


THE CONCEPT OF WORLD : A STUDY IN WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS

ABSTRACT

By
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A Dissertation submitted for M.Phil Degree in
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ABSTRACT

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A STUDY IN WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS

This dissertation aims at exploring the concept of world as envisaged by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico - Philosophicus. There is a sense in which the world provides the subject matter for study by all disciplines. But the concept of world itself stands in need of explication. A humble attempt has been made in the dissertation to explore and analyse the concept of world in the context of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. On many occasions points of similarities with Kant have been highlighted.

This dissertation consists of five chapters. The first chapter is entitled "Introduction". In this chapter I have presented a brief outline of different ways in which the world has been understood. Chief among them are the causal and the non-causal. Scientific explanation of the world is causal. It tries to explain the world in terms of cause and effect. For scientists, the world is not a system of ideas; it is a system of things and events. Science aims at discovering the inter-relationship between different aspects of the world. But the philosophical understanding of the world is

non-causal. Philosophers are not concerned with the world as a totality of things and events. He is, in a word, concerned with the concept of the world. Philosophical questions regarding "World" are conceptual. They are questions relating to the meaning of the concept "world". This point has been spelt out in detail in this chapter.

The second chapter is entitled "Constituents of the World". Wittgenstein treats the world as a totality of facts as against the totality of things. What is a thing? What is a fact? How is the fact distinguished from a thing? These are very important issues in philosophy. Why did Wittgenstein seek to characterise the world in terms of fact in lieu of things? Such issues stand in need of being explored. Such questions have been examined in detail in this chapter.

The third chapter is entitled "Our Knowledge of the World". Wittgenstein is not very much explicit on this point. There are suggestions in the Tractatus as if Wittgenstein is an empiricist. Accordingly some positivists have traced the principle of verification to the Tractatus. On the other hand, by and large, Wittgenstein

obtains knowledge of the world through language. It is the truth functional analysis of language that gives us knowledge of the world. Wittgenstein's theory of knowledge, (if he has any) is something very different from those of the empiricists and the rationalists. In fact, for Wittgenstein, knowledge of the world can be obtained through analysis of language only. It is a novel epistemology developed by Wittgenstein.

The fourth chapter is "Language and the limits of the world". In Tractatus, Wittgenstein wanted to draw a boundary of language. for him, all propositions are truth-functions of its constituent propositions. Tautologies and contradictions say nothing about the world. Because they are either true or false in all possible circumstances. Only the contingent or descriptive proposition say something. All descriptive propositions as well as propositions of natural sciences must be either elementary propositions or truth-functions of elementary propositions. This view puts limitations on what can be said. Wittgenstein maintained that the limits of our language is the limit of the world. He further said that the limit of my language means the limits of my world. This view leads him to solipsism. In this chapter an attempt has been made to analyse


and examine Wittgenstein's view in this respect.

In the fifth chapter, I have drawn my conclusion. For Wittgenstein, only descriptive propositions can assert all that can be said. All descriptive propositions are ultimately analysable into elementary propositions. Elementary propositions consist of names. And the meaning of name is the object it denotes. But this thesis of descriptive propositions rules out many things like religion, morality and aesthetics as unsayable. Regarding them nothing can be said. Wittgenstein wanted to keep them outside the world. They cannot be put into words. They lie beyond this world. They are transcendental. Wittgenstein seems to distinguish between this world which is described by factual language and the transcendental world described by non-factual emotive language. In this context points of similarity with Kant's distinction between "World of phenomena" and "World of noumena" has been highlighted.

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By

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DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

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IN

FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF

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I Certified that the subject matter of this thesis is the record of work done by Mrs. Rajasree Paul, that the contents of this thesis did not form a basis of the award of any previous degree to her, or, to the best of my knowledge, to anybody else, and that the thesis had not been submitted by her for any research degree in any other University.

In habit and character, Mrs. Rajasree Paul is a fit and proper person for the degree of Master in Philosophy.

SHILLONG
The 18th Dec. 1989


(Dr. N. Malla)
Supervisor

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C O N T E N T S

Supervisor's Certificate

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ABBREVIATIONS

NB : Note-Books 1914-1916

T : Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

What is the nature of the world? How do we study it? What is its relation to man? These questions have not only kept the scientists worried for centuries but also have worried the philosophers. The scientists, particularly the natural scientists study the physical world. It is sometimes said that the social scientist study the social world.

From the scientific point of view the term "world" designates the totality of things and events in which observational astronomer and the theoretical physicist are interested in giving an account of it as a whole. Even scientific enquiry often poses a number of philosophical questions. They are methodological and epistemological in nature. These questions constitute the philosophy of scientific cosmology. The theoretical cosmologist studies the universe in order to understand it and make it intelligible. He constructs a model of the universe and studies the ways in which this model may be used to interpret the observational data already available. He tries to understand the universe as some kind of readily identifiable object, system, or class of objects. A model of the universe is not something that can be directly

visualised or completely represented in the pictorial diagram. The kind of model that the cosmologist constructs is wholly conceptual rather than material. It consists of different sorts of symbols including ordinary language, mathematical language, diagrams and charts. The model is designed with the help of various clues and sources to which the cosmologist appeals in determining the properties to be assigned to his model. Chief among them are observational clues provided by the astronomer and theoretical principles thought to be of relevance to the problem. The observational data collected by the astronomer help the cosmologist, suggesting ways of assigning certain idealized properties to the model by providing empirically ascertained values from the constants and variables in the model. It also helps the cosmologist by offering empirical tests for the adequacy of the model as a tool for predicting observable matters of fact.

The second major source of ideas in the construction of cosmological models is the conceptual resources of mathematical physics. The cosmologist may turn to some already established physical theory as expressed in fundamental principles and derived laws. He examines to what extent the universe as a physical system has a detailed structure that may be articulated and specified by

means of the selected physical theory. For example, he may use Newton's law of gravitation or Einstein's theory of relativity as a guide to construct a model of the universe.

In order to construct a cosmological model the cosmologist, instead of appealing to already established principles or laws, may undertake to create a new principle assumed to be of special relevance to the cosmological problem.

Thus, scientific enquiry, in a broad perspective, may be said to present two main aspects. One is ascertainment and discovery of facts. The other, the construction of hypotheses and theories. These two aspects of scientific enquiry are sometimes termed as descriptive and theoretical science. Again, theory-building may be said to serve two main purposes. One is to predict the occurrence of events or outcome of experiments and thus to anticipate new facts. The other is to explain or to make intelligible facts which have already been recorded. These two aspects - prediction and explanation are sometimes regarded as basically identical processes of scientific thinking. They differ only in time perspective. Prediction looks forward from what is to what will come. Explanation usually looks back from what is to what went before.

Thus, scientific explanation of the world is causal. It tries to explain the world in terms of cause and effect. The great works of the scientists like Kepler, Copernicus, Galileo, Newton and Einstein can be understood only in this light. For these scientists, the world is not a system of ideas; it is a system of things and events. Science aims at discovering the interrelationship between different aspects of the world .

But philosophical understanding of the world is non-causal. Some Philosophers try to understand the world in terms of value and purpose. The concepts 'value' and 'purpose' go beyond the physical world. To the physicist, eyes and hands are no more interesting than sticks and stones. They are all just varieties of the so called Prime matter. But the conception of purpose goes beyond the physical objects and gives importance to the differences between man's hand and other mixtures of elements.

It can be said in this connection that a philosopher is not concerned with the world as a totality of things and events. He is, in a word, concerned with the concept of the world. What do we mean by 'World'? What does the concept of World imply? How is the world made intelligible to us? Is the World a totality of things or it is a totality of facts? Is the World endless or it has limits.

Are there are values in the world or it is neutral? These are some of the issues which a philosopher generally raises about the world. The philosophical questions about the world are conceptual. They are questions relating to the meaning of the concept "World."

World in the sense of totality has been used as a synonym of reality in philosophy. In this sense, it can be said that every system of philosophy has its concept or view of the world. The empiricists have their view of the world and so is the case with the rationalist. For the empiricist, the world is a totality of simple ideas or impressions. Similarly for the rationalist, it is a totality of logical conclusions internally connected and derived from a set of self-evident principles. For Hegel, the world is a system of self-developing and self-manifesting ideas. In short, it is the externalization of reason.

Seen in this light, it appears that the concept of world or totality is crucial to any philosopher. In the contemporary time Wittgenstein treats the world as a totality of facts as against the totality of things. What is a thing? What is a fact? These are very important issues in philosophy. Why did Wittgenstein seek to characterise the world in terms of fact in lieu of things? Such issues

stand in need of being explored.

The present dissertation aims at exploring Wittgenstein's concept of the world as envisaged in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. There is a great deal of similarity between Kant and Wittgenstein on the concept of world and its limits. For Kant, human understanding can only know the phenomenon. The noumenon is unknown and unknowable? Why does Kant say so? What are his reasons? On the other hand, for Wittgenstein, our language sets limits to our world. According to Kant, human understanding and the world are intimately connected where^{as} for Wittgenstein, language and the world are intimately connected.

An humble attempt has been made in the course of the dissertation to explore Wittgenstein's concept of the world. On many occasions, points of similarities with Kant have also been highlighted.

CHAPTER - II

CONSTITUENTS OF THE WORLD

Historically speaking, both scientists and philosophers have tried to understand the world. But there is a difference between philosophical and scientific understanding of the world. The scientist seeks to understand the world in terms of causes and effects, whereas the philosophical understanding of the world is non-causal.

In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein developed a metaphysical system. He did it from a particular consideration of language and meaning. But the metaphysical and linguistic doctrines are so closely connected that neither can be understood without the other. Wittgenstein opened the Tractatus by saying: "The world is all that is the case" (T,1). "The world is the totality of facts, not of things" (Ts 1.1). "The world divides into facts" (T,1.2). On this point we find a great deal of similarity between Russell and Wittgenstein. Both of them believed in the correspondence between structure of language and that of the world. Wittgenstein claims that the world is a totality of facts. This runs contrary to the commonsense view of the world. How do we go about it? One can very well argue that whatever

we see in this world or come in contact with are things, that things not only make up the world but also that the world is the totality of things. This is so just because things do make up the world. If we try to give a list of all objects around us we will get only an inadequate idea of what the world is like. For example, "if we describe a room by giving an account of things present in the room we do our job very unsatisfactorily. What we are doing here is just giving the list of things. But this is not actually wanted. What is wanted is not only a list of the articles contained in the room but also what they look like and how they are arranged in the room. If we do so, then we are not giving an account of objects but an account of facts. Thus, the truth about the world is not that there are such and such things rather there are such and such facts.

Suppose we are asked to build a model of a building with a list of objects that a building generally contains. There may be a number of possibilities of combining all these objects. So our task will never be completed. But we can present a complete model of the building very easily if we are given with a list of facts about that building. Thus, we can draw pictures of an infinite number of possible world with the objects, that make up the actual world, by arranging them in many different

ways. Thus it follows that it is not the things but facts that 'determine the world'. Wittgenstein says, "World is the totality of facts and not of things".

According to Wittgenstein, the world literally means 'situation' and etymologically it would suggest 'hold of things' i.e., a way things stand in relation to one another. By 'situation' Wittgenstein means an arrangement of objects which, according to him, are simple. For him, a "situation" is a concatenation of simple objects. Wittgenstein thought that a fact is also complex. For example, the fact that 'the pen is in my hand' is a complex consisting of the 'pen' and 'my hand'. Here the two objects, "pen" and "my hand", are so arranged that the former is in the latter. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein thought of facts in this way. His statements about facts and states of affairs makes it clear. In the Tractatus, he wrote, "A state of affairs (a state of things)' is a combination of objects (things)." (T,2.01). "In a state of affairs objects fit into one another like the links of a chain" (T,2.03). "In a state of affairs objects stand in a determined relation to one another" (T,2.031).

According to Wittgenstein, "objects" cannot exist independent of facts. Only facts can exist independent of anything else. It has the most basic kind of

reality. According to him, "the world divides into facts" (T.1.2). These are self-subsistent and can exist by themselves. Wittgenstein arrived at the atomic fact from the side of language and not by empirical investigation. For Wittgenstein it is a logical necessity that there are simples and there are objects. Since every complex presupposes simple, so there must be simples. He wrote: "The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts the existence of states of affairs" (T.4.21). To assert that there is a certain complex is to assert that its constituents are related in a certain way and that is the assertion of a fact. A proposition asserts the relatedness of the constituents of the complex.

According to Wittgenstein, a full description of the world can be given if we know all the atomic facts and not by mere naming the objects. A proposition which asserts atomic fact is called an atomic proposition. They are logically independent of one another. Logical inference is not concerned with atomic facts, but with the non-atomic propositions i.e., molecular propositions.

According to Wittgenstein, there is a fact corresponding to each proposition. It makes a proposition true or false. Facts may be either positive or negative. A positive fact is the existence of the state of affairs

and a negative fact is the non-existence of a state of affairs (T,2.06). "A state of affairs is the combination of objects (things)" (T,2.01). State of affairs are elementary or atomic. They are what correspond to elementary propositions. As elementary propositions cannot be reduced to further basic propositions, so the state of affairs cannot be said to consist of more basic states of affairs. Moreover, elementary propositions consist of names, and states of affairs consist of objects. States of affairs are independent of each other. In states of affairs objects stand in relation to one another "like the links of a chain". (T,2.03). An object is a positive constituent of a state of affairs. According to Wittgenstein, not only do objects occur in states of affairs, they cannot but occur in them. The possibility of occurrence of an object in states of affairs is not merely possible, but the possibility of its occurrence in one or another is essential to it. In support of this view Wittgenstein offered two arguments:

- (i) Suppose, that the appearance of objects could as well exist alone as in a state of affairs. But if an object which existed alone on its own account subsequently occurred^r in a state of affairs, it would look like an accident that the state of affairs could be made to fit. Here

the point is that objects can never be characterised and understood as accidental.

- (ii) If we know an object we thereby know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs. But since this is essential to know the object, it must be essential to the object. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein wrote: "If I am to know an object, though I need not know its external properties, I must know all its internal properties." (T,2.01231). Here by internal properties is meant the possibilities of its occurrence in states of affairs.


Another characteristic of objects is that "objects are simple" (T,2.02). They constitute the substance of the world. Thus they cannot be compound i.e., they must be simple. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein wrote: "objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite." (T,2.021). That the world must have substances can be proved by the following argument: The world must have substance because (i) if the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend upon whether another proposition was true, and (ii) if whether a proposition had sense depended upon another proposition's being true, then we could

not sketch out a picture of the world, true or false. The argument moves from the obvious falsity of the consequent in (ii). Without simple objects we can have no names, and without names language would be limited only to descriptions. Propositions containing descriptions have an element of indeterminateness in their sense. We can never get rid of indeterminateness entirely as long as we use descriptions. Thus, there are two alternatives. Either, (a) we reach names eventually and can say with full determinateness what we want to say about the world or (b) there is no end to the descriptions. There will be always an indeterminateness of sense and we can never be able to picture a particular state of affairs if we use descriptions. In the absence of simple objects and names, generally can never be avoided and what precisely we mean can never be expressed. Without reaching names, the sense of a proposition will never be specified.

According to Wittgenstein, "objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same" (T,2.027). Objects are the same as the unalterable. They are common to all possible worlds. It is the objects which must exist for there to be meaning. So objects are the actual, and states of affairs are the possible. They only group and re-group. Even in imaginable world

what we do in imagination is to re-arrange ^{the} already existing elements. All that can vary is the pattern, never the elements themselves. Whatever be the content of our imagination, the only difference with the things is the configuration that the objects enter into. Objects are fixed through changes. There must be simple which cannot be destroyed. Wittgenstein wrote: "objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable". (T,2.0271). They may differ in external properties also. Moreover they may have numerical difference in them. This implies that though they are not discriminable, they are not identical. The objects constitute substance of the world. Objects are combined with one another to form a fact. This is internal to objects. This is the structure of objects. Thus, objects cannot exist apart from facts.

According to Wittgenstein, some combination of objects exists and some do not. The former is associated with positive facts and the latter with the negative facts. But when he says that "World is the totality of facts and not of things" and the totality of existing states of affairs is the world, it seems that he is identifying facts with positive facts for states of affairs can be identified with positive facts only. Thus, the world finally divides into positive atomic facts. But



reality is much more than this. It includes both positive and negative facts. It is inclusive of both positive and non-positive State of affairs in their respective states of existence and non-existence. If this is accepted, when it appears that Wittgenstein accorded non-existing states of affairs only a shadowy kind of being, a mere possibility. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein wrote: "The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality" (T,2.06). But immediately in T,2.063 he wrote: "The sum-total of reality is the world". This implies that the world also contains both positive and negative. But we can come out of this difficulty. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein wrote: "The totality of existing states of affairs also determines which states of affairs do not exist" (T,2.05). "For the totality determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case" (T,1.12). Thus, we find that positive and negative facts are inseparable. All positive facts imply all negative facts as well. To say that the world is composed of both positive and negative facts is to say that these two - positive and negative facts - are inseparable. Negative facts are only non-existence of possible states of affairs. It does not exist. Thus, only the positive atomic facts form the parts of the actual world.

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We have seen in T,2.01 that "A state of affairs is a combination of objects (things)." Thus, it follows that both non-existent and existent states of affairs form a combination and arrangement of existent objects. An existent states of affairs is an actual arrangement of existent objects and a non-existent state of affairs is a non-actual arrangement of existent objects. But non-existent states of affairs can neither be actual nor a non-actual arrangement of non-existent objects. Any proposition about a non-existent object is meaningless. Hence the arrangement of non-existent states of affairs is unintelligible. And thus all discussions about non-existent objects and arrangement of non-actual states of affairs are meaningless. Thus both existent states of affairs and non-existent states of affairs are arrangements of existent objects only.

According to Wittgenstein' objects are eternal. All possible worlds must be composed of the same objects that this actual world of ours is composed of. Thus, all possible number of worlds differ only in the arrangement of objects. Any possible or imagined but non-actual world must be configuration of all possible states of affairs. It must be an arrangement of existent objects which compose the real world. Wittgenstein wrote: "It is obvious that

an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something, a form-in common with it" (T,2.022). "Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form" (T,2.023).

Facts are not strictly definable. When we try to define anything, we try to do so by intuitive induction where we try to define it by grasping its common and essential characteristics by examining several incidence. But facts do not possess any common and essential characteristics called "being a fact". They do not have any object or structure in common. They do not have any connotation. In T,4.1272 Wittgenstein himself said that object is a pseudo-concept whatever the word 'objects' (thing etc.) is correctly used, it is expressed by a conceptual notation by a variable name. Wherever it is used in a different way, that it is a proper concept word, nonsensical pseudo-propositions are the result. So no one can say, for example, 'there are objects', as one might say 'There are books'. And it is just impossible to say, 'There are 100 subjects', or 'there are no objects'. And it is nonsensical to speak of the total number of objects. The same applies to the concepts 'complex', 'fact', 'function', 'number', etc. They all signify formal concepts, and are represented in conceptual

notation by variables, not by function or classes (as Frege and Russell believed). Thus, definition of a fact is impossible. We can explain them. Through proposition and sentence we can explain them.

A proposition is a statement which may be either true or false. A statement is a sentence which indicates something. Thus, only indicative sentences are propositions. It is a combination of words set according to the rules of grammar and syntax of language. It states such and such is the case. Whatever is object of belief and disbelief is a proposition. Statement about facts and events are proposition. Of course, we cannot characterise a proposition as simply believed or disbelieved; but we may simply state a proposition. For example, the statement "All honest people are happy" is neither believed nor disbelieved. It is presented for consideration only. A proposition is either true or false. It is an assertion. It either affirms or denies something. But the sentences which are simply presented for consideration are not assertions. These are neither believed nor disbelieved. Only meaningful indicative sentences are propositions. Thus, we find that though all propositions are sentences, all sentences are not propositions. For example, imperative, optative and exclamatory sentences are not propositions. Sentences are groups of words set according to rules

of grammar and syntax. It may be either meaningful or meaningless. But only meaningful indicative sentences are propositions. Again, there are two aspects of indicative sentence. One aspect is the linguistic aspect; and the other is meaning aspect. The linguistic aspect of indicative sentence is the sentential expression of proposition. This is the verbal symbol that we use in a proposition. An indicative sentence is an ordered set of symbols. A proposition is either true or false. But a set of symbols cannot be said either to be true or false or believed or disbelieved. Thus, we find that a proposition is what an indicative sentence means to express. Though propositions are not identical with linguistic expression, they must be expressed in some language. According to some logicians, we use a sentence and mention a fact. If we say that a proposition is what a sentence means as distinguished from sentence, then sentence and meaning become two separate things. But if we define a sentence as a meaningful combination of words then the distinction between a sentence and the meaning of a sentence will vanish.

Thus, we find that sentence and proposition are two different things. A sentence belongs to some definite language. It is a combination of words set according to rules of grammar and syntax. A proposition is not

composed of words and, therefore, does not belong to any particular language. The same proposition can be expressed in different language in different types of sentences.

To quote Cohen and Nagel: 'A sentence is a group of words, and words, like other symbols, are in themselves physical objects, distinct from that which they refer to, which they symbolise. Sentences, when written are thus located on certain surface, and when spoken are sound waves passing from one organism to another. But the position of which a sentence is the verbal expression is distinct from the visual marks sound waves of the expression. Sentences, therefore, have a physical existence. They may or may not conform to standards of usage or taste. Truth or falsity can be predicated only of the propositions they signify.'¹

Strawson in "On Referring" distinguishes a sentence from the use of a sentence. This is similar to Wittgenstein's distinction between a sentence and a significant sentence. According to Strawson, it is not the sentence that is true or false, rather it is the sentence used on a particular occasion. According to Wittgenstein, it is not sentence which is true or false but the use of a sentence. The meaning and the intelligibility of a proposition

is independent of its truth or falsity. In Tractatus Wittgenstein wrote:

"To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true. (One can understand it, therefore, without knowing whether it is true).

It is understood by anyone who understands its constituents". (T,4.024).

A proposition has a sense that is independent of the facts. There we find the difference between the meaning of a name and meaning of a proposition. Proposition may have meaning even when there is no fact but a name is meaningless when there is no object corresponding to it, because as Wittgenstein himself wrote: "A name means an object. The object is its meaning". (T,3,203). Wittgenstein tried to distinguish between the meaning of name and the meaning of a proposition. Wittgenstein wrote: "Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning" (T,3.3). Proposition thus gives the description of a situation. It does not name a situation. It is a description of a state of affairs (T,4.023(3)). According to Wittgenstein, the sense of a proposition is the situation it describes. In Tractatus Wittgenstein wrote: "Instead of, 'This proposition has such and such a sense' we can simply say,

'This proposition represents such and such a situation' (T,4.031(2)). A proposition is a "logical picture" and, as Wittgenstein wrote: "what a picture represents is its sense". (T,2.221). Thus, from the above discussion it follows that the sense of a proposition is the situation it describes or represents. But now there arises a difficulty regarding false proposition. If the sense of a proposition is the situation it depicts, then a false proposition has either no sense because there is nothing to represent or describe, or there must be non-existent situation which it describes or represents. Wittgenstein used these two terms in such a way that both the terms can be either actual (i.e., existent), or merely possible and non-actual (i.e., non-existent). In T,2.202, 3.11, 4.125 and in many places he talked of possible situation. He also spoke of existence and non-existence of states of affairs.

We have seen that according to Wittgenstein, the sense of a proposition is the situation which it describes or represents "Thus one proposition 'fa' shows that the object 'a' occurs in its sense -----" (T,4.1211). When we say 'The house is burning', we do not think of actual fire in the sense of the proposition. That is so because we normally distinguish between the sense of a proposition and the actual fact that it describes.

But we can come off his paradox very well. Wittgenstein identified these two things, sense of a proposition and the fact it describes. And once this is done, we will find no problem in speaking of an object occurringⁿ in the sense of a proposition. For this particular object occurs in the situation which the proposition describes.

After overcoming the above paradox, we come in connection with another paradoxical passage. In Tractatus Wittgenstein wrote: "A proposition does not actually contain its sense, but does contain the possibility of expressing it". (T,3.13(3)). Here Wittgenstein wants to say that a proposition does not include the situation which it describes. The term 'sense' often led him into puzzles and problems. Let us take a proposition about a complex thing. Suppose I say 'The book is lying on the table'. Here what I have said is about the whole book. I have not said anything about certain features of the book. A proposition describes the situation it represents. But it describes the whole situation. In the proposition 'the book is lying on the table', the sense of the proposition includes the whole book and not the constituents of it e.g., cover, pages, etc. But in Tractatus while speaking about the analysis of propositions Wittgenstein wrote: "Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a statement of their constituents

and into the propositions that describe the complexes completely" (T,2.0201). A proposition is analysable. These would again be further analysed and these would be about the constituent parts of the former proposition and so on. In this way, by analysing the proposition "the book is lying the table" we will come to propositions of the minutest parts of the book. Thus after ultimate analysis of the proposition, the sense of the original proposition 'the book is lying on the table' will contain every single part of the book. In the Note Books 1914-1916 Wittgenstein drew such conclusion: "When I say this watch is shiny, and what I mean by "this watch alters its composition in the smallest particular, then this means not merely that the sense of the sentence alters in its content, but also what I am saying about this watch straight way alters its sense. The whole form of the proposition alters", (NB, entry for 16.6.15).

But this view is not clear. When one says something about an object, one does not always say something about all the parts of an object. Parts are irrelevant to the truth or falsity of the proposition. Wittgenstein realised the absurd thesis which follows from the view that the sense of a proposition is the situation it describes. It really does not follow from it. But in the Note Books

Wittgenstein worte: '.... If I say that this watch is not in the drawer, there is absolutely no need for it to **Follow Logically** that a wheel which is in the watch is not in the drawer, for perhaps, I had not the least knowledge that the wheel was in the watch, and hence could not have meant by 'this watch' the complex in which the wheel occurs.' (NB, entry for 18.6.15). When we say that the watch is lying on the table, the complex situation, that we are talking about, does not include the situations in which all the parts of the watch occur. It includes situation that are essential for the watch being a watch and the table on which it is lying.

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein used the term "sense of a proposition" in another way. The two elementary propositions P and $\sim P$ are two opposite senses. In Note Books, he wrote: 'Every proposition is essentially true-false. Thus a proposition has two poles (corresponding to case of its truth and case of its falsity). We call this the sense of a proposition'. (NB, p.94).

'A proposition is a standard with reference to which facts behave, but with names it is otherwise. Just as one arrow behaves to another arrow by being in the same sense or the opposite, so a fact behaves to a proposition; it is thus bipolarity and sense come in' (NB, p.97).

According to the first sense, P and \sim P have no opposite sense. They have same sense, both of them describe the same state of affairs. In one case it states that P exist and in another case it states that P does not exist. Both P and \sim P do not exist. Both P and \sim P have same reality corresponding to them. Wittgenstein wrote: "The proposition P and \sim P have opposite senses, but there corresponds to them one and the same reality". (T, 4.0621(3)). And since they have the same reality corresponding to them, they have the same sense. In the second use of the term 'sense', it refers to the 'direction' in which the objects are related in the situation which constitutes its reference in its first use.

Wittgenstein argues that the same reality corresponds to a proposition and to its negation. There arises a fundamental problem about how it is possible that P and \sim P describe the same situation. How the sense of a proposition S is P would differ from \sim (S is P)? There would be no need to have two different meanings of 'sense of a proposition': "S is P" would have one sense and \sim (S is P) would have another sense.

But Wittgenstein thought that it is impossible to admit the existence of negative states of affairs. There are negative non-elementary propositions which

describe negative non-atomic situation. But, according to Wittgenstein by analysis such proposition i.e. negative non-elementary proposition is reducible to elementary propositions. The two elementary propositions P and $\sim P$ are alike. The only difference is that the negative one contains one more name. If this is true then the sign ' \sim ' would be a name and would denote an object. But this consequence is totally unacceptable. For if ' \sim ' is the name of an object, then the proposition containing double negation would be completely different from the original proposition as it would describe state of affairs with two more objects than the original one. Wittgenstein wrote: ".....nothing in reality corresponds to the sign ' \sim '," (T,4.0621(1))." And if there were an object called ' \sim ', it would follow that ' $\sim \sim P$ ' said something different from what P said, just because the one proposition would then be about ' \sim ' and the other would not" (T,5.44(4)). But as we know that $\sim \sim P$ and P are exactly the same. The view that ' \sim ' is the name of an object and that there are negative facts must be abandoned. There can never be negative facts. Negative facts are only the truth function of elementary proposition. Thus the two propositions P and $\sim P$ describe the same states of affairs.

According to Wittgenstein, the world divides into facts. All facts are ultimately analysable into

atomic facts. This follows from the theory of truth-function. According to Wittgenstein, there is no general facts which are irreducible. All facts must be ultimately reducible to the atomic facts. But it may be noted that Russell had accepted general facts which are irreducible to any atomic facts. According to him, Universal propositions are not reducible to propositions about particulars. They are not truth function of proposition about individuals. Thus, he argued that there must be some universal propositions as basic and these universal propositions are irreducible to any other kind of propositions. And to explain them there must be some general facts which are irreducible to any other atomic facts. There are universal propositions to correspond to these general facts. Wittgenstein rejected Russell's view that there are irreducible general propositions. Wittgenstein argued that there is no need to explain universal propositions. He did not find it essential to explain universal proposition. All universal propositions are ultimately analysable into basic elementary propositions. They are molecules of elementary propositions. For him, non-atomic situations or facts are molecules or structure of states of affairs and atomic facts. It may be pointed out here that Russell admitted negative facts also to explain negative propositions. But Wittgenstein has rejected this view on the same ground.

References

1. Morris, R. Cohen: An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method, Allied Publishers Private Ltd. Calcutta, 1978, p.27.

CHAPTER - III

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE WORLD

A proposition may be true although one may not know it to be true. But the question arises by what means do we come to know propositions to be true? Let us consider here some of the alleged roads to knowledge.

Of various sources of knowledge sense-experience is the most obvious. Through seeing, touching, smelling, tasting and hearing we know that physical things exist. All our senses on various occasions inform us about various things. But sense-experience requires judgement. The sense-experience that we have does not alone constitute knowledge. It is proposition that we judge to be true or false. Sense-experience is neither true nor false. It simply exists or occurs. It forms the basis of perceptual judgement. It alone is not enough to constitute that judgement. Thus, there are many perceptual errors. It is commonly believed that the existence of the perceptual error shows that our senses are fallible. But it would be more accurate to say that our judgement is fallible.

But sense-experience is not our only source of knowledge. Reason is also another source. When we know $74+89=163$, we do not know it by seeing or touching

or hearing. We arrive at the answer by reasoning. Briefly, reason is the ability to think. The degree of our rational power or power of reason is the degree of ability to engage in thinking. It is in this sense that we say man is a rational animal. Unless we think, we will not be able to acquire any knowledge at all including knowledge acquired through sense-perception. To understand or formulate the proposition e.g., 'this object before me is a book' requires ability to understand word and form concepts. Sense-experience provides the raw materials for our judgement. But without reason we could not formulate any judgement at all. To isolate, out of the total experience, one thing and classify it as book, we must be able to identify features of experience and abstract these features from all others. And this requires something far more than the use of our senses. It requires the use of our mind, our intellect, our reason.

There are some other sources of knowledge. Some of the disputed candidates for that position are authority, intuition and faith. "I know it's true because Mr. X says so, and Mr. X is an authority on the subject". In such statement we often invoke authority when we are asked how we know that a certain statement is true? And we often claim this knowledge without bothering to check the statement for ourselves. Intuition in its most limited

sense is merely the label for a certain kind of experience, one that is not easily described. It is a conviction of certainty that comes upon us quite suddenly. It is like "a light going on inside" and instantly we are convinced that what comes to us in this "flash" is true. The existence of intuition as an experience can hardly be doubted. Another type of claim to knowledge is faith. It sometimes overlaps the previous one. We often say 'I believe it through faith and this faith gives me knowledge'.

There are different theories regarding the origin of knowledge. According to rationalism, all knowledge are analytic. Mathematics had been thought of as the analysis of what is implied or given in the definition. Analytic knowledge is apriori. This sort of knowledge possesses universality of acceptance and logical necessity. On the other hand, the empiricists thought of knowledge as primarily synthesis or association. It is a process of connecting together of separate ideas. Judgement about object meant judgement about the co-existence of separate ideas which are not bound by any logical necessity. Such type of knowledge is empirical and a posteriori and has novelty.

Kant tried to synthesise both rationalism and empiricism. He claims that all true knowledge consists

of synthetic apriori judgements which must have necessity, novelty and universality - all in one. We must demand **apodeictic** certainty in our sciences. Such a certainty is possessed only by synthetic apriori judgement such type of judgements are found in basic principles of physics and mathematics. Kant uses the term "apriori" in three senses: (1) prior to experience, (2) independent of experience but having an empirical application and (3) universal and necessary. A synthetic judgement not only synthesises ideas but states something new about the subject.

According to Kant, there can be no synthetic judgement without a mind having the capacity to synthesise. Knowledge presupposes a mind. But we cannot think anything without something to think about. Without the co-operation of sensation and understanding knowledge would be impossible. Percepts and concepts constitutes the elements of our knowledge. Percepts without concepts are blind and concepts without percepts are empty. Our intellect elaborate what is given by sensibility. Reason is concerned with the principles or conditions according to which we understand things. This new attitude to reason^{is} described by Kant as the Copernican change in philosophy.

Russell distinguished between two sorts of knowledge: Knowledge of things and knowledge of truths.

Knowledge of things may be of two kinds: (1) knowledge of things by acquaintance. It is logically independent of knowledge of truth. (2) knowledge of things by description. This sort of knowledge involves some knowledge of truth as ground and source. Now, let us make clear what Russell meant by 'acquaintance' and 'description'.

'Acquaintance' is direct awareness of a thing without the mediation of any process of inference or any knowledge of truth. In acquaintance of a thing sense-data appear to us. By it, things are immediately known to us just as they are. So my knowledge of a thing e.g., a table as a physical object is not direct knowledge. It is through sense-data we are directly acquainted with sense data.

Our knowledge of things as well as truths is based upon acquaintance as foundation. We have acquaintance in sensation with the data of the outer senses. To obtain an adequate analysis of sense-data we must consider other things besides sense-data. Acquaintance by memory is the source of our knowledge about the past by inference. Without it our knowledge would be limited to present sense-data. Acquaintance by introspection, which Russell called self-consciousness gives us knowledge of mental things such as thoughts, feelings, desires

etc. Moreover, we have acquaintance with universals. This awareness of universal is called conceiving and universal of which we are aware is called a concept.

Knowledge by acquaintance does not give us knowledge about the physical object (as opposed to sense-data) nor other peoples minds. We can know them by description. Knowledge by description enables us to go beyond the limits of our private experience. We can have knowledge by description of things which we have never experienced in spite of the fact that we can only know truths composed of terms we have experienced in acquaintance. By 'description' Russell meant any phrase of the form 'a-so-and-so' or 'the so-and-so'. The former one is 'ambiguous' description and the latter a 'definite' description. Here we will concern ourselves only with definite descriptions. It is connected with the nature of our knowledge concerning objects. Thus, by description we mean only 'definite description' in this context. A description which we know to be applicable to a particular must involve some reference to a particular with which we are acquainted. Such reference involves mention of past, present and future. Similarly, all names of places, when used, involve descriptions of some particulars with which we are acquainted. It may be noted here that in logic no reference to actual particulars is involved. It concerns not merely with

what does exist but with whatever might or could exist. Many universals like many particulars are known to us by description. In the case of particulars, knowledge by description is ultimately reducible to knowledge by acquaintance. Thus, the analysis of propositions containing descriptions reveals the fundamental principle that 'every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted'. According to Russell, we must attach some meaning to the word we use and that meaning must be objects with which we are directly acquainted.

Wittgenstein is not very much explicit about our knowledge of the world. There are suggestions in the Tractatus as if Wittgenstein is an empiricist. Accordingly some positivists have traced the principle of verification to the Tractatus. On the other hand, by and large, Wittgenstein obtains knowledge of the world through language. It is the truth-functional analysis of language that gives us the knowledge of the world. However, let us examine the epistemological issues in the Tractatus in detail.

According to Wittgenstein, the world is totality of facts. It is through propositions that a fact can be expressed. Propositions are expressed through sentences.

It is either true or false. According to Wittgenstein all complex propositions can be analysed into less complex propositions and these in turn into more less complex and so on. Ultimately we come to a situation where it cannot be further analysed. This ultimate proposition is called elementary proposition. Like atomic fact, it cannot be analysed further. Like atomic fact, it has components but these components are not themselves propositions. An elementary proposition consists entirely of names. In Tractatus Wittgenstein wrote: "An elementary proposition consists of names. It is a nexus, a concatenation of names" (T,4.22). Name is one that cannot be analysed or defined. As he said: "A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign" (T,3.26). Names are contrasted with one that can be verbally defined. Wittgenstein agreed with Russell that they are really abbreviated definite descriptions. According to Russell, terms like 'Sir Walter Scott' and 'Socrates' although counted as proper names, par excellence in ordinary discourse, are not really proper names at all, not "logically proper names"; he held that they are really concealed descriptions - i.e., abbreviated or truncated descriptions. Names can be known by denotation. The only way of defining name is by ostensive definition, i.e. by pointing to whatever it denotes. It denotes something

simple. For Wittgenstein, 'objects are simple' (T,2.01). So, 'a name means an object'. The object is its meaning' (T,3.203). According to him, analysis of proposition must bring us to elementary propositions which consist of names in immediate combination. Wittgenstein did not arrive at elementary proposition by empirical investigation. He thought that there must be certain elementary propositions and hence names and objects. The correct analysis of a proposition gives its real meaning. The meaning of any term (with the simple exception of the so-called "Logical constants") is whatever it designates or denotes. Thus, the meaning of a term depends on the meaning of simpler propositions. According to Wittgenstein, "Every sign that has a definition signified via the sign that serves to define it" (T,3.261(1)). Ultimately, we reach propositions which do not lead us to any further proposition. These ultimate propositions consist of names. Names denote something directly.

The existence of the simple signs is essential for the determinateness of a propositions's sense. For "when a propositional element signifies a complex, this can be seen from an indeterminateness in the propositions in which it occurs. In such cases we know that the proposition leaves something undetermined (T,3.24(3)). For a complex can be given only by description. And this

can be right or wrong. Thus, simple signs are not only possible, they are actual. Because, according to Wittgenstein the sense of every proposition is perfectly determinate. When a proposition is properly analysed, all indeterminateness vanishes. Thus, we see that all analysis must end in elementary propositions which consist of simple things i.e., objects. And that is what name denotes. Like Russell, Wittgenstein held that the meaning of a name is the object it denotes. Hence for any term to be meaningful it must refer to something that actually exists. It must designate something existing. Simple objects provide the ultimate foundation for the edifice of language.

Thus, according to Wittgenstein in analysing the sense of any proposition we must ultimately arrive at nothing but elementary propositions. Only if a proposition has a unique and complete analysis, it can have its sense as definite. Non-elementary propositions are molecules of elementary propositions. They are combined by truth-functional connectives. Thus, all non-elementary or molecular propositions are truth-functional compounds of elementary propositions.

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein wrote: "A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions" (T,5). If we know all elementary propositions and know

which of them are true and which of them are false, we can determine the truth-value of any propositions whatsoever. For, the truth-value of any proposition is determined by the truth-value of its component elementary proposition. And thereby we are able to know everything knowable. In Tractatus Wittgenstein wrote: "If all true elementary propositions are given, the result is a complete description of the world. The world is completely described by giving all elementary propositions, and adding which of them are true and which false". (T,4.23). Universal propositions about complexes are truth-functions of particular propositions about objects. According to Wittgenstein, given all possible elementary propositions one can construct any number of propositions from them by using truth-functional operators. According to him, we can describe a complex situation by the truth function of elementary propositions which describe the state of affairs that make up the complex situation.

Wittgenstein's view can be called logical atomism. According to him, all genuine propositions are molecules constructed of logical atoms called elementary propositions. And all situations are molecules constructed of logical atoms called 'states of affairs'. "States of affairs are independent of one another" (T,2.061). So is the case

with elementary propositions. "One elementary proposition cannot be deduced from another" (T,5.134). So there can be no elementary propositions contradicting one another .

The Tractatus extended its influence on the movement known as 'logical positivism' organised by a group of philosophers headed by Moritz Schlick.

The main problem with the positivists was how to formulate a theory of meaning. As we have seen, according to Wittgenstein, every proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions. Thus, descriptive propositions state that certain 'states of affairs' exist and certain others donot. The positivists treated Wittgenstein's 'state of affairs' to be observable one. Thus our knowledge of their existence and non-existence is acquired by means of empirical means. By investigation, we verify them. The 'state of affairs' involving verification also constitutes its sense. According to the positivists, for a proposition which is non-trivial (i.e., neither tautology nor contradiction) to be significant or meaningful must fulfil some observable conditions whose existence or non-existence would verify it. And these conditions constitute its sense. Thus, the criterion of the meaningfulness of a nontrivial proposition is its verifiability. This criterion is a mere scheme of empiricism. The positivists treated

Wittgenstein's elementary propositions to be "observation propositions", to be reports of actual or possible sensory observations.

The positivists were accused of having put wrong interpretation on Wittgenstein. But Wittgenstein never thought of elementary propositions in that way. It is true that Wittgenstein was not concerned with the epistemological questions of whether or not his elementary propositions could be treated as "observation propositions" and whether his "states of affairs" were observable. But some of Wittgenstein's basic doctrines commit him, to the observability of 'states of affairs.' Wittgenstein in one passage of the Tractatus wrote: ".....In order to be able to say, "p" is true (or false)", I must have determined in what circumstances I call 'p' true, and in so doing I determine the sense of the proposition" (T,4.063(2)). This must have induced the positivists to read empiricism into the Tractatus.

According to G.E.M. Anscombe, probably the best known thesis of the Tractatus is that 'metaphysical' statements are nonsensical and that the only sayable things are propositions of natural science. Propositions of natural science are empirical. That is, they can be verified by sense experience. It is the sense-observation

that makes a proposition true or false.

According to Moritz Schlick, whenever we ask about a sentence, "what does it mean?", What we want is the circumstance in which the sentence is to be used. Schlick seems to have been influenced by the Tractatus. In Tractatus Wittgenstein wrote: "I must have determined in what circumstances I call 'p' true, and in doing so I determine the sense of the proposition" (T,4.063).

In the Tractatus, the "determination of the circumstances under which we call a proposition true" must be a statement of its truth-condition. And this is completely different from what Schlick called "rule for the use" of a sentence if he meant ostensive definition by it. If Schlick is following the Tractatus, 'ostensive definition' can be relevant only to the elementary proposition. Moreover, Schlick insists that our "rules for use" are "arbitrary". But in the Tractatus, the only arbitrariness is in the assignment of names. Certain arrangement of names is capable of representing such-and-such situation. And it can do so only by reproducing the arrangement of the objects in the situation in its own structure. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein struggled with problems of reference, not with problems of how do we know. It is only with successful reference that

a sentence comes to have meaning. When we say that something is meaningless, we mean that we have not assigned a reference to this expression but not that we have not stipulated observation-conditions to establish the truth of this. Through the names we depict particular facts. Without simples it would be impossible to picture the world. James Griffin, in his book "Wittgenstein's logical atomism", holds the view that it is almost certain that the Tractatus had nothing to do with sense-data. In support of his view, he advances two arguments. First, Wittgenstein is perfectly explicit that objects, as he means the term, are what constitute facts, and that facts, as he means the term, are what constitute the world. And there is no possibility that the world can be read as 'the world of my experience'. Second, objects are eternal, and this would hardly be the case with the parts of a sense datum.

Wittgenstein treats tautologies ascertain. In T,4.464, he wrote: "A tautology's truth is certain, a proposition's possible, a contradiction's impossible (certain, possible, impossible: here we have the first indication of the scale that we need in the theory of probability)". Again in T,5.525(2) he wrote: "The certainty, possibility, or impossibility of a situation is not expressed by a proposition, but by an expressions, being a tautology, a proposition with sense, or a contradiction".

It seems that the remark implies that certainty belongs only to tautology. But the 'state of affairs' whose certainty is expressed by an expression's being a tautology cannot be a state of affairs described by a tautology. Wittgenstein himself holds that tautology describes no state of affairs, - is true for every possible state of affairs. An expression that is a tautology gives no answer to 'state of affairs'.

It will not be proper to characterise Wittgenstein either as an empiricist and a rationalist. In fact, Wittgenstein's theory of knowledge, (if he has any) is something very different from those of the empiricists and the rationalists. In fact, for Wittgenstein, knowledge of the world can be obtained through analysis of language only. It is a kind of novel epistemology developed by Wittgenstein.

CHAPTER - IV

LANGUAGE AND THE LIMITS OF THE WORLD

In the preface to the Tractatus, Wittgenstein maintains that his aim was to plot the limits of language. In fact, he wanted to draw a boundary to language.

According to Wittgenstein's theory of proposition, all compound propositions are truth function of elementary propositions. A compound proposition is a truth-function of its constituent propositions. The truth value of the proposition is determined by the truth value of its constituents. There can be three kinds of propositions - tautologies, contingents and contradictions. Tautologies are those whose truth-table assigns them truth only. It is inconceivable that a tautology should be false. All necessary truths are tautologies. The truth of logic, like necessary truths, are tautologies. We can know logical truths a priori. They are true solely by virtue of the definitions of the basic logical constant as given in their truth-tables. Since the propositions of logic are tautologies, the truth of logic are completely empty for they say nothing. They are not substantially necessary truths about any kind of entity. They are true under all circumstances. It does not matter for them what the reality is like. Thus, Wittgenstein said: "I know nothing

about the weather "when I know that it is either raining or not raining" (T,4.461). A tautology does not describe a situation. It only asserts that it exists. The sense of a proposition is the situation it describes. But since tautology does not describe a situation, it follows that this type of proposition lacks sense. It leaves entire field of facts open.

Contradictions are those whose truth-table assigns them truth-values of falsity only. It is false under all possible situations. It closes down the entire field of facts. It rules out every combination. It leaves no possibility open. Like a tautology, a contradiction also says nothing. Since it does not describe any fact, it also lacks sense. Though both tautology and contradiction say nothing they, however, are not nonsensical. They are part of the symbolism. According to Wittgenstein, neither tautology nor contradiction is a picture of reality. Thus, tautology and contradiction say nothing about the world because they are either true or false in every possible state of affairs. Their truth can be discovered by mere study of the symbol that expresses them. They are superfluous even in ideal language. Thus, we can do without logical propositions. Only the descriptive or contingent proposition can say something. It says

that a certain state of affair, exists or does not exist or that certain truth-functional combinations of them exist or does not exist. An intelligible discourse is that which makes an assertion about the states of affairs. Similarly, thoughts are also limited in the same way. In T.4 Wittgenstein wrote: "A thought is a proposition with a sense" The limit of language and that of thought are thus one and the same thing. Thinking is operation with certain sorts of signs. And the conditions that are necessary for a mental sign to be intelligible are the same as that of verbal signs. All propositional signs that can be applicable to linguistic sign can be applicable to mental signs too. In a letter to Russell, Wittgenstein wrote: "I don't know what the constituents of a thought are but I know that it must have such constituents which correspond to the words of language..... "Does a Gedanke consists of words"? No! But of psychical constituents that have the same sort of relation to reality as words. What those constituents are I don't know" (NB pp.129-30). Thus, thought can be expressed through language. The thought that can not be put into words is not a thought. One can never have a thought which is impossible in principle to put into words. Propositions of natural science, like descriptive propositions assert the existence and non-existence of states of affairs or some truth-functional

combination of them. It asserts all that can be said. Descriptive propositions as well as propositions of natural sciences must be either elementary propositions or truth-functions of elementary propositions. They are reducible to or, in other words, analyzable into elementary propositions. This view puts limitations on what can be said.

Metaphysics arises out of the attempt to pass beyond the boundaries of language. It arises when philosophers talk about the relationship between language and the world. But there can be no proposition which can represent what metaphysical entities have in common with the world. There is no way of comparison between the world and language. All propositions about metaphysics are pseudo-propositions. According to the Tractatus, propositions of logic, mathematics: - the prior part of natural sciences, ethics and aesthetics are all pseudo propositions. Wittgenstein considered them as attempts to say the unsayable. Wittgenstein thus said: "The correct methods of philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said i.e., propositions of natural science i.e., something that has nothing to do with philosophy - and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions,"

(T, 6.53). Thus, the limits of language are the limits of the reality of the world. We cannot say that there may be other reality beyond this limited reality. Because the proposition 'there may be some other reality' is not a genuine proposition. A genuine proposition must be reducible to elementary proposition. But the supposed proposition that there may be some other reality beyond this limited reality cannot be reduced to any elementary proposition at all. The limits of the language are, then, the limits of the world. Language is the totality of propositions expressed in it. "The totality of propositions is language" (T,4.001). In Tractatus Wittgenstein wrote: 'Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. So we can not say in logic 'The world has this in it, and this but not that.' For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this can not be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well. We can not think what we can not think; so what we can not think we can not say either' (T,5.61).

Thus, we find that the limits of language are the limits of the world. According to Wittgenstein, language is the totality of propositions expressed in it (T,4.001).

But it is not possible for a person to know the whole of language. No one can claim to possess complete language. Thus what I know is only a limited portion of the language in general. It is limited to certain terms and to certain states of affairs. The portion of language I know can be called my language. Limits of language means the limits of my language. The limits that occur in language is the same as the limits of my thought. But since limits of the language are the limits of the world, so the limits of my language are the limits of my world. Wittgenstein said, "The limits of my language means the limits of my world" (T,5.6). This view of Wittgenstein leads him to solipsism. According to solipsism (1) only what I experience exists (2) what I do not experience does not exist. But neither of these two are genuine propositions for every proposition is analysable into truth-function of elementary propositions. But if we analyse the two expressions we will reach the utterances such as "states of affairs a Rb exists and hence object exist and C does not exist". But all these utterances are pseudo-propositions and thus, not genuine propositions.

Solipsism presupposes two kinds of things. First, it pre-supposes a thinking, knowing and experiencing self i.e. the subject of experiences. Second, it maintains

that there are experiences which are subjective in nature. According to Wittgenstein, solipsism should not be interpreted in this dualistic way. Solipsism claims that only what one experiences exists. There is no such thing as thinking, knowing metaphysical self. He says, "There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas" (T,5.631). "The I is not an object" (NB, entry for 7-8-16). Often the grammatical form in a sentence such as "I think that....." misleads us to suppose that there is an object.

According to Wittgenstein, "I" or self is not an observable object, Wittgenstein argued that if the self existed, then it will have to be configurable with other objects to form states of affairs. But, if this is so, then it will have to be observed by the same self which is one of its constituents. But an object in a state of affairs can not observe that very state of affairs.

Thus, we come to the conclusion that the self cannot exist. And thus it can never be part of reality. As Wittgenstein said, it is "the limit of the world - not a part of it" (T,5.641). It observes reality, but it is not a part of reality. After eliminating the thinking self, we find that only objects of experience remains.

According to solipsism, 'I am the only I: the world, including all the people in it, is essentially an object of experience and therefore, of my experience'. Wittgenstein remarked that what is intended here is right but it can not be said (T,5.62). It is true that where there is consciousness there is an 'I'. But the question arises regarding consciousness and the legitimacy of speaking of an 'I'.

According to Wittgenstein, I am the centre but this is inexpressible. In the Tractatus he talked of 'my language' (T,5.6) and explains this as meaning 'the only language that I understand' (T,5.62). Its limits 'stand for the limits of my world'. I can not postulate a language for talking about the relation of language, the world and the philosophical 'I' in which my world would be one particular thing to talk about.

But the 'I' is not something that can be found as a mind or soul, a subject of consciousness, one among others. Nothing can be found as the subject of consciousness in this sense. We can find only contents of consciousness: 'I am the world' and 'the world and life are one'. Thus, the "I" whose language has a special position is unique. And the world described by this language is just the real world. As Wittgenstein himself said: ".....solipsism,

when its implications are followed out strictly coincides with pure realism" (T,5.64). According to Wittgenstein, the 'I' of solipsism is not used to refer to anything body or soul. For, in respect of this all men are alike. The 'I' refers to the centre of life, or the point from which everything is seen.

Wittgenstein has been much impressed by Schopenhauer. Wittgenstein's idea of the limit is partly derivative from Schopenhauer.

Wittgenstein distinguished the metaphysical self from the soul. Soul exists and there can be a natural science of it known as psychology. Psychological self is nothing but series of thought, pain, desires etc. In Tractatus he wrote: "The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world - not a part of it (T,5.641).

Thus, according to Wittgenstein, propositions as "A has the thought P", like any genuine proposition is truth-function of elementary proposition. He argued: "It is clear however, that 'A believes, that P", "A has the thought P" and "A says P" are of the form "P" says P: and this does not involve a correlation of a fact

with an object, but rather the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their objects". (T,5.542). The analysis of the proposition 'A has the thought P' contains two propositions. First 'A' has a thought expressible by the propositional sign 'P' and second, the sign 'P' says that P. The second proposition is a descriptive proposition and asserts certain contingent facts about the world. And thus may be assumed to be a truth-function of elementary propositions. The first proposition 'A has a thought expressible by the propositional sign 'P' obviously asserts the existence of a definite situation. It is also a descriptive proposition and therefore, truth-function of elementary propositions. But the question arises about what situation it describes? Wittgenstein claimed not to know what the constituents of a thought are, rather he claimed to know that whatever they are, that they bear the same relation to reality that words do. A thought is analogous to propositional sign. It is a mental propositional sign. Like any propositional sign, thought is a fact. According to Wittgenstein, a thought is not merely a kind of propositional sign. It is a proposition. As he wrote: "A thought is a proposition with a sense". (T,4).

According to Wittgenstein, the only drawback of solipsism is that what it wants to say can not be

said. Wittgenstein further said that though what solipsism wants to say cannot be said, it can be indicated. It can be shown. It shows itself. There is one to one correspondence between my language and my world. When I say that I know certain things, I know it from the fact that they are the only objects I see i.e., their being limited in this way shows its truth. Similarly, my language being limited shows the truth of solipsism. Wittgenstein, thus, remarked: 'For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it can not be said, but makes itself manifest. The world is my world: This is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) means the limits of my world' (T,5.62).

One of the main theses of Wittgenstein's Tractatus is that the structure or form of an elementary proposition is identical with the structure and form of its states of affairs (let us call this thesis E). An elementary proposition is a picture of reality. In a picture, a certain situation is depicted. The picture has the same structure as the situation it depicts. But we cannot make a picture that depicts the fact that the picture has the same structure as its situation. We can make a picture of a situation. But we cannot make a picture of a picture. The same point can be put as follows: Thesis E i.e. the statement that the structure or form

of an elementary proposition is identical with the structure or form of its state of affairs, does not seem to be truth-function of any elementary proposition . It does not simply assert that certain states of affairs exist and that certain states of affairs do not exist. Rather, it asserts the relationship between all states of affairs and something other than a state of affairs. This means that the thesis E cannot be a descriptive proposition. Because all descriptive propositions are truth-function of elementary proposition. And since it cannot be a tautology either, it cannot be any kind of proposition at all. Thus, no such things as thesis E can be said. It is not anything sayable. Wittgesntein said: 'In order that you should have a language which can express or say everything that can be said, this language must have certain properties; and when this is the case, that it has them can no longer be said in that language or any language'.¹

Like solipsism what the thesis E means to say is true but what it wants to say can not be said. The truth of solipsism can be shown by something. It is shown by the fact that the limits of my language means the limits of my world. Similarly, the truth of the thesis E is also shown by something. It is shown by the structure of elementary propositions and by the structure of states

of affairs. By comparing these two structures we can see that they are identical. Thus, that these two are identical can be shown. But cannot be said. Similarly, an elementary proposition shows what the structure of its state of affairs is. But it can not say what it is. As Wittgenstein wrote: "Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them. What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent. What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language. Propositions show the logical form of reality. They display it." (T, 4.121) What can be shown, cannot be said.

But the question arises, can we draw a distinction between things that are shown, and things the opposite of which is 'shown'; between the things that would be true if they could be said and those that would be false if they could be said? It is impossible to speak of anything the opposite of which is shown. Such propositions are not merely not correct, but quite incoherent and confused. The demonstration of such propositions completely destroys the idea that there is anything at all behind the would-be statement. There are utterances which attempt to say something the opposite of which is 'quite correct'. But there will be more error in such attempts than in trying to say the things that are 'shown' even

if they are really unsayable. It may be, because someone used sentences of the Tractatus, which Wittgenstein regards as helpful inspite of their being strictly non-sensical according to the very doctrine that they propound, like steps to climb out beyond them to see the world rightly - to see what 'is shown' instead of trying to propound and assert sometimes cases of what is 'shown' and sometimes would be contradictions of these.

What a philosopher declares to be false is supposed to be not possible or even really thinkable. It is not really thinkable thought at all. As Wittgenstein puts it: "we cannot think what we cannot think" (T,5.61). Thus, it is impossible to say anything which cannot be thought. It can only be forms of words or suggestions of the imagination that are attacked. Aristotle rejected separate forms and Hume rejected substance on the ground that if we want to argue that something is a philosophical illusion, we cannot treat it as a false hypothesis. If we try to treat it as an hypothesis for the sake of argument, what we infer from it is not a contradiction but an incoherence.

We can distinguish between logical truths and the things that are 'shown'. As we have seen logical truths are tautologies and therefore senseless propositions,

and their negations being contradictions, attempts to say what is 'shown' produce non-sensical formations of words.

The connection between the tautologies and the unsayable things that are shown lies in the fact that the tautologies show the logic of the world but it does not attempt to say anything. They are legitimate constructions introduced into the system of proposition. Moreover, they are not the only proposition that shows the 'logic of the world'. Every proposition does that. In the Tractatus the most prominent things among all the things that are shown is 'logic of the world' or of the facts. As Wittgenstein said: 'My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts'. (T,4.0312). Here Wittgenstein is contrasting logical constants with names which 'go proxy' for their objects. The possibility of sentences rests upon the principle of signs as going proxy for objects. And this principle amounts to the possibility of logical picturing through one fact having the same logical form as another. It is only in the context of the proposition that a sign will go proxy for an object. Sentence thus cannot represent 'the logic of the facts'. They can only reproduce it.

According to Wittgenstein, all the logical devices, the twiddles and manipulations of our language, combine into an infinitely fine network - forming 'the great mirror' (T,5.511). It is the mirror of language. It reflects the world and makes its individual say that such-and-such is the case. We need not learn the meaning of all the sentences of our language. Given the meaning of the word, we can understand sentences and construct it. We can understand its meaning without it being explained to us.

Logic does not describe any fact . There are no logical facts. Logic preceeds any experience - that something is thus and this.

Thus, what is given by experience is fact . A grasp of the 'substance of the world' is not given by any experience. For everything logical about a proposition is understood before it is known whether the proposition is true or false.

But logic should not be thought of as something independent of the world. Otherwise 'how could we apply logic?' (T,5.5521). We cannot say that such-and-such cannot be because there is a logical fact that is inconsistent with it. As Wittgenstein said: "It is used to be said that God could create anything except what would

be contrary to the laws of logic. — The truth is that we could not say what an 'illogical' world would look like" (T,3.031).

Thus G.E.M. Anscombe remarks "When the Tractatus tells us that 'logic is transcendental', it does not mean that the propositions of logic state transcendental truths; it means that they, like all other propositions, shew something that pervades everything sayable and is itself unsayable. If it were sayable, then failure to accord with it would have to be expressible too and thus would be a possibility."²

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1. "Notes dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway" (1914),
reprinted in NB, p.107.
2. G.E.M. Anscombe: An Introduction to Wittgenstein's
Tractatus. (p.166).

CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

In the preface to the Tractatus Wittgenstein said that the aim of the book is to plot the limits of language. By limits of language he meant the limits of factual language. Philosophical problems are solved by a critique of language which fixes the limits of factual discourse. The curtailment of factual discourse leaves religion and morality outside factual discourse. If the limits of sense are the limits of factual discourse, all non-factual discourse will be nonsense. But by deciding to locate the truth of religion and morality outside factual discourse, Wittgenstein was not rejecting them, rather he was trying to preserve them. They are non-sense because they lack factual sense. But to make this point about them is not to condemn them as unintelligible. It is the first step towards understanding them.

In the Tractatus all doctrines are related to Wittgenstein's idea that language has limit and that limit is imposed by its internal structure. And the internal structure of propositions shows what can be said and what cannot be said. Tautologies and contradictions say nothing about the world. Only descriptive or contingent propositions say something about the world. Thus,

all significant discourse are statement of natural science. Wittgenstein developed a theory of logic in the Tractatus. And he deduced it from the nature of proposition. All truths of logic are tautologies. But though logical propositions are tautologies and not substantial theories, the fact that logic exists indicates something about the nature of reality. It presupposes that reality consists ultimately of simple object. The existence of logic depends on the possibility of combining factual propositions to form tautologies. And these factual propositions, in turn, involve the possibility of elementary propositions and the ultimate granulation of reality. This argument is a transcendental one which, like Kant's, aims at showing how a priori propositions of logic are possible. Logic covers everything that can be said in advance of experience; everything that is a priori. Experience gives us world of facts. When logic discloses the structure of factual discourse, it also discloses the structure of reality which factual discourse reflects. These two structures which are really one may be regarded as framework spreading through the whole space of possibilities in which the world of facts floats. The limit of this space which is reflected in the limit of factual discourse is determined by logic. Wittgenstein does not suggest that tautologies say anything about reality. His suggestion

is that when certain propositions are combined, a tautology is produced. It indicates the essential structure of reality. This structure is something which can only be shown. Logic only settles what can be said in advance. It cannot settle the question what objects exist or types of objects exist, because the answers to these questions would be only conditionally necessary. And so experience would be needed to settle them.

Thus, only propositions of natural science or descriptive propositions can assert all that can be said. All descriptive propositions are ultimately analysable into elementary propositions. Elementary propositions consist of names. And the meaning of the name is the object it denotes. But this thesis of descriptive proposition rules out many things like religion and morality as unsayable. Thus, religion and morality lie outside the limits of factual language. Regarding religion and ethics nothing can be said. Any discourse on morality and religion refers to entities which lie outside the limit of factual discourse. Any attempt to say anything is to cross the limit. And this is impossible. Thus, Wittgenstein wanted to keep them outside the world; beyond the limits of the world.

According to Kant, religion and morality should be

separated from the system of factual language. Religion and morality are not based on the same material as that of science. According to Hume, morality is based entirely on human feelings and inclinations. He thus gave a psychological treatment to ethical terms. But Kant rejected his view saying that Hume's view makes moral belief subjective. The basic truth of religion and morality lies beyond the factual knowledge. So they cannot be known in the manner in which scientific truth is known. They are postulates of moral life and thought.

The Tractatus held that language is ultimately composed of names. The meaning of a name is a simple object. And the sense of a sentence arises from the names that compose it. According to Wittgenstein, the truth of religion and morality cannot be caught in the framework of factual language. Though it cannot be said in language, it can be indicated in language. As the truth of logic can be seen from the structure of tautology, so also the truth of religion and morality can be seen from the limits of language.

Ethical propositions do not state facts. They do not state what happens to be the case. On the contrary, they try to evaluate certain situations as good or bad, and etc. Thus, they attempt something 'higher' than any

ordinary descriptive propositions which state facts. Descriptive propositions say all that can be said. But Ethical propositions do not state facts. Ethical propositions are not propositions at all."And so it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics. Propositions can express nothing of what is higher" (T,6.42). It might be argued that if ethical terms like 'good', 'value', 'ought' and so on, have any meaning, they must be analysable in terms of states of affairs. The truth about the world is that certain objects are or are not configured in certain way. Whether these configurations are good or bad and whether we ought or ought not try to change them - these are not additional facts in the world. They could only be additional configurations of objects and thus, just what happens to be the case. But ethical propositions do not state facts. They do not state what happens to be the case. According to some moral philosophers, ethical propositions contain terms like, 'good', 'right', 'ought' and so are descriptive propositions which merely state empirical facts. Mill, for example, tried to define 'good' in terms of pleasure. And thus according to him propositions containing such concepts are purely descriptive. But G.E. Moore argues that it commits the "naturalistic fallacy". With Moore, Wittgenstein also agreed on this point.

According to Wittgenstein, there is no value in the world, but outside it. In the Tractatus, he wrote: "The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen. In it, no value exists - and if it did exist, it would have no value. If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental". (T, 6.41).

For Wittgenstein, value must be something that is non-accidental. It must be something necessary, uncreated, indestructible, immutable. But nothing like this will be found in the contingent world. Nothing in the world can satisfy the mystical craving for essence. Factual propositions only state what is in the world; what happens to be the case. They state fact. But what belongs to ethics cannot be said. Nothing of value is expressed by any significant proposition. There can be no proposition of ethics. Thus what belongs to ethics is transcendental. For it deals with value rather than fact. It is not in the world. It is the limit of the world. But though they can not be put into words, "They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical" (T, 6.522). All genuine

propositions state empirical facts. They are contingent. But value is not an empirical matter. It cannot be treated as a given feature of fact. And since value is not a fact, it cannot be in the world. Everything in the world is accidental. Wittgenstein's argument is that if anything has value, this fact cannot be accidental. But everything in the world is accidental. Therefore, there is no value in the world. This view is an absolute denial not of the existence of value but of its existence in the world. Propositions can state only what is in the world. What does not belong to the world cannot be stated. It is transcendental. The world and what is there in the world is neither good nor evil. Good and evil exist only in relation to the subject (the ego). But this "subject" to which Wittgenstein referred to is also transcendental. It is the value endower. It is not in the world. It is the limit of the world.

According to Wittgenstein, there is no connection between the will and the world. Being objective, facts are independent of our will. Thus the world which is a totality of facts is independent of our will. Here we can contrast Wittgenstein's view with that of Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer thought 'the world is my will' and is bad. And the only redemption for the will is 'to turn and freely deny itself'. But Wittgenstein thought that

the world is good and independent of my will. Good and bad are attitudes to the world as a whole.

For Wittgenstein, what happens in the world is ethically irrelevant. Everything in the world happens according to the law of natural science. According to him, our will enters into the world from outside. And thus, we feel that we are dependent on an alien will. By 'alien will' Wittgenstein meant God. God is that on which we are dependent. Alien will is independent of our will. Meaning of life can be called God. God being factuality of fact cannot be in the world for he is not a part of the world. He is the essence of the world. Language can represent everything which is a fact. But it cannot represent the factuality of fact. Because the formal property of a fact is not itself a fact. So language cannot describe it.

Wittgenstein's attitude to religion is a form of pantheism. In the Tractatus he said that God does not reveal himself in the world. And this means that God does not reveal himself in any particular fact or set of facts. In the Note Books he goes further and says that God is the world. God is how things stand, so the object of philosophical enquiry is also the object of religious feelings. But though the object is the same,

it is approached in two different ways.

According to Wittgenstein, 'God' is the essence of the world. He is world's meaning and form. The essence or form of the world is nothing but the general form of the proposition which is the essence of a proposition (T,5.471). To describe the essence of a proposition is to describe the essence of all description. And to give the description of the essence of all description is to give the essence of the world. The general form of a proposition is: "That is how things stand". (T, 4.5) In the Note Books Wittgenstein said: "God is, how things stand" (NB. 1,8.16). The generalised proposition gives us knowledge of a certain part as a limited whole. Therefore, the feeling of the world or a limited whole is 'the mystical'. God is something inexpressible, unsayable. It is mystical. It is not how the world is, but that it is. God is the essence of the world and cannot be in the world. God is ineffable.

Ethical attributes like value, obligations etc. are projected by the world through the will. My will is the ethical subject. But the subject is also transcendental, and it is impossible to talk about them. Factual language can only state facts. But the subject qua subject and will is not a fact. Things get significance only when they come in contact with 'my will'. And 'my will'

is projected only by the world through ethical attributes. A will is common to the whole world. So my will means the world will. According to Wittgenstein, the willing subject is the value-endower. It is transcendental and cannot exist in the world. Ethical attributes enter into the world from outside only through the subject. But the subject is not a part of the world. It is the limit of the world. Thus, ethical propositions are not possible.

Goodness and badness belong to the Willing subject. They are not qualities of facts. And since the Willing subject is not a part of the world, so good and evil do not exist in the world. They are predicates of the subject. It is the will which is good or evil (NB. 11.6.16). A happy life is good and an unhappy life is bad.

Wittgenstein has talked of ethical reward and ethical punishment. An attempt to formulate ethical laws must lead to irrelevance. The prospect of reward and punishment in the world has no ethical importance. But even if there is an ethical way of life that leaves all facts unchanged. An ethical imperative invokes the question of the consequences of disobedience. But if that question can properly be raised we have not yet reached an absolute or intrinsic value. Ethics has nothing to do with reward and punishment in the ordinary senses

of those terms. Yet, there must be a kind of intrinsic reward or punishment internal to the action itself. Reward must be something pleasant and the punishment something unpleasant (T, 6.422), we may guess that 'happiness' is the reward of right action and unhappiness a punishment of wrong action. Everything that happens with the view of reward or punishment is necessarily egoistic action and therefore without pure moral value.

According to Wittgenstein, the world is independent of my will. There is no logical connection between will and the world. There is no logical connection between my will and what actually happens at all. In so far as an event in the world can be described as voluntary and volition be studied, the will and action are phenomena of interest only to psychology. Thus, action in the ethical sense, is something independent of what actually happens in the world. This is the bearer of good and evil. Thus, the 'will that is the bearer of the ethical' (T, 6.423) belongs to the transcendentals of the Tractatus along with the mystical and the meaning of life.

Wittgenstein said very little about art. He treated ethics ~~at~~ par with aesthetics. They are one and the same. Ethics tells us how a man can be happy. It tells us how the purpose of human existence can be fulfilled. How a man's life should be conducted and how we should look

at the world if we want to be happy. Aesthetics also has the similar aim. In the Note Books, Wittgenstein argues that the essence of art lies in the fact that it looks at the world with a happy eye (NB 20.10.16). Like ethics, art also views the world as a limited whole. Both ethics and aesthetics seek happy life. So both of them are theories of eternal present. In the Note Books, Wittgenstein argues that the connection between art and aesthetics is that the work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis and the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis. We might say that it is the essence of both the aesthetic attitude and the ethical attitude as Wittgenstein conceive them to be disinterested - not to be concerned with mundane or prudential considerations.

According to Wittgenstein, the only motto of life is to 'live happily'. Good and evil are simply attitudes towards life. According to him, happiness alone is intrinsically good. To be happy is to see the world of facts as a whole with expanding limits. If it is the happy man's view of the world which alone has intrinsic value then the ascription of intrinsic value to it should be neither a tautology nor a factual proposition about anything in his world, but rather a transcendental judgement. A life of happiness is to be attained by renouncing the

world. It can be attained by subduing all desires for the contingent. The world of 'the happy' is the world of those who have achieved self-abnegation. According to Wittgenstein, the world of the happy is a happy world. The happy man fulfils the purpose of existence. He is satisfied and therefore, is at peace. He needs no purpose outside life and is, therefore, without fear even of death and is without hope. Death is not an event in life for it is not a fact of the world. (T, 6.431; 6.4311). It is not a part of the world. It is the world's limit. The fear of death arises when we mix fact with the willing-subject which is transcendental. It arises from our wish which expects some facts to happen or not to happen. In the Note Books, Wittgenstein argues that the fear of death is a clear sign of false hope (NB, 8.7.16). The happy man is in the present, not in time. To live in time means to live in the sphere of wishes. One who lives in time is always victim of fear and hope. But will is free from time. It is always a thing of the present and is without any desire, hope and expectation. So, to attain freedom, one must be freed from time. Therefore, a happyman is always satisfied without any desire. He is always at peace. He is always in accord with the world. Being happy means to be in agreement with the world's natural order. He is in agreement with the alien will

or God. A good will is one which agrees with whatever happens as it happens and is completely free from desires and wishes. A man can acquire happiness by total submission to the will of God or natural order. A happy man simply fulfils the purpose of existence. (NB, 6.7.16). The happy life is self justifying and the only right life. It can renounce the amenities of the world. It is to be achieved through the life of knowledge. It consists in viewing the world rightly. It renounces the amenities and comforts of the world. Happy life can be achieved only through the proper understanding of the natural order. It is the knowledge of the essence of the world. Happy life is achieved through the contemplation of the beautiful. Beautiful is that what makes a man happy. According to Wittgenstein, if any will has intrinsic value, it is not the psychological will, but the transcendental will which is not a part of the world. For him, good will is happiness.

Wittgenstein thus distinguished between this world and the transcendental world. This world is described by factual propositions and the transcendental world is described by non-factual emotive propositions. Plato also distinguished between the "world of appearance" and the "world of reality". The world of appearance consists of objects of sense and the world of reality consists

of "Ideas". Things of sense exist in space and time as opposed to the timeless and non-spatial ideas. Things of sense are "copies" or "imitations" of the Ideas. They participate in the Ideas. All forms, all the specific characters and features of matter are due to the operation of the Ideas. Thus, we have, on the one hand the world of Ideas and on the other, things of the world which are a chaotic mass.

Kant also distinguished between two worlds - the world of phenomenon and the world of noumenon. According to Kant, categories of understanding make empirical knowledge possible. It gives us knowledge of objects of sense. We cannot know things as they really are through sense-perception. The world known through the senses - the world investigated by the physical sciences and familiar in everyday experience - can be no more than a phenomenal world. But over and above this phenomenal world there is another world of real objects. This is the noumenal world. Our knowledge of objects is restricted to the phenomenal world. But though we cannot cross the bounds of phenomenal or empirical reality and know what lies beyond these bounds, yet it is not proper to assert that there are only phenomena. Kant introduces the idea of noumenon which literally means object of thought. The concept of the noumenon is indispensable. Things-in-themselves are unknowable. But we know them

through the representations which their influence on our sensibility procures for us. This idea of noumena is represented as arising, not through inference to a cause of sensation, but as an inseparable correlate of the idea of the phenomenon. Kant also speaks of the free, non-empirical ego and about God as noumena and as possessing noumenal reality.

Wittgenstein's view is closer to that of Kant than that of Plato. The aim of Tractatus is to show that the questions about religion, morality, aesthetics cannot be answered by natural science. Wittgenstein gives the impression that the point of the Tractatus was ethical and that the more important part of the book was the part that he did not write. By this , he means to say that among the things that cannot be said and he did not try to put into words are religion, morality and aesthetics. What makes the demarcation of factual discourse important is that it prevents encroachment and preserves religion, morality and aesthetics from being discredited as pseudo-scientific. Wittgenstein tried to keep these three safe from the encroachment of science. Kant also tried to keep ethics safe from the encroachment of science. But there are certain basic differences between these two philosophers. For Kant, fundamental ethical principles

are of the nature of categorical imperative where as for Wittgenstein, they are transcendental. Wittgenstein placed his ethical theory out of this world.

The world for Wittgenstein, is not the physical world. As a matter of fact, Wittgenstein uses the concept world to stand for the totality of descriptive propositions. For the empiricists, the totality of the descriptive proposition is the world where as for the rationalists, the totality of the logical propositions is the world. On the other hand, Wittgenstein puts descriptive and logical propositions in two different baskets. The logical propositions constitute the scaffolding of the world. In this respect, Wittgenstein gives us a fresh philosophical insight. It is this: The empirical and the non-empirical go together. This point was crystalised in 'forms of life' in the Philosophical Investigations.

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