



THE MYTH OF INDEPENDENCE

Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto





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The Myth of Independence

ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO

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Dedicated to
The Sovereign People of Pakistan



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Preface

When in 1958 I entered upon my career in high public office at the comparatively early age of thirty, as Minister for Commerce in the Martial Law Government, the situation Pakistan found itself in was such that every decision of any importance, even as regards matters that ought to have been of purely internal concern, was affected by some aspect, real or imaginary, of international relations, especially of commitments to the United States of America. For me there was no escape from problems of international relations, whether I was in charge of the Ministries of Commerce and later of Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, or Minister for Industries, a portfolio which I held during 1962-3.

The study of history, an acquaintance with the problems of underdeveloped countries, and my own penchant for international politics justified, I imagined, my ambition to serve Pakistan as its Foreign Minister. That ambition was fulfilled when I was made Foreign Minister in January 1963, on the death of Mr. Mohammad Ali of Bogra.

Before that date, however, I had had to deal with international problems of fundamental importance to the interests of Pakistan. In December 1960, in my capacity as Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, I went to Moscow to conduct negotiations with the Soviet Union for an oil agreement. I mention this fact because it marked the point at which our relations with the Soviet Union, most unsatisfactory until then, began to improve.

On my return from the famous General Assembly Session of 1960 which was attended by Premier Khrushchev, Presidents Nasser and Soekarno, Mr. Macmillan, Pandit Nehru, Señor Fidel Castro, and many other eminent statesmen, I was convinced that the time had arrived for the Government of Pakistan to review and revise its foreign policy. I accordingly offered suggestions to my Government, all of which were finally accepted. This was before I became Foreign Minister. The

ground was thus prepared for my work, by changes introduced, at my own insistence, when I took charge officially of the conduct of foreign policy as Foreign Minister.

The reader will discover for himself in the pages of this book what opinions I held, what my attitude is to world problems, what mistakes I believe were committed by Pakistan in dealing with foreign powers—particularly with Global Powers—and how those mistakes may be remedied; what my proposals are for a foreign policy adequate to avert the dangers which now threaten the country. It would be pointless to attempt to summarize these views within the brief compass of a Preface. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that the policy of close relations with China, which I formulated and put into operation, is indispensable to Pakistan; that in dealing with Great Powers one must resist their pressures by all possible means available, when they offend against the Nation's welfare; and that compromises leading to the settlement of disputes by default or in an inequitable manner strike at the roots of national security, even existence. If I assume responsibility for certain policies, I also admit that I made every effort to carry them into effect until I left office in June 1966.

Though tempted to write at greater length about the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and the subsequent Tashkent Declaration, I decided, for various reasons, to defer discussion of these and other topics to a later date. The truth of this chapter of history has yet to be told.

I confess that this book has been written in haste, in circumstances over which I had no control, in a race against time which is dragging Pakistan, with giant strides, to the crossroads whence all ways but one lead to destruction.

Z. A. B.

Karachi,
November 1967

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CHAPTER I

The Struggle for Equality

On 19 May 1954, after some hard negotiations, Pakistan and the United States of America concluded the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement and entered upon a period of association euphemistically called a 'special relationship'. For over twelve years, the United States provided Pakistan with considerable economic and military assistance. In 1959, misunderstandings arose in the relations between the two countries and have since grown and multiplied, especially after the Sino-Indian conflict. Relations have followed a chequered course, sometimes bearing on economic matters and sometimes, more profoundly, on political issues. The pendulum has swung from one extreme to the other, from association to estrangement. There was a time when Pakistan was described as the most 'allied ally' of the United States and, to the chagrin of other 'client States' of Asia, it was asserted by President Ayub Khan, in an address to the United States' Congress in 1961, that Pakistan was the only country in the continent where the United States Armed Forces could land at any moment for the defence of the 'free world'. When, during the U-2 episode, in an attempt at refined diplomacy, the United States prevaricated with ambiguous statements, Pakistan, more royalist than the monarch, openly admitted that the aircraft had taken off from Pakistan and that, as a staunch ally of the United States, Pakistan was within its rights to allow it to do so.

In less than a quarter of a century, Pakistan's relations with the United States and India have completed a cycle in each case. Vigorous efforts have been made to drag Pakistan away from the posture of confrontation to co-operation with India and, in this very process, relations with the United States have changed dramatically from those of the most 'allied ally' to the point at which it is alleged that there is 'collusion' between Pakistan and the United States' principal antagonist—the

CHAPTER 2

Global Powers and Small Nations

Since the end of the Second World War, a new political situation has developed which, perhaps because it is so evident, is not always seen in its correct perspective and its implications sufficiently understood. Up to 1939 it could be said that the Great Powers were:

1. The United States of America
2. The United Kingdom
3. France
4. Germany
5. The Soviet Union
6. Japan
7. Italy

The traditional method of conducting foreign affairs in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries was by means of regional alliances formed to maintain a balance of power among the grouping of the Great Powers with the assistance of the smaller nations. Peace was preserved by maintaining this very delicate balance, and peace was disturbed only when the balance, at any given time, tilted in favour of one group or the other. In those days, the smaller nations could influence the policy and the alignment of Great Powers by indulging in various political permutations and combinations.

All this has changed today with the emergence of Global Powers which, in addition to having all the attributes of Great Powers in the classical sense, are at the same time much more powerful and play a larger role in determining the destinies of people all over the world. The emergence of these Powers in the last twenty years has changed the whole concept of conducting affairs of state. The task of smaller nations, in which category all the developing nations fall, in determining their relationship with Global Powers and in furthering their

CHAPTER 3

American Attitudes towards Partition and Indian Neutralism

Situated in Asia and being an underdeveloped country, Pakistan has to adjust its foreign policy to the world situation on the basis of progressive, enlightened national interest infused with a desire for universal peace and justice. Pakistan is an ideological state or, to be more precise, a state with an ideology. To the Muslims of the sub-continent it is a God-inspired country; the expression of the idea of justice and equality translated into reality by the process of self-determination. Pakistan has specific international responsibilities in accordance with its nature; it must of necessity take up such a position as will permit it to contribute to the fullest extent in the discharge of its inner obligations, to the consolidation of world peace and the realization of equality amongst all peoples and nations; and will, at the same time permit it to deal with its own problems.

Fired by the zeal to end domination and to achieve equality, the Muslims of the sub-continent struggled for a separate state and were successful in attaining Pakistan. Although there are some who still regret the division of the sub-continent, it is quite evident that without partition none of the Muslim peoples of pre-Partition India would have been able to protect the values they hold to be supreme and regard as indispensable to a world freed from domination.

Practically the whole of India had been united in ancient times during the reign of Emperor Asoka, and later at the apogee of the Mughal Empire when Aurangzeb's fiat prevailed from one end of the sub-continent to the other. In both cases it was an imposed unity. Polyglot India remained a rich diversity of conflicting cultures held together by imperial orders. It was not a case of culture and unity flowing from the fountainhead of a single nationality. Indeed, the concept of nationality or

CHAPTER 4

India seeks American Support against China

With the United States' policy well grounded on the concept of military alliances, it was not surprising that the warmth of the United States-Pakistan relations continued to increase during the late fifties, reaching their highest point just when India's relations with China suddenly deteriorated in late 1958 and early 1959. United States-Pakistan relations endured some slight tremors during the Ladakh clashes, and some more severe ones when the Sino-Indian border dispute began to intensify. In these developments the United States saw a great new opportunity—that of realizing its long-cherished ambition to spread its influence over India.

1959 marked the end of one era and the beginning of another. Mr. Manzur Qadir was then Foreign Minister of Pakistan and I was in New York leading Pakistan's delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. In a letter addressed to him from there, I gave warning that the conflict in Ladakh would give rise to many changes in the sub-continent. The Dulles era had come to an end and a new situation was evolving for which the inflexible diplomacy of 1945-58 would no longer be suitable. The conditions of the forties and early fifties had altered radically. Europe was changing and there were changes in the Soviet Union; the world was moving away from the dogmas of Dulles to the spirit of Camp David. These and other developments in Asia and elsewhere called for a reorientation of the United States' foreign policy. The changes came sooner than expected by Pakistan. The regime, which was closer to the United States than any previous Government, was not psychologically prepared to accommodate itself to the changes caused by the rigidity of American post-war policies.

The magnitude of the change can be measured, in economic

CHAPTER 5

America aids India and ignores Pakistan

The shift in India's foreign policy did not escape the notice of the non-aligned nations of Asia and Africa. Dr. Subandrio, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, an important non-aligned nation in the community of Asia and Africa, observed on 26 June 1963 that there had been a major shift in his country's foreign policy, because of the 'selfish and heartless attitude of India'. Mr. R. G. Senanayake, a member of the Ceylonese Parliament, gave warning of a potential threat that India might invade Ceylon, and added that 'despite Gandhism, India was doing everything to become an imperialist power by amassing American weapons including warships and submarines'. He went on to declare that 'India's target is Ceylon and not China'. Similar declarations, expressing alarm at India's growing military strength and its abandonment of non-alignment, were made by other prominent Afro-Asian statesmen.

These apprehensions notwithstanding, on 27 July 1963, Mr. Nehru defended India's acceptance of the Western offer of joint air exercises and military equipment by emphasizing that it did not mean any change in the country's foreign policy of neutrality. Later in the year, however, he rejected Western 'air cover' on the ground that foreign bases on Indian soil would compromise India's non-aligned status. In the meantime, it was reported that the Indian request for \$100 million emergency military aid was being considered, in addition to the aid promised at Nassau. Moreover, in August 1963, the Aid to India Consortium increased that year's contribution from various countries to India's Third Five Year Plan from \$915 million to \$1,000 million. The largest additional donor was the United States with an increased contribution of \$60 million. In contrast to this, the quantum of aid to Pakistan was not only not being increased, but some of that already pledged by the United States International Agencies was being cut back. The

CHAPTER 6

American Policy to bring Pakistan under Indian Hegemony

Force enters when diplomacy is exhausted. If all attempts to bring about co-operation between India and Pakistan fail, it would be imprudent to rule out coercive measures. This does not necessarily mean that the United States, whose objectives are not quite identical with those of India, would, in desperation, create conditions that would enable India to dismember or destroy Pakistan. However, if the lessons of September 1965 are not forgotten, it would be rash to discount this possibility altogether in the calculations of Pakistan's foreign and defence policies.

The history of Pakistan-United States relations has been outlined in the preceding chapters to clarify the implications of present developments. It is high time that, after two decades of independence, we learned to approach events more systematically and to put an end to the age-old habit of impetuous and arbitrary *ad hoc* responses.

On the face of it, the decision of 12 April 1967 was taken to restrain the arms race between India and Pakistan and prevent another war. It was also supposedly intended to divert defence expenditures to agricultural and industrial development. In the first place, however, an arms *balance* between India and Pakistan is likely to reduce the risk of war. This has been borne out by our experience of the last twenty years. Outside the sub-continent, and on a much larger scale, there is the example of the existing military balance between the Soviet Union and the United States, which has led not to war but to a *détente*. The temptation to wage war normally arises when there is a military imbalance. After a period of time, the effect of the United States' decision will lead to a situation in which India would be in a strong position to strike at Pakistan. It does not, therefore,

CHAPTER 7

Collaboration with India on American Terms

The reasons adduced for joint economic collaboration between India and Pakistan are precisely those advanced against the Partition of the sub-continent. Arguments, decisively settled by Partition, have been resurrected. The objections of the Indian National Congress to a division of the sub-continent's economy and security forces had been overruled at the creation of Pakistan by the Muslim's decision to be 'separate and equal'. Many years ago, in a conversation between Mr. Jinnah and the British author Beverley Nichols, the economic and defence consequences of Partition were discussed.

SELF [Nichols] The first is economic. Are the Muslims likely to be richer or poorer under Pakistan? And would you set up tariffs against the rest of India?

JINNAH I'll ask you a question for a change. Supposing you were asked which you would prefer . . . a rich England under Germany or a poor England free, what would your answer be?

SELF It's hardly necessary to say.

JINNAH Quite. Well, doesn't that make your question look a little shoddy? This great ideal rises far above mere questions of personal comfort or temporary convenience. The Muslims are a tough people, lean and hardy. If Pakistan means that they will have to be a little tougher, they will not complain. But why should it mean that? What conceivable reason is there to suppose that the gift of nationality is going to be an economic liability? A sovereign nation of a hundred million people—even if they are not immediately self-supporting and even if they are industrially backward—is hardly likely to be in a worse economic position than if its members are scattered and disorganized, under the dominance of two hundred and fifty million Hindus whose one idea is to exploit them. How any European can get up and say that Pakistan is 'economically impossible' after the Treaty of Versailles is really beyond my comprehension. The great

CHAPTER 8

American Demands and the Choices before Pakistan

The United States' decision to stop military assistance to the sub-continent appears to be directed against both countries in the form of what was called 'even-handed treatment' at the time of the Indo-Pakistan conflict in 1965. Like the earlier treatment, this, in reality, is injurious only to Pakistan, which for over a decade has received military equipment solely from the United States. Her armed forces are accustomed to American weapons and the defence establishment has been orientated according to American thinking. Pakistan does not possess sufficient indigenous ordnance factories for its ammunition requirements, nor does it have a steel mill or factories producing armaments. Although, all of a sudden, Pakistan's one source of military supplies has dried up, the United States' decision provoked an uproar in India. Under certain stringent conditions, the United States has agreed to permit the sale of spare parts on a cash basis to both countries. This concession, admittedly, will cushion Pakistan's defence requirements for a brief period. It has been made, however, not to give Pakistan any passing advantage over India, but to continue to maintain the American hold on Pakistan's defence machinery. It is in the United States' interest to keep a finger on the trigger even after the termination of its military assistance. Not only does it thereby retain its influence in this most vital field, but it can also extract valuable information concerning the military equipment Pakistan has recently received from other sources.

If Pakistan does not now hasten to take positive counter-measures to safeguard her security, India is likely to evict more Muslims on the Assam borders, take over East Pakistan's water resources, strangle its economy, and prepare to launch an attack on Azad Kashmir and, if necessary, on the rest of Pakistan.

CHAPTER 9

The Indo-Pakistan War and its Analogies

The ways in which Pakistan can meet the challenge to her vital interests can best be considered by seeing how she stands in the world. *Indeed, an assessment of Pakistan's international position* and her attitude to world issues is of paramount importance in evaluating how she will be able to resist foreign intervention in her internal affairs.

To some extent the policies of the *United States and India* run parallel, but fortunately for Pakistan their ultimate objectives differ. In the interest of its sovereignty, it is essential for Pakistan to conduct its diplomacy in such a way as to divide the parallel lines and enlarge the contradictions. *India seeks to bring Pakistan back to Mother India, but is not anxious to become entangled in a global conflict against China. The United States wants to see meaningful co-operation between India and Pakistan with the purpose of encircling China and, if this is to be the purpose, India would hesitate to have that kind of co-operation with Pakistan. India would equally resent the growing interference in her internal affairs aimed at making her an active instrument in the cold war.*

Pakistan has no alternative but to resist foreign interference inimical to her national interest and to carry on the struggle for the vindication of its legitimate rights in the sub-continent. The success or failure of her diplomacy will depend not only on her bilateral and direct relations with India, on the one hand, and with the United States on the other, and with them jointly, but on the manner in which she discharges her international obligations and conducts her general foreign policy.

Although the principal challenge to Pakistan comes from India and the brunt of the international pressure from the United States, it would be wrong to lose sight of the rest of the world in this context. Just as it was necessary to trace the evolution of United States' relations with Pakistan in order

CHAPTER 10

Relations with Neighbouring Countries and Some Others

Pakistan has established a model relationship with Iran and Turkey, and this fraternal association is an increasingly powerful factor in Asia. The Regional Co-operation for Development, popularly called RCD, will bring our countries closer together as it is based on equality, mutual assistance, and friendship. We should further strengthen our mutual relations and assist one another in overcoming common difficulties by common endeavour.

It is a happy augury for the future that the seemingly intractable prejudices between Turkey and the Arab states are being overcome. Many signs of improvement have recently appeared, but none equalled the encouraging support that Turkey gave the Arab states in their conflict with Israel. Similarly, although relations between Iran and the United Arab Republic have in the past been ruptured, the war in the Middle East and Iran's support for the Arab cause provided an excellent opportunity to repair them. Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan, all of whom maintain good relations with both Iran and the United Arab Republic, are individually and collectively in a position to assist in the process of restoring normal relations between the two countries. What appeared difficult before the conflict, should now be less difficult after the Iranian demonstration of sympathy with the Arabs. A rapprochement between these countries would help greatly in bringing peace to the troubled Middle East and the explosive situation in the Gulf region.

To turn now to the underdeveloped countries of Latin America, it is necessary for Pakistan to maintain good relations with these, both to secure fairer terms of international trade and better economic conditions of co-operation between the

CHAPTER 11

Pakistan and the Vietnam War

Before discussing Pakistan's relations with China and India, it is necessary to touch upon Vietnam, the most burning issue now facing the world. Like Pakistan, Vietnam has a historical past of subjection to colonial domination. This the Vietnamese people have gallantly resisted from the earliest period. Shortly after the Second World War, they were obliged, when all attempts to come to terms with their former colonial rulers failed, to take up arms against France which was then supported by other Western states. That war of liberation forced the French to leave the country. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 were intended to constitute the framework of a free and independent Vietnam, but the United States intervened and frustrated the objectives of these Agreements.

In the beginning, the United States sent 'advisers' and 'military observers', under the pretext of combating Communism, to assist the South Vietnam regime in the civil war, which it had intensified by its increasing military involvement. In the Spanish Civil War many persons of liberal conviction came from other parts of Europe and the United States to the help of the Republicans. After General Franco's victory, Western Europe and the United States treated Spain for many years as an outcast, ostracizing it from the Western community. How different is the case of Vietnam, where the liberal and progressive forces are being crushed to prevent the country from becoming Communist!

It is a matter of conjecture whether the United States believed, from the beginning, that its commitment in Vietnam would become as extensive as it now is. Pity and justice have been sacrificed to overweening national pride. The United States is probably capable of achieving a military victory in Vietnam, but such a victory would not provide the political answer to a problem which defies all but political solutions.

CHAPTER 12

Sino-Pakistani Relations

Pakistan's relations with China have greatly improved since 1962. This has caused misgivings in the United States, where the rationale of this relationship has been much distorted. Sino-Pakistani relations are not primarily based on the differences of the two countries with India. That factor forms only a part, important though it be, of the rationale. China is Pakistan's neighbour and it is essential for us to maintain good relations with all our neighbours on the basis of friendship and equality. *There are no territorial or other disputes between the countries to give rise to differences.* Ever since the Revolution in China, the leaders of that country have made sincere efforts to establish normal relations with Pakistan. During the Bandung Conference, Premier Chou En-Lai assured the Prime Minister of Pakistan that China desired good relations with Pakistan, and it would have been unwise for Pakistan to have spurned a gesture of goodwill from a powerful neighbouring country. *China's dominant place in Asia is assured; Pakistan is an Asian state, whose destinies are forever linked with those of Asia, and it is vital for Pakistan to maintain friendly relations with China for strengthening Asian unity.* As members of the community of Asia and Africa, our countries have a common interest in the promotion of Afro-Asian solidarity—a further reason why they must maintain good relations with each other. As underdeveloped countries, China and Pakistan seek to co-operate with other such countries, for obtaining better international trading terms and for a more equitable participation with the developed states in the economic and social advancement of the underdeveloped nations. From the very beginning, China has taken a just position on the partition of Palestine and has supported the Arab cause against Israel. *China's support for the Arab nations is in conformity with Pakistan's position, as was conclusively demonstrated by the bold position China took on the*

CHAPTER 13

Relations with European Powers and Great Powers

It remains to be seen which of the three quasi-Great Powers of Western Europe is capable of making the greatest contribution to Pakistan's national cause in the foreseeable future; but on the basis of her present policy, France seems the most likely. Her support for the principle of self-determination, her effort to free herself from the Atlantic hegemony, and her comprehension of Asian problems has resulted in France's good relations with Pakistan.

During the September war of 1965, France gave Pakistan no cause for disappointment. On the contrary, her attitude in the Security Council was most helpful on account of its opposition to sanctions threatened by the other Great Powers. Even during the Consortium crisis of July 1965, France gave Pakistan both economic and political support. Her global policy coincides with our national and international interests, and she has taken careful note of the negative consequences of India's shrinking status under the shadow of hegemony. France believes that India's conflict with China is not conducive to the cause of peace in Asia; values Pakistan as a country that has developed a relationship of trust and understanding with China; and sympathizes with Pakistan's struggle to keep her identity and sovereignty intact.

Pakistan is on friendly terms with the Federal Republic of Germany and has not so far established any contacts with the other Germany; but because of the limitations of German foreign policy, it cannot be asserted to what extent the Federal Republic, despite its accumulating power, will find itself in a position to offer substantial assistance to Pakistan in the event of heavy pressure being exercised on it. Nevertheless, it is important that we continue to develop friendly relations with

CHAPTER 14

Some Conclusions

In view of past experience and other considerations Pakistan must pursue three principal objectives:

1. A policy of friendship and good faith with China, a Great Power with whom its basic interests conform.
2. Good relations with the United States and the Soviet Union, but without preconditions and on the basis of non-interference; also with the nations of Eastern and Western Europe, especially France, Germany, Britain, Roumania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.
3. The strengthening of the Third World—the underdeveloped nations of Latin America, Asia, and Africa, and, in particular, Muslim nations and neighbouring countries.

The realization of these objectives would secure, so to speak, Pakistan's flanks and rear, enabling us to face the rising tide of difficulties with India, which has become more acute on account of the changes in American sub-continental policies. If Pakistan is not prepared to resist these, she should, at least, take an unambiguous stand as did Burma and Cambodia some time ago. One sharp and decisive encounter at the political level would put a stop to the downward trend, and is infinitely preferable to a step-by-step retreat ending perhaps in dismemberment. In international politics, ready prescriptions are not available as they are in medicine, but this does not mean that remedies are not available for political ailments.

The United States' decision to terminate military assistance to Pakistan and its general policies in the sub-continent have considerably increased the threat to Pakistan's security. We must therefore take remedial measures, and the sooner the better for peace in the sub-continent. India's armed strength is greater than Pakistan's. The United States' decision and

CHAPTER 15

The State's Best Defence

The Pakistan Government will have to undertake measures to make the country's economic and food resources self-supporting. Most underdeveloped countries need foreign assistance and ours is no exception. Foreign assistance should serve to turn a dependent economy into a self-reliant one, but, if it is accompanied by foreign interference, dependence increases and the object is defeated. It has yet to be seen whether the economies of India and Pakistan have moved towards self-reliance at all with the heavy foreign investments on the Western pattern in the last decade or so. There are conflicting opinions on the growth of Pakistan's economy. Some are of the view that Pakistan has made tremendous strides and become a model Asian State, second only to Japan! Others maintain that Pakistan's economic development has been erratic, irrational, and not in accord with its resources and essential needs. There are signs of growth and development and there are also indications of serious economic trouble. With sustained effort and with a change in the economic system, Pakistan can overcome her economic difficulties. The country's Achilles' heel is her food-grain deficit of 2.5 million tons, but, with this problem solved, she would be in a position to withstand a multitude of international pressures. Unfortunately, much precious time has been lost. If the Government of Pakistan had paid as much attention to agriculture in its Second Five Year Plan as it is doing in the current Plan, the country would have become self-sufficient by now. But the policy of the Second Five Year Plan was irrationally directed to industrial development in all fields except that of the basic industries. It was then argued that Pakistan was too poor to afford heavy industries such as the production of steel, and that the country should not strive to attain self-sufficiency in agriculture, because its food deficit could always be met by generous assistance from the United

CHAPTER 16

Deterrent against Aggression

Pakistan's security and territorial integrity are more important than economic development. Although such development and self-reliance contribute to the strengthening of the nation's defence capability, the defence requirements of her sovereignty have to be met first. Pakistan will have to pay equal attention to the attainment of self-reliance through economic development and to her defence requirements. A non-industrialized country, without even the basis of a heavy industry, cannot depend entirely on the traditional defence system of a small, though highly efficient, armed force equipped with conventional weapons. The country being poor, the size of the armed forces cannot be large, nor can it be expanded beyond a certain limit; and it is doubtful whether that limit, even if reached, would be high enough should Pakistan be again confronted with an aggressor many times larger, stronger, and better equipped, not to speak of the numerical strength of its armed forces. The economic strain created by the expansion of a standing force would be great, and it would be unwise to think in terms of competing with India in size of forces and quantity of equipment. Pakistan has so far been unable to establish an industrial war-base, for a number of regrettable reasons: one of them being the greed of those for whom the import of steel was more profitable than the production of steel in their own land. It is not possible for Pakistan, within the next few years, to develop a local industrial potential for equipping its armed forces with the more sophisticated weapons; nor can we depend entirely upon ingenious diplomatic initiatives. Indeed, the effect of a nation's diplomatic activities is often related to the weight of its fighting capacity. Many clever things may be said and done, but in the face of real danger a country has to depend on its own strength. International circumstances will change. Therefore, too much reliance upon diplomatic support, with-

CHAPTER 17

How to Face the Looming Crisis

A national crisis is a call to national greatness, and must be met with a spirit of dedication. Muslims cannot be better inspired to face such a challenge than by heeding the words of the Holy Koran:

Fighting in defence of Truth and Right is not to be undertaken light-heartedly, not to be evaded as a duty. Life and Death are in the hands of God. Not all can be chosen to fight for God. It requires constancy, firmness and faith. Given these, large armies can be routed by those who battle for God.

At the time of the Consortium crisis in July 1965, the Government took the issue directly to the people of Pakistan and, with their support, the country successfully surmounted that crisis. The current crisis is more serious and the people must be told the truth: what is wanted of Pakistan and why Pakistan is not in a position to oblige. Underdeveloped countries cannot, by material means, resist the pressures of Great and Global Powers, which can cause havoc by silent diplomacy. They have only to bring into operation a host of devices which wreck the economic and social equilibrium of dependent states and overthrow regimes. Great and Global Powers prefer to operate in silence behind the scenes, and a variety of reasons would be given why discussions on the differences should not be made public. The dependent state would be told that exposure and agitation would further vitiate the atmosphere of the talks. Such states, however, lacking levers to operate directly against Global Powers, have no choice but to expose these machinations and mobilize their people to offer resistance. For this reason, underdeveloped nations seek international platforms like the General Assembly of the United Nations to inform the world of the difficulties involved in their struggle for emancipation and a better life.

CHAPTER 18

The Origins of Dispute with India

Relations between India and Pakistan should resemble those between Sweden and Norway, countries which had to break apart in order to come closer to each other. India and Pakistan have so much in common that the rest of the world sometimes finds it hard to understand why they are in a state of perpetual confrontation. The dictates of reason, the compulsions of geography, and the influence of international forces require them to live in peace, but their poverty-stricken masses have been denied the benefits that ought to have accrued to them from political independence. There are many reasons for this state of affairs: the legacy of history, superstition, and prejudice. The Hindus of the sub-continent have borne a thousand years of subjugation and the Muslims have been victims of foreign domination for over 150 years. The mental outlook of all peoples of the sub-continent has been distorted by alien domination. They have still to find their bearings as independent nations. *They still need to acquire confidence to break with the past.*

To the end of his life, Mr. Nehru maintained that the resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute would not bring peace and amity to the sub-continent, because Indo-Pakistani disputes were only the symptoms of the bigoted attitude of theocratic and reactionary Pakistan to secular, progressive India. Pakistan, on the other hand, maintained that only by a resolution of the disputes, to which the Indian Government and Prime Minister Nehru were internationally committed, would it be possible to determine whether the disputes were the causes or the symptoms of Indo-Pakistani differences. It is obvious that only by the resolution of territorial and other essential disputes could it be possible to attain normal conditions. It is strange logic to usurp the territorial and economic rights of a country on the grounds that enmity with that country is unavoidable. There is no

CHAPTER 19

Confrontation with India

The principal objective of Indian foreign policy has been to isolate Pakistan. In the early days, recognizing the fact that Pakistan had affinities with the Middle East, India concentrated *her diplomatic activity against Pakistan in the Arab World*. When, in self-defence, we moved towards the United States, India denounced our mutual Defence Agreements with that country.

Taking advantage of Soviet hostility toward CENTO, India embarked on a comprehensive plan for co-operation with the Soviet Union in political, economic, and military matters, firstly, to counteract Pakistan's alliance with Western countries, and, secondly, to put further difficulties in the way of Soviet-Pakistan relations. India's initial objective was the promotion of grandiose designs in south-east Asia and the total isolation of Pakistan from the People's Republic of China. In international organizations, such as the United Nations, India continued to operate on an over-ambitious scale and, for the benefit of the *Afro-Asian world, sought to portray Pakistan as a client of the Western Powers* and, therefore, unsuited to play an important role in Afro-Asian matters. Perhaps the excess of zeal with which India pursued this objective helped Pakistan to maintain her standing in the international arena. It became increasingly clear to other countries that it was India's malice towards Pakistan and not the substance of Pakistan's domestic or foreign policy which motivated Indian policy. Her obduracy over the Jammu and Kashmir dispute did more than any other factor to expose the true nature of her policies towards Pakistan. This unconcern for international morality led India to a position in which, during the war between India and Pakistan, her leaders were forced to lament their isolation and the lack of support from any part of the world.

On the one hand, India preached peace, while on the other, she continued to increase her defence expenditure to unprece-

CHAPTER 20

Epilogue

No country in the world can in principle oppose universal disarmament in face of the ever-present risk of the employment of thermo-nuclear weapons on a scale to destroy life on this planet. When people everywhere are anxious to improve their living conditions, no nation has the right to oppose the demand for using available resources for economic development instead of defence. However, in order to be effective, disarmament must be on a multilateral, universal basis, so that no one nation has an advantage over another, or one group of nations an advantage over another group of nations. But the proposal for the reduction of forces between India and Pakistan does not contain a single element of equity. India is in possession of Jammu and Kashmir and eastern enclaves belonging to Pakistan. In such circumstances, bilateral disarmament between India and Pakistan would mean the victory of the state possessing the disputed territory and the defeat of the dispossessed.

We should not be daunted by the powerful support India is getting. By herself she is a menace to the security of Pakistan and, aided by powerful external forces, she will be a greater menace. But no matter how great the menace, it cannot break the united resolve of a nation with a just cause. The present situation cannot last indefinitely. The attitudes of Global Powers, as we have seen, are capable of changing. In international dealings there is no such thing as an 'irrevocable constant'. That is why India is afraid when she hears talk about bridges of understanding between China and the United States. With the passage of time, when a *modus vivendi* is struck between the United States and China, or between China and the Soviet Union, India will find herself in isolation. The war in Vietnam is of decisive importance. It has a direct bearing on future developments in the sub-continent and in Asia as a whole. Let us hope that it does not extend, giving us the respite to resolve

