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
*THE
REALITIES
OF
WORLD
COMMUNISM*

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WILLIAM PETERSEN, EDITOR




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REALITIES
of
WORLD
COMMUNISM

University of California, Berkeley

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on

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**The
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of
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**Edited by
William Petersen**

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"At least one claim of Soviet propaganda is thoroughly justified: no one can understand contemporary history, let alone intervene effectively in it, without clarity as to the nature of the present-day Soviet society."

Peter Meyer



Preface

The purpose of this book is to raise the level of discourse on one of the most complex political phenomena of our time. Many Americans display a sublime, and sometimes willful, ignorance of Communist ways. Their attitudes swing from cautious optimism through apathy to naked fear, and back again. When Khrushchev plays the jolly peasant, they think a deal might be possible. When Khrushchev is bilious, they have bad dreams about fifty Hiroshimas scattered over the United States. One reason for these pendulum swings is simple lack of information.

The mass media do not help much. The fifteen-minute television newscast devotes more time to selling the sponsor's product than to serious discussion of international problems. Most newspapers describe Soviet-American negotiations on any issue in terms borrowed from a TV western: there are good guys and bad guys; tall, lean, clean, smoothly shaven, quiet-talking good guys, and short, fat, unbathed, bearded, or at least mustachioed, robbers. This level of reporting may make the audience feel better, but not for long.

Instead of dispassionate informed analysis, Americans have been getting predigested pabulum from self-professed experts with no standing in the scholarly community. Two such appeared at the campus of the University of California in Berkeley within a period of two or three weeks. One had made a career of preaching sympathetic understanding of the difficulties that the Soviet people were trying to overcome, and a sympathetic appreciation of their real or fancied successes; he was pleased to report on the new thaw in the post-Stalin era. The other had been even more successful in attacking Communism and all its works in the most simplistic terms, and in seeking financial and political support from some of the less responsible elements on the Right edge of American politics.

Some of us at University Extension, Berkeley, were appalled that at this reservoir of higher learning, with a half dozen experts of international reputation on its faculty, the students and the community had been offered this alternative on this important subject. University Extension is the arm of the University that extends its resources into the community. *The Realities of World Communism* was originally conceived as a series of lectures by members of the faculty to be offered in several cities of Northern California. The men who spoke were highly qualified authorities in the field, and they spoke to large, enthusiastic audiences. Newspaper editorials commented favorably that the University had sent its best minds into the community to help raise the level of citizen understanding.

This volume seeks a larger audience than could attend the lecture series. Its purpose, however, is the same: to offer an objective and scholarly analysis of the theory and practice of Communism.

MORTON GORDON
Head, University Extension
University of California, Berkeley

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Introduction

In the 1930's the tiny groups of anti-Stalinist radicals used to return again and again to a discussion of what they termed "the Russian question": what kind of society is the Soviet Union? From today's perspective, it may seem appropriate that these scholastic logic-choppers should have concerned themselves so obsessively with a quality as medievalist as a society's essential nature. And yet in this case, as also in some others, they were asking the right question even when they did not find a satisfactory answer.

In every viable society there is a strain toward consistency, and thus a tendency to persist in fundamental respects. Unless we can identify, however approximately, this underlying bent, we are likely to misinterpret particular facts; for social facts are significant in relation to their social setting. Especially with respect to a civilization as complex as the Soviet Union, in which every datum has its political coloration, the "scientific" positivism of the "objective" analysis is likely to reflect, to one degree or another, the doctrine of the Party that defined any particular data as worth collecting. If we are really to see for ourselves, we must begin by deciding independently what we want to look for, and this means defining for ourselves the conceptual model into which our facts will be fitted.

The point is important enough to be worth spelling out with one significant example. In the moves and counter moves of the cold war, on the face of it one side looks very much like the other. Each defines its position as defensive, and the stance of the other as aggressive. Even Hitler, one recalls, used to claim that he wanted peace, and that his seemingly aggressive moves were merely responses to the West's intended, but not yet realized, aggression. The Communists maintain that war is a natural feature of capitalism, while socialism is naturally at peace. The strength of this argument is not in its validity, which is nil, but in its degree of generality

—because of which many in the West, not otherwise Communist dupes, half-accept this thesis of Lenin's *Imperialism*. One way of specifying the "aggressor," it might seem, would be to look at a world map, to see which side has spread over the continents since 1945; but apparently this is too simple. Is it true that a Communist society is "peace-loving"; is this part of its nature? What kind of society is the Soviet Union?

Answers to "the Russian question" can be classified into four broad types:

(a) The official doctrine, of course, is that the Soviet Union is socialist. Oppositionist Communists and non-Communists of various types have paraphrased this formulation in many ways. For example, Leon Trotsky (until the day he was murdered by a Soviet agent) defined the Soviet Union as a "degenerated workers' state"—a "workers' state" because the means of production were publicly owned, but "degenerated" because this abolition of private property had not resulted, as it should have by socialist theory, in improving the quality of life. Perhaps the typical American is in this respect a Trotskyist: he is likely to half-accept the Soviet Union's self-definition, while also half-aware that the Communist state is a world that 19th-century socialists never dreamt of. Similarly, he typically places Communists at the extreme Left of the political continuum, thus next to socialists and only two steps removed from liberals, but as far as possible from fascists.

(b) Some have termed the Soviet Union "capitalist" or "state capitalist." The prime purpose of the country's economic planning, it is argued, like the principal effect of 19th-century capitalism, has been to accumulate a stock of capital goods. However, it is obviously somewhat inadequate to define a society by only one important characteristic, passing over the great differences between a planned and a market economy—not to say the still greater differences outside the economic sector. Those who insist on this formula have been principally ex-Communists, enough liberated from the dogma to see that Soviet society is not socialist yet still caught in the Marxian dichotomy: if not socialist, then it *must* be capitalist.

(c) Increasingly in recent years, the Soviet Union has been defined as simply a "large-scale industrial society" (Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer). It is a "developed" country, and thus distinguished from "underdeveloped" areas, but approaching more and more closely the way of life of such other urban-industrial nations

as the United States. This Deutscher thesis, as we may call it—for it has been associated especially with the British analyst Isaac Deutscher—is a comforting one. Indisputably, most of the world is striving to become industrial and at least some of this richly aided effort is succeeding. If in this process the world is also becoming more and more like the democratic West, then we need only batten down the hatches and wait till the storm of Communist aggression has passed. By this view, history is really on our side, even though the Communists believe it works for them. In their case, this faith has operated as a stimulus to bring the future nearer; in ours the belief in victory has meant usually that we sit down and wait for it.

Note that in these three concepts of Soviet society, the principal criterion of the definition is the country's economy. To designate the Soviet Union as "capitalist," which would seem to deny official Soviet claims completely, is merely the other side of the same coin. Such a designation follows Marx's dictum that a society—any society—derives its principal attributes from its economy, and not from what he termed the "superstructure" of politics, social relations, and culture. Just as Marx said he turned Hegel on his head, so in order to understand this self-proclaimed Marxian society, Marx must be turned on his.

(d) The Soviet Union has been termed a "totalitarian state economy" (Rudolf Hilferding), a "Party State" (Ruth Fischer), an example of "bureaucratic collectivism" (Max Shachtman), or of "Oriental despotism" (Karl A. Wittfogel). The precise term we use is less important than that we escape from the prison of economic determinism. The simplest of several alternatives, a "totalitarian society," is adequate, provided that we understand that this is not a mere epithet.

A totalitarian society is one dominated by a single minority Party, which, in order to realize its particular vision of a perfect community, attempts to achieve total control over the major workings of all significant institutions. The several components of the definition are all essential. Rule by a single minority party over a country with important loci of competing power is not totalitarian; in Ghana, for instance, the rule of the party can be challenged by traditionalist chiefs and the urban middle classes; in Franco Spain, by the army, the church, and the monarchist clique. And even if a group holds complete political power, it is not totalitarian if it does not also penetrate the social institutions in order to move

them toward its utopian goal; the military dictatorship of a Latin American country or of a province of pre-Communist China is not totalitarian. No society, indeed, is completely totalitarian (just as none is completely democratic or completely capitalist), but Stalinist Russia was a close approximation of the pure type.

Indeed, almost all would now agree that Russia up to 1953, the year of Stalin's death, was a totalitarian society; and to recall the sharp, often bitter, divergences of the 1930's and 1940's in the light of this virtual unanimity suggests that some progress may have been made. After the end of the war, the evidence on Soviet terror, on Soviet slave labor, on the arbitrary controls over every sector of Soviet life, mounted higher and higher, finally to be capped by none other than Khrushchev himself addressing a Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Eventually the most dedicated fellow-traveler, self-trained in blindness though he was, could no longer fail to see: the Soviet Union was a totalitarian society. It should be noted, however, that some who now make this declaration emphasize not *totalitarian*, but *was*. The agreement that has been reached about the past is almost irrelevant, for the old disputes continue with respect to the Communist present and the Communist future.

The complexity of present-day Communism as it has evolved in various countries is great enough to induce different interpretations and sometimes sharply contrasting prognoses from even the best informed analysts, observing the same events in the same Western democratic perspective. Some of this disagreement is represented in the essays of this volume. There has been no attempt to construct a monistic line, hiding honest differences of opinion responsibly arrived at by scholars qualified to have them. But the imposition of these legitimate criteria—scholarship, responsibility, honesty—has appreciably reduced the range from that between the apologists for the Left and the irresponsibles of the Right.

The theme of this symposium is the interaction between continuity and change in world Communism. In the first essay, on Communist ideology by Bertram D. Wolfe, the emphasis is on the permanent element in this changing world. Wolfe not only admits but stresses the many revisions that Khrushchev has made in the Stalinist system, but in his words (here quoted from another article of his) they have been within-system changes, not changes in the Soviet system. However one answers it, this is the crucial question:

which of the many important alterations in Soviet life can be reasonably taken as the beginning of a fundamental metamorphosis, a change to a different type of society? One step in answering this question is to supply a benchmark from which to measure the post-Stalin evolution; and this is given in the second essay, on Soviet society under Stalin, by William Petersen. The next two papers, respectively by Gregory Grossman and Paul E. Zinner, analyze the economy and the society of the post-Stalin decade. To the degree that any one-sentence summary of their richly detailed analyses can be adequate, both see the many significant changes under Khrushchev to be definitely within the same social and political framework.

Variation in Communism, however, is not only from one Russian dictator to another but also from one country to another. In Stalin's day (or in Lenin's, for that matter), the Communist Parties of the world were united in toeing the Moscow line. Each time that Russian foreign policy dictated another reversal in the international Communist policy, every Party turned about, whether in Europe or in Asia, in an industrial or a peasant country. Some of the present East European satellites, in particular East Germany, show something like the same obsequious subservience to the Kremlin. But others, Gomulka's Poland for example, are controlled on a much looser leash; and for a period Tito's Yugoslavia escaped Soviet domination altogether. These variations on a Soviet theme are analyzed by Paul Kecskemeti, who also regards the continuity in Soviet patterns as more significant than the deviations from them.

Is this true also of Communist China, Russia's principal competitor within the Communist bloc? Ideally, it would have been useful to replicate the three papers on the Soviet Union rather than crowding all of the analysis on China into the one essay by Robert A. Scalapino. But accurate data on this enormous, complex, and rapidly changing society are scarce. It is possible to skim the surface and present a reasonably accurate impression, but a more detailed discussion would have involved mainly the rather technical (and, for laymen, pointless) question of challenging the reliability of competitive sources. With respect to China, we are like the Westerners in the 1920's who tried to understand what was going on in Russia—balancing ignorantly hostile reports against ignorantly enthusiastic ones, measuring present misery against the misery of the past and the extravagant hopes for the future, hoping to establish some basis

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for credibility. That is why the question of whether "Maoism" differs fundamentally from Leninism is so important: if those are correct who hold that the same Party is fashioning both societies to essentially the same mold, then everything we know about Russia can be applied—remembering that these are different cultures—to China. But among the handful of Westerners genuinely informed about both Communism and China, this is still an open question.

The analysis of world Communism is not complete if it stops with those countries that have become Communist and passes over the international Party's efforts to establish new power. In the United States and other Western countries, these efforts were mainly through a special type of Party adjunct, known as a Communist front. This is an organization created or captured by Communists, who almost always constitute only a minority within it, in order to serve the Party's purposes in one particular field. By thus setting up a kind of associate membership—fellow-travelers, who adhere to only a certain portion of its program and discipline—the Party can increase its range of power enormously, both directly and by corrupting competing institutions that have been successfully infiltrated. The several million Americans who became members of one or more of the several hundred Communist fronts that flourished during the 1930's and 1940's, it is important to remember, were mostly *not* Communists; indeed, some of the more credulous may have been unaware that they were cooperating with Communists. The list includes important dignitaries of the Democratic and Republican parties, trade-union and corporation leaders, lawyers and actors, avowed atheists and clergymen of several denominations, and so on through almost the whole American social structure. When a person on the Right names the names on such a list, he draws the conclusion that, apart from the tiny sects that he supports, everything in American politics is tainted. From the same list, once he is forced to admit its validity, a person on the Left typically draws the opposite conclusion: organizations whose membership included so many distinguished, intelligent, *sincere* people could not be part of a totalitarian conspiracy. Both overlook the most characteristic feature of the front, that it is set up to enable a small nucleus to manipulate the large amorphous mass.

John Hutchinson's paper on trade unions is a case study on the Communist infiltration of democratic institutions. By concentrating on the facts concerning this one example, he is able to cut through

some of the emotions surrounding this highly charged area and reach conclusions that, even so, go far beyond the labor organizations he analyzes.

Such Communist fronts as still exist in the United States have little influence, and in fact the strength of all Communist organizations has waned throughout the Western world. Currently the battles of the world revolution are being fought mainly in the underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. While these nations differ in many respects, they share a number of characteristics favorable to revolutionary change, and thus possibly to eventual Communist control. Many were recently the colonies of Western nations, which they are inclined to see still as the imperialist enemy. Traditional leaders are losing their power, in part because they typically refuse to adapt to new demands. The new heads of the countries are very often part of a rising class of radical intellectuals, hostile to the West and attracted to one or another school of revolutionary doctrine. The problems these new elites face are overwhelming—to build a nation out of inimical elements speaking a score of different languages; to satisfy the demands for social welfare and, at the same time, for rapid industrialization; to raise a population largely illiterate and almost totally unskilled in urban-industrial arts to the level necessary to attempt such goals; to ride with turbulent changes and yet stay in power. Even to plan tasks of this dimension suggests totalitarian methods, and the examples of Russia and China reinforce the suggestion. On the face of it, thus, the Communists have important advantages among the so-called uncommitted nations. The principal characteristic of the underdeveloped world is social fluidity: nothing is fixed. And the Communists see social upheavals not as disasters, but as opportunities. A Western democrat is at a moral disadvantage working in a social setting where democracy would be manifestly inappropriate: if he does not admit this, he feels himself to be a hypocrite, and if he does, he generally lacks any other social philosophy to guide his day-to-day activities.

It would be easy, however, to overestimate the Communists' advantages. In the paper by Robert J. Alexander on Latin America, the basic conclusion is that the Communists cannot control their radical allies. Fidel Castro in Cuba, a typical Jacobin, is indispensable to the Communists, for they could not rule without him. They can neither dispose of him nor absorb him; he is their indigestion.

And the Latin American wave of support for Castro has a similar ambivalence with respect to international Communism; for the first time in decades, Communists have a competitor to their Left, even more romantic and less responsible than they, and thus better able to gain from simplistic but vehement denunciations of "the system." Whether Jacobin violence can lead to a stable state with Communists in power, however, is still a moot question.

WILLIAM PETERSEN

Berkeley, California

Communist Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy

Bertram D. Wolfe

It was only towards the middle of the twentieth century that the inhabitants of many European countries came, in general unpleasantly, to realize that their fate could be influenced directly by intricate and abstruse books of philosophy.

—Czeslaw Milosz

For four and a half decades, statesmen and experts have waited confidently for the Soviet Union to mellow. Repeatedly they have thought they were witnessing the longed for change of dynamism, of direction, or of heart, which would make Communist totalitarianism in power just "one state among many"—different of course (are not all states different?), but a member of the comprehensive genus of orderly, constituted governments, content to tolerate orderly neighbors and to act according to the not too generous rule of live and let live by which governments, reluctantly, indifferently, or a little contemptuously, suffer one another's presence on the same earth.

A review of the pronouncements made on this theme over these forty-five years makes for melancholy reading. From the notion that Lenin's regime would last but a few weeks or months (Lenin himself shared this view for a while) to the certitude that power and responsibility always sober their wielders; from Lenin's New Economic Policy to Stalin's "socialism in one country" and Khrushchev's "thaw"; from the celebration of Russia's entry into the League of Nations through the shock of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact to the unity of the Grand Alliance that was to build "one world"; from Stalin's "peaceful coexistence" to Khrushchev's "peaceful competition"; from the "collective leadership" following Lenin's death to that following Stalin's to the personal rule of Khrushchev and the anti-Stalinism of the most apt of Stalin's pupils—at every zig

Soviet Society Under Stalin: The Prototype of Totalitarianism

William Petersen

By lifting their hands against Comrade Stalin, they [the defendants in the 1937 show-trial] lifted them against everything that is best in humanity, because Stalin is the hope, Stalin is the expectation, Stalin is the lighthouse of all progressive humanity. Stalin, our banner! Stalin, our will! Stalin, our victory!

—Nikita S. Khrushchev, 1937

In 19th-century England Marx distinguished the bourgeoisie (the owners of the means of production) from the proletariat (who owned nothing but their "labor power"); and this distinction still holds for the West, even though mere ownership of corporation stocks has become far less important than control of boards of directors. In a totalitarian state, the class structure is determined mainly by political, rather than economic, attributes. The Soviet Union of the Stalinist period had three broad social classes—the Party at the top, the slave laborers at the bottom, and the mass of free non-Party people in between. We shall begin at the top and move down through the social structure, restricting the analysis to the roughly thirty years (out of the forty-five since the 1917 revolution) that Stalin was either in ascendancy or in power.

The role of the dictator in a Communist dictatorship, though seemingly not a problematic matter, has often been misunderstood. In the first portion of the Stalinist era, from the death of Lenin (1924) to the 16th Party Congress (1930), Stalin took pains to deny the special importance of his personal role. His achievements were ascribed to a "collective leadership" of the Party, through which the inevitable forward march of History was being realized. The Party embodies perfect wisdom and is, unlike any mere individual, infallible. And it is true that Stalin won the fight for control because he was an *apparatchik*—a man of the Party apparatus. The heir appar-

The Soviet Economy in the Post-Stalin Decade

Gregory Grossman

As one seeks to reconstruct a picture of the Soviet economy in those late winter days of 1953 when the dictator lay dying, the epithets "grim," "oppressive," and "bleak" haunt the mind. True, the repair of the enormous wartime physical damage had been nearly completed. Industrial production had been rising rapidly since the end of the war, and even the output of manufactured consumer goods was already considerably above the 1940 level.¹ The consumer's lot had also improved markedly from the extremely low levels of the early postwar years.

But grim, oppressive, and bleak the economic picture still was. Although the war had been won, the economy continued mobilized on a quasimilitary footing to speed reconstruction, to conduct the cold war, to master atomic weaponry and rocketry, and to support the war in Korea. (The burden of the Korean War on the Soviet economy should not be minimized. Among other things, it led to a perceptible decline in the production of civilian machinery.) The notorious labor control laws of 1940 were still on the books, though apparently no longer fully enforced, while a separate and equally severe set of laws and regulations controlled, or at least were intended to control, the mobility and activities of collective-farm peasants. The "cult of personality," that is, Stalin's unbridled and capricious despotism, was felt by everyone and in everything. Millions of persons—the exact number is still unavailable—were leading a semihuman existence in forced-labor camps, many of them only recently impressed during Stalin and Beria's last major wave of arrests. For those outside the camps, and even for the populations of the satellite states, the terror and the political and cultural controls were at a new peak of intensity.

The real wages of the urban population were already substantially above their relatively low level in 1940, just before the German at-

Soviet Society Since Stalin: Changes and Continuities

Paul E. Zinner

Khrushchev's Russia is not Stalin's Russia. The old dictator bequeathed to his unchosen successors a legacy of personal rule which they could not have assimilated even had they wanted to. He left behind him a society frozen, or nearly frozen, in its tracks, approaching general paralysis: the pervasive terror so withered the people's senses as to make them incapable of responding properly even to coercion. It was to be expected that Stalin's death in March 1953 would bring changes, in form if not in substance, to alleviate the incredible pressures under which all the society had been laboring, and to avoid possible breakdown or insurrection. The Soviet leaders, concerned about their country's and their own welfare, saw that rapid adaptations were necessary. They devised a crash program to forestall untoward developments and to gain time to adjust relations among themselves. They made concessions to the people in the form of amnesties and material palliatives, and to the outside world in the form of gestures toward an international *détente*.

Under the circumstances they could not have done less and still hope to survive. Yet the emergency measures of the period immediately following Stalin's death did not reflect panic. Nor did they presage a structured program of changes in the management of the affairs of Soviet society. They provided the rulers and the population with an essential breathing spell to take stock and strengthen flagging energies. In a longer perspective, the basic issue was—who would succeed Stalin? Pious references to collective leadership, which for a while abounded in Soviet media, were a convenient cover for the struggle for supremacy among individuals and factions. As long as collective leadership was hailed as the time-honored Leninist norm, one could be reasonably certain that forces at the top were divided and that no one had sufficient power to oust his rivals. The Party line was a barometer of the atmosphere in the ruling hierarchy.

The East European Satellites: Variations on a Soviet Theme

Paul Kecskemeti

At the end of the second World War, a vast tract of East-Central Europe, running from the Baltic to the Adriatic and the Black Sea, came under Soviet political control, based mostly upon military occupation. Ever since then, the political history of the countries or country fragments involved (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria) has been a set of variations on a common theme.

The unitary, common theme was the gradual imposition of totalitarian political regimes closely modeled upon Stalin's Soviet Russia. But there were also variations, departures from mechanical uniformity. This was inevitable. The process of sovietization started from initial conditions that differed widely from one country of the region to another, and also differed from those prevailing in Russia during the formative period of the Soviet regime itself. Moscow's pressure toward uniformity, massive as it was, did not succeed in effacing these initial differences. Thus, political developments in each country of the region proceeded along specific lines, reflecting variations in social structure, the degree of industrial development, national-political orientation, indigenous Communist strength, and so on. Because of these variations, no two countries of the region experienced the ordeal of sovietization in exactly the same manner. I shall briefly outline the various patterns of sovietization that emerged, the stresses generated by them, and the physiognomic differences now prevailing among the Communist regimes of the region as a result of the divergent historical paths they followed.

II

The withdrawal of the German forces from East-Central Europe in 1944-45 brought about the collapse of the German occupation

Communist China— The First Fourteen Years

Robert A. Scalapino

The People's Republic of China will shortly celebrate its fourteenth anniversary. On October 1, 1949, in the shadow of Peking's historic Imperial Palace, Mao Tse-tung formally inaugurated a new national government and a radically new era. Ten days earlier, the Communist-sponsored People's Political Consultative Council had ratified the Common Program, the first blueprint for Communist rule. For the Communists, these were both hectic and exhilarating days. The hour of triumph had followed nearly thirty years of struggle. The civil war was drawing to a close, with the Kuomintang forces disastrously defeated and Chiang Kai-shek already brooding in exile on Taiwan. Mao's New Democracy now dominated the land. A small group of veteran Communist revolutionaries stood at the apex of power, in supreme control over nearly 600 million Chinese, one-fourth of the world's population. And how many of these 600 million could realize that they were about to experience the greatest upheaval in the 4,000-year history of their civilization?

An accurate, balanced analysis of Communist China today is a truly formidable task. In the first place, one must deal with a huge and diverse society. In size and population, Communist China is nearly one-half of Asia. Its people, who presumably number between 700 and 750 million at present, are spread over an area of nearly 3,660,000 square miles. Within the boundaries of greater China, moreover, exist a variety of subcultures, each containing elements of uniqueness that cannot be quickly or easily leveled, even by Communism. Another problem lies in the fact that China is currently undergoing massive and extraordinarily rapid change. Nor is the change always in a single and predictable direction. Lenin's phrase, "Two steps forward, one step backward," captures in some measure the Communist mode of operation, although it does not

Trade Unionism and the Communists: American and International Experiences

John Hutchinson

Every movement has its leader, and every doctrine its scriptures. The impact of Communist ideas and actions on the American and international labor movements derive largely from Lenin. He was a contemporary observer of the rise of the modern trade unionism and also, as Marx was not, the supervisor of a revolution. His ideas on trade unionism, developed in the crucible of experience, guided the course of Soviet labor organization, and remain of great importance today.

Trade unions did not become legal in tsarist Russia until 1906, long after Lenin had become a professional revolutionist. But they did exist in rudimentary form, and during the 1890's Lenin and other intellectuals participated in union activities in St. Petersburg, forming the "League for the Emancipation of the Working Class," helping to conduct strikes, and using such occasions to spread revolutionary propaganda. From these and later experiences he developed a clear and generally consistent view of the role of trade unionism in a revolutionary age.

"The workers' organizations for carrying on the economic struggle," Lenin wrote, "should be trade-union organizations. . . . Let every worker who understands the necessity for organization, in order to carry on the struggle against the employers and the government, join the trade unions."¹

Trade unions should attract as many members as possible. "The wider these organizations are, the wider our influence over them will be."² Trade unions should not be doctrinally selective, since "it would be far from being to our interest to demand that only Social Democrats [that is, Leninists] be eligible for membership in

The Jacobin Left and the Future of the Communists in Latin America

Robert J. Alexander

The advent of the Castro government to power in Cuba opened a new chapter in the history of the Communist movement in Latin America. Not only did it result in the establishment of the first self-proclaimed Communist regime in the hemisphere, but it also allowed the Communist Parties to break out of a position of political isolation in which they had been for a decade.

However, although Castro's immediate effect was favorable to Latin American Communists, his long-range impact may be considerably less so. For there is good reason to believe that Communists will be faced with an important challenge from the Left, from groups temperamentally and politically a good deal more extremist than the Communist Parties themselves. Fidel Castro and the group most closely associated with him in Cuba have helped crystallize a current of Latin American political opinion which we shall call the Jacobin Left, or simply Jacobins, still somewhat amorphous and disorganized, but a potential extremist challenge to the Communists.

Of course, the Jacobin parties and groups are not the first competitors of the Communists for leadership of the revolutionary movement in Latin America. From their very inception, various of the Communist Parties have had to battle socialist parties for the loyalty of the workers, the middle classes, and the peasants. In several countries traditional liberal parties have also been formidable rivals. And during the last three decades the Communists have been confronted with an even greater competition in the national revolutionary parties, which in country after country reduced the Communists to little more than a nuisance.

World Communism: A Reading List for Nonspecialists*

William Petersen and Paul E. Zinner

In the 1930's intellectuals aspired to know all the important books about Communism; today scholars find it difficult to keep up with their own specialized areas. More than ever, the general reader needs a guide through the growing literature. There are two excellent bibliographies, but neither quite satisfies his needs. Philip Grierson, *Books on Soviet Russia, 1917-1942: A Bibliography and Guide to Reading* (London: Methuen, 1943), is limited to Russia and to a period that ended more than two decades ago. R. N. Carew Hunt, *Books on Communism* (Essential Books, 1959), covers both scholarly and popular works on Communism anywhere in the world up to mid-1958. Our list was prepared independently and then checked against Professor Carew Hunt's recommendations. There is a surprisingly small overlap, in part because of the large number of works published in the interim, in part because each bibliography reflects to some degree the backgrounds, preferences, and prejudices of the compilers. Robert Finley Delaney, *The Literature of Communism in America: A Selected Reference Guide* (Catholic University Press, 1962), is largely an uncritical compilation of congressional hearings and reports.

Our reading list is not "objective" in the sense of balancing each criticism of totalitarianism with an apology for it; in this sense, we are no more "objective" about Communism than we were about Nazism. The works have been chosen and described from the point of view of a Western democrat, but also from the point of view of a Western scholar: the two criteria do not clash. The first and most important standard by which the books have been chosen is that in

* This list is based in part on the recommended readings suggested by some of the other contributors. We are especially grateful to Gregory Grossman and Nancy Heer, who reviewed a draft of this paper. But the opinions expressed and the responsibility for them are ours.

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