"<sup>2</sup>

The existence of various languages point to the existence of distinct linguistic conventions with their respective rules and patterns. These rules not only prescribe the ways of meaningful combinations of words and expressions but the ways in which certain linguistic expressions are to be related to experience which they seek to describe or represent. In other words learning a language consists in mastering these syntactical rules

---

2. Ibid, p.80.

by which one could produce any number of grammatically meaningful structures but also the semantic rules which consist in correlating the linguistic expressions with certain extra linguistic conditions. Language is intimately wedded to experience. Of course the purpose of language as Max Black puts it -

"The purpose of language in point is not to evoke reality, as perhaps representational painting hopes to do, but to say true things about it. And to accomplish this, it is essential that the representations should be distinct from the thing represented. Language cannot be saddled with the absurd task of reduplicating reality."<sup>3</sup>

Nonetheless the fact remains that language in order to be meaningful must have some uniform relationship with certain objective conditions. Mere articulation of grammatically correct expressions will not make a statement meaningful. If I say for example - "it is shocking" and be in a state of ease then my hearers will not understand me. For to be shocked implies being in a state of discomfort and depression. Since the conditions are missing I cannot be said to have used the expression meaningfully. So over and above the syntactical conditions the semantic conditions must be satisfied in order that the expression is meaningfully employed. The use of a language necessi-

---

3. Ibid., p. 164.

tates correlating the verbal expressions with certain mode of life that is non-linguistic in nature.

✓ Life in a broad sense connotes functions that the living organisms perform from their birth to death. Birth, growth, decay, leading to final extinction are the necessary stages in the life of an animate being. The mode or the form of life of an animal centres round its instinctive necessities. Some linguists and animal psychologists in their attempt to study animal behaviour have noticed certain sound patterns among some birds and animals. Frogs produce certain uniform sounds in their mating seasons. Similarly birds also produce certain uniform sounds at the sight of the death of one of their species. Thus certain amount of regularity or correlation can be found among the sounds and certain events in the animal life. But linguists are constrained to say that animals do not have language. ✓ For language in the proper sense of the term connotes something more. Language is a growing and dynamic phenomenon intimately wedded to the various facets of life.

There are two distinct ways in which the language of human beings can be distinguished from the sound patterns of animals and birds. Human language which consists

of words are subject to the intricate rules for composition. "It permits a competent speaker to liberate himself from the 'tyranny of the immediate present' - to say what has never been said before, to record what no longer exists, and to imagine what may never happen. It is the indispensable condition for history, science, and imaginative literature. No difference between man and beast is more important than syntax."<sup>4</sup>

But in case of the mating call of frogs, the sound so produced are conditioned by certain biological state and certain environmental situations. ~~Moreover the~~ language of human beings is purposive. Language has as many functions as there are human interests and purposes. It is designed to express thoughts, wishes, attitudes, and feelings of the speaker. It is employed to bless and curse, to request and admonish, to describe and inform. It is a purposeful activity backed by ones deliberation whereas in case of animals it is more instinctive than deliberate. Language is invariably related to one situation or another so much so that given an expression one can imagine what kind of situation it invokes and given a form of life one can imagine what is the

---

4. Ibid., p.82

form of language - that would represent it. In other words given one, the other could be read off. Since human beings have varied interests they are said to have different modes of life. Since fact stating is only one of the purposes, one should not limit the function of language to its fact stating job only.

✓ To illustrate the nature and function of language with more perspicuity Wittgenstein takes the analogy of "game" and coins the expression "language game." The expression language game is highly indicative of the close affinity between the activities "playing a game" and "using a language." There are various games with their respective rules and mode of performance. The rules of one game obviously are irrelevant in playing another. For example - rules of chess and the rules of playing badminton are not followed while playing cards. Games with their distinct mode of performance also serve various purposes. A game like football may involve physical exertion on the part of the participants whereas in playing chess what is called for is the exercise of one's mind and intelligence. Over and above the rules regulating a game and the purpose it serves, playing a game also involves a sense of participation on the part of the players who play it. Normally

to participate in a game is to commit oneself to a certain framework of rules and therefore to bind one's movement or activities to certain specific and predictable behaviour. Therefore given the name of a game one can very well presume the sort of performance that the participants are going to engage themselves in and given the performance one can know about the type of game that is being played. But in case of a child who plays ball by himself, he does not follow any accepted or well defined set of rules. But from the fact that the child plays throwing the ball at random one can very well presume that the child is playing with amusement. The child's game is no doubt a game with its peculiar mode of activities. The child obviously does not behave in the way that an adult might; the game of the child is distinctly childlike. So an onlooker while watching the child's play does not normally expect what he would expect in case of an adult. This clearly shows that the child has a distinct mode of participation. Hence to play the game is to participate in a mode of life. Even though from the point of view of rules there is nothing common and essential to all games what is common to one and all is that playing a game involves a characteristic mode of

participation. A particular game is intimately wedded to certain mode of participation.

Wittgenstein most befittingly compares using a language with playing a game. In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein explains at length as to how by language we discharge various functions. He would call them activities. Stating facts, though a primary, is not the sole function of language. By language we command, we request we pray, we curse, and we do several other things. Language is employed in making scientific investigation and for writing poetry. While employing language for a particular purpose in particular area or universe of discourse one consciously or unconsciously abides by certain rules. For example - In a scientific universe of discourse the words and expressions are used with maximum precision and are descriptive of facts and phenomena. Hence the purpose here is to acquaint the reader or the hearer with certain phenomena or events. But when a poet composes a poem he is hardly interested in describing anything objectively. His purpose is rather to evoke emotions in the hearer or the reader or just to express them. For example - Wordsworth's lines -

"My heart leaps up when I  
behold a rainbow in the sky."

does not purport to describe anything about the rainbow or his heart. But rather to communicate a deep sense of exhilaration at the picturesque beauty of the rainbow. And while going through the lines a sensitive reader is likely to imagine or experience similar intensity of emotions. But one may ask how can a heart jump? How can a heart leap? Is it noticeable in the graph of electrocardiogram? It does not make literal sense to say that the heart jumps at the sight of the rainbow. To say so is clearly to misunderstand the very nature and logic of poetic language. The rules, the criterion of understanding and intelligibility true of scientific language is obviously inapplicable or rather irrelevant to the understanding and interpretation of a piece of poetic creation. The attempt to understand the poetic description in the model of science is as good as playing one game with the rules of another. As it is also possible for one man to play different games with their respective rules and mode of participation, it is possible for one to make various uses of language, that is to play different language games. But while using the language for a specific purpose one is to conform to the rules of its employment. So learning a language would imply to master certain skills as to the use of it.

What is still more significant is that using a language does not merely call for the ability to combine words into grammatically meaningful compounds but to use them only when certain specific conditions that are non-linguistic or non-verbal in nature are fulfilled. These non-linguistic conditions are said to be semantic for they are the totality of the conditions that impart meaning to the expression. Negatively speaking, an expression otherwise grammatically sound may not be intelligible at all if divorced from the requisite semantic conditions or the content which renders it intelligible. An expression significant in one context or universe of discourse or language game (to use Wittgenstein's terminology) may not be significant in another. For example - the concept of truth is quite meaningful in the scientific language game, may not be relevant in that of ethics. Similarly the normative or evaluative expressions like good and bad may not be relevant or appropriate in description of facts. And the same expression may have different meanings in different language games. The term - "truth" is used as synonymous with reality; for a moralist who exhorts "speak the truth," truth is obviously the property of judgement. And for a spiritual aspirant

it signifies the highest state of being i.e., the 'Absolute.' So to determine the meaning of an expression is to understand it in the context of its use.

Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations and in the Blue and Brown Books time and again lays emphasis on the fact that the language that we speak is thus intimately wedded to life situations. The words and expressions derive their meaning and significance from situations or circumstances. So learning a language would consist not only in mastering the linguistic conventions that render certain combination of words meaningful but also learning as to how they are correlated to certain extra-linguistic phenomena. In other words, the knowledge of the meaning of words and the syntactical rules will not amount to using the language. Wittgenstein remarks in Philosophical Investigations:

"If a lion could talk we could not understand him."<sup>5</sup>

It is not because the forms of words uttered by the animal are unintelligible but it is because the surrounding circumstances or the forms of life connected to it

---

5. Wittgenstein Ludwig, Trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe, Philosophical Investigations, p.223.

are missing. We could not understand it even if he could utter grammatically correct sentences. Because his behaviour would be radically different from ours. ) For example - If a lion says "Goodness it is three o'clock I must hurry to make appointment, but that he continues to lie there, yawning, making no effort to move"<sup>6</sup> and we cannot say that the lion has asserted or stated something. One could not make out what he had asserted for the modes of behaviour into which words are woven are too radically different from our own. We would not understand him since he does not share the relevant forms of life with us.

Thus one can make a distinction between speaking a language and using it. Speaking a language in a very narrow sense may mean articulating certain sound patterns. In this sense an animal or a bird can be said to speak a language in the sense that they can be trained to produce certain grammatically meaningful expression. But using a language would require an ability of skill to relate expressions to certain modes of behaviour. The remark "it is 3 o'clock I am in a hurry for the appointment" should ordinarily be accompanied by a kind of briskness and restlessness in the behaviour of the utterer and be followed by necessary preparations to hurry for

6. Pitcher George, The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, p.243.

the appointment. Communication is a bipolar process as it normally presupposes a speaker and a hearer. As using a language implies the ability to correlate the linguistic phenomenon with the accompanying modes of behaviour, the understanding of the language or expression would similarly imply man's skill in discovering the correlation between language and the form of life from where the former gets its meaning. In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein is not so much concerned with the question about the meaning of words and sentences or predicate expressions but with the problem about the use of expressions in a great variety of speech situations.

In the Brown Book the idea of language game is correlated with the idea of certain conditions or occasions or the role in which language is played in the whole life. To understand and translate the language spoken by a unknown tribe would require an observation of various non-verbal behaviour that is action, facial expression etc., and co-relating them with verbal expressions. 3

"Whether a word of the language of our tribe is rightly translated into a word of the English language depends upon the role this word plays in the whole life of the tribe; the occasions on which it is used, the expressions of emotion by which it is generally accompanied, the ideas which it generally awakens or which prompts its

saying, etc., etc. As an exercise ask yourself: in which cases would you say that a certain word uttered by the people of the tribe was a greeting? In which cases should we say it corresponded to our "Good bye", in which to our "Hello"? In which cases would you say that a word of a foreign language corresponded to our "perhaps"? - to our expressions of doubt, trust, certainty? You will find that the justifications for calling something an expression of doubt, conviction, etc., largely, though of course not wholly, consist in descriptions of gestures, the play of facial expressions, and even the tone of voice."<sup>7</sup>

Thus understanding a concept requires observing the occasion of its use. In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein remarks -

"To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life."<sup>8</sup>

All these go to suggest that the words and expressions in language do not have any meaning in isolation. To understand a language one has to look at how the language is used and relate the forms of words with the 'forms of life'. The co-relation may be direct or remote. To elucidate this Wittgenstein draws a distinction between pure language game and impure language game. Pure language game would consist in using certain expressions in

7. Wittgenstein, The Blue and the Brown Books, p.103.

8. Wittgenstein Ludwig, Trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe, Philosophical Investigations, Section 19.

abstraction. For example, one can go on lecturing and discussing about 'pen' at length, without obvious reference to actual situations: such a theoretical discussion may be quite meaningful to the speaker and the hearer. But Wittgenstein would point out that the understanding of the expression 'pen' and many other related expressions in the pure language game would presuppose that both the hearer and the speaker have mastered the meaning of these expressions in the impure language game, by co-relating them with their objective counterparts. In other words, the uses of words in impure language game are basic "in the sense that if a person did not know how to play the impure games, he could not play the pure ones either."<sup>9</sup>

( In diagnosing the nature of the metaphysical paradoxes Wittgenstein traces them to the fact that, the philosophers run into muddles when they treat the expressions in abstraction. There being an intimate connection between language and behaviour (either linguistic or non-linguistic) the words derive their meaning from language games which are their original homes. Therefore when the words are abstracted from the contexts and treated in isolation one ends up in paradoxes and puzzlements.

9. Pitcher George, The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, p.248.

"Philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday."<sup>10</sup>

"The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work."<sup>11</sup>

Wittgenstein substantiates his view by referring to an example in Augustine's Confessions. This is with regard to the notion of "time." There is hardly any confusions as to the use of temporal expressions in common parlance. But when the philosopher asks "what is time?" it poses a problem. This question is raised here in abstraction, and the normal tendency is to treat it on the pattern of some analogies. This leads to the formation of certain pictures that hold us captive. In this case the word 'time' may be conceived after the analogy of a stream, flowing from the past to the future through the present and the obvious philosophical attempt would be directed to discover the nature of this quasi physical stream. Here 'time' is considered to be a substance for it being a noun is understood to be signifying some substance. Wittgenstein would observe that, in spite of the grammatical form of the expression it may not necessarily be expressive of its function in language game and sometimes it is positively misleading. Therefore to ascertain

---

10. Wittgenstein Ludwig, Op. cit., Section 38.

11. Ibid., Section 132.

the meaning of a putative expression one is to go beyond the surface grammar and look into its actual uses in the language game which is its original home. Thus his remark "grammar is dangerous" is highly suggestive and the expression "do not think but look" is highly consequential in solving philosophical problems.

The above account does seem to betray what might be called a German idealistic tinge in Wittgenstein's philosophy. Words or the expressions are not definitions. The meaning of a term is not built into the very structure of it rather it has to be determined depending upon the mode of life or life situations to which it is necessarily bound up. In other words a word is not meaningful in isolation, it gets meaning only when it is related to the totality of experiences in the particular form of life. So determining the meaning of a word would consist in finding its relation to the totality. The understanding of one would involve reference to the total framework. In this respect there is a striking resemblance between Wittgenstein and Bradley with the exception that Bradley would refer to the absolute totality where as Wittgenstein would restrict it to a context. So the meaning of an expression is the way it is used is suggestive

of the fact that meanings are not discovered but rather attributed or ascribed to the words. Words do not have meaning but get meaning. As to the question whether a given proposition is meaningful or not Wittgenstein would ask us to appeal to one's linguistic intuition. The word linguistic intuition stands in need of clarification. Linguistic intuition may be taken to mean one's capacity to understand, signifying therefore the ability of one to make sense out of a proposition. The ability to understand is largely determined by one's exposure to situations in and around - that is the richness of one's experience. For example - A man who is born blind cannot have visual concepts therefore cannot probably make sense out of a piece of poem about rainbow.

In this respect Wittgenstein makes <sup>a</sup> fundamental departure from the Kantian mode of thinking. Kant believes in the innate structure of human mind. The categories of understanding and forms of intuition are fixed and immutable and determine a priori the nature and the limit of human knowledge. By definition if there could be anything that does not conform to the forms and categories would not only be unknown but will remain unknowable. Thus he restricts the domain of intelligibility to the

realm of phenomenon only. Wittgenstein offers a growing and dynamic interpretation of the notion of intelligibility. The meaning of an expression cannot be determined in abstraction i.e., irrespective of the language games in which it occurs. Even Wittgenstein suggests to invent possible language games. So in finding out the area of intelligibility one has to appeal not only to the existing uses of the expression but imagine a possible language game or a form of life in which it could meaningfully be employed. He observes that if the world were different where a patch of green or yellow colours cause pain or pleasure, the expression pleasure patches or pain patches could be taken as quite significant. But the capacity to invent and imagine a form of life would again depend on one's richness of experience. Thus a criterion of intelligibility cannot be a priorily fixed. The above observation of Wittgenstein urges one to rethink about the conclusions of analytical philosophers about the metaphysical propositions and the language of the mystics.

A few important questions can be raised in this connection. How many language games are there? Does Wittgenstein believes in a fixed number of language games? Let us answer these questions. The logic of language game

implies that their number is not fixed. Old games become extinct and new games might come into being. Moreover rules of a particular language game might also change. What does this amount to? Can we say that we can manufacture language games as we like? Wittgenstein has a very cautious reply to this. One is not "allowed" to manufacture language game as one likes. The acceptability of a language game depends upon its conformity to other existing language games. This is otherwise characterized by Wittgenstein as the content of the speech act. Consistency and conformity with other speech acts is the test for a fresh and singular speech act. This is how it can be said that Wittgenstein is an idealist. The totality of the speech acts has to be consistent whole otherwise nobody could understand it. A lion's talk cannot be understood by a man. This is a very significant statement made by Wittgenstein. This shows that simply uttering some words is not sufficient. Every speech act generates certain expectations. These expectations are anticipated speech acts which constitute the background against which a particular speech act can be understood. If this background is absent no speech act could be made intelligible. The totality of speech act is the totality of different forms

of life. Different forms of life are interconnected and one cannot understand it in isolation. This sort of relation among different forms of life excludes the possibility of certain forms of life being unintelligible. In other words Wittgenstein even goes to the extent of declaring that all forms of life are intelligible.

CHAPTER - IV  
LANGUAGE AND ESSENCE

## Part - I

One problem of language connected with meaning has been the problem of meaning of general terms. This problem, in its more general aspect is also the problem of classification. The latter problem may be put in the form of the question "what is the explanation of the fact that we are capable of classifying particulars?" Our ability to classify particulars is such a fundamental and pervasive fact about the human condition that it would be easy not to see it as a fact at all. To do justice to the insight which prompts the above question we have to make ourselves see as peculiar - almost as mysterious - this ability of ours.

But let us try and do this exercise on the problem in its linguistic form. Consider the words "John" and "fat" as they are ordinarily used in the English language. Each may be applied to a particular either correctly or incorrectly, but the issues about correctness or incorrectness are throughly different in the two cases. Suppose there is a person in front of me and I want to know whether I can correctly apply the word "John" to him i.e., call him John. I may know of dozens of other people whom I know to be called John and hundreds whom I know are not

called John, but that knowledge does not help me at all with my present problem. In order to know whether I can correctly call the stranger John I must know what he is customarily called so by his acquaintances, was first called by his parents etc.

On the other hand because I know many people to whom the word "fat" applies and more to whom it does not, the odds are that I can determine whether or not this word can be correctly applied to the stranger without knowing whether anyone has ever applied it too, or denied it of, him. In some way my knowledge about other particulars to which I know that the word "fat" applies, and about still others to which I know that it does not apply, equips me to apply it confidently and correctly to the stranger.

What the question about classification that I mentioned above asks is; "how is the trick worked?," to put it in the linguistic form the question is, "when two or more people have agreed on a sufficient number of instances and counter instances of a general word, they can without any conflict agree on most further instances and counter instances - how is that trick worked?"

Now someone who asks "how is that trick worked?," is asking not for a causal or physiological explanation, but rather for an account of what the technique is, what rule and rules are followed. His question is nothing like, the questions, "what is the explanation of the fact that new born babies can breathe?" It is somewhat like the question; "what is the explanation of the fact that a physician can tell from an external examination what the internal trouble is?" So the question about general terms turns into something like; what rule or rules are to be followed when we apply general terms or what is our technique or method for correctly applying general terms?

These questions are in principle unanswerable. There could not be a technique or method for applying general terms as such i.e., a procedure which someone employed in every classification or every time that he applied a general term. And the reason for this is as follows. A technique or set of rules for doing D must be capable of serving as a set of instructions for how to do D - instructions which could in principle guide someone who did not know how to do D. But no technique for classification could be used as a guide by someone who could not classify at all. The technique or rules of

instruction would have to be of the form; "if such and such is the case, and a given particular x is k then classify x in such and such a way." But knowing whether a given particular is k is knowing how to classify it in some respect. Wittgenstein saw this, and so did Kant. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant says that there cannot be rules for how to apply concepts to particulars; for if someone needs a rule in order to be able to apply concepts to particulars then he needs a further rules in order to be able to apply the first rule and so on-ad-infinitum.

Of Wittgenstein's many ways of making the same point, one involves the number series model. Someone might know the appropriate general formula for a given number series and yet be unable to continue the series in accordance with the formula. One is tempted to say, "that shows that he does not understand the formula; so we must explain it to him." But Wittgenstein says if we try to do this by giving him a general account of what the formula means then we are just giving him a second formula for the application of the first. This might do the trick; it might enable our man to continue the series in the manner dictated by the formula. On the other hand it

might not; and it certainly would not if his problem was that he did not understand general formula (See in the Remarks on the foundation of Mathematics, Part I Section 1-4 and Philosophical Investigations, Section 189-190 and for a slightly different formulation of the same basic point Section 85-86). The foregoing arguments enable us to predict that any purported technique of using general words as such will be circular, question begging, competence - presupposing. That is it will offer a rule for classification which could only be followed by someone who already knew how to classify.

Let us try to test these predictions against a famous attack to describe a technique as such for classification; or for use of general terms as such. We may give this attempt the general name of platonism. In giving this label one does not necessarily imply much about the historical Plato. For a more recent version of platonism see Russell's Problems of Philosophy, Chapter 9-10. Platonism says that as well as particular items there are universal items - which may provisionally be called properties, universals or essences. A universal does not have a spatio temporal location but it, the whole of it may be instantiated by any number of particulars at various times

and in various places and it ---, the whole of it, may be apprehended or thought about by various people at various times. According to platonism any classification is associated with some universal. If I am capable of assigning particulars to kind K, then I must in some way apprehend a universal U which is uniquely associated with K; when the question arises of whether a particular, x, is to be assigned to K, what I do is to observe whether x instantiates U and, if it does, assign it to K. If x does not instantiate U then I do not assign it to K. What enables me to assign x to K? Platonism's answer to this question is; my knowing that x and y instantiated a single universal. Then what enables you and me to assign x to k? Platonism's answer is: our both associating a single universal K and our both observing x instantiates U. In general the question is "many particulars, but one kind or classification or general term - how come?" And platonism's answer is several particulars but one universal - that is how come?

A general criticism of platonism has been that universals are mysterious metaphysical entities, that it is not possible really to make sense of talk about universals. This criticism however, whether valid or not has

little relevance to an assessment of theories of the Platonic type as such. And in any case talk about universals can be made sense of in any of the following ways without reference to any mysterious entities; to say that two particulars can instantiate a single universal is the same as to say that (i) they can share a single property (e.g. can both be green), (ii) they can belong to a single kind or (iii) properly be co-classified. If something like this is accepted as bringing out what it means to say that two particulars can instantiate a single universal and more generally of bringing out of what is meant by talk about universals generally - then there are universals, there is nothing mysterious and peculiar about them and two particular can indeed instantiate a single one of them. But then platonism's answer to the question that we posed above will obviously be useless. It will offer a rule of classification which someone can follow only if he can already tell whether two particulars instantiates a single universal i.e., whether they belong to a single kind or can properly be co-classified. The platonic "technique" then is on a par with; "classify something as a case of malaria if the patient has malaria; otherwise don't." And the circularity here is too obvious to be pointed out.

## Part - II

Another problem connected with the problem of universal is that of the definability or otherwise of words in a particular language. It has for instance been claimed that since any word in a language can only be defined in terms of other words, there must be some words which must be incapable of being defined. Such words are what philosophers have sometimes called simple words, words which cannot be further verbally defined but only ostensively so; words such as 'blue,' 'red' etc. This problem however did not seem to worry Wittgenstein as much as the problem of the "indefinability" of words of another class e.g., "train," "party" and perhaps "games." The difficulty about such terms is not that we cannot get started, but rather that when we do get started we find that whatever we put on the right hand side is either too weak or too strong. This is sometimes expressed by saying "there is nothing common to all games by virtue of which they are games," and in this the phrase "nothing common to" suggests that the point about these words is that they cannot be defined conjunctively. But this however does not seem to be the point. If there is a valid point about "game" it is that its meaning cannot be captured in a tolerably brief

definition of any form. Here is how Wittgenstein makes the point about the meaning of "game." "Don't say: "There must be something in common, or they would not be called 'games'" - but look and see whether there is anything common to all. - For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look! - And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 'family resemblances.'"<sup>1</sup> This brings out a difference between words such as blue for instance and words such as games. Blue things differ in all sorts of ways but it is not true that blue things manifest "a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing" and that it is this network which justifies there being called "blue." Whereas the point about game is not just that there is a network of similarities but further that something counting as a game depends upon its relation to this network.

1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Sect. 66-67.

When Wittgenstein says "you will not see something that is common to all," why should we not reply "we do see something common to all: All games are activities?" This would refute that Wittgenstein says but not what he means. What he means is that there is nothing which must be possessed by every game and cannot be possessed by any non-game i.e., that we cannot say what it is for something to be a game by stating necessary and sufficient conditions for gamehood. It is pity that some of Wittgenstein's formulations mask the fact that this is the point.

Is there a connection between what we might call Wittgenstein's family resemblance doctrine and the problem of universals that we discussed in part I of this section. Some philosophers have thought that there indeed is such a connection. A fairly powerful attempt at establishing such a connection is that of R. Bambrough in his article "universals and family resemblances." Bambrough's treatment of the problem of universal as such is similar to our treatment of the problem in part I <sup>of this chapter</sup> of this chapter and also, therefore, to Wittgenstein's treatment of it. However the question of the connection between the problem of universals and Wittgenstein's remarks about family resemblances is a separate one. Although somethings that Wittgenstein says might lend support to the idea that the

doctrine of family resemblances might have something to do with the 'solution' of the problem of universals, it is much more closer to the truth to take the family resemblance remarks as confined to a rather narrow area of language than to a solution of a very general problem about the applicability of general terms as such. It is indeed the case that the family resemblance material seems to (and indeed does) raise issues about definability; Bambrough remarks that even a definable word cannot be ultimately explained by definition; and this launches him on the problem of universals. But this is not a very good starting point for a consideration of the problem of universals. A thorough investigation of the problem of universals is not helped by the rather trivial point that I cannot come to understand a word by understanding its definition unless I already understand some other words. Also a family resemblance claim about something say "G" might be rather unconsciously misexpressed by saying that the "Gs" have nothing in common except that they are "Gs"; and a generalized form of this could also be used to make the point about the problem of universals that we made above in part I. It seems that it is this fact more than anything else which has persuaded Bambrough that in seeking

for Wittgenstein's solution (of the problem of universals) we must look mainly to his use of the example of "games." But someone who thinks that these two disparate areas form a unity, because this vague formula can be made to apply to both should consider what he is up against. Here is one small but powerful evidence that the family resemblance material does not bare directly on the problem of universals and was not thought to be so by Wittgenstein. Roughly Wittgenstein's view about universals which Bambrough accepts is based upon an abstract argument for the impossibility of giving a single comprehensive explanation of the fact that things fall into kind or that general words have application at all. Wittgenstein's great achievement was to see that in the platonist account the explicandum is so general and all embracing that some part of it must be in a certain way presupposed, or left out of account by any explanation of anything. If someone offered to argue for Wittgenstein's view in a piecemeal way, by showing that platonism will not work for this classification, or for that, or for that other, we should have to conclude that he had understood neither the problem of universal nor the platonist answer to it, nor Wittgenstein's rejection of that answer. But when Wittgenstein talks about family

resemblances he says: "look and see whether there is anything common to all. To repeat; do not think but look. Look for example at board games, now pass to card games. We pass next to ball games. And the result of this examination is we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing." It is simply impossible to take this as pointing to the correct solution of the problem of universals.

It is interesting that Bambrough should also say the following in the course of his discussion of the family resemblance material. "It is because of the very power of the ways of thought against which Wittgenstein was protesting that Philosophers are led to offer accounts of his doctrine which restricts the range of its application. They recognise the importance of Wittgenstein's demonstration that at least some general terms can justifiably be applied to their instances although those instances have nothing in common. But they are so deeply attached to the idea that there must be something in common to the instances that fall under a general term that they treat Wittgenstein's examples as special cases, as rogues and vagabonds in the realm of concepts, to the general run of law abiding concepts which do mark the presence of common elements in their

instances." There would at least be several philosophers who would not regard Wittgenstein's examples as rogues and vagabonds: one might even ask, does any philosopher? Does Bambrough have any evidence to support this dismissive generalization? The point is important; because someone who says that some words don't have family resemblance kinds of meaning, while agreeing that words which do are plentiful and perfectly respectable, cannot be said to be "deeply attached to the idea that there must be something in common etc." If we must describe him in diagnostic term, what we can say of such a person is that in this respect at least he is innocent of "the ways of thought against which Wittgenstein was protesting": He is free from the "craving for unity," he does not show a contemptuous attitude towards the particular case, he is prepared to "look and see."

CHAPTER - V  
PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS : THEIR GENESIS AND SOLUTION

Philosophers disagree. This has been a characteristic feature of the practice of philosophy. They differ not only in their conclusions or views but also about the very method and goal of their pursuit. In the history of European philosophy the ancient Greeks are found to be the first among those who were disturbed by the ultimate questions about nature and reality. Thales, Anaxamder, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, address themselves to questions relating to the ultimate source of creation. On the other hand, the Upanisadic thinkers of the east were trying to articulate their views about the nature of the ultimate as the world ground. Then two distinct traditions developed drawing sustenance from their backgrounds, and traditions and culture. Philosophy began with man's sense of wonder at the vast reality surrounding him and man's persistent effort to understand it. Though philosophy began with speculation about reality in course of its growth and development it has outgrown its basic function.

Philosophy has been defined differently at different times. Philosophy as an explanation of the reality in its whole is equated with metaphysics. The metaphysician seeks to provide an explanation of reality in terms of concepts and categories. The scientists engage themselves in explain-

ing the things and processes in nature. While explaining an event the scientist refers to the cause or the sum total of antecedent conditions to the extent he undertakes the investigation of nature coming under his scope of study. It is seen to be particular in scope and factual in nature. Unlike a scientific explanation the philosophical explanation does not limit itself to any specific thing or event in space and time, rather attempts to explain reality in its totality. Philosophers like Locke, Berkeley and Hume make a departure from the traditional mode of metaphysical thinking by insisting on an investigation into the source, nature and limit of knowledge of the reality. Locke writes in the introduction of his Essay -

"Since it is the understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and given him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them, it is certainly a subject, even for its nobleness, worth our labour to inquire into. The understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes in see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance and make it its own object. But whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this inquiry, whatever it be that keeps in so much in the dark to ourselves, sure I am that all the light we can let in upon our own minds, all the acquaintance we can make with our own understanding, will not only be very pleasant, but brings in great advantage, in directing our thoughts in the search of other things. This, therefore, being my purpose to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge."<sup>1</sup>

---

1. Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 69.

The differences among philosophers about the source of human knowledge are responsible for the appearance of rationalism and empiricism, the former claiming that reason is the ultimate source and the latter claiming sense experience as basic to all human knowledge. Depending on this initial thesis the rationalists pleaded for the a priori character of human cognition and the empiricists insisted that all knowledge is a posteriori. Hume took the empiricistic thesis to its logical extreme and ended in scepticism doubting the very existence of self, substance and causal necessity. This epistemological controversy led Kant to rethink the basic premises of the rival schools. He made profound contribution in his critical philosophy, by showing that knowledge in order to be knowledge proper must involve reference to the functions both of "sensibility" and "understanding." Certain, what he called "transcendental" consideration led Kant to speak about the a priori forms of intuition and understanding. He sought to account for the possibility of knowledge by referring to the functions of mind in the form of the faculties of sensibility and understanding. Kant discovers a uniformity in the functioning of the faculties. Anything to be an object of knowledge has to conform to the a priori form or categories of sensibility

and understanding. Space and time being the a priori forms of sensibility, an object in order to be an item in our knowledge must have already been ordered in space and time. In other words if there could be non-spatial and non-temporal that cannot probably enter into domain of knowledge. Though "knowledge begins with experience, it doesn't arise out of it." The percepts in order to constitute knowledge stand in need of ordering and synthesis brought upon them by understanding through categories (a priori way of synthesis). Thus one of the central concerns of western philosophy has been a cluster of issues pertaining to the concept of knowledge and what might be called the phenomenon of knowing.

Philosophers also have been interested in the basic principles of meaning and intelligibility. In fact some would regard this concern as the defining character of philosophy. In this sense philosophy is as it were, "the science" of concepts. Other disciplines which are concerned with what are called "matters of fact," while giving their theories about reality inevitably employ certain concepts whose clarity is, from the nature of the case, taken for granted. Philosophers take up some of these concepts like cause, effect, body, mind, self, God, truth and subject them to logical analysis. A philosopher as a logician may be interested in

abstract operations of words and expressions, sentences and propositions irrespective of their truth values. The logician rightly takes up the job and brings out the basic rules of consistency and coherence. The laws of logic are nothing but the basic laws which the user of a language must satisfy in order to be intelligible. Whitehead and Russell seek to deduce all the mathematical propositions from certain primitive logical concepts. Philosophy being a conceptual enquiry must base itself in logic. Thus metaphysics, epistemology and logic constitute the different aspects of the enterprise called philosophy.

The age of "renaissance" in the west and the period subsequent to it are marked by inventions and discoveries in the various fields of science. The views of Galileo, Newton, Darwin, Einstein revolutionized man's thinking about himself and the world. This led to a fundamental change in our way of looking at things. This change was spearheaded by the new concept of rationality inherent in the "scientific" revolution. Faith, which figured prominently in philosophical thinking in medieval ages gave way to "reason." Nature was no more to be feared and worshipped. Man became victim of the possibility of conquering the forces of nature

and putting them to his own use. Man became more sceptical about the traditional beliefs and theories. It is but natural that it had certain tangible repercussions in philosophy.

Idealism was the major note of the philosophical thinking of the nineteenth century. Idealism in the hands of Green, Bosanquet and Bradley reached its zenith. The conclusions in the idealistic metaphysics were obviously contrary to the commonsensical and scientific way of thinking. Expressions like "time is unreal," "matter is unreal" made idealism susceptible to the criticisms by scientists and philosophers at large. Pragmatism, Logical positivism, ordinary language philosophy were but different reactions against idealism in particular and metaphysical thinking in general. Logical positivism was pioneered by Ernst Mach in Vienna. A group of scientists, philosophers having been inspired by the idea of unification of sciences considered it to be their primary duty to eliminate metaphysics. Metaphysics according to them contains nothing but a bundle of paradoxes and contradictions as they do not conform to the very conditions of meaningfulness. A proposition which is not analytic, in order to be meaningful must be verifiable. Metaphysical propositions being neither analytic nor synthe-

tic in the above sense contain nothing but senseless collections of words. Logical positivists then obviously drew their incentive from David Hume.

Moore sought to refute idealism in the interest of common sense. His argument against idealism rested on the contention that the truths, believed in common parlance are self evidently true. Metaphysical conclusions like "matter is unreal," "motion is impossible," "space is unreal" do obviously contradict common sense beliefs. Moore argued that common sense truths cannot be denied without self-contradiction and absurdity. When metaphysical truths are in conflict with the common sense notions one should doubt the validity of the former rather than the latter.

Russell "refuted" idealism in the interest of science. He is of the opinion that metaphysical confusions arise out of the confusion of grammatical form with logical form. In the theory of definite descriptions Russell exhibits the way philosophers posit a realm of entities having been deceived by the form of language. For him the language of science serves as an ideal language to dissolve metaphysical disputes.

Ryle on the other hand while exposing the absurdities of the cartesian myth "ghost inside the machine" traces the confusions in philosophy to what he terms as category mistake. In spite of the similarity of two expressions from the point of view of grammar they may belong to two different logical categories. To assimilate expressions belonging to two distinct categories into one category is to commit the category mistake. "Body" and "mind" though they are both nouns, do not stand for substances spatial and non-spatial respectively. The concepts associated with body and mental conduct concepts operate differently in our language and therefore have a different logic of their own. According to Ryle philosophical confusions can be removed and philosophical understanding can be achieved by drawing the logical geography of the different concepts. Wittgenstein mentions in the Tractatus -

6.5 - "The riddle does not exist."

7 - "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."

He takes the language of science as an ideal means for analysis of meaning. By limiting significant discourse to that of science he probably confined the function of language to its fact stating job only. Language for him consisted of elementary propositions as their ultimate

constituents which directly picture reality by denoting a state of affairs in the objective world. Although Wittgenstein starts with certain considerations about language and meaning, he ends up with a pluralistic conception of reality. He says in the Tractatus -

2.021 - "Objects make up the substance of the world"

1.1 - "The world is the totality of facts, not of things." The atomism of Wittgenstein was the logical consequence of certain assumptions about language and meaning.

The Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations starts with a critical re-examination of the Tractarian views. He not only questions the very assumptions on which his logical atomism was broadly based but also goes on to analyse the very nature of philosophical problem, their genesis and solutions.

In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein says that "A philosophical problem has the form: I do not know my way about."<sup>2</sup>

---

2. Wittgenstein Ludwig, Trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe, Philosophical Investigations, Section 123.

As Pitcher puts it -

"When a person thinks about something philosophically, he inevitably becomes puzzled. Being bewildered in this way is not, according to Wittgenstein, merely an unfortunate condition that some good philosophers happen to fall into but might have managed to avoid, it is an essential preliminary aspect, literary a pre-condition of being good philosopher. To know, in the fullest sense, what a philosophical problem is, entails being thus bewildered."<sup>3</sup>

For a layman the ideas of matter, mind, cause, effect, do not contain any obscurity. But when a philosopher starts thinking about these fundamental concepts their definition, implication, inter-relation he finds himself entangled with a nest of confusions. For example, we all in our day to day life do implicitly believe that everything has a cause irrespective of our knowledge of them. A medical scientist has not yet succeeded in detecting the cause of cancer but he, for that reason does not claim "here is an event which is not caused." For not finding the cause is attributed to one's failure to find the same but not to the non-existence of it. Similarly we all believe that most human actions are free. Given certain alternatives man is at liberty to choose one course of action rather than another depending on his interest and purposes. He is free to choose either the good or the bad, the desirable or the undesirable. But when a

3. Pitcher George, The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, p.188.

philosopher considers the idea of cause in the context of human actions he find himself in contradictions. If an action is taken as an event as per the strict deterministic laws of causality it must have been due to the sum totality of antecedent conditions and the antecedent condition can also be accounted for by referring to their antecedents and so on. This goes to suggest that what one is doing at present is determined by factors and conditions in the remote past over which one does not have any control. In other words one does so because one could not do otherwise. This leaves no room for free will. In the absence of free will and volition the entire edifice of ethics and morality would find no base for their coherence. Wittgenstein philosophizes against the background of a host of brilliant metaphysicians. But while diagnosing the nature of the philosophical puzzlements Wittgenstein attributes them to misunderstanding about the nature and functions of language.

Language is indispensable for human communication. The words and expressions that constitute the outer clothing of language are vehicles of ideas and meanings. It grows out of the necessities of man to communicate with each other. The words and expressions as it has been earlier pointed out in order to be meaningful should not only satisfy a given set

of rules and conventions but should also be employed in the right context. Language is context bound. If one would describe one's kindness by saying "my kindness is long or short," one would only betray one's ignorance about the use of certain expressions. Concepts like length, breadth are relevant in the description of objects in space and time. The spatio temporal rootings of these concepts make them irrelevant in the description of human qualities and virtues. Use of language is wedded to life situations. Therefore Wittgenstein observes that when words and expressions are treated or considered in abstraction, i.e., irrespective of the context one is likely to land oneself in absurdities. Metaphysical paradoxes are of this type.

Bradley for example subjects the notion of 'matter' and 'relation' to philosophical scrutiny, finds them to be contradictory and therefore relegates them to the level of appearance. Zeno's paradox of motion, Berkeley's idealistic thesis "esse-est-percipi" go down as the specimens of philosophical conclusions. Wittgenstein would observe that the concepts handled by the philosophers have their meaning and significance in ordinary language of which they are part and parcel. So like other concepts they become meaningful only against the semantic conditions (verbal and non-verbal).

When the terms are used in isolation apart from the mode of life which makes them significant they hardly convey any sense. Metaphysicians are prone to such mistakes and confusions. Wittgenstein traces them to two fundamental sources viz., the unity seeking character of human mind and picture thinking. Man has a basic tendency to find unity in diversity. When a number of particulars or individuals are brought under one class one tends to ignore the differences among the members of the class. This basic tendency also motivates the scientists to discover more and more general laws which subsume the less general ones under them. Craving for generality also governs our thinking about language and meaning. Having been prompted by this natural tendency, one tends to find similar functions in case of words belonging to different categories. The function cannot be read off from the grammatical form of the expression only. In other words, given two expressions of the same grammatical form, they may have two different kinds of functions in the language. For example - Body and mind are nouns, therefore belong to one grammatical category. Descartes was obviously led to think that body and mind stand for two different substances hence whatever is true of body in so far as it is a thing or a substance must be true of mind. One thing

that is true of the body in so far as it is a thing at all, is that there are processes going on in it. It was supposed, therefore, that correspondingly in the mind also there must be mental processes going on. Since mind as a substance is non-spatial the processes there of are not public and therefore must be going on in the "private arena" of the mind itself. Thus Descartes having thought of mind on the model of body was prompted to invoke mind as a private chamber. So also Plato thought of universals on the model of particulars and invoked a supersensuous world to house the ideas. "Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script and print. For their application is not presented to us so clearly. Especially when we are doing philosophy."<sup>4</sup>

The craving for unity leads one to assimilate words into certain paradigms. We think that all nouns function alike and all verbs stand for actions and processes. This leads one to form pictures. Picture thinking is endemic to human mind. Once a word is assimilated to a paradigm the models and pictures associated with the paradigm also influence our thinking about it. The word 'time' because of its

---

4. Wittgenstein Ludwig, Op. cit., Section 11.

similarity with other nouns has been thought as signifying a thing and conceived on the model of a stream which carries things and events with it. We speak of 'time' in terms of an eternal flow towards the future from the past through the present the pictures which are otherwise formed in our experience has certain usual connotations such as change, irrevocability and so on and so forth. Therefore when time is taken as a flow of stream one is likely to ascribe the properties of flux, irrevocability to time. In a sense our thinking about time is largely influenced and determined by suggestions from the picture. In other words we are held captive by pictures. When one is under the spell of pictures one tends to be oblivious of the real connotations of terms and falls into philosophical puzzlements. Pictures are also embedded in our language. For example, somebody remarks "I shall keep it in mind" The word 'keep' has a spatial connotation. We normally speak of "keeping things in the basket, box etc." Because of the spatial undertone of the term when it is used in relation to mind, we think of the mind as if it is respectable where informations are stored for future reference.

Philosophical conclusions according to Wittgenstein are partly due to certain frailties of human mind and the

peculiarities of language. The peculiarity of philosophical puzzlements consists in the fact that they are not amenable to solution in the light of facts. Had it been so philosophical problems would have been long solved like their scientific counterparts. The philosopher is already conversant with all the relevant facts but clings to his view in spite of the evidences contrary to it. Idealism in its extreme form maintains that an object is nothing but conglomeration of ideas. In experiencing, an object, ideas and concepts are all that we have access to. So the postulation of an external world over and above ideas is logically unwarranted. From this idealists go on to "refute" the belief in the existence of an external world. Berkeley would subscribe to the above version of idealism, in spite of his obvious awareness of the evident facts that there is an external world in which he has his being. Wittgenstein compares the philosopher with a neurotic who continues to doubt the intention and the gestures of one and all even though there are no circumstantial justification for having them. Wittgenstein would observe there is hardly anything wrong with the people. The difficulty of the psychotic lies within himself. In case of the philosophers "the trouble, in short, lies not in the alleged "facts" to be explained, but in the philosopher's way of looking at them,

in his way of thinking and talking about them. It appears to him as though there are profound difficulties about sense perception itself, about free will itself, about truth itself, and so on; but in fact the difficulty lies not there, but rather in the philosopher's way of viewing them."<sup>5</sup> A philosophical problem says, Wittgenstein is "not a scientific one; but a muddle felt as a problem."<sup>6</sup> The philosopher is the man who is intellectually sick and hence stands in need of a cure. So the proper treatment of a philosophical puzzle is "like the treatment of an illness."<sup>7</sup> The philosopher like the psychoanalytic patient can be made to see sense by making him realize the real source of his difficulty. "A person caught in a philosophical confusion is like a man in a room who wants to get out but doesn't know how. He tries the window but it is too high. He tries the chimney but it is too narrow."<sup>8</sup>

Philosophical problems are, therefore, pseudo problems, philosophical doubts pseudo doubts, philosophical questions pseudo questions. One must, however, add that although, they are "pseudo," they are not so in any trivial sense.

---

5. Pitcher George, Op.cit., p. 195.

6. Wittgenstein, The Blue And The Brown Books, p. 6.

7. Wittgenstein Ludwig, Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Philosophical Investigations, Section 255.

8. Malcolm, Memoir, p.51.


There is profundity to them not unlike the profundity of the neurotic's sickness. They arise as consequent upon profound misunderstandings of uses of language. Wittgenstein would urge that all terms and expressions get their meaning from the ordinary language which is their home. Metaphysicians in their attempt to get to a "world view" select certain expressions current in ordinary language and define them in abstraction. But meaningful use of an expression is not possible if it is divested from the context which renders it meaningful. As a result of metaphysical stretch of ordinary expressions metaphysicians harvest confusions and paradoxes. Bradley treats space, time and matter in abstraction and assess them by his own definition of reality and as a consequence arrives at conclusions like, space is unreal, matter is unreal, time is unreal, which obviously conflicts with common sense truths. Since metaphysical puzzles are due to taking expressions away from the contexts of their actual use, they can be solved by bringing back expressions from their metaphysical use to their home use.

Unlike in the Tractatus Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations admits the possibility of alternative language games. Fact stating though primary is not the only function of language. Language is used for different purposes.

We perform different speech acts by means of language. It is also used in doing something i.e., in course of our speech activities. To state facts, to ask questions, to wish, etc., are different speech acts. But statements containing informations, statements in form of questions, exclamatory expressions may also occur in course of relating a story. But Wittgenstein would insist that the rules governing a descriptive expression would be different from the rules of the language of ethics. To use one language by means of the semantic rules of another is as good as playing one game by the rules of another. So Wittgenstein admits all possible alternative kinds of life which give rise to their respective languages. Philosophical confusions disappear only when one gets adequate clarity as to the meaning of the word by finding it in the way it functions in the language. In finding out the meaning of an expression he would urge to enumerate not only the actual and remote use of the expression but also to invent and imagine possible states of affairs and see if they could be meaningfully employed in them.

The above analysis reveals meaning of an expression is not part of it rather it gets meaning from the context.

So the criterion of intelligibility cannot be fixed a priori. Is it not possible to make sense of the philosophical treatment of concepts in the context of the metaphysical thinking? Is it logically sound to dub all metaphysical problem as pseudo ones as they do not conform to the ordinary or common sense ways of looking at it? What is after all the idea of ordinary language? Does it stand for the language of the riff-raff? A close perusal of the history of metaphysics would make one think that the metaphysician is very well aware of the uses of the expressions in ordinary language and in spite of this, being persuaded by certain logical considerations, he defines them in a particular way rather than another. Metaphysical conclusions can sometimes be traced to certain assumptions which are accepted again on the basis of rational considerations. Metaphysics is the philosophical exercise with concepts to offer a coherent and holistic explanation of reality. Of course a philosopher does not explain the world in the way a scientist does. Nonetheless the endeavour to explain the world by means of certain basic concepts and categories no doubt illuminates one's understanding and furthers the cause of philosophy. To pronounce metaphysical problems as muddles because the metaphysical uses of expressions



are not in conformity with their uses in ordinary language might itself amount to evaluating one game by the principles of another.

The foregoing might give the suggestion that philosophical problems are solely caused due to linguistic and conceptual confusions. This point stands in need of elucidation. As a matter of fact a philosophical theory might have various type of causes. The causes might be psychological, social, religious, scientific and cultural as well. Therefore it is wrong to say that linguistic confusion is the sole cause of philosophical theories. The philosopher proposes a particular theory which might have multiple axes to grind. He might be trying to advance a particular ideology. As a matter of fact many philosophers have tried to advance ideologies in the form of philosophical theories. Therefore it is wrong to say that philosophical theories are caused due to conceptual confusions alone. We wish to point out that Wittgenstein is not oblivious to this fact. What he is trying to point out is this: whatever might be the causes of a philosophical theory, it can be presented as cases of conceptual confusions. A philosophical theory is a concatenation of concepts. Wittgenstein would argue that certain philosophical theory exhibit cases of conceptual confusions.

CHAPTER - VI  
WITTGENSTEIN, AND IDEALISM

Wittgenstein, as I shall argue in this Chapter, is, in a fairly recognizable sense of the term, "an idealist." In both the works earlier and later he has developed what might be called his own form of idealism. It might appear very strange that Wittgenstein could use the language of idealism. It is sometimes argued by a section of scholars that Wittgenstein is an anti-metaphysician. The logical positivists treated the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus as their bible and tried to get intellectual support for their anti-metaphysical position from it. The positivist position that metaphysics is meaningless, is claimed to be implied in The Tractatus. The Philosophical Investigations has also been interpreted in the similar manner by some scholars. Metaphysics is a muddle. Metaphysical theories are results of conceptual confusion.

We wish to show that Wittgenstein, as a matter of fact, continues the Germanic tradition of transcendental idealism. Before we argue out this position it will not be out of place to spell out in brief the idealistic thesis. "Idealism" popularly means belief in and commitment to "ideals." In this sense we sometimes say that so and so is man of ideals, that means he is committed to

certain values and lives up to it. Idealism in this sense stands for certain values, beliefs and attitudes. But idealism as a philosophical theory has usually the following forms viz.,

- (i) epistemological idealism,
- (ii) metaphysical idealism, and
- (iii) transcendental idealism.

Epistemological idealism relates to theory of knowledge. Metaphysical idealism relates to theory of reality. According to epistemological idealism the object of knowledge is dependent for its existence on the knowledge of the percipient. It got its classic expression in Berkeley. Berkeley was an epistemological idealist. For him *esse est percipi*. This means existence is perception. A thing cannot be said to exist if it is not perceived. This theory of perception compelled Berkeley to maintain that the external world is nothing but a series of perceptions.

Metaphysical idealism is a doctrine which claims that the nature of the object of knowledge is of the nature of mind. In other words the subject and the object are of the same type. The knowing subject and the object of knowledge belong to the same category. This type of

idealism is sometimes known as metaphysical idealism. Hegel and Bradley are metaphysicians in this sense. Epistemological idealism is sometimes known as subjective idealism. Subjective idealism, historically speaking has resulted in solipsism. To use Perry's words, it has resulted in what is known as ego-centric-predicament. Objective idealism, has reduced matter to objective mind. Hegel argues that the world is an externalization of the spirit. Mind categories are the ultimate categories. But Hegel did not use mind in the subjective sense as a specific apparatus of knowledge of an individual.

But both the two types of idealism are reductionist in nature. Epistemological idealism reduces the world to a series of perceptions. Metaphysical idealism reduces matter to mind. The type of idealism which Kant advocated may be characterized as transcendental idealism. According to Kant there are certain ultimate, basic and fundamental conditions of human experience and knowledge. These conditions are transcendental in nature. That is to say they are not created or manufactured by us. They constitute the basic furniture of human knowledge. Without these categories and concepts no knowledge is possible. But at the same time we cannot transcend the limits set by these categories. These



categories not only make our knowledge possible but set a limit to human knowledge. In other words they determine the nature and limits of knowledge.

In spite of the differences between epistemological, metaphysical and transcendental idealisms there are similarities among them. In other words they share in certain common points. Ideas or concepts are central to knowledge. Unfortunately the epistemological idealists used ideas in the sense of image or mental contents. To use Bradley's words the British empiricists psychologized logic. They treated logical issues as if they were psychological ones. Ideas in the sense of images or mental contents are not the subject matter of philosophy. The British empiricists confused between logical and psychological issues. Bradley makes a distinction between ideas as images and ideas as meanings. Ideas in the sense of meaning can be studied by philosophers and the idealists study concepts or ideas.

Bradley examines the categories of knowledge. He came to the conclusion that reality cannot be known through categories. He treated them as make-shift devices. Ideas are of no use in knowing reality. Ideas present before us appearances not reality, that is why Bradley recommends a

non-categorial mode of understanding. It is a type of understanding where concepts and categories cease to operate. Bradley spells out in detail the contradictions inherent in ideas or categories.

Wittgenstein can perhaps be characterized as a transcendental idealist of the Kantian type. In both the works Tractatus Logico Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations transcendental idealism is inherent. It is not visible on the surface. One can dig out the idealistic structure submerged in both the works. Let us first discuss the idealistic position held in the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. The Tractarian world is a totality of facts. These facts correspond to the elementary propositions. Facts for Wittgenstein are both actual and possible. The totality can be exhausted only by actual and possible facts. The elementary propositions lie submerged under ordinary language. At this stage language pictures reality. The ideal language much talked of in the Tractatus is not a constructed ideal language. It is a language discovered by a particular type of analysis. The elementary propositions are treated as the pictures of reality. According to Wittgenstein both language and reality have isomorphic structure. This means that the multiplicity in elementary

propositions correspond to the multiplicity in the facts. But this structure shows itself. That is why Wittgenstein claims that which can be shown cannot be said. This is the unsayable. The structure of the world is reflected in the structure of the language. This shows itself therefore it cannot be put into words. This is in fact the unspeakable. At this point Wittgenstein resembles Kant. Like Kant he sets a limit to human thought and communication. Kant warns us against transgressing the sphere of phenomena. Any transgression of the bounds of phenomena will result in antinomies. But at the same time Kant points out that there is an eternal impulse in man to transgress the bounds. Poets and mystics have always tried to transgress the bounds of the sayable and the speakable. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason may be characterized as a treatise concerned with setting up of boundaries to the world. Similarly Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico Philosophicus can be characterized as a treatise concerned with setting up of limits of meaningful discourse. Wittgenstein maintains that the limits of my language are the limits of my world. This has puzzled subsequent commentators. Some of them have read solipsism into it. But we wish to point out that Wittgenstein is not a solipsist. His argument that

where of one cannot speak there of one must be silent is not symptomatic of solipsism; rather it tells us not to transgress the boundary of speech and communication. Language sets a limit to thought and communication. Any attempt to go beyond the boundaries of communication is to land oneself in absurdities. Wittgenstein in the Tractatus maintained that only genuine propositions are descriptive ones. The propositions of natural sciences belong to this category. They constitute the area of the sayable. As Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason gave a metaphysical defence to Newtonian mechanics, Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus was trying to delimit the scope and boundaries of descriptive propositions of natural science. Wittgenstein is not a subjective idealist. He does not treat the external world as a series of perception in the mind of the percipient. The following arguments could be given on his behalf. The subject of knowledge can never be made the object of knowledge. This is a position which is usually accepted by the transcendental idealist. The transcendental idealist make a distinction between the 'ego' and the 'transcendental self.' The ego may be treated as an object of knowledge but the transcendental self can never be treated so. Kant made such a distinction. Accord-

ding to him the self is a transcendental unity of apperception. It cannot be caught in the process of perception. Its existence is logically postulated to account for the unity of perception. The Upanisadic text is full of such references. It has been argued in the Upanisads that 'I' or the 'transcendental self' cannot be treated as an object of knowledge. All knowledge is possible because of this transcendental self. The self is a unity of perception. That is why it cannot be treated as an object of perception. In the Advaita Vedanta of Sankara the self has been treated as a transcendental principle. It is not amenable to ordinary modes of perception. No categories can be applied to it because of the simple reason that the application of all categories are made possible because of this principle. Wittgenstein treats the self as Kant treats it. Therefore Wittgenstein can be treated as a Kantian in his treatment of the self. For him the 'I' or the self is a formal concept. There are no objects corresponding to these concepts in the world. Wittgenstein does not reduce the self to a series of impressions in the manner of David Hume. Hume reduced self to a string of impressions. His famous argument is that when one looks within, one never comes across what is known as the self.

One only comes across a particular sensation or other but never what is known as the self. Hume committed the mistake which many other empiricists have done. The empiricists treated the self as an object and later on were disappointed when they did not find it. This is as good as raising the dust and complaining that one cannot see things. The formal distinction between subject and object compels one to posit that the self can never be made as an object of knowledge. The Advaitins were aware of this fact. They made a distinction between perceptual consciousness and witness consciousness (Sāksicaitanya). The witness consciousness can never be caught in the process of perception. Any attempt to perceive it in the manner of an object will lead to infinite regress. The empiricist forgot to recognise the logic of perception that it is based upon a postulate of transcendental self. The omission of this fact has led empiricism to solipsism. There is no element of empiricism, consequently of solipsism, in Wittgenstein. He is neither an empiricist nor a solipsist. He is a transcendental idealist.

As we have pointed out Wittgenstein is not an empiricist he is not a realist too. He does not treat the

world as a totality of things as a realist would do. Nor is he an advocate of common sense view of the world as G.E. Moore would like to uphold. His treatment of the world is Kantian in nature. The Kantian world is a categorised or conceptualized world. The world that we know Kant would argue that it is not the world per se. It is a world categorised. The world becomes intelligible to us through these categories. The categories so to say give a shape to the world. One comes across similar views in the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus of Wittgenstein. He treats the world as a totality of facts. These facts consist of objects. The fact is a configuration of objects. But how did Wittgenstein arrive at this? In answer to this it can be said that Wittgenstein arrived at this theory of the world through extensional analysis of language. He treats language as truth functional. A truth function is a compound proposition whose truth value can be determined by the truth values of its component propositions. Thus in the process of analysis we arrive at elementary propositions. A compound proposition is decomposable into elementary ones. An elementary proposition lies hidden behind the compound proposition. The elementary propositions in their turn picture facts. The elementary

propositions can be, with some reservation likened to Kantian categories. As the Kantian categories are empty without the content so is the case with elementary propositions. The categories of Kant give a shape to the world. But the world and the elementary propositions according to Wittgenstein have the same structure. They are isomorphic in nature. The elementary propositions, so to say, are the categories of knowledge. They are impersonal and objective in nature. They are not like the subjective impressions of the Human variety. In other words they cannot be treated as a string of fleeting impressions. The elementary propositions have an objective status even though Wittgenstein refused to give an example of it. But what is the nature of the world without these elementary propositions? As the world for Kant cannot be made intelligible without the categories similarly the world for Wittgenstein is unintelligible without elementary propositions. The elementary propositions in a way give a shape to the world. This is an idealistic position.

The Philosophical Investigations also has an idealistic undertone. This is the line of continuity between Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations. In

the Philosophical Investigations language has been treated as a form of life. It is a prism through which we look at the world. What does it mean? Wittgenstein's remark that there cannot be 'seeing' as such but always 'seeing as' is a pointer in this direction. This means that there cannot be any 'seeing' in perception without application of categories. This is really a Kantian position. Knowledge is conceptual. Without concepts and categories no knowledge is possible. An object is an object only when it is seen through a category. The world cannot be said to exist for us unless we apply these categories. The world without the categories is the Kantian nou-mena which is unknown and unknowable. It is through the network of language games that the world becomes intelligible to us. The difference between Kant and the later Wittgenstein is that Kant believed in fixed categories whereas the later Wittgenstein does not believe in the fixity of categories. For him language is a form of life. Sometimes the old language games become obsolete and new language games come into being. Wittgenstein's language games are the counterparts of Kant's categories with the difference that Kant's categories are fixed and static and Wittgenstein's language games are dynamic in nature. Language

games grow, become obsolete and new language games come into being. But the fact remains that the world is intelligible to us only through language games. Language has been treated as a form of life. This is an idealistic thesis in disguise. This means that language and life are inalienably connected. To understand life means to understand language game and to understand language game means to understand forms of life. Language cannot be understood without relating it to human context and situation. Wittgenstein in the manner of F. H. Bradley treats the world as an organic whole. Bradley points out that to understand one thing is to relate it to other things. This is in short the cardinal feature of idealism. The idealist like Hegel maintains that the world is organically related. Any idea contains limitless possibilities. The idea of being for example not only contains limitless potentialities but also the idea of its self-annihilation that is non-being. 'Being' even contains the idea of 'non-being.' This might look very strange and contradictory. How is it that both 'being' and 'non-being' which appear contradictory in the surface go together? This cannot be understood without unearthing the Hegelian philosophical motives. We wish to point out in this connection that Hegel

was concerned with exploring the limitless potentialities of basic ideas of thought. Ideas constitute an organic unity, so does thought. Thought and reality have the same structure. This brand of Germanic idealism is very much present in Wittgenstein's work. Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations narrates an incident in the following manner. Suppose somebody comes across a nail on the way but how do we recognise it as a nail. A nail is a nail only when it is related to certain other things. This means that the idea of purely unrelated object is a myth. All language games are internally connected. According to Wittgenstein experience is semantic in nature. Non-categorised pure experience without any semantic touch is a myth. In other words pure experience is not possible at all. An experience in order to be an experience has to conform to the categories. It can be said in this connection that the totality of language games is actually the totality of facts for us. In the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Wittgenstein thought that these language games in the form of elementary propositions are fixed for all time to come. But in Philosophical Investigations he comes to the conclusion that there are infinite and innumerable language games. Therefore there are

innumerable ways of looking at the world. It is the language games, the modes of representation that bring us closer to the world. Without these language games the world will not be world for us. It is only through language games we know the world and talk about it. In the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Wittgenstein characterizes these totalities as both actualities and possibilities. The world is totality of facts both actual and possible. It is interesting to note that in the totality of facts Wittgenstein included possible facts. Why did he do so? In answer to this it can be said that logically speaking the totality has to include possibilities. Without this totality will not be complete. The actual language games do not exhaust the totality of language games. The totality of language games is constituted by both possible and actual language games. This is the meaning of totality. In this connection we wish to point out that this is much more a Hegelean brand of idealism that is recognizable in the works of Wittgenstein. It is very difficult to say whether Wittgenstein read Hegel and Kant and was influenced by their writings. But the fact remains that the Germanic idealistic element can be discovered in Wittgenstein.

One of the major themes of idealism is that the world is a system of ideas or concepts. These ideas are not subjective impressions of human mind but objective in nature. As Hegel points out that the world is an externalization of ideas. The world is ultimately a system of ideas. Virtually there is no distinction between the ideas and the world. Now the question is what is the nature of these ideas? Are the ideas language bound, context bound or they are independent of language and context? Answers to these questions will open up new dimensions. If it is argued that language conditions thought then one will argue with Sapir and Whorf that our perceptions are determined by our language. In other words this will lead to linguistic determination of human perception. One will be forced to accept the view that the categories of language are the categories of reality. Some philosophers have pleaded for this view. Russell argues that the linguistic structure of Indo-European languages has been conducive to subject predicate logic and substance attribute metaphysics. In this connection he further argues that language devoid of nouns and adjectives perhaps will not have substance attribute metaphysics. Substance attribute metaphysics is contingent upon linguistic facts.

Sapir and Whorf go to the extent of saying that language not only determines reality but the world view as well. There is a close and intimate connection between the structure of language and the structure of thought and reality. Is Wittgenstein Sapirian? Does Wittgenstein accept the Sapir Whorf hypothesis? These questions are of fundamental importance. We wish to point out that Wittgenstein is not a Sapirian. He will not agree with Sapir and Whorf that the categories of reality are dependent on linguistic categories of specific languages. The views of Sapir and Whorf tie reality to specific languages. Thus it will lead in the direction of not only metaphysical relativism but cultural relativism too. In other words linguistic relativism will ultimately lead to ethnocentrism. There will be as many pictures of reality as there are languages. Sapir and Whorf accord place of primacy to linguistic categories and these categories are language specific. Therefore it can be said that different linguistic groups will have their own picture of reality as determined by their linguistic categories. But what is the status of these linguistic categories? To this question, Sapir and Whorf will probably tell us that the linguistic categories are autonomous in nature. In

that they determine and condition our thought. The linguistic categories condition the nature of reality by way of conditioning the nature of thought. For Sapir and Whorf there is only a one way traffic between language and reality. But this will not be acceptable to Wittgenstein. To interpret Wittgenstein as a Sapirian is to commit a mistake. It is true that for Wittgenstein experience is semantic in nature. It is true that perception and knowledge is category based but these categories are not contingent upon specific languages. Though the categories and concepts are expressed by and embodied in languages, yet they are not dependent on languages. This means that categories and concepts are independent of any specific languages which embody them. In this sense Wittgenstein may be characterized as a Kantian but not a Sapirian. There is a sense in which it can be said that the basic categories and concepts are not language dependent. They are trans-linguistic and trans-cultural in nature. The twelve categories of Kant and seven categories of Kanada belong to this type. The Vaisesika Padarthas and the Kantian categories are not linguistic in nature. They are the categories of thought, speech and communication. These categories cannot be explained in accordance

with the Sapir Whorf hypothesis. There is a sense in which there is a bed rock of human thought and knowledge. Kant and Kanada seek to discover such a bed rock. These categories may be termed as basic, primary and fundamental categories. These primary categories are not language bound, context bound or culture bound. They are trans-linguistic and trans-cultural in nature. As opposed to these there may be a group of categories known as the secondary ones. The primary categories do not change, they are stable and fixed. To use Strawson's word they are basic or primitive categories. The secondary categories are amenable to change. In a certain sense these categories can be said to be bound to context and culture. The derivative meanings of words in the Sanskrit language is a case in point. A close look at the formation of compound (Samāsa) and morphophonemic analysis (Sandhi) of words in Sanskrit language tells us a lot about the social and cultural condition prevalent in ancient India. There is a rule regarding compound formation in Sanskrit language. It is this: an expression denoting a group of people who are treated as untouchable (aniravāsitasudra) cannot be compounded with expression denoting higher class. This grammatical rule and consequently the expression

aniravāsitasudra are indicative of the social and cultural conditions prevalent in ancient India. But this does not go to prove the Sapirian hypothesis. It simply indicates that there is a constant interplay between language and thought in the sphere of secondary concepts. Sometimes new thoughts give rise to new grammatical and linguistic categories. It may so happen also that these grammatical categories shape our perception and thought. At this stage the question of cross cultural communication and understanding becomes prominent. How do people belonging to one culture understand others belonging to another culture? To this question a solipsistic answer may be given. It may be argued that one cultural and linguistic group in principle cannot understand another for the simple reason that both of them have two distinct and different linguistic categories. We want to maintain in this connection that this position will not be acceptable to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein surely believes in infinite and innumerable number of language games. He will even go the extent of conceding that different linguistic and cultural groups have their specific language games. But what are the language games? Are they really private, to such an extent that one group cannot

understand another? The idea of linguistic privacy and solipsism goes against the very idea of language games. Language games are public. To say that language is a 'game' is to say that it is governed by rules, and to say that it is governed by rules is to say that others can understand it. It is true that certain cultural categories prevalent in one group cannot easily be made intelligible to others. There might be difficulties, inhibitions and obstructions in the way. But this does not go to prove linguistic and cultural solipsism. To understand another group may be very difficult but not impossible. The logical impossibility of cross cultural understanding is a myth for the simple reason that it goes against the very idea of language games. The Oriya proverb that 'mature girls and ghee should not be kept for a long time at home,' may appear very ludicrous to an outsider. They may think that these people are barbarians, uncultured and uncivilized because they do not want to keep their daughters and ghee at their home. One who passes such judgement fails to take into account the culture and tradition of the people who have this adage. What we wish to suggest is this: to understand one culture

is to understand the form of life and way of life of the people; otherwise misunderstanding and misinterpretation are likely to ensue. As a matter of fact many European scholars passed such types of biased judgements on Asiatic civilizations in the beginning of 19th century. Different language games are not isolated islands. They criss-cross and overlap each other. This shows that language games are interconnected. Different language games have contact points. This interconnection among language games makes it possible for one culture to be intelligible to another. To over look this is to misunderstand Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein is an idealist but never a solipsist. To read solipsism in Wittgenstein is to misinterpret and misunderstand language games.

CONCLUSION

playwright, a novelist uses words usually in non-conventional ways. This endows words with profound meanings. Cognitive meaning is not the only meaning. There are non-cognitive meanings as well. The positivists tried to treat cognitive meaning as the meaning and decried non-cognitive meaning. But Wittgenstein is not a reductionist. He does not reduce non-cognitive meaning into cognitive ones.

Lastly, I would like to draw a lesson from what I call the idealistic strand in Wittgenstein's thought. And this has to do with our understanding of culture in general and cultures of other people's in particular. One may paraphrase Wittgenstein by saying that to understand a form of life is to understand the interconnectedness of ideas and to be able to bring the whole to bear upon one's appreciation of the part and likewise, to bring the part to bear upon one's appreciation of the whole. In order to follow the game of cricket one must understand what a bat, a stump, innings, onside fielder, a bowler, a wicket keeper, and a slip cordon are and what the game in which these things are elements all about. When a critic attempts to interpret Keats' "Ode on a Grecian urn," he does so by repetatively asking himself the alternating questions

"What is the whole poem about?" and "what exactly has Keats' scene depicted on the urn", emerging at the end of an advancing spiral of general observations and specific remarks with a reading of the poem as an assertion of the triumph of the aesthetic mode of perception over the historical? In the same way, when a person tries to find out what goes on in the mind's of people belonging to a culture quite other than one's own, he has to move back and forth between asking himself "what is the general form of their life?" and "what exactly are the vehicles in which that form is embodied?", emerging at the end of a similar sort of spiral with a whole set of insights. I would like to suggest that a proper understanding and handling of the Wittgensteinian notion of a form of life can mark the beginning of a revolutionary turn in the sciences of man.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

## (Books)

- Ambrose, Alice and Lazerowitz, Morris, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophy and Language, London: George Allen And Unwin Ltd., New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1972.
- Ammerman, R (ed.), Classics of Analytical Philosophy, Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company Ltd., Bombay, New Delhi, 1965.
- Austin, J.L., How to do Things With Words, Oxford University Press, London, 1971.
- Ayer, A.J., Language Truth and Logic, Victor Gollancz Ltd., London, 1936.
- <sup>9</sup> The Foundation of Empirical Knowledge, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1971.
- , The Central Questions of Philosophy, Penguin Books, 1973.
- Baker, G.P. and Hacker, P.M.S., Essays On The Philosophical Investigations, Vol. I, Wittgenstein Meaning and Understanding, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1980.

- \_\_\_\_\_, An Analytical Commentary On Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Vol. I, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1980, 1983.
- Berkeley, George, A New Theory of Vision and Other Writings, J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd., London, 1969.
- Black, Max, Language and Philosophy, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1970.
- \_\_\_\_\_, The Labyrinth of Language, Penguin Books, 1968.
- Bradley, F.H., The Principles of Logic, Oxford University Press, London, 1967.
- Chomsky, Noam, Reflections on Language, Fontana Books, 1967.
- Crystal, David, Linguistics, Penguin Books, 1971.
- Fann, K.T , Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969.
- Flew, A.G.N. (ed.), Logic and Language, Second Series, Oxford Basil Blackwell, 1973.

- Hartnack, Justus, Wittgenstein and Modern Philosophy,  
Trans., Cranston, Maurice, Anchor  
Books, Doubleday and Company, Inc.,  
Garden City, New York, 1962.
- Hume, David, Enquiries Concerning The Human  
Understanding And Concerning The  
Principles of Morals, Oxford, 1972.
- , A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford  
University Press, London, 1973.
- Hospers, John, An Introduction to Philosophical  
Analysis, Allied Publishers Pvt.,  
Ltd., New Delhi, 1971.
- Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Trans., Smith,  
Norman, Kemp, Macmillan and Co.,  
Ltd., London, 1970.
- Kenny, Anthony, Wittgenstein, Penguin Books,  
England, 1973.
- Klemke (ed.), Essays on Wittgenstein, University  
of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago,  
London.
- Langer, K. Susanne, Philosophy in a New Key, Cambridge,  
Massachusetts, Harvard University  
Press, 1971.

- Lewis, H.D. (ed.), Clarity is Not Enough, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1963.
- Locke, Don, My Self and Others, Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Edtd. with an introduction by Yolton, J.W., J.M. & Sons Ltd., London, 1961.
- Lyons, John, Chomsky, Fontana/Collins, 1970.
- Malcolm, Norman, Ludwig Wittgenstein, A Memoir, Oxford University Press, London, 1967.
- Mandelbaum, G. David (ed.), Selected Writings of Edward Sapir, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1973.
- Miri, Mrinal, What is a Person, Shree Publishing House, Delhi, 1980.
- Pears, David, Wittgenstein, Fontana/Collins, 1971.
- Pitcher, George, The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Prentice-Hall of India Private Limited, New Delhi.

- \_\_\_\_\_, (ed), Wittgenstein, Doubleday & Company  
I.N.C., New York, 1966.
- Plato, Dialogues, Trans. Benjamin Jowett,  
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1953.
- Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, London:  
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., New  
York: Humanities Press Inc., 1923.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, London:  
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., New  
York: Humanities Press Inc., 1923.
- Royal Institute of Phi- Understanding Wittgenstein,  
losophy Lectures Volume Macmillan, 1974.  
7, 1972/73,
- Royal Institute of Phi- Idealism Past & Present.  
losophy Lectures,  
Volume 57, 1982.
- Ress, Rush (ed.) Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal  
Recollections, Oxford, Basil  
Blackwell, 1981.
- Russell, Bertrand, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford  
University Press, London, 1971.

- Scarle, John, R, Speech Acts An Essay In The Philosophy of Language, Cambridge, at The University Press, 1970.
- Taylor, Charles, Hegel, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975.
- Vlastos, Gregory (ed.), Plato A Collection of Critical Essays, Anchor Books, Doubleday And Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1971.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, Trans., Pears, D.F. & McGuinness, B.F. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Philosophical Investigations, Trans. Anscombe, G.E.M., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1974.
- \_\_\_\_\_, The Blue And Brown Books, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Philosophical Remarks, Trans. Hargreaves, Raymond and White Roger, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1975.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Zettel, Trans., Anscombe, G.E.M., Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1967.

- On Certainty, Ed. Anscombe, G.E.M.,  
and Vonwright, G.H., Trans., Paul  
Denis and Anscombe, G.E.M., Basil  
Blackwell, Oxford, 1974.
- Winch, Peter (ed.), Studies In The Philosophy Of  
Wittgenstein, London: Routledge  
and Kegan Paul, 1969.

## (Journals)

- Gahringer, R.E., "Can Games Explain Language,"  
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 56, 1959.
- Hunter, J.F., "Forms of Life in Wittgenstein's  
Philosophical Investigations,"  
American Philosophical Quarterly,  
Vol. V , 1968.
- Linsky, L, "Wittgenstein On Language And  
Some Problems of Philosophy",  
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 54, 1957.
- Mamel, A. R., "Games and Family Resemblance,"  
Philosophy, Vol. 42, 1967.

- Nielsen, H.A., "Wittgenstein on Language",  
Philosophical Studies, Nos 1-2, 1964.
- Pompa, L., "Family Resemblance," The Philoso-  
phical Quarterly, Vol. 17, 1967.
- Smart, Harold, "Language Games," The Philosophical  
Quarterly, Vol. 7, 1957.
- Wellman, C., "Wittgenstein and the Egocentric  
Predicament," Mind, Vol. 68, 1959.

## (Encyclopaedia)

- Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967.
- Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, T & T Clark, 1971.
- International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,  
Macmillan Co., 1968.

## BIO-DATA

Name ... KALIPADA MOHANTA

Date of birth ... 4th October, 1956.

Permanent Address ... Gourmohan's Building  
(Near R.M. Temple)  
P.O. Baripada  
ORISSA 757 001

Educational Qualifications ... 1. M.A. (Utkal)  
2. M. Phil.(N.E.H.U.)

**BNU Library**  
 Acc. No. 101742  
 Acq. by ----- 3/1/86  
 Class by -----  
 Sub. Reading by --  
 Date by -----  
 Transcribed by --  
 -----