

Security & Development


*The Political Economy Of Insurgency
In Manipur*

K.Gyanendra Singh

SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

The Political Economy of Insurgency in Manipur

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Preface

The relationship between insurgency and economic development is the most debated issue today. There exists a two-way interlinkage between insurgency and economic development. But it is often alleged that economic underdevelopment is the outcome of insurgency. However, one needs to keep in mind that a weak material base often provides the base for the growth of insurgency.

The state of Manipur has been undergoing a serious turmoil since Independence. The initial democratic movement for statehood turned into militancy movement in the later years due to various factors like failure of the Indian state to accommodate the nationalist inspirations of Manipur in general and Meiteis in particular, economic underdevelopment, losing credibility of the state power elites, corruption, etc. These militant movements have, over the years, degenerated and are now involved in various unwanted activities, sometimes in connivance with the state power elites. This has further robbed the state of her peaceful existence and development.

The ethnic composition of the state is another source of tension in Manipur. As these different ethnic groups often come into conflicting claims, accommodating the interest one group is possible only at the cost of other groups. This has resulted in a serious wave of ethnic explosion in the state.

The economy of Manipur is also undergoing a low growth syndrome. Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy of Manipur. However, the strategy of development which focused on social sectors has left the real sectors of the economy virtually handicapped. The peripheral location, non-availability of core natural resources, lack of infrastructural facilities leading to high transport cost, etc. have contributed to her industrial backwardness and left the state far behind her counterparts in the country. The low growth syndrome has resulted in high unemployment, which in turn has escalated the problem of militancy in the state

The present book, which is the outcome of my research work carried out in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, National Institute of Technology, Silchar for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Arts (Economics), is a humble attempt to address the issues of development and insurgency in Manipur. As such the book is divided into six broad categories. The first chapter deals with the research problem, review of literature and methodology of the study. The second chapter deals with the growth of identity and nationalism among the major ethnic groups in the state, viz., Meitei, Naga and Kuki. In the third chapter, an attempt has been made to trace the dynamics of growth of economy of the state since feudal era upto the present period. In the fourth chapter, the dynamics of growth of militancy in Manipur has been studied. In the fifth chapter, an attempt has been made to analyze the economic and social costs of insurgency. The last chapter is the conclusion where an attempt has been made to put forward some policy implications to come out of the present crisis.

I am extremely indebted to my guide Dr. Gurudas Das, Associate Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, National Institute of Technology, Silchar, for his guidance and active supervision throughout the period of this research work. The present work would never have been completed without his guidance and support, both morally

and financially. His comments, criticisms and words of encouragement helped me immensely in completing the present study. No words or phrase can ever describe his help and support throughout my career as a student since my higher secondary days.

I am also thankful to all the faculty members in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Dr. N. Bhupendro Singh, Dr. Ashim Kumar Das and Dr. Reena Sanasam, for their valuable advice and comments. I am also thankful to my fellow research scholars in the Department for their support and help.

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My sincere thanks also go to my beloved parents, sisters and brothers who have been all along supporting and encouraging throughout my career. The pain and sacrifices they have undertaken while fulfilling my academic pursuits can never be repaid throughout my whole life. I am, forever, indebted to them.

Last, but not the least, I would like to thank the Almighty, under whose spiritual guidance I have existed till today.

K. Gyanendra Singh

Abbreviations

ADCC	=	Assembly Demand Co-ordination Committee
AFSPA	=	Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958
AMRTDMWU	=	All Manipur Road Transport Drivers and Motor Workers' Union
AMSU	=	All Manipur Students' Union
AMUCO	=	All Manipur United Clubs' Organisation
AMWJU	=	All Manipur Working Journalists' Union
ANSAM	=	All Naga Students' Association, Manipur
AR	=	Assam Rifles
ATSUM	=	All Tribal Students Union of Manipur
CHS	=	Commission on Human Security
CM	=	Chief Minister
DLP	=	Democratic Legislature Party
FGN	=	Federal Government of Nagaland

FPM	=	Federal Party of Manipur
GOI	=	Government of India
GPRN	=	Government of People's Republic of Nagaland
IBRF	=	Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front
IFP	=	Imphal Free Press
INA	=	Indian National Army
INC	=	Indian National Congress
ISI	=	Inter-Services Intelligence
KCP	=	Kangleipak Communist Party
KIA	=	Kachin Independence Army
KLA	=	Kuki Liberation Army
KNA	=	Kuki National Assembly
KNA*	=	Kuki National Army
KNF	=	Kuki National Front
KNO	=	Kuki National Organisation
KNU	=	Khulmi National Union
KRA	=	Kuki Revolutionary Army
KVI	=	Khadi and Village Industry
KYKL	=	Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup
LR	=	Land Reforms
MAICL	=	Manipur Agro Industries Corporation Ltd.
MANIDCO	=	Manipur Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.

MANITRON	=	Manipur Electronic Development Corporation Ltd.
MCL	=	Manipur Cement Ltd.
MCCL	=	Manipur Cycle Corporation Ltd.
MDU	=	Manipur Dramatic Union
MHHDC	=	Manipur Handloom and Handicrafts Development Corporation Ltd.
MHU	=	Manipur Hills Union
MKS	=	Manipur Krishak Sabha
MLR	=	Manipur Land Revenue
MNF	=	Mizo National Front
MNU	=	Manipur National Union
MPA	=	Manipur People's Army
MPCCI	=	Manipur Plantation Crops Corporation Ltd.
MPLF	=	Manipur People's Liberation Front
MPM	=	Manipur Praja Mandal
MPP	=	Manipur Peoples' Party
MPS	=	Manipur Praja Sangha
MR	=	Manipur Rifles
MSC	=	Manipur State Congress
MSC*	=	Meitei State Committee
MSCP	=	Manipur State Congress Party
MSMCL	=	Manipur Spinning Mills Corporation Ltd.
MSP	=	Manipur Socialist Party

NC	=	Naga Club
NDA	=	National Democratic Alliance
NDP	=	Net Domestic Product
NEFA	=	North Eastern Frontier Agency
NH	=	National Highway
NHD	=	Naga Hills District
NHDTC	=	Naga Hills District Tribal Council
NHMM	=	Nikhil Hindu Manipuri Mahasabha
NHTA	=	Naga Hills Tuensang Area
NMM	=	Nikhil Manipuri Mahasabha
NNC	=	Naga National Council
NNO	=	Naga National Organisation
NPC	=	Naga People's Convention
NSCN	=	National Socialist Council of Nagaland
NSDP	=	Net State Domestic Product
NWUM	=	Naga Women's Union, Manipur
ONK	=	Operation New Kangleipak
PANMYL	=	Pan Manipuri Youth League
PLA	=	People's Liberation Army (Eastern Region)
PLAC	=	People's Liberation Army of China
PR	=	President Rule
PRC	=	People's Republic of China
PSP	=	Praja Socialist Party
PSS	=	Praja Santi Sabha

PULF	=	People's United Liberation Front
RAW	=	Research and Analysis Wing
RIMS	=	Regional Institute of Medical Sciences
RGM	=	Revolutionary Government of Manipur
RJC	=	Revolutionary Joint Committee
RPF	=	Revolutionary People's Front
SCS	=	Special Category State
SIDO	=	Small Industries Development Organisation
SPF	=	Secular Progressive Front
SRC	=	State Reorganization Commission
TNV	=	Tripura National Volunteers
UCM	=	United Committee Manipur
UK	=	United Kingdom
UKLF	=	United Kuki Liberation Front
ULFA	=	United Liberation Front of Asom
ULP	=	United Legislators' Party
UN	=	United Nations
UNCM	=	United Naga Council, Manipur
UNLF	=	United National Liberation Front
UPA	=	United Progressive Alliance
WTO	=	World Trade Organization
ZRA	=	Zomi Revolutionary Army
ZRO	=	Zomi Revolutionary Organisation

Glossary

Atiya Guru Sidhaba = Sky the immortal guru (*atiya* = sky; *sidaba* = immortal)

Chahi Taret Khuntakpa = Seven Years Devastation (*chahi* = year; *taret* = seven; *khuntakpa* = devastated)

Chandan Senkhai = fee collected for the mark on the forehead (*chandan* = substance used for the mark in the forehead; *senkhai* = fee or contribution)

Chawkidar = watchman

Cheithaba = counting using stick (*chei* = stick; *thaba* = put down)

Kangleipak = old name of Manipur

Kei = granary

Keirakpa = keeper of granary

Khong = canal

Khullakpa = village chief (*khul* = village; *lakpa* = chief)

Lakpa = chief official in charge

Lallup = group of male subjects of the kingdom for the service to the country both military and non-military without remuneration for 10 days out of 40 days

Lambu = persons used for communication with the hill tribes during the British administration of the hill areas

Leimaren = homestead goddess

Loukok Eba = keeper of land records

Lourungpurel = official in charge of revenue department

Luplakpa = in charge of a group

Maiba = a person who perform the dual duties of a priest and doctor

Mangba-Sengba = outcast or excommunicate (*mangba*) – purified (*sengba*)

Mantri = minister

Nupi Lan = women's war (*nupi* = women; *lan* = war)

Pana = administrative division

Pangal = muslim

Pari = unit of measuring agricultural land; one pari = 1 hectare or 2.5 acre

Phunan Selungba = an official who looked after all the matters connecting with land

Pothang = an amalgamation of two words, *pot* = things; *thangba* = carry; the village labour had to keep up the roads and schools and they had to carry the things of the Manipuri officials from village to village when on tour

Puya = old Meitei religious books

Sanad = a testimonial or certificate from a high authority

Sanamahi = homestead god

Sangbai = a special basket for measuring paddy, rice, etc.; one *sangbai* is equivalent to 32 seers or (0.933 kg * 32 =) 29.86 kg.

Sel = currency

Senapati = general

Singlup = wood club (*sing* = wood; *lup* = group)

Soraren = god of rain

Takhen = old name of Tripura

Taothabi = a red and tailed paddy

Umang Lais = term used for Meitei gods
(*umang* = forest; *lai* = god)

Yubraj = the heir apparent of the Raja or crown prince

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1

Introduction

The security of one person, one community and one nation rests on the decisions of many others – sometimes fortuitously, sometimes precariously [Commission on Human Security (CHS), 2003: 2]. Today's global position of a borderless world spotlights the many interlinkages in the security of all people.

The term 'security' is multi-dimensional. Its meaning, interpretation and scope are too vast, too diffused and diversified to be precisely defined. Security is inextricably linked to defining public and private values, to individual or collective identity and to safeguarding life, property and cultural values of every social group (Mishra, 2000: 1, 9).

The security debate has changed dramatically since the inception of state security in the 17th century. According to that traditional idea the state would monopolize the rights and means to protect its citizens and sustain order and peace. But in the 21st century the challenges to security have become more complex. The state remains the fundamental purveyor of security. Yet it often fails to fulfill its security obligations and at times has even become a source of threat to its own people (CHS, 2003: 2).

Security is facing new challenges. Today it covers international, regional, global and human perspectives. While global security includes a whole range of issues including management of environmental threats, economic threats, human rights, AIDS, narcotics and so on beyond conflictual interaction i.e., coercion, conflict and war to settle issues, international security recognizes that the security of one state is interconnected with others based on cooperative interaction (Reddy, 2001: 822-823). The same premise is also relevant for regional security arrangement.

State security which focused mainly on protecting the state – its boundaries, people, institutions and values and which were assumed to emanate from external forces have become a narrow view with various threats of today's world like environmental pollution, transnational terrorism, massive population movements and infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS. Moreover internal conflicts have overtaken interstate wars as the major threats to international peace and security. With the galloping pace of development, the gaps between rich and poor countries and between wealthy and destitute people have widened. The exclusion and deprivation of people from the benefits of development naturally contribute to the tensions, violence and conflict within countries (CHS, 2003: 5).

State security can be classified into two types, viz., external security and internal security. Whereas external security emanates from competition with other national elites in other state territories, internal security emanates from the competition with other elites within a particular state territory (Hettne, 1988: 91). With the end of cold war and coming of nuclear weapons era the threat to state security from external forces have subsided by degrees though it cannot be ignored totally. Today the threats emanating within the state have become the biggest obstacle towards maintaining the state security and more importantly towards realizing the goals of economic development.

India's security thought largely followed the classical nation-centric theory, which was confined to the issues of territorial inviolability and military preparedness against external threats – mostly physical and defensive in orientation. Its threat perception remained Pak-centric until 1970. It was only during the 1950s that China made the first incursion into Akshai Chin and constructed the strategic road linking mainland Tibet with Xianzang. Today, an eyeball-to-eyeball military confrontation prevails on border. But during the 1990s, India reverted to Pak-centrism. "Sixty-one (originally "fifty-four years" as referred in the book) years war in South Asia" is the current euphemism to describe the eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with Pakistan (Reddy, 2001: 824-827).

Coupled with the threats from Pakistan and China is the internal threats that India has been facing since Independence. The communal partition at the midnight hour of August 15, 1947 led to bloody violence. It was followed by left extremism in Telangana (1948-51). Then a series of armed rebellions came into being with different aims and objectives. The Naga insurgency, Mizo insurgency, Meitei insurgency, left extremism in Naxalbari, linguistic riots in South, Tripura insurgency, Punjab terrorism, ULFA and Bodo in Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, LTTE, etc. (Reddy, 2001: 868-869).

Internal threats begin only when the armed phase of the struggle begins or violence transcends law and order. Its broader agenda includes a wide variety of politico-socio-economic-technological-security forces concerns besides all forms of governance, administration and psychological warfare. The internal security challenges can be categorized into different heads: secessionist uprisings, religious fanaticism, ideological impoverishment, supra and sub-regionalism out of identity crises and ethnocentrism, terrorism, and societal entropy due to demographic transitions, casteist factionalism, criminalization of politics and moral and physical corruption (Reddy, 2001: 863, 870).

India's approach to counter internal security challenges have been mostly Delhi-centric, episodic, micro-centred and law and order skewed. Such challenges were merely viewed as law and order problem and are dealt with armed forces. Imposition of President's Rule, declaring the affected states as Disturbed Areas and placing them under army control has been the strategic approach. It is this approach that led to the enactment of draconian anti-democratic laws in the Northeast and consequently employing security forces to crush the secessionist movements (Reddy, 2001: 858-859).

Northeastern Region

The Northeastern region, popularly known as the 'seven sisters', comprises the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura. It is one of the most volatile areas in the Indian subcontinent. Connected tenuously to the rest of India by what is popularly known as 'the chicken-neck' a mere 21 km. wide Siliguri corridor, these states are vital to India's security. Yet, these states have suffered a state of insecurity from the time of independence.

The Northeastern region is surrounded by Bangladesh, Bhutan, China and Myanmar and inhabited by the social groups having close affinities with their counterparts across the border.

The region is hot-bed for violence, conflicts can be traced at different levels: between individual states and the centre, between state and society, between the states themselves and between social groups within the states. Elite group competition, ethnic assertions, and interethnic as well as intra ethnic conflict and competition have resulted in fratricidal wars within each state. While some of the movements seek redressal within the constitutional framework of the country, some others seek to attain their goals through extra-constitutional means. Both types of movements create

security threats. While constitutional movements raise internal security, the extra-constitutional movements, often being linked with outside powers, create far more serious threat to countries' sovereignty and integrity. The social insecurity created out of the operation of various militant groups negatively impact upon the local economy. Economic decisions like production, investment, saving and capital formation – all are informed of the existing socio-political milieu. This is far truer when there is a social dichotomy between the enterprising community and the indigenious community, which lays claim over the social space. This dichotomy is omnipresent in all the social spaces across the northeastern region. The efforts towards ethnicizing the economic space, i.e., monopolizing the economic opportunities by a particular (often politically dominant) ethnic group have various forms of manifestations. One such form is the demand for complete secession, which is often presented under the disguise of the right to nations for self-determination.

However, economic issues, although very important, is not always at the root of all secessionist demands. The issues of livelihood do not only guide the threat perceptions of a community. There are hosts of other issues that can also pose a threat to the life of the community. For example, unrestricted immigration may pose a threat to political power structure of the host community in democratic set up (as happened in case of Tripura). Apart from immigration, cultural invasion, differentiated value system, religion, language, etc., which a community values may also get threatened and community may seek redressal through secessions.

Manipur

Manipur lies in the northeastern frontier of India. It is a charming place encircled by nine hill ranges on all sides with a small and oval valley at the centre. The state splits up naturally into two tracts, viz., the hills and the dales. The

state has 352 km. long international border with Burma (Myanmar) to the southeast and 502 km. long border with adjacent states of Nagaland on north, Cachar district of Assam on the west and Mizoram on the south and the southwest.

The genesis of insurgency in the Imphal valley goes back to the days when the ruler of Manipur signed the Standstill Agreement and the Instrument of Accession with India on August 11, 1947. The state was, then, merged with the Indian Union with the signing of Merger Agreement on September 21, 1949 which came into effect on October 15, 1949. Subsequently, Manipur was declared a province of the Chief Commissioner and was put under the category of Part 'C' State. In the initial years, the denial of statehood of Manipur spurred Meitei sub-nationalism and led to the formation of the militant wings committed to the formation of an 'independent socialist republic'. However, in 1956, Manipur became a Union Territory with Territorial Council which was upgraded to Territorial Assembly in 1963. It was in 1972 that Manipur became a full-fledged state.

Although Manipur had a long history of state formation, the denial of statehood had negatively impacted upon the peoples' psyche. People of Manipur felt the sense of deprivation while Nagas were offered statehood before them. The granting of statehood to the Nagas had sent a wrong signal to the other communities in northeast who were clamoring for the same demand. Communities interpreted the incident as without arm power nothing will come on the way. Perhaps this feeling has led to the formation of a number of insurgent groups in the region *a la* Naga National Council (NNC).

In November 24, 1964 some group of people organized the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) on the basis of Pan-Mongoloid concept with the aim to drive out foreigners (Indians) and liberate Manipur and its neighboring states from the Indian dominion. It forged links with Naga and

Mizo insurgents and even sought assistance from Pakistan. The root causes were real as well as psychological: feeling of distrust, relative deprivation, utter negligence by the central government, alienation, unemployment, growing pressure on land and growing community awareness.

The economy of Manipur still remains predominantly agricultural. It has virtually no industrial base. It has very limited scope for industrialization due to inadequate availability of mineral resources, paucity of infrastructural facilities, limited size of the local market, etc. The economy of Manipur has not changed fundamentally as well as positively to tackle the menace of the threatening size of surplus manpower resources.

Lack of economic opportunities of the ever growing 'reserve army' has led to large-scale social frustration. The competition for the limited opportunities has led to inter-ethnic conflicts which further widened social cleavages. The resentments against the outsiders have robbed the region of investments, which could have given fillip to economic development. Out-migration of people from business class and professions has sent a wrong signal to the investors. Development has been a major casualty of such anti-outsider movements.

The large-scale social frustration has strengthened the ideology of secession preached by various insurgent groups. Unemployed youths have joined the rank and file of these groups who often paint rosy picture about their future in independent Manipur. The resource mobilization by these groups for carrying out their operations and fund arms procurement activities has further robbed the local economy which desperately needs investment funds.

As these militant groups are well trained, better organized and have some credibility, the electoral political process often use them for electoral gains. The unholy alliance between

the militant groups and parliamentary political parties and their leadership has further aggravated the problems of security and development.

The question of the role of the 'sons of the soil' is always entangled with the goals of development. Economic development as a goal is desired but it should be brought by, and directly beneficial to the sons of the soil. The nexus between politicians, bureaucrats and contractors is responsible for siphoning off the government funds and a part of these funds finds its way to the underground for financing the violent campaigns.

Manipur reflects a combination of high degree of social fragmentation, stagnating economy and insurgency-dominated activities. Even after so many years of independence, political and administrative reforms and efforts towards plan economic transition, political uncertainty has shown no sign of abatement. It is also a known fact that insurgency has come to stay in the state. The region is, thus, caught in a vicious cycle of insecurity and underdevelopment. Lack of security of life, property and business has resulted into the flight of capital, skill and talent from the region and thereby allowing underdevelopment to perpetuate. Again, the perpetuation of underdevelopment is generating outright frustration and a feeling of deprivation among the local youths leading to the growth of militant movements demanding separation and secession, which further worsen the security environment.

Manipur is one of the backward states of India. Its underdevelopment is the outcome of its peripheral location, non-availability of mineral resources, security threats, inadequate market access, high transport cost, etc. The proposed study seeks to investigate as to whether economic underdevelopment is the root cause behind the growth of militancy in the state or it plays a secondary role in

exacerbating the problem of militancy. It seeks to find out the paradoxical trade-off between development and security. It will attempt to throw some light on the chicken-egg problem, i.e., whether underdevelopment is the cause of insecurity or insecurity is the cause of underdevelopment? How do the insurgent activities drawing upon the resources of the state? How these activities are impacting upon: a) the investment decisions, b) business confidence, c) economic growth, d) implementation of various development projects, e) utilization of development fund, f) provision of the social and community services like education and health which have both intrinsic and instrumental value for the formation of human capital, g) progress of industrial development, and h) functioning of various agencies and institutions in the state.

The study will also focus on the alternative options available for the reconciliation of various socio-political conflicts in the state by weighing the costs and benefits involved in such conflicts.

Review of Literature

Over the past years many writings have been published on economic development and security environment of the northeastern region. Most of the studies have focused on the region as a whole. Of course, a few writings have also brought the issues in Manipur into the focus. But still there is a dearth of literature on Manipur as far as our problem is concerned. These studies, although, are descriptive in nature, they offer deep insights and contesting perspectives which are, no doubt, of immense value.

Allen (2003, *Gazetteer of Naga Hills and Manipur*), Banerjee (1934, *The Eastern Frontier of British India*), Bhattacharyya (1963, *Gazetteer of Manipur*), Brown (2001, *Statistical Account of Manipur*), Dun (1981, *Gazetteer of Manipur*), Hodson (2007, *The Meitheis*), Hodson (2007, *The Naga Tribes of Manipur*), Johnstone (2002, *Manipur and*

Naga Hills), Mackenzie (1999, *The North East Frontier of India*), McCulloch (1980, *Valley of Manipur*) and Pemberton (1966, *Report on the Eastern Frontier of British India*) give an account of Manipur and people living therein. They give an account of the origin of the people inhabiting the state of Manipur and detail out the customs, traditions, laws, religion and economic conditions of the people.

Kabui (1991, *History of Manipur*, Vol. 1), Parratt (2005, *The Court Chronicle of the Kings of Manipur: The Cheitharon Kumpapa*), Sanajaoba (1988, *Manipur Past and Present*, Vol. 1), Singh (1987, *Introduction to Manipur*), Singh & Singh (1989, *Cheitharon Kumbaba*) and Singh (1992, *A Short History of Manipur*) deal with the ancient history of Manipur. It covers the period from 33 A.D. till the coming of the British in 1891. However, the chronicle records are available up to Maharaja Boddhachandra, the last king of Manipur before the merger in 1949.

Lal Dena (1990, *History of Modern Manipur*) and Singh (2002, *Colonialism to Democracy: A History of Modern Manipur*) deal with the modern history of Manipur from the time Burmese invasion till statehood.

Bhaumik (1996, *Insurgent Crossfire*), Dev (2009, *The Talking Guns: North East India*), Hazarika (1995, *Strangers of the Mist*), Nepram (2002, *South Asia's Fractured Frontier*), Nibedon (1981, *North East India: The Ethnic Explosion*), Pakem (1996 (ed.), *Insurgency in Northeast India*), Tarapot (1996, *Insurgency Movement in North East India*) and Verghese (2004, *India's Northeast Resurgent*) deal with the insurgency movement in northeast India in general.

Constantine (1981, *Manipur: Maid of the Mountains*), Gopalakrishnan & Thomas (2005, *Conflict to Reconstruction: Some Observations on Nagaland and Manipur*), Hemanta (2007, *Khengjoi Chingsangda*), Kshetri (2006, *The Emergence of Meitei Nationalism*), Parratt (J) (2005,

Wounded Land: Politics and Identity in Modern Manipur), Ranjit (2002, *Unrest in Manipur*), Singh (2005, *Revolutionary Movements in Manipur*), Singh (2008, *Ethnicity and Inter-Community Conflicts: A case of Kuki-Naga in Manipur*) and Tarapot (2005, *Bleeding Manipur*) deal with the insurgency and ethnic conflict in Manipur:

Singh (1989, *Hijam Irabot Singh and Political Movements in Manipur*), Singh (1992, *Social Movement in Manipur*), Singh (1998, *The Unquiet Valley*) and Singh (2006, *Nupi Lan*) deal with the social and political movements in Manipur during the colonial period.

Das (1998) has outlined an account of peripheral limits to economic development in the northeastern region which also appears to be true in case of Manipur.

Das (2002) has pointed out various dimensions of the impact of insurgency movement in an economy in qualitative terms, viz., resource drain, demoralized business confidence, flight of capital, unproductive expenditure, etc. In reference to the insurgency movement in Nagaland, he holds that insurgency is not the direct offshoot of underdevelopment but the latter creates a material base which sustains and strengthens the former.

Datta (2004) observed that the backwardness of the region and insurgency are interlinked, the lack of economic development had fostered discontent and violence and thus in turn has impeded development.

Phanjoubam (2001) has observed that insurgency and investment do not go together. Insurgency impacts upon both private and public investment decision. Private investment is shield away because of the sense of fear that insurgents may interfere directly through extortion, intimidation, etc. As the government's preference in an insurgency prone state like Manipur has been more towards buying guns and

ammunition, raising counter-insurgency forces and managing the incidents of violence, neither could it focus on economic development nor could it mobilize resources for public investment.

Mahendra (2000) observed that a bandh costs Rs. 2 crore a day which is very costly for the economy of Manipur.

Rammohan (2002) is of the view that there has been a continual siphoning of developmental funds in Manipur. The insurgency has degenerated and proliferated into a number of ragtag groups and is now primarily, a widespread extortion racket, which has spread like a cancer into all facets of politics, administration and social life of the state.

Joshi (2002) identified inhospitable hilly terrain, lack of infrastructural development in the fields of transport and communication and power as serious hindrances to development in Manipur.

Dutta (1994) has observed that economic change requires supporting changes in the social sphere. It cannot be implanted without the social context.

Sachdeva (2001) has pointed out that in order to encourage private investment, the region has to become investor friendly. The policy maker has to focus on infrastructure, land, labour policies and security.

Sahni and George (2001) have pointed out that a thriving economy of extortion, smuggling, gunrunning, narcotic and an oligopolistic control over government contracts have become the essential feature of the terrorist infested economies of the northeastern region.

Sahni (2001) has pointed out that in northeast a wide variety of economic activities that were integral to the lives of this region – including cross border trade, use of variety of forest product, some collective rights over land use, etc. –

have suddenly been 'criminalized' forcing the otherwise law abiding citizens into a collusive relationship with militants.

Sinha (2001) has pointed out that insurgency in northeast flourishes because people have the feeling of separate identity on the basis of ethnicity, culture or history. This is compounded by a sense of neglect, exploitation and discrimination and economic backwardness. The key to the situation is to provide good, corruption-free governance and economic development.

Barpujari (1997) has observed that insurgencies and ethnic conflicts involving killings, kidnappings and extortions had hit hard the regional economy and have brought the development works to a standstill. Not to speak of new investments, there had been a flight of capital from the region which is adversely affecting her economic growth.

Nepram (2004) has pointed out that the northeastern region is flooded with small arms and light weapons of all types which have made all sorts of war - ranging from secession to autonomy to self-defence - possible. Most of the arms and arms procurement routes originate from Cox's Bazaar in Bangladesh. A Manipuri gunrunner's route is from Myanmar to Sugnu and from Sugnu, the guns are taken to other parts of the state.

Rajmani and Pradan (1998) have listed an account of various social, economic and environmental factors which acts as constraints to the economic development of Manipur.

Stewart put forward three hypotheses regarding the connections between development and security both within developing countries and globally: that human security forms an important part of people's wellbeing and is therefore an objective of development; that lack of human security has adverse consequences on economic growth and poverty and thereby on development and that lack of development, or

imbalanced development that involves sharp horizontal inequalities, is an important cause of conflict.

Collier (2004) observed that the relationship between civil war and failures in development is strong and goes in both directions: civil war powerfully retards development; and equally, failures in development substantially increase proneness to civil war. He also observed that the poorest countries are likely to be stuck in a 'conflict trap'—a cycle of war and economic decline.

World Bank (2002, 2003, 2005 and 2006) has put forward a framework for conflict analysis and identified various variables for analyzing the economic and social costs of conflict. It also put forward various policy options to come out of conflict trap.

Research Methodology

In order to enquire the historical dynamics of the growth of militancy in Manipur, political economy approach towards the study of social development has been adopted. While assessing the dynamics of economic development and its implications for the growth of militancy in the state, we have followed empirical approach. Secondary data published by various government departments, both central and the state, and development agencies have been used. Wherever possible data used in the study have been cross-verified. The simple technique of percentage analysis has been used for comparative assessment. While studying the impact of insurgency on the economic development, emphasis has been given on understanding the processes rather than quantifying the relations. An institutional approach has been followed while interpreting the linkages between insurgency and social and economic, and political agencies. A sample survey has been conducted in order to capture the people's perspectives on the various dimensions and linkages between insurgency and development in the state. Primary data generated in the

process have been processed and tabulated in convenient manner for presentation.

As far as the conceptual categories are concerned, there exists a difference between militancy and insurgency. A militant movement turns into insurgency while it establishes links with outside foreign powers. The links with foreign powers may or may not continue for long. Looking at the Manipur experiences, while some groups could establish links with power across the border at one point of time, there are no perceptible evidences that those links still hold good. As a result, words like "militant group", "insurgent group", "underground"—all are used in the synonymous sense.

Similarly, social categories like "ethnic group", "ethno-national group", "ethnic community", all though bear a thin line of differences, but one category can assume the place of other with the growth of group solidarity and political consciousness within the group. As a result, we have chosen not to make finer distinctions between them, as social anthropologists would have like to, and have used them in synonymous sense.

Manipur, a northeastern state of India, is one of the conflict-ridden as well as underdeveloped states of India. This book is a humble attempt to address the issues of development and insurgency in the state and suggest some policy implications to come out of the vicious cycle of security and underdevelopment. As such the book has dealt with the growth of identity and nationalism among the three major ethnic groups in the state, viz., Meitei, Naga and Kuki; the dynamics of growth of the economy since feudal era till the present period; dynamics of growth of militancy and economic and social costs of insurgency.

This book will immensely help the policy makers, researchers, academicians and people as a whole to take a relook into the chaotic situation that the state is facing today and help in restoring peace and development in the "Jewel of India"

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