


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A FEW PROBLEMS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY AND HUMAN EMOTION: AN EXPLORATION



By

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DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
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THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT
FOR THE DEGREE OF
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In habit and character, Shri. Charles Pothan Alexander is a fit and proper person for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

(Mrinal Miri)

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The 19th September, 1994.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis explores the concept of emotion generally and takes up emotions of a particular kind which are associated with, specifically, man's inability to cope with the reality around him. Any study of such kind cannot be devoid of a proper understanding of what one or more therapeutic system has to say on these issues. In my study, I've been constantly making use of Freudian psychoanalysis as the back ground against which emotions like love, urge to die etc. are explicated. Psychoanalysis is a personality theory, a philosophical system and a method of psychotherapy, besides it being the first or fundamental therapy. The major historical contributions of psychoanalytic theory and practice are the following. (1) An individual's mental life can be understood, and the insights into human nature can be applied to alleviate some human sufferings. (2) Human behaviour is often governed by unconscious factors. (3) Early childhood development has a profound effect on adult functioning. (4) psychoanalysis has provided a meaningful frame work for understanding the ways in which an individual attempts to cope with anxiety by postulating mechanisms to avoid becoming engulfed in anxiety. (5) The psychoanalytic approach offers ways of tapping the unconscious through the analysis of dream, resistances and transferences. However, against this back ground I've been trying to formulate in a systematic manner my own views and findings.

In the chapter on Emotion, the endeavor has been to understand what exactly emotion is. It is generally supposed that

emotions are not just certain feelings in the subject's mind, but that emotions have an intentionality linking them to objects outside the feelings and also that emotions involve the subject's being in a situation which he has cognitively assessed in a particular way. Thus, for example, one is normally afraid of something and one is so afraid because one considers the object of fear to be in some sense the source of danger to one. We can move on to more complicated emotions such as that of shame or indignity. The subjective feeling of shame requires for its characterization as such an appropriate situation which is judged to be appropriate by the subject himself or herself. In this connection I've taken both James and Sartre into serious consideration. William James claims that any sort of emotion arises basically because of one's awareness of one's bodily states. While Sartre claims that it is due to the awareness of a potential danger out there; to Sartre, the emotional expressions are basically attached with an intention to transfer the outer world. But, the question remains as to why two different people might respond, emotionally, to the same situation in two different manners. To answer this question is to take into account the holistic picture of a person's life, including the past, as psychoanalysts do. Each individual person is unique. And each of the emotional responses are due to the amalgam state of mind created by admixture of two diametrically opposed forces—instincts and cultural norms. In each and every person there is the development of an amalgam psychic state as one grows up from

a child to an adult. Hence, each of these emotions are due to the cognitively conditioned amalgam psychic state. The amalgam state is different for each person due to the varied individual experience with diverse situations in the developmental phase. Thus, different emotional responses to the same situation by two two different individuals. Emotion, therefore, is a mode of response to an object where the intentionality linking them to the object outside is due to the regulation of cognitive pattern of the amalgam psychic state, while one is in a situation.

Given this general schematic account of emotion, problems arise, particularly in the context of emotions which have a powerful distorting hold over the personality of the person. They are what is usually known as abnormal emotions or abnormal emotional behaviours. These are emotions such as anxiety, anguish etc. Hence, in the chapter titled 'Abnormal Emotional Behaviour', chapter I tried to analyse the cause(s) behind such emotions, within the above cited schema. This chapter discusses some key concepts like 'conditioning', 'cognitive patterns' etc. (see Appendix-1) - The point here is that repeated self-assertion can produce manifestations of what one has asserted and cognitively conditioned oneself to believe about the world. Abnormal behaviours are due to the systematic break down in the belief forming mechanism or the capacity of mind, particularly in relation to those practical beliefs about oneself and one's immediate circumstances. In other words, it is due to the

cognitive defect. This view, of course, is different from what Plato, Locke, Hobbes or even Kant had to say about it, under the name of 'madness'. Plato, in *Timaeus*, draws a distinction between madness and ignorance as two different kinds of defect of intelligence. Locke, almost similarly draws a more important distinction between madmen and idiots, describing them as having too many ideas and too few ideas respectively. What he reaches towards is the current distinction between madness and other forms of mental illness like neurosis on the one hand and retardation or mental deficiency on the other. Madness is, then, a disease—something that happens to the mind; whereas retardation is a constitutional handicap. Hobbes says (in *Leviathan* part 1 c. 8) that 'to have stronger and more vehement passions for anything than is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men call madness' and that 'all passions that cause strange and unusual behaviour are called by the general name of madness'. Thus, Hobbes states that excessive emotions that cause madness are unusual in nature and they are such as fury and melancholy; anticipation, paranoid mania and depression. In a more systematic way Kant in his *Anthropology* has pointed out that madness means lack of insight into one's own problems. He argues that therapy cannot help the abnormal because he is locked in his own world of fantasy. They are correct, in their formulations, as far as the nature of abnormality is concerned. But, what I've tried to point out is the cause of such a mental state. So, I took the principles of psychoanalysis along with what Voltaire wanted to

say about the subject matter: 'we call madness that disease of the organ of the brain which inevitably prevents a man from thinking and acting like other's (Dictionnaire Philosophique) '. In other words, I was more concerned with the gradual and continued development of a specific world view in one; which, of course, is the development of a specific cognitive pattern. Each thought and act depends not only on one's constitutional factors but also cognitive style. A specific way of cognition of the outer, for a long period, due to both constitutional as well as situational factors (Endo-psychic factors and Exo-psychic factors) can alter the structure of thought (perhaps, the circuit of neurons). This structural alteration, then, brings about functional changes. All abnormal emotions have its origin with an acquired specific mode of cognition of the outer. This cognition, in a sense, is a negative perspective of the individual that has been nurtured by some other similar situations as time passes on. A specific mode of cognition that has developed in the developmental phase, along with specific feelings attached to it, would then, condition the subject to have a specific perspective. This perspective, hence, is a gradually developed cognitive pattern. This specific mode of cognition calls for a specific mode of response to different situations. That is, then, normal for one; for one has been auto-conditioned-locked within-though others consider it otherwise. Nonetheless, in this process two forces are at work i.e. Exo-psychic force (the cultural environment and other people) and Endo-psychic force (the

instinct and constitutional factors). The activity of Exo-psychic force on the Endo-psychic force creates what I call the amalgam psychic state, which is the cognitive amalgam of Exo-psychic force and the moderate Endo-psychic force. This amalgam state in turn creates a perspective for the self. This perspective of the self is the nuclear self, that which commands over the whole self. If a child, thus, in the developmental phase, cognises the world negatively for many reasons, at a certain period, then he develops a negative cognitive auto-conditioning. So the growing man gradually turns out to be one with personality disorder due to the sustained negative attitudes towards oneself as well as the world, or either of them. Hence, a systemic break down. But, this negative apprehensions and the cognition of the world that has began, while the amalgam psychic state had formed, and has been evolving over the years but has been forgotten by the person. It has, as Freud claims, gone down to the unconscious. What is then adrift is his memory. He, on the one hand still has that cognitive pattern, on the other hand suppressed the unbearable part, and constructs a new world for himself wherein he is emotionally comfortable by fulfilling his desires, which in reality cannot be.

In the third chapter titled 'Love: an ally of interpersonal relations' my attempt is to view the whole concept of love, specifically the negative attitudinal relationships that may be found in some cases, within the framework of the above cited

schema. In this study I've examined, in some detail, the involvement of ego or what might be called the self love in narcissistic sense. Love as such, is a positive emotion which involves the cathexis and feeding of one's own ego as well as the other's in direct and indirect manner. I've also pointed out that the choice of love-object is the preferential choice of the person depending on the perspective developed on the basis of earlier experiences—anaclitic and narcissistic.

The fourth chapter discusses, in some detail, the basic factors behind suicidal behaviour. This indeed was a psycho-philosophical enquiry into the nature of value that one attaches to life. The fundamental question of the suicider is, when encountered with the absurdity of life and of the world—which, indeed, is in reality that cannot be surpassed easily—is life worth the trouble?. In other words, when the feeling of absurd rises one's question would be, 'to be or not to be'. If one surrenders willfully, one acknowledges passively that it is better 'not to be'. However, the one with the consciousness of 'absurd' prefers 'to be', with consistent revolt against it. Suicidal attempts, indeed, are hue for help as also an attempt to be out of one's suffocatingly intolerable predicaments. But moving on in psychoanalytic line I've also explicated how it is the death instinct inverted as a self-destructive force. Hence, in the case of love the libido or the instinct (creative) is directed towards an object outside, while in suicide there is an

inversion of thanatos (destructive or the death instinct). In love, knowing the limitation of one's own existence, yet desiring to exist longer, one tries to immortalise oneself through the offspring resulting from the conjunction of one with the object loved (even if it is the creative piece of a creative genius, after having fallen in love with one's creative productivity). But, in the case of suicide denying to attach meaning or value to life, one annihilates oneself by inverting the aggressive instinct—so much clear in the case of masochism. Here, what happens is that the self-annihilation takes over the decrees from nuclear self.

In the concluding chapter I attempted on the one hand to point out the insufficiency and inadequacy of objective study of mystically veiled human psyche, in the line of science, taking empirical scientific outlook as the paradigm, while on the other hand I stressed on the need of an intuitive and analogically introspective study of human psyche. Hence, what I've tried to illuminate therein was that any proper psychotherapeutic system must be an adequate philosophical system. This is so for an adequate therapeutic system aims at restructuring the whole, encountered with a specific problem, like that of a philosopher who tries to visualize and establish a systematic and all encompassing knowledge, starting with particulars; specifically when encountered with existential problems. The theoretical of human nature tries to construct the total fabric (the human

nature) out of the collection of individual strands - like instincts, Reason, will to power etc. whereas the task of a psychotherapist is that of mending the tormented pieces of a design meticulously with intuitive insight into the total structure of the designed - fabric, patiently. In this regard a psychotherapist ought to be like a philosopher who looks for consistency, coherence and/or even the existential significance of his work.

In sum, human life is not a set of logical or mathematical principles or a set of scientific propositions where given X we always invariably obtain Y. Life is a complex perplexity. Each and every person is unique. Every person's life has diverse and unseen factors behind it. What one needs to know is, in order to live in its fullest extent, (to go with psychoanalytic and other therapeutic system), 'what one is and what one wants to be', what one projects out to be and what one actually is'. So the task of any therapeutic system is the cognitive reconditioning of one by making the uncommon unhappiness (the repressed) a common unhappiness. What things appear to one as is due to the circumferential view of the person. For instance, agoraphobia may take origin from a frightening experience, a so-called "traumatic incident". One may expect that a girl who has been sexually assaulted in the street would be reluctant to venture out alone for a while. But, in most cases, it will be found that agoraphobia originates from what can be called as disturbance in

'attachment behaviour'. That is, an enquiry into the patients earlier emotional development will reveal that, as a child attachment figures were unreliable or absent. As the consequence of that instead of developing an increasing confidence the child comes to regard the world as frightening and an unpredictable place into which it was not safe to venture along without a supporting arm. Or for that matter consider the case of depression. People who are particularly prone to depression tend to feel both helpless and hopeless in the face of any form of adversity. If one is to understand the reason why any one habitually reacts in this way to disappointment, loss or challenge, it is necessary to investigate the emotional climate in which the patient was reared. But, what one can be at best is to-be-in-good-terms-with-oneself; the guidance towards this end is the task of any efficient therapeutic system. An appropriate therapy is a renormalising procedure, where one acquires an insight into one's own problems. For an adequate therapy, then, a therapist needs to proceed through the manifestations of nuclear self to the cognitively conditioned amalgam psychic state. This, in other words, calls for a meticulous understanding of the language of the amalgam psychic state; for each of the cognitively coded message has a specific symbolic language that is impregnated with some sort of feelings attached to it. One's coming in terms with oneself, then, is mastery over the amalgam psychic state and making necessary change in one's perspective by altering one's cognitive pattern-which in turn is a change in the cognitive language

pattern. An insightful coming in terms with oneself works as a catalyst that enables one to grow more close with facts of life, enjoying the individual freedom and value attached attitude TO BE, without the dread of the 'Future - shock'.

HUMAN EMOTIONS

Human mind is one of the most abstruse and yet a pleasant topic to ponder on, but one of the most discouraging when it leaves one at the crossroad. It is a pilgrimage for both psychologists and philosophers to begin with, carefully following the path of rules and norms, and while not too far, breaking away from them to reach their own subjective conclusions. One such mental phenomenon is the phenomenon called Emotion. Etymologically the word Emotion is derived from the Latin word *Emovere*—meaning to stir up, to agitate or to excite etc. In other words, it is a motion towards an object. There are positive and negative, pleasant and unpleasant emotion, although the disruptive nature of it might lead one to the impression that emotions in general are discouraging. To a great extent it could be true that emotions of great intensity tend to be maladaptive, but moderately intense ones are necessary and are normal — this, in fact, is the motivational force behind further constructive and creative acts. Pleasant and positive emotions such as love, joy, reverence and security etc. have elements of organizational and directive and motivational forces in them. Emotions, then in short, are complex states.

Words like Emotions, passions, affections, feelings and moods have been categorised and used to designate the same psychological state; which, of course, inevitably overlap. All experiences have a degree of feeling in it. Feelings are only an

aspect of Emotions. Emotions occur usually, when the degree of feelings become, relatively intense. Emotions are different from moods too. Moods are essentially emotional states. Moods induce an individual to express one kind of behaviour rather than another; which could have been if the mood was different¹. This is so, because the arousal of a mood depends on the unconscious phantasmal Putations which I'll try to explicate in course of the discussion. Similarly, passion is also only one of the violent aspects of an emotional expression or emotional experience. It cannot be the whole of emotion. It may be true to an extent in claiming emotions to be an affective state. But they are not just affective states alone. They have important cognitive as well as physiological and motivational features. The emotional pattern of an individual, surely, begins with heredity factors, though could be altered by environmental influences on the individual. Biochemicals play an important role in the emotional temperament and responses of an individual. Two different hormones, for example, have been found in the adrenal secretions of man and animals - noradrenaline and adrenaline. It has been claimed that the direction of anger depends on adrenaline and noradrenaline like substance. Anger directed outwardly is associated with the noradrenaline-like-substance, whereas anger directed inwardly and anxiety is said to be associated with adrenaline-like-substance². In other words, this brings us to a point of claim that emotions are complex states of organism(s), involving physiological as well as psychological changes, marked by strong feelings. Here,

one may readily agree with Harvey, as he writes in his treatise 'on the circulation of the blood' :


The fact that in almost every affection, appetite, hope or fear our body suffers. The countenance changes and the blood appears to course hither and thither. In anger the eyes are fiery and the pupils interacted; in modesty the cheeks are suffused with blushes; in fear and under a sense of infamy and of shame, the face is pale ... in lust how quickly³ is the member distended with blood and erected...

Similarly William James distinguishes two groups of phenomenon in Emotions; a physiological group and a psychological group. The psychological group he calls as the state of consciousness. The essence of his thesis is that the state of mind such as joy, anger, fear etc. are nothing but the consciousness of physiological manifestations on the individual, by the individual. William James' view point was supported by the danish physiologist Carl Lange. Their theory is known as James Lange theory. James writes :

"our natural way of thinking about the emotions is that the mental perception of some fact excites...the emotion, and that this later state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My thesis on the contrary is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that the feeling of the same changes as they occur is the Emotion. Common sense says we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we meet a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this... sequence is incorrect... that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike or tremble because we are sorry, angry or fearful as the case may be."⁴

This point was elucidated by Lange in his 'The Emotions'. According to him, if the symptoms such as excess heartbeat, blurred looks, vacillating thoughts etc. are removed from a frightened man, then there will be nothing of the fear that remains. He, thus, writes:

"Take away the symptoms from a frightened individual let his pulse beat calmly, his look be firm, his color normal, his movement quick and sure, his thoughts clear and nothing remains of his fear" ⁵



In other words, their claims about emotion is conspicuous from the preceding statements, that it is nothing other than one's consciousness of bodily states or expressions. This implies that the consciousness of bodily states constitutes the formation of emotions. The theory then, proposes that an emotional event brings about visceral and motor reactions of the body-crying, trembling, striving etc. and that these reactions send afferent impulses to the brain, where they are interpreted in terms of emotional feelings. What James and Lange has not taken seriously note of, perhaps, is that physiological state of disturbance alone cannot render an account of the organised character of emotion. Physiological states are mere expression or simple manifestation of the fact that one is at the grasp of an emotion. They could be just an aspect of emotional manifestations. If one takes the theory in its literal sense of becoming conscious of physiological states, one must admit the possibility of time gap between the perception of, for example, a snake and then the

decision taken either to strike or to screech or to run away or to walk over it bravely; because one has to observe or perceive one's physiological states meticulously before such an act is performed. It may not be the case that after having seen a snake one projects only a particular sort of emotional expression. One may have a complex mental state as either 'to run away or to scream or to strike etc.'. In such a circumstance it is pointless to assert that one has perceived only one particular sort of physiological state. To put it differently, in such a circumstance what is the physiological state observed or perceived that there will be a complex behaviour or emotional state? They have missed the point here. Infact there is no time gap between the perception of the object and the emotion, which is, infact, necessary if we take their theory to be infallible. Every emotional response is spontaneous and there is no time gap between one's perception of an object on the one hand and then that of one's physiological states on the other. It would be rather rewarding if one ventures to put it the other way, that the mental events or states control physiological states. One can easily calm down one's anger the moment one becomes aware that one is trembling and not that one trembles so one is angry. Hysteria is, for example, the outcome of psychological trauma, and not that one becomes hysterical because one perceives one's physiological state; and made whole again by the command given with the psychic force to the affected part, as one may notice in hypnotic cases.

Nonetheless, Cannon and Bard brought forth a new version of the theory of physiology responsible for emotions. Their theory is known as Cannon-Bard theory. Cannon regarded thalamus as the control centre of emotions. The impulses split with one signal travelling to the cerebral cortex and causing the conscious feeling of emotions; the other travelling simultaneously to the viscera and bringing about physiological changes. Cannon at first thought that the cause of certain emotional responses was thalamus, but Bard cleared this by the summary of various experiments that the hypothalamus is responsible. Hence, the limbic system play a major role in eliciting emotional behaviours. Cannon and Bard did not, of course, claim either the thalamus or hypothalamus to be the seat of the emotions. But, they knew that both automatic nervous system and cerebral cortex contributed too.

However, as a caution it is necessary to point out, here, that emotions cannot be reduced to bodily expressions alone or physical states alone. If not, one may be misled to think of man in merely mechanical terms as that of a powerful fighter Robot; which is devoid of mental states that man is endowed with, although it outwardly - in fighting-expresses the human-emotion - attached-behaviour. It is also not necessarily the case that if one has a peculiar sort of physical state then we can deduce him to be having a mental state to which the physiological states can be approximated. This is so, because in the case of emotion some hidden mechanism, involving the whole being, is at operation.

Thus, after having stated that neither physiological aspects alone, nor a single aspect of an emotional state can be whole of emotion, I would like to enter into a discussion of J.P.Sartre's view after which I would like to justify the psychoanalytic perspective - which ofcourse, may be, presented with my own colouring. Sartre, as he pointed out in his 'Sketch for a theory of the Emotions', supports Janet's claims to a considerable extent, although he slides away from Janet in the consideration of pleasant emotions; which; Janet left out. Janet interpreted psyche with emotions. According to him the consciousness that we have in emotion is not simply the correlative of physiological disturbance but it is the awareness of a defect and is a behaviour of defeat. This, in other words mean that when a task is too difficult to be carried out or adjusted with them it becomes difficult to maintain a behaviour appropriate to it. As the consequence of that one adopts to change the path of psychic energy-one may adopt an inferior behaviour which necessitates to a lesser psychic tension. Janet has a dynamic concept of personality. It is the synthesis of psychic energy and tensions. The quality of energy that we possess depends on our general health and vitality. At any particular time we may have a larger quantity of energy available and our psychological tension will be high; as of after a good sleep. It could be even vice-versa. Thus, neuroses is the result of the lowering of psychological tension. He gave a hierarchy of mental energy, the highest of that are operative when we are on a high level of psychic tension

and others are at a low ebb, fatigued from mental or physical exhaustion. When at a low ebb of energy we are capable, merely of primitive reactions. The levels are:

- Reflex action
- Perceptive functions
- Elementary social behaviour
- Elementary intellectual behaviour
- Affirmation and belief
- Deliberation
- Rational behaviour
- Experimental functions
- Organization and interpretation of results (this is the highest function of man)

The lowering of psychological tension may be due to (1) constitutional or hereditary factors or (2) Environmental conditions or (3) Both.

Hence, emotional conditions are wastage of energy and deplete our resources. It is 'Surplus behaviour'. It happens when one tries to do more than one is capable of and fails or when one overdoes it and expend more energy than is demanded. In both cases there is a wastage of energy which results in fatigue. When we give up and look for lesser achievements in life, we feel better and more energetic. So, when a person finds things too much for him and sobs, she/he feels better because there is no longer a wastage of energy in emotion. It is evident here that Janet treats the whole organism - physical and psychological - as one. Physical and emotional shocks equally deplete our energy, and the source of energy being one, the exhaustion of this

energy may bring about either physical or emotional symptoms⁶. Emotions are, then, a sort of behaviour, supervenes, to mask one's inability to pursue the line of adopted behaviour.

A similar sort of explanation for emotive behaviour was propounded by opponent-process theory of Richard Solomon and John Corbit. Here, it states that an emotional stimulus produces an emotional reaction which first increases to a peak of intensity and then there is an adaptation, reducing the emotion to a steady level which may be maintained for some time for eg :

" Women at work discovers a lump in her breast and immediately is terrified. She sits still, intermittently weeping, or she paces the floor. After a few hours, she slowly regains her composure, stops crying and begins to work. At this point, she is still tense and disturbed, but no longer terrified and distracted. She manifests the symptoms usually associated with intense anxiety. While in this state she calls her doctor for an appointment. A few hours later she is in his office still tense, still frightened. She is obviously a very unhappy woman. The doctor makes his examination. He then informs her that there is no possibility of cancer ... and that her problem is just a clogged sebaceous gland requiring no medical attention. A few minutes later, the woman leaves the doctor's office, smiling, greeting strangers, and walking with an unusually buoyant stride. Her euphoric mood permeates all her activities as she resumes her normal duties. She exudes joy, which is not in character for her. A few hours later, however, she is working in her normal perfectory way. Her emotional expression is back to normal".

It is indubitable that both theories depict in one way or other emotional response as a defense mechanism or as an escapism. Janet, needless to say, was stressing on the negative emotional responses. This was true of the opponent-process theory

too. The lady wanted to escape from an unbelievable phenomenon - which, ofcourse, is what she has projected to be cancer. She was almost successful in convincing herself of the fact that it is cancer and needs medical care. This, perhaps, was the only option left. So, she escaped the tremor; because she believed that the only way to fight it is through a doctor. However, the doctor's statement that it is not cancer made her again to adopt an excess mode of behaviour. This euphoric behaviour was the result of a new, unexpected, message given to her by the doctor. Here, she was happy and euphoric because she escaped an operation or an expensive medical care. Nonetheless, both these theories show only one-sided picture of emotion. They have not at all mentioned as to how a peculiar thought occurs to an individual, at the glance of an object, which evoke an emotional response. For this one needs to count on depth psychology.

Sartre, picks up the thread on this line and states that emotional behaviours are not a disorder at all. It is an organised pattern of means directed to an end. These means are summoned up in order to mask, replace or reject a line of conduct that one cannot or will not pursue. At this point we can ask as to why there are various kinds of behaviours in defeat? - why one may react to a sudden aggression either by fear or by anger?. The reason behind these diversity of emotions is, sartre says, that each one of them represent a way of eluding a difficulty in a particular way of escape; a special trick to get over the

tremble. Escape is merely a diminution of the self. When there is conflict between two forces - then that sets up a tension in the phenomenal level. If solution is found, the successful action puts an end to the tension. The solution can be of the sort of an escape or may be even falling back upon one's thoughts which erects a protective barrier between the hostile field of action and one-self. Anger, then, is not an instinct nor a habit, nor is it a calculated action. It is rather an abrupt solution of the conflict. Being unable to find out the precise answer to a problem, in a high tension, we act upon ourselves, we transform ourselves into a being for whom the grossest and the least adopted solutions are enough. The angry conduct is an appropriate one as far as the breaking of tension is concerned, although inferior and less well adopted. Thus, an emotion of that sort may be a break up of one, and reconstitution of another kind of behaviour. But, it is by consciousness alone that we can comprehend this transformation. Consciousness is that which can render an account to the finality of emotions. Consciousness alone, by its synthetic activity, can break up and reconstitute forms without ceasing.⁸ Sartre, then, writes in his 'Sketch for a theory of the emotions-

" for the majority of psychologists everything happens as though the consciousness of emotion were primarily a reflective consciousness, that is, as if the primary form of emotion, as a fact of consciousness were its appearance to us as a modification of our psychic being - or to use ordinary language, its being grasped first of all, as a state of mind ".... " Fear does not begin as consciousness of being afraid

The emotional consciousness is at first non-reflective and upon the plane it cannot be conscious of itself, except in the non-positional mode. The emotional consciousness is primarily consciousness of the world"⁹.

Sartre, being the champion of consciousness, has denied psychoanalytic principles and was sceptical about James-Lange theory as well. There is nothing, to Sartre, other than consciousness and conscious acts. He ruled out the necessity of having to consider the concept of unconscious. This is clear from his writings:

" In so far as a consciousness makes itself it is never 'nothing but' what it appears to be. If, then, it has a signification, it must contain this within itself as a structure of consciousness The consciousness, if the cogito is to be possible, is itself the fact, the signification and what is signified"¹⁰.

Hence, Sartre points out that consciousness and conscious act has its own significance, which need not have to be deciphered from a hidden motive or force. It determines the totality of human actions and reactions: in other words it controls the human situation. One is conscious of something and takes decision consciously - there is an intentionality involved here; directed upon an object. So, to Sartre, we need not look

for another cause or motivational force in the unconscious.

Criticizing psychoanalysis he states:

"And moreover we affirm that, in so far as the psychoanalyst is making use of understanding to interpret consciousness, it would be better to recognize frankly that whatever is going on in consciousness can receive its explanation nowhere but from consciousness itself. In other words, it is the consciousness which makes itself conscious, moved by inner need for an inner signification"¹⁴

What Sartre wanted to point out here is that a world-out-there, when becomes 'difficult', this difficulty is not reflective, which would imply a relation to the person concerned. But the 'difficulty' is out there in the world. It is the quality of the world of perception. So that the 'emotional consciousness is primarily a consciousness of the world'. It is not, then, the consciousness of oneself, as the consequence of which one fall into an emotional state (or as James says the consciousness of the physiological conditions). A man who is frightened, is afraid of something. Emotion does not part with the company of the object and thus becomes absorbed in itself; it returns to the object time after time to feed upon it. It is as the consequence of one's awareness of the presence of an object (of fear, for eq.), out there, that one flee from it; because, one who seeks a solution to a practical problem is out - in - the - world. He is aware of the world at every moment throughout the course of all his actions. Emotion is, then, a specific manner of apprehending the world with specific mode of action, as he says:

"It is a transformation of the world. When the paths before us becomes too difficult, or when we cannot see our way, we can no longer put up with such an exacting and difficult world. All ways are barred and nevertheless we must act. So then we try to change the world; that is, to live it as though the relations between things and their potentialities were not governed by deterministic processes but by magic To put it simply, since the seizure of one object is impossible or set up an unbearable tension, the consciousness seizes or tries to seize it otherwise; that is, tries to transform itself in order to transform the object Thus, through a change of intention, as in a change of behaviour, we apprehend an object, new or old, in a different fashion"¹².

From the above passage one can clearly notice atleast three important aspects of Sartre's notion of emotion. They are (1) The object-out-there (2) A peculiar mode of consciousness already existing at the contact of the object, about the object. (3) The change of consciousness as an attempt to modify the attitude of consciousness towards the object-out-there may be transformed as necessary. However, he warns, to note that emotional conduct is not 'effectual'. Its aim is not really to act upon the object as it is. An emotional behaviour tries to confer another quality upon the object, without modifying the structure of the object. This is what, perhaps, he wanted to communicate in the following lines.

"In a word, during emotion, it is the body which, directed by the consciousness, changes its relationship with the world. So that the world should change its qualities.... The real meaning of fear is now becoming apparent to us. It is a consciousness whose aim is to negate something in the external world by means of magical behaviour, and will go so far as to annihilate itself in order to annihilate the object also".¹³

It is conspicuous from the above passage that the external world - works to be done, people to be met, obligations of day to day life - remains the same, although the means for realising them changes. In other words, one tends to look at those with a new perspective. Emotions, then, are not just passing disorders of organism and the mind, that which come-in-from- without and upset the organism. Emotions are also not an accidental phenomena, it is a mode of our conscious existence, one of the ways in which consciousness understands its being in the world.

Emotions, therefore, are natural. It is just a pattern of response to a (particular) situation. This leads us to, ofcourse, a relativistic position. Individual is the standard, for there is no clear cut demarkation of criterion for the normal emotions and abnormal ones. Sartre is right to a considerable extent, but remains incomplete in his endeavours to point out that emotions are emotions of something and they are normal. Sartre has left out the involvement of genetic factors and instinctual factors (Endo-psychic forces) in shaping a specific emotive behavioural pattern after having had the encounters with social norms and institutions (Exo-psychic forces). He claims that emotional responses are the ways in which 'consciousness understands its being in the world'. This is, indeed, credible and a valuable contribution, but it is still incomplete. At the out burst of an emotional response, one is not only conscious of the danger-out-there but also of oneself - one's parlous condition. Thus, there

is a consciousness of one's existential predicament and situational consciousness. This is clear from the way one responds to a situation, for one is motivated to respond the way one does either instinctively (as in children) or by the remnants of (cognitively assessed) previous repeated experiences of the similar or more or less similar sort. Sartre missed out or rather overlooked this motivational cause behind such an emotional act as shame, fear etc. His theory rather sounds like that of James-Lange theory, with the difference of one caught with the idea of emotion to be consciousness of the World, while the other that of consciousness of physiological states of the person. Sartre's version of emotion is that of sour grapes. The question that Sartre, perhaps, left unnoticed and unanswered is, what could be the cause behind a particular kind of 'activity of transference' that the consciousness endeavours and in fact adopts. What we notice, assuming what Sartre had said to be true is that one chooses one form of transference (in relation to the object) to the other. So there must be a cause behind this choice, and that Sartre missed out. What kind of transference consciousness chooses depends on what one is disposed to. This mental disposition finds better explication in psychoanalysis, as a causal and motivational force, than in any other system.

Each and every emotion has its significance because it is directed towards an object. This significance, then, could be functional. All functions are goal oriented endeavours and reach

inertia once the final goal is obtained. We, therefore, can speak of finality of emotions—when it finally gets manifested in one's behaviour. It could best be suggestive, hence, of the importance of psychoanalytic theory. Psychoanalysis gives a view point, whereby, one can talk of the finality of all actions that could be explained in terms of symbolic gratification of a wish. Anger, for example, then, can be explained as a means of achieving symbolic gratification of an unconscious urge. One can say that an expressed emotional behaviour is the product of previous emotional experiences and that ordinary efforts cannot modify its course unless one lives with the conscious mastery of it. A woman with certain phobia, for instance, faints if she sees a lump of laurels. This occurs as a refusal to relive the memory of an event connected with laurel; which could be a bitter sexual incident associated with laurel bushes. Here, the emotional reaction is expressed in a polished and censored form, by refusing to recollect the incident connected with laurels. In psychoanalytic explanations or interpretation, one notes that desire is not implicated in its symbolic realization—in other words the moment one has conscious awareness of it, it ceases to be a phobia or whatever. Thus, what is signified in a behaviour is wholly privy, outside the expressed behaviour, and different from what one may at its face value take to be consciously signifying. Conscious behaviour is related to what it actually signifies; the relation is more often deeper and can be

deciphered by the appropriate psychoanalytic, self-pervious, techniques. Hence, the role of unconscious as the seat of motivational factors for emotional behaviour, and that of 'what is signified'.

Emotions, then, are more or less tangible psychological consequences. Emotions are part of happy occasions and distressing occasions or strainful occasions. They are the richest aspects of human life. They are acquired partly through heredity, partly through experience and partly through maturation. There are fair amount of physiological reactions accompanying our emotions. Activation of sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system readies the body for emergency actions - blood pressure, increase in perspiration, increase in respiration, increased heart beat, increased supply of blood sugar to meet the extra energy that will be needed, the dilate pupils of the eye, indigestion due to the eccentric passage of blood from stomach and intestines to the brain and muscles. The salivary glands may cease working and cause the mouth to become dry. Muscles, just, beneath the surface of the skin contract; causing hair to stand on the end. But, these are all only some aspects of emotion. They may occur at the time of emotional response, we can not reduce the entire phenomena to them alone.

What Sartre calls the intentionality of emotion was well recognized by Anglo-Saxon philosophers. How - be - it, Sartre neglected the way emotions can transform or metamorphose their

object. Sartre may say that when we describe a mast as 'terrible', we do not mean that it inspires terror in us, but we attribute a property to it. His point is that the category of terrible belongs to emotions. This means that the property that we attribute to the mast is a denizen of the world of emotions. He, here, contrasts between 'conviction through feeling' and 'conviction by reason'. In the case of emotion it is the conviction through feeling that works. One in this case tries to convince oneself of something exterior - menacing - which is, ofcourse, similar to that he had experienced once upon a time. This part has been ignored by Sartre, while emphasising on 'attribution of qualities' to something exterior. In other words, value neutrality of things were not seen the way it could have been. Things are value neutral and one attributes qualities to them or categorises them into different classes of appropriate proportions of attributes, categories etc. (which, ofcourse, call on certain feelings) in one's mind.

Sartre's theory has missed out some major point because he had left the psychoanalytic principle of unconscious motivation. In the case of obsessions or some other abnormal behaviours the function of reason is relatively passive. Here, rather an unseen and unknown motivational force, unknown to the person himself, is at work. This shows that nothing serious can be traced from, just, the conscious state of one's behaviour. For example the sound of a jeep horn must be sufficient to cause a violent emo-

tional response in one person, while it may be just an ordinary noise to the other. Sartre has no answer to the questions pertaining to such cases. He has also not taken note of the fact that a specific mode of response to an event is initiated due to the qualities that are attributed to that event by the individual himself. In other words, there are individual differences in the mode of responses. A's response to a particular situation may be X, but B's response to the same may be Y. Now, the question is 'why these differences?'. This aspect of emotional response cannot be adequately explained without psychoanalytic explanatory principles. This peculiarity can be explained if one is at the positive side of psycho dynamics and endeavours to expatiate it with the phenomena of repression and unconscious phantasies which constitute a peculiar mode of response¹⁴.

In psychoanalytic account, emotional responses of a person has a marked influence of past events. Each time one experiences any sort of events in the world, it affects him/her-specially if it is too shocking or too exhaustive. A continued or a repeated experience of a similar or more or less similar situations arouse a particular mental state, each time it occurs, and this in turn creates a mode of behaviour which is an after effect of the cognitive assessment of the situation that later turns out to be an emotional response. The point here is, even if the situation is altogether cancelled or dispersed or finished, it had certainly created a mnemonic disposition in the person. A disposition to be

behaving in a particular manner at particular circumstances. Hence, given the same situation or more or less same situation this disposition can be activated, for an emotional response. Man is, no doubt a complex whole. He has brought with him a few of his own -the instincts and genetic factors-which are his, in-born but and motivational force for survival; aggression, for example is activated to protect oneself from the perilous-other. However, there are certain complex situation that instinctual responses cannot tackle, as McDougall thought while giving fourteen instincts and fourteen accompanying emotions. In any emotional response of an adult, instincts alone cannot be considered to be playing sole role, but a relatively great role must be ascribed to culture or social systems. Emotional responses are due to the modifications of instincts as the result of inculturation of oneself, that has taken place in the development phase. In complex situations, limited by the surroundings, a child will not opt to express the natural, instinctual, responses for the fear of being punished. One, then, moves to a complex mode of behaviour; where the complex responses are due to the instinct modifications by the circumstantial socio-cultural factors. There is, then, an amalgam psychic state, because here both instincts and those socio-culturally conditioned norms are brought together to respond to a situation-a terror or a danger or even any other events, as the individual psyche perceives it. However, in each case of experience and response to a stimulus the human mind fabricates an unconscious phantasy, with a cognitive mode

operating in that world, which indirectly colours one's perception of the outer. This is what we see from the statement of Freud..

Psychoanalysis unhesitatingly ascribes the primacy in mental life to affective process, and it reveals an unexpected amount of affective disturbances and blinding of the intellect in normal no less than in sick people"¹⁵.

Psychoanalytic explanation shows a marked link between emotions and the unconscious. The unconscious is non - rational i.e. instinctual. Two primary instincts-eros and thanatos - are generally thought to be affective in nature. Man is in constant aggression within himself, against these two forces to cope with the norms of society. These powerful instinctual forces get their expression, when conscious and conscience are at ease or relaxed; while reason slacks its control over oneself - specially in dreams, neurosis, obsession etc. What is important, here, then is that each anterior experience leaves a few sediments for the specific mode of emotional growth and response. In other words the anterior segments are registered in the cerebral cortex (the unconscious domain, perhaps) along with the feelings it evoked and they determine the mode of response in a new situation. This anterior is, in this way, an antecedent in time, and could be the quasi-logical antecedent or a model that influence 'the mode of response' of its successor. Here, one may be tempted to support, in opposing Freud, Prof. Field and Laird, As Laird writes:

The past event to which we return in memory ... is over and done with however frequently we look at it Although these events have consequences for our subsequent history, it is nonsense to say that they persist"¹⁶.

Here, what Laird had not taken note of is the fact the feelings evoked by each events get registered in the brain, and that there is a world of fantasy in conjunction with feelings and these experiences. It is these feelings along with phantasy that evoke a mode of responses in the future similar occasions. It is this world of fantasy that was first aroused at a similar situation (the anterior), and that responses were made spontaneously-appropriate or inappropriate, positive or negative etc. It is, then, the feeling couled fantasy that is the antecedent or anterior circumstance which is the determining factor of the posterior behaviour. This is the trade mark of psychoanalytic movement. When Freud referred to the unconscious, what he had in mind was a particular kind of mentality that is determined by mental states dating back, even to the early childhood, before the growth of judgment and autonomy. He, perhaps, had in mind the emotional response of early childhood, such as greed, envy, the desire to control others etc., which 'stands out in the crudest contrast to the rest of the conscious'. It is infact these that get metamorphosed, at times, into something positive, as one lives in society and experiences new events. Thus, instincts are being clothed and covered to look gentle and beautiful, although, still they constitute 'a background to other conscious mental

activity - in a disguised way. Now, after having painstakingly repressed them, a new pattern of life is adopted, to cope with the norms, and so, a new mode of response to the situation; a new mode of behaviour etc. In short, what Freud was thinking could be, of the way our present reactions containing emotions, which animated those earlier emotions.

Hence, when Freud was dealing with emotions, specially those present in the abnormal cases, he was concerned with an unconscious phantasy present in the individual psyche. For example, a child in the process of maturity makes challenges and takes up promises against others. These challenges and promises get simmered there (in the unconscious) and works as a motivational force or the cause for the latter behaviours. This very fact can be seen from Freud's own life that is narrated in 'The Interpretation of Dreams'.

"When I was seven or eight years of age another domestic incident occurred which I remember very well. One evening, before going to bed, I had disregarded the dictates of discretion and had satisfied my needs in my parent's bedroom, and in their presence. Reprimanding me for this delinquency, my father remarked: 'that boy will never amount to anything'. This must have been a terrible affront to my ambition, for illusions to this scene recur again and again in my dreams, and are constantly coupled with enumerations of my accomplishments and successes, as though I wanted to say: "you see, I had amounted to something after all"¹⁷..

This shows that there was an unconscious phantasy ' to be amountable to something ' always at work as a motivational force. This is conspicuous from the very fact that he has referred it as present, even in his dreams. In the case of phantasy there is no distinction between thought and reality. It may, rather, take a thought for a reality. Each thought depends on the particular mental frame work and perspective which one holds. Hence, to understand one's response to a situation is to take account of its significance for the person; as she/he sees it and of the kind of person she/he is - desires, interests, values, fears and apprehensions etc. This, therefore, leads us to say that the environment in which one grows renders a specific perspective and mode of response to situations.

Emotion, then is a partial response of one being in, to, a total situation, because although there are infinite number of possibilities, one's psyche is modelled in such a way as to see only what the world of phantasy asserts; which, ofcourse, is partial, limited and closed. In this case the abnormal emotional behaviour would be a response to a situation with a projected phantasy object or phantasmal ideas (of fear, of shame etc), due to the continued experience of the present-essentially-projected, at constant intervals before. The history of mankind also teaches us that the cultural differences and the change of civilization proposes man for a change and he becomes subject to the framing of time. This compells one to repress himself and yield to a

purgatory (though superficially) endeavours, and consider culture and civilization to be cul-de-sac. In the course of it one gets tormented or pulled into different directions—with much tendency towards the expression of what he wants to be. Nonetheless, he yields to the norms of the society and tries to be mature. In this endeavour one renounces (partially and outwardly) the older and the new and the modern or the modified or even to be more appropriate the transfigured life is accepted. This modernity is not a specific historic event, but a historical conjecture which had happened several times in our history. In the process of it one faces frustrations and discouragements, because he feels that he is bound by the norms and is not he himself. And he consoles himself by repressing them. But, when repeated frustrations occur that propels him to propend on to the feeling of self - pity, self-depression and a sense of uselessness. Hence, here, being an irresistible to be oneself, all those repressed wishes get fulfilled symbolically, by the adaptation of abnormal behaviours. In other words, negative emotions (abnormal behavior) could be due to the anxiety, 'to be or not to be oneself'. However, emotion is a specific spontaneous mode of response to an object; the outcome of instinctual proclivity and modification of it due to the exterior forces—due to a specific perspective about the outer because of the cognitive assessment of the of the amalgam state. It is, then, a mode of response that emerges or emanates from the core of one's being which is pregnant with a cognitive - perspective of the outer.

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ABNORMAL EMOTIONAL BEHAVIOUR

One may get puzzled by some one's description of a state of being as normal and something else as abnormal. Normal is the criterion which makes sure that something is right and abnormal is not. In common parlance abnormal just means that which is not normal and normal is that which is not abnormal. But these terms have very deep connotation in the study of the mind. It is commonly held that normality enables one to formulate and execute conscious plans for oneself rationally and make conscious choice for oneself. One's ability to make conscious choices signifies one's capacity to act according to one's awareness of surroundings cultural moorings etc; because although man is a free agent, to a great extent society—the socio-cultural norms—control him. In other words the term normality implies in psychology or study of mind a different state of being from what might be implicative in physiology. A normal person, then, is one who knows his or her existential predicament and is, yet, quite with it, for to surpass them or evade any one of them will be at the risk of losing one's being and bond with his or her kins men. This fact again, takes us to the point that a normal person is one who has conscious control over one's freedom as well as freedom necessitated acts. She/he will be realistic in judging one's own capabilities and reactions. One will be pragmatic in interpreting what is going on in the world; around oneself. That is to say a normal person is one who has an efficient perception of reality, has an

adequate self-knowledge, has ability to control one's behaviour voluntarily, has an appropriate amount of self-esteem and acceptance.¹

Given the above account of normality, what is opposed to normality could be abnormal. But, this view will have to be taken with some reservations, because there is so far no generally accepted standard of determining what normality is and what is the contour crossing which would be abnormal; although one can have a discourse about the characteristic of both. Abnormal, simply, means away from what is considered normal. Nevertheless, every society has a more or less fixed way of viewing them. What may be normal in one society may not be normal in another and vice-versa. For example, members of some African tribes do not consider it unusual or abnormal to hear voices when no one is actually talking or to see visions when nothing is actually there. But, most societies consider such behaviours as abnormal and mere hallucinations. The concept of abnormality is also subject to change from time to time, at the socio-cultural level. For instance, most of the Americans would have considered smoking marijuana or appearing nude at the beach as abnormal behaviours, some thirty year back. But, today; they are considered to be a mere difference in life-style than signs of abnormality.² However, the case of abnormality that I propose to discuss is somewhat at the personal level or the individual level, which the society may consider to be abnormal in one way or other. Here,

then, it would be necessary to note that, not just all persons who differ from us are abnormal, but persons with infrequent behaviours, faulty perception or interpretation of facts, self-defeating behaviours, and socially unacceptable behaviours are considered to be abnormal.

Howsoever, as long as one takes socially unacceptable behaviours to be the criterion of madness or mental derangement, one is likely to be in support of the view point that Foucault put forth in his 'Madness and civilization'. He was of the opinion that, there is nothing called pure madness—a pure madness in itself— which cannot be captured in concepts. What one identifies or classifies and treat as mad is determined by our institutions. Our institutions set the paradigm in terms of which we view insanity or madness and treat them by the system of our own creation. In other words, what he wants to point out was the impact of the socio-cultural classifications on the behavioural pattern of man. For instance, there were no poets prior to the romantic era, though there were people who wrote poems. There were no homosexuals and heterosexuals before doctors of deviancy invented it, although there were just that kind of acts. The fact of emphasis here is that, 'that kind of person(s)' sprout only after a form of description or labelling was constituted to identify such an act.³ This view, may be, true to a great extent, but this truth is, perhaps, in such a manner as to be untrue, because the fact is that as far as abnormality is concerned it is

a state of one's being. Whether or not one has an appropriate description for such a state, emotionally disturbed states exist in an individual called mad or insane or abnormal. Foucault's point of view, if taken at its face value might be misleading, as though there is nothing called abnormality besides the description. To put it more negatively each and every one is an abnormal or deviant because there is nothing called pure madness, except by description. And even if a state (total) of human madness exist, it is not as yet labelled or described. But then, the moment it is described it will be nothing other than the description of normality or atleast the negation of abnormality- the description of the total human nature.

Abnormal behaviours are surely due to certain emotional disturbances and, no matter how a society perceive it, it is barely present to the individual concerned. It, then, is a fact that is determined by the very absence of conscious awareness and control over one's behaviours by oneself - life compulsive obsessional behaviours, phobias, depression etc. The causes of the psycho - pathos will have to be exhumated from the individual psycho-social cognitive frame work- the amalgam state of one's mental set up. Man, being emotional, is prone to emotional disturbance or what is called abnormal behaviour with more or less intensity and everyone has a minor degree of phobias and personality disorder; although the disorder, as such, that we talk of aggravated emotional sort. Our understanding and interpretation

of the causes behind such abnormal behaviours depends on our general understanding of human conditions and situation as a whole.

There has been, for the past few years, controversial debate over mechanistic versus vitalistic status of man. Mechanists say that life is explicable in terms of chemistry and physics and nothing that is not available to the minds of men. Whereas vitalists claim that life is not explicable in terms of chemistry and physics alone, and that the added ingredients transcend the realm of knowledge that is available to the minds of men. Despite the debate, I would like to, however, state that man is an adaptive-control-system with elements of disorders due to the unusual (peculiar) individual adaptation, and so a peculiar mode of cognition of the world around. This could be the reason why creative genius Dostoyesky reminds us that:

"man is a creature that can get accustomed to anything and I think that is the best definition of him."⁴

This adaption, ofcourse, depends on the biologically inherent conditions along with psycho-social interactions and the interpretation of neutral data by the individual at the earlier phase of life. At this level, mostly man's instinct dominate him and leaves him as it were an instinctually programed mechanism. Later as he grows, through the encounters with various situations he discovers the (socio-cultural) existential predicament before

him. She/he realise the limits of one's freedom. One, then, realises the true meaning of freedom. One realises the implication and impact of other's freedom over one. Freedom, one understands, consists of the impulses of death and self-destruction as well as it has the power to transform one's being and exalt one - self to the highest being. Freedom is, then, a dialectic of good and evil.⁵ So, one is condemned to be free; precisely because one is free that one loses one's freedom to be oneself at the social set up. This is very well echoed in Dostoyevsky, which B.P. Misra puts forward as:

"....the nucleus of man is his genuine essence which is given in his freedom, his thirst for individual self assertion -that is to live according to his own stupid will. Man's ontology is defined by this thirst for freedom, the thirst to be oneself."⁶

This realisation to lose one's freedom because of flexibility of one's freedom jolts one with an initial shock. But gradually he gets used to it, gets adapted to it, gets adjusted to it till finally one identifies oneself with it, pushing aside 'himself', as it were, to be masticated and irradiated. However, this caricature and purgation of 'himself' is of that which is intimately nearer to him. The only endowment of his, that he came with - the instincts of man; the instinct to be a hero (will to power), the instinct to procreate, the instinct to be unruled by anyone, the instinct to be unhindered by anyone in one's endeavours. But, these unruly instincts are unwarranted

were and now in one's socially determined existence. He is, then, forced to repress them. The pattern of his thought about the world within him, then, must change, because he has to adjust to the demands of the social system. He gradually learns to adapt to them, impelled by the fear of social extinction. One, then, has a new (neurological) pattern artificially built in, due to the dread on the one hand and the irresistible (will to live) tendency to live as one is on the other. One, so, unwillingly endorses the codes of socio - culturally moulded norms to be one among others. However, this has its own cost to pay at the interpersonal transactions. Here, the other who is part of the social system will be looked down upon, unconsciously, as 'the hell', for it is she/he who is the cause behind the loss of one's freedom. Nonetheless, one is also in dread, the dread of one's social acceptance, if one behaves all the way one wants to be, all the way as to fulfill one's desires. Thus, one is on the one hand conscious of one's limitations, conscious of one's predicaments and on the other hand in spite of that wants to be himself. This creates an anxiety. This sort of anxiety is found, to a meager degree in everyone, due to the dreadful predicament in which one is i.e. if actions are not formulated in such a way that would be acceptable to society, one's indulgence would be put to an end forever. This could be the reason, perhaps, why Dostoyevsky puts into the mouth of Zosimo, a psychiatrist the following passage, depicting the common anxiety and disorder noticeable in almost all man, in 'crime and punishment':

....In a sense, indeed, all of us are very frequently more or less deranged, with slight difference that the sick are a little more deranged than we, and therefore we must draw a distinction. But a fully harmonious person, it is it is true, is surely to be found, in tens or perhaps hundreds of thousands you will meet only one, and then not a very good specimen".?

Human mind is a mechanism that can be altered and adjusted, (an organism which has conscious susceptibility), to its environment. It is emotion that render this vulnerability to adjustments. Adjustment, here, means that something is being adapted to something else; which in practice implies that the socio-cultural environment is being interpreted in the inherent mode of doing so, in order to adopt it to oneself and to be adjusted in the social system. As the consequence of that behaviours are adopted in terms of the personality. This interpretation depends, in other words, on the cognitive pattern of the organism - the human mind. The cognitive pattern depends on the electrochemical activities of the brain on the one hand and the entire body chemistry on the other, which has been proved by innumerable researches beginning from Hippocrates to I.P. Pavlov and others. Pavlov, for instance, experimented on dogs to find out stress behaviours of the animal and came to analogous conclusion about man. His ethology was perhaps on the assumption like that of Lorenz who claimed, like Darwin, that man has evolved from other animals. Just as human bodies an animal physiology show a recognizable

continuity from those of other animals, human behaviour patterns are also fundamentally similar to those of animals. Thus, to Lorenz, to think of ourselves as different, in kind, from those of animals, either in virtue of free will or anything else is an illusion. Our behaviours are subject to the same causal laws of nature as all animal behaviours. The difference, of course, is only in degree. Pavlov, nonetheless, in the course of his study (experiment) has seen that all dogs did not respond to stress alike.

This, to him, was because of four basic, inherent temperaments of the animals. It was as he discovered, due to, what Hippocrates called, four humours of the body i.e. the predominant humour within the body which caused the organism behave differently to the same stimuli; they gave rise to pre-dispositional personality traits such as Sanguine, Choleric, phlegmatic and melancholic personality pre-dispositions.⁸ In other words, man is prone to cognise and respond to things as they do because of their bodily mechanism. However, one's particular kind of interaction with the outer, as stated in the previous chapter also alters one's total cognitive style. This shows not only the impact of nurture on the cognitive pattern but also of nature. This change in the cognitive style, in turn, calls for a structural alteration. at the same time this is the product of the interaction of two great forces i.e. Exo-psychic force over Endo - psychic force. In other words the force of

socio-cultural norms and situational factors upon the instincts and physiological factors compel one to surrender oneself (instinctual freedom) at the alter of the exterior forces. That is to say, this structural change rein - stalls a new cognitive pattern, while the old ways are pushed aside; which renders one, now, a cognitively assessed mode of behaviour. This, implicitly brings forth a functional change - changes in thought, reactions to the outer etc. In other words there seems to be as though, two selves existing, one being the true self and the other being as it were the masked self. Thus, when the confrontation begins with the unconscious ratiocination to be what one wants to be vis a vis what one should be in the eyes of the other, which results in the defeat of the former by the superegoistic Panges of the conscience, one gets tormented with a sense of guilt. Hence, this guilt is basically an oppro - brious feeling against oneself for having been so presumptuous by challenging the exterior forces rather than being proselyte. This is so, because challenges are of great danger to oneself, for its pernicious nature. So, to 'never repeat it again' or 'never to let it happen' one arrogates guilt and punishes oneself; by pushing to an extreme end-sometimes with the strong seizer of urge to die and kill oneself. At the same time there is an in` built hatred, as I've already stated, towards the situation, environment, or person(s) enforcing some control - Exo-psychic factors. This traumatic object (may it be person(s), situation or any other symbolised object) is, then, interalised and phantasised,

looked upon vulgarly, stabbed many times on the one hand and feared and deared on the other hand. In other words, one is conditioned to look upon that object of particular sort of experience (mostly, perhaps, bitter) particularly and the rest of the environment with a specific acquired perspective of one, due to varied experiences with that object.

This point comes more vivid, if seen against the case of a woman, cited in the previous chapter on emotion, who was stricken by the laural phobia. However, a pertinent fact to be noted in her, is that, due to these sort of peculiar experiences, there is alteration at functional level - a change in the cognitive pattern, as we have already said it above. These changes are consciously invited by the social being - the person - because of one's willingness to prolong life in the society, which renders one with the concept of real enduring self. The concept of real enduring spirit or self is not innate but arises in the course of social interactions, from the appraisals of the other people. That is to say, one finds meaningless to live an isolated life, despite the trauma living together might bring on the individual.⁹ This view is quite perspicuous in Medard Bo0s to words:

"...the essential, basic arch-anxiety (primal anxiety) (is) innate to all isolated, individual forms of human existence. In the basic anxiety .. human existence is afraid as well as anxious about its being-in-the world".¹⁰

Hence, to be out of the primal anxiety one enters into the interpersonal relationships, as though justifying Aristotle's claim of man as a rational social animal, although one has to pay for it. This complicated interpersonal relationship, along with other situational factors, conditions one to adopt a specific individual cognitive pattern. This cognitive pattern would be, in certain cases (specifically in the case of pro-abnormal constitutional structure) biased with a sense of self-defeat or apprehensions and an urge for defensive reactions to whatever stimuli (external) that one encounters. Here, given this, then, neutral social information and transactional outputs would be looked upon seriously and significantly bias the processing of social information, as the result of the specific cognitive pattern. One would adopt a fixed mode of response i.e. biased with a negative perspective. But, then, this mode of behaviour could not be projected out with violent defensive gestures, for the fear of rejection. So, they are repeatedly, painstakingly, repressed and an unwilling mode of behaviour is adopted. The cognitive along with the perspective by then becomes increasingly resistant to change and appears self-perpetuating¹¹ - the point of perspective I have discussed in the next chapter, on love, where I have shown that perspective becomes as it were a self that I call the nuclear self. Nonetheless, the point is that at the core of one's being the suffocatingly repressed feelings (wishes, desires, apprehensions etc. which are attached with specific feelings) simmer and manifest themselves in the form of psychopathos - the

abnormal emotional behaviour - that in turn crumbles down the whole interpersonal relationship. This is well insighted in Dostoevsky's character Raskolnikov, in *Crime and punishment*. The reading of the character would enlighten one with the idea about the origin of psychopathos-like that of Raskolnikov's. One, here, readily discerns that he was the offspring of interaction between his personality and environment. The personality is as perhaps Hippocrates says, derived from constitutional factors. Given to a poor or weak personality, environment which interacts adversely is the constant feeling of guilt that he experiences towards his self - sacrificing mother and sister, who have gone to inordinate lengths to support his education. The cognital traits interacts with his environment which appears to him as always conspiring against him. He begins to hate, what we call, reality-because he has his own reality that is different from that of others. To be able cope with this hatred of reality he gives in to the world of fantasising and fragmenting that reality with his mental apparatus. This, has an adverse impact on his language. In his confused and biased cognitive reactions, he takes recourse to omnipotence; the delusion that he is superior to others. He begins to undervalue the importance of people and events. For example, at an instant he begin to think with paradoxical and perplexingly terrible anger (over some people on some trivial issues):

"The chief thing is that there is no attempt here to cover up things or show the least consideration. How did you come to discuss me with Nikolai Fomich if you knew nothing of me? Consequently, they don't even want to hide that they are after me like a pack of hounds. They spit on my face quite openly '...well get straight to the point, don't play a cat and mouse game with me ' That is really uncivil, Porfiry Petrovich, and perhaps I won't allow it - I will stand up and blurt out the whole truth in your face; you will see how I despise you ...But if it is all my imagination? What if it is a delusion, a mistake on my part, and it is simply my inexperience that makes me blow up and fail to carry on with the wretched role I am playing? Perhaps it was all unintentional ' All their words are quite ordinary, but there is something to them-all of them might be spoken at any time, but still there is a something".¹²

Here, one can readily notice the the overtones of delusions and heroism. There is an element of self - assertion and self-glorification in this deliriously confused emotional state. Hence a conspicuous fact that stands out projected in the cases of abnormal emotional response is that the anxiety generating source in the external environment is not simply situation as it objectively is. It is rather the situation as it is interpreted by the patient in the light of his or her cognitive assessment on the basis of the past experience-rather the base experience ' The point of importance, then, is that the person who has experienced bitter past (childhood), for instance, is cognitively conditioned to be negative in attitude towards the objective world, which, although, is impartial, unbiased and neutral. However, even though the cognitive pattern is fashioned due to the conditions of the base experience, yet what one has now as the cognitive

pattern is nothing but the residue of those experiences. This happens so, because down through the developmental stages all that one has had experienced gets repressed and overlooked (forgotten), but with the perpetuation of the negative emotive-cognitive outlook.

In other words, inspite of infinite number of alternatives to interpret an external stimulus one looks at it as the way one is conditioned to perceive it; the way one apperceives it is bound to happen and as the result of this apprehensions an inappropriately predicted behavioural pattern evolves, which the individual thinks is the most fitting kind (see appendix I for more on conditioning). In such circumstances any value neutral incidents get twisted and turned because of the pathetic, (pathologic), state of internal conditions of the individual. Hence, the sole cause of biased cognitive assessment and judgment of an event is the internalised and reverted subjectively repelling object along with a peculiar mode of feeling it evoked once upon a time. However, the emotional abnormalities are not just because of one's consciousness of the objective world alone, but it is, rather, due to the tension between the consciousness of one's predicament in the spatio-temporal world with a persistent desire or 'will to be some one else' - a free individual, a hero etc. The following illustration of a woman whose irresistible obsessional thoughts to kill her children underscores this point lucidly:

"A 30 year old mother of two small children sought help because she was distressed over obsessively intrusive and repugnant thoughts related to injuring or murdering her children. On infrequent occasions, her husband was also a "victim". These thoughts are so repugnant, made so little sense, and were so foreign to her conscious feelings that she had been afraid and embarrassed to seek help. She had kept this problem to herself for nearly two years, despite considerable psychological pain, tension, and turmoil. Finally, the steadily increasing difficulty had reached an intolerable level....Early in life, this woman had developed a defensive need to deny the presence of all negative feelings. To defend herself against the guilt occasioned by having such 'terrible' thoughts, she endeavoured to dissociate herself from them-to deny that they were her thoughts, "Its just awful words that pop into my head.... They have nothing at all to do with the way I feel. They couldn't be my thoughts at all...."The patient had been raised by an anxious and insecure mother who was unable to permit herself or her children the slightest expression of negative feelings. The daughter soon realised that any feelings other than loving ones must be repressed or denied. The patient was the eldest of three siblings and had been assigned undue responsibility for their care. She felt deprived of her share of her parents affection, was greatly resentful of her younger sister and brother and fantasized about what it would be like if they were not around. Her occasional murderous fantasies about them were accompanied by tremendous guilt and anxiety. As a result, the fantasies and associated emotional feelings had been completely repressed from conscious awareness. These early conflicts were reactivated during her marriage when the needs of her husband and children seemed to take precedence over her own needs."¹³

This example reiterates that the motivational cause behind an (irresistible desire for) action or behaviour or an emotional out break lies elsewhere, beyond one's conscious domain. A specific emotional encounter, perhaps repeated, with a specific or crucial situation and the grasp of human predicament as such right at the early stage of one's life formulates an ordered or disordered personality. This, if negative, creates the developmental disorder of the whole person - specially of the

cognitive pattern which distorts facts and mirrors reality retrospectively. Hence, a retrospectively biased perspective (or narcissic self). This distortion of reality has a profound impact on the interpersonal transactions, because the objective phenomenon would be looked upon as it were the internalised object (the object of encounter) with which one has fabricated a phantasmal relationship at the unconscious level. This point is well explicated by the Rorschach ink-blot test. This test has as its rationale the notion that if a person is given relatively ambiguous and meaningless stimulus, namely an ink-blot, then she/he will 'project' on to this stimulus one's own feelings, desires, ambitions and so forth. What is evident from this is that the unconscious has its own semeiology (semeiology of the world of phantasy); it has its own contextual symbolic attachments to the feelings etc. That is to say, to understand an abnormal behaviour is not just to understand the outward manifestations or the output alone, but the process reaching inner causes through outer motions.

In other words, it is to understand the grammar of the psychic process. To explain behaviour is, then, not just to give the causal account for the behavioral output alone, but to explicate why the process is structured as it is. It is to explain how the behaviour regulating mechanism came to be constituted as such that this inner cause would necessitate to produce that outer effect. This also involves, in the process of

explaining a behaviour, pointing out what caused the inner structure responsible for the behavioural process—cause of a thing causing the other. This would lead us to the point that the relevant explanations of behaviour (abnormal) are not only structural but also functional, and functional explanations are implicitly causal explanations.

It is this point that psychoanalysts hold on to while they talk about the unconscious (repressed) wishes — may it be aggression, eros, archetype or will to power. All our behaviours have an inner motivational force, which in turn is a cause precisely due to the psychic mechanism involved in it. This is what Freud and his followers pointed out. In other words, emotionally disordered behaviours and mental states are due to the overflow of previously repressed (obscene or hostile) impulses. These repressed thoughts render a particular outlook on the events accompanied by the dispositional behaviour—not in Ryle's sense but in Freudian sense, which is different for every person. The dispositional behaviour depends on the content of the unconscious and the symbolic semantics of it. However, at this point one may claim that this view of the psychic is deterministic. True to a gear extent.

But, at this juncture I would like to make a distinction between complete determinism and relative determinism or incomplete determinism. The problem of determinism and indeterminism occur, specially, when we talk about (connection

between) events in causal tones,. That is to say, strict causality of the sort $X \rightarrow Y$ is an indication that nothing can change the course of x giving rise to Y . It is then inevitable that - given X there must be Y and that the presence of Y in no way can be preceded by the absence of X . Hence, the absence x in no case can amount to the presence of Y . Thus, complete determinism involves a logical necessity. But, in relative determinism the course of events are subject to change in relation to one's willingness and knowledge to change the anticipated event by Y . This is what exactly is the case of the human psychic. This view is supported by our everyday discourses about our failures and ignorance to successes. Hence, the statement that one makes, say, 'I could have done had I known', 'I could ... if I chose to' etc. readily points out the relative inevitability of (psychological) events.¹⁴ Human actions and behaviours, motives and emotions cannot be explained in terms of absolute determinism. It can be explained in terms of relative determinism alone. Freud extended the notion of determinism to cover mental life. But, his thematic account of human behaviour was far from a causal account in the sense of complete determinism as he writes:

"By abandoning a part of our psychic capacity as unexplainable through purposive ideas we ignore the realm of determinism in our mental life".¹⁵

Freud's assertion of causal relation and determinism was of incomplete sort which does not exclude the possibility of Freedom

of will and self-determination 'to be somebody' rather than what one thinks one can not be. In the case of a complete determinism one has nothing to do in order to change the course of events. But, the point here is that human mind is (incompletely) determined because of one's ignorance of one's as well as the general human predicament. However, no sooner one wakes up from the slumber than the chain of situation fall broken and one realise that the entire trouble was because one was not aware of one's psychological mechanism and its functions, as one should be. Once this end is successfully obtained, then a decoding process, of what was previously auto-conditioned and has been recorded with a peculiar feeling, begins. This in turn brings forth a new cognitive pattern and a perspective - a change at both structural and functional levels. At this phase, one is not only aware or conscious of one's phantasies along with the deep rooted feelings that some events in the past has evoked, but also becomes conscious of the human predicament as a whole. One realises that one's problems are akin to the general human problem and, then transfers one's uncommon unhappiness to a common unhappiness. One realise the possibility of innumerable options before him. One understands that the entire trouble was because of one's misween attitude towards life; a biased percept of the outer. This is what Freud aimed at by the psychoanalytic theory-a total transformation; not a mechanistic kind but a self-reinforcing kind. This self-reinforcement is the will to live, acknowledging that fears and sorrows are all part of life; as in

the case of Raskolnikov's transformation and resurrection to a new life, depicted in the epilogue of 'Crime and punishment' by Dostoyevsky:

"And what were all, all the torments of the past? Everything, even his crime, even his sentence and his exile, seemed to him now, in the first spate of emotion, to be something external and strange, as if it had not happened to him at all. But this evening he could not think long... he could only feel. Life had replaced dialectic, and something quite different had to develop in his mind.... But that is the beginning of a new story, that of a man's gradual regeneration, his gradual rebirth, his gradual transition from one world to another, of how he came to know a new and hither to unknown reality".¹⁰

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LOVE : An ally of interpersonal relations.

Philosophers, Poets, Scientists and Psychologists have their own versions of what love is and yet its mystery remains unveiled in layers. My task in this chapter would be on the one hand to see what love generally is and what is romantic love in particular from a Freudian perspective. A question that we must put forth before any discussion on Love is, 'what do men show by the intends of their behaviours to be the meaning and purpose of life'. Indubitably, at the outset this question seems to be vague and meaningless. But, the answer to it has deep implication and relevance to the issue of Love. Proper analysis of human behaviours indicate that (the ultimate) intension behind our behaviour is happiness - an intension to live a ' happy life '. Happiness is, ofcourse, a subjective state of one's being (in time), which may vary from person to person or even from a person of one culture to that of another. Howsoever, a happy life is one which is merited by the absence of pain and the subsequent unhappiness. This state has as its essence positive aspects of life that buttress one's egoistic (narcissistic) self-image and self-worth-such as a acceptability, concern, comfort etc. Hence, one of the most basic emotions that can render one with these positive aspects is Love. In other words, one constantly endeavours to promote one's happiness by being in love. One constantly seeks to love, for to do so is to be loved in return and to be loved is to experience happiness.

However, of all emotions, Love is the most enigmatic albeit that which everyone expresses and experiences in one or other forms. There would, perhaps, have been no question of love or even the emotion itself, if men were isolated creatures. But the fact is that there are always interpersonal transactions, as though a mark of acknowledgement that man is a rational social animal. Any healthy transaction depends on the intensity of commitment, concern and care that one has for the other. In other words, these being some of the elements of Love, a relationship would be determined by the intensity of Love one has for the other. But, Love itself, is determined by what is good, because that which is good is lovable and loved. This is what precisely Brentano pointed out, that to say an object is good is to say that it is correct to love and to say that it is bad is to say that it is incorrect to love or correct to hate it. This implies that an object is good if and only if it is worthy of being loved and an object is bad if and only if it is unworthy of love or worthy of hate¹. This is so, because when one interacts with another, one either feels favourably disposed towards the other or feels unfavorably disposed. This indicates the lovability or unlovability of the other and so indicates the goodness or badness of the other by being favourably or unfavourably disposed towards the other. Before we proceed further, let us look into some of the classical classification of Love.

Greeks classified Love into three classes viz. Agape, Philia and Eros. Of all these Agape is considered to be the most purest and selfless love. This love is prescribed by Christians. It is a love in spite of. The lover loves the loved in spite of all what the loved is. It is the love in its most pure and altruistic sense. Agape is a love of 'God - man', 'Man - God' and 'Man - Man'. But Philia on the other hand is a love because of. It is a love because of the particular relation that the lover has with the loved. It is a love of family members for each other because they are family members. It, besides being Parental, filial and sibling love, even includes the love of friendship; (these issues are discussed elaborately in the works of Vlastos - Platonic studies - and Nygren - Agape and Eros). Third kind of love is Eros. Eros is a conditional love. It is sensual and erotic in nature. It is a love of lust.

As the saying goes, ' Love is faith and Faith is forever ', trust is an essential aspect of love. A grain of suspicion on the credibility is a harmful voyage on the part of the Lovers, because distrust in any form precipitates an unfavourable disposition towards the other or each other. Psycho-physical aspects of love brings to our understanding that Love is a particular sort of mental attitude or the attitude of the whole being for the other perhaps, had there been no attitudes of this sort the entire human life would have been different. As Harlow puts it :

"Love is a wondrous state, reassuring. Because of its intimate and personal nature it is regarded by some as an improper topic for experimental research. But, whatever our personal feelings may be, our assigned mission as psychologists is to analyse all factors of human and animal behaviour into their component variables. So far as love or or affection is concerned, psychologists have failed their mission. The little we know about love does not transcend simple observation and the little we write about it has been written better by poets and novelists."²

A classic example of what the last line of the above paragraph resonates in not only Romeo - Juliet, but also in the Kreutzer Sonata of Leo Tolstoy; where a cynical gentleman, (who later on kills his wife) is indulging in a dialogue with his lady. This man thinks that to be in love is just to have one's erotic feelings gratified. The dialogue goes as follows:

" 'Yes, but how is one to understand what is meant by 'true love' ?' said the gentleman....

'why ? it's very simple', she said, but stopped to consider.

'Love ? Love is an exclusive preference for one above everybody else', said the lady.

'Preference' for how long ? A month, two days, or half an hour ?' said the grey-haired man and began to laugh.

'Excuse me, we are evidently not speaking of the same thing ...'

' Yes I know ... you are talking about what is supposed to be, but I am speaking of what is. Everyman experiences what you call love for every pretty women'.

'oh, what you say is awful ' But the feeling that is called love does exist among people, and is give not for month or years, but for a life time'.

'No, it does not',³

Here, the lady tries to portray an unmetted sense of human intrinsic value—the value of caring, being attaches to, being intimate to, being committed to and being investing oneself in the other. In other words is an exclusive preference of one for the other and one over many. While the man guided by his concept of Love perhaps, Freudian in its limited sense—considers what could normally be named as infatuation. Nonetheless, love is an, essentially linking, attitude in a relationship. A commitment to love, then, is not only a commitment to sustain this attitude of being given to one but also taking on the responsibility for having made the commitment. Love commitment, therefore, implies assuming the responsibility for sustaining patterns of thoughts that foster emotions conducive to the sustainment of love.

A trustfully sustained attitude to maintain the same attitude always, regardless of the case whether one is with or away from the loved one, is an essential prerequisite of Love. The strength of this attitude depends on the strength of trust one bestows upon the other. If at any given time the trust is broken then the attitude would be also reverted — through the cognitive dissonance. But, the moment the attitude is changed the magnanimity of the relationship too changes. Any attitude can be

altered by cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance simply means that people dislike inconsistency; inconsistency in thought and action. It is, as a theory, concerned with the sequence of events in which an individual makes a decision which is inconsistent with the previous behaviour and which affects consequent behaviours and presumably, attitudes. Cognitive dissonance theory rests on the assumption that the individual attempts to observe and establish internal harmony, consistency or congruity among - opinions, attitudes, knowledge and value-cognitive elements. This fact is evident in Leon Festinger's A theory of cognitive dissonance. He observes that pairs of cognitive elements may exist in irrelevant, consonant or dissonant relationships with each other. The relationship is an irrelevant one if the two elements have nothing to do with each other; it is consonant if one element follows from the other; and is dissonant if, considering two elements alone, the obverse of one element follows from the other. For instance, an event, that invalidates a belief that is important to one, occurs. In this case the belief has led one to expect something other than what actually occurred. The event, then, does not logically follow from or tally with what one believed to be true and is the case. In as much as the individual strives to maintain harmony (consonance) among cognitive elements the presence of dissonance leads to pressure to reduce the dissonance, the amount of pressure being consistent with the amount of dissonance that exists. The dissonance can be resolved by a change in one's cognitive elements; by the addition

of new elements with the attached priority while reducing the importance of the older beliefs.

Cognitive dissonance occurs either due to persuasion (conditioning) or due to the inconsistency noticed between one's attitudes and behaviours. Some supportive researches, specially in social psychology, show that we can draw conclusions about our attitudes from our decision to engage in particular behaviour. Hence, cognitive dissonance theory leads to the point that one can change people's attitude (or one's attitude) by getting them (one), some how, to behave in a manner consistent with the attitude one wishes to promote. This is radically true of Love transactions. So, is, for instance, the the case with ' X ' who in the beginning was unfavourably disposed (hated) to ' Y ' has later on fallen in Love with ' Y ' (rather developed a favourable disposition). Mr. X must have at first hated Ms. Y for he had had some prejudiced ideas about her (or even the entire class of women). However, the close association, due to perhaps professional reasons, gradually developed a favourable disposition while the unfavourable dispositional behaviours and attitudes got brushed aside. This begets a new attitude - a trustful attitude. This trustful attitude gave rise to Love, which is altogether a new attitudinal state as opposed to that of hate. In other words this favourable disposition was achieved through the cognitive dissonance -an established dissonance (or consonance) as opposed to what was previously asserted and believed to be true

(consonance). Here, what is readily observable is that of a dissonance transition from one state to the other; or a transition from hatred generating prejudice to Love effervescent trust. However, with the aid of the same theory, cognitive dissonance, one can also turn the card to expatiate the dead-end of Love. What we have already seen is that one can be successfully convinced to trust if and only if the attitudes and behaviours of the other are consistent. In other words, inconsistencies found in attitude (expressed through words) and behaviours will not successfully generate trust in one. And, unless the trust in one is built a favourable disposition (pro-attitude) towards the person will not develop; and till a pro-attitude is developed Love will not happen. The intensity of Love depends, then, on the pro-attitude one has towards the other. Now, when the trust stops short the attitude changes and when the attitude changes love vanishes. This, therefore, shows that the inconsistencies that are found in one (or both) of the lovers by (either) one of them (or both) between what is cognitively asserted and the behaviour creates a dissonance between the favourable disposition to love (pro-attitudes) and the favourable disposition to hate. This tug of war in ordinary cases emanates cognitive dissonance and the relationship, most often if not always, crumbles down. Hence, commitment to love not only calls for creating desirable emotions and attitudes but also demands to sustain an already present disposition to have them.

This implicitly seems to imply that love is an impulse, or at least in part, not guided reason. But, then the expression of this impulse is a necessity of human existence. This impulse is the expression of life instinct. It is an impulse to unite everything into one; at least the one more lively and like the lover. To put it in the words of Russell:

"There are three forces on the side of life which require no exceptional mental endowment, which are not very rare at present, and might be very common under better social institutions. They are love, the instinct of constructiveness, and the joy of life".⁴

Russell's idea of impulse and great force is true as much as as that of Freud's Eros and Thanatos. They are the vital human energies, to Freud. They are the principles of construction and destruction. Love is an unity and construction force. But is that all? Love, looking from a closer point of view, as seen before, is a preferential choice of one for the other, over others. Love is a constant self-enlarging experience. It is an act of one to extend one's ego-boundary for the purpose of nurturing one's own and the loved one's ego. Thus, the act of loving is an act of self-evolution. It is an evolution towards self - actualisation, towards a process of becoming. It is an act of will and an act of intension; without one being so much conscious of it. But, an important point here is that the expression of love has to do with ego-boundaries and it involves the extension of one's self. One's limit is one's ego-boundary. When one extends one's limit

through the act of love one does so by reaching out towards the beloved whose growth one wishes. The prerequisite for this is that the beloved object must first of all become beloved to one. To put it simply, one must be attracted (favourably disposed) towards the beloved object so that one can be committed to the beloved and invest one's energy for the growth of the beloved. This process of investment and commitment can be called as cathexis. Hence, the lover cathect the beloved object while in the process of that the object outside oneself gets as it were psychologically assimilated and incorporated into oneself. This, surely, is found in the case of mother - child relationship. The one who is fed, taken care of every physical and, may be, psychological needs - the infant is not only just a part of the mother, but also acquires a model of Love, Lover and Love-object which she leaves there in the being of the potential man - ofcourse, if the child experience negative interaction then she/he develops negatively biased cognition about himself and about others and their transaction. This point has been dealt by Freud, while talking of anaclitic and narcissistic models of love-object choices.

The central thesis of Freud is that all love is derivative of sex instinct, where the love - object is the person of the opposite sex and the aim is sexual union. All other kinds of love - agape, Philia - are formed by sublimation of the normal (sexual) aim. The first love-object, to Freud, is the parent of

the opposite sex or the parental surrogate and the first lesson of affection and feeling of tenderness is taught in the family by the painfully rewarding mechanism of repression of sexual energy and sublimation of it into affection. Thus, he says:

"The process of finding an object are fairly complex and no comprehensive account has hitherto been given of them. For our purpose it may be specially pointed out that when, in the years of childhood before puberty, the process has in some respects reached a conclusion, the object that has been found turns out to be almost, identical with the first object of oral pleasure instinct. Though it is not actually the mother's breast, at least it is the mother. We call the mother the first love-object. We speak of love when we bring tender side of the sexual trends into the foreground and want to force back the underlying physical or sensual instinctual demands or to forget them for the moment. At the time of which child's mother becomes his love-object (the psychical work of repression has already begun in him, which is withdrawing from his knowledge awareness of a part of his sexual aims)"⁵

What is vivid in the above mentioned passage is the anticipation of psychic-conditioning- an established favourable disposition towards a personality that is congruent with the model- or a deterministic model of Love-object selection. At this point one might rightly assume that Freud was concerned with romantic love or to put it more crudely erotic love. Moreover, Freud wanted to assert that the linguistic range of the word Love or Liebe is much wider than what we may usually think of them to be. Psychoanalysis provides justification for these linguistic facts by its hypothesis that the tender feelings of affection that characterize all cases, besides the nuclear (sexual) love, originate in the

same instinctual-sexual-impulse. But for the greek philosopher Plato all these cases fall under the term love because they have a common nature or essence-the desire for the good; the immortalization of oneself, which in turn brings forth happiness and happiness is good. Freud illustrates this in his 'Group psychology and the Analysis of the ego':

" Libido is an expression taken from the theory of the emotion. We call by that name the energy, regarded as a quantitative magnitude (though not at present actually measurable) of those instincts which have to do with all that may be comprised under the word ' love '. The nucleus of what we mean by love naturally consists (and this is what is commonly called love, and what the poets sing of) in sexual love with sexual union as its aim. But we do not separate from this-what in any case has a share in the name of 'love' - on the one hand, self-love, and on the other, love for parents and children, friendship and love for humanity in general, and also devotion to concrete objects and to abstract ideas. Our justification lies in the fact that psycho-analytic research has taught us that all these tendencies are an expression of the same instinctual impulses, in relation between the sexes these impulses force their way towards sexual union and in other circumstances they are diverted from their aim or are prevented from reaching it, although always preserving enough of their original nature to keep their identity recognizable (as in such features as the longing for proximity and self-sacrifice). We are of opinion, then, that language has carried out an entirely justifiable piece of unification in creating the word ' Love ' with numerous uses, and that we cannot do better than take it as the basis of our scientific discussion and exposition as well ... In its origin, function, and relation to sexual love, the Eros of the philosopher Plato coincides exactly with the love-force the libido of psychoanalysis."

Hence, after having stated that all kinds of love, save one, are aim inhibited, he goes on to say that Romantic love has as its main characteristic, attachment and overvaluation or overestimation. This is true as a matter of fact. It is the attachment that enables one in object cathexis. Love, then, would be nothing other than 'object - cathexis on the part of the sexual instincts with a view to direct sexual gratification. Once the sexual gratification is obtained the cathexis expires. But that is not the end. The desire for the same gratification revives after a while and so the cathexis process continues. However, in other sort of love, although, there is no sexual gratification there is an ego - gratification. In romantic love the special gratification provided by the interaction under condition of mutual attractions are important. Thus, ultimately the rewards provided by the partner (object - loved) take on a quality of exclusiveness. Hence, exclusive choice (preferential choice) of the object of love and attachment to that person with the dispositional attitude, whether sexual, affectionate or both, is an universal characteristic of romantic of Love. Yet another interesting characteristic of romantic love is overvaluation or overestimation. Freud explains this phenomenon in the following lines

"In connection with the question of being in love we have always been struck by the phenomenon of sexual overvaluation -the fact that the love object enjoys a certain amount of freedom from criticism, and that all its characteristics are valued more highly than those of people who are not loved or than its own were at time it itself was not loved"⁷

Freud maintained that over valuation is a phenomenon that one finds mostly in typical male love affair, while although 'typical' cases of women fail to exhibit any sexual overvaluation toward men, they scarcely ever fail to do so toward their own children⁸. Factors of over valuation in female could not be studied by Freud, because women's erotic life is still veiled in an impenetrable obscurity. The increased over valuation in men is attributed to resistance or increase in resistance on the part of women. The excess over valuation, then, would be associated with the unattainability of the women. These views lay bare a point to us i.e. the over valuation is a drive that is derived from the male child's original feelings for the mother or mother surrogate at the infantial and childhood stages; which, ofcourse, was later on sublimate and turned into feelings of tenderness and affection. Thus, there is a transformation of the sexual instinct through the aim-inhibition. This transformation is to the flowery side of love-affection and compassion. We can, then, say that the first love-object is the paragon or the paradigm, the experience and relationship which determined the subsequent selection of Love-object and transactions. That is to say, the first love - object leaves an unconscious impression (cognitive assessment)

about the entire affairs of affection and compassion. So, the strength of interpersonal relationship would depend on one's cognitive evaluation of impression that the paragon has left, through the direct interaction, about affection and compassion. Therefore, the experiential conditioning along with the specific attitude that one has unconsciously developed about oneself and 'the other' (specially, the gender of the paragon) in the complex process of child - parent relationship determine the consequent love life of the potential man. In Freud's words:

"The feature of overvaluation by which the loved one becomes the unique, the irreplaceable one, fits just as readily into the infantile set of ideas, for no one possess more than one mother and the relation to her rests on an experience which is assured beyond all doubt and can never be repeated again".

The [new] love-object, then, is a parent surrogate. One who bears similarities may be physical or role - similarities or the situational similarities, so that one can express oneself to a great extent without the Panges of super-ego and the fear of prohibition. In ordinary cases the powerful sensual feelings find an external outlet in an object (person) outside oneself. But, in abnormal cases like fixation, regression and situations where normal sexual aim is not achieved, what happens to the libido? It is precisely at this point that Freud talks about the development of auto-erotism and narcissism. Narcissism denotes an attitude of one to treat one's own body in the same way as the body of a sexual object would be treated. Some degree of narcissism

may be found in all individuals, and an excess degree could be seen in neurotics and psychotics. This is a phase of regular sexual and psychological development. Narcissism may simply be called as self-love. One of the greatest and lasting contributions, as Eric Fromm says, that Freud had made to the human civilization is the idea of narcissism. The key concept for understanding man's urge to be the one (a hero) - the will to power - is narcissism. This concept, an appellation of the mythical Greek Narcissus, is a claim that we were hopelessly absorbed with ourselves. If we care about anyone it is usually ourselves first of all - as Aristotle puts it somewhere that luck is when the guy next to you gets hit with the arrow 'One of the meaner aspects of narcissism is that we feel that practically everyone is expendable except ourselves. Narcissism operates as though our organism is ready to fill the world alone, even if our minds shrink at the thought of it. In other words, working narcissism is inseparable from a sense of self - esteem, self - worth, an endeavour towards limitless self - perpetuation and ultimately what we might call the self - perpetuation through the projective skill of cosmic significance. Hence, the amount of self importance involved in one's craving for recognition and immortalisation of oneself indicates how deeply one is in love with oneself, at the bottom. Thus, all other acts are offshoots of this basic sense of self - worth. Narcissistic energy, then, is what keeps men marching into point - blank fire in wars, because at the heart one does not feel that one will die (see ,

the next chapter for more on suicide). Freud's explanation for this was that the unconscious does not know death or time; in man's inner organic recesses he feels immortal. Love too is not free from narcissistic inclinations, where the narcissistic energy (libido) extrorses towards an object out of the narcissistic inclinations for the exultation of self-esteem, self-worth and self-immortalisation through the offspring(s).

There are two kinds of narcissism. The primary narcissism, which is the original infantial investment of the ego with libido, associated though distinct from auto-erotism. While, the secondary narcissism, on the other hand, arises when there is a withdrawal of libido from external objects and reinvest it into the ego. This is associated with auto eroticism. This narcissistic model (model of the self - projected-object) usually has a strong impact on the choice of love - object in both the sexes; although, to Freud, narcissistic model of love - object selection is often found in women than in men. However, an element of self-love is essential part in a love relationship, otherwise object-cathexis becomes impossible; cathexis of the beloved would be difficult. One may be in the secondary narcissistic state for sometimes - ofcourse, owing to the cognitive setup one has about the outer and self-but, in the developmental process to maturity one may intend to obtain a lover of the secondary narcissistic model, which one has cherished once upon a time and wished oneself to be. However, a fixation or regress at this state will

not allow one for such an object-choice; as Freud correctly puts it:

"Before puberty they have had feelings of a likeness to men and have developed to some extent a masculine lines; after this tendency has been cut short when Feminine maturity is reached they still retain the capacity; of longing for a masculine ideal which is really a survival of the boyish nature that they themselves once owned."¹⁰

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in psychoanalytic scheme there are two kinds of Love-object choice (the choice of the beloved). The Anaclitic model and the Narcissistic model. Anaclitic model is more a characteristic of men and Narcissistic of women. But this could overlap and so this division cannot be universal. A women's choice of love - object could be, and is mostly, determined by the father model and also, as pointed out above, all cases of love reverberates self-love. Hence, we may have an admixture of both models often and at times only one.

Thus, in the anaclitic model one looks for:

- (i) The woman who tends
- (ii) The man who protects

While in narcissistic model one loves:

- (i) What one actually is
- (ii) What one once was
- (iii) What one would like to be
- (iv) Someone who was once a part of oneself
(like the child to a mother).¹¹

Whatever may be the model of choice of the beloved, there is an involvement of ego-boost in both the cases; because love as it were exudes from the egoistic (heroistic) narcissism. In one case there is a gratification of the ego-libido and in the other case there is a boost of the ego in an altruistic way; being tender and affectionate to the beloved, one's ego gets feed back in the form of appreciations that upheavals self - esteem, self respect and reassures the worth to be a hero. It, then, is right to say that self-love and an appropriate self - esteem is essential for love, which in return pushes the ego forward. An important point here is that Narcissism and egoism are one and the same concept. The word narcissism only emphasis the point that the egoism is a libidinal phenomenon. In other words, narcissism is the libidinal complement of egoism. When we speak of egoism we have in view only the individual's advantage. But while considering narcissism we take into account the individual's satisfaction. Being in love is characterised by self-sacrifices, humility, limitation. Being in love is characterised by self - sacrifice humility, limitation of narcissism and self-injury. This might seem to be opposite of egoism i.e. altruism. Certainly so is the case, for when one acts with a view only to the advantage of the other (loved) there is a case of non - libidinal altruism. This, ofcourse, enhances once happiness, though not the libidinal (aim) gratification directly. But, in the case of being (completely) in love, where the ego-libido as it were flows into the object-libido, the lover puts the beloved in the place of his/her own ego. Hence, extension of the ego boundary.

Love then, is a dispositional preferential choice, in which a commitment to sustain the intentional act of love is unconsciously determined. As have already pointed out, the choice of love - object (beloved object) is indubitably deterministic - anaclitic and narcissistic-in the Freudian frame work. Nonetheless, modern psychiatric studies too propose a similar deterministic model, not of the object choice but of the arousal of the emotion-love-itself. An empirical study was conducted by (New York psychiatrists) Donald F. Clane and Michael Ludwig, who call love as 'Hysteriod Desphoric'. They observed that a neurotransmitter called phenylethylamine is responsible for this marvellous emotion called love. There is a chance of two individuals to fall in love, when their brain glands being activated enough to produce the chemical phenylethylamine. Another scientist Dorothy Liberove explains that during sexual activity the quantity of phenylethylamine in both partners become at par and thus the relative sexual need of both partners start to diminish.¹² In other words, alteration in the level of phenylethylamine implies alteration in the emotional state - love. But, along with these psycho-physical explanations, what is vital part in the choice of the beloved, and the concept of (falling in) love itself, is the development of the cognitive stream of the child (the potential man).

Obviously, the parent of the opposite sex could be the first love-object, the model in fact. Each and every transaction with

the parent and the parent surrogates, creates circuits in the mental mechanism of the child. At the phase of psycho - physical development if the first love-object (the model) reciprocate in a negative manner to the demands for affection and compassion, consecutively for a long period, then she/he develops, a negatively processed perspective and, thus, develops a poor self-esteem, a poor self-regard, a weak self-image etc. The favourable disposition and the preferential selection or the unfavourable disposition and rejection or selection and the following unhealthy interaction with the love-object (loved) depends on this perspective that dominates one, without one's being aware of it; as it were a self itself, as it were assimilated with oneself. While processing the external stimuli cognitively, the substance of the cognition creates a particular perspective towards the outer world for the person. This perspective is cognitively impregnated with positive or negative attitudes. It becomes as it were a ruler - the personality (the mask behind which the perspective lurks) - of the individual and thus the nuclear self.¹³ Nuclear self has a specific mode of response to the situations, depending on the structural and functional variations each individual possesses due to the specific mode of cognitive circuit one possesses. These Specific circuits were caused by the cognitive conditioning. Nuclear self hence, commands over the whole self in interpersonal relations; so is the case with love relation (see. App. II). But, if the nuclear self is handicapped with negative cognisance (conditioning) the commands of the nuclear self would

be negative and the negative mode of response would be projected; so also with positive responses. Thus, the choice of the beloved depends also, to this effect, on nuclear self. The formation of Nuclear self takes place in the early part of one's life, though it may get altered and moulded or even strengthened in its original beliefs as one evolves with history. If a thing is found good, it is lovable and loved. If one is loved, one is good. That usually is the attitude of the child (potential man). But, if one is not loved (or at least feels that one is not loved), one feels unhappy and evolves a poor self regard with a silent and suffocatingly intolerable claim that one is unlovable because one is not good. Simultaneously at the unconscious level one agitatedly asks 'why not', while plunging into a form of narcissism with an unpromulgated negatively generalised or mixed attitude towards the entire 'class' of being(s). This marks the beginning of a particular mode of conditioning, which in due course turns out to be vicious perspective - the nuclear self. This in a sense, thus, is a cognitive dissonance that is perpetuated and established by the similar or more or less similar experiences time and again. For instance, a child who has been ill treated by a woman - owing to have already developed a cognitive dissonance towards that particular lady and (most often) the female-folk generally, due to the constant conjunction between one's voluntry decisions and those of associated events develops a particular perspective. As the consequence of this negatively biased perspective (which is there in everyone with more or less in intensity) some anomalies

might occur in the (love) relationship with people. In this context Branteno was right, for love or hate extends to the entire class, while considering a particular case (here, the relationship, may be, with the first love-object or some surrogates) if the logical requirement of love or hate is experienced then the 'goodness or baseness of the entire class becomes obvious at a single stroke, so to speak, and without any induction from particular cases'¹⁴. In other words, one feels favourably or unfavourably disposed to the whole class with a particular dispositional attitude (perspective) gained in the, variety of, complex process.

Therefore, Love is an attitude, as it were, of the nuclear-self. The prosperity of love depends on one's willingness to alter one's attitudes and proclivities if they were initially biased. It is not only the cathexis of the other but also the self-enlarging process towards maturity. The most important element of love one needs to understand, in a relationship, is oneself—one's positive and negative proclivities, in the preferential act called love, towards the entire class of the beloved. This self-analysis would foster not only the relations but also the attitude to maintain the commitment. This is what one can evidently notice in the character Raskolnikov of Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment. Here, we see an evolution of love out of low comparison level for emotional support.

"...at that instant, she understood. Ineffable happiness shone in her eyes; she had understood, and she no longer doubted that he loved her, loved her forever, and that now at last the moment had come - They tried to speak, but could not. Tears stood in their eyes. They were both pale and thin, but in their pallid faces there glowed the dawn of a new future, a perfect resurrection to new life. Love had raised them from the dead, and the heart of each held an endless store of life for the heart of the other"¹⁵.

That, indeed, is the magnitude of abundant love. What man consciously strives for in all his acts, as already mentioned, is happiness. The absence of pain and an experience of the pleasure of being a hero who is above everybody else. One of the techniques via which one perseveres to attain this heroic happiness is love. In Freud's words, it is:

"The way of life which makes love the centre of everything, which looks for all satisfaction in loving and in being loved.... We are never so defenceless against suffering as when we love, never so helplessly unhappy as when we have lost our loved object or its love."¹⁶

The loss of love and loved is indeed loss of everything to the (heroically oriented) lover. It deprives the lover of the (heroic) satisfaction of love. It also deprives one of the protection, compassion and the tender care of the loved. Hence, she/he discouragingly feels being lowered for there is no more reciprocal love bestowed upon the ego of the lover from the loved. But, being in love one feels happy, because there is a reciprocation from the loved to the lover, which is a boost to the ego unto the generation of happiness. This is true of all sorts of

love. But there are altruistic love, where one loves all men alike instead of being limited exclusively to the selected one (unlike the romantic love). Nonetheless, they too are the exploiters of love for the benefit of an inner feeling of happiness. By doing so they protect themselves from the pain of loss of the exclusively preferred object, through directing their love to all alike. They get an inexorable joy by transforming their sexual instinct into affection and tender feeling. Love is, then, the deliberate will of one to enrich the spirit of the loved by enabling and enhancing the growth of the beloved. Love is the gift of civilization for men. It is under the magic spell of love that the entire human affairs take place - the interpersonal relations prosper, the unity of races, tribes, kinsmen and humanity survive .

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SUICIDE:AN INSTINCT INVERTED

Life, it is said, begins with conception and ends with death. Life is, then what is in between, conception and extinction. One can neither, with rational certainty nor empirical evidence, talk of one's prenatal existence nor posthumous existence as many people try to do so. This specific truth of life indicates that life is, in its totality, a mystery. But, one can quite certainly assert that one passes through various psycho - physical alterations and experiences, until finally annihilated. Of all aspects of human beings death has been a major puzzle for man since time immemorial. The fact that death is inevitable rules out man's too tall claims of indeterminism and absolute negation of fatalism. Death is, as Bhagavat Gita States, "the last truth of life"; which reperussed in Freud's claim that 'death is the ultimate goal of life'. There are, then two truths of one's life which one needs to accept without any reservation and grudge, i.e. one's unopted givenness and one's unopted annihilation. One, never chooses to be born, but finds oneself to be just there inextricably. One has no choice than to live with the givenness. To put it differently, existence with its determinant goal (death) precedes freedom. One, indeed, is born with freedom of choice, but she/he never chooses to be born; yet is born. Nevertheless, one has always an option, 'to be or not to be '. Hence, one who willfully opts for 'not to be' is the one who ventures at suicide, which depends, ofcourse, on one's attitude towards life and death.

After Darwin, the problem of death as evolutionary came to the fore, and many thinkers immediately saw that it was a major psychological problems for man.¹ The biological expatiation of death and specifically the idea of death instinct - thantos - has taken its robust shape in the psychoanalytic schema of Freud. In Freud's frame work, death in its disguised manifestations (specially suicide) is due to the activation of aggressive instinct, within, upon oneself to join with the inorganic substances. But, man always tries to supress the idea of death because it is painful and the thought of it quells one's enthusiasm to live peacefully and ambitiously. Hence, one always represess it. As he writes:

"Is it not for us to confess that in our civilized attitude towards death we are once more living psychologically beyond our means, and must reform and give truth its due ? would it not be better to give death the place in actuality and in our thoughts which properly belongs to it, and to yield a little more prominence to that unconscious attitude towards death which we have hitherto so carefully suppressed ?. This hardly seems indeed a greater achievement, but rather a backward step but it has the merit of taking somewhat more into account the true state of affairs."²

What Freud, here, insists on is the meticulous role play of suppression or repression of the idea of death, that is a threat to oneself; although, elsewhere, he points out that the death instinct - the self - destructive force - is alive at the core of one's being. What is the essential point in here is that man cuts out for himself a managable world; he throws himself into a

action - uncritically and unthinkingly without the fear of death, (for the idea of death is suppressed). The child who is well nourished and loved develops a sense of omnipotence. He feels that he is indestructible. One might say, correctly, that his repression of the idea of his own death is made easy for him because he is fortified against it in his very narcissistic vitality. This shows that basic narcissism is increased when one's childhood experiences have been securely life supportive and warmly enhancing to the sense of 'inner - sustainment'⁹. That is to say, if the child had had a favourable upbringing, it only serves all the better to hide the fear of death. But, if otherwise, the consequences too would be otherwise.

Death means extinction of life. It is a normal natural phenomenon as all life ends in death, and all those born must die or become extinct. It is absolute cessation of embodied existence. The scientific discourse of death - Thanatology claims that life is a co-ordinated activity of psycho-physical factors. Consciousness is the specific characteristic of psyche; brain stem is, biologically, considered to be the seat of consciousness. A person dies when the brain stem stops functioning. Death, is said to be of two types. The first type is Somatic or systemic death (clinical death). It is the complete cessation of the functions of brain, heart and lungs. The second is what is medically known as molecular death or cellular death. It occurs when tissues and cells responsible for bringing body to the temperature (thermo-

stat) of the surrounding environment ceases to operate; usually within three to four hour of the clinical death.⁴ Both clinical death and cellular death are two sides of one coin- the death - which is unsurpassingly an invariable truth of (human) life.

Death, is an unequivocal and permanent end of one's existence. Natural death is a spontaneous negation of life. It is a physiologically determined fact and end. Determinism, which indicates a drawback in the continued existence, is thus only negative in nature. It is, then, determinism of negation. But, what, then is the case of suicide ?. If the idea of death is fear generating, why, then one opts for suicide ? Suicide is self-negation, by the choice of a conscious agent, out of many options. The subject chooses to annihilate himself, under the compulsion of a stressful situation. This sounds simple, but I'll try to explicate this complex phenomenon with the help of Camus and Freud. Suicidal behaviour can be characterised as, due to, social and psychological deficits, It is the manifestation of a process which begins in early childhood and is socially nursed and channelled into a variety of behaviours, all of which are seen as deviant.⁵ Suicidal behaviour, indeed, is a voluntary act of the self. It could be, rightly said that it is a desperate outburst, out of, one's helplessness and suffocations that was left unnoticed and uncared by the bypassers; but that has, indeed now caught the attention of many. It is on the one hand a cry for help, on the other, the rejection of life as meaningless. In

other words, the choice to die or not, depends on one's value or meaning attachment to life.

The notion of value is, always, implicitly, associated with preference. Here, of course, one needs to be more careful in differentiating preference as a means to an end and preferences that are end in themselves. One might prefer, say, A to B, because A might be more comfortable state to be in or to be with etc. which would be relatively lesser in the case of B. Hence, it is preferable because A is comfortable to be with. So the value of A is much higher than that of B wherewithal, the intensity of value attached to A can be measured by the amount of sacrifices that one is ready to undergo to obtain A. Essentially, though there are varied problems, what one finds desirable and valuable are certain states, conditions or type of activities which are positive and enjoyable. It is being alive, doing certain things, having certain experiences etc. that one prefers and considers as good⁶. That is to say, normally, one does not prefer death and is disposed to endeavour for a happy life; but, then, why suicide ?

This question can be illustrated with the explication of Camus' understanding of the subject along with Freudian psychoanalytic interpretation of the reversal of aggressiv instinct upon oneself, while toiling to make sense of one's predicaments till finally one grasps the purpose of life. As Camus writes:

"There is only one really serious philosophical problem, that of suicide. To judge that life is or is not worth the trouble of being lived, this is to reply to the fundamental question of philosophy"⁷

The implication of this statement is that man desires for metaphysical assurance that life is a part of an intelligible process directed to an idea goal, and that in striving after his personal ideal he has the backing and support of the universe or of reality as a whole. To Camus, there is an interlink between the individual thought and suicide. The act of this kind, which is volitional is 'prepared within the silence of the heart, as is a great work of art'. The individual himself or herself ignorant of its grip as an impelling force. Suicidal behaviour is, mostly, due to the thoughts, often negative ones, of having been 'undermined' by some exo - psychic forces or situational conditions. Hence, in each of one's sorrows and distress as Shakespear puts it in Hamlet Act III. Sc.II, one whispers to oneself:

"To be or not to be; that is the question; whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, or to take arms against a sea of troubles and by opposing, end them".

There, then, one encounters the absurd. In the end the world is revealed to the clear-sighted man as without any determinate purpose or meaning, save death. The world is found to be irrational with the rise of a feeling of absurd. In other words, dying

voluntarily means that one has recognised the absence of any profound reason for living, the insane character of that daily agitation and the uselessness of toiling. This feeling of absurdity arises because one feels an alien, a stranger, due to the divestiture of one's joy and light. There, then, arises a divorce between man and his life - the joy and hope. This divorce and sense of alienation or having been put aside begets a choking suffocation; the feeling of absurd. The world, as such, is not absurd, but it simply is. The absurdity arises out of a confrontation - between man and nature, as Camus writes:

"The absurd arises from this confrontation between man's appeal and the irrational silence of the world".⁶

The feeling of absurd can arise in a variety of ways, through for example, the perception of Nature's indifference to man's values and ideals, through recognition of the finality of death, or through the shock caused by the sudden perception of the pointlessness of life's routine. The man who is, however, able to look the absurdity of human existence in the face sees the meaning of the world disappear.

So the issue of suicide revolves around the question of adequate meaning of life; the possibility of having which must have been shattered systematically and gradually, for many reasons. One naturally prefers life to death, provided it is meaningfully livable, because only meaningful life is valuable


and only valuable one is preferable. There is, however, difference between the feeling of absurd and the consciousness of absurd. One who is conscious of absurd, like Sisyphus, revolts against it, knowing the absurdity of the world, with the passion to conquer the absurd. Suicide, then is a surrender to the absurd. It is capitulation. But, human pride and greatness are shown neither in surrender nor in the timeless engagement in escapism. It is rather by living in the consciousness of the absurd and constantly revolting against it by committing oneself to life in its fullest manner that one shows one's greatness. Hence, suicide is a passive and yet a chosen surrender to the absurd devoid of the courageous revolt.

Emile Durkheim, a french sociologist, too puts across his version of suicide, which he classifies in to three; namely, altruistic, egoistic and anomic. If one's commitment and attachment to one's society, nation, community etc. are deep enough, for the common good one ventures to sacrifice one's life. This he calls an altruistic suicide - this is, ofcourse, an explicit expression of heroism. The second kind of suicide which Durkheim calls egoistic suicide is due to one's alienation from rest of the members of a social group, Community etc. This occurs due to emotional and obligatory detachment of one from other members - in other words a life too constricted, without much social interactions and attachment, leads to egoistic suicide. And the third kind of suicide is as he calls it, anomic. The results from lack

of rules or what can be correctly known as normlessness. If a society is too lean with the way of life this might lead to the feeling of absurd, there being no control over, and subsequently to suicide. In the case of anomic suicide, though, the individual may be deeply involved in social activities, the group life fails to provide one with adequate controlling standards of behaviour. Life may be unbearable for the egoistic suicider because of excessive self-discipline (perhaps due to the rule of a specific perspective decreed by the nuclear self). But life, on the otherhand, may be unbearable for the anomic suicider due to inadequate self-discipline.^o So-be-it, there is an increasing sense of feeling of absurdity or uselessness and directionlessness felt in each of these two cases.

Nonetheless, it is an amazing paradox that although human beings, on the one hand, fear death, yet, on the other prefer it to life when the feeling of absurd rises. As I've pointed out earlier, although the idea of death has been given, one learns to suppress it that it rarely passes through the consciousness. One in the process of development readily incorporate into oneself the cultural programming and that one learns not to uncontrollably expose oneself (the thanatos), because or else one would be extinct due to the external forces acting upon him. Death, perhaps, is the greatest fear of human beings. The fear of death is due to the powerful life instinct present in all forms of life. The death instinct, then, is the reduction in the thrust of

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life instinct of the self, but present normally as homicidal instinct; which is indirectly also for the preservation of the self. It is precisely because of the existence of life instinct that life has survived and because of it the intelligent and rational human beings dread death.

However, there is some element of unconscious (instinctual) drive towards annihilation, the intense propensity towards which increases with the deterioration of psycho - physical conditions reaching its apex. The living organism has a tendency, and desire, to return to the primal form of inorganic matter from which it arose.¹⁰ It, then, is love in its depleted sense, because there is a preferential choice and denouncement of one's embodied existence to obtain the unity with a cosmic force, that, ofcourse, can be obtained only by death. Death, is the eternal sleep and a return, perhaps, to the pre-birth condition on which the suicider prefers to lean on as a means of recalcitration and retaliation towards oneself, for one's helpless existence. In this process one endeavours to make one's absence felt to the adversaries, specially if it is a case of love failure. It is, then, on the one hand a revenge to the other and a call for help on the other hand. It is a revenge to the other, because the other will be struck by the guilt for having caused the subject to suffer the fate of voluntary annihilation. In this case one then can readily notice, on the one hand a sadistic attitude and on the other hand a masochist attitude, that gets culminated and

ultimately terminated when finally annihilated. These two aspects of human instinct was enunciated vividly by Freud in his instinct theory.

Freud's acclamation is that there are two basic classes of instincts. They, though essentially different, work in human beings as complementary. These instincts are, no doubt, eros and thanatos-sex instinct and aggression instinct-and are tamed and controlled by human civilization and culture (the super - ego). But, there are phases of one's life where an enthusiastic observer can easily notice the admixture of these two instincts. These phase are sadistic and masochistic. Freud, then, writes:

"We have argued in favour of special aggressive and destructive instinct in man not on account of the teachings of history or of our experience in life but on the basis of general considerations to which we were led by examining the phenomena of sadism and masochism. As you know, we call it sadism when sexual satisfaction is linked to the condition of the sexual object's suffering, pain, ill-treatment and humiliation, and masochism when the need is felt of being the ill-treated object oneself It is our opinion, then, that in sadism and in masochism we have before us two excellent examples of a mixture of the two classes of instinct, of eros and aggressiveness" ¹¹

What Freud, indeed, intends to show by this is the ' fusions or alloys of both creative and destructive instinct '. However, a careful study after isolating its components will reveal, specially in the case of masochism, an aspect of self-destructive force. This is so because aggeression being a destructive

instinct, in masochism gets directed towards oneself and in sadism is directed towards an object outside. Freud continues:

"A certain amount of the original destructive instinct may still remain in the interior. It seems that we can only perceive it under two conditions: if it is combined with erotic instinct into masochism or it - with a greater or lesser erotic addition - is directed against the external world as aggressiveness. And now we are struck by the significance of the possibility that the aggressiveness may not be able to find satisfaction in the external world because it comes up against real obstacles. If this happens, it will perhaps retreat and increase the amount of self - destructiveness holding sway in the interior.... A queer instinct, indeed directed to the destruction of its own organic home".¹²

One, however, must not be confused between instinct and death or urge to die. Death is not an instinct by itself, but a biological determinant. Instincts are psycho - physical forces which can either be fostered or modified - for example eros and thanatos have been manipulated in different fashions in different persons as per the dictates of civilization (superego). Suicide or suicidal tendencies are, then, nothing other than the activation of destructive instinct upon oneself. Freud, like Schopenhauer, holds that life must have once proceeded out of an inorganic matter, and 'an instinct must have arisen which sought to do away with life once more and to reestablish the inorganic state'.

Nevertheless, suicidal tendencies could be also due to an acute sense of guilt felt over an act performed once upon a time, which has been compelling one with a need for being punished.

This feeling of need for been punished grows over the time, in a manner unnoticed by the person himself, along with the present feeling of obscurity and absurdity. This creates a negative perspective towards oneself, a negative attitude towards oneself, untill finally the annihilation act (suicide) takes over the rule of nuclear self with a total self-hatred for not having been able to be out of one's existential vortex. In other words, vulnerability to suicide depends on the simmering of negative self-attitude within. This fact, reminds us of the implications of Camus' writings that 'an act like suicide is prepared within the silence of the heart and that the man himself is ignorant of it in the long term process', till at last really kills himself with a nod to the call of absurd, with a silent confession that 'life is not worth the trouble.'

Death, be it natural or suicidal, is annihilation. There is no question of one being better than the other. As for the normal life and death one does not have a choice, but to live with the givenness and to be given to death as the time requires of one. However, there is an element of choice in the act of suicide or suicidal behaviour i.e. 'to be or not to be'. And, the suicider opts 'not to be', because life seems to be not worth the trouble; he cannot simply attach value to it. To him to live longer is 'to be in hell'; thus earlier the better. Hence, the voluntary - wilful - negation of one's spatio - temporal embodied existence. In fact every attempted suicide is a hue for help. It is an attempt at enucleation of the suffocation of a disintegra-

ted being. The idea of death is, normally, somehow repressed, for the constant awareness of it might be shocking and a threat to the joyful engagements.¹⁴ But, it is active at core, for the destructive instinct is active, though, may be, in an altogether disguised or channelised manner. If the potential man (child) feels insecure at the developmental phase, there would be a negative-self esteem along with negative perspective established. His perspective could be, 'it is better not to be, for life is too frightening, too risky and not at all worth the struggle'. Hence, a nuclear self with negative perspective and negative commands controls the total being; as I've explained above.

The task of psychotherapy, then, is to enable the subject to integrate, the tormented pieces and shattered visage. In this process one needs to be taught the art of recapitulation. The person has to be directed towards self-mastery with the complete knowledge of the whole. One should be, renormalised with cognitive dissonance and reconditioned by replacing the negative with positive. Here, what the person needs to understand is that 'what was cannot be what was not', so need not be stricken with guilt. In sum, the subject could be encouraged to take responsibility for the life and choices, with an integration process which enables him to construct a meaning of life painstakingly. In other words the therapist's role is to make a dissonance towards the already existent negative feelings the subject has towards life. This implies the need for reconstructing the cognitive pattern of the subject, through subject's grasp of

predicaments and unconscious desires, with a vision at the nuclear self to alter its perspective. There are elements which, if added to one's experience, make life better; and there are other elements which, if attached to one's experience, make life worse. However, life is worthliving even when the bad elements of experiences are plentiful, and the good ones too meager to outweigh the bad ones on their own. The additional positive strength to live is supplied by experience itself, rather than by any of its contents¹⁵ -like Sisyphus who revolted against the absurd to be strengthened by the traumatic experience itself.

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CONCLUSION

Science, it is said, is knowledge par excellence. Science not only tries to study phenomena critically, but also tries to establish generalised principles that can be universally applied to similar set of events or phenomena. An endeavour towards this is not just mere speculative game, but a process intuitively moved towards an objectively verifiable conclusion with the help of observation and experimentation. Hence, observability, objective verifiability and falsifiability are the trademark of any scientific enterprise. This undercurrent, then, is the meta-rule in an empirical game. This is a meta-rule because, this rule is not only applicable to the scientific games in natural sciences, but a rule that is often emulated and appropriated by any enterprise worth the name of scientific enquiry. So is the case of Psychology, let alone social sciences. Psychology has empirically developed since Wilhelm Wundt and, may be, Sigmund Freud, to such an extent that one might equivocally call it an empirical science. Different schools of psychology have been evolving during the past few decades—specially in the line of experimental psychology where man is ascribed the see of a mysteriously operating mechanism. Nonetheless, the question that still remains is, despite the accumulation of empirical data from the sophisticated studies on the mysteries of human nature, can any absolutely certain and (may it be empirically or rationally) generalised principles be derived from the studies of particular cases. There are various sets of theories regarding the nature of

man and nature and function of human psyche-like that of the christian's, the Marxist's, Sartreian's, Skinnerian's, Lorenz's etc. However, most of these theories were more an emperico-analytical studies of human being than that of being purely an empirical pursuit. We may call their theories to be emperical as far as they are systematic enquiries into the nature of human beings. But we cannot call them to be factual enquiry of physics' sort, for they lack objective verifiability and hence falsifiability. One can falsify a theory only when counter factual evidences are brought against it. As far as human beings are concerned all that one observes is the case and so will be the case with the second, third and fourth person to infinitum. This shows the uniqueness (the individuality) of human being(s) and the subjective nature of one's experiences. As Somerset Maugham puts it:

"When I look over the various parts of my character with perplexity, I recognise that I am made up of several persons and that the person that at the moment has the uper hand will inevitably give place to another. But which is the real one? All of them or none?"¹

This points out that any theory regarding the nature of human being is just, may be, one dominant aspect of the being, which the theoratician views from his own perspective. The reason behind depicted diversity and yet obscurity of humn nature is that man, essentially, is a psycho-somatic beng in space and time. One is not only limited by one's genetic and constitutional

factors, but also environmental and situational factors. The impact of these factors on one is vivid in the diversities in character and personality (perspective) found in two different persons from two societies, guided by different social norms and institutional rules. My endeavour in this thesis was to point out how human nature, and specially the mental set up, is formulated due to the interaction between these two forces - Exo - psychic forces and Endo-psychic forces. However, the conspicuous fact is that what is commonly called as human nature is actually a complex of so many aspects and is so incoherent, that the attempts to construct an analytic definition which would take into account all its aspects will lead to failure. If we wish to comprise in the concept of human nature all semantic intuitions attached to it, then we get an incoherent whole. This is so because the development of each system depends on the perspective and the set orientation towards the goal of the researcher. However, we can delineate from that complex whole several coherent parts.² Hence on the foundation of that thinkers construct several concepts of human nature. Thus, such basic concepts that thinkers like Freud, Sartre, Hobbes, Lorenz etc. Systematically isolated to construct their definition are instincts, energies etc. Whereas behaviourists and neurologists go with the concept of neurological alterations that can be produced due to the environmental interactions; hence a specific behaviour - overt behaviours.

Nevertheless, these studies, may it be empirical or empirico-analytical, implicitly or explicitly indicate much of determinism by considering man just as an adaptive operative mechanism. But, I like to point out that man is not just a mechanical being but a conscious-adaptive-operative-mechanism. In other words, man, though a conscious being, is a mechanism that operates - psychologically - in a deterministic manner due certain sort of motivational dispositions of the unconscious cognitive perspective which constantly tries to operate in the world in an adaptive manner. This is clear when we speak of thoughts being alive. We call a body alive which shows activity, organization and a more or less stable form which remains the same inspite of continuous renewal of matter. In an analogous manner we can call a thought alive (that I call the cognitive perspective) which is able to produce activity and a certain form of behaviours i.e. to move people either to feel or think or act in a specific manner.³ In other words, this works as a Persona(lity), whereby one may control, suppress and disguise one's true self i.e. what one really wants to be-hero- and tries to operate adaptively. But at times fails; when self can no longer retain its self - deceptive position and this we call abnormal caprices-such as dread, anxiety, urge to die etc. Hence, in all of one's behaviours what one tries to implicitly project out, and yet apparently kept disguised in order to be acceptable and adaptive to the system, is the will to power - an egoistic narcissism, a will to be a hero-as Adler or even Nietzsche might

say. However when this inner desire appears threatened, one would be put down; so then the ultimate aim would be fight or flight-suicide. But all these depends, again, on one's perspective orientation towards one's own life and that of others as well. This statement might sound deterministic for one being deterministically disposed towards as it were the decrees of perspective.

However, determinism in the case of human being is incomplete and relative. This is so, for man is being in time with different experiences. If one is to understand persons one is compelled to try to understand their interpersonal relationships as social beings. What we call a person is defined by comparison with, and interaction with, other persons. This is what John Macmurry meant while saying that:

"Persons... are constituted by their mutual relation to one another. "I" exists only as one element in the complex "you and I".⁴

This is what I've been emphasizing on while stressing on the impact of these interactions in one's life, throughout the developmental phase, which creates a cognitive pattern and perspective. In other words, the cognitive residues of different experiences (interpersonal relations) determine the dispositional output. But these cognitive residues varies from person to person, so also the dispositional output; although different persons happened to experience the same set of stimulus for the

same consecutive period. This shows not only the uniqueness of man but also the relevance of relative determinism. In other words, the output (behaviour) is relative to the cognitive content of the unconscious (roughly the amalgam psychic state). A perspective is an idea, may it be malism or whatever. This perspective is cognitively assessed and filtered essence, or rather the effervescence out, of several instantaneous experiences. Hence, any alteration in the cognitively conditioned content of the person would alter the disposition. Thus an alteration in the behavioural output. This was the view point of psychoanalysts in general and Freud in particular. Nevertheless, I go a step further to state that no mental mechanism is operative without its semeiology. Cognitive conditioning is impossible without an appropriate thought pertaining to it. But, no thought is possible unless there are words and no words are available unless there are concepts. So, words are nothing but symbolic surrogates of concepts. But the semantics of mind might not be similar to that of ordinary language. It has symbolic approximations to the experiences which to a large extent depends on socio-culturally determined moorings. Man is not just the activities of electro-chemical substances; or else there would have been no difference between man and Robot. Man is an adaptive operative mechanism⁵ which can be reconditioned by making necessary alterations in the semeiology of the unconscious; without necessarily inflicting a modification on the individual parts alone, like that of a physician-but an adequate change in the whole (perspective). Thus

a systematic therapy is the hermeneutics of the perspective. Hence, therapeutic systems like psychoanalysis, neurolinguistic programming, transactional analysis etc. endeavour at a catharsis process through the alteration of semantics of the unconscious to the alteration of a cognitive-perspective of one towards oneself as well as the outer.

It is, then, evident that an adequate psychotherapy and even any systematic enquiry into the nature and functioning of human psyche should be a consistent philosophical system. The reason behind it is that the psychotherapeutic endeavours are not just the cure of a symptom or two alone, like that of a medical practitioner, but a cure of the whole. Its task is reorientation and intergration of the tormented self with reinvegerative spirit and an aspiration to live. This is somewhat similar to that of philosophical endeavour. Philosophy tries to understand parts in terms of the whole. Philosophy tries to give an all encompassing knowledge. At this task philosophers are constantly enhanced by their intuitions. This is true of psychotherapy also, because objective understanding of a person, like the behaviourists do, will not help the therapist at the the gnosis of the other's feelings and emotions as what they are. In order to do that one need to introspectively understand one's own feelings and emotions at a given situation and apply them to the clients intuitively and emphathetically. If the therapist treats the patient the way in which a scientist treats a chemical solution,

he cuts himself off from the sources of information that we habitually use in understanding each other. This is what Isaiah Berlin made clear in his *vico and hereder* :

"Understanding other men's motives or acts, however imperfect or corrigible, is a state of mind or activity in principle different from learning about, or knowledge of, external world....Just as we can say with assurance that we ourselves are not only bodies in space, acted upon by measurable natural forces, but that we think, choose, follow rules, make decisions, in other words possess an inner life of which we are aware and which we can describe, so we take it for granted - and, if questioned say that we are certain - that others possess a similar inner life, without which the notion of communication, or language, or of human society, as opposed to an aggregate of human bodies, becomes unintelligible."⁶

Psychotherapists are, therefore, not merely concerned with making what is unconscious conscious, but with the total understanding of the person. If one is to understand a person, one must assume an inner life which is revealed only through an introspective analysis; a life with unconscious intentions, will, motives, beliefs and values. It is precisely this point that Skinner and his followers tried to rule out, taking science as the paradigm. But psychic experiences are deeply embedded in the subject and requires our understanding it, not mere duplication as in the case of experiments in chemistry or physics. Hence, the task of psychotherapy would be to seize upon the inner psychic process, which is projected on the outside world, through definite patterns of behaviours. So, in the process of an attempt to eliminate the peculiar symptoms of the subject, a therapist

brings about renormalisation and integration of the (whole) self, on the understanding of the whole. This is so, because behaviours are always someone's (inner) choice between alternatives, and are due to one's experiential self-assertions that cannot be commonly predicted nor explicated in ordinary language. But what one can on the other hand say in this field is only what can be logically said, and the only statements that reach this degree of logical imprecability are the statements pertaining to facts that make a little claim on objectively verifiable experiences. So is the case of a philosopher; a philosopher is one who speaks or writes, abstractly or conceptually - enquires, relates, generalises - on everything that appears to be given; often in more detail about some particular things. A philosopher who has something to say must have lived his problems if they are existential, and he must have first hand and inner knowledge of them like that of a therapist. Hence, any adequate system of psychotherapy must be a consistent system of philosophy. Today we are faced with the central problem of finding a new mode of philosophical expression adequate to the present condition of man. Therefore, a new starting point i.e. psychotherapy and human emotions.


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APPENDIX - I

These concepts, conditioning and cognitive pattern, were selected carefully on the basis of an empirical study conducted on randomly selected group of people; though the purpose of it was not to arrive at a generalized statistical conclusion as to how many people can be connectively conditioned and how many cannot be. There were twenty five people, selected for the conditioning test. While applying a liquid on the back of their palms, they were told repeatedly in an assertive tone that they'll have a painful reaction. Ten of them have reported, by marking on the indicative card, that what was told to them really happened, although the applied liquid was just water. This brought me to the concept of conditioning and the idea that repeated assertion (conditioning) can create as well as alter a specific mode of cognitive pattern.

APPENDIX II



A THERAPEUTIC MODEL OF HUMAN PSYCHE

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