

NATURE AND PATTERN OF INSURGENCY IN NAGALAND  
A GEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS

By  
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THIS IS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF  
**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**



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This is to certify that the thesis submitted by Sri SUBASH CHANDER for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) at the Department of Geography, School of Environmental Sciences, North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong, Meghalaya, entitled "Nature and Pattern of Insurgency in Nagaland, A Geographical Analysis", is a bonafide study of the author to the best of our knowledge and belief. This study may now be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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However, all the facts presented in the thesis  
is author's own.

Date: 25 Jan., 1984.

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## PREFACE

"The general principles which govern the application of geography in the general areas of military concern, apply to problems of counterinsurgency. However, the technique of geographical analysis of conflicts of interest can be useful here. One part of the problem of counterinsurgency appertains to foreseeing the outbreak of insurgent activities and to estimating the future requirement for counterinsurgency activities. Geographical evaluation can contribute to such foresight, both in the estimate of the most likely form of insurrection and in the estimate of the advantage which might derive from sponsoring revolt in a particular place."

(Louis C. Peltier and G. Etzel Percy, Military Geography Indian Ed. (New Delhi, 1981) pp. 95-96.

The present analysis is with the intent to prove into the underlying relationship (spatial) of the insurgents movement in Nagaland to the people who speak it as their own in an environmental framework. It also seeks to identify the underlying dynamics of the movement (so called Nationalist expression of the few) that express the dynamics in their distinctive social behaviour and geographical environment. The author has attempted to show the role of geographical factors as one of the many determining factors in all this interactions. Such an approach, to author's knowledge has never been presented before, nor has the name which the author has attached to it. Even the attempted analysis is unusual, lending itself to be elaborated in succeeding chapters.

While many had written on insurgency\* and on Nagaland, it has almost invariably have been as an appendage of colonialism<sup>al</sup> ( and capitalism), and only a relatively few since independence on such problems. There had been a considerable discussion in respect to origin and development of insurgency in Nagaland with its associated diacritica, varied socio-economic and political problems.

It had evidently occurred to no one (possibly) to understand the role of geographical factors that motivated (impart) the movement. It is of course difficult to overemphasise the role of this factor, when one sees the overall development of the state.

Other factors too have contributed to the author's approach. Among them was the basic dynamics of social and politico-economic aspects, which seems to the author, greatly clarified the effect of insurgency upon the Naga's society. The author had also sought to indicate contrastively the validity of the geographical bases of the study by paralleling it with(to some extent) their ideological bases.

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\*The words insurgents, extremists, etc. are used interchangeably throughout the present work.

One important and significant challenge was the Naga perception and its response to integration with the Indian Republic. As the author feels, their ideology that was essentially tribal in character from the outset, proved difficult to adjust or recognise the advantage of ~~the~~ remaining with the Union of India. Their persistence and resultant offensive (insurgency) had struck the author as an example of an ideological bias that required clarification.

It soon became evident to the author that the work had to be planned around

(i) the geographical bases and its relationship, and

(ii) Contrast between socio-economic parameters and their political implications. Inevitably the question of sources, origins and foundations involved in the dynamics of insurgency as well as arising from the above two points began to focus themselves in the study. Out of this national and social forces emerged the concept of process, whose social ramification was founded upon differentiation within the Naga society.

The present analysis is an attempt, then, to construct and establish a relationship between the environmental matrix and insurgency in Nagaland. This is because


there have been efforts in making the problem actually ethnic one which has posed a challenge to India's security environment. Again right from independence there had been an uncanny continuity of events (in the North-east that is continuously testing the Indian Union).

The present attempt also seeks to fill up some of the gaps that exist about the state and the insurgent movement. By providing a spatio-temporal framework of references, the author seeks to clarify but has hitherto been in doubt.

Place: Shillong

*Subash Chander*  
Subash Chander


Date 25 January, 1984.



MAP NO 1

# NAGALAND ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

10 0 10 20 30 40 50 KM



## INDEX

State Capital ★

### BOUNDARIES

International	.....	Sub Division	----	NQ District	⊙
State	~ ~ ~ ~	Circle	- - - -	NQ Sub-Div	⊚
District	~ ~ ~			NQ Circle	○

## **INTRODUCTION**

## INTRODUCTION

Analysis of (and studies on) insurgency is a part of Political Geography<sup>1</sup> and very little has been done so far. The study takes into account the changing pattern of political and ideological factors that not only threaten the status quo but also induce significant Geographical changes. These changes, then, as the author contends, have direct bearing on the landscape; and any change in the landscape brings forth new sets of spatial relationships (that depend upon the degree of preceding relationships).

Insurgency in Nagaland indicates a relationship between natural environment and political responses (for example, the pre-determined frame of reference among the insurgents). Author feels that through Political Geography, the role of factors and forces can be evaluated including that of the insurgency.

Whatever action that has taken place within the Naga environment, does not fall under any known

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1. See Richard Muir (1975) Modern Political Geography (London) pp.110-112, and R.W.McColl(1969)"The Insurgent State; territorial bases of revolution," Annals Association of American Geography(AAAG) Vol.59(U.S.A.) pp.613-31.

instance. The Naga insurgency, in the study, has been considered as unique and has been treated as such. The nature and pattern of insurgent activity in Nagaland has been reflected in number of books and articles, that have described at length the origin and development of armed insurgency in Nagaland as well as other associated events in this strategic part of the country. These books and articles have suggested the approaches to the Naga problem and have attempted to describe subjective and objective conditions. These studies also included the role of the people of Nagaland in the armed struggle. But these books and articles though of quality may need not be necessarily taken as an indicator to the spatio-temporal pattern of the Naga insurgency and the people who promoted them.

Some of the most protracted and bloody guerilla war was such as in Vietnam, Cambodia etc. have not shown any definite theoretical framework. But they are reflection of strategy to a particular time and place, for example after the World War II, Kurds have continuously fought and experienced the theme of guerilla warfare, eventhough they have not read a book on the subject.

The ultimate result is not due to their lack of knowledge of reading guerilla literature or any doctrinal shortcomings. This is in contrary to some of the armed insurgent movements that had very strong ideological background but had failed miserably due to the lack of geographical base, (for example the continuing struggle in Upper Burma or in the Golden triangle).

Perhaps what is happening in Manipur and Tripura (though having ideological basis) has perhaps no validity in the Naga situation, but as these states are territorially contiguous, the geographical implications are significant. During the training period, however, the insurgents lacked resources and which have compelled quite a few Naga insurgents leaders to adopt a particular ideological front (as the case of Muviah group calling themselves as Naga socialists or the NSCN).

The doctrine of guerilla activity in Nagaland has to be studied in the context of time and space. It has to be subjected to a critical analysis, for by no means, it provides a true reflection of guerilla

experience and reaction of the central government. Many of the insurgents have joined the movement with the definite perceived commitments ( as the insurgent leaders interpreted and indoctrinated the raw recruits). But with the due process of time, they found that their goal was not in sight, and saw the relevancy of the fact that the prosperity of Nagaland lay in their union with India (1975 Shillong Accord clearly illustrates this. See also Appendix - Z).

The propagators of the Naga insurgent movement (though vacillated by their perceived and ambiguous ideology) were in fact lured, as the author feels, by the politico-economic advantages that would have accrued<sup>YU</sup> from the creation of independent Nagaland. Their conception, therefore, geographically, politically and economically is not viable. The only advantage which the propagators of the Naga movement could have(?) achieved with some success was to have been a constant irritant in the India-China relations in this strategic location. Further, the author feels that even socially and culturally, the entire concepts that lay behind the insurgent movement could not have been plausible. For,

- 1) The Naga as an ethnic group are dispersed

in parts of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Burma besides, Nagaland proper. The inter and intra-tribal differences within themselves have, to a substantial degree, given them a static outlook;

ii) the presence of insurgent groups in Burma like that of the Kachins, Karens, Shans, Burmese Communist Party, etc. have a very dominant presence. The Naga movement, in comparison, is in minority and so far the Nagas insurgents have never been assimilated in this broader regional insurgent movement, nor they have been able to influence them adequately. Infact, it can be said with substantial clarity that the Naga movement is localised phenomenon in a broader international perspective. This, however does not rule out their sanctuaries in Burma or whatever material aid they have received from other external forces. As a result whatever the movement that is taking place is merely an expression of dissidents who have discarded all avenues except the organizational change within the Naga society and within the Indian Union.

As far as the question of identity is concerned the opponents of the union or the insurgent's view, is

largely biased and misinterpreted, (in this way they were often encouraged by the British administrators on the eve of independence). For the Sixth Schedule of the constitution of India and the existence of Nagaland as autonomous state is in itself a defending point against the insurgents advocacy. In this respect the role and operation of government and private agencies have been questioned. For it was stated that they have persistantly acted as a disruptive element, a case in point was the stand taken by Rev. Michel Scott. The present analysis is part of wider study, which the author believes has not been attempted before - a critical interpretation of Naga problem from the geographical (an environmental) view point. The present analysis deals with the insurgency and the insurgents. It does not aim at presenting a solution - for such a solution would be either exceedingly vague or unacceptable to all concerned. Although many such studies have their own uniqueness, they often formed a part of historical and sociological enquiries (but they eschew generalisation). There are still common pattern to be discovered and analysed. It is to the search for these patterns from the geographical perspective

that this study is devoted. Hence the comparative approach (politico-geographical) which has been used by the author in this study (& is aware of its limitations).

The analysis of the insurgent activity is not very complicated nor is it full of mystery. For they have been more or less the same with slight variation ~~by~~ all over the world. The Naga intransigence (from early times) have been one of preserving their identity and territorial independence, while harassing any power that had intention of forcing a political dominance. Their tactics were based on common sense and imagination, varying from tribe to another and from location to another, to take advantage of those reforms that were beneficial to them particularly, while opposing those which did not meet their approval. These are primarily effected by the geographical conditions as well as the social and political process and matrices. These were in the background of new techniques and innovations taking place from time to time in the broader regional, national and international environments. These developments alongwith geographical influences are examined in detail in the present study.

It is in the analysis from the environmental point of view to the Naga insurgency that most of the difficulty were encountered.

The present study in which modest attempt has been made to integrate the physical, social and economic variables will lead to a clear picture of the present problem of insurgency in Nagaland.

An attempt has also been made to find out how much importance should be attributed to the environmental background and political orientation of the insurgent movement (this is in the general framework of the situation prevailing in the North-East India). Or to put it differently, to identify the basic nationalistic impulses underlying the tribal (Naga) responses. Further, the present study also seeks a possible explanation of the decision-making process/ apparatus that ultimate shaped the spatio-temporal pattern of the movement.

#### Literature Survey:

The study of insurgency is as old as geographer's interest in the man-environmental relationships. Originating from the humble beginnings of the earliest man,

it has been cross-bred again and again with different ideologies and strengthened with technological innovations through the ages. The development of man's mind and his innovations of tools and traps were the precursors of his offensive and defensive measure against natural and man made hazards or opposition. By gradually exploiting mobility, surprise and deception, he further developed the technique of chase and hunting to offset superiority of a stronger adversary. Such tactics were known to have been adopted on a broad-scale as early as 360 B.C. against Emperor Hunang in China. Isolated guerilla operation motivated by fanatic zeal were launched during the crusades and the Hundred year war. Though in India, in their fight against Mughal Emperors, Rajputs and later sikhs employed the tactics of guerilla warfare. The real credit for successfully mobilising large masses for the first time for guerilla warfare must go to the Marathas. From the contemporary concepts, Shivaji can be rightly acclaimed as the world's first modern insurgent<sup>2</sup>. Guerilla operations of some significance also came to be witnessed during the American War of Independence and

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2. V.K. Anand (1981) Conflict in Nagaland, (New Delhi) p.3.

the civil war in America. In Spain similar operations were conducted against the Napoleonic armies and later during the civil war. The German, Italian, and the Japanese forces followed by the British, French, Dutch and Portuguese also faced guerilla opposition in their conquered territories. The Red Indians, Negroes, Aborigines and a variety of Asian tribesman still resort to guerilla warfare to a great advantage (see also appendix -III). *Bibliographic note*

Realising the use and importance of geographical factors in the insurgency, McColl noted that virtually every aspect of the insurgency processes has undergone intense study.<sup>3</sup> There remains one element however, that has not received adequate attention. This is the geographic aspect in the evolution as well as definition of revolutionary movements. He tried to co-relate the geographical factors responsible for the insurgency in the different parts of the world i.e. Cuba(1958) China, (1927-34) Central Luzon(1946-50) Greece (1948) Java (1948) South Vietnam (1960). He found that for contemporary national revolutions, the capture and control

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3. McColl, n.1, p.614.

of territory has virtually become a territorial imperative. Control of a geographic part of the state is essential for initiating the guerilla movement. Each stage of a guerilla war has its basis in geographic as well as political circumstances. If a system of guerilla base areas evolves, then a parallel state (Insurgent state) is formed. It is the continuance effort to create an insurgent state, complete with the elements of power, core areas and administrative units that from the manifestation of the insurgent's territorial imperative.

The Naga landscape at the very outset (as well as seen in the subsequent analysis) reveals following inherent or explicit features, which to a greater extent, have influenced the course of events that had taken place. These are:-

1) The accessibility for Nagaland (as the insurgents believes) lies not via Burma but through Brahmaputra Valley.

ii) Despite the long period of co-existence a basic minimum intercourse between the plain and

hill people had taken place that has along with (i) have encouraged few to advance the necessity for safeguarding their identity and strengthening the concept of racialism.

iii) The nature of the geographical dispersion of the tribal communities in the strategically sensitive frontier suggests extra mural relationship and influences.

iv) The difference that existed within the Naga tribes to merge with India or to separate did not require a political action that changed it self to active armed opposition. The continuance of this opposition led<sup>to</sup> intensification of conflict situation that brought ideological, political and economic goals within the overall environmental frame work that were incompatible.

v) The prevalence of tension in limited geographical area-Nagaland - in which the tendency of confrontation resulted in continuous action and counter action directed towards co-operation and developments, as against isolation and economic backwardness.

vi) The Naga insurgency is primarily ideological and political with economic factors tended to look closely inter-related. Leaving aside all other factors, ideological factor became paramount (Racism and extreme tribal nationalism). This was transformed as major politico-social force directed towards definite goal.

In order to bring out the salient features of the problem, following postulations are made:-

1) That geographical position and historical development, are to a large extent, determining factors that has, regardless of the kaleidoscopic changes of contemporary events and despite the form of Government instituted or political party in power, the situation (or the problem of insurgency) in Nagaland has a tendency to return again and again to the general and fundamental alignment-i.e. status quo.

ii) That there may be exist a causal relationship which may asserts itself between some environmental factors or sets of factors on the one hand and some attitude, action or state of affairs on the other ( particularly their interpretation and application).


iii) That the incidence of insurgency sofar has made it imperative to identify the distinction between the political attitudes and policy decisions on the one hand and on the other by layout in space or other state of affairs operational.

These assumptions, then enable, the author to seek probable interpretations of solution to the following questions that are inherent in the analysis of such themes.

(1) How far the environmental factors have become related to the perception and decisions. For this essentially entails the policy of integration being apperceived and taken into account by those who participate in the process (the Central Government, the State Government and the insurgent leaders)

(2) How far the postulations that have been, made, can provide fruitful linkages between the various approaches to the study.

(3) How far the factors have been significantly related to the final solution (as it is today in Nagaland) even though the role of such factors are not apperceived and taken into account in the final solution ?



(4) How far the opportunities and limitations latent or implicit in the milieu of the state (in relation to the problem) can be calculated ?

(5) How far the environmental situations and topical explanatory premises can be useful for the analysis of the problem under consideration.

Data Base:

The present study is based on the field survey (which the author was able to make, he was able to collect some aspects of material pertaining to his study. It was however, limited) and secondary data in some cases. The first few chapters are primarily based on the secondary sources. In addition to these, the author was able to interview few in the study area to obtain observations and information that helped to clarify few points significantly. These were regarding the attitude of the people and insurgents towards state and central Government, their socio-economic background and standard of living who joined the movement. The village headman and other elder persons were able to provide some information about the problem.

Plan of Work and Methodology:

The study is divided into 8 chapters (including introduction and conclusion). The study is planned and designed within an environmental cum socio-economic framework, begins with an assessment of the physiographic background of the region.

In chapter I an analysis has been made on the geographical background as well as the analysis of related but complex problems. The insurgent operations is an implicit phenomenon within the geographical framework of Nagaland. Various geographical indices have been prepared for a better understanding of the area in terms of environmental conditions. In this chapter discussion has been made to emphasize the different aspects which have a direct bearing on the insurgency. The basic logic of this chapter is also to find out how far the environmental factors are responsible for high intensity of insurgency in one region and low intensity in another region.

In chapter II an attempt has been made on factors which form the background of the problem. It also analysis the impact of earlier political organization on the Nagas. This chapter concludes with the discussion,

the impact of colonial ruler and their role in the development of insurgency in the Nagaland.

In chapter III an analysis has been made to find out the economy and level of development of Nagaland. In the first part of this chapter a detailed investigation is made to find out the economy by taking into consideration some variables such as Agriculture, Industries, road and communication development. Secondly the existing pattern of level of development have been examined to identify the area which is much developed, and its impact on the insurgency. In this study Kendal's technique has been adopted. In this exercise the approach has been made the elimination of bias of the scale of 13 selected indicators and also of their 4 sets separately by dividing them by their respective means and therefore, making them scale free. The value of each division of variable by respective means are added horizontally to form the composite score for each set. These index values for each observation are subsequently grouped on the basis of range differences to put each observation i.e. circles into a certain rank which represents its level of development.

Chapter IV deals with socio-political set up of Naga tribes. The present situation of political awareness among the Nagas and their traditions bound laws and customs are analysed in this chapter. The awareness of being one people which was understandably absent among the Nagas till very recently. The impact of their customs and traditions on the present problem also discussed in this chapter.

In the V chapter which deals with the Naga insurgency entirely based on field survey. This chapter embodies the existing pattern of Naga insurgency, the area of high intensity and low intensity. The development process and manifestation of the problem is also discussed in detail. The pre-requisites to start an insurgency and the impact of geographical, economical, socio-political conditions to help in sustaining the insurgency for such a long time is also discussed in this chapter.

In the last chapter (VI) an attempt has been made to highlight the level of understanding of the problem at regional, national and international levels. The central Government approach to solve the problem and the attitude of the Naga insurgents also discussed in detail.

CHAPTER - I

GEOGRAPHICAL FRAMEWORK


### GEOGRAPHICAL FRAMEWORK

The state of Nagaland sprawls over 16,488 sq.km . It is situated between 25.6° to 27.4° North latitude and between 93.20° to 95.13° East longitude. It accounts for 0.52 percent of the total area of the country. Nagaland has a unique geographical personality. It is surrounded by Assam on the west, Arunachal Pradesh on the north, Manipur on the south and Burma on the east.






It has magnificent mountains system that extends from the Chittagong hill tracts to the Patkai mountains as a point, where range is joined by north-eastern off-shoot of the Himalaya, it adjoins a part of the Chin Hills and Arakan Yuma system. Nagaland comprises of three mountains chins, which run irregularly parallel to one another from north to south. The Barail, the Naga range and the Patkai, rising from 2000 ft. to 13000 ft. Mount. Saramati is the loftiest peak of the state (12,663 ft.) in Tuensang area of the Patkai range overlooking Burma. The Barail range enters the state at the south-west corner and transverses in a northly direction. It broadens rather

# NAGALAND RELIEF


0 10 20 40 KM



### HEIGHT IN METRES

-  1600 & Above
-  1200 - 1600
-  800 - 1200
-  400 - 800
-  Below 400

steeply out into Nagaland and western Burma (from the north-west of Manipur via. north Cachar), culminating in the peak of Japvo (9890 ft.).

The other important peaks are Padna (9156 ft.) and Kypaneza (7970 ft.). These are beautiful glacial gorges with steep wooded sides, running upto the crest of Barail, which consist for the greater part a wall of grey rock. From this elevated mass transverse spurs connect other parallel ranges. At some places the distance between the ranges are wide enough to enclose fertile cultivable ravines and valleys. The Naga range forming bewildering series of more or less parallel ranges in Manipur merges in the south-west with the Mizo Hills and Sylhet. North of Kohima the main range gradually loses  height. In northern part of Mokokchung district, the Japukong range attains an average of only 750 ~~at~~ in fact.

The relief of the state can be divided into five micro regions<sup>1</sup> (see Map No. 3 ).

(i) The area with the height of below 400 mt ,

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1. The classification of the state has been done according to the height of the area because:
    - (i) It will be easy to understand the area of isolation, relative isolation and area of attraction within the state.
    - (ii) Terrain is an important determinant in the socio-economic development and that of insurgency in the study area.

- (ii) Area between the height of 400 to 800 mts.
- (iii) Area between the height of 800 to 1200 mts.
- (iv) Area between the height of 1200 to 1600 mts.
- (v) The area with the height of more than 1600 mts.

The western portion of the state comes in the first two category of the micro-regions. It covers the southern most Taluk H.Q. of Tenning, Juluke, Dimapur, Lotsu, Bhandari, Longcham, Naginamara and Tizit. The area between 900 to 1500 mts covers the central part of Nagaland . In other words, we can say it as a central upland zone, with the exception of some higher peak like Japvo in the Kohima district. The south-eastern part of the state is highly rugged with deep gorges and steep mountain slopes. The highest peak of the state (Saramati) comes in this area. The topography of the area is very rugged and inaccessible. It has become more difficult due to small streams and rivers.

Drainage:

There are four major river systems in the Nagaland, namely, Doyang, Dikhu, Dhansiri and Tizu.<sup>2</sup>

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2. Directorate of Agriculture, (1975) Soil Survey Reports Nagaland, (Kohima) p.1.

Of these, the Dhansiri, Doyang and Dikhu river systems run towards west and flow into the Brahmaputra. The Tizu river systems on the other hand, flows towards east and south east and enters the Irrawaddy river in Burma.

Doyang, the longest river in the state originates from Japu hills i.e. south-east of Kohima near the southern boundary and flows northwardly. It runs through the Angami inhabited area and flows to the eastern edge of the Rengma's occupied area. From there, moving northward it enters the Lotha inhabited area in the Wokha district. It drains a great part of Wokha area and finally after flowing towards the south of the district debouches the hills for the Sibsagar plains. This river is joined by many small hill streams in its central and western parts.

Chubi which flows southward from Kokokchung district and joins Doyang is a supplementary system of the Doyang river. Another supplementary river system of Doyang river is Nzhu. It rises from the Nerhema area in the Kohima district and after flowing

through Miphong in the Rengma area, it joins the Doyang river in Wokha district.

Dikhu is another important river that starts from the central part of the state. It runs towards the north along the border of the two adjoining districts, namely Mokokchung and Tuensang districts. The tribal territories of Ao, (Mokokchung district) Phom and Konyak (Tuensang district) are drained by this river. Towards the north it is joined by Yangyu river which is an important river in the territories of Phoms and Konyaks.

Dhansiri rises in the south west of the state. It first flows westwardly and then takes a northwardly course (forming a natural boundary with North Cachar Hills). Having debouched North Cachar, it bends eastward and flows past the Rangapahar-Dimapur plains in Kohima district. Again leaving the district it flows northward until it falls into the Brahmaputra.

Tizu river originates from Tuensang district and flows southward through Zunheboto district which is inhabited by the Semas. It further goes southward

through the Changkasang area and finally pours into Chindvin river in Burma.

An important tributary of Tizu river which rises from the extreme eastern part, in the Tuensang district is Zunki. It flows southward and mostly draining the Khumungan's territory joins Tizu river in the south. Apart from these rivers there are a large number of rainfed rivulets, the beds of which remain dry during dry season. The overall drainage pattern in the Nagaland is dendritic.

The role of physiographic characteristics and the river basins in shaping the human landscape cannot be ruled out. It is usually these rivers which form the natural territorial boundary of different tribes. It also enables us to understand that the spatial distribution of different Naga groups and clans are to some extent influenced by these natural micro regions. We find that the area below 400 mts. are occupied by the Zelinang, Kuki, western Sema, western Lotha and Ao's. The boundary between the Rengma and the western Sema is by the Rengma river. The natural boundary between the Lotha and Rengma is by the Aujong river. Between Lotha and Ao is the small

river Disai. The natural boundary between the Ao's and the tribes of Mon district is by the Yangmun river (see Map No. ).

The central portion of Nagaland, which fall in the category of 800-1200 mts. occupied by the Angami, Rengma, Sema, Lotha, Lower Konyak and Sangtam groups. These tribes are also separated from each other by the mountains and rivers. The Angamis are separated from Zeliangs and Kuki by the tributaries of Dhansiri river and also by Rengma river which separated them from Rengma also. Chakasang and Angami are separated from each other by Doyang river and its tributaries. Sema tribe is confined between the two main rivers of state, which separates Sema in the western from Rengma by Doyang river and in the east from Yimchunger by Tizu. Upper Konyak and lower Konyak are separated from each other by the Tukok, tributary of Doyang river.

The south-eastern part of Nagaland which is more rugged is occupied by Chakesang, Pochuri, Yimchunger, Chang and upper Konyak. The physical feature of this area had in turn also divided the same tribe/clan from each other. Upper Konyak and Chang are separated from

each other by the river Yangmun. Khemeunger, south Sangtam and Pochury are separated from each other by the river Zungui and Thervirate.

It can be inferred that the natural micro-regions had divided the Naga groups into different Clans<sup>3</sup>. This had induced the tribes to developed their own language and habits. This divisions did not isolate them from extra-mural influence, but also kept alive the difference between each group. With the help of distribution of Naga tribal(groups), one can identify the areas of isolation and area of attraction within the state. The tribes which are close to the plains have developed different technique in agriculture such as the case of Angami who had developed wet cultivation, whereas in other parts of the state, Jhuming practice is more prominent. The tribes of Mokokchung and Kohima districts are much more developed in comparison to the tribes of Tuensang, Mon and Phek districts, in respect of literacy etc.

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3. (1) Upon this analogy, it can be argued that at the time of peopling of Nagaland by the tribes, the altitude as factor in settlements was significance.

(ii) It can also be put forth that natural features became important boundary marks dividing the tribes/clans from each other.

The central upland zone is an area of relative isolation. The district of Zuneheboto and part of Phek and Tuensang districts have better accessibility in comparison to the Mon district and eastern most stretch of Phek and Tuensang districts.

Due to rugged terrain and difficult accessibility, the movement of the people (Tribe) was restricted to their village. The fear of head hunting was also the one factor which kept them isolated from each other. Although their traditional faith in their clans and chief kept them aloof from the plain people. Thus in short it could be mentioned that the river basins and physical environments have performed the role of natural ecosystem where the separate tribal groups initially settled and acquired definite and distinct characteristics for example the changing trend of Naga tribes from head hunter to a guerilla. Further they also have influenced the orientation of lines of communication, and the extent of cultivation.

Climate:

The climate of Nagaland varies spatially. In the foothills it is warm subtropical whereas over

the hills it is cool and temperate. The rapid changes in topography result in climatic changes within short distance. The foothills, plains, shattered valleys and the ranges are marked with climatic contrasts. In Nagaland the winter are cold and the summer are warm. The beginning of winter is marked by a steep fall (almost  $5^{\circ}$  C) in temperature during the first month i.e. December. January is the coldest month of the season, when frost occurs. In the winter the winds are generally light and variable. Occurance of dense fog during morning hours becomes a characteristic feature of river valley. Another interesting aspect of the hills and valleys is characteristic of inversion of temperature, which keeps the valleys bottoms cold at night.

The spring season is warm and humid, but the breeze though invigorating is interrupted at times by the gales. The north western(outlying) foothills areas are hot and damp as the adjacent plains. Rainfall is occassional and December is the driest month of the year. Due to the interaction of north-westerly, southerly and north-easterly airmasses,

Table 2.1

Average Monthly Rainfall and Temperature Conditions in Nagaland (1970-'74).

		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Kohima	Rainfall(mm)	13.00	28.57	29.26	106.38	182.24	273.38	217.82	133.76	101.80	33.48	9.18	
	Temp. C	15.61	18.28	22.18	22.48	26.02	27.49	27.80	27.74	27.26	24.30	20.25	15.45
Dimapur	Rainfall(mm)	14.86	29.16	31.14	87.68	178.56	369.60	392.80	384.34	31.92	137.62	81.88	16.20
	Temp. C	11.08	13.46	17.98	19.51	20.90	21.50	21.68	21.30	21.34	20.06	17.10	12.62
Tura	Rainfall(mm)	16.80	35.26	37.28	90.46	154.00	283.36	270.80	313.52	22.34	176.34	89.64	16.92
	Temp. C	10.90	12.34	16.78	17.98	19.48	20.44	20.46	20.48	20.1	18.98	15.26	11.84
Mokokchung	Rainfall(mm)	11.40	57.70	95.56	208.96	291.24	424.15	486.88	474.66	258.50	30.50	31.08	17.10
	Temp. C	16.82	18.08	22.18	23.82	26.83	28.32	28.90	29.40	28.86	27.72	23.16	18.91
Wahgaon	Rainfall(mm)	12.55	25.81	30.00	177.95	266.70	286.80	541.05	678.45	586.70	198.7	59.00	14.75
	Temp. C	17.05	17.95	19.80	19.75	21.65	21.90	21.95	20.60	20.40	20.15	17.10	15.80

Source: Soil Survey Report Nagaland (Kohima) 1975


instability develops. Due to this severe thunderstorms occur extensively, some times preceded by dust raising squall. With the advance of the season the amount and frequency of rain increase. The rainfall is generally associated with thunderstorms and squalls in the afternoon or evening. The monsoon period lasting for about five months from May to September is the dominant season of Nagaland. Rainfall is generally heavy in the whole state (see table No.2.1) and communication between different areas becomes difficult.








During the hottest part of the year (July or Aug) the temperature on the average of 40 or 42° C. In summer and autumn sky is frequently clouded. Owing to the thick mist, which when rising up in dense columns from the glens and precipitous slopes, soon envelop the landscape.

It has its blessing indiguis as it gives support to orchids and mushroom, which bloom uninterruptedly in the moist soil. But the vegetation which cloth the crest of hills and mountains is varied and profuse. The foothills afford a

# NAGALAND VEGETATION

SCALE 0 20 40 KMS



-  SUBTROPICAL MOIST DECIDUOUS FORESTS
-  TEMPERATE EVERGREEN
-  SUB TROPICAL EVERGREEN
-  CONIFEROUS (PINE)
-  BAMBOOS
-  DEGRADED REGROWTH (JHUM)
-  RESERVED FORESTS

MAP NO 4

corridor to Assam (being contiguous to the plains), and has share a tropical weather.

Towards the end of September the south western winds become feeble and following two months experience their retreat. The rain gradually stops, temperature moves downwards and the sky becomes clear. The season is a most pleasant part of the year. The amount of the total rainfall in the state varies from 200 cms. to 250 cms. During the monsoon humid and sultry weather is obtainable in the lower tracts.

#### Vegetation:

The entire state is bestowed with lush green vegetation and wild animals. About 20 percent of Nagaland's area is covered by forests. Vegetation in state varies from alpine to sub-Himalayan and from tropical to sub-tropical and also to temperate. It is mainly classified as follows (See Map No. 4 ).

- (i) Sub-Tropical Moist Deciduous forests
- (ii) Temperate Evergreen forests
- (iii) Sub-Tropical Evergreen forests
- (iv) Coniferous (Pine)
- (v) Bamboos
- (vi) Degraded regrowth (Jhum)
- (vii) Reserved forests

The plain belt on the north-west abounds in the wet evergreen vegetation. This zone constitutes a tropical broad leaf vegetation, some trees reaching the top canopy in gigantic height.

Subtropical wet hill vegetation thrives at altitude ranging from 1000 to 4000 ft. Bengma foothills adjoining Sibsagar plains abound in deciduous riverian canes and some time impenetrable bamboo groves. Pine trees are found over an altitude varying from 3000 to 4000 ft., <sup>Forest</sup> but confined only to Oak and Rhododendron are also associated with it. Wet temperate forest is wide spread at 5000 ft. altitude. The vegetation is assigned mostly to moist and swampy places.

Lower Hills near Kohima and along the National-Highway (Dimapur-Imphal) have been cleared off the vegetation, because of large scale deforestation in connection with cultivation. A greater part of the slopes have been reduced to permanent wet rice terraced fields. In Chakhesang and Zelongroung area, vast forests tracts are still seen clothed with a profuse vegetation.

The profuse vegetation, temperature, physiography, in association with geology and rainfall are

still major handicap for better means of communication. Thus restricting accessibility to Nagaland and this lends direct help to the insurgency. Being mountainous in the northern, eastern and southern side, it could be approached only through the plains of Assam, lying in the north west or south-west. This indicates the significance of accessibility for it serves entire Nagaland. Land slides, treefall and gushing water snapping of telephone wires and the atmosphere turbulence, storms and high mountains make communication unreliable. Covered jungles and monsoon drenched mountains pose serious problem for the authorities to tackle the insurgents. Beside making movement difficult time consuming and tiring the uneven ending forests restrict the visibility severely making it as short as five meters even in the broad daylight.

Naga insurgents had the choice of ground for their operation. They found in an area that is more rural than urban, mountains rather than plain, thickly forested rather than bare land, with bad road and communication. There are very explicit geographic criteria that have evolved from past insurgents movement

experiences. These locational features have been most explicitly stated in the Chinese, Vietnamese and Cuban revolutions. They have been and are being applied in numerous other movements in modified form (to suit the need of the area). The specific techniques or tactics of guerilla warfare related always to the specific local situation and were supremely expedient. The guerilla is above all an improviser. The nature of provisation depends naturally, on immediate and long range objectives, the terrain, the relative strength of his forces and those of the enemy. The material means at his disposal and similar factors. These very same factors influence his procuring equipment and provisions. Infact it acts both ways i.e. it supports him, and <sup>is</sup> his own chief obstacle .

The physical conditions in Nagaland afford both natural concealment and obstacles to hinder the movement of military transport - mountains and swamps where tanks and trucks cannot go. Wood and thick brush that provide cover from aerial observation and attack, forests from which to strike quickly and safely at security forces. Highway communication in which to ambush small army units, while the railway <sup>can</sup> extends

upto Dimapur which is in the plains. The insurgents have sufficient mobility to manoeuvre freely along the international boundry, without the danger being caught in a closing spiral of encirclement. It thus became difficult for the security forces to flushout the insurgents. This way they increased their area of operation. To counter this the government will have to extend its security forces and disperse its lines of supply and communication.

Terrain and local conditions ultimately decide the size and organization of the guerilla band. The guerilla normally do not give battle until the terrain favours them. Their efforts is always to lure the enemy in situation in which numbers are of little account, because the way is too steep and the passage to narrow for more than <sup>one</sup> to proceed at a time. When fighting began, it ~~was~~ on the ground of the rebels own choosing, preferably from commanding heights with dense cover and limited visibility, where a few determined men can hold up an army.

Besides terrain and local situations a complex international boundary is an aid to any insurgent, (which the Naga insurgents enjoy). An International

boundary shared by the Naga insurgents provide them ideal heaven from the hot pursuit as well as potential source of continued supply. They get sanctuary in the neighbouring states in Burma i.e. Kachin, Karans and Shan. When such boundary sanctuary are suddenly denied to an insurgent movement, as happened in Greece in 1949, when Tito broke with Stalin and closed the Greek-Yugoslav border to the greek communist<sup>4</sup>, the movement rapidly disintegrated or was eliminated by government troops. The Naga insurgents also suffered in 1971 with the emergence of Bangladesh, when they stopped getting their supply from Pakistan, particularly Chittagong hill tracts now in Bangladesh.

In counter insurgency, land forms generally ~~act to influence~~ movement, observation and the efficient use of the equipment. Because the tactics of a large scale campaign reflects the nature of the landscape over which it take place. The high relief in Nagaland restricts observation. The available cover and concealment from surface observation depends

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4. Rober, Taber(1969) The War of the Flee(PALADIN)  
p.149.

directly upon the amount of irregularity of the landscape. This problem was oftenly faced by the Indian security forces in Nagaland.


Thus the above analysis clearly demonstrates the following:

(1) Distribution of Geographical characteristics had encouraged the rapid development of various phases of insurgency in a short period. This coupled with inaccessibility enabled the insurgents to effectively coordinate their activities in such a way that security forces could adopt only a defensive posture. As a result of this, insurgency in the early phases had larger participation and sympathisers.

(ii) Corollary of above, demonstrates that with the adoption to the mountainous environment, sophisticated equipments, better accessibility and introduction of counter insurgency operations strengthened the hands of security forces. As a result, security forces switched from defensive to offensive operations. This coupled with assured supply and better communication, completely changed the situation in Nagaland. In addition, strict vigilance of the international frontier,

political stability in the state and implementation of development (socio-economic) plans further consolidated the position of Central Government. This is evident from the present day position of the insurgents who are not only restricted to definite pockets but are also ideologically divided within themselves.

In short, it can be summed up that Geography continues to be the focal point on which the human activities revolved. The relationship then can be summarised as:



On Time Scale/Insurgency Phases

CHAPTER - II

SOME ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND

SOME ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND

Since independence (or even prior to it) the Naga problem (due to its strategic location) had become important for the Indian Government (more so than 38 years ago when a tide of world war flowed and receded over the same mountains). In the early phase of the movement it was objectives and territory that mattered as well as the human components that was involved. Whether the villagers or the soldiers, Indian, British and Japanese who fought and died in the Naga Hills for Kohima ridge, (the eastern gateway to India), were mere pawns in a vast drama of world power. But even then glaring tributes were paid to the Naga people both by General Slim, commanding the allied 14th Army, and by some Indian National Army officer operating in the same hills.<sup>1</sup> Prominent among the virtues extolled were courage and loyalty in adversity to whom so ever they pledged their word. Afterwards, the frontier became as forgotten as of old until the Second World War broke out.

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1. <sup>See</sup> F.M. Slim (1965) Defeat into Victory, London.

In fact, it can be argued that among other factors World War II ushered an era of rapid politicisation (of the frontier inhabitants) which affected the Nagas more than the Indian subcontinent. It can be said that the Nagas to an extent were also influenced by the Indian freedom movement. Indeed the period between 1942 and 1945 would be a great watershed in the history of south and south-east Asia as well as the ethnic belts that stretched across international frontier. The entire region with Bangkok standing at the geopolitical centre was caught in an ethnic revival and nationalism. Consequently, as in Malayasia, a grim conflict commenced. This was a frontless, faceless war between armed communist bands of Chinpeng and British security forces.

Intrestingly, Naga underground movement was having some impact of these movements, (and also as author believes) of the tribal invasion (backed by Pakistan) in Jammu and Kashmir and the communist uprising in Srikakulam district of Andhra Pradesh. Naga insurgency then, was first of the large scale movement (after independence) which attempted to force a political decision through armed struggle

against the established Central government. It was further enhanced by the feeling of a distinct identity, enabled the Naga tribal groups to launch (or prompt) a defensive guerilla warfare. This move was further galvanised by the spread of Christianity to a large extent. However, the geographical inertia was largely responsible for such a situation to develop.

They had developed (Naga) a myopic vision due to their isolation aided to some extent by British support and sympathy. The propogators of Naga movement started to view the geopolitical forces, strategic considerations and modern tools of warfare with a distorted perspective. All along, there has been an inherent fierce pride of race among the Nagas to protect their own land, their forests and their way of life from external influences. This was also one of the factors which led to the later demand for political independence. No useful purpose was, however, served in making the past influence of British officers or foreign missionaries a scapegoat for the insurgent movement or for an urge which was fundamentally much deeper. It is indeed noteworthy that at

the time of transfer of power, there was no significant move among the Nagas to assert their claim through armed struggle. There were rumour prevalent at that time in the north-eastern part of India regarding the creation of a British crown colony for the eastern hills<sup>2</sup>. Yet, one cannot ignore the activities of Phizo both in Burma as well as in Nagaland.


What, then, was the history of the present deterioration in the situation ? The early intention of British administrators ( from the middle of the last century) was not only to prevent tribal raids against the developing commercial economy, (especially the tea industry of Assam Valley) but also to avoid as far as possible the British involvement in tribal affairs. However, this policy did not work, as in the settlement of tribal and intervillage disputes, protection had often to be extended to those threatened by head hunting raids. So the administration was extended progressively over the whole area which was known as Naga Hills district

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2. Verrier Elwin (1961), Nagaland, Shillong, p.51.

# SKETCH MAP OF NAGA HILLS DISTRICT

1968 - 1957



## Reference

- +--- RAIL WAY
- TOWN

PKS

SOURCE: P. N. LUTHRA, NAGALAND FROM DISTRICT TO A STATE, SHILLONG 1974, P. 120

of Assam. It contained almost half of the total Naga population and territory. British administration was further consolidated after a last desperate attempt by the Nagas to fight for their independence in 1879. The area settled down in the early decade of this century. The Kohima and Mokokchung areas became centres of education from which ideas spread to the adjacent Nagas.

Tuensang area, which lay deeper in the hills remained unadministered and undisturbed except for the despatch of occasional punitive expedition in cases where head hunting raids assumed alarming proportions. Even here, however, administrative control or influence was gradually extended. By 15th August, 1947, a part of this area came under regular administrative control of the Naga hill district, while the rest (although not regular administrative control) was subjected to partial influence and control (somewhat similar to the North-west Frontier of British India). Infact, during the World War II a wireless detachment in aid of the Allied forces was actually set up in the remote village of Pangsa on the Indo-Burma border. There is a theory

(though un-founded in the eyes of those who have lived through the past in the area) that the present lawlessness is the result of some attempt to resist administration and invasion of previously unadministered territory. On the contrary, the entire impetus and leadership of the extremists comes from the long administered Naga Hill district of Assam or from persons who have long been under close administrative control and influence.

In the early stages after independence, when former administration was being extended a political deadlock developed in the Naga Hills of Assam. The people started thinking that their land was to be occupied by the others. This pronounced feeling for their lands highlighted their common sentiments. On the other hand, the Nagas are very much loyal to their clans (without which no family can survive in the Nagaland). Even the people who were not in favour of the movement kept quite and worked for the common cause inadvertently. They had the feeling that they were not Indians in any sense of the word, neither in origin nor in habits or in outlook; and it is only a historical accident that they have been tagged on to

an Indian province.<sup>3</sup> That "historical accident", which the Nagas are determined to undo began in 1820's when the British added Assam to their empire. The Ahoms, previous rulers of the Assam had long known the Nagas as turbulent and dangerous neighbours whose raids on the plains had to be contained by forts and ramparts. The policy of the Ahom rulers towards these tribes varied from time to time according to the situation. The Ahoms compelled these Naga tribes to pay tribute in the form of mithuns and other commodities as token of their allegiance to the Ahom King.<sup>4</sup> They also recruited Naga youths in their Army and administration.<sup>5</sup> Thus it is evident that some sort of understanding existed between the Assamese rulers and Nagas concerning matters of mutual interests.

By the end of the seventeenth century the Ahom's of Assam had established their authority over some of the Nagas i.e. the Konyak, Lotha and Ao; who were living on the borders of Ahom kingdom (upto river Kapil). Once again they started raids on the plains

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3. S. Barkataki (1968), Tribes of Assam, Shillong, pp.1-5.

4. Elwin, N.2, p.18.

5. Ibid, p.1 and p.18.

of Assam, in the nineteenth century, when Ahom rulers succumbed to the internal divisive forces as well to the Burmese and the British (ultimately) invasions.

Initially it was not a part of the British policy to absorb the Naga hill tracts. The intention to leave them beyond the pace of civilization was confirmed by the first British penetration into the Naga country in 1832, when the British officers were harrassed by sustained, strong and effective attacks. The Nagas are a fighting people. Their villages, located on hill tops and crest line, were easily defensible and presented problems to the British. The Naga warrior, whose intuitive sense for guerilla in the nineteenth century, have proved to be a thorn in the flesh of Indian security forces in the present century. But to leave the Nagas alone was not a sufficient answer for the imperial power. Because the Nagas soon showed that they were not prepared to leave the British alone. Naga raids, especially those of the Angami tribe were so constant, that between 1835 and 1851 no less than ten punitive expeditions were sent into the Naga areas. The raids continued with

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6. A. Mackenzie, (1884) History of the relation of Government with the hill tribes of NEI of Bengal. Calcutta. pp.101-2.

pillaging and the taking of heads. The result was inevitable extension of British Administration into the Naga areas. A post was established at Kohima in 1866 as a first step towards taking over of the Angami country. The British continued the expansion of territory inspite of great resistance from the Nagas (especially the Angamis). As a result British administrators realised, "once the central Angami area was pacified expansion was bound to follow"<sup>7</sup>. The Angamis were considered as administered tribes paying taxes and supplying labour when required. It was only a matter of time before Semas could be administered. So it went on as a matter of administrative expediency only. Sir Charles Pawsay stated that "there was no question of imperialism. The British however stopped well short of extending their administration throughout the Naga area, which is normally administered and the administration was often limited to an annual tour."<sup>8</sup> Although it was a matter of cost benefit and of convenience, yet there is no doubt that the British considered the

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7. R.C.Woodthorpe (1882), Note on the wild tribes inhabiting the so called Naga hills on the North East Frontier of India. Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol.II. Calcutta. pp.56-72 and pp.196-212.

8. Quoted in, M.Horn, (1975) Naga Polity, Delhi.p.17.

entire Naga area a launching pad for extension of administration in that entire region (if they so wished).

After an initial reaction of antipathy, the British soon established a secure and even friendly rapport with the Nagas. The British officers who came into contact with them responded warmly to the qualities they found in the Nagas. Their courage and cheerfulness, their magnificent physique, truthfulness soon endeared them to the British. In a community with such characteristics they saw a common bond against the plainsmen, for whom both the hillmen and the administration of the hill region bore a dislike. Adapting their own administrative practises to the sensibilities of the administered, the British made it an unwritten rule that no plains officer would be posted in this area. By regulation they made sure that traders and speculators from the plains would not be allowed to infiltrate and exploit the Nagas. British officers laboured for a century to ensure that Nagas should retain their racial characteristics and should not be reduced to the status of tribals

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9. E.A.Gait (1926), A History of Assam. Calcutta pp.366-368.

as in the plains who were regarded only as untouchables to be exploited by money lenders and the higher castes. They recognized a cultural gulf with a great apathy and potential for destruction of hill cultures. They saw to it that this gap was not bridged at the cost of the hillmen. But as more presence as rulers they did create a situation in which the attention of Nagas and other hill people from the plainsmen (especially Hindus) found a political expression whereas it was largely the presence of the British that had given (to most of the separate national identities of the subcontinent) a sense of common identity. It was on the prospect of the departure of the British that created the separatist tendencies in (or among) the Nagas. The first missionaries (American Baptist) had arrived on the very heels of the British, and the Nagas responded to them too. This exposure to a common cultural force may have had awakened the dormant sense of unity among the often warring tribes.

It found early expression in 1929 when the Simon Commission on constitutional reforms visited Kohima. A Naga delegation (no doubt speaking with

the approval of British administration) expressed unwillingness to being made a part of Assam in any new constitutional arrangement the British established. They also urged that when or if the British actually left, the Nagas would revert to the independence they had enjoyed before the British advent. Except for a few tribes (Angamis, Ao's, Konyak's) which were under the ruler of Assam, other tribes enjoyed village state hood. "You are the only people who conquered us, when you go we should be as we were" - one delegate was quoted as saying. The Naga and the other tribal areas were duly excluded from Assam under the reforms in allowing a larger degree of Indian self-rule which came into effect in 1937. The British, sharing the Nagas disinclination to see the hill people coming under the sway of those of the plains, maintained these areas under direct administration.

With approach of independence in the 1940's the question of Naga future was raised. The British

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10. Elvin.n.4,p.51

11. Constituent Assembly debates, Reports of the Sub-Excluded areas, Appendix 'C' Part -I, Vol.II, No.1 Delhi, 1948.pp.132-3.

and especially those who had spent most of their time among the Nagas, hoped to find means to perpetuate the protective insulation as they saw it (and the Nagas too), from the domination of the plains. They (British) mooted various alternatives which would have enabled the Nagas to achieve self-rule after their departure. One idea was that the tribal areas of the north-east should be cut off from India and set up as a British crown -  
<sup>12</sup>colony. Another was a tripartite guarantee of the integrity and autonomy of the Naga areas by Britain, India and Burma.<sup>13</sup> From the Naga side, the discussion of their future centered around the Naga National Council (NNC), the organisation which expressed and modulated the Naga sense of Nationhood. There too various ideas were put forward.<sup>14</sup> But the dominant view was that the separate identity of the Nagas could be preserved and protected only by political independence i.e. political independence and sovereign

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12. Elvin, n.10,p.51

13. Report of the Indian Statutory Commission,1930, London, p.75.

14. The Naga Nation,1947,Vol.I.No.31.pp.5-10.

state instead of autonomy within the Union of India.

These concepts certainly exceeded what most of the British, even those most sympathetic to the Nagas, had been expecting as an answer to the problem the Nagas would face after their departure. The British commitment to the Nagas had been further strengthened in the Second World War, when the Nagas held back the Japanese thrust into Kohima and helped the British cause in every way. But even then, the records shows<sup>15</sup> no British support for the idea of Naga sovereignty.

From the Naga point of view however, anything less than sovereignty was too little. They were faced with the prospect of rule by people, whom they considered, were far more alien than the British.

If the Nagas were increasingly engrossed in the years preceeding independence with the future of minorities, no less were the other subjects of the waning Raj. Indeed it could be said that the question of minority rights of provincial autonomy and central authority were the essential counterpoints to the

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15. See Slim, n.1, p.98.

demand for independence. Even before the end of Second World War the Congress leadership was seized with the question.<sup>16</sup> Seemingly adamant then in their resistance to the Muslim league's demand for partition, the Congress leaders were still prepared to consider that the successors might not be permanently monolithic.

While in jail in 1944, Jawaharlal Nehru, in his letter to the Congress High Command had stated,

"the right of any well constituted area to secede from the Indian Union has often been put forward, and the argument of the U.S.S.R. advanced in support of it before any such right of succession is exercised there must be a properly constituted free India. It may be possible then, when external influences have been removed and real problems face the country, to consider such questions objectively and in a spirit of relative detachment, far removed from the emotionalism of today. Thus, it may be desirable to fix a period say, ten years after the establishment of the free Indian state, at the end of which the right to secede may be exercised through proper constitutional process and in accordance with the clearly expressed will of the inhabitants of the area concerned."<sup>17</sup>

Nehru's colleagues in the Congress working Committee were in the same jail. He made his opinion known to them, so thus, it can be taken as a statement

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16. See Chandrika Singh (1981) Political Evolution of Nagaland, New Delhi.

17. See Neville Maxwell, India and the Nagas, Report No. 17, 1960, Minority Community, London.

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of Congress thinking at that time. The gap that lay between the theorising and (Congress) practise became apparent, when in 1947 a Naga delegation went to Delhi to assert the Naga intention to opt out of the prospective Indian Union, rather than be headed by it. This was quite in keeping with the apparent political climate.<sup>19</sup>

The delegation was led by A.Z. Phizo, already identified as the leader of the Nagas in their demand for sovereignty.<sup>20</sup> They met Jinnah and told him that they did not mean to <sup>be</sup> included in India either and infact intended to make a unilateral declaration of Independence on August 14 (which was also to be Pakistan's independence day). On August 14, a determined faction of the Naga National Council extremists including the recently broken moderate, declared the independence of Nagaland under the leadership of Phizo at Khonoma.<sup>21</sup>

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18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. D.R. Mankekar, On the Slippering Slopes of Nagaland, (1967), Bombay. p.39.

21. V. K. Anand, Conflicts in Nagaland (1980), p.65, New Delhi.

To further their cause the extremists despatched a six member delegation to New Delhi and during the meeting with Gandhi on July 13, 1947, some philosophical remarks of his were interpreted as an approval for the independence of the Nagas.<sup>22</sup> Three week's later the delegation met Nehru and from him heard what Congress policy was infact and would remain.

"We can give you complete autonomy but not independence.<sup>(23)</sup> You can never hope to independent. No state big or small in India will be allowed to remain independent.<sup>(24)</sup> We will use all our influences and power to supress such tendencies".

For the Nagas, it can be seen in retrospect, this was the moment of truth. What they had feared all along, first expressed in 1929, was not coming to pass. The claims and interests of other were going to overside.

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22. Phizo reported that Gandhi said, "Nagas have every right to be independent. We don't want to live under the domination of the British and they are leaving us. I want you to feel that India is yours. But if you say they are not mine, the matter must stop there, I believe in the brotherhood of man, but I do not believe in force or forced unions. If you do not wish to join the union of India, nobody will force you to do that".

See Maxwell n.2.p.

23. Maxwell n.17. p.

24. Ibid.

There had been clear understanding that their demands could not be satisfied in full. "The representatives of the people will not accept anything less than independence,<sup>25</sup>" which was not fulfilled. The numbers of the Naga National Council had to decide the further of the Naga people in a way that suited them best.<sup>26</sup> While the position of nothing more than autonomy stated to the Nagas by Nehru in August 1947, was to remain the consistent stand of Indian government.<sup>27</sup> The British appointed the Governor of Assam, Sir Akbar Hydari, to hold talks with the Naga leaders.<sup>28</sup> After listening to the views of the Naga National Council Akbar Hydari held talks with the Naga leaders and in June 1947 signed a nine point agreement which came to be known as the Hydari Agreement.<sup>29</sup>

Unanimity over these articles was almost reached but when the question of interpretation of the ninth point came up, the trouble started. Sir Akbar Hydari and Pandit Nehru, who had accepted the Agreement, obviously

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25. Ibid.

26. N. Alim Chiba, A Brief Historical Account of Nagaland Kohima, pp.166-167.

27. Assam Tribune(Gauhati) 27 June, 1947.

28. Mankekar, n.20.

29. Text of Nine Point Hydari Agreement, Appendix II.Ibid.

intended that at the end of ten years the Nagas would be free to suggest, if they desired, change in the administrative pattern to suit their special character and to ensure a greater measure of autonomy within the Indian constitution which was still to be framed.<sup>30</sup> The constitution was to formalise the Naga demands in the Agreement and they would, therefore, themselves decide whether they would join the plain district of Assam or other adjoining areas such as Manipur or have a separate state within the Indian union. Some of the Nagas (extremists) lead by A.Z. Phizo, however, interpreted the ninth article in their own way.<sup>31</sup> According to them, this article meant that they would have the liberty to demand complete separation from India after the expiry of ten years.<sup>32</sup> Thus, a controversy arose over the interpretation of the ninth article of the Hydari Agreement.

The extremists, however, were adamant and wanted assurance of the Indian government for complete independence after the expiry of ten years. The provisions

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30. Ibid p.40

31. The Naga Nations, Vol.I.No.11. June 1947, p.5.

32. C.Singh, Political evolution of Nagaland, New Delhi, (1981).

of the Agreement, therefore, were put to vote in the Naga National Council and the majority accepted them.<sup>33</sup> The extremists who were in a minority were outvoted and consequently remained dissatisfied. This dissatisfaction prevented the Nagas from coming to a definite understanding with the Interim government of India. Thus, due to lack of mutual understanding, between the two parties, the Hydari Agreement remained unimplemented. The British government on the other hand was in a haste to grant independence to India. India being a successor state inherited all such territories which formed a part of British India earlier, except those which were earmarked for Pakistan. The Naga Hills area therefore, became an integral part of Independent India.

Here a question arises, as to why, the Nagas wanted a separate state of their own after the British departure. From the above discussion one can conclude that there was some impact of British administration on the Nagas. Firstly, the prolonged isolation and separation from people of plains had enabled the Nagas to develop a separatist tendency. The British policy

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33. Modern Review, Vol XXI No.5 (Calcutta May, 1969) pp.5 and 354.

had aimed at keeping the hill people far from the freedom movement of India, which was in full swing in the early thirties of this century.<sup>34</sup>

The British deliberately managed to prevent the spread of Indian nationalism to the Naga hills districts, which united people of different caste, creed, religion and culture into a nation. A state of mind in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt for the nation.<sup>35</sup> The Indian freedom fighters were not allowed to visit the Naga hills, with the result that the impact of nationalism was not felt here.<sup>36</sup> Hence the Naga people could not identify themselves with the hopes and aspirations of the people of the nation nor could they develop a common national outlook. This contributed vastly to the growth of a separatist tendency among the Nagas.

Secondly, false propoganda and rumours about Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam had created a misunderstanding among the Nagas against plain's men.<sup>37</sup> Rumours prevailed

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34. Chandrika Singh: n.16.p.25

35. Modern Review.Vol.XXI No.5.(Calcutta,May,1969) pp.354.

36. S.R.Johari:Dark Corner of India(1970) p.137,Lucknow.

37. Ibid.


that both Hindus and Muslims of the plains bore a hatred towards them. So, the Nagas gradually came to understand that they would not be comfortable and well received in Independent India. The Assamese and the other plains men would occupy all the key posts in the administration of the Naga Hills district. The majority of the Nagas being illiterate would not be able to complete. Hence they felt that solution lay in staying aloof from Independent India.

The Christian missionaries who were active in the Naga Hills also influenced the Naga outlook and mentality to retain their individual identity. They circulated wild stories about the rigidity of orthodox caste Hindus, who were to dominate the political scene of India.<sup>38</sup>

This created a sense of insecurity in the minds of the Nagas. Some of the British officials serving in the Naga hills district also induced the Nagas to maintain their separate political identity.<sup>39</sup>

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38. Current Events.(Delhi, May, 1958) p.33.

39. Ibid. 

Adams, the Deputy Commissioner of Naga Hills district in one of his talks with the Nagas on November 27, 1946, stressed the importance of the unity. He said that if they remained united they would make a nation.<sup>40</sup>

Lastly, the separatist<sup>st</sup> tendency among the Nagas also grew because they had little contact with plainsmen due to habitation in isolated areas. When the British administration gradually extended across the Naga Hills, the only Indian who went with the British officers was the sepoy in uniform or the camp follower. Both of them were looked down upon by the Naga as the legitimate target of attack on whom vengeance could be wrecked.<sup>41</sup> The British officer never cared to correct this misunderstanding. They were only interested in the maintenance of peace and order in the Hills.

These were the facts which contributed greatly to the growth of a separatist tendency among the Nagas which invoked them to start a vigorous

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40. S. Yonuo: The Rising of Nagas, p.162

41. Y. D. Gundevia (1975): War and Peace in Nagaland pp.56-57, Delhi.

campaign to secure an independent status for the Naga Hills district. But while on one hand the Nagas were demanding separation from India, the Indian leaders and British government, on the other hand were trying to impress upon them the futility of such a demand.

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CHAPTER - III

ECONOMY OF NAGALAND AND ITS LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT

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DEVELOPMENT

The general economic profile of the state is backward. It reflects a low level of development of economic infrastructure and a low level of living of the people. There are other backward regions in the country; but in terms of separate political unit and various linguistic groups covered this state with its strategic location requires very special efforts to accelerate the rate of growth to overcome its relative backwardness. The forces of change which from time to time emerged in the central Indo-Gangetic plain had hardly any impact upon the pattern of activities of the state (while situation across the international frontiers had enabled the tribes to maintain their traditional hostility towards outsiders and settled governments, like the Kachins, Karens etc.). Also because this area was isolated from the mainland and its geographical conditions did not attract the people from other parts of the country. There is no doubt that in the later period, these influences gradually permeated to the state. This intergennum had however allowed the traditional socio-political values to get well entrenched.

There are number of historical geographical and socio-political factors which have been responsible in retarding the progress of the state. The major cause of the slow progress can be attributed to the century old neglect and hardship during the alien administration. The socio-cultural outlook had also not been properly developed to an extent to which the state can march with the dynamism of the new era. It has therefore became urgent to deal deeper into the problem of socio-cultural harmony for bringing about integrated economic development. Another important cause for underdevelopment can be attributed to the pattern of British administration. Naga hills was administrated separately from the rest of the North-east. It was also staffed by British officers, who on the one hand encouraged the traditional codes and values, while on the other hand discouraged the outsiders (belonging to the Brahmaputra valley and other areas) to settle within the hills. This attitude allowed the suspicion of the Nagas to plain people to breed and spread. This was further reinforced by the British by instituting the Inner Line control. The result was that the plains people could not go to the tribal areas without special 'pass' and the

tribal did not dare to (fear of exploitation) come to have close contact with the plain people. Consequently the lack of contact, resulted in statusquo - The prevalence of a primitive tribal economy.

The economy of the tribals was self sufficient (to meet their own wants of clothing, housing and food). Only the Nocte, Konyaks, Lotha and Ao Naga had some trade relations with the Ahoms to meet the need of salt , cloth etc. So there was hardly any market and trade relation among the tribals. The Ahoms rulers tried to make improvements in the trade relation with other Naga tribes, but their involvement with the Delhi - sultanate or neighbours came in the way. Tribal clashes and wars were another handicapped in their development.

Most of the tribes in Nagaland are isolated from each other due to rugged topography of the state<sup>2</sup>. Due to which different societies evolved<sup>3</sup> and they tried to achieve some kind of adjustment between their material

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1. E.A. Gait (1925) History of Assam. Calcutta. p.29

2. See Chapter - I~~7~~.

3. See Chapter - IV.

needs and the resources availability of the area. Be that as it may the size of tribal groups, their material needs, potential for tapping the existing resources from within were some of the limitation imposed by the environment. As a result, their behavioural process remained conditioned and can be termed as a restricted to their environs.

Yet, one can assert that these groups, by virtue of their location, enjoyed a unique advantage within the overall framework of the region (as well as the country itself). The corollary of which was that, even if the majority pretend ignorance (of the problem of the region) than there is every possibility of the minority transforming the area into a tension area (which the Nagas have shown)<sup>4</sup>.

The strategy for economic development for any area implies the fixation of certain priorities for the development programmes in the light of area's existing stage of economic and social development as well as factors of endowments. There are several indicators which can be used to delineate the economic

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4. See Chapter V.

situation. In the light of an analysis of the situation and available resources a course of action can be planned.

In order to <sup>analyse</sup> the present situation the following indicators have been used.

- (1) General characteristic of population.
- (2) State of Agriculture.
- (3) Participation rate.
- (4) Industrial development.

#### Population:

According to 1981 census <sup>6</sup> the population of Nagaland was 7.73 <sup>million</sup> in comparison to 5.16 million in 1971. In 1961 the erstwhile Naga Hills district of

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5. These criteria have been used as indicators, mainly because, Nagaland presents a peculiar locational inferences with predominantly tribal basis of economy and wide spread jhuming, Nagaland had (as of recent) shown indications spatial reorganisation both in administration and economy. Also because serious attempts are being made to evolve infrastructure more suitable to its needs and functions. The high priority that has been given to socio-economic development was followed by semblances of political stability in the state (with reference to the insurgency). Thus we find that the adoption of these criteria illustrates the relevance of spatial perspective in relation to the insurgency in Nagaland.
  6. Preliminary census report of 1981, series - 15, Vol. I.

Assam had a total population of about 2.35 million, with <sup>a</sup>break down of Kohima, 108,000 and Mokokchung 125,000 persons. Another 134,000 inhabited Tuensang. The percentage variation of population in Nagaland from 1901 to 1971 was 238.20 which was quite high in comparison to the all India population variation from 1901 to 1971 (129.64 percent). This great variation of the population growth in Nagaland is due to the growth of urban centres like Dimapur, Kohima and Mokokchung. The setting up of the new industrial units in the state were also responsible for the higher growth of population.

The districtwise study revealed that there was also a great variation of population growth between 1961 to 1971. The percentage variation between (1961 to 1971) in Mokokchung was 33.50 in Kohima 60.85 and in Tuensang it was 28.84. This growth can be due to their function, i.e. Kohima as the capital and Dimapur as an economic centre. The more important point which attributes to the growth of population in Kohima and Mokokchung, was the good communication network with the rest of the country. On the other hand we find that the growth of population in Tuensang district

is low in comparison to Kohima and Mokokchung. This area had inhospitable mountains, rugged topography and poor transport communication net work. This area did not attract the people from other part of the country even as labourers.

#### Rural - Urban Population:

According to 1981 census rural population constituted 84.46% of the total population. These people are mostly cultivators. Out of 4.65 million rural population, the male constituted 2.41 million and 2.74 millions female. The urban population had very little share in the Nagaland total population. It was only 1.20 million out of which 0.75 million were male and 0.45 million female. These figures revealed that most of the persons who were in urban centre were outsiders, either in service and business or as labourers.

#### Density of Population:


The density of population of any region depends upon the demographic and non-demographic variables. The

non-demographic factors such as physical, cultural and economic, individually or collectively affect the distribution and density.

According to 1971 census the density of population in Nagaland was 31 which was quite low in comparison to all India figure of 182 per Sq.Km. in 1971. The districtwise study indicate that the density of population in the districts were same as per the state. But the preliminary 1981 census Report indicate the density of population in Nagaland has increased from 31 to 47 persons per Sq.Km. This increase was perhaps due to the natural growth and the new developments projects such as sugar mills in Dimapur, paper and pulp industry in Mokokchung and ply wood factory in the Mon district that has attracted the people from other parts of the country. These development projects have given rise to a correspondingly higher density of population both in rural and urban areas. Table 3.1 shows the density of rural urban population in different districts of Nagaland 1981. (MAP No-9)

# NAGALAND DENSITY OF POPULATION

20 10 0 10 20 30 KM



PERSONS PER Sq. KM.




Table 3.1Density of Population in Nagaland ( 1981 )

Districts	Rural/Urban	Density
Kohima	Rural	46
	Urban	2602
Phek	Rural	35
	Urban	1345
Wokha	Rural	29
	Urban	1345
Zunheboto	Rural	43
	Urban	2274
Mokokchung	Rural	54
	Urban	1186
Tuensang	Rural	34
	Urban	881
Mow	Rural	40
	Urban	812

Source: Census of India series - 15 Nagaland-1981  
(Preliminary Report).

The above table shows that Kohima has the highest urban density of population where as Mokokchung has the highest rural density of population. On the other hand Wokha has the lowest rural density and Mon has the lowest urban density of population. This population data suggests that the highest density of population in the urban is due to the influx of outsiders in the state capital due to government services, business and labourers in the Dimapur town of Kohima district. In the case of Mokokchung district the highest density of rural population, in comparison to Kohima district is obvious, because in the Mokokchung district, Mokokchung is the only town, and the people who come from outside for the labour job work in the small scale industries that are located in the villages. These people have settled permanently in the district. In the case of Tuensang, Phek and Mon districts the rural and urban population density is low due to rugged topography. The people are scattered over the area. The communication network is also not so good and there is hardly any industry which can attract the people from outside.

We can then, conclude that where ever density is less the tribal concentration is more. Because the

tribal are inhabiting the hilly area in the form of scattered settlements. According to 1971 census the percentage of tribal population to the total population of Nagaland was 88.61% whereas Tuensang having 94.70% of tribal population its total population in comparison to 80% and 91% of Kohima and Mokokchung respectively. It reveals that the area which are more inhospitable and away from the economic centre have higher tribal concentration. These people have adjusted themselves to the environment and are mainly cultivators and normally do not come out from the boundaries of their villages.

#### Economic Development:

From the economic point of view, Nagaland is an underdeveloped and underpopulated region of the country. But to develop a diversified economy in the state, it has adequate natural resources such as forests, minerals and oil resources (between Tapan and Basail area). It has an immense potential for hydel power also. It is indeed a sad state of affairs that out of the total potential available in the area only a very limited portion is exploited. There are distinct

constraints that are inherent in the Nagaland scape. These inherent difficulties may arise on account of cultural barriers, geographical factors, plan neglect and political situation or a combination of all these factors. Although all these factors create a special problem for the development planners, but this is the case with the hill areas of North-eastern region including Nagaland.

Physical barrier kept Nagaland in isolation from the rest of the country.<sup>7</sup> Several factors are attributed to this seclusion from outside influence, namely difference in racial composition, cultural expression and religious beliefs lack of modern civilization and bad condition of road and communication etc. But the most important reason of that isolation seems to be people's fear of losing their distinct identity and exploitation by outsiders.<sup>8</sup> Therefore this area remained unaffected by the economic growth of Assam and rest of the country.

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7. See Chapter - II.

8. See Chapter - IV.

In recent times we find the economic condition of the people showed a change and there is great participation of the people in the development programmes to improve their living conditions. On the other hand Government had also adopted certain priority measures to develop agriculture and industries as well as to gear up the condition of the people at par with the rest of the country.

State of Agriculture:

Nagaland has an agrarian economy. About 87% of the population live in rural area are depend on agriculture. Of the total area of 16,408 Sq.Km about 7000 Sq.Km. are under cultivation. One fourth of this is under permanent cultivation and rest under jhuming. A land development programme was initiated during the third plan period to popularize permanent cultivation. Emphasis was again placed on the same programme in the 4th and 5th five year plan. One of the schemes under this programme was land reclamation, under which tractors and bulldozers on hire were made available to the farmers for reclamation, leveling and ploughing of newly reclaimed land. The following table of land use in

Nagaland had showed a remarkable change between 1970-71 to 1976-77:

Table 3.2

Land Use Basic Data

(In Hectare)

Sl.No.	Items of Land use	1970-71	1976-77
1.	Net area sown	170,061	182,117
2.	Current fallow	83,319	85,582
3.	Net cultivated area	253,375	267,679
4.	Other uncultivated land excluding fallow land.	59,565	44,690
5.	Fallow land other than current fallow.	113,385	427,525
6.	Cultivated waste land	49,598	-
7.	Net available for cultivation.	28,336	47,535

Source: Report of the Agriculture Census of Nagaland 1976-77, p.259.

Another scheme envisaged subsidised supply of agricultural implements and machinery to the agriculturist.

Other schemes included supply of fertilisers and seeds also on subsidised rates. The total terraced rice cultivated area with irrigation has increased to 30,000 hectares. Practically, (due to non-availability of data) the distribution of cultivated area within districts between various uses is not known. The cultivation is dependent mostly on rain. Between 1972 to 73 to 1975 to 1976 the gross cropped area in Nagaland has increased by about 6.0 percent. There was also an increase in area by 1.0 percent under high yielding varieties in Nagaland during 1973-74 to 1976-77. As a result of these measures the production of rice increased from 34.7 thousand tonnes (1972-73) to 71.5 thousand tonnes in (1977-78)<sup>9</sup> Although rice is the main crop that is grown in Nagaland followed by millets, maize, pulses, oil seeds, fibres, sugarcane, potato etc, All these crops are not sufficient for their local consumption.

#### Industrial Development:

As already mentioned the economy of Nagaland is primarily agrarian with a low percentage of the

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9. Corresponding to this (1972-73 to 1977 to 78) North-east Region's Rice production was 2778.2 thousand tonnes to 3288.3 thousand tonnes. India's production was 39245.3 to 52676.5 thousand tonnes.

labour force employed in secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy. In the state as a whole there are 1.43 percent workers are engaged in the secondary activities and 26.21 percent in the tertiary sector. The percentage of workers engaged in different sector for the year 1981 is given below:

Table 3.3

Distribution of Workers(1981)

District	Primary activities (P.C.)	Secondary activities (P.C.)	Tertiary activities (P.C.)
Kohima	56.15	2.99	40.94
Phek	81.33	0.30	18.37
Wokha	73.84	3.23	22.93
Zunheboto	77.34	0.38	22.88
Mokokchung	68.94	0.91	30.15
Tuensang	83.63	0.67	15.70
Mon	84.40	0.15	15.45

Source: Census of India-1981(Nagaland) Preliminary.

The above data reveals that the percentage of workers in the secondary sector is very low. This suggests that state is not industrially developed. Therefore the main stay of population is only agriculture.

To develop the state of Nagaland, three major industrial projects have been taken up. A sugar mill with crushing capacity of 1200 tonnes per day has been set up in Dimapur as a state government project. A distillary unit with a daily capacity of 1,000 gallons of alcohol was also added to the sugar mill project. The second is a paper mill at Tuli in Mokokchung which is a joint venture of the state and the Union Government. The major share of the cost is being borne by the Government of India. The approximate cost of the project is 56 crores and its capacity 100 tonnes of paper per day. The third is a plywood factory at Tijit in Mon District (The Nagaland forests products Ltd.) which has gone into operation with a capacity of 15 lakhs Sq.metre per annum.

Handloom and sericultural are also important cottage industries of the state. These industries are receiving encouragement from the Government. These

industries are expected to ensure larger employment opportunities, thereby reducing the pressure on land and leading to balanced regional development. There are six weaving cum production centres, seven sericulture farms, one handicraft training cum production centre and three small scale industries service centre.<sup>10</sup> The following table shows the Number of industries in Nagaland districtwise:

Table 3.4

Number of Industries in Nagaland  
(Districtwise )

Type of Industry	Kohima	Phek	Moko- kehung	Wok- ha	Zun- hebo- to	Tue- nsa- ing	Mon
Industrial Estate	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Weaving Training-cum-production centre.	1	-	2	-	-	2	-
Cottage industries cum-production centres.	-	-	1	-	-	1	1
Sericulture farms	3	1	2	2	1	1	1
Handicraft Training-cum-production centre.	-	-	-	-	-	1	-

10. Source: Directorate of Industries, Nagaland(1979).

Table 3.4(Contd...)

Type of Industry	Kohima	Phek	Moko- kchung	Wok- ha	Zun- hebo- to	Tue- nsa- ng	Mon
Small scale industries service institute.	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sugar mill	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Paper and pulp mill.	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Flywood factory	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Distillery unit	1	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Directorate of Industries Nagaland, Kohima(1979).

This table shows that the district bordering Assam and whose topography is not too rugged had the major share of industries. Whereas the districts like Phek and Zunheboto had only one service industry due to the lack of communication and non-availability of raw materials for the industrial development. The Government had attempted to develop the districts of Mon and Tuensang, which are quite far away from the central authority. To develop

the people of backward region and to give the sense of unity with rest of India this step has given the fruitful result. The people who were engaged in head hunting and who had never seen the world of civilization are changing day by day.


Another important factor for the development of road and transport communication. The Government of India had taken up the road development programme in Nagaland with top priority since independence. A brief account of the road development in Nagaland since independence will show us the achievement of the state as well the union Government.

#### Road Development:

Before independence whatever communication that was developed in this state was done to cater to the administrative needs of the colonial rulers without any regard to the economic uplift of the people of the area. In 1875 a bridle path from Samgating to Wokha via Kohima was opened. However, the most important commercial routes in the west were described to be Vngma Moewngyimsen and Dengkum-Anguri routes.

# NAGALAND COMMUNICATIONS

10 0 20 30 40 KM



## ROADS

- NATIONAL HIGHWAY
- STATE HIGHWAY
- - - UNMETELED
- RAIL

MAP NO 8

In the Second World War, the roads linking the district in the Naga Hills were the Mokokchung Amguri road and Kohima Mokokchung road via. Wokha. But after independence road communication became very essential for transportation of goods as well as people and for the growing need of the traders. Great change took place after the formation of Naga Hills Tuensang Area in 1957. (see Map No. 8 ).

Now withstanding the remarkable progress achieved in the field of communication in recent years, Nagaland still has a long way to go in becoming fully developed as far as communication is concerned. It may be mentioned that Nagaland had only 10.45 Km of railways which passes through the Dimapur plain with a railway station at Dimapur and (another small station) at Naginimore with very limited capacity for goods and passengers movements. There does not appear much scope for extension of railways in to the interior areas of the state due to rugged terrain. Therefore, it cannot serve as a viable media for transportation in Nagaland.

Nagaland does not have any civil aerodrome, but there is military aerodrome at Dimapur which allows civil

traffic. It started operating in 1971. However, it does not cater to the need of mass transportation so that its impact on transportation is negligible.

Development of communication system is a continuous process. Its implication becomes more significant when confronted with areas having a hostile terrain. Nagaland is a hilly state with very difficult terrain as the major portion of the Patkai range cuts through the state. Therefore the only means of communication which can be developed the state with considerable effort are roads. Roads transportation consequently shall continue to be the only means of communication which would cater to improve the basic infrastructure of the socio-economic aspects in the state.

It is in this background that state Government had taken up a scheme during 1963-64 for the creation of departmental road transport undertaking namely the Nagaland state Transport(NST) to cater to the transportation needs of the State in phases. Accordingly, passenger transport in the state was started by NST in a small way from 15th June 1965 by introducing bus services between Kohima and Dimapur. The process of expansion of

passanger service in the state continued. In a span of 16 years (1981-82) the bus service have reached all the towns and almost all administration centres of the state. In the last 16 years the Nagaland State Transport has grown vigorously and considerably expanded its services.

#### Roads (National and State High Ways):

The state is served by two National Highways, viz. NH-39 and NE-36. Whereas NH-39 has a route length of 103 Km within the state connecting Dimapur upto Mao, via. Kohima, NH-36 has got a length of only 5.4 Km in the state in Dimapur. Nagaland has got 1161 Km of state Highways covering all the 7 districts of the state.

#### State Highways in Nagaland (as on 31.3.1979)

1. Kohima/Wokha/Mokokchung	SH.No.1	152 Km
2. Anguri-Mokokchung	SH.No.2	102 Km
3. Kohima-Chakabama-Pfutsero Melari.	SH.No.3	251 Km
4. Meraphani-Wokha	SH.No.4	64 Km
5. Sonari-Namtola	SH.No.5	60 Km
6. Mariani-Mokokchung- Tuensang.	SH.No.6	195 Km
7. Chakabama-Chazouba- Zunheboto-Mokokchung.	SH.No.7	220 Km
8. Tuensang Kephire	SH.No.8	122 Km

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Source: Transport Commissioner, Nagaland, Kohima (1979).

Apart from these there are other roads in Nagaland such as major district road (MDR) other district roads (ODR) and Village roads. The table below show the districtwise length of the roads as on (31.3.79) including the State Highways.

Table 3.5

Districtwise Road Length (Km)

Sl No.	District	State High ways		M D R		O D R		Village road		Total	
		S	U	S	U	S	U	S	U	S	U
1.	Kohima	98	-	-	147	57	164	3	360	158	671
2.	Phek	314	-	-	49	9	38	-	250	325	337
3.	Mokokchung	235	-	-	63	26	65	7	302	268	430
4.	Tuensang	212	-	-	-	10	46	7	759	229	805
5.	Wokha	56	-	41	41	8	2	-	160	64	203
6.	Zunheboto	102	-	-	-	-	130	-	280	102	410
7.	Mon	40	8	-	-	4	64	-	240	52	212

Source: Transport Communication Nagaland, Kohima (1979).

National highway 39 which passes through Nagaland is the most important road link as it carries an estimated 40 to 45<sup>percent</sup> of the total traffic. The major portion of the goods traffic of Manipur state is also carried along the

same road. There are frequent landslides on the road at milestone 41 from Dimapur, during rainy seasons. This becomes an obstacle, for the traffic is either partially or wholly closed in different spells for days together.

The surface conditions of the said road being extremely poor. The wear and tear on the vehicle is quite high. The situation has further aggravated due to small percentage of the length of the N.H. in the state. The length of the N.H. in the state constitutes only 2% of the total route length of the state, which is quite low when compared to the all India average of 6% to the total surfaced road length.

Level of Disparities:

In hilly regions, the level of socio-economic development are generally low, and there exists distinct regional disparity. Such disparities are unique in tribal dominated hill areas like Nagaland. What is more concerning to the planning is ever widening gap between the 'Developed and the 'Backward' regions. It has been found, that the poorer a region is, the greater is the difference between its developed and underdeveloped

areas. In the case of Nagaland where the tribal culture and natural environment are significantly related (since historic time) one can assess it through levels of social change and degree of modernisation.

Regional disparities in hill are precisely due to the following causes:

(1) Lack of spatial integration of the economy as the inhabitants have closed economy.

(2) Higher degree of dependence on a particular sector of economy and absence of economic diversification.

(3) Lack of even and uniform diffusion of growth impulses in space.

(4) Unsystemic utilization of generative forces.

(5) Higher degree of economic instability due to absolute dependence on physical environment including climate.

(6) Spatial distribution of growth Nuleii

only along the transportation network and absence of  
<sup>11</sup>  
diffusion due to physical constraints.

Measurement of Disparities:

In an attempt for area clarification and regionalisation no single variable is adequate to portray (some of ) the complex characteristics which are not directly observable. A package of statistical methods based on a host of variables are involved in the present work on area classification and identification of regional system. It comprises the use of factor analysis and related grouping procedures and

- 
11. Development in hill is clustered around a few nuclei where communication networks are well laid for the flow of capital inputs, social overheads and other innovative traffics. Growth of these nuclei are explained by the emergence of subcentres in a 'ribbon pattern' along the communication lines. However the growth of these 'urban featured' nuclei - that are tilted exogeniously more towards the urban plains than towards the indigenous country-side do affect very little on the transformation of the surrounding areas through the diffusion of growth impulses. Such neutral relationships between growing urban areas and the surrounding rural areas in the hill are more prominent in those areas where, alongwith transport bottlenecks religious taboos, and other tribal norms persist or allowed to persist for certain geopolitical reasons. The reason for the backwardness of the border states in North-Eastern hills of India both in terms of economic and social conditions can be attributed to these factors.

also the composition of the chosen variables into indices so that each of the areal observation can be compared with others (through all the related variables). This measure the levels of inequalities within the region. The object of constructing a composite index has been to assimilate with proper weightage, the variation in the observed values of the selected indicators into a final score of index. A very simple method is ranking of the variables and then addition of these ranks to find the composite index has been used.

The obvious draw back of this method is that the unit difference in ranks does not reflect the extent of difference in the active observations. This method of summation ranks of different variable makes little sense because units of measurement are different. In this exercise, the approach has been the elimination of bias of the scale of 13 selected indicators and also of their 4 selected indicators and their 4 sets separately by dividing them by their respective means; thereby making them 'scale free'. The values of each division of variable by respective means are added horizontally to form the composite score for each set.

Thus if  $\bar{n}_a, \bar{n}_b - - - \bar{n}_n$  are the arithmetic means for  $n_a, n_b - - - n_n$  indicators (here  $n = 13$ ), the composite index  $X_1$  for one unit of observation (circle) is given by

$$X_1 = \bar{X}_a + \bar{X}_b - - - + \bar{X}_n$$

using this method separately for 4 sets of 13 indicators, the final aggregate composite index is derived out of the addition of the scores of each of the four sets. These index values for each observation are subsequently grouped on the basis of range difference to put each observation i.e. decides into a certain rank which represents its level of development.

Table 3.6

\*Indicators of Level and Potential of Development-sets and their sub-sets

Set	Original Variable	Indicator
1. Educational facilities & literacy	Educational Institutions	
	a) Primary School	a) P.S. per 1000 pop <sup>n</sup>
	b) Middle School	b) M.S. per 1000 pop <sup>n</sup>

Table 3.6 (contd....)

Set	Original Variable	Indicator
	c) Secondary School	c) S.S. per 1000 pop <sup>n</sup>
	d) College	d) Colleges per 1000 pop <sup>n</sup>
	e) Literacy	e) Literacy per 1000 pop <sup>n</sup>
<b>II. Medical Medical Institutions</b>		
	Facilities.	
	a) Dispensary	a) Disp per 1000 pop <sup>n</sup>
	b) Hospital	b) Hosp per 1000 pop <sup>n</sup>
<b>III. Power supply and communication.</b>		
	a) Village having power supply	a) % of villages with power supply.
	b) Village having pucca Road	b) % of villages with pucca Road.
	c) Village having post office	c) % of villages having post office.
	d) Village having Tel. Office	d) % of villages having Tel. Office.
<b>IV. Economic Base.</b>		
	a) Non primary work force (NPWF)	a) Proportions of NPWF to total work force.
	b) Secondary work force (SWF)	b) Proportion of SWF to total NPWF.

\*The selection of indicators, has however been severely constrained by the non-availability of requisite data.

To understand the socio-economic underdevelopment of a region the complex development process call for the selection of more than one indicator and hence thirteen indicators have been chosen to measure the existing levels and potentialities of development of each sub-region(circle). These indicators have been classified into 4 sets that correspond to different aspects of social and economic development process. Some of these indicators are not the most suitable ones but possibly the most relevant ones that are consistant to the concerned phenomenon could be squeezed out of the existing inadequate data base.

The first set of indicator i.e. Educational institutions are the infrastructure and literacy a general index of cultural and technological advances is both an outcome and agent of awareness of development. Institution population ration(i.e. number of school per 1000 population) does not actually form the most suitable indicator in Nagaland's conditions because the institutions are always under utilized in tribal areas. In other words, when the population in a given area is doubled, it does not effect or

proportionately diminish the per capita availability of schools by half. The ratio of each of the Educational institution to a unit of geographical area could be more appropriate, when the accessibility constraints is an important factor in Nagaland's conditions. As against the literacy-population ratio, it would be more appropriate to take the students in the schools and colleges as proportions of the populations in relevant age group. However, these two attempts could not be used in this exercise due to non-availability of secondary data.

The second set of indicators deal with medical facilities, Census report for 1971 is confined to the availability of medical institutions in each circle such as dispensaries and hospitals. The indicator (II/a and (III)b pertains to the ratio between the institution and population of the circles. In constructing these indicators, it would have also been more appropriate in Nagaland's condition to take the medical institutions as ratio of the geographical area because accessibility constraints play more dominant role in the utilization and expansion of the medical facilities in the hill areas.

The third set of indicators pertains to the power supply and communication. Here, the indicators (III)a,b,c and d are framed as ratios between the number of villages in the circle, as unlike for the indicators in the first and second sets. Since the availability of power supply, Pucca roads, post and Telegraphic office can be considered as non-immediate type when compared with indicators in first two sets. For indicators(III)b, it would have been more appropriate to take road distance as ratio to the geographical area of the circle, but for the lack of data it could not be done. However, this set of indicators would at best may help to understand the levels of development, since they form and are agents of change in the total social system.

The fourth set of indicators which pertains to economic base asserts the level of diversification of economy which is directly linked with development in Nagaland because of Tribal economy the question of economic diversification has been very obscure. Since non-primary activities have a higher productivity than primary activities, an area dominated by non-primary activities is characterised by large production and higher per capita income, thus growth of development.

Therefore, a change of occupation from primary to non-primary sector reflects development and is valid for Nagaland's conditions (where more than 90 percent of the local work force is engaged in tribal based primary activities dominated by monocropped primitive agriculture).

The extent of development of an economic structure is determined by the pattern of change of occupations from primary to non-primary sectors. The indicators 'a' and 'b' of this set pertain to the structure of participation rate in non-primary sector of economy. Indicator 'a' pertains to the ratio of non-primary work force to the total work force of a circle which will show the degree of development.

The indicator 'b' pertains to the ratio between the secondary work force (SWF) and the total of non-primary work force (NPWF). The secondary sector being an asset and an economic (bone of a developing region), its levels of growth and labour absorbing capacity indicates the development levels of a region.

Levels of Development:


The western part of Nagaland is relatively developed than the eastern region. Within these regions, difference in development do exist. However, based upon the composite index derived out of the four sets of indicators as mentioned above the entire region of the state can be classified into six levels of development. The table 2 and Map (A/o-6) show the state's 60 circles under 6 groups or levels of development.

Circle in the first category:

With the highest aggregate score of 17.952, Zubza under Kohima district is the only circle in the state under this level of development. The relatively highest level of its socio-economic development is due to the well developed transportation network and social infrastructure and has close proximity to Kohima town, the state capital which have strongly influenced the social and economic conditions of the Zubzo circle. For a population of 5107 in 1971, the circle have favourable ratios to almost all aspects of socio-economic base.

# NAGALAND LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT

10 10 20 30 KM



## LEVELS



FIRST



FOURTH



SECOND



FIFTH



THIRD



SIXTH

MAP NO 8

Table - 3.2  
Nagaland: Levels of Development

Category	Composite score	Kohima District	Mokok-chung District	Tuen - sang District	Total No. of circles under the Category
First	More than 13.633	Zubza	-	-	1
Second	13.059 - 13.633	-	Mangkulemba	Naginimala	2
Third	4.606 - 8.396	Tsemi-yu, Zakh-ama, Dima-pur, Pheri-ma, Phek-sadar.	Ongpangkong, Tuli, Kubulong, Changtongya, Akulato, Aitepyong.	Chessore, Mon.	13
Fourth	2.992 - 4.325	Chiepho - bzou, Pfut-sero, Chizami, Chazouba, Meluri, Tenn-ing, Pedi.	Chuhuyim-lang, Alongkima, Longchem, Aghunato, Atoixu, Satoi, Wokha Sanis, Bhandari, Lotsu, Sungro	Tuensang-Sadar, Longkhim, Chare.	21
Fifth	0.974 - 2.622	Pughob-hoto, Pho-kungri, Jaluke	Satakha Euruhoto, Hoshepu Achikuohu, Zunheboto	Noksem Tamlu Longleng Tabu Shantorr Noklak Thonknyu Tizit	22

Table 3.7(contd....)

Category	Composite score	Kohima District	Mokok-chung District	Tuen - sang District	Total No. of circles under the category
				Phomoning Champang Kiphare Pungro Sitimi Seynchung	
Sixth	0.423	-	-	Chew	


Circle In the Second Category:

Two circle Mangkulemba in Mokokchung district and Naginimara in the north western part of Tuensang district fall under the second level of socio-economic development with the aggregate composite score of 13.633 and 13.069 respectively. The position of Mangkulemba which appears to be an island surrounded by relatively lower developed region, is an exception. For Mangkulemba is a tiny unit both in terms of her population, size and areal divisions. In 1971, the total population of this circle was only 511, a figure which would obviously boost up the population socio-economic ratios.

Naganimara with a population of 10,518 in 1971 has been the most highly developed circle in Tuensang district. Naganimara's relatively better infrastructural development (especially in communication system) is attributed to its external linkages with Sibsagar district of Assam. Naganimara forms the northern gateway of Nagaland to the developed Brahmaputra Valley.

Circles in the Third Category:

The regions under this level of development is confined mostly in western half of the state in the form of patterns. There are altogether 13 circles under this level, five in Kohima district six in Mokokchung district and remaining two circles in the Tuensang district. These have the aggregate composite score ranging from (14.6 to 8.4). 13 circles under this level can be considered as having fairly developed socio-economic infrastructural base. It is in the close proximity of the circles like Dimapur, Pherima and Zubza to the state industrial town (Dimapur) and state's capital Kohima. These circles have easy access to the National Highway. The location of regional



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administrative headquarters in most of the remaining 10 circles under this hierarchy, have significantly influenced the development of the socio-economic infrastructure.

Circles in the Fourth Category:-

There are 21 circles under this hierarchy with the highest composite score of 4.325 and the lowest score of 2.992. Half of these circles are under Mokokchung district a third under Kohima district and the remaining one sixth under Tuensang district.

Almost all the areas under this level are in the western half of the state and they can be categorise as moderately developed or marginally developed on the basis of relatively highest value scored by each indicators to their respective means.

Circles in the Fifth Category:-

About 33 percent of the total geographical area of the state is under the fifth level of socio-economic development. These areas comprising a total of 22 circles which may be considered as areas of the low level of development or backward area of the state. Out of these

22 circles, Tuensang district alone has 14, which is more than 66% of the total area, Kohima has 3 circles that come under this category. The respective means of the each set of indicators for almost all these 22 circles are higher than their Industrial scores on the column.

The low level of socio-economic development in these regions can be attributed primarily to the higher degree of inaccessibility, isolated settlements and poor level of social awareness among the tribes. One of the unique features of the region is that all the border areas of Nagaland facing Burma longitudinally are undeveloped. Considering the strategic position of Nagaland it is obvious that these borders areas are kept as buffer zones on geopolitical grounds.

Circle in the Sixth Category:

With an aggregate composite score of 0.423, this is represented by Chen circle of Tuensang which forms the most backward areas of the state. Chen is a border area and has the total population of 8485 (1971 census). Literacy ratio is very low, (only 4.8 percent are literates). Educational institutions

restricted to middle school level and the socio-economic infrastructural facilities in the circle are totally absent. Therefore, it is not surprising to note that the circle's work force participation to non-primary activities is only 1.64 percent.

Levels of Development and Tribal Concentration:

Each of the Naga tribe are concentrated in a definite area with strong cultural and economic base. In the past such distinct territorialisation among the Naga tribes was accentuated by constant socio-political and economic conflict within the Naga communities and against the non-Naga invaders untill the entire Naga hills were dominated by the British and Christian missionaries who penetrated into their domains and injected the art of westernisation into the blood of Nagas. After India achieved independence and a state of Nagaland was formed in 1963, the process of socio-economic assimilation and aculturation among the Naga tribes with the people from urban plains took place in much rapid pace. However, as compared to the rest of the country, the levels of such cultural assimilation and development were in a retarded form. Such a state

of affairs has been due to (a) physiographic constraints for development of the infrastructure (b) Strategic location, (being a border area facing Burma and China), (c) the policy of the Government of India in dealing with scheduled tribes (d) Naga attitudes towards assimilation (e) strong cultural attachment among them, and lastly (f) the discontentment among some of their leaders towards the policies of the Government (that resulted in the outbreak of hostility against the Government).

The levels of socio-economic development among the Naga tribes and their degree of assimilation or detribalisation is closely related to their spatial distribution and concentration.<sup>12</sup> The tribal area where infrastructural facilities and other innovative measures could penetrate only by overcoming physiographic constraints are singularly favoured by the tribal communities.

Significantly the problem has to be tackled at the grass roots, for the development requirement of the state essentially includes the extension of

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12. See Chapter IV.

transport and communication facilities, development of trade and a possible re-orientation of the national policy so as to incorporate them as an integral part of the country. Reviewing the existing transport linkage and associated elements, it is clear that mountainous topography has hampered the vertical development as well as lateral communication facilities in the state.

Lack of interaction since the colonial period in Inner-line area has delayed the economic development and transformation, which in turn has resulted into ethno-lingual diversities in the region. The ethno-lingual diversities definitely created centrifugal forces and regional and sub-regional overtones against integration, whether political or economic in character. It is important to understand the perception of the people guiding the national policies and this would help in bringing a balance between forces emanating from tribalism, regionalism and nationalism.

It then can be concluded that Nagaland clearly indicates distinct regional variation of development. Consequently, the attitude of the tribes has also changed

both towards intra and inter tribal relationship as well as with the people of rest of the country. This has had a corresponding influence on the insurgent movement in Nagaland. During the early stages of the insurgent movement the extremists were able to motivate the tribes, who were occupying areas which were backward or least developed.

The analysis of the level of development also indicates the perpetuation of the phenomenon of growth even today. So much so that there are pockets of resistance by extremists within Nagaland with the gradual penetration of modernization and with the establishment of political stability the insurgent movement has found its operation in a very lowkey if not completely eliminated.

The process of development also indicates that the extremist leader had taken the advantage of ignorance and economic backwardness. Subsequent progress has however, reversed the entire situation. This has led to conflict situation, which the extremist leaders today are not able to explain to their followers. This was compounded by lack of safe sanctuaries for the

insurgents within Nagaland. Those that exist, exist in Burma. The international frontier between India and Burma in Nagaland sector is clearly marked by very backward economic region, which under the circumstances was of no use to the insurgents - a relatively strong factor for the Government to reduce the insurgent activity.

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CHAPTER - IV

SOCIO POLITICAL SET UP OF NAGAS

SOCIO-POLITICAL SET UP OF NAGAS

Nagaland presents unity in diversity in matters of race and language. The social and cultural heritage of the Naga people might have been the same had they had one common language. But the Naga people do not belong to one tribe but to more than twenty. There are thirteen major tribes and not less than seven minor tribes. While Ao, Angami, Sema, Chang, Konyak, Lotha, Chakhesang, Phom, Rengma, Sangtam, Yimchunger, Kuki and Zeliangroung may be grouped into major tribes. Chankru, Chiru, Kheza, Pehury, Shamnyayang, Tikhir, Wancho etc. may be classified as minor tribes. This multiplicity of tribes in Nagaland is due to the fact that the Naga people migrated to this part in different groups and they remained confined to their ridges and mountainous terrain.<sup>1</sup> This also resulted in the multiplicity of language in Nagaland. The various tribes used to speak their own dialects which were essentially different from one another. But recently the Naga people have developed a language which is known as Nagamese.<sup>2</sup>

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1. S. Barkatake, (1968) Tribes of Assam, (Shillong) pp.1-5.

2. Based on personal survey of Nagaland and its people.

But as soon as Nagaland became a constituent state of the Indian union, English became the state language. This departure from the main trend is due to two factors. Firstly, the Naga people did not have a common script of their own.<sup>3</sup> Nagamese has been developed very recently when the Assamese came into contact with the Nagas. Secondly, the British Missionaries influenced the Nagas and who tried to change the social and cultural outlook of the Nagas.<sup>4</sup> The British infact made a deep impact on the social and cultural life of the Nagas.<sup>5</sup> The Nagas were dazzled by the English culture and way of life and English thus became very popular among the Naga elite.<sup>6</sup> It was regarded as the language of the socially, economically and politically advanced Nagas who were of the notion that the key to advancement lay in learning

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3. R.B. Maccable, Outline Grammer of Angamis Nagas language, (Calcutta).pp.13-14.
  4. V. Elvin, (1969) The Nagas in the Nineteenth Century, (Bombay), pp.15-18.
  5. Kevevino Peseyie, (1974) Educational Development and Social Change in Nagaland "High Lander".Vol.11, No.2. (Kohima).pp.7-12.
  6. W.C.Smith, (1923) Missionary Activities and Acclituration of Backward people, "Journal of Applied Sociology", Vol.7.(Calcutta).pp.15-18.

English. Years after independence when Nagaland was given statehood, English was accepted as the state language by the people of Nagaland/

The Naga people are simple, friendly, hard-working and self respecting. They could be called egoists, because the moment they felt, they are being let down, they became ferocious and dangerous. The most praise worthy thing about the Naga is their belief in casteless society. They do not harbour any prejudices related to caste and creed.<sup>7</sup> There are no social outcasts in Nagaland. All are equal there and they do not make any distinction among themselves on the bases of caste, creed and colour.<sup>8</sup> Mostly the Nagas are Christians. They are deeply religious and every village has a Baptist Church.

It will be important to add a few words as to why the people living in this part of the hills

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7. Based on personal survey of the Naga people.

8. Base on personal contact and conversations with the Naga people.

are called Nagas<sup>9</sup>. The origin of the Naga people is also shrouded in mystery. Different scholars hold different views. Some believe that the Nagas belong to the Indo-Mongolid<sup>10</sup> race. There is yet another version, suggested<sup>11</sup> that the Nagas were no other than the Kiratas of India. The chief exponent of this view was Dr.S.K.Chattarjee. No doubt there are some references of Kiratas, whose original have was in himalayan slopes and in the mountains of east Assam. But

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9. John Buttler believes that the people in plains used to call the persons living in the hills Nagas. Some other writers however, believe that the word Naga has been derived from the Sanskrit word Nag which means a snake. But the Nagas did not themselves know that they were the decendents of the snake spirit. Hence it is not convincing that the Nagas are the decendents of snakes. L.W. Shakespear and Robert Reid think that the word Naga is deformed Hindi word of Nanga, meaning naked. A Greek scholar of second century A.D.ptolemy holds the same vie. He has referred to the Nagas as Nanglong, which means naked people. According to Holcombe and Peal the term Naga has its origin in the word Nok which means folk and as the Naga people used to live in groups, they came to be known as Naga later on. This view of Holcomb and peal appears to be logical and nearest the truth. See also, journal of Apolied sociology, history of Upper Assam, Upper Burma and North-east frontier, The Ao Naga tribes of Assam.

10.H.B.Rowncy,(1932) The Wild Tribes of India,(London) pp.167-70.

11.S.K.Chatterjee,(1950) Kiratas Naga-kirit "Journal of Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol.16,No.2(Calcutta) pp.22.

most of the scholars do not subscribe to the view that the Kiratas were none else than the Nagas.

The Nagas have some legends and stories of their origin. The Chakhesang, Sema, Rengma and Lotha believe that the first Naga came out of stone in a place known as Khezkenoma.<sup>12</sup> Thus as the Christians believe that Adam and Eve were the first to come on the earth and that later their sons and daughters spread all over the world. The Nagas think that the first Naga, who came out of the stone gave birth to several sons, who left their original places of birth and went away to different places to settle. There is still another legend in Nagaland which suggest that the first Naga emerged from a lake.<sup>13</sup> These stories and the legends do not, however, seem to very convincing because they are based on superstition and religious belief.

It thus appears that there is a lot of controversy regarding the origin of the Nagas. But the view which states that the Nagas belong to the Indo-Mongolid race appears to be very near to the truth.


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12. M. Alemchiba, (1970) A Brief Historical Account of Nagaland, (Kohima), p.22.

13. T.C.Hondson, (1970) Some Naga Customs and Superstitions, Folklore, Vol.21(London), pp.296-312.

# SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF NAGA TRIBES

0 10 20 30 40 KM



## INDEX

	KONYAK (U)		TIKHIR		SANGFAM
	PHOM		ZELIANG		KONYAK (L)
	CHANG		ANGAMI		AO
	YIMCHUNGER		SEMA		KHEMLUNGER
			GHAKESANG		POCHURY
			LOTHA		RENGMA

This is simply because the Naga people did not come to this part of India from very far off land. Some of the people living in the plains from other side of the Himalaya might have come to this part and mixture produced the Nagas. Hence it will be more appropriate to say that the Nagas belong to Indo-mongoloid race.<sup>14</sup>

The history of how the Naga tribes came precisely to occupy their present position has of course passed into the dim obscurity. However, it does not appear that the Nagas have been living in this area with the allied tribes of Nagas like Karen Shan, Chin, Singpho and others, who have come from the western China settled in Burma.<sup>15</sup> S.K.Chatterjee believed that these Indo-mongoloid group of people came to India in tenth century B.C. and confined themselves only to the North-eastern part of India.<sup>16</sup>

According to J.H.Hutton, the legends of the Aos and Semas give those tribes a more or less autochthonous origin.<sup>17</sup> Though these legends of the race

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14. B.S.Guha, (1944) "Racial elements in the population," Pamphlets on Indian Affairs, No.22.(Oxford), p.8.

15. S.K.Chatterjee, Ref.<sup>n.</sup> No.11.p.145.

16. Ibid.

17. J.H.Hutton Folk Tales of Nagas "Folk Lore" Vol.26 (1926) pp.371-94.


which have been given local values, the other Naga tribes too have their own legends of their emergence. The reasons are not far to seek that these tribes were not inhabiting this land <sup>from</sup> time immemorial. Because the terrain is so rugged and unproductive, that the people cannot think of settling there in normal circumstances. Most of the scholars believe that originally the Naga came from central Asia. These people of central Asia were known as now Chinese, Chinang tribes. They first came to north-west border of China many centuries before the Christian era and later on these tribes spread over to China, Indonesia, Philippines, Bhutan, Burma and Nagaland. This is evident from the fact that the Nagas bear similarity with some tribal groups such as Dyaks, and Konyaks, the tribal people of Indonesia and Philippines. Smith is of the view that the Naga belong to the same blood which is found in the people of Burma, Sikkim, Bhutan and other hilly areas of North-east India.

Different Naga tribes came to Nagaland after crossing the Irrawaddi and the Chindwin rivers of Burma.

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18. W.A.Holcombe, (1964) Exploration survey in the Naga Hills (London), p.4.
19. Sikim and Bhutan, p.7. Also see Burma census Report of 1911, p.252.
20. W.C.Smith, (1925) On Nagas tribes of Assam (London) pp.153-60.

# NAGA MIGRATION

0 10 20 30 40 KM



## INDEX

— ANGAMI  
 — AQ  
 — SEMA  
 — RENGMA

--- LOTHIA  
 — CHANG  
 — KONYAK  
 --- SANGTAM

— YIMCHUNGER  
 — PHOM  
 — ZELIANGRANG  
 — KHENMUNGAN

Some of them came through the Mao gap and spread south where the other Naga tribes spread north wards. The Lotha traditions say that <sup>they</sup> once occupied the country, which is now of Angami. The Ao broke off from Lotha stock and went north, and as the Angamis pressed in their rear the Lotha followed suit, going first west then crossing the Dyang at Laghtimukh and spreading up to the Ao country and going north east towards Sema country. Even now they point to Lotha Genna stones erected on long deserted and tree grown hills to the south of the Dayang as making the sites of their former homes. They also remembered stories of the great Lotha Chief Pemvo who led them against the Angamis. And it is possible that the migration of part of the Rengmas to the Rengma hills in Golaghat was partly the result of the north-eastward pressure of Lotha migration.

After great struggle these tribes occupied different pockets of Nagaland. At present Angami occupy the northern and western parts of Kohima, with Kohima town as their centre. While the north western part of Kohima is inhabited by the Rengmas. The south west is patronised by the Zeliangs and Kukis who extend into Manipur in the south. Chakesang and Pochury occupied

Phek district of Nagaland. AOs are concentrated in Mokokchung district, Lothas in Wokha district and Sema in the Zunheboto. Tuensang the most under developed district, has its northern portion occupied by the Konyaks. Now this tribe is divided into two groups, one has gone to Mon district that is known as lower Konyak and in Tuensang district group known as Upper Konyak. The remaining portion of the Tuensang district is occupied by the Phoms Changs, Khamyungans, Yimchungrs, Sangtan, Mon district is inhabited by the lower Konyak and some other small Naga tribes( see Map No. 10 ).

Thus the Naga have a chequered history. The primitive Nagas must be appreciated for their local self government. which was based on customary laws, though fights head hunting wars, rivalries and petty tribal feuds very much prevailed among them. Now a days the Nagas believe the such virtues as unity at the time of outside invasion, obedience to elders or chieftains, peaceful settlement of their quarrels and faith in customs and tradition.

#### Society:

The structure of the Naga society is basically rural in character. Although the tribes are different

in many way, they share things in common. They (almost) all live in villages, which vary in sizes as some contains as many as thousand houses while other not more than fifteen. The village are often built on the top of isolated hills, this is because in old days the people were constantly at war with one another and wanted to watch their enemy approaching. Hence the Nagas preferred to live on the spur of the Hills and many villages are still so situated. Many villages have a dormitory for the young unmarried men and called "Morung". It is the house where strict discipline is maintained and is also a recreation centre. Morung is considered to be an important educational political and social institution. Here the youths of the tribes are taught lesson in discipline and what is expected of them in working for the common good.<sup>21</sup>

The family is the fundamental unit of society in which the father is the head of the family. A son sets up a separate family after getting married. Whereas daughter goes to another clan leaving her original clan on marriage. The clan comprises a group of consanguineous

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21. Asoso Yonuo, (1974) The Rising Nagas, (New Delhi) p.11.

families descended from a common ancestor by whose home the clan is known on the patrilineal and exogamic line. Then a number of clans (combined together compose a well defined village) occupying a definite permanent area with sovereignty and finally a tribe by a number of villages of the same descendants.<sup>22</sup>

A peculiar form of slavery exists among the Nagas, which is different from its conventional sense and value. In that the slaves mostly from the poor family are purchased, are well treated and also considered almost as members of the family. However, the Nagas admit that men are not equal in congenial endowment as such the ruling of rational superior to less rational superior is a natural law.<sup>23</sup>

Naga life in practice is not committed to non-violence as an absolute way of life. Fighting or war against outsiders is supposed by Nagas like Greeks to be a matrix of civilization and survival of mankind.<sup>24</sup> It is a natural quality and necessity of human existence and advancement. It, holds the society together even

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22. Ibid. p.11.

23. Ibid. p.14.

24. Ibid p .24.

non-violence and peace to be a matter of ethos. As a result the institution of head hunting has been entrenched in the Nagas, with as much as professional case, if not the objective of worship and depository of sanctity. The reasons, however, mingled with superstition and social position are that it ensure good harvest if the blood of enemy head could be sprinkled over their fields. Secondly, the man who takes an enemy head is entitled either for marriage or a seat in the village Council and thus is affirmed an honourable position in the society and finally, the removing and perserving the head of the mankind in the war as a proof of success over the enemies.

It must be remembered however, that it was predominantly this head hunting war that had divided Nagas into a number of small disunited sovereign independent village states. Whose people involontely recognise that they were the same discendents embeded in basic common culture. Yet these fractricidal head hunting wars had become so invariably devastating, that they brought their civilization to grief and disaster. Realising the aftermath animism or shamanism has shifted from sanctification of head hunting to out right tabooing of head

hunting. The forgoing are the main characteristics feature of the life and culture of the Nagas.

Political System:

Traditionally, there are immense diversities so far as indigenous political institutions in Nagaland are concerned. The Political organisations differ from tribe to tribe. However, the permanent political institution have been the sovereign village states which have different forms of government.

The political institutions among the Lemas Konyaks, Maos and Tangkhals are hereditary chieftainship. All political and administrative organizations are under the control of the chiefs. The office of the chieftainship passes to the eldest son on the death of his father. If the chief dies without a male issue, the chieftainship goes to the nearest descendent. In the village states, the chief and his family members form an aristocracy in the literal sense of the word, being (possibly owing to better nourishment and the habit of command) physically, morally and intellectually the best of the community.

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25. J.H.Hutton(1971) The Lema Nagas, (London).p.150.

Among the Semas each villages has a council (Chochomi) to assist the chief in administration. But in some villages, Chochomi can be regarded as runners for the office of the chieftainship. They are nominated by the chief from different clans. Generally in some villages Chochomi has only a secondary place in the polity of the village. The chief has to direct the village in war and decide either by himself or in consultation with his council members. All questions of relations between his own and neighbouring villages. Theoretically, the chief is the master of all lands within his jurisdiction, but the individual right over land are also recognized. No transaction of land can be done without the knowledge of the chief. The chief exercises power in all social and political organization and acts as judge together with his councillors, in the settling of all kinds of disputes. Among the Sema Nagas, the disputes are settled by oath. The swearer bites the tiger's tooth in the case of old disputes. In the case of land, the swearer bites soil as oath, the swearer bites with the declaration. If I don't remain faithful to my promise, I and my clan are as good as dead; (while) alive it is taboo to be equal to him, like unto a rotten gourd vine unto decayed ayeshu, unto decayed chulleaf.

So must we perish, and before that I can eat of this years' rice let me die.<sup>26</sup> In the oaths given by the chief, it is essential that the swearing should take place with the face towards the sun set which signifies that if he took a false oath his life will perish like the setting sun. The chief received free labour from all the villagers for twelve days in a year and harm of every animal killed by his villagers.

The Angami and Rengmas have similar type of political institution. Although the village is regarded as the unit of political and social life, the real unit of social organisation is based on age group which controls the village affairs. Among the age group people choose one or two persons, who are skilful in diplomacy, have shown bravery in war, or possess wealth in the form of land, cattle etc. and have the capacity to control the village affairs to act as the chief of the village called Pehuma or pichua. Among the Rengmas the persons chosen to act as the chief and settle cases in the villages with the help of the elders is called Peshukedagu or Kekhanwa. Among the Lothas, the chief is called Ekhung, who is normally choosen from the age group and act as the political head of the village. But Ekhung exercises

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26. Ibid. pp.166-167.

his authority through the council members, elected from among the people of different social status called Ephyoesan. Among the Angamis, deciding disputes relating to customs would be and still is referred naturally to the old man of the clan, and the decision of the old men in regard to the matter is more or less final. Questions of fact are usually decided by oath concluding with the formula. If, I lie in what, I now say then between heaven and earth, let me not grow like other men, but let become as ruin, as burnt out fire, as rotted twins. A person accused of any crime against the social code is fined. The disputes are settled by oath even among the Lothas. They bite tigers tooth in the case of old or long standing disputes whereas in land disputes, they bite soil fixed with some of his hairs with the following declaration." If my promise is not true, I will get countless diseases like my hairs and I will die before eating of this year's crop! In some case, they accept the majority decisions of the council members.

(Ephyo-Esan).<sup>27</sup>

The Aos have a democratic form of village government in which a sizeable number of council members called "Tatar" elected from the different clans forms

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27. J.H. Hutton, (1921) The Angami Nagas, (London). p. 145.

the council of ministers called ('Putu-Menden'). The council of ministers controls the social and political administration of the village states. The main task is to lay down laws and regulations for social and political administration of the village states. This council includes elected men (Tatars) belonging to the eldest age group representing all the clans living in the village. Putu-Menden has four sub-offices, they are Tazungpur, Unger or ungbo, Chindengodeny or Senyim and Mapangsur.<sup>28</sup> The members of the Putu-Menden are responsible for the administration and also the preservation of customary laws which are handed down from one generation to another. The members of Putu-Menden vacate their offices periodically, yielding place to new groups from time to time. Like other Naga tribes, the Aos also settle the disputes by oath.

Thangkul village chief exercises a great deal of authority called "Awunga" a title equivalent to the English king.<sup>29</sup> He is elected from the dominant clans in the village. The village has a council called 'Hangva' and is responsible for village administration. The members

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28. Imti. L. Aier, (1967), Ao Naga Social and Customary Genealogy (Kohima). p.4.

29. M. Horn, (1977) Social and Cultural Life of Nagas (New Delhi), p.76.

of the council are usually elected from the clans to represent the particular clan. The chief and the councilors decide the disputes in the village, but "almost all disputes and differences between families belonging to the same clan are as far as possible decided by the clan elders.<sup>30</sup>

In the Naga society, the chief directly deals with foreigners whenever they come to visit the Naga village. Traditionally, he must first meet the chief at his residence. The chief then enquires about the main object of his visit and after full deliberation, the strangers are permitted to stay in the village. The chief usually summons the council members to discuss the matter and gave his final decision. The same process is followed in allowing the foreigners to go back to their native villages. They (Naga) live with nature, without elaborate standing policemen, Judges and prisons under a village government with little authority. This form of government we may describe as a sort of Naga anarchism in absence of a measure of permanent existence of a Government with force.<sup>31</sup> It is a political system which governs least and in which

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30. Ibid. p.80

31. Yonuo Anoso, (1974) Rising Nagas ( New Delhi).p.18.

every man follows his conscience and respects the rights of others so as to have peaceful relationship in the community.

It shows that due to isolation they have adopted their own way of life which was quite apart from the main stream of society in the country. Partly because of isolation and partly because of their limited world outlook characterised by overall traditions orientation, they are integrated in terms of certain age old practices rooted in the past. These integrative themes and a special cultural forces as it has been observed by distinguished anthropologists have given them a separate cultural identity, and they often possess latent or manifest value attitude and motivational system, which are remarkably different for them a series of tangled problem of social economic and cultural adjustment and finally political consciousness to identity.

Although the Nagas are the most politicized tribes of the North-east India since the early twentieth century, because of their politicization they attained statehood from the Naga Hills district of Assam. With the advancement of education and reform the Nagas

became politically more conscious. Broadly speaking the Nagaland political transition may be divided into the following phases:

(i) 1918-46 i.e. right from the formative phase of the first Naga society called Naga club in 1918 till February 1946. The year of the formation of the Naga National council which was an outcome of the Naga club and Tribal councils. This phase is characterised by the beginning of new political aspirants.

(ii) 1947-63, This phase may be regarded as the most critical period on the eve of Indian Independence Day on 15th August 1947, the Naga had also declared themselves to be sovereign state on 14th August 1947. This period can be noted as the period of blood shed, which at least partially stopped and on December 1st 1963, Nagaland was granted statehood.

(iii) The third phase started from 1964-75 which is characterised by two principal events viz. the signing of cease fire between under ground Nagas and Government of India on September 6, 1964. Which ended in September 1975 by signing of Shillong Accord. It was the beginning of an era of peace in Nagaland. Which is characterised by peace and division of political ideologies i.e. the emergence of National socialist council

of Nagaland led by Muivah and Issak. It may be noted that this phase is one of the worst phase, which hampered the socio-economic development in Nagaland due to the political problems.<sup>32</sup>

It also shows that the Naga politicization have resulted into gap between the poor and an emerging rich class. Though the enlightened few in urban areas are benefitted out of the new development but the face of the country side has not changed. The rural areas development is much more important, as 90% of the population of Nagaland lives in 800 villages (census of India 1971) than any other aspects of development in Nagaland. This is the most challenging task necessitating immediate attention right from the grass root level.

It can be concluded here that in the early stages of insurgency the whole Naga tribes were supporting the insurgent movement (It was because they were loyal to their social organisation which decide to participate in any particular activity or not). After

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32. Muivah and others, Manifesto to the N.S.C.N. Jan. 31st. 1980, Also see - Mibedon Nirmal, (1978), Nagaland the Night mare of Caeillas, (New Delhi).

1975, (Shillong Accord) we find that some of the tribes started disengaging themselves from the movement, for example Ao Nagas, who were the main participants in the beginning, but slowly and gradually started leaving and assimilated themselves in the development process of the state. Same can be attributed to the other tribes also. Yet some elements of tribal support to the insurgents movement cannot be ruled out, though it cannot be pinpointed.

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CHAPTER - V

NAGA INSURGENCY

NAGA INSURGENCY

It is understandable that the study of insurgency and insurgents has of prime interest to scholars as well as to politicians and military men. Virtually, every aspect of the insurgency process has been considered. There remains one element, however, that has not received adequate attention. This is the geographical perspective in the evolution and definition of insurgency. There is a definite distinction between secessionist movements, rebellions, revolution and national revolution. Secessionist movement or (insurgency), such as those of the Nagas in 1950's was the attempt of one region of the country to secede. Similar to this was of in America during the Civil War 1861-65 and 1967-69 situation of Nigeria(Biafra).

A rebellion is locally oriented and often of only limited political objective. Overthrow of the entire Government, or secession from the state is not part of its objective. Revolution on the other hand is directed towards the overthrow of the entire national political structure and Government. The distinction between revolution and secessionist is not in their objectives, but in the involvement of nation population. Revolution often

is characterized by political struggles among elites. By contrast, insurgency consciously attempt to involve entire population in their causes. Their objectives are not merely to replace the existing leadership of the state but drastically alter the form of government (and often the structure of the society itself), as in China in 1949 or Cuba in 1959. It is this pattern that is characteristic of today's insurgent era and it is the secessionist movement that is the objective of the present analysis.

No insurgency is identical to another (when one compares such documented revolutions as those in China, Greece, Philippines, Malaya, Indonesia and Cuba), except to capture the centre <sup>1</sup> of a territorial base within the state. They have also demonstrated the critical role of certain pre-requisites like historical background favourable terrain, sympathetic population, self sufficient economy, <sup>and</sup> poor communication <sup>2</sup>. Though the individual exploitation and contribution varies from stage to stage and from insurgency to insurgency, the importance of pre-conditions to start a successful insurgency cannot be disputed.

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1. R.W.McColl, (1969) The Insurgent State: Territorial Base of Revolution, AAAG (Annals, Association of American Geographers) p.614.

2. Ibid.

Broadly speaking, factors that are necessary for insurgency to develop in a particular area are the geographical conditions i.e. rugged terrain, thick forests, land bound borders with passable obstacles, negotiable internal barrier and a land-scape of rural riverine or delta type<sup>3</sup>. Low mountains with temperate climate, flora and fauna springs and streams that provide cover, food, water and freedom from endemic diseases go a long way in sustaining the insurgent activity. Blessed with these attributes the geography of Nagaland and North Burma has greatly influenced the tribal insurgents groups, like the Nagas, Shans, Kachins, Karens, etc., to survive for well over three decades despite continuous check by respective security forces (India and Burma).

The incompatibilities providing the roots for insurgency always operates in combination of factors. They are so interlocked that it becomes difficult to extract each from the imbroglio for adequate and meaningful analysis. For instance, British influence gave a spurt to group aspiration causing political dissension. Naga inertness, religious fantaticism, linguistic antagonism led to the emergence of strong centrifugal tendencies (see also chapter II).

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3. V.K. Anand, (1980) Conflicts in Nagaland. pp.6-10.

Not to speak of centrifugal tendencies which has given the idea to the minority for separation from the main land and create a tension within <sup>The</sup> state. But political and ideological factors also threaten the status quo and initiate <sup>4</sup> geographical change. This change was not understood by the Indian government after the departure of the British, which has generated uncertainties <sup>to</sup> devalue the authority's representation and enhance the insurgent image.

Whereas ~~the~~ pre-requisites discussed earlier had provided the field conditions that partially determined the state of insurgency in Nagaland, <sup>B</sup> but to constitute a full scale insurgency there were certain other elements. These intangible elements were like charismatic leadership of Japio Phizo, popular cause of freedom, goal of independence, aim of democracy and ideology based on religion, and British moral help and encouragement made the people's involvements in the struggle. The various arms and ammunitions dumps left during the Burma war further enabled this partisan group to take up to the arms (see also chapter II).

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4. Richard, Muir, (1975) Modern Political Geography (London), p.110.

Processes and Manifestations:

Insurgency in Nagaland can be divided into three broad phases, that is /Build up phase that led the creation of forum from where such political consciousness resulted in the emergence of leadership,(ii) The commencement of the political phase marked by the transformation of the forum into a political party. Later development saw the formation of several tribal Council such as Lotha Tribal council (1923) and All Tribal Council in 1928. However in 1945 the Naga Hills District Tribal Council was formed. Which was changed to Naga National Council (NNC) in 1946 at the Wokha session. The NNC gave a sense of political unit to Naga tribes and introduced the concept of Naga Nationhood. On the other hand Government policies were formulated and necessary initial measures were taken. The commencement of military phase which was initiated by guerilla actions in 1956 and followed by mobile operations (third phase).

The development of this problem in Nagaland had deep root in itself. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the Naga Hills district had already become an integral part of British India. The Naga people had also

reconciled to this fact. The first World War(1914-18) brought significant changes in the Nagas. The Nagas who went to France brought back horrified accounts as to how the great civilised nation fought for their ends and interests.<sup>5</sup> The intercourse among the different Nagas<sup>2</sup> of different tribes in France, far from their home, fostered mutual love, service and sense of political unity. This manifested itself in their verbal resolution to return to their home land, they would work for friendship and unity among themselves. They had also decided that they would also give up their weakness like head hunting and village feuds. It was this spirit which spear headed an upsurge of the Naga nationalist movement. But the Naga demand for a separate and distinct status for their hill districts had originated mainly after the second world war, when negotiation were going on for granting independence to India. But the idea of according special status to the Naga hill area was mooted as early as 1929, when the Simon Commission had visited Kohima.<sup>6</sup>

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5. Asoso, Yono, (1974) The Rising Nagas, A Historical and Political Study, (New Delhi), p.46.

6. W. Elvin, (1958) Myths of North-East Frontier of India (Shillong) pp.1-21.

After the end of the second world war in 1945, the Naga leaders again started the movement for a special status for the Naga hills district as distinct from India. In the post war period the labour party headed by Attlee, came to power in Britain. His Government was in favour of granting independence to India. This very fact prompted the educated Nagas, who in February 1946 had developed <sup>formed</sup> the Naga club into a social and political organisation known as Naga National Council to put forward the demand for a special status for the Naga hills district<sup>7</sup>. This NNC had been organised primarily to enlist the active support of the British officers for social, economic political and cultural developments of the Nagas. But soon this organisation developed into a political party. This was evident when the cabinet mission came to India to prepare ground for granting independence to India. The Naga National Council submitted a four point memorandum on 19 January, 1946 which was as follows:

a) This Naga National Council stands for the solidarity of Naga tribes, including those in the un-administrated areas.

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7. Report of the Indian Statutory Commission(1930) (London).p.75.

b) This Council strongly protest against being included in Assam.

c) The Naga hills should be constitutionally included in an autonomous Assam in a free India, with local autonomy and due safeguards for the interests of the Nagas and

d) The Naga tribes should have a separate<sup>8</sup> electorate.

It was thus obvious that the Nagas in the beginning did not wish to form an independent state of their own. They just wanted some autonomy in matters of local administration. This attitude, however, soon changed. As per the four point memorandum submitted by NNC to cabinet mission, it seems (according to author) that the Government of India had always said the same. The stand taken by the Naga extremists, then suggests that they were merely attempting to take maximum advantage of British withdrawal and partition of the sub-continent. The Naga dissidents then, probably were aware of their minority position (politically speaking) and low popularity among the various Naga tribes. The armed struggle, then

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8. The Naga Nation, (1946) Vol.I No.II pp.2-5.

only suggests that this minority group was attempting to seize political power through insurgency. So in the beginning of 1947, they started clamouring for an independent status for the Naga hills area.

The Naga National Council submitted a memorandum on 20 February 1947, to the British Government which expressed the misgiving that "a constitution drawn up by the people who have no knowledge of the Naga hills area and the Naga people"<sup>9</sup>. It will be quite unsuitable and unacceptable to the Naga people. They also mentioned that their unique system of the life will be wiped out with forty crores of Indians, as their strength is only one crore.<sup>10</sup> The Naga National Council made an appeal to the British Government and the Government of India to set up an Interim Government for the Naga people for a period of ten years. At the end of which the Nagas should be free to choose the form of Government they liked.<sup>11</sup> On 19 May, 1947 the Naga National Council again submitted another memorandum, clarifying that the ten years interim Government might be a government of Naga people with full power over the administration except

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9. Naga Nation, Feb., 1947, Vol.V.No.17. pp.3-7.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid

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 its defence. Two days later on 21st May, 1947 they again issued a statement, in which they said "the Nagas who were determined not to allow themselves to be involved in a divided and chaotic India are prepared to declare their own independence and can only think of entering into a ten years treaty with an independent  
 13  
 Assam.

The Indian leaders tried to pacify the people. As early as August 1946, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the then President of the Indian National Congress, wrote a long letter to Bhakharie, the secretary of the MNC, with a view of removing the doubts and suspicion of of some Naga leaders about the status and future of the hill districts in free India. He said, "that the Naga territory is too small to be an independent state. It lies between the two huge countries of India and China. It will not be possible for the British Government to hold on the Naga hills or any part of it. More over the people of the Naga hills are backward and they need considerable help from the free India for their

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12. Constitution Assembly Debates, Vol. VII No.1  
 op.cit.pp.132-133.

13. Assam Tribune(Gauhati), 22 May, 1947.

development. They would be isolated between India and China. Inevitably therefore, Naga Hill must form a part of India and of Assam with which it has developed such close association. At the same time it is our policy that tribal areas should have as much freedom and autonomy as possible, so that they can live according to their customs and desires.<sup>14</sup>

He also said that a special department will be opened in the state as well as in the centre which, would look after the welfare and interests of the tribal areas.<sup>15</sup>


Pandit Nehru's constructive approach, however could not break the ice and the Nagas continued their agitations for an Interim Government. The British Government was also unable to entertain the demand of the Naga leaders.<sup>16</sup> Though few British officials in the Naga Hills had earlier suggested to convert this area as a crown colony or a Trust territory, but the labour

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14. M. Alemchiba (1970) A Brief Historical Account of Nagaland. pp.166-167.

15. Ibid.

16. D.R. Mankekar, (1967) On the Slippery Slope in Nagaland (Bombay) p.40.

Government in England was not in mood to open this complicated issue at the time of their withdrawal from India.<sup>17</sup> Hence, they (British) simply kept silent on the representation of the Nagas. The efforts of Andrew Clow, the then Governor of Assam, to make them understand the futility of their demand  was unsuccessful. He stated that a separate state or even a separate province for them was not a practicable proposition. If they insisted to get it, they would remain poor and backward and would even lose some of the inadequate service they were enjoying at that time.<sup>18</sup> He, therefore, advised the Nagas to have an understanding with the people of Assam and live with in the Indian Union.<sup>19</sup> The advise of Andrew Clow did not change the Nagas attitude to have interim Government. Even, some extremist demanded complete independence.

Sir Akbar Hydari, the then Governor of Assam, was instructed by the Government of India to find out possible solution to conclude an agreement with them

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17. Reginald Coupland, (1943) The Future of India (London) pp.164-65.

18. V.V.Rao (1976) A Century of Tribal Politics in North-east India (Delhi). pp.153-156.

19. Ibid.

regarding the status of the Naga Hills district. After long discussions with the Naga National Council leaders, Sir Akbar Hydari reached at nine point agreement in June 1947. (see Appendix -No.1). which came to <sup>be</sup> known as the Hydari Agreement. <sup>20</sup> Unanimity over these articles were almost reached, but, when the question of interpretation of the ninth point came up, the trouble started. In fact there were two sections among the Nagas, moderates and extremist. The moderate interpreted the agreement in the right form, whereas the extremist were adamant to have assurance from the Indian government for complete independence after the expiry of ten years. The provisions of the agreement was put to vote in the NNC and the majority accepted it. <sup>21</sup> But the extremist under the leadership of Phizo remained dissatisfied. Their dissatisfaction prevented the Nagas from coming to definite understanding with the Indian Government. Naturally, when, there was no meeting point, the Hydari Agreement could not be implemented.

But the Indian leaders were ready to accommodate the demands of the Nagas as far as possible in the

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20. Ibid.

21. The Naga Nation, Vol.I. No.31, June 1947. pp.5-10.

constitution. An Advisory committee was set up under the chairmanship of G. Bordoloi the then Chief Minister of Assam, to assess and advise on the future administration of the tribals and excluded areas, inhabited by the hill people. He recommended the middle path, after assessing the situation. All the tribes of the provinces other than Assam, whether living in the plains or in the partially excluded tracts, should as a whole should be treated as minority. These areas must therefore be treated separately from the rest.<sup>22</sup>

On the basis of the recommendation of the Bardoloi Committee, the sixth scheduled of the Indian constitution was made, which partially met the Naga demands to manage those affairs that concerned them. In a way the Naga demand of autonomy in cultural, religious and economic matters were met. The Nagas were given the District Council and regional Council and representation in the Government of Assam. The founding fathers of the Indian constitution had expected that the creation of the District Council and Regional Council would give the

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22. Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. VII. No. I Appendix 'C' Report of the Sub-committee on North-Eastern Frontier Tribal and excluded Areas Part II, 1948, pp.132-33.

Nagas a sense of participation in the administration and they would gradually come within the main stream of India.<sup>23</sup>

These expectations of the Indian leaders, however, were not based on a realistic assessment of the situation existing in Nagaland at that time. The Nagas, far from being satisfied with the provisions of Indian Constitution, became all the more irritated and dissatisfied. The Nagas had been demanding a Government of their own, of course within the Indian union for the time being but contrary to their expectations, they were tagged with Assam, which they had consistently opposed. They felt that they had been betrayed.<sup>24</sup> Indian side, it was such he said as no Naga could have written, "Nehru's views was that the very idea of independence was a piece of mischief planted in the simple Naga soul by some of the British administrator and the missionary, and he apparently suspected that foreign hands were still behind the Naga position.<sup>25</sup> Soon after the attitude was clearly expressed by the Assam Chief Minister who blamed the Baptist missionaries for

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23. A.C. Banerjee(1974) Indian Constitutional Documents, Vol.IV(Calcutta) pp.225-257.

24. Assam Tribune(Gauhati) 23 Jun, 1948.

25. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol.II, op.cit.pp.491-93.

abetting "a foreign conspiracy to separate the Naga Hills from India and retain it as an imperialist strongholds".

With the decision of the Indian Government the point of collision became the only alternative. Finding every other way closed, their demands refused and ignored, the Naga National Council took a leaf out of the Congress book and tried civil disobedience. A campaign was launched for non-cooperations with the Government in the development schemes which was just beginning, and for non-payment of taxes, teachers and children withdrawn from schools, village headmen resigned their official responsibilities. The dissidents and extremist Nagas, therefore succeeded in creating a feeling of subjugation and exploitation. This anti-Indian feeling was deliberately allowed to grow. It ultimately culminated in hostility against India and underground activities were started.

Manifestations:

Phizo operated skillfully, that one by one all tribes will be involved in the struggle. They had taken decision that all the tribes should support their leader's decision

unanimously. There were some Nagas who were not accepting the leadership of Phizo (because of violent means) were bound by their traditions, <sup>and</sup> drowned their dissident's voice.

The extremist in Nagaland twisted every event to propogate their cause for example when the executive Committee got the assurance in February 1963, for the negohtation, the extremist started propogating the people that an agreement had been reached on the dissolution of the Interim <sup>27</sup> body. There was no broadcasting station in Nagaland and hence, rumours had a currancy which Government of India did not have; by which the extremist confused the villagers. Even the most distant and primitive Nagas of Tuensang could not escape the spell of the extremists propaganda. Phizo, it is alleged, visited the Konyaks and other tribesmen along the border of Burma on numerous occassions and succeeded in motivating them. He also enlisted a large number of those, who were prepared to join any fray that promised head hunting <sup>spec-</sup> to regain the aura of their past. The most powerful and advanced tribe (Angamis) almost


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27. The Times of India (New Delhi) 23 February, 1963.


rallied behind him out of tribal and religious loyalty. The majority of the next progressive Aos, who were also predominantly Christians had no choice but to join the struggle as the religions appeared to be in danger. The Semas also rallied around Phizo to merely satisfy their hunger for violence. The remaining tribes, namely Chakasan, Lotha, Chang, Sangtam, Zeleang, Kengma, Phom and others did not give the second thought and plunged themselves into the struggle. Those who cherished peace had perished.

For the first time, the Nagas who for centuries had no contact with the people of neighbouring village joined hands for the cause of perceived independence. This unanimous development in one of the most inhospitable area of the world was perhaps a most notable achievement of the insurgents. The Naga youth already had all the inherent attributes of a fighter and required no training or experience to learn the hard way. The traditionally blind faith of the Nagas in their top brass resulted in unquestioned acceptance of what they said. While the naked display of their military power instilled confidence in their ultimate victory. The yearning for head hunting helped the junior leaders to enforce their own laws ruthlessly. By presenting a programme and manifesto that tickled every Naga's (aroused) aspiration,

# TYPICAL PATTERNS OF INSURGENT EXPANSION



MOBILE WAR




GUERRILLA WAR with fixed bases

≡ AREA OF MOBILITY

≡ GUERRILLA AREA

➤ DIRECTION OF EXPANSION



REGULAR WAR

⊖ BASE AREA

⊕ LIBERATED AREA

≡ GUERRILLA AREA

SOURCE - R W McCOLL, "The Insurgent State, Territorial Bases of Revolution"  
 AAAG vol 59 1969, p 615

MAP NO 12

their leadership cashed on their state of mind. Most of the Nagas thus motivated and some compelled to develop faith in the political wing and support to the militant Naga.

The rise of Naga insurgency to military supremacy is a sordid account of ignorance and obstancy of the extremist Naga leaders. On the other hand unrealistic appreciation and inadequate responses on the part of authorities. The anti national activities of Phizo and Naga National Council made the Government of India to think seriously about the problem of Nagas. Consequently the government put a number of restriction on the activities of the extremist. Since Phizo was the ring leader of the antinational activities, the Indian Government issued a warrant against him with the rummours of the imminent arrest of the Naga National Council leader, Almost every one who had some position of responsibility went underground. The arrest of some people only confirmed the fears expressed by the extremists.

The search of village Khonoma in May 1953 scared people still further and more of them found it safer to go underground. Such a development only helped the extremist to prove their forecast and challenge the bonafides


of the non-committed and the moderate section. In order to incapacitate the symbols of authority, many officials were intimidated, kidnapped, taken hostage and even murdered. As a mark of civil disobedience, the lower level functionaries were ordered to disassociate and stop collecting the house tax, the only source of revenue. Irrespective of the merits such a crisis expected every Naga whatever his status and station of posting to support his own people. Many young Nagas volunteered and some were coerced to join the underground with the fear of searches, seizures arrests and drafting as informers. These things were appearing real to those who had not joined the underground. They started running away to the deep interior of the state for safety from one side to another, after a period of intense political activity that was followed by wide spread sabotage and terrorism (in early 1955). The hostile Indian Nagas launched the guerilla warfare in Tuensang, one of the remotest and least administrative area of India. In April, due to the unabated guerilla activities, Tuensang was declared as a disturbed area. But this was no sudden out burst in Tuensang. It was planned and controlled terrorism launched to assess the reaction and response of the authority to a given crisis situation, as it was to compel the Tuensang Nagas to fall in line with the insurgents.

The Central Government reacted over the situation in the same way as at first the British had. Several leaders of Naga National Council were arrested. The sixteen tribal councils, established by the British just before independence (All of them were under the leadership of Naga National Council) were abolished. Reinforcement of security forces were moved into the area to tackle the problem. It was officially stated in Shillong on January 8, 1955 that units of Army and Assam Police had gone into action in the Hilly tracts on Assam-Naga Hills border to comb the area for armed Naga hostiles (who had began to harass the plains people on mission of dacoity and loot).

By the beginning of 1955, insurgent activity not only intensified but also enclosed wider territorial parameters. The Indian government declared Mokokchung a disturbed area and security forces were soon employed in wider scale to restore speedily political stability and authority of the central government.

On March 22, 1956 the insurgents (underground Nagas) declared the Naga Hills and Tuensang areas as a united and independent state. They established a Federal government of Nagaland and promulgated a constitution, the preamble of which begun Nagaland is a people's sovereign

republic. The following Table will show the Phizo's  
<sup>28</sup>  
 parellel Federal Government. □



28. Asoso Yono, n. 5, p.

The insurgency gathered momentum after the establishment of Naga Federal Government. But the villagers began to suffer more even, when not actively engaged. Retaliating against villagers for the actions of the guerillas, the Indian security forces took the strict measures against them. This had general hostility between the suppressor force and the villagers. On the other hand, it was also true that generated bitterness among the villagers dividing those, supported the guerillas and their cause from those who stood by the powers that be. That difference between the two groups may be merely tactical will not necessarily lessen the hostility between them.

The Indian security forces in that great strength had put a road block on the path to real independence, which the Naga National Council by insurgency and guerilla Campaign, were trying to gain. The other Nagas (loyal Nagas), this approach appeared at least adventurist at worst futile. They advocated out flanking or infiltrating the Indian resistance in other words by separating Nagas from Indians by constitutional means. However, in early 1956, difference within the NNC became apparent. It started with the torture and execution of T.N. Sakhire, once a close associate of Phizo, by the extremists elements of the insurgent movement. This incident was

to demonstrate to other elements in the movement not to question Phizo's emphasis on prolonged insurrections (to which Sakhiro was opposed).

The central government was quick to take advantage of this insurgent division. They (authority) surfaced the idea in late 1950 that statehood within the Indian Union might provide an answer for the demand of autonomy. This idea was put forth because the overground organization of Nagas known as Naga people convention had put the proposal earlier for the same. From the outset it was suspected by members and supporters of the underground that the idea of statehood been conceived by the Indians to divide and delude the Nagas. Although Pandit Nehru strongly resisted the idea of a new state of Nagaland, which was also shared by most sections of Indian political leaders, they warned that to grant statehood to Nagas would set up a chain reaction of similar demand throughout North-east India (It might be said that exactly that did in fact happen).

At all events the Prime Minister Pandit Nehru suddenly revised his opinion after receiving the Naga delegation under the leadership of Imkongliba Ao and decided awarding statehood demand for Naga Hill district.

Constitutional and administrative procedure took three years and the state of Nagaland was inaugurated on 1963<sup>29</sup>. It was then by far the smallest state in India with an area of about 16488 Sq Km and a population of some 3.50 million<sup>30</sup>. Nevertheless the statehood move was quickly denounced as surrender by the federal Nagas, who were fighting for the sovereignty. The Nagas who were co-operating with Indian in establishing a state paid the price with the assassination of first Chief Minister of Nagaland Mr. Shillø Ao. The guerilla activity again started in Nagaland. Although the Indian security forces did not slacken their counter operations.

In April 1964 a convention was held in Nagaland which was attended by several thousand people and resolved on an attempt at peace and proposed the three man commission. A cease fire agreement was signed between the Indian Government and Naga Federal Government on 24 May, 1964. Agreement on a cease fire masked for a moment the absolute and disagreement that continued between the two sides. The task of the commission to whom

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29. The State of Nagaland Act, 1962 Vol. IX, No. 52, December 24-31, 1963. p. 55-81.

30. The Keesings Contemporary Archives, Vol. XI, December 7-14, 1957. p. 158-94.

the cease fire agreement gave a continuing mediatory role to play. It proposed this way out of the dead lock that the Indian Government should give the time and opportunity to the Nagas to participate voluntarily in the Indian Union (that is to accede to it).

Again this proposal was really a non-starter. To the federal Nagas, it meant surrender to the Indian government. It required an act of trust in the other side (for to give the right to accede necessarily entitled the right not to do so) and also would set a precedent immical as they saw it to the future unity of the country. After a brief series of futile meetings between the delegation of the Naga federal government and Mrs. Indira Gandhi (who had become Prime Minister at the beginning of 1966), the political negotiations broke down. However she made it clear that the solution of the problem had to be found with Nagaland, remaining a part of the Indian Union and there could be no compromise on this issue.<sup>31</sup> The cease fire continued to be extended<sup>32</sup> trimonthly and later monthly intervals by formal, though separate announcements by the two sides.

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31. The Statesmen, New Delhi, April 15, 1966

32. Asian Recorder, Vol. XII, No. 12, March 19-26, 1966. p. 69-83.

At last the peace mission dissolved in May 1966 because both the sides were at logger heads about the agreement.<sup>33</sup>

The rebel Nagas, no doubts stepped up their hostile activities after the failure of peace talks, but the desired goal was not in sight. This led to not only a sense of despondency among a section of the rebels but also caused a serious rift in their campaign <sup>that</sup> weakened their capacity to pressurize the government. The harassed and weakened rebels could not withstand the mounting pressure from the nationalist and liberal Nagas, who had all along been working for an end to hostile activities and for the establishment of lasting peace in Nagaland. Their efforts ultimately succeeded in November 1975, with the conclusion of the Shillong accord between the Government of Nagaland and the underground Naga leader. It was a historic event as it opened a new chapter in the history of Nagaland. It ushered an era of understanding, peace and tranquility in this strife-torn state. The constitutional issue of the political problem and insurgency was brought to an end by this agreement. This accord was accepted by the underground Organisation among themselves at their Dehoma meeting on 5 December, 1975.<sup>34</sup>

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33. Ibid.

34. "Dawn of Peace in Nagaland" (a pamphlet published by the Directorate of Information, Publicity and Tourism, Nagaland. (Kohima 1975) p.1.

The underground organisations and movements thereafter ceased to exist as a threat as all had agreed to be a peaceful citizens of India and to function in accordance with the constitution as it stands. The people of Nafaland heaved a sigh of relief because of the hostile activities at long last came to an end. The underground Naga got an opportunity to live peacefully and happily in the midst of their family members and friends. They also got an assurance of being rehabilitated by the Government of Nagaland. The Shillong accord also provided an opportunity to those underground Nagas who were across the border to come back to their land and to join the rest of their colleagues in accepting unconditionally the constitution of the country and taking their rightful place in the society.<sup>35</sup>

It has to be admitted that the problem of those hostile Nagas, who had gone outside the country to get training and collect arms remained as it was. The appeal of the Government authorities to those hostile to come back to Nagaland and make their legitimate contribution to the progress peace and normalisation which is well on its way in Nagaland had however, no

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35. Ibid. p. 3.

significant impact on those hostiles. They did not care to come back to Nagaland under the amnesty announced by the Government with the result that the problem of such rebel Nagas still exist.

Independent Nagaland was merely an idea that was encouraged by the British, who permitted conspicuous decision of the leaders of the movement. They perceived the field of settlement in Nagaland, where they had free independent government activity, (it seems that the Naga insurgent leaders wanted political power desperately, which they could not get otherwise). Yet such brevity of the leaders of the movement had completely over simplified the Naga history. If one consider the evolution of Nagaland it is very clear that the history could not be compressed. The present study provides one of the many alternatives between the political and geographical study of insurgency in Nagaland, but not necessarily suggesting a short-cut. It does not reduce the scope of political geography nor permitting the politics on an easy platform. It is an attempt, however to provide some academic clarification and it may provide available media of working back and forth among historical, political and geographical data.

Naga insurgency had occurred in fact in political area - Nagaland - from a series of decisions of the insurgent leaders with little or possibly no intervening movement. Their actions and decisions and responses were directly proportionate to that of the Central Government, which took decisions after considering the location and federal character of the country or vice versa. Hence, the field service areas of the insurgents were gradually isolated and in some cases completely eliminated. So much so that the effective field service areas of the insurgents have to be located across the frontier in Burma, where they have to contend with the Burmese insurgents.

The Naga insurgency in both the Geographical and political terms was essentially a situation of conflicts (both within and without). The resolution of conflicts (accompanied by violence) are clearly expressive. It clearly indicated, conflicts of ideas that did not amount to much until they began to be embodied in decisions that were primarily to create an independent Nagaland. But it culminated in a movement that abstracted the development (socio-economic of Nagaland and the unity of Indian Union). Insurgents' effective field was only in contact, if we consider their movement as merely kinetic. But the early phases, say otherwise for it was at that time dynamic

that gradually disintegrated (showing the inherent tendencies which was centrifugal in character in diverse tribal society).


Although no limit can be introduced <sup>To</sup> the idea of independent Nagaland of insurgents. It can be clearly stated that their decisions, movements, fields and political areas was conditioned by the geography of their environment. This is because their very idea was composite of cultural ideas, and could have succeeded only if their very idea was to be within Indian Union. (In fact the author contents that the creation of Nagaland as a state within Indian Union, like other Indian states, was in itself a recognition of the Nagas as a separate culture).

(Spatial Pattern of Naga Insurgency).

Looking from the point of view of internal political development, the creation of insurgent state had a number of values to a movement. In March 1956, just before the devastating eastern monsoon broke out, the extremist underground Nagas declared the Naga Hills and Tuensang a united and independent state. To demonstrate the establishment of the authority of their

# AREA OF HIGH & LOW INTENSITY OF NAGA INSURGENCY

20 10 20 30 40 50 KM



Naga Federal Government(NFG) they hoisted their own republic flag at Phensinyu village in Kohima area.<sup>36</sup>

It demonstrated the weakness and ineffectiveness of the Government to control and protect its own territory and population. Finally the insurgent state and its political administrative organisation provided at least an aura of legitimacy to the movement. To forge unity in the NFG, terms from various Nagas dialects had been adopted. To establish lineage with the mongols, whose blood still runs in their veins, the term Tartar was borrowed from Aos, the word kilonser was adopted from the Yimchunger Aung was the Konyak contribution. Kedahge came from the Rengmas.<sup>37</sup>

Although their main objective of unity to give a turn to the movement to the military stage, it began by dividing the movement into three stages, the stage of contention, equilibrium and general counter offensive. The Naga insurgents were on the stage of equilibrium after declaring independent state of Nagaland. As they were able to control some part of the state. According McColl, each stage is looked at as part of the progressive

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36. Mankekar, n.16.p.48.

37. Anand, n.3.p.102.

creation of new state within politically hostile territory.

Yet the need for a territorial base becomes apparent the insurgents must chooses a specific area for controlling the activity. Ideally a guerilla area should have the following attributes.<sup>38</sup>

(i) If possible an area should be choosen that had previous experience in political opposition to the central government.

(ii) Political stability at both the national and local levels should be weak or actually lacking.

(iii) The location must provide access to important military and political objectives, such as capitals, cities and critical resources of transport service.

(iv) Area of weak or confused political authority such as borders lands or even along international boundaries or ideal location.

(v) Terrain should be favourable for military operations and personal security.

(vi) In so far the area should be economically self sufficient.

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38. McColl, n.1, pp.617-618.

In the case of Nagaland, after a period of frantic political activity and wide spread sabotage, the hostile Naga launched the guerilla warfare in Tuensang district. Because this place had some of the above stated criteria. This movement compelled the Tuensang Nagas to fall in line with others. The hostile Nagas were quite right in selecting Tuensang as the area of contest. Being furthest away from the seat of central authority and along the international border is most inaccessible area. They had been able to establish their clandestine military cadres secretly and unobtrusively in its remote and inaccessible corner. The means of communication, the thick forests and high mountains were all in their support. But with the counter action of the security forces, Tuensang ceased to be the vast deep remote interior later on. As far as the guerilla experience was concerned the hostile Nagas already had the best which the security forces learned later on.(see chapter I).

But over emphasis on their military superiority that was merely inter-tribal made them complacent and distorted the concept of liberated or safe base. Eventhough Tuensang failed to provide the depth resources and safety required for the developments of troops ,expansion, they started planning for the next stage.

They started converting their guerilla into regular units and hill tops village into fortified defensive positions. This led to the formation of what they thought were liberated or safe bases for initiating mobile and entrenched warfare. The main consideration for the guerilla leader during the mobile was to select of an area which can provide adequate room to manœuvre and hide from counter-insurgency troops and still remains within the striking distance of a major political targets. To meet these requirements the area must be large in terms of its geometric configuration or it must have terrain suited to the hide and seek character of mobile war.

The Naga insurgents selected the area of Thangkul Nagas in Manipur and Nagaland border, which is having the elements required for the mobile war. After strengthening their bases in the Thangkul Nagas area, they continued their efforts of terrorism. No village was spared from the taxes and every house was obliged to supply either a fighter or a porter. Forcible collection of paddy, eatables, clothing, money and drafting of personal for unspecified mission became a routine. Those who disagreed with their means of violence and goal of independence could at best lay passive.

The policy of wholesale murder in Nagaland was designed to keep the local people terrorised. Through this mean they were able to maintain ruthless control over the people and prevented the local population to support the Government.

In March 1956, the NFG was able to control all the major tribes and compelled them to fight for a single cause that was independence and as stated by Phizo. To eliminate opposition, subvert the administration and ascend militarily the insurgent in Nagaland had raised numerous mass association fronts and cells like in Malaya, Vietnam, Greece and Philippines. But such a resounding development in Nagaland in so short a time with no viable economic base, devoid of communications, common language and media was a fantastic movement.

Like any other military organisation the Naga federal government raised a course party and small intelligence cell of varying strength. They did not face much problem in setting up these units. Born and brought up in the same village and very close to the hands of nature the geographical characteristics were already well embedded in the Naga brain. A common source of their

information was, for example when the agents merged with the numerous road construction repair parties. Their well spread network around defensive positions camps forward the occupants either by speed marches or through relay runners. The Nagas inhabiting the areas around the security posts in their traditional dress were the best bet. With such natural ingenuity and invaluable aids the Naga federal army was able to maintain an efficient system of intelligence communication and security.

Linked with the land mass was the issue of manpowers. Because the limited territory denied the Nagas, the ability to develop deep interior, bases for regrouping, training centre. Rest areas and depots beyond the reach of Indian security forces. Assuming the early 1956 population of Nagaland to be around 3 million their ratio to then Indian population of about 400 million comes to yawning 1 to 13 persons. Any complete and prolonged diversion of the Nagas towards insurgency could only cause famines and economic hardship in their area. Because they depend entirely on their agricultural production for survival. The hands that could be spread from the total of 115,554 male workers (working force in 1961) to effectively control a hilly sub-tropical area

with population scattered all over could be very .

It is very difficult to fix their strength at any time. However, of the estimates varying widely from 5,000<sup>40</sup> to ~~15,000~~<sup>41</sup> was reduced to 300 after the Shillong Accord. The effective number of active insurgents whether equipped with modern arms or primitive daos and spares can be placed at around 9000 i.e. approximately 3% to the total population which was reduced to 2% after the emergence of the loyal Naga section. Though many old Naga foggies and teenagers of either sex performed all sort of jobs, and ran errands (as in other insurgencies in the world), the absence of any reliable data, only leads to an estimation that more than three fourth of the Naga federal army was between the age group of 18 to 35.

The Naga federal governments had all the pre-requisite except the finance for which they had to depend on the local population. Their condition was so bad that their civil and military personal were rarely paid adequately and regularly. Because at that

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40. M. Alemchiba, (1970), A Brief Historical Account of Nagaland (Kohima) p.184.

41. S. Chanderika, (1984), Political Evolution of Nagaland (New Delhi). p.161.

time there were no factory workers or a large labour force whose regular wages could be taxed. Payments and requisitions came to be made against post dated cheques on the assurance that after the Naga currency was printed all arrears would be cleared.

Phizo and his extremists band were able to control ~~over~~ the Naga people without any resistance from the Indian authority. This gave rise to the morale of hostile Nagas. The people of Nagaland had no option other than to support Naga federal government. Obviously this was the time (1956), when the Naga insurgency entered the stabilisation phase. But unfortunately, the phenomenal material and human mobilisation could not be matched by the intellectual competence to comprehend the process (assured supply of materials and finance) and character of insurgency. It was unfortunate for the Naga federal government that neither their leaders nor the youth (which was nursery for the insurgency) were familiar with the arts and skill required to conduct the affairs of sovereign state (not to speak of launching a successful guerilla warfare as Mao did in China).

Although the Naga insurgents launched the guerilla warfare in the beginning without any resistance. They were having all the pre-requisités in the Tuensang area and

got the success in the first stage. But on the other hand central authority took strict measures to suppress these insurgent movements later on. On January 29, 1956 the whole Naga Hill areas was declared a disturbed area and troops were moved to the Naga Hills to suppress the insurgent movements. The insurgents started moving from Tuensang to other parts of the region. The Assam Governor, Gen.S.M.Srinagesh issued a notification in Shillong on December 30, 1959 declaring three sub-divisions as disturbed area. i.e. bordering East Pakistan (Now <sup>a</sup>Bengladesh) Jowai sub-division in United Khasi and Jaintia Hills and Silchar and Karimganj sub-divisions in the Cachar district to deal adequately with hostile Naga gang, reported to be moving and about to create disorder<sup>43</sup> (see map No:-14)

(A communique issued by the foreign office Rangoon on May 16, 1961 that, it was reported by informed sources that the rebel had now established strong forces on Burmese territory between Homalin and Saramati.<sup>44</sup> It was also stated that the Naga hostiles had their strong bases in the Somra ~~that~~ between the Indian border and the Chindwin

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
42. The Statesman (Calcutta) 1956, Also see the Asian Recorder(1960) between January-March p.31-21

43. The Statesman(Calcutta)Dec. 3, 1959.

44. The Nation(Rangoon) May 30, 1931.

# NAGA INSURGENT OPERATIONAL AREA IN N.E.R.

50 0 50 100 150 KM



river near the 26th Parallel. This area was almost inaccessible, and there were no Burmese army unit operating.<sup>45</sup> It also informed that another hostile group was moving towards the Naga areas in Burma, probably to re-establish their old headquarter on the south western slopes of (13,700 ft.) Saramati Peak which they had abandoned in 1962. Naga hostile also had their base at an height of 7,600 ft at the Katon Peak in Burma, which had deep gorges west wards. Their area of operation was in the Indian and Burma side at a point between Lenakot and Bangmut. The actual entry of the Naga hostile to Nagaland was near the trijunction of Manipur, Mizo Hill and Burma.<sup>46</sup>

The Governor of Nagaland on November 19, 1963 declared the area between Kohima and international boundary as disturbed. He also asked the Manipur authority to declare the whole area of Ukhrul sub-division three miles from the International border as a disturbed area. The hostiles in Manipur were spread over in Tolloi, Tuenoem, Nambri, Seukhong and Anikathel all in Ukhrul sub-division. They also had their base at Maram in Mao sub-division

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45. Ibid.

46. The Times of India (New Delhi) February 26, 1962.

of Manipur. In the Manipur they were having the support of the volunteer force on the Indian-Burmese border in Tengnaupal sub-division of Manipur.<sup>47</sup>

The above discussion shows that the Naga hostiles were operating in the area, where the terrain afforded natural concealment and obstacles to hinder the military operations (where mountains and swamps hindered the tanks and trucks movements). Wood and thick vegetation provided cover from areal observation and attacks.(see Map No.-/3 ).

The Naga insurgents got serious setbacks after the Chinese aggression when the Indian authority diverted its full attention towards the Naga hostiles. On reinduction of the Army units, the intelligence sources dried up. Informers and agents were either terrorised or liquidated. The masses reasserted their loyalty to the NFG(for want of protection) . The NFG was strengthened by additional recruits from the Naga village. The Indian security forces had to commence all over again. But soon the NFG found itself hard pressed by the Indian security

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47. The Statesman (Calcutta) March 20, 1970.

forces, who were no not new to the game, and started looking for respite which they got when the Naga hostile prayed for the peace. It was continued. from September 5, 1964 to 31 August, 1972 which was terminated by the Government of India when the Naga hostile intensified their subversive activities (attack on Hokishe Sema, Chief Minister of Nagaland).

The emergence of Bangladesh in December 1971, resulted in the denial of their safe haven. The Burmese authority's strict measure to eliminate the insurgents from their territory only stupified them. (The government of Burma allocated us \$208 million for defence in the new fiscal year to deal with insurgents effectively). In the face of an uncompromising stand taken by the Government of India for the first time in 1972, the bulk of what ever was left of the extremist saw wisdom in closing their unimpressive score books of violence and opening a promising account of peace under formula that could provide them safety without loss of face.

In the beginning the morale of the Naga insurgents were boosted, because large towns were garrisoned but the small villages were not, so they always got concealment in

those village. In April 1956 the solitary brigade supported by the few contingent of Assam Rifles and Assam Police commenced counter insurgency in the Naga Hill. Their strength was less than half of the NFG. It was worse that time to create a small village post, since each individual post was easily overwhelmed, its soldiers captured or killed their arms and ammunitions seized. This was another propaganda victory that was scored by the insurgents. These were some of the reasons due to which the insurgency spread all over the Nagaland in the initial stage, inspite of certain measures taken by the authority. It started dying only when the common mass started understanding the result of the violence. The Government of India took this opportunity quickly by separating this group of Nagas who were against the violence by giving them material help and security. This section was later on known as loyal Nagas section. The Government of India and security forces won the heart of people by showing the sympathy towards them and with development works.

The Naga Federal Army like the guerilla forces inevitably were so weakly developed and badly co-ordinated that they could neither re-organise nor reinforce any other bases after the inevitable clashes with the Indian security forces.

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CHAPTER - VI

PERSPECTIVES AND RESPONSE TO NAGA INSURGENCY

PERSPECTIVES AND RESPONSE TO NAGA  
INSURGENCY

There has been substantial research on the Naga tribal literature. It indicated in a stress that has generally been in the form of our response to the (supposed) oddities of tribal behaviour and attitude (than the otherway round). Much of the tension and misunderstanding in the state's relation with tribes has arisen from the fact that, we are only ready to react to tribal intransigence, when confronted with their practices and attitudes. We do not sufficiently consider and weigh their reactions (within the context their environmental framework).

There are various tribal groups in Nagaland. Each of these tribes have, through centuries, evolved their own distinct pattern of culture, language and code of laws. All of them have (untill recent times) succeeded in maintaining their identity despite modernization around them. The differences between the tribes are, partly geographical and partly dependent upon their level of socio-economic base that exist. The impact of these factors are inherent in their political aspirations and ideology(see chapter II and IV).

Viewing the environmental influence and the British occupation of the Naga tribal belt, the area has had witnessed a succession of events that had the tendency to give into the changing conditions and circumstances. This, ultimately exposed the operational effects of administration. The most precipitating event was the manipulation by extremist leaders, who were deluded by the fact that the interest of the Nagas lay in the independent Naga statehood. Looking it at the other way round, it can also be inferred that it was not only the succession of events but also a concatenation of events, such as urban growth, spread of developmental activities and subsequent contradictions, that induced uneasiness and unrest in the rural areas (where the insurgents were supposedly to have a stronger base). With the development of each individual Naga group, the social process was initiated embryonically as a stimulus. This was probably introduced by enigmatic action within the Naga tribal groups, that enabled them to acquire characteristics that was influenced by the environmental factors.


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1. The term 'Environment' has often used by geographers to denote space. It is also been used in its broader sense as well as for its specific purposes of study. The present analysis includes (besides above) also the objective dimensions, where the behavioural aspect of the environment exists as a complex sub-set of the total geographical milieu. It also includes the socio-

As a consequence of the symbiosis, Naga tribes fell into the distinctive groups. Each with their own territory and features. This enabled them to acquire a clear pattern of ideological conviction that obliterated any question of tolerance for other ideas or phenomena (that which was contrary to what they had perceived and understood). The resultant political stance(s) thus constituted what was argued to be a sufficient rationale for insurgency. These

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political interaction. In the study it is also perceived to include the psychological environment (isolation and its consequent impact). This is obvious from the dichotomy of location both in respect of the state and the tribe, where the tribal elements are considered as secondary to other elements.

The total or gross geographical environment has been considered to be effective - equivocal phenomena, can be measured through space and time. The environment has been taken as to include the elements that are not perceived by individuals/groups and at the same time excludes those elements that are not required for the normal functioning. This then suggests that existing gross environment on which the insurgency of Nagaland operated, suggest the following equation (from the politico-geographical point of view).



Environmental context of insurgency in Nagaland

motivations can also be taken as responsible for the distortions that latter emerged.

But, though all the Naga tribes experienced (as conditions permitted) an essentially similar process of group development, they were subjected to the vicissitude of environment, history and accident. These alone were the source(s) of the specific(s) that divided them under the circumstances of relative isolation. In the process, this created spatial interrelationships, both within and outside the Naga tribal groups. However, in the early stages of insurgency, the extremist leaders, within their boundary - whether in close association or in isolation - wanted to develop

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See:- Edward.A.Acarman<sup>KER</sup>, "where is the research frontier", AAAG, Vol.53, 1963 pp.429-40; H.E.Barrows, Geography as human ecology, AAAG, Vol.13, 1923 pp.1-14; R.J.Chorley, "Geography and Analogic theory". AAAG, Vol.54, 1964, pp.127-37, S.Eyer, "Determinism and the ecology approach to the Geography", Geography, Vol.49, 1964, pp.369-76, Petter.R.Goued "Man against Environment", A Game Theoretical Framework, AAAG, Vol.53, 1963; William Kirk, "Problem in Geography", Geography, Vol.48, 1963; J.S. Lal (ed.) The Himalya; Aspects of Change; Delhi, 1981. D.Lowenethol, Geography, "Experience and imagination towards geographical epistemology". AAAG, Vol.51, 1961; Phillips.W. Potter, "Environmental Potential and Economic Opportunities", American Anthropologist, Vol.67(II), 1965; Wolpert, Julian, "The Decision in Spatial Context". AAAG, Vol.54, 1964.

a common platform of independent Nagaland and its manifold specificities. Again these were the tendencies that can be derived from the Naga's environment. As also from the influence that the environmental change has brought to this society. For, then by varying means, this lead to relative isolation. The environmental influences have divided and impressed Naga tribes.

The trend and intensity of the insurgency had repeatedly changed since independence. After independence, there was a series negotiations between the extremists and government representatives. However, this did not produce any concrete results. Within the Naga scenario, the moderates continued to direct their efforts towards reconciliation between the insurgents and the government (Moderates were not in favour of separation and wanted to remain within the Indian Union). Their efforts were thwarted by Paizo (who was able to exercise a dominant influence over the Naga tribes), who expressed his profound reservations about the interpretation and usefulness of the Hydari agreement<sup>2</sup>.

Skipping over the stage of coalition fronts, the extremist scored an unusual advance in compressing (or squeezing) the political phase. The first act of the Naga

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2. The Naga Nation, June, 1947, Vol. I. No. II. pp. 7-12.

resistance under Phizo, claimed to have received a favourable mandate of the population. This was the time when the Naga insurgency began to acquire mass support and general sympathy. This was also demonstrated in 1952, when none of the Nagas, filed nomination papers and nor did anyone turn up for voting in the election of representatives to the Assam legislature and the parliament.

After a period of frenetic political activity, there was a wide spread sabotage and terrorism in the state. In early 1955, the insurgents launched the guerilla warfare (State II) of insurgency (See Chapter V). Between 1953 to 1956 insurgency was at its peak with almost complete mass support. It was followed by the Military phase (Stage III) or counter insurgency. Another contributing factor to this development was the Naga federal government's delusion of the fact that their base was strong and secure. But were in fact no better than isolated pockets and thinly occupied strongholds. The behavioral environment in the state, compelled the extremist leaders to falsely believe that their existing position will enable them to stabilise and declare independence from the Indian Union

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3. C.Singh,(1981) Political Evolution of Nagaland(New Delhi) P.47.
  4. N.Alemchiba(1970) A Brief Historical Account of Nagaland (Kohima) pp.175-182.

By early 1958, the insurgency started declining, but a large number of high ranking extremist leaders were still underground (probably hiding in their Burmese sanctuaries). Though, their mere existence was an indication of the level of support they enjoyed, yet, their escape to Burma showed the waning mass support. A stage was soon reached when large number of Nagas started openly demonstrating their desire to be with the Indian Union and their preparedness to confront the Naga federal army bands and to halt their depredation in the rural areas. The people lost their confidence and began to disassociate themselves from insurgents. This compelled the Naga federal army to be more cautious so as to ensure no further enlargement of the alienated section against their cause.

If the insurgency had united the diverse Naga tribes, their humiliating reverses and consequent sufferings divided them soon (This was caused by the operations conducted by the security forces in 1956-57). The extremist leaders found themselves in a enviable position - a position to retain the insurgent structure and cohesiveness as well as the sympathy of the populace for their struggle. Eventually after the beginning of the reverses, there was a large scale exodus of insurgent elements. Their mass

surrender ( and becoming a part of the Naga society within the Indian constitutional framework once more, can considered as a severe blow to the insurgent movement in Nagaland). Moreover, it can also be added that the disillusionment of the insurgent elements about the extremist leaders and their interneicene political rivalry provided no alternative except to give up the struggle that had no future except trial of endurance.

On March 22, 1957 the Ao tribe (was the first) publicly expressed their desire for peace, which was greatly encouraged by the government. The newly formed "All tribes Naga people convention" held its first Conference at Kohima in Aug, 1957 to evolve a method for a peaceful settlement of the problem. It was attended by 1960 representatives and 2,000 abservers.<sup>5</sup>

In 1958-59, "the Naga people Convention or NPC (claimed 75 percent support of the Nagas) presented a sixteen point memorandum for the formation of of a separate state of Nagaland within the Indian Union. This<sup>6</sup> was accepted by the government of India in March 1969.

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5. Elvin, (1961) Nagaland, (Shillong) p.65.

6. D.R. Mankekar; (1967) On the Slippery Slopes of Nagaland, (Bombay). p.40.

Between 1960 and 63 the Naga insurgents (lacking local support) started seeking help from the neighbouring countries like Burma, China and Pakistan. This was possible because of the fact that, many units of the security forces were pulled back to counter the Chinese aggression of 1962. Later on, the Naga insurgent found themselves hard pressed by the Indian security forces, who by that time had adopted themselves to insurgency situations and started counterinsurgency operations.

In February 1964, the Naga Baptist Church Council held a convention in Wokha, that was attended by over 5000 delegates from various tribes and villages. They requested to the government of India to appoint a peace mission to initiate talks for final settlement. Despite the efforts of the peace mission (from April 1964 to October 1967), the status quo was maintained. The emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 and suspension of peace operation in 1972, baffled the Naga insurgents more. They started looking for a peaceful solution of the problem that ensured peace without loss of face.

This resulted in the agreement that was signed in Shillong on November 11, 1975. The Naga Federal Government accepted the solution within the framework of Indian

constitution. Thus, from 1975 to the present day, the insurgency remained at a very low key. Although the organisational set up for insurgency still existed (but in a fragmented form) majority of the people had dissociated themselves from the underground movement. The efforts of the Indian government in the development of their economy and education enabled the Nagas to have second thoughts about the viability of the underground movement (But this does not mean that insurgency in Nagaland has completely petered out).

Broadly speaking, these events can be attributed partly to the fact that British while maintaining the view of keeping peace in the area, actually wanted a probable buffer between them (in this part of Asia) and Central Asia (which was the play ground of imperial rivalries in the 19th and early 20th centuries). However, after independence, central government began to strive for overall economic development of the country. At no point, the government had denied the legitimate political aspiration of a section of people nor did they consider it to be an obstacle for overall growth. The only emphasis was the maintenance of territorial and national integrity of India.

Impact:

If we take the extremist leaders view point to have a independent state of Nagaland for the Nagas, the analysis so far makes it clear that it was not viable at all. Because the government of India considered the Naga insurgency as a destabilising factor and hence anti-national. They rather perceived that such movement can have their impact elsewhere in the country and strengthen the process of disintegration of India. They gave ample agreements in favour of Nagaland as a part and parcel of India. Pandit Nehru had explicitly declared that there was no point in trying to make the tribals a second rate copies of ourselves. Other considerations also show that it is in the favour of Nagas to be with India.

Ethnographic Unity:-

There is no doubt that Nagas form a separate ethnic group which distinguishes them from the rest. But they have nothing in common with one another (between the Naga tribes themselves) for example as regards to customs, festivals habits, language (see Chapter IV). Accordingly one author states that the truth is that if not impossible it is exceedingly difficult to propound any test that can distinguish them from Assam or Burma tribes.<sup>7</sup> Thus an ethnic

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7. J.H.Hutton;(1921)The Angami Nagas(London).pp.12-13.

union of people can be grouped in one separate state provided no other problem comes in the way, such as economic, strategic and political. But following the principle that the boundary should ideally separate different cultures and ethnic units at the same time, it should not create difficulties by splitting up the functional units. Based on above arguments, Nagaland does not have basic pre-requisites to become an independent state. Moreover, the ethnography as a basis for an independent state is in itself a complex geopolitical problem (more so when the location is taken into consideration) that cannot be solved easily.

#### Economic Consideration:

The difficult hilly terrain presents a dismal picture economically. Nagaland lacks the requisite resources for establishing an economically viable state. For it is essential for an independent state to have sufficient resources, e.g. agriculture, minerals, industries etc. and firm educated base in the population to cater the need of administration etc. of the state (or at least it should possess substantial part there of to maintain its identity). But the economy of Nagaland reveals serious

deficiency in these aspects (see Chapter III) Moreover, from the point of view of accessibility, it is Assam that provides an easier outlet that across the frontier in the east. For all practical purposes that insurgent claim for an independent state, will only be a puppet state with heavy foreign dependence.

#### Political Background:

It is obvious that majority of the Nagas were deprived of modern education (due to their socio-economic conditions) till recently. Most of their dialects (which cannot be mutually understood) indicated that Nagas in some part of the state are still to reach the take-off point. In most circumstances, an independent Nagaland would have created international complications, because the separatist movement among the Nagas was largely influenced by the inherent factors as well as foreign powers. Moreover, the Indian Constitution does not allow secession. The recognition of Nagaland as an independent state, would start balkanization of the country.

#### Strategic Consideration:

By virtue of its location, Nagaland has felt the impact of insurgent activities of Upper Burma. Added to

this, the massive Chinese invasion of India in 1962, clearly illustrates the vulnerability of the Indian position. A position whereby India has not only to take suitable measures to check the external military threat but also to ensure stability of its constituent units. Moreover, viewing the entire north-east, it is clear that the demand of Naga extremists will never be conceded by the Government of India. This is because, otherwise will prove to be a geopolitical blunder and one which will be exploited by those forces who do not want a stable and united India. Again, hypothetically, the formation of Nagaland as an independent state may lead to two possibilities.

a) China may be invited by the Nagas to ensure security. As such China would find it easier to penetrate the Indian territory and to advance in this part of Asia.

b) Nagaland may ask for economic as well as military aid from U.S.A. and other powers. In which case the aid giving countries will be in a position to create a situation like south-Vietnam. Either of these possibilities are not tenable for the security of India.

#### Internal Difficulties:

The creation of Nagaland as an independent state will lead to a chain of internal problems. Like, Nagaland

there are other hilly regions in the country, whose inhabitants differ from rest of India in one respect or the other. Thus if such demands are conceded may stand divided and weakened.

The Indian leaders familiar with the political games of the sub-continent but unaware of the extent to which the Naga mind had been alienated, felt that vociferous agitation for Naga independence was only a prank for greater autonomy and enhanced finances. They realised the problem after the movement had entered the military phase. But by this time it was late (even though the government of India had agreed for the creation of autonomous Nagaland within Indian Union). The extremists adamantly pursued their goal of independent Nagaland.

#### Responses:

While it was a hope that that Nagas would grow friendly towards the plainsmen, if they were given an opportunity for closer contact, the result was opposite. As the plainsman were recruited on a temporary basis he took little interest in identifying himself with the Nagas. There was also a category of plainsman, who became so allured by the perquisites of office that they tried to ingratiate themselves with the tribal people so that

their service may be retained on a permanent basis. In the first case the officer put little heart into his work as his sights were set on his next assignment after completion of his tenure with hills. In the second, the officer had no scruples about tending wrong and harmful advices as long as it would be conducive to his continuance in the office (see Chapter II).

The relationship between the Nagas and outsiders deteriorated so much that only those candidates, who had failed to secure employment elsewhere in India, were ready to serve in the Naga hills as a last resort. The Nagas thus came, to be served by an indifferent and mediocre bureaucracy who did little to enhance India's image in the hillman's eyes (a common tribal fear)

It would not be just to place the entire blame either on the inherent weakness of the democratic system or administrative policy as it operates in India or on the ambitious of and implementation by politicians and civil servants. The basic causes are more deeply rooted in the gross environment such as of cultural disturbances and maladjustment. Under the British, the administrative structure was so light that the Nagas scarcely felt its weight or presence. Far more, pernicious, however was

the impact on an unprepared perception of ideas that may seem innocuous enough in the climate in which they have germinated. But can be of damaging effect in an alien environment whose people have not yet been conditioned and adapted to set up their defences. Unfamiliar ideas and beliefs were recklessly and indiscriminately injected into the minds of the Nagas, with little thoughts of the impact they may have on people of a completely alien background and environment. Thus it was not surprising that the effect was usually traumatic for the whole community. (See also Chapter II).

It should not be inferred, however, that the disturbed conditions prevailing in the Naga hills will continue. What has been sought here to be shown is that deeper malady underlies the disturbances. For unless they are brought to light no solution to the problem can be brought about. It has been demonstrated that there has been no malice or alienation on either side. The Government has shown generosity in its approach to the tribals in general and Nagas in particular. The Nagas have nevertheless had genuine cause to entertain fears and apprehension (as it was projected by the British to them). At the root of all this, has been ignorance

and misunderstanding on both sides and it is through this that they have caused such a situation to emerge. A view from time to time has been advanced that the Naga troubles have been mainly formulated and encouraged by the conspiracy of neighbouring countries, particularly, China and Pakistan. However, there are evidence that India's neighbours have taken advantage of the unsettled conditions along the frontiers. It would not be incorrect to brand them as one of the instigators, for they supplied the tribals with arms and ammunitions, to continue the armed struggle. They have been offered asylum across frontiers when pursued by security forces. They have been trained, equipped and supplied before recrossing the frontiers and resuming their hostile anti-government activities. But had it not been for the deeper causes underlying the disturbances ( a very backward state economy) the question of tribal seeking support from neighbours would not have arisen. While the effort of security forces to seal off the frontiers will serve the limited purpose of depriving dissident Nagas of supplies, armaments and haven of refuge, a final solution lies <sup>in</sup> the removal of the malady itself (the implementation of the development policies has been vigorously taken by the state and Central Government). The position of the security forces is that

(now) insurgency is petering out in Nagaland and sooner or later the remaining insurgents will either surrender or be liquidated.<sup>7</sup>

Accordingly, at present, there are two groups of Naga insurgents, The National Socialist Council of Nagaland under the leadership of Mr.T.Muivah and Mr. Issackswak and the Naga Federal Government of the followers of Mr. A.Z.Phizo, who are now camping along the international border. However there is no confirmed evidence on whether these groups have joined hands or not. From time to time they have been sneaking into Nagaland to collect ration and taxes from the villagers. But it is felt that these collections are only to keep their presence felt.

With regards to sealing off the international frontiers, the author believes that the agreement between India and Burma allowing the border inhabitants of the two country to trade with each other, precluded any such move. Probably this was exploited by insurgents, who smuggled themselves into the Nagaland from across the frontier.

The signing of the Shillong accord on November 11, 1975 between the followers of Mr.Phizo and representatives

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7. The Telegraph, 28th April, 1983(Calcutta).

of the Indian Government was the outcome of the counter-insurgency operations. The people have come to realise the futility of blood shed and nonimplementation of development works. It was the author's view that major part of security operations were carried on the basis of information given by the villagers. Reports in the newspapers about frequent clashes between followers of Mr. Issakswak and Mr. Muivah of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) and Mr. Khole of the Naga Federal Government (NFG) are suggestive of acute internal rivalry among the extremists. The NSCN has rejected Mr. Phizo and is trying to eliminate signatories of the Shillong Accord.

After the signing of the Shillong Accord, over 500 rebels have come over-ground. But for the first time in the history of pro-communist Naga socialist Council of Nagaland which was formed in 1979, hard-cores like the self-styled Major Ithoko Sema, bodyguard of Mr. Issak has surrendered. So far, 30 hard cores have surrendered along with their arms. These rebels have told newsmen that the life of underground is very tough. The Chinese authorities have refused them any sort of help and some of the rebels are at the point of starvation. Furthermore, many of them are treated no better than servants by the extremist leaders and their dependents.

There have been group clashes, mutual distrust and struggle for leadership enhanced by the fact that Mr. Muivah is a Naga from Manipur, while the majority of hardcore rebels hail from Nagaland. The author also infers that there exist no agreement between India and Burma to launch a joint offensive against the insurgents (officially). But both Burmese and Indian security forces have stepped up counter-insurgency operations in their respective areas. This does not mean the end of insurgent activities in Nagaland. The insurgents whose total strength is put at 500 are well equipped and may well keep up the struggle.

There is no gimmick that can solve and end the Naga problem. The problem will work itself out to its conclusion, but in its own time. We have observed some of the innerforces underlying the problem, and further seen that these forces cannot be summarily discounted or dismissed. India has behind her the experience of 35 years to guide her in her future relation with the Nagas. The government of India have gained by this experience, a clearer appreciation of the mainsprings of the Naga action and attitudes. (and through this experience, Government of India has been better equipped to deal with situations in Manipur and Mizoram). They will not be as harsh in their judgement and reaction as they

so often have been doing in the past. But if the Nagas do cherish in their hearts with sincerity the Christian doctrine of forgiveness and atonement. The working of the Naga problem to a happy end may yet prove to be a reality despite the bruises they have suffered.

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### CONCLUSION

This problem of the Naga insurgency has been approached judicially. The analytical challenge lay in the central theme of the thesis, Nature and pattern of Insurgency: A geographical analysis, that has been viewed in the contemporary conditions. In the process, it was evident that the insurgent leaders have inadvertently become the victims of their own lack of comprehension in the rapidly changing politico-geographic environment (which was caused by the British withdrawal from the subcontinent in 1947, emergence of communist China in 1949 and Bangladesh in 1971) of the region.

From the analysis so far, it is very clear that history, geography, economic development and socio-political aspects have significant impact on the insurgency in Nagaland. There has been no doubt that the physical milieu had played a significant role in the development of Naga insurgent movement. Inaccessibility and the rugged topography of the state has proved itself, in time, conducive as well as bane to the insurgent movement in Nagaland. Thus along with thick vegetation and low visibility among others, had complicated the movement, Thus it can be seen that, whenever such movements do not consider the hard physical

fact of the area concerned (despite) its initial success, the movement is found to fail (unless the area is richly endowed with resources).

Although entire Nagaland (Naga hill district) had come under the British influence and administration (excluding the unadministrative area of Tuensang district) there were few sections of populace who were politically active and who remained as spokesman of the movement. Their efforts to identify and distinguish themselves from the rest of the country was encouraged by the colonial rulers. Ethnicity and distrust became the focal point. This suggested that the spatial arrangement must be such that minimum distortion (psychological) may have either retarded or inhibited the development of the tribes and the unsurgent movement. Political domination, better communication facilities etc., were indirectly suggested by the colonial rulers as instruments which encouraged the tribal fear of absorption and loss of identity after independence.

It can thus be said that the analysis of the Naga underground movement and the interest of their leaders clearly illustrates:

(1) That extremist leaders resorted to the use of force to decide the issue. It then suggested that the

insurgency formed a continuum by which the insurgent pursued their interests. However, the choice of means under the circumstances was not only their own but also was the function of certain environmental conditions over which they had no control.

(2) The alliances and unity between various tribes in the early stages of insurgency suggested that it was a means to explicate and precise the existence of commonality of interest among them (either through ignorance or by force) and transform it into a legal obligation of the populace.

It follows that among the Naga tribes, that there is no such large scale community of interest-common, or complimentary- either the unity between them will break as was proved later (see chapter V and VI) or display their traditional aggressiveness which never provided a firm foundation. The Naga situation clearly demonstrates that the unity between the diverse tribes depended upon the duration and success of the struggle through which the movement was able to achieve and retained the advantages so derived (as in the early stages).

The Naga ambivalence towards space complicated a balanced investigation. They (extremist leaders) sought a definite space but their political background only indicated its relative weaknesses. It remains that had it only been peace, distance and stability that was needed, Nagaland would have never been faced behavioural complexities. One can add that inherent political antagonism and insurgency would never be solved or achieve their purpose. If one does not turn away from the reality of the situation, the solution to the problem has to be sought within the context of innate needs of the people environment and integration with Indian Union. Abundance of study clearly illustrate, the consequence of violence which the Naga tribes experienced. Their actively defended territories and unchanging tribal boundaries came under new pressures in which their intransigency was no help at all.

Inherent in their environment, was the fact that the diverse areas of Naga hills had the capacity to sustain the population in varying degrees. Neither was any damage inflicted by the inter-tribal conflict. The onset of administration and subsequent policies united the various Naga tribes who began to voice their political view point in concert (missionaries actively became one of the rallying points which tempered that traditional aggressiveness

to an establish but alien administrative mores and values). Their political beliefs and explanation gradually intruded their domestic arrangements as well as other aspects. In short, as far as the Nagas were concerned (to a large extent by extremist leaders as well) the phenomena of space greatly impinged upon their behaviour.

The Naga insurgent elements, it seems, considered the extension of authority as intrusion of their personal space without considering the fact that political environment in the world in general and the sub-continent in particular had undergone drastic changes. They persisted upon their traditional interpretation of space and district identity from the rest. They lacked comprehension about the offer of autonomy in the early phase of their struggle. Their insistence on reverting to situation that existed prior to British annexation and independence only makes it obvious that their conceptual bases of geographical location and political environment was weak and tenuous.

But any consideration to the problem of insurgency in Nagaland, should necessarily consider the territorial propensities. Their territorial principle have remained effective. The territorial pattern provided a premise to investigate, although since late 1960's and early 1970's

the insurgent movement has spread to Manipur, Mizoram and Tripura ( it was present in Upper Burma which was contiguous to these states). The stepped up counter-insurgency operations resulted in de-territorialisation of the movement. From the insurgent's point of view this was not followed by the conceptual substitutes that could have kept the intensity of movement alive. What their strategy and ideological stand failed to realise was that territorial manifestations and personal space offers adequate accommodation in Nagaland and within the framework of Indian constitution.

Viewing the distribution pattern of tribes in the insurgents context, one can clearly state that social distance was expressed by its scattered dispersion that constantly discouraged the influence of alien elements, social space and distance in Nagaland context can be summed up to include an area of permanent location and with definite boundaries(that which is recognised by other Naga tribes). Their territorial behaviour was inherent in their environment though certain distinct disparities exists.

Again apart from the proposition of common political forum(?) the Naga tribal groups were separated from each other. The separation have been through

acceptance of territorial rights (this has also brought about significant problems to the Naga insurgents band in the Upper Burma), and group antagonism. A closer analysis clearly reveals a mosaic of territories that were discrete and their impact in the distribution of social order. The consequence of which was in the form of integration. It was only a (common) suspicion that aided and abetted by the concerned parties that resulted in joining of forces by various Naga tribal communities against the Central Government in 1950.

The fears of dominance as advocated by extremist leaders lay at one end of a continuum in the early faces of insurgency in Nagaland. The psychological consequences of the inhabitants of Nagaland was dictated by both the insurgents and Government. Though dominance was expressed by in terms of space, restricted environment thwarted any definite territorial spacing between them. Intensity of the movement did not bring about any organised principle but parallel government of the insurgents - the Naga federal government (NFG).

The formation of NFG was preceded by gradual emergence of an elite who through their political power contemplated on the controlling the social space - Nagaland

- without sharing it. However, in this, the extremist leaders grossely miscalculated and came in confrontation with central government for a relation of dominance in space. As a result, in the initial phases, the insurgency remained non-territorial while it continued to be dominant over the tribal population (this has despite any territorial success which the insurgent would have had).

This then leads us to presume that the Naga insurgent movement desperately needed a territory which in turn was a consequence of a space. The need for territory became imperative. However, this failure manifested itself as a political issue and insurgent elements strove for recognition and equality.

Theoretically or practically such a stands did not help in territorial arrangements. The exposure of deterritorialisation resulted in the establishment of sanctuaries across the international frontiers in Burma (this was again at the goodwill of insurgents elements of upper Burma). Passing through the continuum resulted in the increasing conflicts within the Naga insurgents movement. Insurgents environment therefore imposed serious limitation, failure to tackle effectively. Immensity of

organisation resulted in either the surrender to the security forces or elimination.

This then suggest, that the Naga insurgency is fundamentally a consequence of Naga perception of state that clashed with reality. The political boundaries which they inherited bore little relationship to the traditional tribal areas. Nonetheless the Naga irredentism has played a relatively small part as destabilising factor in the region. Certainly disruptive possibilities and separatism are evident but the Naga insurgency has indicated that untill the pre-requisites are full filled such movements can hardly succeed.

The problem of insurgents physical environment should not normally be beyond solution. Neither should incidence of insurgency place beyond the powers of solution. But in any event the basic essence in the Naga insurgency dilemma reflected not the continuation of the struggle but concentration of powers and decision making apparatus in the state.

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NINE POINT AGREEMENT WITH HYDARI, THE GOVERNOR  
OF ASSAM

Preamble: That the right of the Nagas to develop according to their freely expressed wishes is recognised.

1. Judicial: All cases whether Civil or Criminal arising between Nagas in the Naga Hills be disposed of by duly constituted Naga court according to Naga customary law, or such law as may be introduced with the consent of duly recognised representative organisations, save that where a sentence of transportation and death has been passed there will be a right to appeal to the Governor.

In cases arising between Nagas and Non-Nagas in (a) Kohima and Mokokchung town areas (b) in the neighbouring plains districts the judge, if not a Naga, will be assisted by a Naga assessor.

2. Executive: The general principle is accepted that what the NNC will pay for it will control. This principle will apply equally to the work done as well as the staff employed while the district officer will be appointed at the discretion of the Governor, sub-divisional council with a full-time Executive president,

paid by the NNC would be responsible to the District Officer for all matters falling within the latter's responsibility and the NNC for all matters falling within their responsibility. In regard to (a) Agriculture: The NNC will exercise all the powers now vested in the District officer, (b) C.W.D. The NNC will take over full control; (c) Education and Forest; The NNC is prepared to pay for all services and staffs.

3. Legislature: That no laws passed by the provisional or central Legislature which would materially affect the terms of this agreement or the religious practices of the Nagas shall have legal force in the Naga Hill without the consent of NNC.

In case of dispute as to whether any law did so effect this agreement the matter would be referred by the NNC to the Governor who would then direct that the law in question should not have legal force in the Naga Hills pending the decision of the central Government .

Land: That land with all its resources in the Naga Hills should not be alienated to a non-Naga without the consent of the NNC.

5. Taxation: That the Naga National Council will be responsible for imposition, collection and expenditure of land revenue and house tax and of such other taxes as may be imposed by the NNC.

6. Boundaries: That the present administration division should be modified so as -

(i) to bring into the Naga Hills district all the forests transferred to Sibsagar and Nowgong Districts in the past and

(ii) to bring under one unified administrative unit as far as possible all Nagas. All the areas so included will be within the scope of the present proposed agreement.

No areas should be transferred out of the Naga Hills without the consent of the NNC.

7. Arms Act: The District officer will act on the advice of the National Council in accordance with the provisions of the Arms Act.

8. Regulations: The Chin Hill Regulation and Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation will remain in force.

9. Period of Agreement: The Governor of Assam as the agent of the Government of Indian Union will have a special responsibility for a period of ten years to ensure the due observance of this agreement; at the end of this period, the Naga National Council will be asked whether they require the above agreement to be extended for further period, or a new agreement regarding the future of the Naga people arrived at.

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TEXT OF THE SHILLONG ACCORD

1. The following representatives of the underground organisations met the Governor of Nagaland, Shri L.P.Singh, representing the Government of India at Shillong on 10th and 11th Nov.1975.

1. Shri I.Tenjenba 2. Shri S.Dahru 3.Shri Vecnylyi Rhakhu 4. Shri Z.Ramyo 5. Shri M.Assa 6. Shri Keviyallay.

2. There was a series of four discussions. Some of the discussions were held with the Governor alone, at others, the Governor was assisted by the two advisers for Nagaland Shri M.Ramunny and H.Zopianga, and Shri. M.L.Kampani Jt.Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs. All the members of the Liason Committee namely Rev.Longri, Ao, Dr. M.Aram, Shri.L.Lungalang, Shri Kenneth, Kerhew and Shri Lungshim Shaiza, Participated in the discussion.

3. The following were the outcome of the discussion:

(i) The representatives of the underground organisations conveyed their decision of their own volition, to accept without condition, the constitution of India.

(ii) It was agreed that the arms now underground, would be brought out and deposited at appropriate

places. Details for giving effect to this agreement will be worked out between them and representative of the Government, the security forces, and members of the liaison Committee.

(iii) It was agreed that representative of underground organisation should have reasonable time to formulate other issue for discussion for final settlement.

Dated, Millong  
November 11, 1975.

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BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

One of the most difficult problem involved in writing the present work was the scarcity and unreliability of research material. There is no comprehensive bibliography on the Naga insurgency(with geographical view point). The material that has been collected in some instances has been co-related, while the absence of reliable material was felt throughout. For the benefit of succeeding research in the same theme a brief resume of source materials and problems, I have encountered is presented here.

Source:

The author has not attempted the use many of his sources, because either the facts presented by them was not substantive or the material they gave compel the author not to disclose his sources. Much of the material thus has to be treated secondary. Author's own pre-occupation and knowledge compels many of the sources as secondary in character.

The author has besides depended on the secondary sources for much of his information. National library in Calcutta, National Archive of India, New Delhi, and other libraries has been consulted at length. The analysis is purely author's view point and it does not at any stage is reflection of government of India's view point.

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