

Chapter V

STATE AND RULING CLASS IN THE THIRD WORLD

Dependency or Self-reliance

Emergence of the Third World, now covering more than half of the world territory and about two-thirds of the world population is a significant event in the post-war world. Behind their appearance as new actors in the international system, there lies a history of about 100 years of anti-imperialist struggles. With the weakening of the imperialist chains during the World War II these freedom movements gained momentum in most of the colonies and semi-colonies. The birth of socialist block as a powerful anti-imperialist force and the growing strength of the patriotic forces in colonies and semi-colonies made it difficult for the imperialists to stick on to their policy of colonialism. Taking advantage of the weakness of the imperialist forces, many countries in Asia and Africa attained political independence. Along with them, a few other countries like Iran, Maldives and some of the Arab States which were never colonies of any imperialist power also identified their interests with the developing societies.

Ever since the Third World countries made their presence felt in the international politics, their dynamics began to attract the attention of the intellectual world. In the initial years, the intellectuals concentrated mainly on the problems of development and modernisation in the Third World. However after the mid-sixties, many scholars have started coming forward to understand the nature of state in the UDCs. Apart from liberal thinkers there are many Marxist and other radical schools which attempted to theorise the dynamics of the underdeveloped countries. But

the social formation in the Third World is so specific that it has become difficult to arrive at consensus about the character of the state in these developing nations. Since each nation in the developing world exhibits so many specific features, a comprehensive knowledge of the nature of the state in the Third World requires concrete analyses of the dynamics of class struggles, structure of civil societies and stages of development study is not possible unless a theoretical discourse is built by perfecting the existing Marxist analytical categories. Keeping this necessity in mind, an attempt is made in this chapter to evaluate different Marxist and other radical schools of thought, especially on questions relating to the state, classes and economic development in the Third World. Since such evaluation presupposes a fair knowledge of the Third World, one may first try to grasp the specificities of the social formations in the developing societies.

Multi-structural Societies

All the underdeveloped countries (UDCs) are multi-structural and multi-stratified societies exhibiting considerable variations in the levels of economic development. Many countries including those with the highest population are among the low income countries with highest percentage of people living below the poverty line. According to an estimate, 75% of people in Bangladesh, 51% in Indonesia and 34% in Pakistan live in poverty. On the other side one can see some of the oil rich countries like Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait whose per capita income is equal to or in some cases more than many of the western capitalist countries. In addition there are newly industrialising countries like Singapore and South Korea whose per capita incomes remain around \$3,000.¹ Despite these variations in the levels of economic development, in almost all countries capitalist and pre-capitalist structures exist side by side for a long time. Unlike 'pure' economic formations of the advanced capitalist societies, the developing nations are characterised by the existence of different modes of production. Even within the Third World, nature of multi-structural economy differs from one country to another. The multi-structural socio-economic systems of Saudi Arabia and Bhutan cannot be reduced to those of India and Sri Lanka. Yet it should be admitted that in all countries social forces having their roots in precapitalist social formations dominate the internal politics. Mention may be made here of castes in India, tribes in Africa and religions in countries like Iran, Bhutan, Nepal and Pakistan. The roles that these structures and

their corresponding social forces play are so dominant in certain countries that they even overshadow the role of the classes and class struggles. Even in these countries where they play subordinate role, they succeed in giving specific orientation to the class politics of these states.

Specificity of Classes in the UDCs

As far as the question of the nature of classes is concerned, the developing societies show certain distinct features which cannot be seen in the West. Though in certain countries of Africa classes are still in formative stages, one can see well developed classes in many of the nations of Asia and Latin America. But correlation of social forces is not alike in all these countries. In certain countries such as India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Singapore, capitalist growth reached the stage of monopoly. Taking advantage of the state control over production sector, in many African states a class of bureaucratic bourgeoisie developed. In Pakistan, Jordan, Morocco and in many countries of Latin America land lords who still inherit hundreds of acres of land reign as influential classes. But in countries where communal ownership dominates, say as in Tropical Africa and Oceania class of land lords is completely absent. Numerically dominant classes in the developing societies seem to be the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. Peasants constitute 60% to 80% of the population of certain countries. Petty-bourgeoisie including the professional and urban middle class and semi-proletarian strata constitutes sometimes about 65% of the population. As far as the working class is concerned, one can notice uneven development. In countries like India, South Korea and Egypt the working class is numerically a well developed class. But in countries like Kenya and Fiji the workers are yet to emerge as a class. In countries like Swaziland, Tonga and Western Sahara the working class is almost absent.²

Question of Ruling Class

What constitutes the ruling class of such countries? This is another controversial question. As is mentioned earlier, most of the scholars tend to generalise the issue by basing on the experiences of one or a few countries. During Mao's regime, the official circles in China used to argue that the ruling class in the Third World countries is composed of feudal lords and comprador bourgeoisie.³ Hamza Alavi who based his arguments on his study of Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia con-

cluded that in the post-colonial societies the ruling class is constituted by "three propertied classes, namely the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous bourgeoisie and the landed classes"⁴ Followers of A.G. Frank would argue that the underdeveloped countries are led by the lumpen bourgeoisie. On the other extreme, we have Michael Kalecki who says that most of the liberated countries have intermediate regimes where the petty-bourgeoisie and the rich peasantry form the ruling coalition.⁵ However, such wide generalisations seem to go against the dialectical method which demands study of the particularities of each phenomenon before giving a general theory of it. Since classes and social forces which attained power after independence differed from one country to another, it is not appropriate to say that the class character of all countries in the Third World exhibit uniformity. Due to differences in correlation of class forces that led to the anti-imperialist struggles, the class character of the state also differ from one to another. In fact the questions related to the nature of liberation struggles and the classes or groups which attained state power are so complex that even those who claim themselves Marxists find it difficult to identify the nature of dominant classes in most of the countries of the Third World. For example, referring to Africa where indigenous bourgeois class is weak, Markovitz, Joel Samhoff and J.S. Saul argued that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie or 'the organisational bourgeoisie' became the ruling class.⁶ But the communist activists like Babu consider that all the African states are dominated by the petty bourgeoisie or proto-bourgeoisie who act as lackeys of foreign imperialism.⁷ In India also, even after forty years of independence the communists find it difficult to arrive at consensus about the class character of the state.⁸ Such kinds of conflicting characterisations are unknown in the advanced western societies. Since the classes which attained state power after independence differ from one country to another, one can see different kinds of states viz., national bourgeois states, bourgeoisified feudal states, bureaucratic or comprador states and also countries where state power is jointly shared by the capitalists and the land lords.

Government and Political Regimes

Now one may have a look at the specificities of the nature of government and political regimes in the Third World. The Third World is a laboratory which is experimenting different forms of government and testing all kinds of political regimes. At the beginning, most of those

colonies tried to experiment with parliamentary forms of government implanted on their soil by their colonial masters. But due to lack of essential conditions necessary for successful experimentation with bourgeois parliamentary superstructure the limitations of the experiment came to light within a short span of time. Contradictions between political superstructure and the actual dynamics of internal socio-economic structure led to modification of the role of parliaments in the Third World. Most of the countries opted for military-bureaucratic rule where parliaments became subordinate to the executive. In some other countries authoritarianism developed within the context of parliamentary forms of government. In countries like India legislatures became political power centres to reconcile the conflicting interests of different classes, castes, tribes, regions and religious communities. In some other countries like Bhutan, Nepal and many Arab countries the parliaments remained as only consultative organisations without any real powers.

Certain amount of democratic freedoms are guaranteed in countries where the national bourgeoisie dominates other classes. But in most of the countries with monarchical, and bureaucratic forms of government, the rights of the people are restricted. Status of political parties may be taken as an instance. In countries like Saudi-Arabia and Bhutan even the ruling classes do not have parties of their own. The political parties are generally banned in countries where military takes over governmental power. In certain countries communist parties are not generally allowed to function legally. In many of the African countries like Tanzania, Mozambique and Zaire there exists only one official party. But certain countries like Sri Lanka and India have multi-party system. However, it should be made clear that the nature and content of the single party system or multi-party system in the Third World are qualitatively different from those of the West.¹⁰

Another feature of the Third World is the transitory nature of its regimes. Generally no government or political regimes remain stable for a longer period. Among the UDCs there will be a very few states which did not experience any forms of the authoritarian government from the beginning. Such changing nature of the political regimes can be attributed to the changing correlation of class and other social forces within the Third World. International economic crises, external intervention, attitudes of the local elites and the dynamics of military officials, religious leaders and tribal chiefs—all these factors play important roles in giving

particular colour to the government and the political regimes. If necessary, responding to the objective necessity to overcome the immediate problems, these political regimes mobilise one section of people against other. In the context of Latin America the roles that different regimes—populist, democratic, military and revolutionary regimes—could play in response to the necessity of managing different crises; the class or social forces that they could rally and the overall success and failures of all these regimes were well accounted in Gary.W. Wynia's book, *The Politics of Latin American Development*.¹¹

Autonomy of the State in the Third World

Whatever be the forms of government or political regime, the states in all underdeveloped countries enjoy certain amount of autonomy vis-a-vis the dominant classes and their economic base. Levkovsky argues that this relative autonomy is "objectively caused by the very socio-economic and class-political structure of the transitional societies". Though all states enjoy some amount of autonomy, the forms of independence differ from one country to another. As Levkovsky puts it, "This increased relative autonomy of the state superstructure at various stages of revolution and under the impact of dissimilar objective and subjective factors, is realised in different forms".¹² In another sense, intellectuals like Hamza Alavi see it as the consequence of the weakness of the dominant classes within the post-colonial societies. To quote Alavi, "the state in the post-colonial society is not the instrument of a single class. It is relatively autonomous and it mediates between the competing interests of the three propertied classes namely the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous bourgeoisie and the landed classes, while at the same time acting on behalf of them all to preserve the social order in which their interests are embedded, namely the institution of private property and the capitalist mode as the dominant mode of production".¹³ In the cases of certain Asian and African states sudden disappearance of colonial masters left a vacuum which could not be filled by the indigenous classes. Since none of the indigenous classes achieved the status or strength to be able to use the state power to its own advantage, the military-bureaucratic apparatus acquires relative independence. The scope of such autonomy is however restricted in countries like India where the bourgeoisie is fairly developed even before independence and it was and is conscious of its economic and political interests. But even in such countries the key role that the state plays in economy gives enough

strength to the state to withstand any kind of pressure from the monopolist groups. Almost in all developing countries the state imposes many rules and restrictions to regulate the activities of the individual capitalists. While initiating the process of development in these multi-structural societies, the state creates conditions for the development of certain classes and social forces. For example, by providing irrigation, banking and marketing facilities the state facilitates conditions for the transformation of individual land lords into the rich peasants. If the conditions demand, to legitimise its own authority and to give credibility to the whole system, the state in the developing societies use nationalist ideology, religious dogmas or even pseudo-socialist slogans.

Compulsions of Economic Development : Imperialism and Third World

Political instability in the Third World is, in one sense, the result of the contradictions created by the low level of economic development. Except OPEC nations and the Western show pieces like Singapore, South Korea and Hongkong, all other countries are backward—most of them with lowest per capita income in the world. The economic crises in turn aggravates the already existing political and cultural problem thereby posing danger to the stability and integrity of those new nations. The pressure on states to play ideological and repressive roles will be relieved only when these countries can achieve economic self-sufficiency. Awareness of this fact forces the states in the developing societies to play a complex role in economy.

With the achievement of political independence, one important phase of the history of imperialism came to an end. Political independence could keep the alien powers away from direct control of the affairs of the state and allow the newly liberated nations to decide their future. However, while setting up priorities conducive for their economic progress no native rulers can overlook the power of imperialism that indirectly continue to influence the economy and politics of the post-colonial societies. Domination of foreign capital and unequal status that the Third World occupies in the world capitalist system force the UDCs to depend on the West. It only shows that political independence is not sufficient for total liberation. Unless full economic independence is achieved political separation from the colonial powers becomes meaningless. At the same time it should be remembered that economic inde-

pendence can't be achieved without prior political independence. As such achieving and maintaining political independence is a precondition for the attainment of economic self-reliance in these newly emergent nation states.

Once it is concluded that the countries in the Third World are formally independent, then a discussion of efforts that these countries made in developing their economy becomes logical. In developing countries, the weakness the indigenous ruling classes and the necessity of responding to the aspirations of the people for a decent living forces the states to take active roles in economic development. The tasks ahead of these countries are many. The anomalies perpetrated by the imperialists for their colonial exploitation should be overcome gradually. The precapitalist socio-economic structures that stand in the way of development need to be eliminated. The countries should develop the forces of production and achieve technological independence. They should limit the role of foreign capital in the native economy and carry on radical reforms in the agrarian structure of these countries. The whole economy must be systematically planned and utmost care should be taken to see that the plans are implemented properly by keeping in check the vested interests interested in preserving the status quo. In addition, instead of limiting its role to supervision and regulation of economic activities, the state should intervene in the priority areas by setting up basic industries wherever necessary. If all these tasks are carried out to their logical ends, one can expect true economic independence.

In practice fulfilment of these tasks is not easy. To an extent, the success depends on internal structural constraints and the attitude of the imperialists who still exercise considerable influence over the native economies. As far as the role of state is concerned, it has to be said that in almost all developing societies the states made attempt to develop their economies. In fact almost in all these countries the state became a leading actor in economy. The state took over the responsibility of establishing and managing the priority sectors. The share of the contribution of state sector in the national economy increased gradually in all countries. For example, in Algeria, Mozambique, Angola and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen the state sector accounts for 70 to 90 per cent of industrial output. In Tanzania 75% of the mining and manufacturing industries and 75% of the country's foreign and domestic trade are taken over by the state.¹⁴ In Sri Lanka and Bangladesh the state sector controls

about 40 and 70 per cent of the assets of the industries respectively. Most of the capital investment in the developing countries is maintained by the state themselves. In Syria, Burma and Guinea Bissau its share is about 75 to 90 per cent. Even in Latin American countries like Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Peru, Mexico and Venezuela, the public sector contributes more than 50% to the annual formation of capital. In 1975, 56 out of the 100 largest Brazilian enterprises are state owned.¹⁵ In all those countries state took the responsibility of planning and supervising all sectors of economy. Many laws are enacted to regulate the private sector. In India the government enacted number of acts such as Companies Act, FERA, MRTPA to regulate the activities of the capitalists. Land reforms were initiated in many countries and ceilings on land holdings were imposed.

The developing societies tried to overcome the adverse impact of foreign imperialism. New laws were enacted to regulate the rôle of foreign capital. Vigorous attempts have been made to take possession of the natural resources of their country. Many foreign firms were nationalised. At the international level all the developing countries came together through forums such as UNCTAD and GATT to pressurise the West for a just and mutually beneficial international economic order. Sincere efforts were made to change the existing unequal and one sided trade practices by gaining many concessions from the West.¹⁶ Similarly pressure was built around the developed countries to democratise the existing financial organisations such as IMF and IBRD and to divert more funds to the economic development of the Third World.¹⁷ Moreover, to overcome their dependence on the metropolis the Third World countries began to initiate South-South cooperation by forming regional organisations like OAU, OPEC, ECLA, SAARC and ASEAN. By following nonaligned policy many of the Third World states took the financial and technical assistance from both capitalist and socialist blocks. That the UDCs maintained their political independence vis-a-vis the imperialism is evident from the fact that they all voted against the western powers in the UNO, especially on question concerning neo-colonialism, militarism and racism. These facts indicate that the attempts are made in most of the UDCs to bring about economic development without giving up political independence.

But how far such attempts have been successful? It is not correct to say that there is no development in the Third World countries since their independence. However, the development seems to be so uneven that it

could not extricate most of the countries from underdevelopment. Implementation of the plans could not bring solace to the people of the Third World. The so-called state-sponsored industrialisation did not bring any expected changes in the lives of the poorest of the poor. The countries continued to be exploited by the multinationals. Dependence on foreign capital and foreign technology increased. For example, the US investment in Latin America which was \$ 22,100 million in 1975 increased to about \$ 39,000 million dollars in 1987. Between 1973-79 direct investments of the US banks increased by sixfold.¹⁸ Foreign trade debt position in the Third World reached an alarming stage. The aggregate external debt of developing countries zoomed from 755 billion dollars in 1981 to a whopping 1,190 billion dollars in 1987. Their debt to GNP ratios rose up from 18% to 28% during this present decade. Interest payments became an important problem. According to Deutsche Bank, the interest expenditure of the 15 highly indebted countries came to about 200 billion dollars in the past five years.¹⁹ In Latin America, between 1960 and 1979, the interest payments swelled over 30 times *i.e.*, from \$ 282 millions to \$ 8,994 million.²⁰ The reaction of the Third World to this crisis is interesting. Some countries sought loans from the IMF to pay back the interest. Countries like Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and Surinam started searching for foreign investors.²¹

Such state of affairs calls for a scientific explanation. What went wrong with the system? Why is it that the states in the Third World fail to achieve the much needed self-reliance in the economy? How come so many decades of planning could not bring any qualitative change in the lives of the masses? What are the obstacles that need to be overcome to initiate uninterrupted process of economic development? Is such a process ever possible in the Third World? These are some of the questions which require answers from social scientists trying to understand the problem of development in the developing societies. But for us, these questions became important to the extent, that they throw light on the nature of the state, its class character, its dynamics and limitations.

Here it should be mentioned that with the failure of western Modernisation theories, the problems of development in the underdeveloped countries received the attentions of many radical scholars of the world. Several schools of radical developmental theorists came out with systematic theories for underdevelopment which while trying to locate

the causes of underdevelopment, presented alternatives for bringing about development. Since the scope of present enquiry does not permit us to explain the view-points of all scholars, with a stress on their understanding of the role of the state in the Third World.

Soft State : Radical Liberal View of Gunnar Myrdal

Gunnar Myrdal was perhaps the first liberal to make sincere efforts to understand the Third World by breaking the self-imposed limitations of liberal frame-work. By opting for the historical-institutional perspective—the method which the bourgeois theorists generally refrain, Myrdal tried to analyse the specificity of the new world. He studied the dynamics of different institutions and social forces within the specific institutional settings that they inherited from their predecessors.

Myrdal considers that halt in the growth of the indigenous industry and commerce, which is the consequence of the effects of colonial hangovers is one of the determinant factors responsible for the continued underdevelopment of the developing societies. Economic stagnation, severe population problem and existence of precapitalist social and economic structures are cited as the causes for the poverty of the people of the Third World. In his book, *Beyond Welfare State* he expresses great faith in planned economy. If plans are implemented with nationalist fervour, the UDCs are bound to see the economic development. However in his later works, *Asian Drama* and *Challenges of the World Poverty...* he observes that despite national planning the fate of the developing countries did not change. His search for underlying causes lead him to development of the concept called 'soft state'.

Myrdal opines that in varying degrees all UDCs are 'soft states'. Among other causes, this specific feature of the Third World constitute an important cause for their underdevelopment. What does the terms 'soft state' signify? To him the soft state is understood to have comprised "all types of social indiscipline which manifest themselves by : deficiencies in legislation and in particular, law observance and enforcement, a widespread disobedience by public officials on various levels to rules and directives handed down to them, and often their collusion with powerful persons and groups of persons whose conduct they should regulate".²²

In the UDCs, keeping in view the aspirations of the masses, the policy makers at times enact various policies aiming at bringing radical transformation of the traditional society. But at the time of implementation, the policies become so diluted that they fail to bring about even moderate changes in society. Within Asian context, he studies different policies such as land reforms, population policies and acts aimed at improving the status of women and Dalits. But in all countries, the author finds betrayal of the accepted goals that they themselves set to achieve. For example, deliberate delay in legislation and collusion of the bureaucrats with the landlords are pointed out as causes for the failure of land reforms in Asian countries like India, Indonesia and Pakistan. Lack of social discipline, structural linkages between the bureaucrats and the economic elites and rampant corruption that prevails in all branches of government result in social and economic stagnation.

Why do things go this way in the underdeveloped countries? Myrdal sees the answer in the class character of the state. To him "political power in UDCs is held nearly everywhere by privileged groups, the first rank including big landowners, industrialists, bankers, merchants and higher military and civil officials".²³ In this ruling oligarchy he also places the 'middle class' which is composed of the professionals and intellectuals. These privileged sections are in unchallengeable position to prevent implementation of any policies that would upset their inherited pattern of social relations. Even officials and politicians entertain vested interests in preserving the status quo. They assume greater powers in such society where controls are not integrated into plans and the directives for their use tend to be vague and application becomes merely a matter of administrative judgment.

Myrdal unhesitatingly asserts that in such 'soft state', the political, legal and administrative system is systematically and heavily weighted against the poor masses of these countries. The states are ruled by compromises, accommodation and sometimes by infighting among various groups that constitute the upper class. As far as the masses are concerned, in all UDCs, there are merely the objects of politics—not its subjects. According to Myrdal, the so-called democracy in the Third World failed to organise the majority of people for utilising the political power to advance its own interests. Naturally, "when that pressure from below is almost totally absent, as in most underdeveloped countries, we

should not be surprised that the inequalitarian social and economic stratification from colonial times is preserved and that development moves in the direction of greater inequality".²⁴

What is the way out of this impasse? Myrdal's solution would be reversing the present trend—by widening the scope for popular participation, education and organisation of the masses, overcoming the values that preach status quo and ending all kinds of indiscipline and corrupt practices in the society. To sum up, Myrdal expects 'soft states' to become 'hard states'—as in the Western welfare societies.

Myrdal does not see underdevelopment as a product of the crises of capitalist system or of continued exploitation of the imperialist power. Of, course, he points out in his studies the disadvantageous position in which the UDCs are placed vis-a-vis the Western powers and criticises the short sighted policies of the Western World that go against the interests of the developing societies. He even expresses his sympathy for the Third World nationalism. However, Myrdal strongly feels that the interests of the developed countries and the developing countries are complementary and not contradictory. To him, there are two alternatives open to the world—the first being the international class conflict that could be permitted to grow to catastrophic dimensions, ending our civilisation in calamity. The other would be to resolve the conflict by a series of gradual accommodation with an aim to establish a democratic welfare world. His belief in innate good of humanity makes him think that western powers can be pressurised to initiate economic policies that would enable rapid economic development of the Third World states. He considers such a policy to be advantageous even to the developed countries. He says. "The stronger they become the more the attainment of a new situation of the world stability made possible. The stronger they become the more they will be in a position to abstain from policy measures which build up resentment against them".²⁵

Semi Feudal State : Paul Baran's Enquiry Into Political Economy of Backwardness

Among the Western scholars, Paul Baran belongs to the first generation of Marxist intellectuals who tried to account for the backwardnesses of the post-colonial societies. He looks at the problem of

underdevelopment from the point of view of the impact of imperialism on its erstwhile colonies and semi-colonies. In one sense, he is the founder of Dependency School. However, Baran needs a separate study since he differs from other dependency theorists in his analyses of the problems of the Third World and in his characterisation of the class character of the state.

Karl Marx expected that colonialism would work as a blessing in disguise, in the sense that by shattering the traditional stagnant societies, colonialism would create a progressive momentum in the colonies and semi-colonies by sowing the seeds of capitalist development.²⁶ But Paul Baran observes that Western capitalism, far from being a catalyst in the right direction, affected adversely the social and economic conditions in the UDCs by introducing all the economic and social tensions inherent in the capitalist order. The ultimate result was not transplantation of Western capitalist social and economic structures on backward areas. What actually happened was super-imposition of business mores over ancient oppression by landed gentries resulting in compound exploitation.²⁷ For Baran, integration of the backward countries into the international capitalist network of exploitation leads to a partial disintegration of precapitalist modes of production and incomplete development of capitalist economic and class structures making the countries 'semi-feudal'.

Baran attributes the continuing reproduction of semi-feudal status of the developing societies to the weakness of the 'middle classes' *i.e.*, the indigenous bourgeoisie. Having grown up in countries that inherited backwardness and poverty the middle classes could not acquire the necessary self-confidence to play a leading role in society. What is worse, instead of fighting the feudal rule, as in the West they themselves started assimilating political, cultural and moral values of the feudal class. Such a class cannot play its historic role of accomplishing anti-imperialist and antifeudal tasks to its logical ends. Rise of labour radicalism and imminent danger of a social revolution destroyed the chances of capitalist classes joining the democratic forces. Apparent or real threat of working class unity forced the middle classes to compromise with the Church, landed gentry and foreign interests. This led to the formation of counter revolutionary coalition in which "whatever differences or antagonisms existed between the monopolistic and competitive business,

between liberal bourgeoisie and reactionary feudal lords, between domestic and foreign interests, were largely submerged on all important occasions by the overriding common interests in staving off socialism".²⁸ As the popular pressure mounts up the middle class cements a new alliance of all conservative elements which decries all attempts at reform as assaults on the very foundations of society.

In a country dominated by such reactionary coalition all possibilities of economic development would be thwarted. Compromise with landed classes will not allow any radical transformation of agrarian structure. Extreme economic inequalities limit the market potentialities in the Third World. Lavish consumption pattern of the middle classes and their blind imitation of the life-styles of feudal classes drastically limit the savings that could be invested in productive activities. Parasitic economic stratum depending on the service sector and the vested interests obstructing the productive utilisation of landed resources hinder the possibility of uninterrupted industrialisation. In industrial sector, the industrial entrepreneur responding to the monopolistic structure of market involved in production of luxury goods which results in import of foreign capital and technology. As far as the establishment of basic industries is concerned, their responsibility will be vested with foreign multi-nationals who in turn exploit huge amounts in the form of royalties, interests and profits. Their relationship breeds mercantile bourgeoisie whose interests are linked with those of foreign imperialism. In such societies, Baran feels that the establishment of state sector also proves tremendous waste since it only involves squandering of large sums for the maintenance of sprawling bureaucracies and power of the 'comprador bourgeoisie'.²⁹

Baran thinks that there are possibilities of reversing such trends if the state asks up certain necessary responsibilities. If it can impose progressive tax system to check the inflationary tendencies by limiting non-essential consumption, create the infrastructure necessary for the development of industry, provide technical education to the people, impose rigorous controls over speculation in scarce goods, excessive profiteering and then prevent capital flight, then it will bring radical changes in the structure of effective demand in the UDCs. However, Baran understands that the state machinery manned by incompetent and

corrupt officials cannot take up this task. Even if policy-makers announce blue-prints of progressive measures such as agrarian reforms, equitable tax legislation, their structural linkages with the dominant classes will sabotage the strict enforcement of the policies. As Baran puts it, "set up to guard and to abet the existing property rights and privileges, it cannot become the architect of a policy calculated to destroy the privileges standing in way of economic progress, and to place the property and incomes derived from it at the service of society as a whole."³⁰

Given the circumstances how can these countries come out of backwardness? Baran sees very little possibilities of capitalist development in the UDCs. Yet he attributes important role to the national bourgeoisie in deciding the fate of their states. To him, the possibilities of bringing about an indigenous capitalism under conditions of underdevelopment depends "on the economic and political strength of the national bourgeoisie, on the quality of its leadership, on its determination to dislodge the feudal and comprador elements from the position of dominance, on the intensity of the resistance on their part and on the extent to which the international constellation permits the elimination or considerable weakening of the support given to those strata by the world's imperialist powers"³¹ In other words, "which way the historical wheel turn and in which way the crises in the backward countries will find its final solution will depend, in the main, on whether the capitalist middle classes in the backward areas and the rulers of the advanced industrial nations of the world, overcome their real fears or myopia. Or are they too spell bound by their narrowly conceived selfish interests, too blinded by their hatred of progress, grown so senile in these latter days of the capitalist ages as to commit suicide out of fear of death?"³²

Lumpen Bourgeois State : Analyses of Frankian School of dependency

Though Paul Baran is considered as the father of the Dependency school, it was actually in the hands of Andre Gunder Frank that the Dependency theory blossomed into a theoretical framework—which could subsequently attract many intellectuals in and around Latin America. Frank and Baran do not have dispute on the question of dependency. But Frank differs from Baran in his analyses of internal economic structure

of the UDCs. Wherever Baran considers that backwardness of those countries is to be attributed to semi-feudal character of the state, A.G. Frank believes that once the metropolis-satellite relationship is established, then the internal structure of the periphery also tend to acquire capitalist features. Baran locate the cause of underdevelopment the difficulties involved in transition to independent capitalist development in the periphery. On the contrary Frank asserts that there is no escape from underdevelopment within the framework of world capitalism.³³

Frank's theory of underdevelopment is based on three hypotheses

1. "Underdevelopment is not due to the survival of archaic institutions and the existence of capital shortage in regions that have remained isolated from the stream of world history. On the contrary, underdevelopment was and still is generated by the very simple historical process which also generated economic development; the development of capitalism itself".

2. "The satellites experience their greatest economic development. . . if and when their ties with their metropolis are weakest".

3. "The regions which are most underdeveloped and feudal-seeming today are the ones which had the closest ties to the metropolis in the past."³⁴

According to Frank the same process which brought development in the metropolis is also responsible for the development of underdevelopment in the satellites. On the question of reproduction of dependence, Frank like Baran argues that centuries of close association with the metropolis leaves the satellites with economic and class structure which is characterised by differentiation in income distribution. The market structure formed as a consequence of this forces the native industrialists to opt for the production of luxurious goods leaving the basic industries to foreign entrepreneur. This leads to greater dependence on foreign capital and technology and throws the country into the vortex of a host of economic problems such as severe balance of payment, obsolescence in production, under utilisation of productive capacity and high foreign remittances in the form of profits and royalties all these leading to further dependence on the metropolis. Such dependence makes the UDCs subservient to the desires and preferences of the industrially advanced nations. The result is that each tortured inch of industrial advance

become a giant step backward. These ideas of Frank are developed by intellectuals like Dos Santos, F.H. Cardoso and E. Faletto.

Dos Santos point out that the historical form of dependence are conditioned by (1) the basic forms of the world economy which has its own laws of development, (2) the type of economic relations dominant in the capitalist centres and the ways in which the latter expand outward and (3) the types of relations existing inside the peripheral countries which coerce them to the status of dependent nations within the world capitalist order.³⁵ Dos Santos distinguishes different types of relations of dependency—colonial, industrial-financial and industrial technological. Like Santos, Cardoso and Faletto also emphasise the differences and discontinuities between different types of dependency and between the internal structures which result from them.³⁶

Though there are some difference among the Dependency theorists on certain aspects, all of them stress the role of local elites in the transfer of economic surplus from periphery to the metropolis. All these classes sharing the state power in such countries are called by Frank as 'lumpen bourgeoisie'. His definition of capitalism as production for profit leads him to consider that even latifundum, economienda, catequil and hacienda as different forms of capitalist production and exploitation. According to him both the developed and underdeveloped parts of the world are equally capitalist and both of them are part and parcel of the same worldwide capitalist system. This understanding drives him to include all groups—land lords, merchants, financiers, industrialists and all those involved in service and other sectors which act as passive instruments of foreign domination by perpetuating dependency as "lumpen bourgeoisie". When he calls them 'lumpen' he does not mean that in the UDCs there can be bourgeoisie which can be national but not lumpen. He considers the entire national bourgeoisie in the Third World as 'lumpen', since none of them can disentangle the national economic good from their own interests. In fact all these sections are benefited by perpetuation of such lumpen development.

The Dependency theorists see that the structure and composition of the ruling coalition are determined by the particular forms that dependency relations take place in course of economic development. According to Cardoso and Faletto, in all developing but dependent countries "so-

cial structures reflect the double edge of the economic system "its external interests and pressures, those that derive from external economic influence and those that are national."³⁷ In Latin America, almost from independence to the beginning of 20th century merchants, financiers and groups such as latifundistas, agricultural capitalists, traders and mine-owners constituted as ruling coalition under one or the other hegemonic class. It was in the first three decades of the 20th century that the industrial bourgeoisie made their appearance felt. Even during the transitional period the ruling coalition remained tied to the export sector. However, between depression and the end of the World War II, when the ties with the metropolis were weakened and the necessity to import-substitutes arose, attempts have been made by the populist regimes of different Latin American countries in bringing about rapid industrialisation. During this period as a consequence of the development and consolidation of the state sector, the industrial bourgeoisie has strengthened its position. By 1950s it became a strong faction of the ruling coalition, at times even dominating the landed aristocracy and export enclaves.³⁸

The Dependency theorists gave considerable importance to the role the state plays in such countries in mediating the interests of different classes or class fractions of the ruling coalition. With the advancement of bureaucracy, Military and technocracy, the dynamics of the state become more complicated. The state plays a major role in perpetuating the dependency. Different policies of the government such as liberalisation of controls for capital and intermediate goods, repeated currency devaluation and a halt to agrarian reforms are cited to point out how the state is held responsible in promoting the lumpen development.³⁹ Though the role played by the sector is recognised the Dependency theorists argue, in the post-war world the public sector had been subservient to the interests of the multinationals. They, however, accept that dependent development does not take place in a smooth way. It occurs through frictions, accords and alliances between the state and business enterprises. The contradictions between the state and the big business sectors are not as antagonistic as the contradictions between the state and the vast sections of the people, worst affected by this development. Cardoso and Faletto point out that in order to counter the popular opposition, now becoming more and more popular in Latin American countries, the states are expanding and fortifying themselves by having recourse to repressive and anti-people policies. Under the given conditions authoritarian forms

of the state became the only alternative for the national bourgeoisie to continue its domination.⁴⁰

In such conditions, where the state and the national bourgeoisie are involved in fostering dependency and underdevelopment, the Dependency theorists do not find any scope for independent capitalist development in the Third World. The only alternative that Frank suggests is a radical break with the imperialism and immediate transition to socialism through anticapitalist socialist revolution. While attempting to find out the principal enemy, Frank asserts that, "the immediate tactical enemy is the bourgeoisie itself.....in spite of the fact that, strategically principal enemy is imperialism".⁴¹

Anti-Imperialist State : Expectations of the Soviet Marxists

During Stalin's period, Soviet theoreticians believed, the independence gained by countries like India under the bourgeois or petty bourgeois leadership would only be formal and such countries could only be puppets of their colonial rulers. However the Soviets gradually realised that the dynamics of the Third World cannot be seen in such simplistic terms. The first Asian Conference of 1947, Korean and Indonesian crises and Bandung conference of 1955, showed that the developing societies can play a positive and independent role in the world, though they may not be ruled out by the proletariat. After realising all these events the Russian Marxists who earlier characterised the newly independent states as lackeys of imperialism gradually portrayed them as "potential anti-imperialist forces in the world". The dynamic role of the countries like India, Egypt and Indonesia made their party ideologues realise that it would be a great mistake to minimise the world-historical significance of the process of decomposition of the colonial system only because it has brought in its wake non-socialist states. . . Whatever the form of national liberation of the colonies and semicolonies might be. . . this liberation is a great blow to imperialism and consequently, necessarily does not strengthen, but weakens the world capitalist system".⁴²

In the wake of development of this new paradigm, many Soviet scholars began to concentrate and comprehend the role of the state and classes in developing societies. Unlike their Chinese counterparts, the Soviet scholars undertook strenuous surveys to understand the reality and specificity of states in the UDCs. They argue that due to differences in

correlation of class forces in developing societies, ruling classes may differ from state to state. The Soviet scholars indentified that there are national bourgeois states, bureaucratic bourgeois states, bourgeoisified feudal states and states where the state power is jointly shared by the bourgeoisie and landlords.⁴³

Like many other developmental theorists, the Russian Marxists are aware of the impact of imperialist exploitation and the consequences of unequal status that the UDCs enjoy within the world imperialist system. In addition, internal factors such as the existence of outmoded production relations, lower development of productive capacities, lack of adequate capital and shrinking internal market as causes for the backwardness of the developing societies. In short, foreign imperialism, internal precapitalist elements and the local elites (big bourgeoisie/feudal lords/tribal chiefs) allied to foreign imperialism are generally cited as obstacles to the path of development of states in the Third World. Russians believe that there are possibilities of considerable economic development in the UDCs, if the state power is used to sub-plant the outmoded production relations and the economy from the control of the foreign monopolies and broadening of the internal market by generating industrialisation and agrarian reforms. Soviet theoreticians attribute positive role to the public sector. As V.V. Rymalov puts it, "state sector in industry and other branches of the national economy of the former colonies and semi-colonies is the decisive instrument for attaining the economic aims of the liberation revolution. Its all-round development is designed to create the strongest possible progress".⁴⁴ Development of state sector and nationalisation of private industries are considered as progressive steps having anti-imperialist and anit-monopoly characteristics. Further Soviet scholars recognise that it is not possible to undertake such massive development programme without necessary technological development and financial help. So they see the necessity of dependence of the UDCs on foreign capital and technology. Though such dependency gives an opportunity of us Socialist bloc, they can utilise foreign capital and technology for the neo-colonialist exploitation, the Soviet Marxists argue that by taking advantage of the presence of the Socialist bloc, they can utilise foreign capital and technology for their own advantage without sacrificing its political independence. Close ties with the socialist bloc and mutual economic interdependence of the countries belonging to the South are cited as external prerequisites for economic development. Hence the Soviet theoreticians place non aligned movement on a high pedestal and claim themselves as its natural allies.⁴⁵

Depending on the attitudes that different states take on question relating to the implementation of the tasks ahead of them, the countries are designated as progressive or reactionary. Based on the path of development that they opted, and the foreign policy they adopt, the Third World is classified into "the capitalist oriented and socialist oriented countries". All countries which have taken the capitalist path of development are included under the category named, 'capitalist oriented countries'. State power in these countries may be with the national bourgeoisie or bourgeoisie and landlords or bourgeoisified feudal lords or the protobourgeoisie sections. Soviet theoreticians argue that in countries where national bourgeoisie is in power, radical reforms necessary for economic self-reliance cannot be implemented properly. In these countries land reforms fail owing to opposition from the landlords and bureaucrats. Potentialities of state capitalism cannot be realised properly. In most of these countries (other than the progressive national bourgeois states like India) the state sector bows down to pressures exercised by the private capitalist and foreign imperialists.⁴⁶ Due to weak industrial base and lack of diversification in production and exchange. The process of development initiated in such countries became susceptible to the pressures of unjust international economic order.

Parallel to the capitalist oriented countries, the Soviet Marxists believe that there are socialist oriented countries which follow non-capitalist path of development and declare socialism as their ultimate goal. Such countries include Algeria, Tanzania, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Angola and Afghanistan. In these agrarian countries where peasants constitute a dominant class, the state power is claimed to be in the hands of working class of people and peasants.⁴⁷ In these countries where the bourgeoisie is weak, the state sector dominates the industrial sector. In many of these countries 70 to 90% of total industrial produce is attributed to the public sector. In the main the land reforms are strictly implemented and many foreign firms are nationalised. The state here gives considerable importance to the welfare activities such as education, housing and health care *etc.* In spite of these progressive attributes, the Soviet theoreticians themselves observe that there are forces capturing the state power and reversing the process of development.⁴⁸ However Russians argue that if the states adhere to the same path, these countries could sustain

uninterrupted development without becoming victims of all those economic crises that impede the development of capitalist states.

Finally it should be mentioned that the Russians consider all Third World countries—whether socialist oriented or capitalist oriented—as unconscious vehicles in achieving world socialism. As N.V. Simoniya puts it, “Given this situation the development and certain degrees of capitalists relations in some countries does not at all imply “rejuvenation” or strengthening of world capitalism. The liberated countries are not only a potential source of exploitation systems, marxist and capitalist, but bring new contradictions into capitalism and complicate and aggravate the old contradictions. . . (All) these contradictions heighten the possibilities of the revolutionary alternative”⁴⁹ *i.e.* Socialism.

In Search of a Theoretical Framework

In the context of peculiarities of socio-economic conditions in the Third World, we have so far reviewed different interpretations of the role of the state in the economic development of these backward societies. Different authors threw light on different aspects related to state, classes and economic prospects in the Third World. Though there are certain points of similarities here and there, the authors seem to entertain competing and at times, even conflicting views about the nature of the state and ruling classes in the developing societies. In one sense, these differences are the products of the paradigms within which they happen to see the problems of the UDCs. Critical evaluation of these paradigms become necessary to develop a more meaningful and comprehensive Marxist Leninist framework for the study of the nature and dynamics of the states in developing countries.

Gunnar Myrdal offers an ‘institutional theory’ that analyses the economic structure and living standards, agriculture and industry, social stratification and ideology, not as separate problems but in their totality and interconnection. He even recognises the reactionary role of the dominant classes within countries and the impact of centuries of imperialist exploitation. However the solutions he offers are not uncompromising struggle against imperialism and the vested interests within these nations. Like all humanists, he believes in the possibility of reconciling

the interests of different classes within the countries and also the conflicts between the UDCs and imperialists, through a gradual process of mutual understanding, reconciliations and accommodation. But the logic of historical process of development makes it difficult to make Myrdal's myth of 'welfare world' a reality.

Paul Baran correctly understands the historic limitations of the bourgeoisie of the developing societies. He understands that in an era of imperialism and proletarian revolution, the bourgeoisie cannot but compromise with foreign imperialism and local feudalism. However, his attempts to generalise the causes for underdevelopment as joint exploitation of capitalism and feudalism, his innate belief in progressive character of capitalism even in this era and the decisive role that he assigns to the national bourgeoisie in directing the course of development need a second look. He prefers socialist alternative. But what is the course of revolution he proposes—anti-capitalist socialist revolution or people's democratic revolution where even the national bourgeoisie becomes allies in the revolution? It seems, he considers, that at this stage of development, semi-feudalism and imperialism are the main enemies—not the national bourgeoisie. He comes to this conclusion by his analysis of the stage of development of economy in the UDCs—and not the class character of the state power.

A.G. Frank, by defining capitalism as production for profit, goes to another extreme of characterising all dependent relations in the Third World as capitalist relations. He thinks that the national bourgeoisie of the Third World (he calls it 'lumpen-bourgeoisie') can never escape dependent relationship because of its specific relationship with the world imperialist system. Like Trotskites, he sees anti-capitalist socialist revolutions as the only solution left for all developing societies. It may be true in case of Latin American countries where the state power lies basically with the capitalists. But this solution does not hold good in countries where in spite of considerable capitalist development, the state power lies with the feudal lords or comprador bourgeoisie. He makes the same mistake as his counterpart, Baran in determining the present stage of revolution in different countries of the Third World.

The Soviet scholars are better informed, in the sense that they understood the pluralities of the developing societies and did not gener-

alise the class character of the state and the stage of development of economy. Through systematic empirical work, they argued that the classes which came to state power in the Third World differed from one country to another and hence the path of development varied from one state to another. The Soviets see the prospects of development only in two sets of countries—progressive national bourgeois states and states with socialist orientation. However, complete economic independence is possible only in socialism—a goal which will be accepted by all developing countries sooner or later by following non-capitalist approach in development. It is surprising to note however that in spite of their recognition of differences in class character of the state belonging to the Third World the Russians point out imperialism as the main enemy and prescribed national or people's democratic revolution as the present stage of revolution of all developing countries.

Though all the analyses reviewed so far give us an understanding of states, classes and economic development in the Third World, the dialectical interaction between these categories are not properly established. There seems to be a tendency of reducing one structure to another—without comprehending the relative autonomy that each structure or social force has vis-a-vis other structures or social forces. Ignorance of pluralities of the socio-economic structures of these societies make the scholars generalise their experience of a group of countries to the whole Third World. Attempts to comprehend the complexities of the social formation in the Third World within the rigid framework of concepts developed in the context of Western societies cannot make any headway. Take the instance of classes in the Third World. In some countries, the classes are still in formative stages. In some other states, though classes as such are well developed, their members are much influenced by other precapitalist structures (like castes, tribes and religion) that it becomes very difficult to judge one's class character by the apparent ideology. To put it other way, a bourgeois in the Third World behaves not only as a capitalist but also as a man belonging to a particular caste, tribe or religion. How to characterise the role of these precapitalist structures is again a problem. Wherever these structures are obstructing the capitalist path of development in certain countries, in many others, they are coopted in such a way that they play a complementary role in development. For example, religion as institution might have become an obstacle to development in countries like Bhutan and Nepal, but in

countries like Iran, religious nationalisation led to implementation of many radical reforms. Finally, one need to say that there is no eye to eye relationship between the class character of the state and the economic role that it plays. There are semifeudal or bourgeoisified feudal states such as Nepal and Saudi Arabia where the ruling feudal elite itself attempts to bring capitalist development. On the other hand one can find predominantly capitalist states like Brazil and Pakistan, compromising with feudal and semi-feudal elements in their countries.

In view of these multiple complex relationship between the classes and the state, classes and other social forces, and the base and superstructure in the Third World, one should stop generalising about the nature of the state in the developing societies. It however does not mean that one should totally ignore the features common to all developing countries. What is to be stressed is the study of the States of the Third World, in all its specificities and its inter-relationship in general. Developing and perfecting the concepts such as classes, class interests and ruling classes become necessary. In addition, a meaningful political discourse on the nature of the state requires arriving at consensus about meanings assigned to terms such as 'comprador states', 'semi-feudal states' or 'independent national bourgeois states'. Keeping this necessity in mind, attempts may be made to develop as analytical framework on the nature of the state in the Third World.

In developing such a theoretical framework, the following points may be considered :

1) Though one may take note of the economic status of the people, classes should not be seen merely as economic categories. Homogeneous classes which may be defined as "groups of people having similar status in production relations, followed by corresponding ideological outlook and political practice", are rarely found in the developing societies. In the Third World we come across a wider strata of people who cannot be grouped under any class. Hence in addition to taking into consideration one's position in relations of production, identification of one's class or status should stress on the need to understand as to whose class interests one is promoting 'consciously' in his or her day-to-day praxis. The term 'consciously' is important, for, we should ignore here the unconscious victims of ideologies and praxis of other classes. Seen in this sense, even if a member is not a capitalist, if he or she consciously acquires bourgeois

ideology and practices bourgeois politics he or she should be called a bourgeois. In case of mixed categories,⁵⁰ dominant ideological position and political praxis may be taken into consideration. Such criteria are needed to identify class status of certain social categories such as politicians, intellectuals and professionals—who may not have any particular status in the relations of production.

2) By the term 'class interests' we should not mean what individual members of the class consider to be in their interests. Class interests refer to the objective possibility of a class to realise under given conditions, its basic urge to hold or ensure that which they possess or to aspire for that they need to possess.⁵¹ Since, along with economic interests each class shall have certain political and ideological interests. By the term, 'possession' we mean both material production and the realm of ideas corresponding to it.

3) Wide generalisations about the role of the classes—without taking into consideration the given context need to be avoided. For example, while trying to understand the dynamics of the bourgeoisie in the Third World, we should first see, whether they are imitating policies that lead to widest and speediest development of capitalism under the given national and international conditions. To expect the bourgeoisie in the post colonial societies to behave like the bourgeoisie of the Western Europe is not a dialectical way of looking at reality.

4) The word 'comprador' should not be misused. All economically dependent states need not be 'semi-colonies' or 'comprador states'. Some measure of dependent relationship become inevitable for all the Third World countries. Though some of them may be semi-colonies, possibility of existence of independent national bourgeois states among those economically dependent nations need not be ruled out. The basic issues to be considered here are as follows : whether one willingly accepted dependent status or not; whether all activities of the bourgeoisie only promoted the interests of foreign imperialism or it also contributed to indigenous capitalist development; and whether or not the class used all its potentialities to fight foreign imperialism to the extent its own national interests are involved. All these points need to be examined to judge the nature of indigenous bourgeoisie.

5) The other aspect is related to pre-capitalist socio-economic structures. It is true that the UDCs are multistructural and multistratified societies. But it should be noted that all structures and strata in the social formation may not be evenly developed. Identification of the dominant structures and social strata is necessary to know the direction of economic development. If any state is to be characterised as feudal or semi-feudal, one should firstly identify the structures and strata that can be named as semi-feudal or feudal. Then one should examine whether they acquire dominant status or play subordinate role to the dominant capitalist mode of production. The third aspect to be observed is whether the state policies are perpetuating those feudal or semi-feudal relations or trying to change them gradually into capitalist or socialist relations.

6) It may be noted that many times such identified categories may not be in essence semi-feudal or feudal. Traditional structures like castes, tribes and religious communities may modify their roles in such a way that they may not be in conflict with development process. Hence it is necessary to know whether such relations are obstructing the capitalist path of development or whether they themselves started changing their roles in the wake of new opportunities thrown open to these sections in course of development of the economy.

7) So is the question of Ancient tradition or culture. In most of the countries—developed as well as underdeveloped—traditions play a very important part in shaping the psychological makeup and value preferences of the people as well as the policy makers. Political and economic structures are also influenced by them. Though old traditions are considered as impediments to capitalist development, under certain circumstances the bourgeoisie itself may use feudal or precapitalist structures. It may be due to their compromise with the feudal elements in the society. But sometimes the bourgeoisie may use them for their own interest. Even if the economic interests suffer for a short period, if their political necessities so demand, the traditions will be used to consolidate the positions of the bourgeoisie. There is nothing feudal or semi-feudal in the usage of traditional slogans if they ultimately serve the interests of the capitalist class. In view of the different possibilities, one should examine the following aspects: (1) Do the feudal and semi-feudal traditions remain as remnants of old society or are there any semifeudal or feudal structures exists at the base, reproducing, the old traditions at the superstructural

level ? (2) Does such a traditional culture promote the interests of any group which can be clearly identified as feudal or semi-feudal or whether these are only used by the bourgeoisie for promoting its own interests? Finally, what is the role that the state plays in dealing with these kinds of traditional and cultural values?

8) In the light of all these guidelines, the dynamics of the state is to be studied of all relating variations in the forms of government and political regimes to the changing correlation of class and social forces inside each country. All these dimensions should be examined within the context of the status that the ruling classes and the state occupy in the world capitalist system in general and the Third World in particular.

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