


GILBERT RYLE'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND : AN EXAMINATION.

ABSTRACT

BY

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SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

To



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A B S T R A C T

The Dissertation, as its title indicates, is a critical analysis of Ryle's Concept of Mind. In, The Concept of Mind, Ryle presents a dispositional analysis of mind holding that mind is nothing but the disposition of the body, by criticising the dualistic theory of Descartes. Descartes argues that a human being is compounded of two entities i.e. a mind and a body. Mind interacts upon the body and the body interacts upon the mind. Gilbert Ryle criticises Descartes theory and holds that mind being a non-material spirit, (as Descartes argues) how can such spirit influence the workings of a material body? How can the ghost peer through the machine to the world around it? Ryle argues that 'mental' does not denote a status. According to him, Descartes involves himself in what is known as a 'Category mistake', when he (Descartes) treats mind as a substance on par with body. We commit a category mistake when we treat the facts of mental life as if they belong to one logical type or category when they actually belong to two different types. According to Ryle, body and mind are not two substances for mind does not belong to the category of substance at all. Ryle, by criticising Descartes' theory of mind gives a dispositional analysis of mind.

In the Dissertation, I am concerned with Ryle's dispositional analysis of mind, that is, I have attempted to examine how far Ryle is justified in presenting a dispositional analysis of mind. It begins with an attempt to explain what is a

disposition and after presenting the views of different philosophers goes on to argue whether dispositions can be regarded as causes. I have argued out that Ryle's logical behaviourism fails to give an analysis of mind. Among the topics which are subsequently discussed are those of emotion, and imagination. The chapter, 'Mental Conduct Concept' is a major one. It explains in detail what is a mental conduct concept and shows that these concepts cannot be explained purely in terms of overt behaviour. It also shows that by offering a dispositional analysis we cannot make a distinction between mental and physical predicates. In the concluding chapter, first, I have presented the views of different philosophers on theory of action and then try to see how far Ryle's theory of action is tenable to us. Ultimately, I have suggested that Behaviourism as a method in social sciences is unable to explain human behaviour.

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
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Certified that the subject matter of this Thesis is the record of work done by Begum Bilkis Banu. That the contents of this Thesis did not form a basis of the award of any previous degree to her or to the best of my knowledge to any body else and that the Thesis had not been submitted by her for any research degree in any other University.

In habit and character Begum Bilkis Banu is a fit and proper person for the Degree of Ph.D.

Shillong,
the 21st December, 1985.



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A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T

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21st December, 1985.

Begum Bilkis Banu.

BEGUM BILKIS BANU

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1

INTRODUCTION

The problem - what is mind ? has been dealt with by philosophers from very ancient time. There are different theories of mind based upon different conception of the relationship between the mind and body. The dualist hypothesis is that the human mind is one entity or substance and the human body is another. This was put most strongly by Descartes, who claims that mind and body are substances of diametrically opposite qualities and are distinct in that they do not depend on each other in any way for pursuing their essential roles of consciousness in the one case and space - occupying in the other. This thesis involves the claim that it makes sense to suppose that mind can exist on its own independent of the body. The true person or human being is the conscious being, the mind and this is only temporarily lodged in the body.

There are certain difficulties in the dualistic theory of Descartes. If the essence of mind is thought or consciousness what happens when the mind or person ceases to think or becomes unconscious as in a coma or dreamless sleep ? Is it possible for a substance to continue to exist without its essential

characteristics or when its essential characteristic is not being exercised ? Moreover, the modern psychological notion of the unconscious mind as a governing factor in human behaviour, forgetting, wishful thinking and unrecognised motives cannot be explained by this dualistic theory. For the dualist, unconscious mind must be a contradiction in terms since the essence of mind is consciousness. Whatever is mental, according to Descartes, is private and the only way to know that one is in a particular mental state is through observation of one's internal state. To say that one is in pain is to say that one is having a particular kind of feeling or sensation or that one is having a particular kind of experience. However, though one person can never experience the experience of another person, yet one person can know what another person is experiencing by observing his behaviour.

Gilbert Ryle in his book The Concept of Mind, criticises the dualistic theory of Descartes and upholds a dispositional analysis of mind. In my dissertation, I shall be concerned mainly with Gilbert Ryle's dispositional analysis of mind. According to Descartes, the relationship between mind and body is that of interaction. Mind interacts upon the body and the body interacts

upon the mind. Descartes further argues that a human being is compounded of two disparate entities a mind and a body - a ghost and a machine. But the problem arises - how can an immaterial spirit influence the workings of a material body? How can the ghost peer through the machine to the world around it?

As against this, Ryle argues that a person is neither a ghost nor a machine nor a ghost in a machine. Ryle further argues that the 'mental' does not denote a status. According to him, Descartes involves himself in what is known as a 'category mistake' when he treats mind as a substance on par with body. We commit a category mistake when we treat the facts of mental life as if they belong to one logical type or category when they actually belong to another. According to Ryle, matter and mind are not two substances for mind does not belong to the category of substance at all and Descartes who believed that it does, committed a category mistake. Ryle, by criticising Descartes' theory of Mind and by avoiding dualism, gives a dispositional account of mind.

In my dissertation, I shall not discuss whether Ryle's

criticism of Descartes' theory of mind is tenable or not but my objective is to examine Ryle's dispositional account of mind itself.

In the chapter I, I will describe what philosophers have said about dispositions, I will explain what is actually meant by a disposition. I will discuss different views about disposition and will examine whether dispositions can be regarded as causes.

In chapter II, I shall be concerned with psychological behaviourism and logical behaviourism, and will examine how far Ryle's logical behaviourism is tenable.

In the chapter III, I shall be concerned mainly with the concept of 'emotion'. The first half of the chapter will be devoted to presenting a general view of emotion and the second half will be devoted to Ryle's concept of emotion.

In the chapter IV, I shall be concerned with imagination and will examine how far Ryle's view of imagination is tenable.

In the chapter V, I shall be concerned with mental conduct concepts. The last chapter will be the concluding chapter. In this chapter I will sum up my findings. Further behaviourism as a method in social sciences will also be examined.

CHAPTER - I

Disposition

This chapter is divided into two parts - first part dealing with different views of disposition by different philosophers and the second part dealing mainly with Ryle's view of disposition.

I

'Disposition' literally means an ability, tendency, capacity and liability to do certain sorts of things. Therefore, when we say that an object possesses a dispositional property, we simply mean that the object is liable or is capable of doing something. To say of an object that it is soluble, brittle, or to say of a human being that he is generous, touchy or inconsiderate, is to ascribe dispositional properties to them. However, we sometimes describe objects by ascribing certain properties which seem to be non-dispositional. For instance, whenever we talk about the colour of the objects we seem to speak about the non-dispositional property.

Goodman says-

"Almost every predicate commonly thought of as describing a lasting objective characteristic of a thing is as much a dispositional predicate as any other. To find non-dispositional or manifest predicates of things we must turn to those describing event predicates, like bends, breaks, burns, dissolves. To apply such a predicate is to speak only of what can happen".

N. Goodman makes a distinction between dispositional predicates and non-dispositional predicates. Non-dispositional predicates are manifest-predicates or event-predicates. Whenever we apply a non-dispositional predicate to an object, we simply mean that the object is undergoing some change or something specific is happening to that object. Whereas, to apply a dispositional predicate to an object is not to say that something specific is happening to that object. But to apply a dispositional predicate to an object is to say of what can happen to that object under specific conditions. Dispositional properties are, therefore non-occurrent, whereas non-dispositional properties are occurrent.

However, though, disposition is regarded as an ability yet all abilities are not dispositions. Abilities which are exercised continually under all conditions do not count as dispositions. Moreover, actions which occur too irregularly or too infrequently cannot be treated as manifestations of dispositions. Therefore, though dispositions are abilities yet all abilities are not dispositions. A living organism has the ability to breathe but we do not say that it has the dispositions to breathe. The ability to breathe is not a dispositions because this

ability is being exercised continually within the activity of the organism under all normal circumstances. Again, there are abilities that are exercised too infrequently to count as dispositions. A person may have the ability to walk a long distance but in so far as he does these things only infrequently, it is wrong to say that he has a disposition to act in that way.

Non-dispositional predicates do not stand for abilities in the sense in which dispositions are abilities. They are manifest predicates and they are also unconditional. The relationship between a dispositional predicate and its manifestation is logical.

Armstrong advocates the identification of a particular disposition in a particular object with the underlying state or categorical basis which is causally responsible for manifestations of that dispositions in that object and hence claims that dispositions are causes. Armstrong argues-

"To speak of an object's having a dispositional property entail's that the object is in some non-dispositional state or that it has some property (there exists categorical basis) which is responsible for the object manifesting certain behaviour in certain

circumstances, manifestations whose nature makes the dispositional property the particular dispositional property it is".²

Thus he wants to say that for a thing namely 'X' to have a disposition 'd', is for 'X' to be in some state 'S' which is causally responsible for any events which are manifestations of 'd' in 'X' or which would be causally responsible for such events. He identifies a particular disposition with the underlying state and argues that since these underlying states are the causes for the manifestation of that disposition in that object hence dispositions are causes. It also follows from his discussion that dispositional predicates are manifested only under certain conditions and the underlying states are responsible for the manifestation of a disposition in a particular object. For instance, to say that 'a glass is brittle', is to say that the glass is disposed to break. And the glass is disposed to break because the glass is so made that there exists a categorical basis which is responsible for the manifestation of brittleness in the glass.

Moreover, Armstrong holds that an object can acquire or lose its dispositional property. Let us take, for instance, the statement 'This glass became fragile at 'T''. This proposition is a contingently true proposition and since all contingently true propositions are true in virtue of something in the world, this proposition in order to be true there must be some change in the world. And since this proposition is about a particular object in the world it must be the object that has changed and Armstrong would say that if the object acquires or loses a dispositional property at 't', then there must have occurred some change in the world at 't' and indeed a categorical change which is the basis of the acquisition or loss of the dispositional property. Thus we find that Armstrong advocates a realistic view of disposition.

So far as the phenomenalists are concerned, they hold that a disposition does not imply that there is a non-dispositional state which is the categorical basis of the disposition. They hold that a dispositional statement only refers to a non-material

conditional statement. A dispositional statement can be analysed into a non-material conditional statement and there is nothing more than the non-material conditional. But as against the phenomenologists, it can be said that in some cases we find that the non-material conditional is satisfied but the object cannot be said to possess that disposition. For example, according to the phenomenologists, an object is fragile means if that object is suitably knocked at 't' then the object breaks at 't'. However, an object may be suitably knocked at 't' and break at 't' even if the object is not fragile. Therefore, the 'non-material conditional' alone is not sufficient for the description of a dispositional property.

Again, the phenomenologist has no answer for the question— why is it that the glass breaks under such and such conditions ? They cannot refer to the categorical basis of the disposition because they do not believe in such basis of a disposition. Likewise, if it is asked— How can we say whether a particular object has a particular dispositional property or not, at a time

when it is not manifested ? Then they do not have any answer. Since the phenomenalist do not believe in the 'categorical basis', therefore, they would say that apart from the dispositional property an object also has certain categorical properties and since the categorical properties have not changed we have every reason to think that the dispositional properties also have not changed. For the realist, there is no problem. They would say that we have every reason to believe that a thing has a particular dispositional property at the time when it is not manifested because the categorical basis on which the dispositional property is dependent has not changed and therefore the dispositional property exists there.

As against the phenomenalist, it can be said that there is only a contingent connection between a dispositional property and the categorical property and so far as there is only a contingent connection between the categorical property and dispositional property, we can very well conclude that there is no connection at

all. Two events are said to be contingently connected when there is no necessary connection between the two but only that they may occur at the same time. From the mere fact that they come to occur at the said time it does not imply that there is a connection between the two. It may be a mere chance. Since the categorical properties are not the basis of the dispositional properties, therefore from the fact that categorical properties are there, we cannot say that dispositional properties are also there.

Mackie presents the realist view of disposition. He holds, "X is fragile at 't' = If 'X' is suitably knocked at 't', 'X' breaks at 't' in virtue of its intrinsic nature".³ Thus Mackie wants to say that dispositional property is dependent on a basic property and this basic property, on which the dispositional property is dependent, is intrinsic to the object. This intrinsic property of an object is the basis for the acquisition or loss of any dispositional property of that object. "X is soluble in water" = "X has some property which is responsible for X's dissolution in water". If these properties are not there in 'X', then only

the fulfilment of the non-material condition i.e. if we put 'X' in water, cannot make it dissolve in water.

Now, we shall examine whether dispositions can be regarded as causes. Armstrong holds that dispositions are causes. He argues that for every disposition there is an underlying state and this underlying state is causally responsible for the manifestation of the disposition in that object and since having of a disposition is identical with the underlying state, therefore, according to Armstrong, dispositions are causes.

Roger Squirer⁴ argues that Armstrong's theory that dispositions are causes involves a regress. He argues in the following manner: Suppose we have something 'a' with a disposition 'd'. Now, according to Armstrong, there must be some state 'S' of 'a' such that (i) 'S' should cause 'a' to manifest 'd' at 'T'. As against this, Squirer argues that if for a disposition 'd' we have to have a state 'S' such that 'S' causes 'a' to manifest 'd' at 't' then for 'S' to be there, there must be some further



state of 'S' and we call that state of 'S' as S^I . So Armstrong's position would be - S^I would cause 'S' to cause 'a' to manifest 'd' at 't'. For Squirrer, we require a basis i.e. S^I for the state 'S' and in this way, we are launched in infinite regress. First, we have to assert that the state 'S' is disposed to cause 'a' to manifest 'd' at 't'. Secondly, it requires that for the state 'S' to dispose to cause 'a' to manifest 'd', there must be some other state say S^I behind 'S' and in this way the regress follows.

As against this, Armstrong gives a reply and argues that this theory does not involve a regress. He admits that 'a' attributes a disposition 'd' to S and also admits that this theory requires a state 'S' which could cause manifestations of 'd' at 't' but holds that S^I is identical with 'S' and hence there is no regress.

However, I wish to suggest that Armstrong's theory does not involve a regress. Whenever we say that sugar is soluble, we are ascribing (solubility) a dispositional property to sugar.

There is a categorical basis or underlying state of sugar which is responsible for the manifestation of that disposition (solubility) in that object. We shall call that underlying state of sugar 'S'.

Here, I think, we need not have to postulate any further state when we say that 'S' is disposed to cause sugar to manifest solubility.

In the former case, when we say that sugar is disposed to dissolve in water then if it is asked— why is it such that it is disposed to dissolve in water, we can give reply and say that there is a categorical state which causes it to dissolve in water. But in the case of underlying state we never ask why is it such that it is disposed to dissolve in water ? The structure of the underlying state of sugar is such that if it is put in water it dissolves and we need not have to postulate any further state. Armstrong's theory that 'S' is disposed to cause 'a' i.e. sugar to manifest 'd' i.e. solubility does not imply that we are attributing a disposition to 'S' and therefore there must be a further state for it. Further, to say that 'S' is disposed to cause sugar to dissolve in water and to say that sugar is disposed to dissolve in

water is not the same sort thing. The first one implies that 'S' is a state of 'a' which disposes 'a' to dissolve in water and therefore 'S' is the cause of the manifestation of dispositional property. The second one implies that sugar has the dispositional property to dissolve in water and therefore I think, the question of regress does not arise.

My view that Armstrong's theory does not lead to infinite regress should not be taken to mean that dispositions are causes. I do not agree with Armstrong that dispositions are causes.

To say that dispositions are causes is to say that "glass breaks because it is brittle" 'Glass is brittle' means glass is disposed to break and to say that dispositions are causes is to say that the glass breaks because it is brittle. Now, depending on the nature of causal relation we shall examine whether dispositions can be regarded as causes. The truth and falsity of a causal statement depends on the world as it is. The truth and falsity of the statement "black clouds cause rain", depends on the

world as it is and simply by looking at the statement we cannot find out its truth or falsehood. Whereas, the statement "the glass breaks because it is brittle", though seem to Armstrong, to express causal relation yet it is not true. Here we do not have to look at the world outside to find out the truth and falsity of the statement. If we know the meanings of the terms involved in the statement we can say whether or not the statement is true.

Therefore, the statement does not express a causal relation between "brittleness" and "breaking". Moreover, the relationship between 'black cloud' and 'rain' is a causal relation because in case of 'black cloud' and 'ra-in', it may be the case that there is black cloud but no rain follows, whereas, we can never think of this possibility to be there in the case of brittleness and breaking.

'X is brittle' means 'X' is liable to break under suitable circumstances and to think otherwise would be to say that these are black clouds. Therefore, I like to conclude that Armstrong is not reasonable in holding the view that dispositions are causes. To think otherwise would be to say that X is not brittle. Whereas in case of black clouds, even if no rain follows still we can say that these are black clouds.

We know that two things or entities are said to be causally related only if the two entities which are regarded as 'cause' and 'effect' are independently identifiable. "Black cloud" and "rain" are independent of one another. To know what is a "black cloud", we do not have to have the knowledge of rain and vice-versa. Now, if 'brittleness' is regarded as the cause of the breaking of the glass, then it must be possible for us to understand what does brittleness mean independently of our understanding of breaking. However, we cannot understand what does 'brittle' mean independently of 'breaking'. Because 'brittle' means 'liable to break'. We cannot identify the unfulfilled possibility (liability to break) independent of the categorical basis. Since we cannot identify 'brittleness' independent of breaking, therefore, the relation cannot be regarded as a causal at all. To make the point more clear we can cite one more example. Suppose, someone asks -- what is the cause of a drug's putting someone to sleep. We reply that the cause is the drug's soporific power. But soporific power means only "the power to cause sleep". Therefore, it follows that we

cannot identify a soporific drug unless it induces sleep. Therefore, there cannot be any causal relation at all between 'the drug's soporific power', and that it induces sleep'. Therefore, taking into account the nature of causal relation we can say that dispositions are not ~~ca-~~uses.

Now we shall examine how far Armstrong's view that "the categorical basis of a disposition is intrinsic to the object" is correct. Armstrong restricts this categorical basis to the internal constitution of the object and thus holds that the categorical basis is intrinsic to the object. Mackie, on the contrary, holds that the categorical basis cannot be some intrinsic property of that object possessing the disposition. Mackie argues that if the categorical basis of a disposition is regarded as its only intrinsic features then how are we going to explain the fact the two glasses A and B, which not only look alike but are alike in all their intrinsic features, are knocked at time t , in the same way with the result that A breaks but B does not ?

However, this example of Mackie's is not enough to refute Armstrong's view because his example has shown that non-material conditional which is the same in both the cases does make one glass break and leaves the other intact. Mackie does not offer any argument to justify the view that non-material conditional should also be included in the categorical basis. Therefore, we can say that Mackie has not succeeded in rejecting the view that categorical basis belongs to the intrinsic feature of the object.

I think, so far as the manifestation of a dispositional property is concerned, we have to take into account both the natural environment and intrinsic nature. The manifestation of a dispositional property takes place in an environment and the object manifesting this disposition has certain intrinsic nature and these two together serve as the 'basis' of a disposition. However, since, to assert that an object possesses a disposition, is to say something about the object and not about the environment, therefore, it implies that, it is the objects' internal

constitution which is important and it is quite conceivable to think of an object as possessing a disposition without thinking of the environment. But we can say that the non-material conditional is equally important for the manifestation of a disposition and therefore it is to be counted as the basis of a disposition.

Suppose, an object is such that while it is at some place on the earth, then if we knock it, it will not shatter but if we put it on different place and tap it sharply then it shatters. Here it seems that this particular environment of the earth can be treated as the basis of a disposition because the object shatters in that environment inspite of the fact that its internal constitution remains unchanged. However, it seems that we cannot neglect the internal constitution altogether. Internal constitution also plays a vital role because we have to explain the fact of its breaking by saying that the object has such and such a structure and that is why when it is put in that particular place on the earth and is tapped, it shatters. Otherwise, if the environment had been the basis of its breaking then any and every object put in that

environment and knocked, would have broken. We cannot explain the fact of breaking without taking into account the fact that it has such and such a structure.

I like to argue that the internal constitution alone can be regarded as the 'basis' of a disposition because if a thing is not so constituted then it cannot break even if it is put in such and such environment. To make it more clear, I shall refer to the distinction between necessary conditions and sufficient conditions. The environment and the tapping, knocking and dropping etc. are the necessary conditions, whereas the internal constitution, which I call the basis, is the sufficient condition for the manifestation of any particular disposition. If the internal constitution had not been the sufficient condition then we could have explained the fact that 'a thing is fragile' only by reference to non-material conditionals. Since we cannot explain the fact that 'a thing is fragile', neglecting the internal constitution, therefore it follows that internal constitution can

be treated as the basis of a disposition. Moreover, I think, the internal constitution or structure is sufficient to explain the dispositions of objects because if we examine a particular object in the laboratory and find that it has such and such a structure then even if the non-material conditionals have not been satisfied, we can say that this particular object is disposed to behave in such and such a way since it has such and such a structure. Moreover, on the basis of it, we can say that an object in possession of a dispositional property is structurally different from an object which does not possess such a property. And for me, as I have already pointed out, the categorical basis of a disposition cannot be treated as the cause of the manifestation of a disposition.

II

Gilbert Ryle, in his book The Concept of Mind, gives a dispositional analysis of mind by holding that mind is simply the dispositions of the body. A person is not composed of both a body and a mind. A person is said to have a mind if he can do

certain sorts of thing. As regards the disposition, he said -

"When we describe 'glass as brittle' or 'sugar as soluble' we are using dispositional concepts the logical force of which is this- the brittleness of glass does not consist in the fact that it is at a given moment actually being shattered. It may be brittle without actually being shattered. To say that it is brittle is to say that if it ever is or ever had been, struck or strained, it would fly or have flown into fragments. To say that it would dissolve or would have dissolved, if immersed in water".⁵

From Ryle's account, it appears that dispositional properties refer to capacities, liabilities and tendencies. The distinction between the dispositional property and the non-dispositional property is that dispositional properties are non-occurrent whereas non-dispositional properties are occurrent. Dispositional properties are non-occurrent because to say that 'a glass is brittle' is not to say that the glass is at a given moment actually being shattered.

Apart from this, Ryle argues that the statement containing dispositional predicates are hypothetical or conditional and not categorical. The statement 'sugar is soluble' means "If sugar is put in water then it will dissolve". Although a disposition is a

property, it is not a property that is manifested by the individual possessing it during every or even during most, moments of its behaviour. A dispositional property is that which is attributed to an individual at moments when it is in no way being manifested. The reason is that a dispositional property is one which is manifested only under certain conditions rather than unconditionally and that the fact that the property will be manifested only under appropriate circumstances is no less a fact on occasions in which those circumstances do not happen to occur. This explains also the fact that it is uniquely appropriate to describe it in terms of hypothetical statements what is meant by attributing a particular disposition to an individual agent. To manifest a particular disposition is to perform an activity of a certain general type under circumstances of a certain general sort. The statements containing non-dispositional predicates, are categorical. To say that "the table is round" is to ascribe a non-dispositional predicate to 'table'. It is an occurrent-predicate since it does not refer to any ability, tendency and capacity.

The question arises as to whether explanations in terms of dispositions are to be regarded as a variety of causal explanation? To ask why the glass broke is to ask what caused it to break and we explain the fracture of the glass when we report that a stone hit it. The cause, here, stands for an event and the event which stood to the fracture of the glass is related to it as cause to effect. Apart from causal explanation, there is another type of explanation namely explanation in terms of reason. To say that 'the glass broke when struck because it was brittle' is to give reason-explanation and not a causal explanation. Ryle seeks to explain the breaking of the glass by referring to a disposition and not to a happening or cause. Dispositional explanations are, therefore, reason-explanations and not causal explanations. Dispositions also cannot be regarded as causes because to refer to 'disposition' is not to refer to any happening. The breaking of the glass is nothing but the actualization of the disposition 'brittle'. The fulfilment of the disposition requires some conditions like tapping, knocking and so on. To give an explanation in terms of dispositions is not to give

a causal explanation.

Ryle in his Concept of Mind, builds a theory of mind, holding that mind is nothing but the dispositions of the body. Most mental terms, he thinks, are used to refer not to private episodes but to dispositions, which manifest themselves in predominantly public performance. Ryle holds that just as the statement, 'sugar is soluble' does not mean that the 'sugar is actually dissolving in water' but that it is liable to dissolve in water, likewise, to ascribe a mental predicate say, 'jealous', to a person is not to say that there is a private internal occurrence going on within the individual. To say that 'a person is jealous' is to say that he is liable to behave in such and such a way. Ryle says,

To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change, it is to be bound or liable to be in a particular state or to undergo a particular change, when a particular condition is realized".⁶

Ryle makes a distinction between dispositions and episodes.

According to him, certain human actions ^{or} behaviours are the manifestation of dispositions. Episodes are occurrences i.e. we

can say that it is occurring in such and such time. There is some time limit in connection with episodes. When we say, "He is walking now", we are talking about what is happening now. But verbs like, know, believe, are not indicative of occurrences but of dispositions. Some dispositional actions are highly specific while others are highly generic. Words like 'know', 'believe', 'clever' are determinable dispositional words because they do not signify capacities or abilities of only one sort but of different sorts. But Ryle maintains that people make mistakes by thinking that there is a corresponding internal act to dispositional verbs like 'know' and 'believe'. This he treats as a mistake.

Dispositional statements are not statements of laws.

Dispositional statements are indicative of capacities, liabilities and tendencies. They have similarities with law-statements in the sense that both dispositional and law-statements are hypothetical.

However, the following objections can be raised against

Ryle's dispositional analysis of Mind. As we know, there is a distinction between some behaviour tendencies and pure habits, hobbies, interests and occupations. But sometimes a borderline case crops up when we see that some people's jobs are their hobbies and these jobs and hobbies are purely habits. But something done from a habit is not something which is done on purpose. Whereas, actions which are done from hobbies, interests and pleasure are actions which are done for the sake of pleasure.

Moreover, if mental predicates refer only to overt performances then, I think we have another problem with dispositional statements. Merely looking at overt performances we cannot distinguish between two different types of actions. For example, whenever a person is piping a pipe he may either do it out of pleasure or he may do it to satisfy his audience or he may do it as a sort of practising it, but we cannot point out these differences merely by looking at his piping.

However, in this chapter I do not want to draw out all

the possible implications of Ryle's theory of mind, since in the chapters that follow, I shall discuss Ryle's view of mind in detail.

REFERENCE :

¹N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, pp.44-45.

²Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind, p.86.

³J.L. Mackie, Truth, Probability and Paradox, p.130.

⁴Roger Squirer, Analysis, 1944

"Disposition, States and Causes" by Robert Cummins.

⁵Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p.43.

⁶Ibid., p.43.

CHAPTER - II

Psychological Behaviourism and Logical Behaviourism

Behaviourism as a philosophy of mind results only on the rejection of Descartes' Mental Substance Theory. According to Descartes, man is composed of two substances - mental and physical. Whatever is mental is private, and the only way to know that one is in a particular mental state is, through the observation of one's internal state. To say that 'one is in pain' is to say that one is having a particular kind of feeling or sensation or that one is having a particular kind of experience. However, though one can never experience the experience of another yet one can know what another person is experiencing by observing the latter's behaviour. Whenever I am in pain, I behave in a particular way and therefore whenever I find another person behaving in the same way, I assume that he also must be in pain for whenever I am in pain, I behave in that way.

However, the dualistic theory of Descartes, presents many problems. The difficulties are: If mental states are, in principle, not publicly observable, how is one justified in ascribing them to other people at all? Even if one has mental states, how can

I know that the correlations between them and the behaviour exhibited are the same in both the cases ? How are we to describe the links between mental states and other states ? If they are causal, how does the causal process operate ? These problems have led philosophers to search for alternative solutions.

✓ Behaviourism comes into being only on the rejection of the dualistic theory. To accept behaviourism is to say that there are not two substances, one body and the other mind but there is only one substance i.e. the body and mind is nothing but the behaviour of the body. Behaviourism, as a philosophy of mind identifies mental states with actual behaviour. To say that one is in a mental state is to say that one is behaving in such and such a way. Mental states are identical with actual behaviour and thus there is no distinction between the mental states and the actual behaviour. This way of explaining the mental concepts extremely in terms of behaviour is known as psychological behaviourism or scientific behaviourism.

Within psychology, varieties of behaviourism stretch from J.B. Watson to B.F. Skinner and others. This kind of

behaviourism seems to hold that behaviour is the fit subject of study for social science. Since experience are private, it is impossible for one to know what experience another man is having. I am in a given state of mind means I am having certain experiences which no one else can have. Therefore, one man can never experience what another man is experiencing and in fact it is logically impossible also. When we say that another man is in pain, all we can see is his behaviour only, and therefore, on this strength the behaviourists hold that the mental states refer to behaviour only and they (mental states) themselves are behaviour and nothing more. For J.B. Watson, who introduced the term, 'Behaviourism', is primarily a methodological principle or policy: that the data of scientific psychology should comprise of only observed and publicly observable behaviour of living organisms. He even spoke of the fiction that there is such a thing as mental life; and he proposed to drop terms like "consciousness, mental state,.... imagery and the like, because he thought that there are no private states, processes or objects to which such words could be applied. Thus he rejected mental images as fictitious.

According to the behaviourists, human behaviour is

explainable in terms of laws. Since they explain behaviour in terms of laws therefore for them, there is no place of purpose, desire, intention and feeling and so on. That is to say, we cannot explain a piece of behaviour in terms of purpose, intention and so on. In case of any scientific theory, prediction is possible because they explain everything in terms of laws which are said to govern them. In case of human beings, the only observable thing is the human behaviour. Therefore, according to them, so long as human behaviour is governed by laws and so long as only human behaviour is observable, it is predictable also. According to the psychological behaviourists, human behaviour is explainable in terms of laws because all human behaviour, for them, is determined either by internal organism or by the external environment. For Skinner, human behaviour is always a stimulus-response behaviour. According to the behaviourists, an action defined in terms of intention, desire or purpose can easily be defined in terms of internal organism and external environment which are governed by certain physical laws. Since they are governed by physical laws, every human behaviour can be explained as a response to some stimulus only, and as such human behaviour is predictable.

Behaviourism as a philosophy of mind identifies mental states with actual behaviour. And so far as psychological behaviourism is concerned, we find that, human acts are defined as part of the order of nature, causing and being caused by events outside itself.

There is another variety of behaviourism known as logical behaviourism or analytical behaviourism or philosophical behaviourism. Ryle, Hempel, Carnap, Wittgenstein and so on are logical behaviourists. Philosophical Behaviourism as is advocated by Ryle seems to hold that meanings of the mind-predicates must be explained in terms of overt behaviour or that statements about a person's mind can be completely analysed in terms of statements about what others people can or could observe him doing. The philosophical behaviourists like Ryle assimilates all mental predicates to dispositional terms like intelligent or obstinate noticing that their ascription to a person does not imply anything about his current experiences. They deny or gloss over the fact that the disposition in question are often manifested in private experiences e.g. unexpressed thoughts and feelings. Ryle identifies mental states not with actual behaviour but with the

dispositions to behave. However, though both Ryle and Wittgenstein claim to be logical behaviourists yet the view of Wittgenstein is different from that of Ryle. Logical behaviourism holds that there is a logical relation between mental states and behaviour. If the relationship between mental states and behaviour is logical then I cannot believe myself to be in pain unless I am and I logically cannot be in pain without realizing that I am. To be in pain and to be aware that I am in pain are one and the same.

The logical behaviourist, in particular Gilbert Ryle, says:

"To talk of a person's mind is to talk of the person's abilities, liabilities and inclination to do and undergo certain sorts of things and of the doing and undergoing of these things in the ordinary world".¹

For him, the attribution of intention and desire, intelligence, excitement and fear and so on are to be understood as attribution of a disposition to behave in a characteristic manner in suitable circumstances. To be angry is to behave in an angry way: to be flushed, trembling, banging and etc. Mental concepts which we commonly use to describe and explain people's behaviour signify disposition and not episodes. Mental states are names of particular pattern of behaviour; they cannot cause the behaviour in question; it cannot be said that a man's anger made him shout or that his pride made him stubborn.

For Ryle, to build a theory of the mind is to look into the logical character of certain modal sentences containing imagination, perception, thought, emotion and so on. In fact, one can define philosophical psychology as the theory of the logical character of sentences about the mind and it is in this sense that all theories of mind of this type are philosophical. Cartesianism, according to Ryle, is the classical doctrine that all mind-sentences are logically categorical in character. There are sentences whose logical behaviour, Ryle calls, hypothetical or dispositional. Among them are sentences like, 'John is vain, John is intelligent' and so on. The logical behaviour of 'John is vain' is not categorical but hypothetical. That is, if under certain specified circumstances, some one were to praise John in his presence then John would be likely to do other things e.g. try to prolong the particular conversation.

However, it is a misconception to attempt to analyse all mental predicates behaviouristically. Ryle is mistaken when he thinks that it is necessary to deny not only that there can be mental substances but also that there can be mental events or occurrences. There is a distinction between mental occurrences,

and mental disposition. Jealousy, hatred, anger, love and so on are called mental dispositions because whenever these predicates are applied to a person it implies that he is disposed to behave in certain ways. 'X' is jealous of 'Y' means 'X' is disposed to show certain types of behaviour towards 'Y'. Again, there are such things as mental occurrences. For example, concepts like dreaming, imagining, thinking etc. are mental occurrences and cannot be exhausted in terms of physical expressions. They are genuine non-behavioural events. They are occurrences and physical expressions are immaterial to their meanings. One may indulge in thinking without showing any outward sign for it. Therefore, thinking or 'thoughts' also qualify as mental events. We report such events when we say "As I walked in, a terrible thought occurred to me, thought crossed my mind, it suddenly came to me that....."

Thoughts of this sort come into one's head and go through one's mind. Whenever, we report the occurrence of a thought in any one of these many ways, we are reporting the occurrence of an event which took place at some particular time. As in case of reports of feelings, reports of thoughts are not translatable into reports of behaviour. So far as their meaning is concerned, it can be said that, they are reports of genuine occurrences but not of

overt performances. Therefore, Ryle has to exclude these mental occurrences from his theory and cannot explain them by expounding a dispositional analysis.

Logical behaviourists, particularly Ryle is guilty of arguing in a circle in presenting his dispositional analysis of mind. To attempt to explain a mental concept, say, 'intelligent' by an appeal to hypothetical proposition stating what will happen if a person is acting intelligently is to beg the question by appealing to a test whereby the observers determine the nature of otherwise ambiguous performances. When we apply any mental predicate to a person by saying that 'X' is intelligent, this statement, according to Ryle simply means 'X' is disposed to behave in a particular way. Here it implies that we already presuppose that this sort of behaviours are regarded as intelligent behaviour. That is, if we want to say that 'X is intelligent' then we must justify it by saying or by giving such instances which does not include in it that 'he is intelligent! Otherwise, it would be just the saying, that 'he is behaving intelligently and therefore he is intelligent', which is not a case of proving that 'somebody is intelligent' but is simply begging the question. Therefore,

Ryle's logical behaviourism i.e. his dispositional account of mind involves the fallacy of begging the question. This charge can also be brought against analysis of all dispositional mental conduct concepts.

Ryle in the "Concept of Mind", holds that mind is simply the disposition, of the body like other dispositions e.g. brittle, elastic etc. Whenever we say that 'a glass is brittle', it simply means that the glass is disposed to break. But the point is that Ryle does not make any attempt to show why certain concepts are called physical and others psychological if both are dispositional concepts. We say, 'brittle' a physical concepts and not a psychological one. Likewise, 'witty' is a mental concept and not a physical one. If mind is simply a disposition of the body like other dispositions then there need not be anything as mental concepts. In short, the main difficulty that can be pointed out in Ryle's theory is that he all the time talks about mental concepts and physical concepts but he does not point out the difference between dispositional concepts that refer to mind and the one that refer to body. How is it that brittleness is a physical concept whereas 'intelligent', 'witty' etc. are mental concepts ? Thus

we find that the logical behaviourism of Ryle suffers from so many drawbacks.

Though Ryle seems to base his theory on Wittgensteinian line yet his theory differs from that of Wittgenstein. Like Wittgenstein he also holds that mind does not refer to any separate substance or entity. Though Wittgenstein holds that mind does not refer to any separate substance or entity yet he does not deny the 'innerness' of mind. The thesis that there is a logical connection between inner process and overt behaviour seems to be implied by Wittgenstein's claim that behaviour provides the criteria for ascribing mind predicates. Wittgenstein says "An inner process stands in need of outward criteria".² In other words, if there is no 'inner' then the 'outer' cannot be understood without reference to the former. Some behaviour is not intelligible to us if we do not link it with the 'inner'. Whereas, according to Ryle, mind is only the disposition of the body and it does not refer to anything 'inner'. In order to understand what Wittgenstein means by 'outward criteria' let us take the concept of 'pain'. Now if we take 'criteria' to mean the necessary and sufficient condition of anything then to say that someone is in 'pain' would be to saying that someone is behaving in such and such a way because,

outward behaviour is the necessary and sufficient condition of pain. And if it is such that outward behaviour is the necessary and sufficient conditions of pain, then we cannot conceive of pain if these behaviours are not there. Moreover, 'X is in pain' would mean 'X is behaving in such a way' and nothing more. In other words, pain would simply mean 'pain behaviour' and nothing more. However, I think that, whenever Wittgenstein says that inner should stand in need of outward criteria, he uses the term criteria to mean that it is an observable phenomena by which we can know something mental is going on which is unobservable to us. To use criterion in this sense, is to use it in the sense of necessary condition and not in the sense of sufficient condition. Since it is only necessary condition and not a sufficient condition for the explanation of pain, we need not have to equate pain with pain behaviour. It is necessary in the sense that pain would not be a word in language if these behaviours are not there. Again, pain simply does not refer to behaviour only. It is more than the behaviour. Wittgenstein says, "A wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is no part of the mechanism".³ He tries to show that if with pain behaviour nothing goes on inside the person, the behaviour is not at all meaningful. If a particular

wheel is to be regarded as a part of machine then when the wheel moves, some other part of the machine also must move with it if the wheel is to be regarded as a part of the machine. Similarly, he argues that external behaviour is not meaningful to us if there is nothing internal. The external behaviour in order to be meaningful there has to be the inner character of mind. Thus we find that Wittgenstein's view differs from that of Ryle because unlike Ryle he does not reject the inner character of mind, at all. The external behaviour to be meaningful, the inner has to be there.

Wittgenstein can also be interpreted to have accepted the view that we cannot reject the mental state altogether in explaining certain mental concepts. Wittgenstein argues that we can not explain 'remembering' if we hold the view that in remembering there is no mental state going on.

Wittgenstein maintains -

"But you surely cannot deny that, for example, in remembering, an inner process takes place. What gives the impression that we want to deny anything? When one says, "Still, an inner process does take place here" - One wants to go on: After all, you see it"- And it is this inner process that one means by the word "remembering the impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting our faces against the picture of the inner process.

The assumption of an inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word "to remember". We say that this picture with its ramifications stand in the way of our seeing the use of the word as it is".⁴

Thus Wittgenstein wants to say that we cannot hold the view that there is no inner process. Moreover, he can be interpreted as saying that remembering is completely an inner process. For example, whenever, I try to remember something or whenever I try to remember what I did in the last evening, I just go on correlating one action with another and in this way I finally remember what I did. This sort of correlating is completely a process of thinking I need not have to behave physically in a particular manner. What I am required to do is to do some sort of thinking and this is completely a mental process. Thus philosophical behaviourism as is advocated by Wittgenstein does not deny the truth of our every day statements and mental process. Wittgenstein says-

Why should I deny that there is a mental process ? But "these has just taken place in me a mental process of remembering..... means nothing more than I have just remembered". To deny the mental process would mean to deny remembering, deny that anyone ever remembers anything".⁵

Thus Wittgenstein means to say that whenever we say that we have remembered something it means there has occurred in

us some mental process of remembering. Without this process we cannot say we have remembered. Therefore, to deny the process would be to deny remembering.

References :

¹ Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p.190.

² Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigation Sec 580 p.153.

³ Ibid, Sec 721, p.95.

⁴ Ibid, Sec 305, p.102.

⁵ Ibid, Sec 306, p.102.

CHAPTER - III

Ryle on Emotion

It is virtually impossible to give a definition of emotion that all psychologists will accept although all of them agree that fear, anger, joy, disgust should be classified as emotions. Even though we are unable to give a precise definition of emotion, we can, at least, try to analyse what the concept of emotion is. Different philosophers hold different views regarding the concept of emotion. According to the traditional philosophers, emotions are internal or private experiences the owner of which can directly register them. They are internal states taking place in one's secret mental world. As opposed to this traditional view of emotion, Ryle holds a dispositional view of emotion according to which they turn out not to be internal states at all 'but to be reasons' for predicting the overt behaviour. We shall come across Ryle's view of emotion more elaborately a bit latter. Now we shall see what other philosophers have to say about emotion. So in this chapter we will have two parts - first part dealing with different views of emotions by different philosophers and in the second half we will be dealing mainly with Gilbert Ryle's view on emotion.

I

J.B. Watson, the founder of Behaviourism defined emotions as "an hereditary pattern - reaction involving profound changes of the bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly of the visceral and glandular systems".¹ Watson's behaviourism is more of a scientific nature than philosophical. It is scientific in the sense that like other sciences it brings behaviourism or it tries to explain an event through the means of antecedents and consequence only. That is, it explains a piece of behaviour in terms of antecedent stimulus and the consequent of the muscular changes and glands. Muscles and glands are the only effectors and there is no additional mental activity. And that is why Watson tries to characterise emotion only as changes of bodily mechanism. That is, whenever a person is angry we are to explain it by saying that there is a stimulus or an object which makes him angry and when he is angry/^{his} bodily mechanisms are in particular states. Therefore, emotions are to be explained only as stimulus-response behaviour and it implies nothing mental on the part of person who is having a particular type of emotion. But this theory has some drawbacks. Such an explanation leaves no scope for us to distinguish between emotional and non-emotional patterns like

sneezing, coughing and some other reflex actions. Like anger, sneezing and coughing have to be explained in terms of stimulus and response. So given this type of explanation we cannot say whether anger is an emotion or not.

Anthony Kenny in his book "Action, Emotion and Will", gives a philosophical accounts of emotion. He criticises the traditional view of emotion. We shall see what he says of emotion.

He believes that the notion of object is essential to that of emotion and that it is not identical with that of cause. He holds that emotions have both a feeling and an explanatory or motive side to them; To attribute fear to somebody is both to indicate a disturbance of feeling and explain behaviour. Kenny criticises the traditional view as the view that emotions are "purely private mental events" or "internal impressions", or events directly observable only by the person who experiences them". Contrary to this traditional view, he holds that emotions are not internal impressions or purely private mental events. According to him, sensations, feelings and experiences are not internal impressions or purely private mental events either. He holds that emotions are feelings or at least are sometimes feelings. But how

do we distinguish feelings as emotions from other feelings or sensations ? He begins discussion on 'feeling' by distinguishing various uses of the word feel. Among other things we are given a distinction between the object form and the verb form e.g. feeling a mattress and feeling the heat of a fire. Thus he says that anything is a feeling if we use the verb feel in reporting it. In case of sensation or feeling we, by using the verb 'feel', report the feeling we are having, though sometimes it is followed by a direct object, sometimes by an adjective and sometimes by a clause.

Now, one respect in which emotions differ from sensations is that emotions are not localised whereas sensations are localised. Emotions are such that we do not refer to any particular part of body to explain their occurrence. Whereas sensations are such that we can locate them in different parts of the body. Whenever I am having a pain I can say that it is either in my leg or in my hand and so on. But so far as emotions are concerned we cannot localise it.

Kenny then holds that emotions have a characteristic history. "Any pattern is accidental to a sensation, while some pattern is essential to an emotion".² Kenny says that an emotion

has a characteristic history behind it. For example, say, whenever I see Mr. X, I get angry. That is, whenever I see Mr. X, I have the emotion of anger. And there is a characteristic history behind it in the sense that may be sometimes in the past he behaved badly with me. And therefore, whenever I see him I get angry with him. Here my being angry with him is case of emotion and this emotion is there, because there is a history behind it. And then, Kenny says that this pattern is essential to emotions. He says that it is essential because I would not have been angry with him if I did not have this in the background. Therefore, it is essential so far as emotion is concerned. Whereas, this is not so, so far as sensation or feeling is concerned. It is not essential for a sensation or feeling to have a characteristic history. For example, if I get hurt by a stone I get pain and my feeling pain is a sensation. But my feeling pain is not dependent on any characteristic history. If I am hit by a stone I feel pain and my feeling pain is not dependent on a characteristic history as in case of my anger. I cannot just get angry with Mr. X, unless I have some reasons. And this reason is perhaps, what is called a characteristic history. And, therefore, this pattern is essential for the emotion of anger.

However, Kenny holds that the most important difference between emotion and sensation is that emotions unlike sensations

are essentially directed towards objects. That is, there must be an object for an emotion whatever it may be. It is not that the object of emotion has to be a physical object only. It can even be non-physical. But whatever it may be, the object of emotion has to be there. Whenever I am afraid, there must be something which I am afraid of. I cannot be just afraid of nothing. Likewise, whatever, I am angry, there must be someone with whom I am angry and the person with whom I am angry would be the object of my anger. However, there is a difference between object and causes of emotion. The person 'X' is the object of my anger and there is a certain reason behind it, like, he behaved badly with me and that must be the cause of my emotion. Wittgenstein also holds that among emotions the directed might be distinguished from the undirected. Fear at something, joy over something. Thus Wittgenstein also makes a distinction between the cause and the object of emotion.

Now, what Kenny holds is that for each emotion there must be an object and that is why it is said that emotions are directed to objects. Then he says that sensations or feelings are not directed to objects. Sensations or feeling do not have objects. Emotions are feeling of such a kind that they must have

objects whereas sensations are feelings of such a kind that they may or may not have objects. It is not necessary that they must have objects. He says hunger is a sensation but there is no object of hunger.

Now we shall see what does he actually mean by the 'object' of emotion. In his book "Action, Emotion and Will" Kenny says,-

"The sense of 'object' which I have hitherto employed and wish now to discuss is one which derives from the grammatical notion of the object of a transitive verb. The object of fear is what is feared, the object of love is what is loved, the object of cutting is what is cut, the object of heating is what is heated. In discussing the nature of objects we are simply discussing the logical role of the object-expressions which complete the sense of intentional - and non-intentional verbs".³

However, I think that having of an object is not an isolated fact about emotion. That is, emotions do not differ from sensations or feeling only in the sense that emotions have objects whereas sensations or feeling do not. Because sometimes, some sensations seem to have objects. For example, whenever I feel hungry, my hunger is certainly for food and in that case, food may be said to be the object of my hunger. Similar is the case, if I say, I am getting the smell of mango. Here certainly I am having a sensation and mango is the object of my smell. But here the sensations or feelings have objects although it is

not a case of emotion.

Kenny would say that the important difference between an emotion and a feeling or sensation is not that any emotion has an object and no sensation has but that the connection between an emotion and its objects is of a certain kind namely non-contingent whereas the connection between sensation and its object is not of this kind. Kenny criticises Hume's view that the relation between an emotion and an object is a causal one. He quotes one passage from Hume's which shows that the connection being affirmed is a contingent one.

"It is because our minds happen to be made as they are that the object of pride is self or the object of love another person, not because of anything involved in the concept of pride, just as it is because our bodies happen to be made as they are that our ears are lower than our eyes, not because of anything involved in the concept of ear".⁴

Thus, Hume wants to say that the connection between pride and the object of pride is contingent and not apropr. He also says,

"It always happens that we feel proud of our own achievements and not say, of the industry of ants in stone-age-Apua. ...That the idea of Self is not part of the nature of pride and humility; all that belongs to this is a particular experience".⁵

Hume makes a distinction between the object and the cause of an emotion and then holds that the relation between an emotion and an object is a contingent one. Let us take, for instance, the

sentence - I feel proud of my own achievements. Here feeling proud would be an emotion and my achievements would be the object of my pride in the sense that the object of pride is what one is proud of and in that sense I am proud of my achievements. Now, I think, Hume would say that the relation between pride and object is causal because I myself is the cause of my pride. He holds that there is nothing in the concept of my pride as such that I myself is the object of pride but my mind is such that I am always proud of myself. That is, my mind whatever it may, is the cause of my pride. Moreover, I think that it is only if we say that the connection between the two is causal, then only we can think that sometimes it is quite consistent to think that I am not proud of my achievements. I have achieved something, but I may not feel proud of it. But if the relation between the two would have been non-contingent then we could not even think of this possibility to be there. However, since this possibility is there, I think, we can support Hume's view that the connection between the two is a contingent connection.

As against Hume, Kenny holds that the relation between emotion and object is not a contingent one. Kenny wishes to claim that each emotion can have only certain restricted type of

objects. He says-

"In fact each of the emotions is appropriate- logically and not just morally appropriate- only to certain restricted objects. One cannot be afraid of just anything, nor happy about anything whatsoever..... What is not possible is to be grateful for, or proud of, something which one regards as an evil unmixed with good. Again, it is possible to be envious of one's fruit trees; but only if one mistakenly believes that the land on which they stand is part of one's neighbour's property .. What is not possible is to envy something which one believes to belong to oneself".⁶

Kenny tries to show that the emotion e.g. pride is logically connected with certain kinds of object. The concept of pride is such that I cannot just be proud of anything. But I can be proud of only those things which is in some way related to me. That is, pride is always related to certain kind of objects. It is a non-contingent fact that emotions are always directed to certain kinds of objects. He holds that for any emotion-type, the emotion of that type must be connected to object of certain type. Thus he tries to say that it is a non-contingent fact about emotion-object relation. However, as against this, we might say that from the fact that all emotions must have objects of a certain type it does not follow that the relation between emotion and object is not a contingent one but it is non-contingent. Critics would say that from the fact that all emotions must have objects, we cannot go on to say that the relation between emotion and

object is non-contingent. From the fact that the relation between cause and effect is a causal relation, we cannot say the fact every effect has a cause, is also something causal. Neither from the fact that all causes must have effect which is not a contingent one, it follows that the relation of cause to effect is also non-contingent. Likewise, it may be true that it is a non-contingent fact that every emotion must have object but from that it does not follow that the relation between an emotion, say, pride and its objects, say, achievements must also be non-contingent. We say that for the emotion of pride there must be an object for which one is proud of and it is a necessary fact that for every emotion there is an object of emotion but from this it does not follow that the relation between pride and the object is also non-contingent. Therefore, Kenny is telling what the emotion-object relation is which is not our concern. Our task is to find out what determines what the object of a particular emotion is. Why is it that is a particular emotion has only a particular type of object associated with it ?

Kenny says that it is not in general possible to identify an emotion without identifying its object. This shows that emotion of a certain kind must have an object of a certain kind,

that is, to know what someone is feeling one must know what kind of object it has. He says

"It is not in general possible to ascribe a piece of behaviour or a sensation to a particular emotional state without at the same time ascribing an object to the emotion".⁷

That is, whenever I am ashamed of anything I know what I am ashamed of. Thus, Kenny wants to say that emotions are non-contingently connected to their manifestations in behaviour. And if emotional states are non-contingently connected with their manifestations in behaviour then it follows that emotions are nothing internal or private mental states. It seems true that in one's own case one cannot find out what emotion one is feeling without finding out what its object is. For me, I must always know what the object of emotion is with which I am emotionally connected. However, I think so far as others are concerned, at least in some cases, I can say what emotion one is having without at the same time knowing what the object of emotion is. For example, when 'X' is behaving in a particular way, I can say that 'X' is afraid of something even though I do not know of what he is afraid of. However, that does not imply that, there is no connection between emotion and behaviour. So far as the person is concerned one shall have to find out what is the relation between his

behaviour and the emotion he is having. And Kenny says that there is a non-contingent connection between two.

However, if we say that the connection between emotion and behaviour is contingent, then it implies that we are saying something like this: that my emotional state or feeling causes me to behave in such and such a way. But can we apply causal explanation in case of human behaviour? Are the two alike? 'The glass broke because it was struck', and 'I behaved in such and such a way because I was afraid'.

Some philosophers hold that explanation of behaviour in terms of motive, desire and emotion etc. is not a causal explanation. It is said that in case of causal explanation, we arrive at the conclusion that two things or events are causally related by inductive generalizations. We see that in several cases that when one event is occurring then the other events is also there and from this we conclude that they are causally related. For example, we see that in several times when there is black cloud, there is rain and from this we come to the conclusion that black cloud is the cause of rain. But do we really apply this inductive method in case of human behaviour also? Do we really proceed like this that in several cases I have seen

that whenever I am having a headache I behave in such and such a way, and therefore these two are causally related and since now I am behaving in such a way, therefore I must be having pain. Certainly, we never do like this and it is something absurd to say that in case of human behaviour we apply inductive generalization.

Again, if human behaviour would have been a case of causal explanation then, like other causal states, predictions would have been possible in case of human behaviour also. Since in case of other causal events, there is some causal law, that we can predict that 'in future this event is going to produce that event'. But human behaviour is such that it does not fall under any law and in case of human behaviour no prediction is possible. We can never say that given such and such a situation he will behave in such and such a way. Therefore, I think causal explanation is not possible in case of human behaviour.

Moreover, there are certain things which must hold good so far as any causal explanation is concerned. The first is that the cause must be independently identifiable at least once. And if this is not done then it cannot be said to be a case of causal explanation. Just as in case of black cloud and rain,

we can identify black cloud independently of rain and therefore it is a case of causation. However, in case of human behaviour, say, in emotional behaviour, we cannot identify an emotional feeling apart from behaviour. We cannot go like this that now I am having this feeling and at the same time I am behaving in such and such a way. We cannot identify the two separately. I am having an emotion means I am behaving in such and such a way. And my behaviour cannot be there without my feeling afraid. So these two cannot occur separately and therefore, it is not a case of causation.

II

Gilbert Ryle gives a dispositional account of emotion. According to him, emotions are used in two different senses. In the first sense, emotions are used to refer to higher level behaviour of the people; it refers to motives or inclinations of the people. In the second sense, it refers to moods and agitations of the people. However, he holds that in none of the above senses, the overt behaviour is the effect of something mental which is occult. In the third sense, he holds that feelings are emotions. However, he holds that whenever we say that feelings are emotions, it does not mean that our overt

emotional behaviour is the effect of such feeling.

Now, let us see, what Ryle has got to say so far as motives are concerned. He holds that to explain an action as done from a certain motive is not to give a causal explanation. My motive cannot be the cause of my action. In this regard, he makes a distinction between two sorts of explanations; (i) Causal explanation and (ii) Explanation in terms of reason. He says that whenever we say that the glass broke when it was hit because it was brittle', here the 'because' does not report a happening or a cause. It states a law-like proposition. Likewise, he holds that to explain an action as done from certain motive is not to give a causal explanation as such but it is to bring it under a law like proposition. That is, when we say that 'X' has done it from such and such motive, it does not imply that we are telling something like that his action is the effect of certain motive, rather, it implies that 'X' is such that whenever a situation of such and such arises he does such and such. Then, he holds that a man may have several motives at a time, and if a particular motive is very strong then it dominates over other motives. He holds that a miser whose motive is to keep money would perhaps sacrificed everything even his own life to live up to his motive.

Such a man would never be seriously agitated since there is no other motive strong enough to compete with this motive. Therefore, if we use 'emotion' to refer to agitation then such persons with such motive cannot be said to be emotional and it follows that motives are not emotions at all. However, Ryle holds that motives are emotions no doubt, but they are not emotions in the sense in which agitations are emotions.

He holds that mood-word like 'tranquil', 'jovial' including words for agitations like 'harrassed' and 'homesick' stand for liabilities. It is not only that they refer to liabilities but they also stand for episodes. That is, whenever we say that 'a person is nervous' it not only means that he would behave in such and such a way but it also implies his actual behaviour i.e. he behaves in such and such a way. But agitations are not propensities to act intentionally in certain ways. Whenever a woman in anger wrings her hands, we do not say that she wrings her hands because she is motivated to get angry. Here we cannot bring motive into account. Whereas, we can say that 'his motive is to do well in the examinations and that is why he is working very hard'. Here his actions can be explained in terms of reason and not cause. Here the behaviour of the person

refers to an aim. Whereas, the behaviour of an agitated person, so to say, is aimless. Therefore, motives are not agitations nor are agitations motives.

He also makes a distinction between an action done from a motive and in action done from sheer habit. Habitual actions are often termed as 'automatic'. Whenever a person is said to do something from sheer habit, it implies that in similar circumstances he does the similar thing and he does not pay any heed to it and that is why it is called automatic. And an action done from motive differs from habitual actions in the sense that whenever a person does something from a motive, it implies that the person is 'thinking that he is doing'. He says that the expression 'thinking what he is doing' means not that the person is doing something and at the same time he is thinking of it, rather it means acting something more or less carefully, critically, consistently, and purposefully i.e. the action is done not absentmindedly but with a positive frame of mind. He further holds that actions done from a certain motive are actions which can be said to be more or less intelligent. That is, actions done from a motive refer to something higher than the actions done from mere force of habit. Actions done from

a motive coincide with actions which are said to be intelligent. An action done from a motive differs from an action done with competence in the sense that motives refer to the reason behind the action and one does the action in certain ways, whereas the competence refers to one's abilities i.e. whenever someone is said to be competent of something it means that he knows the methods or technique of the work. A man may be competent in beating and he may be beating with a motive to regain his lost health. Again, a man may have the motive of becoming a competent beater and may not have the same degree of competence. Here, the habitual actions or the automatic actions differ from an action done from a motive, in the sense that we cannot ascribe to habitual actions the quality of competence or the reason as such.

However, I think that though Ryle has held that motives are emotions and they are emotions in a sense quite different from agitations, he does not make any attempt to relate motives to emotions. He holds that motives or inclinations do not signify agitations. However, he uses 'motive' in a very broad sense and he includes all sorts of things under motive. For example, whenever he is talking about motive he gives examples like fond of gardening and interest in symbolic logic and so on. Can we

say that the fact that a person is fond of gardening is equivalent to saying that he has the motive of gardening ? Does it mean, that whenever a person is said to be fond of gardening, it means that he has the motive gardening ? He holds that phrases like 'fond of fishing, 'keen on gardening', 'bent on becoming a bishop' never signify agitations. But I, wish to say that they are not motives either in the sense in which we say "His motive is to get through the examination and that is why he is working hard". Now we shall see what sort of explanation, The motive explanation is and how the explanation in terms of motive differs from an explanation which is not in terms of any motive either. As we know, the explanation in terms of motive is not a causal explanation. Motives cannot be causes. Explanations in terms of motive are always explanations in terms of reasons. To ascribe a motive to an action is to explain it by showing that there is a reason behind the performance of an action. It is held that to ask for a motive behind an action is like asking for the explanation as well as for the justification of an action. For example, whenever it is asked "what is his motive behind, buying such costly vegetable" ? We may give the answer by saying that he wants to feed his guests well. Here we are trying to explain as well as justify his action, giving certain reasons. The question of

justification comes in forms of reasons. We sometimes ask for someone's motive behind doing something when we see that he is doing something which is contrary to his convention, or in simple way to say, which is not usually the case what he does. And in that case, to explain his motive is to justify his action, which it seems to be contrary to his rule or convention whatever it may be. Therefore, whenever we see that a person buys vegetables which are quite expensive, we ask for his motive because he usually never buys vegetables at a costly price. And here, we are unearthing the motive behind his action in the sense that we are explaining and at the same time trying to justify his action by saying that he wants to feed his guests well. This is one type of motive explanation.

Moreover, it is held that motive explanations are always explanation in terms of reason but all reason-explanations are not explanations in terms of motives. Some explanations are such that they are reason-explanations no doubt, but they cannot be said to be explanations in terms of motives. Only those reason-explanations which are of the directed sort, can be said to be motive explanations. They are reason-explanation and their reason is directed to certain goal which is absent in case of ordinary

reason explanation. For example, I think whenever we say that "I am reading the book because I like this book", here my liking the book is not cause as such, for my reading the book; rather it is the reason why I am reading the book. Here my reason for reading the book is not directed to any goal as such. I am reading the book and the reason behind it is that I like the book. Whereas, whenever we say that "I am working hard and the reason behind it is that I want to secure a good position in the examination, it is a reason explanation. But it is not only an explanation in terms of reason, it has something more to it i.e. it can be said to be directed towards a goal. That is, my action aims at something which is beyond it. Or in other words, I have a goal or an aim in my mind to achieve and my action is directed towards it. And that is why, whenever I am asked "why are you working hard", I say, I want to get a good position. That is to say, I have an aim to secure a good position and my action is directed to achieve that aim. Here my securing a good position is not only the reason but it is the motive why I am working hard. Thus we find that, all reason-explanations are not explanations in terms of motive.

As we have seen earlier, explanations in terms of disposition are reason-explanations and not causal explanations.

Similarly, explanation in terms of traits of character is also a reason-explanation and not a causal explanation. But we will see whether they can be said to be motive explanations or not. Let us, for instance, take the dispositional explanation first. Suppose, someone is drinking water and if he is asked "What is the motive for your drinking water" ? He might reply that 'I am thirsty'. Here it seems that he has a goal or that his reason for drinking water is directed towards a goal i.e. he wants to quench his thirst. Therefore, it seems that this reason explanation in terms of a disposition is an explanation in terms of a motive.

However, some philosophers would say that there is something called personality traits in man. For example, philanthropy, vanity, punctuality, kindness and so on are called the traits of character. Some individuals have these characters. Now, so far as our reason explanations are concerned, sometimes we give a reason explanation in terms of traits of character. For example, we say that he comes in time because he is punctual. Or we say that he is helping the poor because he is kind. Here punctuality and kindness are not the cause but the reason behind someone's acting in such and such a way. Now, we will see whether such explanations can be said to be explanations in terms

of motive or not. Some would say that to explain something in terms of kindness is not an explanation in terms of motive because here the reason is not directed to any goal.

However, it seems that Ryle does not make any discrimination among dispositions. And it also seems that he tries to hold that all dispositional explanations ~~are not only reason-~~ explanation but they are also explanations in terms of motive. It is true that hungry, greed, considerate, kind, punctual, polite are all dispositional terms. But some dispositional terms refer to the traits of character of a person and cannot be treated as motives; while others always refer to certain goals of a reason and not to traits. Ryle does not make any difference between motive and trait. He holds,

"To say that a certain motive is a trait in someone's character is to say that he is inclined to do certain sort of things, make certain sort of plans, indulge in certain sort of day dreams and also of course in certain situations to feel certain sorts of feelings. To say that he did something from motive is to say that this action, done in its particular circumstances was just the sort of thing that was an inclination to do. It is to say he would do that".¹

Thus Ryle wants to say that a motive is also a trait in a person, that is, if punctuality which is a motive in a person is also a trait, then to say that one did something from the motive of punctuality is to say that one would do certain sorts of

things in certain sorts of situations. Thus, he tries to show that there is no difference between motive and traits to show that there is no difference between motive and traits and both of them refer to the dispositions of a person.

However, R.S. Peters in his book "The Concept of Motivation", holds that there is a distinction between motive and traits. He holds that traits of character like honesty, punctuality and considerateness, do not indicate any goal that a man tends to pursue; whereas motive-terms like, hunger, greed etc. always refer to certain goals in a person. Rather, Peters holds that to say that a person has certain traits e.g. honesty is to say that the person imposes certain regulation of his conduct. An honest person always follows certain sort of standards and he performs his goal whatever it may be, according to that standard. For example, if the motive of an honest person is to pass the examination well, then to fulfil his aim he would do certain sorts of action and they would always be according to certain standard which are honest, that is, his means would be honest. Thus, according to R.S. Peters, the traits of a person dominate over his motives. A person would follow only certain types of actions in order to fulfil his aim or motive depending on what type of

person he is. Whereas, Ryle holds that sometimes a motive, if it is very strong, then it dominates over other motives. In this case he holds that a miser would perhaps sacrifice everything, even his life itself rather than lose what he most prizes. However, I think that Ryle could say such things only because he equates traits with motive. Certainly, to speak of a person as miser is not to say something about the motive of a person but it is to talk about the traits of a person. It is these traits which impose certain regulations on his conduct. For example, a miser, if his motive is to build a house, since he is a miser, therefore he would try to find out how to build a house with less money.

Let us see how motives are said to be related to emotions.

Ryle, in his discussion on emotion, in the section 'Inclination and Agitation', seems to talk about the relationship between emotion and motive. However, he holds that in case of the relation between emotion and motive, motive is not used in the sense of being motivated i.e. "keen to do or get something". It is used in the sense of something that stirs or causes or induces one to move. Further, he holds that people voluntarily subject themselves to suspense, fatigue, fear and surprise in such activities as angling, rowing, travelling, crossword puzzles and so on. Suspense,

fatigue, fear and surprise etc. are agitations because they are disturbances and they cause or induce a man to behave in such and such a way.

The Oxford English Dictionary defines 'motive' as 'that which moves' or induces a person to act in a certain way, a desire, fear, or other emotion or a consideration of reason, which influences or tends to influence a person's volition; also often applied to a contemplated result or object the desire of which tends to influence volition. This definition indicates that a motive is something which leads one to behave in a particular way, it may be fear, desire or other emotion or a reason which induces one to behave in a particular way and that is why it is called 'motive', so far as this emotion or reason is directed to some movement or behaviour.

Ryke holds that people voluntarily subject themselves to such emotions like fear, anger, suspense, and so on. For example, in crossing a bridge while travelling through a bus, I might be afraid of and behave in a certain manner. Here I am afraid not because I know that I am crossing over the bridge but I am afraid because I am thinking that the bus might fall down from the bridge and it is this thinking which induces me to behave in a particular way.

As we know, Ryle uses the term 'voluntary' in a quite difference sense. According to him, we discuss whether an action is voluntary or not, only when the action seems to have some fault and when the action is such that it could have been otherwise also. For example, Ryle holds that when a boy does a sum wrong, we ask, is it voluntary? Whereas, when the boy does his sum right we never ask- does he do it voluntarily? Thus, when the boy does the sum wrong, it implies that he could have made it right also; therefore, in such a case only we ask whether it is voluntarily or not. Therefore, so far as Ryle holds that man voluntarily subjects himself to fear, suspense etc., it implies that a man who is afraid that the bus which is running over a bridge might fall down, could have helped not to be so afraid. He could have sat nicely without getting afraid of falling down. According to Ryle, it is not the case that one could not help being fearful. A man who is getting angry with someone cannot be said that he could not help but getting angry with him. He could have controlled his anger, But this is altogether a different matter whether angers are voluntary or not. However, I think that so far as the relationship between motive and emotion is concerned Ryle has said very little and I think he has not mentioned why he believes that motive, is

related to emotion on the sense of being 'stirred' and not in the sense of anything as being motivated.

A.R. White, also holds that there is a distinction between motives and dispositions. He holds that motives are a class of reasons and not a class of dispositions. He further holds that only lasting traits can be treated as motives but motives are not lasting traits. To explain something in terms of a disposition is like giving an explanation in terms of reason where there cannot be any mention of any goal or purpose. To say why the glass breaks by saying that because it is brittle is to give an explanation in terms of disposition only and it cannot be treated as a causal explanation. It is an explanation in terms of reason. Now, so far as explanation of human behaviour is concerned when we ask for motive of an action and when we explain it in terms of a character traits then it is a dispositional analysis no doubt but it cannot be an explanation in terms of motive. To say that a person does something because he is vain, is not to say that the vain is the motive of the person. 'Vanity' being a personality trait in him is only a disposition i.e. to say that he is a vain person is to say that he would behave in such and such a way under such and such circumstances. Therefore, whenever a vain man does something

because of which we say that he is vain, here he does that sort of thing because he is the sort of person he is. And so far as he does that sort of thing only because he is that sort of person, then we cannot say that his motive is vanity. From the very fact that it is a dispositio~~n~~, it can be a motive. Moreover, I think motives cannot be treated as dispositio~~n~~ because motive explanat~~ion~~ are such that whenever we ask for someone's motive behind an action it implies that we are asking for an explanation and it is not merely an explanation, but it being an explanation justifies the action also. And so far as motives stand as justifications for an action they are something which lie beyond the action or outside the realm of action. Whereas, dispositions are such that to explain an action in terms of disposition is to give an explanation; it is not to justify an action. Justification never comes within the realm of disposition. By taking a particular disposition into account we cannot justify the occurrence of an event. For example, whenever we ask "what is his motive for helping the poor and if we answer by saying that "It is his honesty which leads him to do that", then it is a dispositional explanation and honesty is a disposition, but here it cannot be said to be an explanation in terms of motive; it is only a reason-explanation.

Honesty being a disposition, helping the poor is simply the manifestation of that disposition. If at a particular time someone asks why these sugars are dissolving in water now ? and if we answer by saying that 'because it is soluble', then solubility is said to be the reason behind the dissolving of sugar in water. And the dissolving of sugar in water can be said to be the manifestation of that disposition. Likewise, helping the poor is only one of the manifestations of the dispositional traits called honesty. As honesty is not something different from helping the poor, therefore while asking why a man helps the poor, then if in answer we say, that it is because he is honest, it, I think, can never be a motive explanation but is only an explanation in terms of reason. Thus, I think that motives cannot be dispositions. And character traits which are dispositions cannot be motives.

Moreover, I think that the very fact that someone does something from character traits it implies that it cannot be treated as a motive. Suppose, a person who is punctual, comes to a meeting in time, then, we never ask, why he comes in time ? and even if we ask why he comes in time, then to answer, like this that, 'because he is punctual' is something which sounds very odd. Because as we know a man behaves or acts in the way

depending on what type of person he is. And here to try to point out a motive by saying what type of person he is, is not sound. If a man's action falls within his character traits then, I think, it cannot be said to have any goal or purpose. We can ask for motive of a man's action only when we see that his action does not tally with his character traits. To explain anything in terms of character traits would not be an explanation in terms of motive. When a man who is honest is found trying to steal something, we ask what is his motive behind doing this? We can answer by saying that he wants to help those needy people. Here, the motive to help the poor justifies his stealing since it lies outside his character traits.

Now, let us see what Ryle has got to say so far as moods are concerned and how does he relate mood to emotion. Depression, happiness, restlessness and jolliness are some of the moods that a person can be said to exhibit. According to Ryle, moods are dispositions just as motive. If a person is jovial it does not imply that he is having something inside him or something is going on inside him all the time, but it means that if he is in jovial mood, he finds everything attractive than usual. Moods are only liabilities. However, Ryle holds that there is a distinction between moods and motives though both of them are

dispositions. He holds that moods are liabilities but they are not propensities to act intentionally. And it is this feature of intentionality or purposiveness which distinguishes those reasons we call motives from those reasons we call automatic, habitual, aimless behaviour. And this is, in fact, how Ryle distinguishes motives from moods. He holds, e.g., that when a woman wrings her hands in anger, she does not do it from any motive. We never ask from what motive she wrings her hands. Just as aimless behaviour and paralysis of behaviour are the symptoms of agitations, likewise, wringing hands is also the symptom of anger. He further, holds that the distinction between moods and motives is such that moods are monopolising in nature and character is a title of a total set of a person during that short term. That is, if a person is in a particular mood at a particular time, he cannot be in any other mood. Whereas, motives are not monopolising. A person can have several motives at a particular point of time. They are not monopolising. However, one would say that it is only a distinction between moods and traits and not moods and motives. He holds that a person's momentary mood is a different sort of thing from motives which actuate him. In fact, it can be said that it is not the motives but traits of character which actuate a person. Depending on what type of person one is, it

can be said that one will be in such and such mood if one is put in a particular situation.

Ryle then holds that names of moods are names of emotions. And in that sense, emotions cannot be segregated from thinking, day dreaming and so on. To be in the mood of boredom is to feel certain thoughts and not others, to yawn and not to converse and so on. Just as to have an emotion is not to feel a particular feeling all the time, likewise, to be in a particular mood is not to undergo any unique feeling; it includes doing of certain things in a certain way. Ryle then holds that these moods are such that they do not refer to anything private or mental and that is why to find out whether I am in a particular mood or not I have to go through behaviour only as in the case of others I go through their behaviour to find out what moods they are in. I find, in my own case as well as in case of others e.g. 'I am feeling sleepy' or that 'X is feeling sleepy', is to be found out by finding out whether I am or X is yawning. It is nothing a sleepy man yawns because he has found out that he is sleepy, but it is like the case that he is yawning, therefore he is sleepy.

Regarding moods, Ryle holds that they differ from motive words, not in the term of their application but in their use in

characterising the total 'set' of a person during that short term. Just as we say that the entire ship is cruising likewise the mood refers to the entire person as nervous, gloomy and so on. Thus Ryle wants to say that to be in a particular mood is to be possessed by something.

However, I think that though it is true that we find out only through behaviour what mood somebody is in, yet, moods cannot be equated with behaviours only. To be in an angry mood does not only imply that he behaves in such and such a way. Sometimes it may be so happen that a person is very angry but he does not show any angry behaviour at all. We might go through behaviour to find out what mood one is in but from this it does not follow that moods are only liabilities to behave in such and such a way. Ryle says,

"a person's mood during a given period colours all or most of his actions and reactions during that period. His work and his play, his talk and his grimaces, his appetite and his day dreams, all select his touchiness his joviality and his depression".⁹

According to him, to be in a particular mood is to do certain sorts of things and not others. If a person is in a depressed mood, all his actions will reflect his depression and so on. However, I wish to point out that so far as Ryle says that a person's action reflects his mood whatever it may be, mood is not equivalent to

his action. As actions are reflection of mood, they are something of the mood, that is, they are somehow related to mood but they themselves are not the whole of moods. Reflection is always reflection 'of something', just as 'expression' is said to be the expression of 'something'. Otherwise, if they (reflection) would have been the mood then there would have been no need to speak of them as the reflection of mood.

Now we shall see what Ryle has got to say so far as agitations are concerned. According to him, 'to be anxious', 'shoked', 'irritated', 'harrassed' etc. are some of the words which refer to agitations. He then says that agitations are the commotions in our bodies. Agitations differ from inclinations in the sense that inclinations are not disturbances. A man is agitated when he has two inclinations with opposing forces or when an inclination runs counter to another or when an inclination runs counter to a factual impediment. Agitation is inclination thwarted by the hard facts of the world. However, it may be said that this rule for distinguishing agitations and inclinations conflicts with one another which Ryle offers i.e. that motives are, whereas moods including agitation are not "propensities to act intentionally". Then fear and anger would be agitations

by the first test but motives by the second test. The first test would exclude 'inclination' from the category 'inclination'. He then says that agitations like Moods are only liabilities but are not propensities like motives. For example, to be panic is liable to do certain sorts of things such as stiffen or shriek or to be unable to finish one's sentence. He holds that agitations are not propensities because the things we do when we are agitated are not done on purpose. A woman in anger wrings her hand but we do not say that she does this on purpose. Anguish is not the motive from which she does these things. Ryle then says that wringing of the hands, aimless behaviour as well as paralysis of behaviour are only the symptoms of agitations.

Further, Ryle holds that feelings are intrinsically connected with agitations.

"It is part of the logic of our descriptions of feeling that they are signs of agitations and are not exercises of inclinations".¹⁰

Feelings are intrinsically related to agitations because feelings are signs of agitations. Throbs, twinges by themselves refer to the feelings and words which follow them e.g. 'compassion', 'remark', are the symptomatic of agitations.

Ryle holds that agitations e.g. getting shocked, anxious, started are not occurrences but are disturbances only. However, it can be said that so far as, they are commotions in our bodies, they are occurrences, since commotions are always occurrences. According to Ryle, anger and fear are agitations, because he holds that the things that we do when we are angry or when are fearful are not done on purpose and therefore, they are agitations only. However, I like to say that fear and anger are not commotions only but they are occurrences also. By being commotions or disturbances of some sort, they are occurrences. So long as feelings are occurrences agitations are also occurrences. And they are not just liabilities. As we see, we always speak of fear, anger, as a feeling and since they also refer to some sorts of feelings, therefore they are occurrences no doubt.

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- ²Anthony Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, p.68.
- ³Ibid., p.187-88.
- ⁴Ibid., p.24-25.
- ⁵Ibid., p.25.
- ⁶Ibid., p.192-93.

⁷ Ibid., p.60.

⁸ Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p.90.

⁹ Ibid., p.96.

¹⁰ Ibid., p.101.

CHAPTER - IV

Imagination

The philosophical study of imagination is considered as forming an important part of philosophy of mind. The philosophical study of imagination consists in finding out the analysis of what it is to imagine. Imagination is sometimes thought to be a non-rational faculty or power of the mind. It is linked with our feelings and senses. The Cartesian conception of the mind-body relation has led us to believe that people think to themselves, feel pain or joy, have pangs of remorse or hunger, that there is imagery and to ignore that thinking, feeling and imagining occur in public context.

However, in the Concept of Mind, Ryle attempts to show that in talking about mind, we do not need to refer to the mind as a special kind of thing or place where mental acts take place. It is not a hidden source of all that people do as thinking feeling beings. Mind connotes the actual observable things that people can be seen to do. Usually people consider imagination as being private and internal and accessible only to introspection. But for Ryle, mental terms do not refer to introspectible mental entities or events. The mental term, 'belief' does not refer to any mental

occurrence or process but to a disposition to do certain things. And so far as the mental term imagination is concerned one has no privileged access to others' world of imagination. Ryle thinks that there is no one thing that can be called imagination but rather a variety of activities that are imaginative among which are pretending acting, impersonating, fancying and the so called imaging. A child shows his imaginative ability not by what goes on in his head rather by the way in which he plays, for instance, the manner in which he pretends to be a bear. An actor demonstrates his ability by the way he performs on the stage. The so called mental accompaniments are irrelevant to his public appearances. When we do sums on a piece of paper, we are not doing two things at the same time, one private and the other public. We do not first do the sums mentally and then put them down on paper. The publicly observable behaviour of putting the sums down on paper is the mental act of doing sums.

However, as against Ryle, it can be said that this is not at all true of imagination. Imagination does not necessarily involve the publicly observable behaviour or action. One can very well imagine of 'X' without showing any outward behaviour. One can think of cases where any or all of them (i.e. behaviour) are

absent and yet one may still imagine or visualize something. That is, there may not be any natural behaviour or symptoms of imagination at all. And, I think, it is in this respect that imagination differs from the mental conduct concepts such as being jealous. The workings of imagination seem to resist explanation in terms of publicly observable behaviour.

Ryle in his chapter on Imagination holds that imagining or visualizing is not inner seeing. Imagining is not the seeing of mental objects. The main consideration that makes him think that visualizing an object is not a case of seeing an object is the claim that we can only see objects that exist. Ryle suggests that we can see an object when our eyes are open and the surroundings are illuminated. For him, imagination which is considered as seeing things in one's mind's eye does not involve either the existence of things seen or the occurrence of seeing them. He argues that just as people who pretend to commit murders and just as there are no victims of mock murderers, so people who visualise do not see anything nor are there any objects of mock sight. Therefore, Ryle thinks that in imagination when claim to see something is made it does not satisfy the ordinary accepted concept of seeing i.e. the existence of things seen and the

occurrence of seeing. Even if one were to talk of the location of objects in private time and space, as in the case when I say that an event preceded another in my dream or that I saw an apparition in the centre of my visual field, the objects of my imagination could still not be described as being located in my mind. Now, one can ask, - If Ryle does not think that picturing consists in seeing mental images, what does he think it is? He thinks that imagining i.e. seeing is a kind of pretending. In imaginatio--n we do not actually see but we pretend to see. Just as people who pretend to commit murders do not commit murders and just as there are no victims of mock murders, so people who imagine do not see anything nor are there any object of mock sight. Thus, according to Ryle, ¹⁴ imaging i.e. picturing, having a tune running through one's head etc. is one of the many kinds of acts of pretending and pretending is one of the many ways in which we exercise our imagination. Ryle, further says that pretending to do 'X' is more complex than doing X since pretending to do X involves the knowledge of what it is to do X. 'A' cannot pretend to be murderer or jealous unless he knows what it is to be jealous. However, Ryles maintains that, the person who pretends to be jealous, is not doing two things at the same time - contemplating jealousy and acting in a jealous way.

Pretending to do 'X' does not involve two things - one of meditating X and the other of doing the acting, i.e. one the mental act of pretending and the other overt behaviour. For him, there cannot be such a thing as an overt act of pretending to see or hear simply because there can be no act of pretending to see or hear either overt or secret. Seeing, hearing or any sort of perceiving is not bringing anything about. It is getting something or keeping it but it is not a doing at all. Now, if Ryle maintains that to see something in the mind's eye or to run through a tune in one's head is a kind of pretending and if this pretending involves neither any overt action nor does any act of pretending in secret, then one can ask what this pretence is? Is not the pretence a pretence of having certain inner experience which we actually do not have? If imaging is 'pretending to perceive' then what does one pretend when one pretends to perceive? I think that pretending consists in doing something overtly or producing some overt behaviour knowing fully well that one's overt behaviour is not associated with any 'inner'. I am said to pretend to be in pain only if I show pain-behaviour and do not have pain. Likewise, a person who feels pain may pretend not to be in pain by abstaining or refraining from pain behaviour. The capacity to pretend to do

something or to be something without engaging in any publicly observable behaviour or act is imagining or fancying. Now, if pretending consists in refraining from doing something overtly then can we not say that a person is pretending when he behaves to be jealous without being jealous ?

Moreover, the fact that the logic of 'pretending to perceive 'X' and 'imagining X' are similar and that they are both more complex than that of ordinary perceiving, does not prove that they are equivalent. It is also not clear like how can we reduce imagining to a kind of pretending since pretence is a very complex type of behaviour ? Ryle gives an example of pretence by saying that an actor who pretends to be a murderer on the stage deliberately moves about, changes his expressions and does all other things like a real murderer. Therefore, for one to pretend that one is a murderer is for one to behave in some way or other. Now how can Ryle say that 'imagining' and 'pretending' are similar since in imagining there is no set of overt actions like pretending ?

In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein says, "One ought to ask, not what images are or what happens when one imagines anything but how the word 'imagination' is used. The

question as to the nature of the image is as much about the word 'imagination' as my question is".¹ Wittgenstein is not denying that there is a question of what we may properly refer to as the 'nature' of the image, only that this question is not to be decided - neither for the person who does the imagining nor for anyone else - by pointing ; nor yet by a description of any process.

Ryle holds that we may be encouraged in our tendency to think of images as things we can look at in our heads by our proneness to take seeing as the best example of perception and therefore to take visualizing as the best example of imagining. In ordinary perception we may look either at a dog or at a photograph of a dog. The photograph stands in a particular relation to the dog i.e. it represents the dog. In this way, we can think of mental images as fulfilling the same function as photographs or a portrait bearing the same kind of relation as photographs or portraits to what they are images of. According to Ryle, though we think that we are correct in our assimilation yet it is not true. We may visualize a dog in the absence of the dog itself and may also possess a photograph of the dog in its absence we may think that there is something which we can take a look at, in both cases, to remind ourselves of the dog's appearance and that

when we see the dog in our mind's eye we are inspecting this thing.

If a description of a face is as good in the absence as in the presence of the face, this must be due to the presence of something like a photograph of the face. Ryle would say that the fact that a man can give a description of an absent face does not in itself show that he is seeing either the face or a replica of the face. He might be able to give the description just because he knew what the face was like. In Ryle's language, he might have learned and not forgotten the characteristics of the face. Ryle does not deny that we can accurately describe our images. What he denies is that images are like material objects. By saying that images are not things we mean that images are not material objects and probably also that they are unlike material objects in certain specifiable and important respects. But it should not be taken to mean that there are no such things as images because this in turn, would imply that we never visualize things, or attempt to recall things by 'seeing' them or 'hearing' them or even smelling them and it would be something absurd. Ryle, himself does not deny that we see things in the mind's eye, nor does he deny the connection between such 'seeing' and the seeing of photographs or portraits. He says that when a visible likeness of a person is in front of

my nose, I often seem to be seeing the person himself in front of my nose, though he is not there and may be long since dead. Or when I hear the recording of a friend's voice, I fancy I hear him singing or speaking in the room though he is miles away.

Therefore, in imagination we seem to see something but we do not actually see. Ryle maintains that when we look at a photograph or a particular portrait and see it as a representation of someone, there is a sense in which we see in our imagination the man of whom it is a representation. As soon as we see the portrait before us as a present likeness of someone who is not present we see the original in the portrait. The sense in which we can be said to 'see' the original is exactly the same as that in which we see the dog in our mind's eye when the dog itself is not present. But in the case of dog, there is no portrait or photograph for us to see the absent dog in. Thus, there is no essential difference between the two. The only difference is that in one, we recall the face of our absent friend by looking at his photograph and in the other, we recall it by shutting our eyes and 'seeing' his face. So mental image is a kind of mental photograph, because the function of both the image and the photograph is to help us to recall the visual appearance of something which we cannot actually see before us.

However, it can be said that when a person perceives a portrait or representation of something, he does not perceive the thing at all. What he does is that he think about that thing and perceives a canvas. When he imaging that thing he only thinks about that thing and does not perceive anything at all. He thinks visually, Ryle's "fancying that one is seeing may be taken to mean this only. Thus Ryle seems to make mistakes when he says that "the man who is fancying that he is seeing" is either deceived, or is deliberately playing or pretending.

Thus, Ryle seems to have overlooked certain facts about imagination. This is true that imagination is ^{not} a mental conduct concept. But all mental conduct concepts are not of the same type. Ryle, on the other hand, treats all mental conduct concepts as of the same type. I wish to suggest that they are of different types. Further, imagination is unlike other mental concepts is that one may go on imagining without giving vent to his imagination at all.

Ryle, seeks to explain and elucidate the concept of imagination in terms of overt behaviour. But I wish to suggest that the concept of imagination cannot be exhaustively defined in terms of behaviour and dispositions. I have already argued out

that 'disposition' is also inadequate to explain mental life of men.

Reference :

¹L.Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigation, p.370.

CHAPTER - V

Mental Conduct Concepts

Ryle in his book The Concept of Mind, holds that when we describe people as exercising qualities of mind, we are not referring to occult episodes of which their overt acts and utterances are effects; we are referring to those overt acts and utterances themselves. In his book he most often refers to mental conduct concepts and says that concepts like clever, sensible, careful, inventive, witty, wise, careless, stupid and so on and so forth are mental conduct concepts. For him, these concepts display qualities of mind yet are neither themselves intellectual operations nor yet effects of intellectual operations.

"When a person is described by one or other of the intelligence-epithets such as 'shrewd' or 'silly', 'prudent' or 'imprudent' the description imputes to him not the knowledge or ignorance, of this or that truth but the ability or inability to do certain sorts of things".¹

Ryle seems to believe that though there is a distinction between 'physical' and 'mental' and that muscular doing cannot itself be a mental operation yet it does not follow that mental operations refer to internal operations or occurrences. We use the terms 'mental' and 'mind' most often. We say of a boy that he is doing mental arithmetic when instead of writing down or reciting

aloud, he says them to himself performing his calculations in silence. Similarly, a boy who does calculating aloud or on paper is also doing intellectual operation in public instead of in private. His performance is also an exercise of a mental faculty in the normal sense of 'mental'.

Ryle in The Concept of Mind says --

"What makes a verbal operation an exercise of intellect is independent of what makes it public or private. Arithmetic done with pencil and paper may be more intelligent than mental arithmetic".²

The exercises of the qualities of mind do not take place 'in the head'. Therefore, 'mental' or 'mind' does not refer to any private operation. In judging that someone is skilled at doing something we have to consider his propensities, abilities and capacities of which this performance was an actualization; we cannot say that one is skilled at doing something; we cannot just take into account his ~~own~~ success. We are to take into account his past records and subsequent behaviour. For Ryle, "mind is not the topic of sets of untestable categorical propositions but the topic of testable hypothetical and semi-hypothetical propositions".³

Moreover, what is true of 'intelligent' is true of other intelligent operations. When people are praised as clever, skilful, inspired or shrewd, they are not praised for the ways in which they consider prescriptions for conducting their special performances but for the ways in which they conduct these performances themselves. Thus, for Ryle, concepts, like 'intelligence', are mental conduct concepts because they rest on behaviour or conduct of the person. To apply mental predicates to persons is to describe the ways in which people conduct their predominantly public behaviour. So far as understanding is concerned he says,


"Understanding is a part of knowing how. The knowledge that is required for understanding intelligent performances of a specific kind is some degree of competence in performances of that kind".⁴

Understanding is a part of knowing how, in the sense that a person who does not know how to play chess cannot understand or follow the play of others. A person who cannot read or speak Swedish cannot understand what is spoken or written in Swedish. From all these Ryle concludes,

"to find that most people have minds is simply to find that they are able and prone to do certain sorts of things and this we do by witnessing the sorts of things they do. Indeed we do not merely discover what specific qualities of intellect and character particular people have".⁵

A person's mind is not an entity but the manner, style or way he behaves, Ryle tries to give us in the Concept of Mind a logical analysis of mind or mental predicates and indeed not so much of scientific as of common sense talk. Mental conduct concepts stand for dispositions to behave in certain manner, to modify behaviour in certain ways and so on. Mental conduct concepts, e.g. vanity and indolence stand for dispositional properties because to say that a person is vain is to say that whenever a situation of certain sorts have arisen, he has always or usually tried to make himself prominent or whenever he was faced by an option between doing something difficult and not doing it, he shirked doing the difficult thing. Vanity, indolence are really elliptical expressions of general hypothetical propositions. They do not assert occurrences or narrate incidents. Moreover, Ryle points out that mental conduct terms are of a semi-dispositional, semi-episodic nature. For, to say that a person is paying heed to what he is doing is not simply to attribute a certain disposition to him but also to say that he is doing something. It is both narrative and hypothetical and therefore a semi-disposition.

While talking about mind or mental predicates, Ryle says that overt intelligent performances are not clues to the workings of



minds, they are these workings. For thinking is not an activity over and above, somewhere behind a person's overt bodily performances. His overt intelligent performances are his thinking and not clues. The predicates such as vain, shrewd, careful, stupid characterise mind and to ascribe these predicates to a being is to ascribe to that being 'mind'. Or in other words, to ascribe these predicates to a creature is to say that it is a creature having mind. However, there is a difference between saying that these predicates are "clues to the workings of mind" and "they are those working". Ryle clearly points out that these mental conduct concepts are not clues to the workings of mind, they are those workings.

However, one may say that before we can call any act vain, shrewd, stupid etc. we must assume that the performance under question is a working of mind. Unless and until we assume a piece of performance under the working of mind we cannot characterise this performance by predicates like shrewd, stupid and so on. But when we say that we have to treat a performance as a working of mind, we do not mean to say that the performance is caused by mind. We do not call purely chance actions vain, shrewd or stupid etc. In fact, if we are not certain whether an action is actually a working of mind or intelligent we say, "If that was an

intelligent action it certainly was shrewd". We do not call a parrot's utterance witty or humorous because we know that parrot's action is not an intelligent action.

Ryle says that in judging whether or not an action is intelligent, we do not have to say that somebody is at a particular moment in the process of doing or undergoing anything but that he is able to do certain things, when the need arises or that he is prone to do certain things in certain sorts of situations. When a cow is said to be a ruminant or a person is said to be a grocer, it is not being said that the person is grocing now or the cow is ruminating. Because a grocer is not described as grocing now but only as selling sugar or weighing tea or wrapping up butter now.

However, at this point, one can say that though we give a dispositional account of the statements "X is intelligent and X is a grocer", yet the analogy is very weak. Because overt intelligent performances are sometimes indistinguishable from mere chance performances. For example, if a child utters an intelligent sentence and behaves in a different manner, we may be in doubt whether his action is actually an intelligent action or whether it is a mere chance utterance. But so far as the actions of the

grocer is concerned we can never be in doubt. It is never the case that we could observe someone going through all the actions of a grocer and not be sure that he was actually grocerying. But in case of intelligent action, we may be unable to judge simply from the performance itself whether it is or it is not intelligent.

Moreover, in judging that someone's performance is or is not "intelligent" i.e. whether it is or it is not a working of mind, Ryle has said that, in looking beyond the person's performance itself, we are considering his abilities and propensities or in a word, his dispositions i.e. whether or not he is able to do certain sorts of things in certain sorts of situations. From a single episode of shooting, we may not be able to distinguish a novice from the skilled marksman but ultimately we are able to distinguish between a novice and a skilled marksman by appealing to their dispositions to the fact that one "had the skill" and the other did not. However, Ryle appeals to dispositions to explain if directed actions can be treated as "working of mind". By referring to abilities, tendencies and liabilities, Ryle is trying to show simply that to say that one is a skilled marksman and the other is a novice is to say that we are not looking beyond the performance. To consider one's

abilities, liabilities and tendencies is not^{to} go beyond the performance itself. Indeed, a man with disposition and the hard-earned skill of marksman is apt to do his shots more skillfully than a novice just as an intelligent man is apt to act more wisely in a given situation than a stupid man. And for this reason, when we are in doubt whether an action is skillful, vain, shrewd etc. a knowledge of the performer's past habits may help us, though it is not inconceivable that such knowledge may also mislead and prejudice us.

One important objection can be raised regarding Ryle's "overt intelligent performances". As we have already pointed out "overt intelligent performances" are for Ryle, "the workings of minds and not clues to those workings". But to introduce "overt intelligent performances" is to beg the question; it is already to have interpreted the performances. For Ryle, to call a bird migratory is to indicate how the bird will behave under certain climatic conditions. We may say that it is flying southwards because it is migratory. However, if 'flying southwards' is an actualization of migratory instinct then how are we to distinguish between a non-migratory bird flying southwards and a migratory bird flying in the same direction? If we simply rest on activities then we have to say that both the birds are migratory. Here we will have

to say that two performances are not identical in character. Indeed, scientific investigation has shown that physiologically the episodes are not identical in character. Something more can be said to be going on inside a migratory bird than what is going on in 'the one accidentally flying southwards'. Therefore, as against Ryle, it may be said that "flying south" is a clue of a bird being migratory in the sense that "flying south" is a necessary condition of migratory bird but it is not in a sense the only actualization of migratory instinct. Likewise, overt behaviour of a person is at once treated as a part of the workings or 'actualization' of his dispositions, as well as, a possible clue to the full nature of his activities. Flying southwards is treated as a clue for a judgement about migration as well as being part of the migratory act itself. Equally, overt actions are treated as clues to the workings of minds as well as part of these workings.

'Intelligent performance', for Ryle, consists in our exercising determinable dispositions in variety of ways as occasion requires. Nothing seems to be involved beyond our capacities, skills, habits, liabilities and bents. Now the question arises, Is the explanation of intelligent behaviour in terms of performances and the skill displayed in them, is an adequate

explanation ? I wish to suggest that the explanation of intelligent behaviour namely shrewd, careful, wise etc. in terms of performances alone is not adequate. We cannot say that the statement 'X is shrewd' simply means that 'X is likely to behave in such and such ways when situation of such and such will arise and nothing more. As H.D. Lewis points out-

When I write these words now on the page there seems to be clearly more going on at the time when the movement of my fingers and the pencil. This holds even if we leave out of account the meaning the words have for me as part of my argument. In my actual writing more is involved than the physical movement and this more is not of a merely dispositional kind. It is part, and to my mind the essential part, of what goes on as I have put it.... In the absence of such a process it is hard to see what could be meant by regarding the performance as a conscious or a willed or a deliberate one. It would not be mental activity at all. But it would all be Hamlet without the prince if we tried to tell the story entirely in these terms".⁶

I wish to suggest that the dispositional account of intelligent performance is not an adequate account. As for instance, when somebody is said to be writing a poem, we do not say that he is engaged simply in the movement of fingers and pencils. It is more than the physical movement of fingers and pen because in writing a poem the poet is constantly thinking of something. Something goes on in his mind when the poet is writing the words on the pages. Otherwise, we cannot distinguish the fact of a poet's writing a poem and a child's learning a poem by heart and

writing it in the examination since both of them engage in physical movements of fingers and pencils. Though both of them can be said to be indulging in physical movements, we appreciate the poet's writing and not that of the child.

However, if nothing goes on along with the physical movement of the poet then his piece of writing cannot be described as usually is done a 'soul's creation', or else as a writing itself. If a child who is learning to write the alphabets happens to write a poetical sentence, by chance, we do not regard it as "writing a poetical sentence". It will not be out of context to quote -

"Wittgenstein in this connection :

"A wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it is not part of the mechanism".⁷ He tries to show that if nothing goes on inside along with the external behaviour then the external behaviour is not at all meaningful. Thus, it appears that Ryle fails in giving an adequate explanation of intelligent behaviour by presenting a dispositional analysis. Ryle overlooks the fact that there is something involved in an act beyond the skill and the overt performance and it is something which can be called mental occurrence accompanied by physical movements. Ryle explains it with the concept of "heeding". Ryle argues that whenever a person is

said to pay heed to something it means that he is capable of doing certain things. Whenever a driver is said to be driving heedfully it means that he will not pass over the white lines and will stop the moment the bus ahead of him looks like stopping. According to Ryle, driving heedfully means only these and apart from these overt performances there is no mental occurrences which the word heed can be said to refer to.

I wish to suggest in this connection that Ryle is not reasonable in holding the view that 'paying heed' means only performances of certain sorts of behaviour and nothing more.

Ryle criticizes the traditional or the contemplative theory, of heed or attention. According to the traditional theory 'paying heed' or 'paying attention' refers to an internal activity of the individual whereby he exercises a measure of control over the sensations. In paying attention to something the individual regulates the vividness of his consciousness of the object in question. Ryle's objection to the traditional theory is that it involves the fallacy of reductio ad absurdum. He points out that it is always possible to ask of a spectator, whether he has been a careful or a careless one. Ryle maintains that in order to

interpret it we should have to postulate an additional process of watching. The watching, which is present in the careful spectator and absent in the careless one and this interpretation leads to an infinite regress since it would always be sensible to ask whether or not the watching of one's watching was done carefully or not ?

However, this objection is not at all tenable. The distinction between a careful and a careless driver lies in the amount of heed that each pays to the scene before his eyes. What distinguishes the careful driver from a careless one is the detailed and accurate reports which one is able to furnish as a result of the richness and vividness of the impressions with which his more active heed-paying provides him.

As against Ryle, it can be said that paying heed entails all these but they are not enough to explain it. That is, whenever a driver is driving heedfully he does all these things plus he is continuously purposing to do all these things. He is aware that he is doing these things and moreover, he does these things on purpose. He is all the time aware of the fact that he is driving.

As we have already pointed out, Ryle argues that in paying heed we are not do two things, whistling and minding,

driving the car and attending to our driving; we perform a single activity in a certain way, and therefore, we cannot stop driving the car and continue paying heed. However, Ryle's analysis of the concept of heed is not adequate. Paying heed does not consist simply in doing certain things. The fact that one can continue to drive and cease to pay heed to what one is doing suggests that there are two distinct processes going on. When heeding and driving occur together there is only one set of muscular movements involved in driving. Heeding is a peculiar sort of internal activity which controls the movements of the driver's limit by regulating his consciousness of the stimuli to which he responds.

As we have already pointed out, in The Concept of Mind Ryle has attempted to establish the thesis that most mental conduct terms are used to refer not to private episodes but to dispositions which manifest themselves in predominantly public performances. The terms understanding, knowledge, intelligence, belief are among these. However, I wish to suggest that we cannot explain what it is to understand if we restrict it to physical performances only. Understanding is not simply a matter of how people behave. There has to be something mental about a person's understanding something and behaviour is related to this inward

states merely as an accompaniment. Whenever a person is said to have understood something, it not only means, as Ryle would say, that he is able to answer so many questions but it also means that he is in some sort of mental state. If we reject "something mental" about understanding and rest on behaviour only then we have to say that for me to know whether I have understood something is for me to look at my behaviour or performances and this appears quite absurd. It is absurd because in reality, I never look at my behaviour to find out whether I have understood something or not. But for me to know whether 'X' has understood something or not, it is necessary for me to go through X's behaviour, although, I have no criterion of verification of what goes on in X's mind in that particular moment. I can say whether or not 'X has understood the point' by observing his behaviour because some sort of behaviour are always accompanied by understanding or are the effects of understanding. Though understanding is most of the time accompanied by behaviour yet we cannot say that to understand something is to behave in a particular way. Ryle argues that it is not only that we know from somebody's behaviour that he has understood our point but it is also such that if he is said to have understood something then he must behave in such and such way. If he is not disposed to behave in such and such way then he

cannot be said to have understood anything. Therefore, for Ryle, understanding is nothing mental. If somebody is shown a sequence of numbers and asked which number should come next and after a moment he grasps the principle of the series and announces, "now I can go on", Ryle would say that what makes us say that he has understood the principle is the fact that he says "Now I can go on", and subsequently behave in a certain way. Moreover, when he is asked which number should come next, he gives the correct answer. Therefore, to understand something is to behave in a particular way.

However, I wish to suggest that this example instead of proving the dispositional account of understanding proves, that understanding involves something mental. When a person says that "Now I can go on", it indicates that understanding has occurred at a particular moment in time. "Now I can go on" and "understanding" are not identical. On the contrary, the utterance "Now I can go on" and other performances are signs or the necessary conditions of understanding. So, when someone says "Now I can go on", we must not take him to report an occurrence. As Wittgenstein says, "Now, I can go on" is an exclamation, it corresponds to an instinctive sound, a glad start" and therefore, we can say that

it is not the same as understanding. Moreover, the very utterance 'Now I can go on' implies that understanding occurs at a particular moment of time. Likewise, I think, the statement "Try to understand me", "There is much understanding between us" imply not behaviour but something more than behaviour—something that goes on or exists in the mind of the person who understands. We say such things as "since he understood what I said, he did the right thing", "As he understood the principles involved, he was able to solve the problem". These ways of talking indicate that understanding is something mental accompanied by overt behaviour.

What is true of understanding is true of all other mental conduct concepts like vain, knowledge belief and so on. The vain person is, as Ryle describes him, disposed "to talk a lot about himself, to cleave to the society of eminent, to reject criticisms, to seek the footlights and to disengage himself from conversations about the merits of others".⁶ However, the question can be raised—Does vanity simply mean to talk a lot, to reject criticisms etc. ? Is there not something beyond these physical activities ? If nothing goes on inside, along with these physical processes, then we say that "actually somebody is not vain" but "he is a person of such a type that he always talks a lot and rejects criticisms

and so on." In the case of a vain person these behaviours are always accompanied by some thought or other peculiarly centred on himself. The vain man could hardly be vain without some explicit thought about himself. Moreover, to hold that 'X is vain' means 'X is behaving or will behave in such and such a way' is to beg the question. Here, we already presuppose that these sorts of behaviour are called vain behaviour and therefore when we try to justify the statement 'X is vain' by saying that 'X is behaving in such and such a way' we are not proving that 'X is vain' but are simply begging the question. Thus, we can say that Ryle's dispositional account of mental conduct concepts involves the fallacy of arguing in a circle.

Ryle makes a distinction between behaviour and merely physical processes and in this connection he says that a parrot, may under proper instructions, say something which is full of humour, but we never say of a parrot that it is humorous. Whereas, we regard a person to be humorous whenever we see him exhibiting certain sorts of behaviour. Ryle points out that we say that a person is humorous because what he does, he does on purpose, i.e. a humorous person is skilled at doing so many things. Now, the question arises, why is it that in case of a parrot, we say that

it is a physical process and not behaviour ? Ryle would reply that in case of a parrot we say that it is a physical process because the parrot is not skilled at doing so many things or that the parrot is not disposed to do so many other things. But the question remains open as before. Why is it that in the case of a person certain activities, in turn, are called behaviour and not physical processes ?

Ryle maintains that we should not contrast mind with body but intelligent behaviour with unintelligent behaviour. Behaviour is intelligent when executed from certain dispositions. Shrewd, humorous and so on are intelligent behaviour and to say that a person is shrewd or humorous is to say that he is disposed to behave in a certain way. And by saying that a person is disposed to behave in a certain way we refer to past, future and possible behaviour in addition to actual present behaviour. However, the dispositional behaviour refers to the behaviour of 'man', and all behaviour exhibited by man must be 'bodily behaviour'. Thus, it seems that though Ryle tries to avoid the distinction between 'mental' and 'physical' or 'mind' and 'body', yet he has to refer to 'body', while talking about behaviour. Without any reference to 'body' he cannot just make a distinction between intelligent and unintelligent

behaviour.

I think that by presenting a dispositional account of mind, Ryle fails to make a distinction between intelligent behaviour and unintelligent behaviour. He maintains that intelligent behaviour refers to what may be called behavioural dispositions, i.e. capacities, tendencies to behave in a certain way. To assert that someone has a capacity or tendency to behave in a certain way, on this view, is not to say anything about what is going on here and now; it is to assert a hypothetical proposition about how the individual could or would behave if certain circumstances were to obtain. Hypothetical propositions of this kind can only be verified by observing the behaviour of the individual under certain conditions. In this connection, Ryle gives the example of swimming. The proposition 'X can swim' means 'X is disposed to behave in a particular way when in water'. Similarly, to say that 'the cow is ruminant' is to say that the cow tends to behave in a particular way in certain situations. Similarly, to say that 'X is shrewd' is not to say that X is in a particular mental state but it is to say that if he is put in such and such a situation he will behave in such and such a way. And for Ryle, 'shrewd' implies intelligent behaviour because it is executed from certain dispositions. Now

one can very well ask— whether 'the capability to swim', 'tend to ruminate', indicate intelligent behaviour since they also involve dispositions, and not occurrences? Certainly, Ryle would say that they are not intelligent behaviour. But how is it that 'shrewd' indicates 'intelligent' behaviour since it is executed from dispositions whereas 'ruminant' and 'swimmer' do not indicate such behaviour though all of them refer to dispositions? Ryle cannot say that intelligent behaviour refer to the dispositions of mind because he has already discarded 'mind' nor can he say that intelligent behaviour stands for the dispositions of bodies because in that case he has to include the terms 'ruminant', 'swimmer' as indicative of intelligent behaviour.

So far as the concepts of 'knowledge' and 'belief' are concerned, Ryle insists that they are dispositional words. He denies that there is any legitimate episodic or occurrent sense of knowing and believing. These terms can be explained entirely in terms of disposition. To say that someone knows or believes something, is not to say that he is knowing or believing something. There is a great variety of ways in which we may do either of these things. That is to say, knowing and believing do not stand for private states or occurrences.

However, I do not agree with Ryle's dispositional account of belief and knowledge. As H.D.Lewis points out,

"No one holds that there are private states of just knowing and believing. It is always a case of knowing or believing something. But the fact that there must always be something known or believed in no way precludes these total states from being states of someone's personal experience. In being aware of entertaining some belief, I must be aware of myself as believing something in particular".⁹

I agree with Lewis in so far as he says that belief and knowledge are not dispositions to behave in certain ways. To say that "X believes P" is not to say that if circumstances were such and such then 'X' would do or say such and such. Because it is conceivable that a man may believe 'P' without ever manifesting it; he needs, never to do or say anything that is relevant to the belief in any circumstances whatever. He may simply be very good at disguising or concealing his belief and therefore to say that to believe is to be disposed to behave in certain ways, in this case would be an empty form. Indeed, it is true that there may be some expression or behaviour of belief. But from the fact that there is an expression of belief, we cannot say that the expression is the whole of belief. Though there may be some expression of belief yet we find that belief and its expressions are not related in the way pain and pain behaviour are related. In case of pain we know that there are some natural expressions of pain whereas there

are no natural expression or behaviour of belief. For this reason, belief cannot be defined in terms of its expressions. As A.P. Criffiths points out "If anything is to be said to explain the concept of belief and its place among other concepts then it cannot be reduced to other concepts".¹⁰ I wish to suggest that we cannot reduce 'belief' to behaviour only. Belief is a state of mind accompanied by behaviour and to reduce it to overt behaviour only is to say that there cannot be any possibility of a man simply bring very good at disguising or concealing his belief. Belief is a state of mind accompanied by behaviour.

Now, so far as knowledge is concerned, Ryle holds that it is dispositional in nature. He makes a distinction between "knowing that" and "knowing how", 'knowing that' might be characterized as theoretical understanding and 'knowing how' as practical application. Ryle is of the opinion that not all "knowing how" presuppose "knowing that" because to argue like this is to involve in an infinite regress. Whatever may be the distinction between 'knowing that' and 'knowing how', Ryle seems to believe that for a man to know something is for him to be disposed to behave in particular ways. My question is, If knowledge is dispositional in nature then how are we going to make a distinction between

"merely doing something" and "doing something knowing how to do it".

Certainly, there should be some distinction between merely doing something and doing something with knowledge of it. Otherwise, as Hamlyn points out, we cannot make a distinction between animal behaviour and human behaviour. Hamlyn says:

"It is reasonable to argue that animals that are able to do things instinctively do not really know how to do those things or that it would be misleading at least to say so. This is because "knowing how" normally implies some understanding and knowledge of the principles involved in the activity in question".¹¹

Therefore, when we say that 'X' knows something is not simply to say that 'X' is disposed to behave in a certain way. Apart from behaviour, there is something called the understanding of the principle or the knowledge of the principle. Knowing how is knowledge of a technique, the principle of which could be formulated in form of theory. It remains true that a man cannot be said to know how to do something unless he can do it, except in the sense that he knows in theory how to do it although he cannot do it in practice; he knows the principle but cannot apply them.

In the book The Concept of Mind, Ryle has a chapter on "Sensation and Observation". Regarding sensation and observation, Ryle believes that the part of the complication in an organisms activity which accompanies its overt intelligent actions and of

which those actions are, for an observer, clues, is the having of sensations and making of observations. Ryle does not regard the fact of a person's having a sensation as a fact about his mind. Whereas, the fact that one observes something and the fact that one tends not to observe things of certain sorts does belong to the description of his mental powers and operations. He writes,

There is nothing mental about sensations. Having a sensation is not an exercise of a quality of intellect or character. Hence, we are not too proud to concede sensations to reptiles".¹²

Having a sensation is not an exercise of a quality of intellect or working of mind. Ryle is of the view that sensations are not the sorts of things that can be observed. Sensations are neither observable nor unobservable. But observing entails having sensations. Sensations cannot be described as being either internal or external to an object. Observation and sensation are entirely different kinds of activity. Sensations or sense impressions just happen and are not any kind of apprehension. Further, Ryle argues,

"It is, of course, true and important that I am the only person who can give a first hand account of the tweaks given me by ill fitting shoes and an oculist who cannot speak my language is without his best source of information about my visual sensations. But the fact that I alone can give the first hand accounts of my sensations does not entail that I have, what others lack, the opportunity of observing those sensations".¹³

The first point that can be raised against Ryle's view of sensation and observation is this : Is the making of observation an intelligent action or a working of mind ? For Ryle a sensation is accompanied by overt intelligent behaviour and these overt intelligent behaviours are the making of observations. In answer to this it can be said that reptiles also act in a certain way when they have sensations, and therefore we are to say that they also make observations. They certainly have sensations, else they would never act. So long as they react to a sensation can we not say that reptiles also behave intelligently ? I think, Ryle would say that the way we react to a sensation is different from the way the reptiles react. Ryle must mean that the way we react to what we observe and the way we act to make other observation and to ascertain observations are the exercise of our qualities of intellect.

It is true that the mere sensation is not an exercise of the quality of intellect. It is not reasonable to say that only intelligent creatures can have sensations. In fact, sensations can be had by creatures in whose case we cannot apply any mental concept. A creature having mind can feel and have sensation but to have some sensations is not to have a mind. I think that the way we react to what we observe and the way we all make other

observations is different from that of an animal because animals, though have sensations lack what is called self-awareness. Ryle says, "we do not regard the fact that a person has a sensation as a fact about his mind, whereas the fact that he observes something and the fact that he tends not to observe things of a certain sorts do belong to the description of his mental operations powers".¹⁴

I wish to suggest that it is the awareness of sensation which differentiates an intelligent creature from an unintelligent one. When I have the sensation of 'pain', I behave in a particular way. Likewise, when an earthworm feels pain it also behaves in a particular way and in that respect there is no distinction between an earthworm and a human being. But in case of human beings a sensation is always accompanied by self-awareness, whereas, in the case of unintelligent creatures a sensation is not accompanied by self-awareness. But Ryle, would not agree with the view that sensations are accompanied by self-awareness, in case of human beings. Because he argues that one cannot observe or witness one's sensation and the reason for this is that epithets which can be coupled with words like 'observing' and 'witnessing' cannot be applied to 'having sensations'. We can be more or less successful at observing but not at having sensations carefully or systematically. We can make mistakes of observation but not of sensation and so

forth. However, if this is true of sensation then it must be true of seeing, hearing and touching and so on. But if this is true of seeing, hearing and so forth, then we have to say that we do not observe or we are not aware of what we see or hear, which is certainly not the case. Sensations do not exist independently of our being aware of them. The occurrence of a sensation entails someone's consciousness of that sensation.

References :

- ¹ Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p.28.
 - ² Ibid., p.35.
 - ³ Ibid., p.46.
 - ⁴ Ibid., p.53.
 - ⁵ Ibid., p.59.
 - ⁶ H.D.Lewis, The Elusive Mind, p.51.
 - ⁷ L.Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigation, Sec.271, p.95.
 - ⁸ Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p.83.
 - ⁹ H.D.Lewis, The Elusive Mind, p.76.
 - ¹⁰ A.P.Griffiths (ed.), Knowledge and Belief, p.135.
 - ¹¹ W.D.Hamlyn, Theory of Knowledge, p.103-4.
 - ¹² Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p.195.
 - ¹³ Ibid., p.199.
 - ¹⁴ Ibid., p.211.
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CONCLUSION

In this concluding chapter, I shall sum up my findings by presenting discussions on Philosophy of Action because Philosophy of Action will make clear the views regarding different theories of mind. Moreover, Philosophical discussions on mind have a direct bearing on methodological issues relating to social sciences.

Social sciences are said to be concerned with the study of social reality. Social relationships are manifested through interdependence of human actions. An action is commonly used to contrast with a state of movement of merely process or behaviour. Philosophers have sometimes offered criteria for 'an action' in terms of intention, purpose or consciousness.

Actions involve physical movements but all physical movements are not actions. When people perform actions their bodies can be seen to move; parts of the body change their spatial relations and sometimes sound also can be heard coming from them. But this is not the description of an action because it is simply the description of physical aspect of behaviour. A.I. Melden holds "there is a difference between "my arm rising" and "my rising my arm", between muscles moving and my moving my muscles. In short,

between a bodily movement or happening and an action.¹ However, though there is a distinction between "my arm rising" and my "rising my arm" yet the former always happens when the latter does. Melden says,

"When I perform an action, there is some bodily movement that occurs, but not every bodily movement counts as an action not even those of normal adult human beings— since there are reflex movements, the activities of those who walk in their sleep and the behaviour of those under hypnosis. Hence, it appears as though an action were a bodily movement of a special sort and that we need only specify the distinctive features of bodily movement that count as actions in order to elucidate the concept of an action".²

Melden further holds that the doctrine which tries to explain action by holding that "my raising my arm involves willing in the sense that "I will my muscles to move" is misleading because here 'willing' is regarded as the cause of the movement and in case of other physical movements the causes of the physical movements are the causes other than the act of volition. I move my muscles by performing an act of volition which in turn, produces a muscle-movement.

However, this doctrine raises many problems. If the act of willing or volition is the cause of my moving the muscle then there must be a distinction between the act of volition and the movement of the muscle. If it is a causal relation then we are to

say that willing the muscle movement is followed by my muscle movement. Now, since my muscle movement is preceded by the act of willing therefore we can very well assume that there must be another act of willing for the first act of willing to occur. One must will the willing of the muscle movement and so on ad infinitum.

Again, if the explanation of human action are causal explanation in the sense that for each human action, there is a will or volition which causes the action, then, it must be possible for us to give a description of the cause independently of the effect and vice-versa. As Melden says,

"Now in general if A causes B, a description of A other than that it has the causal property of producing B must be forthcoming. Otherwise, 'A causes B' degenerates into 'the thing that produces B produces B'".³

If the relation between an act of willing and action is a causal relation then how are we going to make a distinction between a particular act of willing and the action followed from it? How do we identify an will apart from an action? Certainly, it is not possible to identify or to give a description of an act of willing without reference to an action. If willing in question can only be understood as "the willing of a muscle movement" then willing in question cannot be a cause of the muscle movement.

Since the reference to the muscle movement is involved in very
 description of the willing then to explain a movement with reference
 to a will is not to give a causal account.

Likewise, if for each human action we are to say that ^{there} is
 an act of volition then it follows that there are numerous acts of
 volition or willing and one act of willing or volition must be
 distinguished from the other act of volition in the sense that one
 act of volition involved in the muscle movement must be different
 from the other act of volition involved in the production of any
 other muscle-movement. Now, how shall we differentiate one act of
 volition from the other act of volition by which the distinct muscle
 movements are produced? And if we say that one act of volition is
 distinct from the other then it must be possible for us to pin point
 the special or distinctive characteristics of each act of volition
 or willing.

Thus, we find that it is never possible to give a causal
 explanation of human action by holding that human actions refer to
 causes namely the act of volition. Causal explanations are wholly
 irrelevant to the understanding of human actions. That is, we cannot
 differentiate the action from mere bodily behaviour by holding

that action differs from mere bodily movements because an action is caused by willing or volition.

Melden holds that a particular happening is an action if it is the exercise of power that makes it happen. There is a distinction between an artificial chess move, that is, a chess move done by a child which is merely a physical movement and a chess move which is not artificial. In case of non-artificial chess move, the concept of rule come in. Rules are obeyed, criteria are employed. So, a child who makes so called chess move without the knowledge of rules and criteria cannot be said to have involved in some sort of action. Melden concludes-

"Just as in the case of the concept of a chess move, so in the case of the concept of any action the context of practices in which rules are obeyed, criteria employed, policies are observed- a way of thinking and doing is essential to the understanding of the difference between such bodily movements and actions".⁴

The chess move involves the notion of following or observing the rules. Since the chess player understands the rules, he therefore, it can be said that also understands what it is not to obey the rules. In playing the game, he is not all the time aware of the fact that he is obeying the rules but since he knows the rules, he therefore simply obeys them. In a sense, his chess movements involves a specific way of thinking. It is both

thinking and doing. Melden also seems to believe that in all cases where thinking and doing are involved, the judgements involving terms 'right', 'wrong' etc. can be passed. We can hold one responsible for one's action, if his doing is accompanied by some sort of thinking. Thus, human action, for Melden, involves the observance of rules and principles i.e. it involves both thinking and doing. Since, all human actions involve both thinking and doing, therefore, for him, 'actions' and moral agent are co-relative. The practical contexts in which rules are obeyed criteria applied, policies are observed, are essentially required in distinguishing actions from mere physical movements.

Much of our ordinary explanation of human behaviour is teleological in form i.e. it relates the behaviour to purposes and goals. To explain behaviour in terms of purpose or goal is not to postulate an unobservable entity that directs the behaviour from within. Charles Taylor holds that human behaviour is purposive. He makes a distinction between 'action' and 'mere movement'. Giving the example of actions, he says 'jumping rope' 'riding a bicycle' are actions. We require two conditions to distinguish between 'actions' and 'mere movements'. The first condition is that human behaviour must satisfy certain standards. Jumping a rope or riding

a bicyclist **requires** appropriate movements. Jumping a rope requires balancing and some other conditions to be fulfilled which are regarded as appropriate movements. The **second** condition required for 'action' is that it must be agent's intention to meet those standards or achieve those results. To characterise one's behaviour as action we must see that one's behaviour conform to a certain standard and one is intentionally trying to achieve that result. Thus, if a child had no intention to jump the rope but made the appropriate leap each time, as a result of being jabbed with a pin, we should not wish to qualify that what he was doing as jumping the rope. The essential conditions are absent in the case of mere physical movement. Taylor says, "The agent must not only make the appropriate movements it must also be his intention or purpose to do so".⁵

Therefore, the distinction between action and 'non action' i.e. 'mere behaviour', lies not just in the presence or absence of the corresponding intention or purpose but in a particular intention or purpose having or not having a role in bringing about the behaviour. If the movements made by a person are intentional, then his movements are regarded as actions. The mere presence of an intention cannot qualify the movement as action, if it does

not bring about the required behaviour. For example, if the knife gripped in my hand plunges into John's body and even if it was my intention to stab him, still it may not be true that I stabbed him. For, I may decide to stab someone and before I can execute my intention, my arm may be pushed. Thus, if the behaviour occurs because of the corresponding intention then only that behaviour can be regarded as action, otherwise, it is not an action even if there is an intention.

However, though Taylor holds that for each action there is a corresponding intention which leads to the appropriate movement, yet the relation between intention and behaviour is not contingent. It is not contingent because of the fact that if a person intends to do X, then, if there is no obstacle, then he must do X. Part of what we mean by 'intending X' is that, in the absence of intervening factors, it is followed by doing X. If I intend to do X, then I must do X when there is no obstacle. My behaviour must follow necessarily from my intention. Intention is not the cause of my behaviour. Intention cannot cause behaviours but behaviour follows from the intention necessarily. If a person intends to kill his friend then in the absence of intervening factors, he will try to kill his friend. If in the absence of

intervening factors, the person does not try to kill his friend then we could no longer say that he intends to kill his friend. Thus, the difference between merely physical movements, namely reflex actions and the genuine actions lies in the fact that in case of reflex actions, behaviour is caused by some preceding factors, whereas in the case of genuine action, there is no cause but there is a reason for an action. To qualify any behaviour as 'action', is to imply that it is 'goal directed'. Its occurrence is to be explained in terms of some intention or purpose of the agents. To say that 'A' stabbed 'C' is to imply that the hand that held the knife was not caused by A's arm being pushed or by some muscular reflex or even by some conditions of 'A's brain. To say that 'A' stabbed 'C' is to imply that A's intention brought about the behaviour. And according to Taylor, this rules out any 'rival account' of behaviour. A rival account of some behaviour event 'B' would be an account according to which B would occur on the antecedent condition whether or not the agent intends to do D.

However, Taylor's account of human action is not adequate. Taylor holds that an action requires an intention. If I stabbed 'C', my intention to stab 'C' is what brought about the stabbing. Therefore, a man's intention is what he chooses. But a person may

choose to kill his friend out of hatred and that is why he chooses to kill him. The reason for killing is the hatred. Therefore, if Taylor says that the agent's intention or purpose brings about the behaviour, it, then, refers to two different works of 'intention'. If 'X' kills his friend, then it is reasonable to ask whether 'X' had the intention to kill his friend and if 'X' answers by saying that he had the intention, to kill his friend, then, we can again ask him what his intention was in killing his friend. And I think, the actual explanation of intention involves the explanation in the second sense. And it is this intention which brings about the action. When a person says that his action was intentional, it opens up the question: why did he do it ? and the person refers to his intention by mentioning that it was to frighten someone. It explains the behaviour by reference to a purpose, desire or motive of the agent.

Moreover, Charles Taylor seems to be mistaken when he argues that there is no major discontinuity between human behaviour and that of non-human ones such as animals. He thinks that it is natural to attribute actions to animals even though we cannot be sure that they have conscious intentions and we do so in terms of the results their behaviour tends to bring about. The

responses taught to animals must be considered to be actions, not mere movements because these movements tend to bring about the end results. The nest-building behaviour of wasps is directed to a goal or purpose and so long as it is purposive it is an action.

However, we cannot fully agreed with Taylor on his view that the purpose of intention of behaviour constitute action. He says that to say that someone jumped rope implies that his intention brought about the behaviour. The intention of an action is indeed the goal to which it is directed but this cannot be identified with the result it brings about. Sometimes though people are very much conscious of the result, yet their behaviour do not lead them to that expected result. But from this we cannot say that people do not intend to have that result. People may believe that their movements would have a particular result and may intend to get that result but may fail to get the intended result and their actions may not lead to the desired end. But from the fact that sometimes actions do not lead to the desired results, can we say that it is not an action? Again, the mere tendency of a process to produce a specificable result is not sufficient ground to invoke the concept of an action. From the mere fact that the various movements of birds lead to nest-building,

we cannot say that these movements of birds are actions. Likewise, we cannot say that the various movements of a machine that tend to produce a certain state of affairs are instances of action. Though the movements of a machine bring about a result, yet these movements have nothing to do with intention and are not intentional but simply automatic processes. As Michael H. Lessnoff says,

"The purpose or intention that guided an action is something that characterizes the agent before and while he acts, not the result he brings about. If we attribute actions to animals we must either suppose they have intentions in something like the human sense or else we use the term in a sense different from that which is relevant to human agency".⁶

Moreover, if from the mere results produced by the movements of the animals and machines, we are to say that the movements are actions then it should not be unlikely to praise them or blame them for their actions. Since a man is held responsible for his actions and not for his movements, therefore, if the movements of birds resulting in nest-building and machines producing a result are regarded as actions, then they (birds and machines) also must be held responsible for these actions. If the behaviour of animals and machines are regarded as actions then there cannot be any difference between animals and men. But can we say that animals and machines are also moral agents like human beings? The concepts of 'action', 'moral agent' and 'person' are very much co-relative, because we attribute responsibility to individual when we treat them as

persons or moral agents and their bodily movements as actions. Thus, we find that Taylor's distinction between action and non-action is not adequate.

Our habitual actions, though are not intentional or are not done on purpose, yet may be regarded as actions. They are actions done from sheer force of habit. But if we accept Taylor's explanation of 'action' then the habitual actions are to be discarded from the sphere of actions.

Now, I shall confine my discussion to Ryle's theory of action. As we know, Ryle presents his theory of action by attacking Descartes' theory of action which he calls the intellectualist error. He criticises Descartes' dualistic theory by presenting anti dualistic arguments.

Ryle argues that it is an error to claim that action always follows a theoretical performance. The intellectualist error consists in claiming that the difference between action and non-action lies in the presence or absence of some occult performance. He says,

"Champions of this legend are apt to try to re-assimilate 'knowing how' to 'knowing that' by arguing that intelligent performance involves the observance of rules or the application of criteria. It follows that the operation which is characterized

as intelligent must be preceded by an intellectual acknowledgement of these rules or criteria.....It is to do a bit of theory and then to do a bit of practice".⁷

An action is intelligent only if it is preceded by an intellectual performance or if it is preceded by an occult event. Ryle's positive account of action is that it is nothing but the exercise of disposition. Knowing how to do something is having the disposition to do that thing. Intelligent disposition is a disposition the exercises of which is indefinitely heterogeneous. Again, intelligent dispositions are described in terms of law-like statements and they are also such that their exercises are described by semi-hypothetical statements. These are the characteristics of intelligent dispositions but they are not unique characteristics. When an object is described as hard, we not only mean that it would resist deformation but would give out a sharp sound if struck and so on. This is true that being hard is a disposition with many varied instantiations. But being hard is not an intelligent disposition though the exercises of intelligent disposition are also indefinite. Further, to say that intelligent dispositions are law-like statements is not to say anything special about intelligent disposition because the solubility of sugar is also described by a law-like statement. To say that this lump of sugar

is soluble, is to say that it would dissolve if submerged in anywhere, at any time and in any parcel of water. If non-intelligent dispositions are also law-like statements then what is the difference between intelligent disposition and non-intelligent disposition? What does it mean to say that intelligent action is the exercise of a disposition?

Likewise, the description of an intelligent disposition by 'mongrel' categoricals or semi-hypothetical statements is not restricted to intelligent dispositions either. However, Ryle says that the distinction between intelligent disposition and non-intelligent disposition rests on the fact that in case of intelligent disposition, the disposition is acquired through learning.

. "To say that a sugar lump is dissolving, a bird migrating or a man blinking does not imply that the sugar has learned to go liquid, that the bird has learned to fly south in the autumn or that the man has searched to blink when startled. But to say that a soldier obediently fixed his bayonet or fixed it in order to defend himself, does imply that he has learned some lessons and not forgotten them".⁸

In order to show the distinction between non-intelligent disposition and intelligent disposition, Ryle makes a distinction between drill and training. Drill is the means of acquiring non-intelligent disposition whereas training is the means of acquiring intelligent disposition. Acquiring a disposition by

learning is to acquire it in such a fashion that one exercises that while thinking what one is doing.

However, I think that though Ryle maintains that intelligent dispositions are acquired by learning, yet he cannot be said to have explained the point— because when he says that intelligent disposition is acquired by learning, we find that 'learning' itself is a disposition. Therefore, all he actually does is to repeat those characteristics of intelligent disposition which he has already made. So, we can very well ask — why learning is said to be an intelligent disposition ? Thus, if the problem remains as open as before, then it makes no sense to say that intelligent disposition is acquired by learning.

Ryle also maintains that an intelligent action is an action which is done with thinking and ^{applying} criteria. Intelligent performance though involves the application of criteria yet it does not consist of two activities— one the application of criteria and the other the actual performance. It is said that a person, must in this way "presch to himself before he can practice". When I do an intelligent action, I do one thing and not two. Intelligent action involves application of rules or criteria.

"Its exercises are observances of rules or canons or the application of criteria, but they are not tandem operations of theoretically a knowing maxims and then putting them into practice".⁹

As against Ryle's analysis of intelligent action, we can ask whether application of criteria is an activity or it is a disposition? We can take for instance, the case of a referee. According to Ryle, the act of refereeing of the referee is not an event or a happening. It is a disposition. However, I think, refereeing is a continuous activity because when one is standing in the field and is neither whistling nor is rebuking the players is still refereeing. This activity goes on all the time and is manifested only under certain conditions. If Ryle agrees with the fact that the referee is refereeing even when he is standing in the field and is neither whistling nor rebuking then we are to say that he has accepted the theory that refereeing does not consist only of making overt performances but also of something else. Being able to do the act of a referee is perhaps disposition but refereeing as such is exercising that disposition throughout the whole game.

Moreover, if intelligent action is the application of rules and criteria then if the application of rules or criteria is

not an occurrence, it must be a disposition. And if it is a disposition, then we can ask whether the disposition to apply criteria is itself intelligent or not. If it is not intelligent, then we are to say that our application of criteria is either intelligent or not so. If it is not intelligent, then we are to say that our application of criteria takes place in an automatic or unthinking way. But certainly, it cannot take place in an unthinking or automatic way. If it takes place in an automatic way then there cannot be any distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent action. Surely, the ability to apply criteria is itself a disposition and it is an intelligent disposition and its exercises are done while applying criteria. Thus, we find that Ryle is arguing in a circle when he tries to explain intelligent behaviour or action in terms of the application of rules and criteria and again explains the application of rules and criteria as intelligent by saying that they are intelligent dispositions. Thus, intelligent action is due to an intelligent disposition to apply criteria. But then one can ask— why is the ability to apply criteria regarded as intelligent? Thus, it seems that Ryle begs the question when he tries to explain intelligent action by means of application of criteria i.e. overt behaviour. These overt behaviour are characterized as intelligent by saying that

they are the exercises of intelligent disposition. Therefore, Ryle has to accept either that intelligent action is associated with something internal or that it is itself a disposition. But he cannot accept the first alternative because this view has already been criticised by Ryle in his attack on dualistic theory. And so far as the second alternative is concerned, he cannot accept this alternative too, because to accept it is to beg the question.

Thus, we find that Ryle's dispositional analysis of action is not adequate. It cannot make a distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent action. And so long as he does not succeed in presenting a dispositional analysis of intelligent action, he can never be said to have succeeded in attempting to give a dispositional analysis of mind.

According to Ryle, motive explanations are dispositional explanations. To say that somebody did something from a particular motive, is to say that his action, done under particular circumstances was just the sort of thing that he ~~was~~ has an inclination to do. It is to say that he would do that.

However, I wish to point out that such dispositional explanations share one crucial characteristic of explanations

based on general laws. General laws are involved to present philosophical understanding of human action. But to offer such an explanation is to assume that all explanations can be subsumed under some general law. It is completely a mistaken view. Our explanation of people's action of every day life which we typically give by filling in the context of action are often particular. There is no law linking context and action for the explanation to stick. We are able to give satisfactory explanation of actions without giving any account of underlying law. Moreover, our behaviour often does not conform to any law-like pattern. There are some human actions for which no law-like explanation is possible but still we can give a meaning to those actions.

From Ryle's dispositional analysis of mind it is obvious that for him mental concepts can be construed as essentially behavioural, the private components being either ignored or regarded as inessential. For example, a man's being drowsy consists in his behaving in a certain way and the way he feels is irrelevant in determining whether he is drowsy or not. Ryle makes mistakes when he argues that all mental concepts can be explained in terms of dispositions. I think, so far as mental concepts are concerned, both the factors like overt behaviour and

the 'innerness of mind' ^{are} /relevant. We make mistakes when we ignore
 any one of them. To think that mental concepts like pain, anger,
 intelligent consist only of behaviour factors is to deny the
 'innerness of mind' and to treat human nature on par with dead pieces
 of matter. We cannot say that under such and such circumstances, one
 will behave in such and such a way. Ryle says, that so far as the
 solubility of sugar is concerned we can give a dispositional
 analysis of it. To say that 'sugar is soluble' is to say that if we
 put sugar in water it will dissolve. He argues that the same is true
 in case of mental concepts. To say that 'X' is kind' is to say that
 if we put him in such and such circumstances, he will behave in such
 and such a way. Ryle makes mistakes when he offers the same type of
 explanation for human beings. Sugar is so composed that it dissolves
 in water, and that is why we can hold the hypothetical statement that
 if we put sugar in water it dissolves. But the case of human being
 is completely different. The internal constitution of sugar is
 sufficient to explain its solubility. If sugar from different places
 are collected and put into water, then, it will dissolve, whereas
 the nature of human being is such that even if two persons have
 exactly the same structure yet we can never say it for certain that
 if they are put in the similar way. If it is such that they never

behave exactly even though they have the same physical structure
 then how can we accept the dispositional analysis of mind ?
 Moreover, what to speak of two person ? Even in the case of the
 same person, it so happens that at two different times, given the
 same circumstances the same person behaves so differently that we
 get surprised. Therefore, we cannot present a dispositional analysis
 of mind holding that it is similar to the analysis of solubility
 of sugar. We cannot offer this type of explanation in case of human
 beings. We cannot say it for certain that 'X' will behave in such
 and such a way if he is put under such and such conditions. I
 think that the 'if... then' model is applicable only in physical
 sciences. This mode of explanation is applicable in physical
 sciences. ~~sciences~~ because physical sciences are concerned with
 physical objects and their explanation involves 'if...then' model.
 Physics, unlike social sciences does not deal with people as such.
 People of course do have a physical aspect, and considered simply
 as bodies, are as subject to physical laws as any other. But
 people considered as people behave in ways that cannot be derived
 from the so called physical laws.

The behaviour of people provides the subject matter of
 social sciences and therefore the model of physical is in appropriate

to study of man. For people have not only physical bodies but conscious minds at least in the sense that they have intention, purpose and desire and so on. Therefore, behaviourism as a method is inadequate in social sciences. Social behaviour always implies the existence of mental states like intentions, purposes, beliefs, awareness of rules which are not explicable in terms of behaviour only. Neither they are observable by empirical methods. In Physics also we refer to theoretical entities such as electrons, protons etc. and offer explanation in these terms. In Physics, of course, these theoretical entities are to be considered as real entities because they are capable of causing certain empirically observable phenomena. So far as mental entities like, intention, desire and purpose and so on are concerned, they cannot be regarded as counterparts to electrons or protons nor can they be regarded as completely unreal. Therefore, so long as human beings have intention, desire or purpose a causal explanations of human behaviour are not adequate and exhaustive. Further, intentions and desires can never be explained in terms of overt behaviour alone.

Thus, explanation of human action is radically different from that of physical phenomenon because it implies no regularities or laws. Thus, explanation of human action cannot be

reduced to simple causality. I would like to point out that Ryle's dispositional analysis of Mind is not tenable to us because it ignores the innerness of mind altogether. Though, he claims to be an analytical behaviourist yet some of his views differ from those of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein does not deny the innerness of mind and maintains that the outer behaviour is not meaningful to us if there is no inner. Ryle's analysis of mind rejects the innerness of mind and maintains that mind is nothing but the disposition of the body.

We make a distinction between the mental and the physical states. It is not only that we make a distinction between mental and physical states but sometimes we also talk about these-- called inner states. Sometimes we say of an old person that 'he has lost his inner strength', 'he has inner fear', and 'he does not have any mental peace' and so on and so forth. When we say that a person has lost his inner strength, we mean that though he is physically strong yet mentally he feels so weak that he cannot proceed to do any work. Similarly, when we say of a person that he has inner fear, what we really mean is that the person, though, outwardly does not show any fear yet in his mind he feels scared. The mental states are not 'inner', in the sense that they are inside the person but they are inner, in the sense that they refer to some sort of state that a person can be said to be in. It is not that 'the inner fear' does not have any manifestation. Of course, there

are manifestations but the manifestations are not the whole of the 'inner fear', 'inner strength' and so on.

As I have already pointed out, understanding, believing, remembering, imagining other cognate mental conduct concepts refer to something inner. As we know, there is a distinction between explanation and understanding. No adequate explanation of human action is possible in causal terms. Understanding of an action is different from the explanation of it. Any theory which has an explanatory force ultimately makes reference to causes. As we have seen, explanations of human actions in terms of intention, desire or purpose has a causal force. Rising of one's arm is explained by one's intention to raise one's arm.

Human behaviour cannot be adequately understood in terms of causes. Human action/behaviour is meaningful. Human behaviour stands in need of interpretation. To interpret it is to discover a meaning and to discover a meaning is to refer to something inner. A piece of human behaviour is an action when and in so far as we can attach a subjective meaning to it. That behaviour is subjectively meaningful implies that the agent has a conception, under some particular description, of what the purpose, or point of the behaviour is. That is, he could describe its point and thus

the nature of the action as he conceives it. For example, building a house is a complex action made up of a number of simpler actions. Here all of these cannot be understood as part of a complex action of house building in terms of the agent's purpose in performing them. His action is regarded as building a house because he understands a language which includes some expressions equivalent in meaning to 'building a house'.

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- ⁵ Charles Taylor, The Explanation of Behaviour, p.29.
- ⁶ Michael H. Lessnoff, The Structure of Social Sciences, p.39.
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