

**THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SĀDHANA
IN VISISTĀDVAITA**

Vedanta Vidwan

Dr. N. S. ANANTHARANGACHAR,
B.A. (Hons), B.T., Ph.D.,

Principal,
Maharaja's Samskrit College, Mysore.



PRASARANGA
UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE
1967

NORTH-EASTERN
HILL UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

Acc. No. _____

130
5

130

M. Yamunacharya
T.


Date Label

NORTH-EASTERN HILL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

The book taken from the Library is to be returned within 7 days A fine will be charged under the rules of the Library for each day the book is kept beyond that time.

Date of Issue	Due Date	Date of Issue	Due Date

N. B.—Book lost, defaced or injured in any way shall have to be replaced by the borrower



**THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SĀDHANA
IN VISIṢṬĀDVAITA**

Vedanta vidwan,

Dr. N. S. ANANTHARANGACHAR,
B.A. (Hons), B.T., Ph.D.,

Principal,

Maharaja's Samskrit College, Mysore.



**PRASARANGA
UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE**

1967

First Edition 1967


© Author

PC
181.483
ANA

PRICE

Ordinary Rs. 15/-

Calico Rs. 18/-



Printed by:
A. S. Kamath
Sharada Press
Car Street,
Mangalore-1

Published by:
The Director
Prasaranga
University of Mysore
Mysore-6

DEDICATED
TO
THE MEMORY OF MY
MOTHER

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

We have great pleasure in presenting to the public "The Philosophy of Sadhana in Visishtadvaita" by Dr. N. S. Anantharangachar. This is a thesis which was awarded the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by the University of Mysore.

It has been possible for us to publish this book because of the financial assistance received from the **University Grants Commission**, which has borne a part of the cost of the publication. We are grateful to the authorities of the **University Grants Commission** for their generous help.


We are also grateful to Sri Kamath, Sharada Press, Mangalore for their good printing.

Prasaranga
Manasa Gangotri
Mysore-6

Prabhu Shankara
Director

CONTENTS

(i) FOREWORD—Prof. S. S. Raghavachar	i
(ii) PREFACE	iii
(iii) ABBREVIATIONS	v
(iv) DETAILED CONTENTS	vii
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. THE SĀDHAKA	6
3. THE SĀDHYA	33
4. THE SĀDHANA	89
5. CONCLUSION	239
6. APPENDIX	243
7. INDEX	289
8. BIBLIOGRAPHY	300
9. ERRATA	304



FOREWORD

I am glad that Dr. N. S. Anantha Rangachar's learned work on the Philosophy of Sādhana according to Viśiṣṭādvaita is being published by the University of Mysore. The scholarly treatise presents the distinctive metaphysical standpoint of Rāmānuja's School of Vedānta and offers a fairly elaborate exposition of the philosophy of sadhana grounded on that standpoint. The learned author closely follows the authoritative formulation of the tenets of the system by Vedānta Desika. It is good that Research on Viśiṣṭādvaita has passed beyond the stage of rough generalizations and is entering into intensive consideration of the basic writings of the master-minds. Viśiṣṭādvaita, like the other great schools of vedānta, is a highly critical and self-conscious system and proceeds on systematic lines of investigation. On the one hand, it works out a devoted interpretation of the authentic message of the upaniṣads, the Brahma-Sūtras and the Gīta and presents, on the other, the resulting doctrines in the plane of pure philosophy, employing all the resources of philosophic reason, with a complete dialectical self-vindication in relation to competing philosophical systems. If Rāmānuja represents the wholeness of vision characteristic of the movement, Vedānta Desika articulates the technical details with matchless insight and precision. It is good that we are introduced in the present treatise to the inner workings of this philosophical movement.

In metaphysics, the position of Rāmānuja is clear and distinct. For him the ultimate Reality is Brahman transcending and comprehending the finite reals. It is Monism not depending on the controversial doctrine of illusionism. Brahman, on this standpoint, is the supreme *one*, appropriating the finite *many*, as its adjectival powers or modes. We have here the *non-dualism* of comprehension as opposed to that of cancellation. In the realm of creative and purposeful living, the doctrine propounds the two-fold programme of Bhakti and Prapatti. Even as Brahman does not cancel but fulfils the finite, Bhakti does not cancel the intellectual and moral values but conserves and perfects them in the supreme ardour and rapture of love. It marks the completion of Jñāna and Karma and unifies them in the enlightened and dynamic ecstasy of adoration. Bhakti is the principle of integration within the finite soul and also the principle that integrates the finite soul with the supreme reality. Bhakti is the aspiration of the whole soul after the whole of the Divine Reality. There is nothing in this philosophic doctrine of Bhakti to make it just a concession to the soft-minded. It is a joyous ascent in love beyond the planes of mere knowledge and action. This heightened conception of Bhakti is a distinctive contribution of Rāmānuja and his School of thought.

Dr. Anantha Rangachar does well in interpreting the full meaning of Prapatti. He rightly brings out the role of self-surrender even in Atheistic cults like Buddhism and its sway over the Vedantic Schools, whether Absolutistic or Theistic is well-known. But the speciality in the Viśiṣṭādvaitic treatment lies in working out a complete explanation of prapatti and all its elements and aspects with technical thoroughness and in according to it the status of an all-sufficing pathway to Mokṣa. Vedānta Desika's great work, Rahasya-Traya-Sāra, is devoted to this theme and it constitutes the classic on the subject. Prapatti is the meeting-point of human effort and Divine grace and it is the point at which human

effort exhausts and completes itself, as it were, in transferring its burdens and responsibilities to Divine grace. This decisive act of 'unburdening' furnishes the much-awaited occasion for the unimpeded actualization of grace. The redemptive power of God held in reserve in a state of potentiality as long as the finite will works in egoistic self-reliance, is released into fullness of operation in response to, and fulfilment of, self-surrender on the part of the devotee. What finally effectuates human emancipation is certainly Divine Grace and that it awaits man's self-surrender for that purpose shows that the Divine scheme is a fulfilment and not a violation of the autonomy of the finite spirit. We have here a profound reconciliation of effort and grace. It is good that we have in this treatise a scholarly and well-thought-out statement of the fundamentals of Sadhana as conceived by the great Acharyas of the Śrī-Vaiṣṇava tradition.

Mysore
10-1-1968.

S. S. RAGHAVACHAR,
Professor and Head of the
Department of Philosophy,
University of Mysore, Mysore.

PREFACE

The system of Visistadvaita has a rich and weighty tradition. It is synthetic in outlook. The great Acharyas of the past have expounded the truths of this system and have shown its merits. This school of thought reconciles all the apparent contradictions between different scriptural statements and arrives at the conclusion of one Absolute Brahman characterised by Its modes of the Chit and the Achit.

Bhagavan Ramanuja (1017–1137 A.D.) is the chief expositor of Visistadvaita. His works—The Sri Bhashyam, Vedanta Sara, Vedanta Deepa, Vedanta Samgraha, Gita-bhashya, the three gadyas and Nityam are ever enduring monuments of his synthetic genius. Many an eminent teacher succeeded Ramanuja and spread far and wide the wisdom of Vedanta as taught by the great Bhashyakara.

Parasara Bhatta, Nanjeeyar, Nambillai, Pillai Lokacharya, Vishnuchitta, Vatsya Varadacharya, Atreya Ramanuja, Sudarsana Suri and Vedanta Desika are some of the most illustrious names in the tradition. Vedanta Desika gave a reformulation of the fundamentals of the school, incorporating all the elaborations that had accumulated in the interval between Ramanuja and himself in a manner at once critical and constructive. In this process he displayed the philosophical strength of the tradition through both his polemics and restatements. Thus to study the school through his works is to study it in its most extensive and powerful presentation.

Vedanta Desika stabilized and systematized the teaching of Ubhayavedanta¹ in his great works. He was an eminent poet, philosopher and bhakta. He led a saintly and simple life. His poetical works are literary gems in Samskrit literature. His philosophical writings and religious discussions are superb. His criticism of other schools is rigorous and thorough. His was a synthetic genius. One of his main contributions to the school of Visistadvaita is the vindication of the supreme value of Prapatti.

Every philosophical system has held the factor of Sadhana as very important. A thorough understanding of the true knowledge of Reality is to lead one on to Sadhana. The school of Visistadvaita also considers, likewise, the fact of Sadhana as all important and has devoted itself to it. The great Acharyas of the past have time and again emphasized that one should follow the prescribed Sadhanas for one's upward evolution, after gaining the true knowledge from the benevolent Acharyas.

The main purpose of this work is to give a comprehensive exposition of the philosophy of Sadhana in Visistadvaita with particular reference to Vedanta Desika. The main sources of this study are the original works of Ramanuja and Vedanta Desika. The 'Rahasyatraya Sara' of Vedanta Desika in manipravalam is the main source for the study of prapatti. Having these as the main sources all other important works both in Sanskrit and in Tamil are utilised.

The scheme of treatment is as follows:—A general introduction to the subject of study is given in the very beginning and then the ontological position of the Jivatman,

1. This is a traditional expression which means the teachings of the Upanishads and the teachings of the Alvars.

who happens to be the Sadhaka is described. In the succeeding section the essential nature of the Supreme Being, 'The Parama Prapya', is expounded. The concept of Sadhana according to Ramanuja, as expounded by Vedanta Desika, is described in the next section. The two-fold aspects of Sadhana namely Bhakti and Prapatti are discussed in this section in greater detail.

The essential features of Visistadwaitic epistemology are delienated in the appendix. It is hoped that this exposition will enable the readers to get a total view of the scheme of Sadhana in Visistadvaita.

The present work was originally prepared and submitted to the University of Mysore as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and it is now presented here, with some modifications, in a book form.

It is my sacred duty to express my sincere gratitude to my Acharya, Vedanta Vidwan, Vedanta Sarajna, Sri Krishna Tatacharya Swamin of Bangalore, at whose feet I studied Visistadvaita Vedanta for a number of years in the traditional manner.

I was very fortunate, indeed, to be the recipient, in a large measure, of the blessings of the Late Sri Hemmige Desikacharya Swamin who verily introduced me to the study of Vedanta and guided me at every stage of my study. I am highly indebted to him.

Professor S. S. Raghavachar, my esteemed friend and renowned scholar, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mysore, has taken a personal interest in this project and has helped me with his valuable suggestions throughout. He read some of these chapters with me and gave me useful criticism. He readily agreed to favour this work of mine with his scholarly foreword. I acknowledge with sincere gratitude the help I have received from him.

My revered uncle, Sri N. Anantha Rangachar, has given a definite shape to my career from the early days of my studentship by helping me in numerous ways and the present work is the outcome of his blessings. I am ever grateful to him.

Had it not been for the timely encouragement and able guidance of Professor N. A. Nikam, M.A. (Cantab), former Vice-chancellor of the University of Mysore, it would have not been possible for me to prepare and submit this work as a thesis to the University of Mysore. Prof. Nikam has been very kind to me throughout and has guided me at every stage of my work. I express my deep indebtedness to him.

The authorities of the University of Mysore have been very kind to publish this work and I am highly grateful to them. I cannot express in words, my indebtedness to Dr. Prabhushankara, Director of the Prasaraanga, without whose initiative, this work would have not come out in this form. I am also highly grateful to Sri K. T. Veerappa, Asst. Director, Prasaraanga, for his very kind help in bringing out this publication. I am very happy to record my sincere gratitude to the authorities of Sharada Press, Mangalore Trading Association Ltd., Mangalore, for their excellent printing of this book.

Mysore,
21-12-'67.

N. S. ANANTHARANGACHAR,
Principal,
Maharaja's Sanskrit College,
Mysore.

ABBREVIATIONS

Rg. v.	Rigveda Samhita
य. आ.	Yajur Aranyaka
ईशा.	Isavasyopanishad
कठ. उ.	Kathopanishad
तै. उ.	Taittiriya Upanishad
मुं. उ.	Mundakopanishad
प्र. उ.	Prasnopanishad
छां. उ.	Chandogya Upanishad
बृ. उ.	Brihadaranyakopanishad
म. ना. उ.	Mahanarayana Upanishad
श्वे. उ.	Svetasvataropanishad
रा.	Valmiki Ramayana
भाग.	Bhagavatam
भ. गी. or B. G.	Bhagavadgita
वि. पु.	Vishnupurana
अ. सं.	Ahimbudhnya Samhita
सि. त्र. — S. T.	Siddhitrayam
गी. सं.	Gitartha Samgraham
स्तो.	Stotraratnam
श्री. भा. — S. B.	Sribhashyam
वे. दी.	Vedanta Deepa
वे. सा.	Vedanta Sara
गी. भा. — G. B.	Ramanuja Gita Bhashyam
वे. सं — V. S.	Vedartha Samgraha
श. ग.	Sharanagati Gadyam
व. ग.	Vaikunta Gadyam
न्या. सि. — N. S.	Nyayasiddhanjanam
न्या. परि — N. P.	Nyayaparishuddhi
त. मु. क. — T. M. K.	Tattva Mukta Kalapa
त. टी.	Tattva Teeka

ता. चं	Tatparya Chandrika
अ. सा. — A. S.	Adhikarana Saravali
ग. भा.	Gadya Bhashyam—Desika
दया.	Daya Shatakam
अ. श.	Achyuta Shatakam
व. पं.	Varadaraja Panchasat
स. सि. — S. S.	Sarvartha Siddhi
गी. सं. र.	Gitartha Samgraha Raksha
श्रु. प्र.	Sruta Prakasika
य. म. दी. — Y. M. D.	Yatindramata Deepika
दर्श	Darsanodaya
गौ. न्या. सू.	Gautama Nyayasutra
सां. का.	Samkhya Karika
र. त्र. सा. — R. T. S.	Rahasya Traya Sara
L. T.	Lakshmi Tantra
न्या. ति.	Nyasa Tilaka
शां. सू.	Shandilya Sutra.
ना. सू.	Narada Sutra
मो. ध.	Moksha Dharma
पू. मीं. सू.	Purva Mimamsa Sutram
न्या. विं.	Nyasa Vimsati
या. स्मृ.	Yajnyavalkya Smrithi
न्या. विं. व्या.	Nyasa Vimsathi Vyakhyana

DETAILED CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1-5
	Sadhna related to Sādhaka and the Sādhya	1
	The ontological position of the Sadhaka in the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita	2
II.	THE SADHAKA	6-32
	The self is different from the body	6
	The self is different from the sense organs	9
	The self is different from the mind	11
	The self is different from the prāṇas	12
	The self is not mere vijñāna	13
	The self is jñānasvarūpa and jñāna guṇaka	16
	The self is endowed with doership	19
	The self has self-luminosity	20
	The self is of the essential nature of knowledge	21
	Eternality of the self	23
	Plurality	25
	Classification of selves	27
	The Jīva is a prakara of God	30
III.	THE SADHYA	33-88
	Attainment of Brahman is the supreme end of life	33
	Brahman is knowable	34
	No distinction between Saḡuṇa and Nirḡuṇa Brahman	36
	Brahman is the ultimate of the Upaniṣads	37
	Ubhayalingatvam	40
	Brahman is not pure consciousness but qualified by it	41
	Brahman is the first and the intelligent cause of the Universe	43
	Brahman is immune from any change	49
	Brahman is known only by Śāstra	49
	Brahman is the ground of all	52
	Brahman is the inner controller of all	53
	Brahman is the Sarva Śeṣi	57
	Brahman is the Sarva Śarīrin	58
	Brahman is the redeemer of all	61
	The five forms of the Supreme	63
	The six principal qualities of Parabrahman	66
	The other auspicious qualities of Brahman	69
	Brahman is the Siddhopāya	72
	Brahman is Śrīman Nārāyaṇa, the Puruṣottama	74
	Brahman is Bhuvana Sundara	77
	Brahman is the Lord of both the Realms	79

Attainment of Brahman is salvation	82
State of Mukti—characterised by service to God	85
Mukta and the mundane world	88
IV. SĀDHANA	89-240
A. Ramanuja's Doctrine of Sadhana	
Background of Sādhana in Viśiṣṭādvaita	89
Mere verbal understanding is not a means to salvation	91
Rāmānuja's concept of Sadhana	95
General process in the scheme of Sādhana	101
B. Karma Yoga	
Karma yoga is different from mere Karma	102
Definition and meaning of Karmayoga	104
Advantages of Karmayoga over Jñānayoga	107
Karmayoga in practice	112
Karmayoga's Jñānākārata Prakāra	118
What kind of self-realization is ordained here?	123
Sthitaprajñata	124
Place of Karmayoga in the scheme of Sadhana	126
Karmayoga is to be done along with Nityakarma	127
Even a little of Karmayoga has its own merit	129
C. Jnana Yoga	
Concept of Jñānayoga according to Viśiṣṭādvaita	131
Jñānayoga is a valid means for Ātmāvalokana	134
Essentials for commencing Yogābhayāsa	136
The four stages of self-realization	139
Ātmāvalokana	143
Resume	145
D. Bhakti Yoga	
The history of the Bhaktimārga	146
The meaning of Bhaktiyoga	149
Bhaktiyoga is greater than Karmayoga or Jñāna Yoga	150
Definition and scope of Bhaktiyoga	151
Is Bhakti a Kriyā or a kind of knowledge?	153
The Sādhanas of Bhakti	154
How is Bhakti practically developed?	158
Classification of Bhaktas	163
Bhaktiyogādḥikārins	166
The Upāsanā of a Jñānin	167
The secret of the greatness of the Mahātmā	171
All the Bhaktas are treated alike by Bhagavān	173
Parabhakti is the means to Mukti	176

Different modes of Upāsana	177
Performance of Nitya and Naimittika Karmas	179
Relationship between Karma and Vidyā	180
Upāsana is to be supported by Astangayoga	182
Upāsana must be repeated	182
How should the Supreme Being be meditated upon?	182
Śama, Dama and others are necessary for Upāsana	184
Upāsana is an effective destructor of Prācheena Karma	185
Self-surrender is essential for Bhaktiyoga	186
Three stages of higher Bhakti	188
Different expressions of Bhakti	189
Resume	189
E. Prapatti	
A brief history of the doctrine of prapatti	190
Rāmānuja and Prapatti	192
Prapatti is a direct means to Mukti	197
Prapatti is a substitute for Bhakti	199
Bhakti and Prapatti	199
The three mysteries imply self-surrender	203
Accessories of Prapatti	204
Complete surrender or Sānga prapadana	208
Prapatti is to be performed only once for a thing	211
Various types of Prapatti	211
Ārta Prapatti and Dṛpta Prapatti	213
A Prapanna is a Kṛtakṛtya	214
How would a Prapanna be steadfast in his knowledge of the Reality?	215
How should a Prapanna conduct himself in this world?	217
A Prapanna should be guided by the Śāstra	219
Should the Prapanna atone for his offences?	220
Where should a Prapanna live?	222
Some objections against Prapatti answered	223
V. CONCLUSION	239
APPENDIX	
Visistadvaitic Epistemology	243-287
Theory of knowledge	244
Knowledge is self-valid	247
Difference between Pramā and Apramā	247
Anadhyavasāya is not Pramā	250
Apramā or erroneous cognition	250
Yathārthakhyāti theory of Viśiṣṭādvaita	251
Theories of other schools examined	253
Pramāṇas and their number	255

Perception				
Definition and significance	257
Yogic perception	259
Denial of mental perception	260
Determinate and Indeterminate perception	261
Perception is not born of a verbal statement	265
Resume	266
Inference				
Inference a distinct means of knowledge	267
Definition and character of inference	268
Essential features of inference according to Viśiṣṭādvaita	270
Negation of Kevala Vyathirekī Inference	272
Refutation of Parārthānumana	274
The component parts of the formal sollogism	275
Upamāna is not a distinct means of knowledge	275
Inference includes Tarka also	276
Resume	277
Sabda Pramana				
Verbal testimony is a valid means of knowledge	278
Definition	278
This is distinct from perception, inference and recollection	278
Word and its meaning	279
Classification of sentence	279
Senses and the word	280
The theory of verbal knowledge	280
The Aparyavasāna Vṛtti	282
Verbal knowledge does not require Karyārtha only for being valid	284
The principal texts of verbal authority	286
Resume	286

INTRODUCTION

Sādhana is a means to an end which is etymologically explained as 'sādhyate Anena ithi Sāadhanam'. This essentially presupposes two factors viz., the sādha and the sādhyā as it is related to both. Sādhana is in fact a bipolar process which unites the aspirant with the goal of his aspiration.

A prior knowledge of the nature of the sādha as well as the sādhyā is essential for any type of sādhana to be possible, for, this becomes meaningless without either an aspirant or an end. Though the word sādhana has a very wide connotation and implies all kinds of means for attainment of all types of aspirations both worldly and spiritual, we restrict its connotation in these sections only to means for achieving spiritual perfection. The different systems of philosophy have prescribed different means for attainment of spiritual perfection and these vary sometimes from person to person according to their mental and spiritual attainments. The different schools of vedānta have expounded the philosophy of sādhana in their own characteristic way and prescribed either karma or knowledge, devotion or self-surrender as the case may be, as the means for perfection and it is the purpose of this thesis to deal with the philosophy of sādhana in viśiṣṭādvaita with particular reference to Vedānta Desikā.

Sādhana related to Sādha and the Sādhyā:

When we think of sādhana we are confronted with a number of intricate and complicated problems. Who is to be an aspirant and why? What is his innate nature? Where is the need for any sādhana at all? What ill would befall man if he would turn away from sādhana? What would he hope to gain by this? If he has to gain his end what should he do? What kind of sādhana should he choose? The above problems are significant as they probe into the being of our being and urge us to take to some sādhana or other to gain our goal of life according to our dispositions and faith.

The entire humanity¹ is meant for sādhana as the animal world bereft of rationality is beyond its purview. The theory of evolution both ancient and modern acclaims the human being as the finest product of creation endowed richly with an enormous power of thought and deed that could be directed towards the attainment of perfection. Man is not a mere compound of certain elements that appears by chance at certain times and disappears at certain other times without a permanent phase. Man has been the subject of study and speculation from very early times and sages with wisdom have arrived at the fundamental truth that he is an eternal principle different and distinct from matter. This revelation of the eternity of the self is the fulcrum on which the entire superstructure of sādhana rests. So the psychology of the jīva has to be studied and his relationship with the Universe has to be understood. Is the jīva self explanatory? Is he himself the creator of the Universe? Or is there an all-powerful, all-knowing blissful creator other than the jīva? If so how is the jīva related to that all-creator? Is he one with him or different

1. Even Gods in heaven have this possibility of Sādhana according to the school of Vedānta.

'तदुपर्यपिबादरायणस्सम्भवात्' —श्री. भा. 1-3-25.

from him? What is the nature of matter and why is the jīva connected with matter? And when can the jīva sever his connection with matter and how?

Only when answers to these questions are understood, the jīva comes to realize his status in the Universe as well as the goal he has to attain. Nachiketusa was in fact worried with only these three problems namely that of the Universal being, that of the aspirant and that of the means and he was instructed into this triple philosophy of the end, the way and the reality² by the God of Death. The philosophy of sādhanā therefore centres round the Sādhaka or the finite self related to the sādhyā or the Universal self. Savants of the past therefore urged all the aspirants to get a thorough knowledge of five factors which were implied in the above three before taking up to any sādhanā³. They are as follows:

- 1) The nature of Brahman who is to be attained.
- 2) The nature of the individual self who has to attain Brahman.
- 3) The means of attaining Brahman.
- 4) The fruit of attaining Brahman or the Summum Bonum.
- 5) The obstructions for the attainment of Brahman.

The ontological position of the Sādhaka in the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita:

The individual self happens to be the sādhanā and the ontological position of this soul must be first of all ascertained before contemplating anything about sādhanā.

The philosophy of Rāmaṇuja advocates the unity of Reality though the world of matter and finite selves are also admitted as a part of Reality. This concept of Viśiṣṭādvaitam is outstanding and comprehensive. This does not strictly signify the notion of the qualified monism nor does this harmonise the claims of monism and dualism. On the other hand this philosophy strongly supports and advocates monism only instead of a plurality of Reality. But the Absolute of Viśiṣṭādvaitam is characterised by its attributes of the sentient and the non-sentient unlike that of the undifferentiated Brahman of Advaita. Desika affirms that the study of vedantic reality as tatva relates to only one Absolute, the Brahman characterised by its modal expressions of the chit and the achit.

‘अशेषचिदचित्प्रकारं ब्रह्मैकमेव तत्त्वम् । तत्र प्रकारप्रकारिणोः प्रकाराणां च मिथोऽत्यन्तभेदेऽपि
वैशिष्ट्यादिविवक्षया एकत्वव्यपदेशः तदितरनिषेधश्च ।’
—न्या. सि. P. 187.

These two entities namely the chit and the achit are real, mutually different and also different from the Supreme Reality. These two entities constitute the cosmos and though these are different from Brahman they have no separate existence as they form never-to-be separable attributes of that Transcendental Reality that manifests Itself in them. No attribute can exist independent of the substratum. So they form one with their substratum though they are not identical with it. According to this relationship of Aprithakāśiddhā viśeṣhāna the Reality is one and indivisible though it is qualified by plurality.

2. Vedānta Deepa 1-4-6. ‘अस्मिन्प्रकरणे येयं प्रेते चिचिकित्सा मनुष्ये (कठ 1-1-20) इत्यारभ्यासमाप्तेः परमपुरष तदुपासनोपासकानां त्रयणामेवैवं ज्ञेयत्वेनोपन्यासः प्रश्नश्च दृश्यते ।
3. R. T. S. 4.

The philosophers of the monistic schools of thought posit non-difference between the attribute and the substratum and explain away the world of differences in different ways. Bhartṛprapancha propogates avasthāvāda and declares the universe as an avasthā or state of Brahman whereas Bhāskara follows the vikāravāda and holds the world as the result of Brahma Pariṇāma. Yādavaprakāśa on the other hand favours śaktivāda and affirms that the world is the result of the effect of divine power. All these theories viz., the avasthāvāda, vikāravāda and śaktivāda are summarily rejected by śankarachārya as 'fictitious constructions' and he, following the vivartavāda, concludes that only undifferentiated consciousness is the Absolute Reality whereas the world of differences is unreal being phenomenal. These vedāntic teachers have arrived at monism by means of Swarūpaikya. But Rāmānujāchārya comes to the conclusion of one Supreme Reality on different grounds of viśiṣṭaika⁴. 'Brahman is qualified by plurality but is not itself plural'⁵. The individual selves as well as matter, though really different from Brahman, the Supreme self, form one with it being its attributes. Rāmānuja explains the relationship of the world with Brahman in a realistic way following the parishkrita śaktivāda according to which the chit and the achit are admitted as the śakti of the Supreme or attributes inseparable and powerful of action.⁶

The physical universe subject to mutation as well as the finite selves that depend upon various conditions are not all-explanatory for they are not the creators of the world. Though the finite selves qualified by matter have substantive being they have no independent existence as they form the prakāras or attributes of the Supreme. The Supreme Being is the prakārin of all other entities and is always characterised by them. The Absolute of Viśiṣṭādvaita is not a sum-total of adjectives but a unity of Brahman in and through the multiplicity of the sentient and the non-sentient. The existence of only one Supreme Entity qualified by the chit and the achit is affirmed in this school unlike the undifferentiated Supreme of Advaita and so this system is rightly described by some as 'Realistic Monism'. This concept of Viśiṣṭādvaitam which admits the reality of the individual souls as well as matter thoroughly dependent upon, and subservient to, the Supreme satisfies the tests of logical consistency as well as the emotional and spiritual yearnings of the seekers after truth.

The school of Advaita negates the world of differences as unreal explaining it as a result of nescience and confirms non-difference as the Reality. Bhāskara also postulates that only non-difference is the reality whereas the universe is explained as due to a real limiting adjunct. Though Yādava Prakāśa explains the universe of differences as vyakti-lakṣhana it is his conclusion that the Reality is non-difference (Śakti-lakṣhana). All these schools of thought give primary importance to non-difference whereas the phenomenon of difference is explained away as secondary. But contrary to all these Rāmānuja affirms on one hand the difference in the characteristics of the three entities and on the other non-difference in the Reality-in-unity.

Thus the philosophy of Rāmānuja is established in the central thought that Brahman is the ground of all existence and that all other entities exist to glorify it. Rāmānuja insists

4. ततश्च वैशिष्ट्यमेवैक्यम् । न सर्वस्वरूपैक्यमिति निर्णयः । Dar. P. 194.

5. Phil. of Vis. P.N.S., p. 101.

6. कार्यानुकूलमप्यविसद्विशेषणं हि शक्तिः । Dar. P. 194.

on the validity of all the Upaniṣhads, without any distinction of primary or secondary texts, as in some schools, and strikes out a unique path of interpretation based on the authority of timeless tradition.

The theories of prakāra-prakāri bhāva, sāmānādhikaranya and satkārya vāda are enunciated by Rāmānuja who formulates a significant interpretation of the apparently divergent texts without harming any one of them. All kinds of scriptural announcements declaring unity and plurality become compatible and meaningful according to this interpretation instead of becoming contradictory. The Upanishadic statements that are analytical, explanatory and synthetic in nature strongly point out to the only one conclusion of the Unity of Reality according to this way of interpretation. The analytical statements pronounce that Brahman transcends the physical nature as well as individual souls. These declare Brahman as changeless, supreme and perfect. The explanatory pronouncements maintain that Brahman is the inner ruler of the Universe and that it is the immanent principle that holds and sustains the world of nature and finite selves together. The synthetic texts affirm that Brahman is the only Reality and all others exist to glorify it. All these different types of scriptural statements cannot be given primary and equal importance in any other mode of interpretation. Rāmānuja has struck a unique path of synthesis by means of which all scriptural statements become equally significant. The empirical world of matter and finite selves form real modes of the Supreme Reality being inseparably related to it as its attributes and signify the Universal monad. The sadvidyā which declares that the Supreme was one without a second before creation implies that even at that stage Brahman was characterised by the chit and the achit in the subtle form. Creation is nothing but manifestation of Brahman in the chit and the achit of the gross state. The world of matter and selves was existing one with Brahman even before creation of this world of names and forms. Then it was in a subtle form and was not possible of being analysed as there was no differentiation of names and forms. This differentiation of names and forms was assumed after creation when this world of matter and selves became distinguishable in name and form. The chit and the achit existed as a part of Reality in the causal stage as they exist as part of Reality in the state of effect. In creation it is only matter and the self that undergo any change but never the cosmic principle, the Absolute Reality. These two entities namely the chit and the achit are adjectival in nature and characterise Brahman both in the primordial and the consequent stages. That is why Reality is declared as the one Absolute characterised by the chit and the achit. The truths of Viśiṣṭādvaita admitting the unity of Reality without discarding the empirical world are fully supported by the scriptures in their entirety.

It is against this background that we now speculate about the nature and efficacy of sādhanā. Sādhanā is possible and even significant in this school as the reality of the sādhanā and the sādhyā is well affirmed. The finite selves who are labouring under the real disadvantage and handicap of avidyā karma are subject to a real state of degradation, from which they have to extricate themselves to attain their original status.

The finite self has lost its native state of consciousness due to the beginningless karma of its own by means of which it has bound itself down to samsara. The state of bondage is a state of reality and involves unhappiness and misery of rebirth. To get rid of this miserable plight and to attain the state of liberation, when only the finite self can enjoy

the illimitable joy of Divine experience, it has to follow some discipline. The goal he has to attain is also a perfect or a positive reality which he can achieve only by individual personal effort. The *sādhaka* and the *sādhya* are both positive realities and have factual value on account of which the philosophy of *sādhana* has a deeper meaning and purpose in this school.

The nature of the individual self, the *sādhaka*, is taken for consideration in the first section and the nature of Brahman, the *sādhya*, is dealt with in the next section whereas the means of attaining Brahman, the *sādhana*s, are detailed in the third section, as expounded by Vedānta Deśika, the foremost of the exponents of Rāmānuja.

THE SĀDHAKA

As described above the sādḥaka, the finite self, is a real entity and never a fictitious construction. The correct term used to denote this knowing principle is Ātman meaning one who attains, completely rules over, supports and uses his body for his own satisfaction. The finite selves are infinite in number according to Rāmānuja, and they are different from matter on the one hand and the Supreme Being on the other. These individual selves are many, eternal, self-luminous, very minute and of a blissful nature. The finite selves are substantive consciousness and are qualified by attributive consciousness. They are different and distinct from the body, the sense organs, the mind, the vital airs and the attributive consciousness and are entirely supported, controlled and used by the Supreme, only for His satisfaction.

The great Yāmunāchārya in his Siddhithrayam has propounded the distinguishing attributes of the Ātman as follows:

देहेन्द्रियमनः प्राणघोभ्योऽन्योऽनन्यसाधनः ।
नित्यो व्यापी प्रतिक्षेत्रमात्माभिन्नः स्वतः सुखी ॥

सि. प्र. P. 11.

Let us now study the significance of this statement in greater detail.

The self is different from the body:

The Chārvāka materialists argue that there is no different entity as the 'self' other than the body. They argue that, as the body is the aggregate of the several parts chaitanya or consciousness might be attributed either to any one of them or to each and every one of them¹. This viewpoint is not tenable as 'Selfhood' cannot be attributed to any one or all of the Avayavas or parts of the physical organisms for many incompatibilities ensue from it. It cannot be admitted that there are a number of 'selves' motivating and guiding the body. In our experience we find that there is unity in our body and never disunity. This kind of unity of purpose and action is impossible if there were a number of souls in a single body.² Nor can we admit that any one of these avayavas or component parts of the physical body is the self, for the mere reason that on the loss of that particular part, the body would become soulless. Even if any part of the body is lost the recognition of the type of, 'He I am' continues and this would be impossible if the part happened to be the soul.

-
1. 'प्रत्येकचेतनत्वे बहुरिहकलहो वीतरागो न जातः' त. मु. क. 2-1.
 2. प्रत्येकं परमाणुषु चैतन्यानुपलब्धेः तदभ्युपगमे च एकशरीर एवानेकसहस्रचेतनापातत् अकारणगुणपूर्वकस्य कार्यद्रव्यवर्ति विशेषगुणस्यासंभवान्न शरीरविशेषगुणश्चेतन्यम् । सि. प्र. P. 12.
स च संस्कारकोशस्ते संघातात्मा प्रतिक्षणम् ।
प्रचयापचयाभ्यां स्यात् भिन्नः स्मर्तात्रिकोभवेत् ॥ स. सि. P. 71.

THE SĀDHYA OR THE UPĀSYA

In the previous section we dealt with the innate nature of the Sādhaka and the difficulties he had to face on the path of Sādhana. We also enquired briefly into the nature of the 'Three Reals' namely the matter, the Finite Self and the Supreme Self.

It is indispensable for a Sādhaka to have a thorough understanding of the nature of the goal he aspires to achieve. He must know very precisely the full content of his ideal with all its implications so that his efforts may not be wasted or misdirected.

What Should be the Supreme End of Life:

Deśika declares this as follows:

असारं अल्पसारं च सारं सारतरं त्यजेत् । भजेत्सारतमं शास्त्रे ॥

र. त्र. सा. 2. p. 77.

'One should ignore what is of no value, what is only of a little value, what is valuable and also what is more valuable. He must choose only that which is the most valuable in the Śāstras just like the nectar in the ocean.'

Here Deśika expounds the futility of all hedonistic pleasures. All materialistic ideals are negative in value as they are full of defects.¹ They are rājasic and tāmasic and they drag down the self to malignity. So they are of no value and are to be discarded. The attainment of worldly goods as ordained in the karma kānda is of very slight value (Alpasāra) and likewise, the attainment, also of good things of svarga. All these values are not real though they are pleasing to some extent. As the Katopaniṣad says, there is an eternal conflict in this world between the pleasure principle and the reality principle, Preyas and Śreyas, and he will be wise, who chooses the reality principle for the other.²

Though self-realization is a nobler and truer point of view, it alone should not be the sole aim of the sādhanaka. It is little more valuable, but is not all. It is of no value to one who desires the enjoyment of the Supreme Being. Self-realization can only be a part of God-realization. So, the Sādhaka will not consider such parts of the scriptures that treat of only the realization of one's own self and the means thereof, as valuable, as it involves isolation from God.

To a sādhanaka, therefore, only the attainment of Brahman and the means thereof are the most valuable. This is the sārātama part of the scripture, for there can be no delight to the jīva without God. The attainment of the illimitable rapture of Divine communion, and of eternal service unto Him, is therefore, to be the highest aspiration of man, as it is his essential nature or svarupa, as a śeṣha of God, to subserve his seshin, the Over-Lord of all.

The soul should get rid of all kinds of misconceptions and become conscious of the omnipotent God. It should formulate a correct sense of values, and hold before itself this lofty ideal of paripūrṇa Brahmānubhavam or a complete and comprehensive vision

1. See Rahasya Traya Sāra, 7-p. 102.

2. 'तयोः श्रेयआददानस्य साधु भवति ।' (क. उ. 1-2-1.)

SĀDHANA

The Upaniṣads declare that one prepares oneself for a Vedāntic life through the practice of Vairāgya in all un-Godly ideals. This kind of Virakti in all things other than Paramātmān, the Supreme object of one's attainment, is to be developed, only from a psychological insight into the imperfections of the soul, and the true knowledge of the eternal perfections and vibhūtis of the Supreme Lord, his Śeṣin. The true knowledge of the Supreme Reality leading one to Virakti is the first prerequisite for becoming a spiritual aspirant—a Mumukṣu. Jñānam and Virakti then lead one to Bhakti.

A Mumukṣu is a blessed soul who has taken a genuine turn in his life from Viṣayarāga to Bhagavadrāga. Vedānta Deśika describes¹ that such an aspirant

- (1) would give up all carnal pleasures of the outside world;
- (2) would consider even the bliss of Kaivalya-Ātmānubhava as a limited delight;
- (3) and would acquire an intense eagerness for Divine communion.

we will deal in this section, with the several means or Sādhana that are to be adopted by such a spiritual aspirant for attaining that Highest object of his aspiration.

Background of Sādhana in Viśiṣṭādvaita:

Before entering into an exposition of Rāmānuja's philosophy of Sādhana, it is essential for us to study some of the important findings of Rāmānuja that formulate his philosophy of Sādhana.

1. The Relationship Between the Karma Kānda and the Jñāna Kānda:

It is Rāmānuja's conviction that both the parts of the Veda viz., the Karma Kānda and the Jñāna Kānda form one integral whole having a definite order. They are never treated as contradictory. But they are taken as complementary. The Śārīraka Śāstra is one integral whole containing these two parts namely the Pūrva bhāga and the Uttara bhāga. They are united as the former and the latter part, having a logical sequence. Each part is assigned its proper place in this school and so is not interpreted as contradictory as in other schools of thought.

The Śārīraka Śāstra begins with the first Sūtra of the Karma Mīmāṃsā, 'Athātho Dharma Jijñāsa', and ends with the last Sūtra of Brahma Mīmāṃsā 'Anāvṛttiśabdāt Anāvṛttiśabdāt'. The opinion of the Vṛttikāra is quoted by Rāmānuja in support of his view. The Vṛttikāra declares that both the parts form one integral unity—

'संहितमेतच्छारीरकं जमिनीयेन षोडशलक्षणेनेति शास्त्रैकत्वसिद्धिरिति । अतः प्रतिपिपादयिषितार्थभेदेन षट्कभेदवदध्यायभेदवच्च पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसयोः भेदः ।'

श्री. भा. 1-1-1.

CONCLUSION

We have so far dealt with the philosophy of Sādhana in Viśiṣṭādvaita according to Deśika. In the first section we have dealt with the ontological position of the Sādhaka or Upāsaka and expounded that he is as real an entity as the 'Supreme Brahman', though adjectival to him in nature. It is described therein that the true puruṣārtha of the Jiva is the attainment of the bliss of Divine Communion. In the second section the essential nature of the Paramātman has been expounded. The Supreme Brahman, it is affirmed, is qualified by both Supremacy and accessibility. The Supreme Brahman is an 'Ocean of Mercy' and one would attain one's highest aspiration only through Divine Grace and God is himself both the 'goal' and 'the endeavour'. In the next section we have discussed about the concept of Sādhana in Viśiṣṭādvaita according to Rāmānuja. We have also detailed the general scheme of Sādhana in Viśiṣṭādvaita according to the path of Bhaktiyoga and Prapatti. The special advantages of Prapatti over Bhaktiyoga have been expounded in the last section wherein the important features of Prapatti have been delineated.


Deśika has interpreted and justified the expositions of Rāmānuja in all his works. He has explained and developed in particular the doctrine of Prapatti that has been expounded by Rāmānuja in his Gadyas.

Though Bhakti and Prapatti are both valid means to Mukti, the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita is following Prapatti more than Bhaktiyoga. Prapatti is, in fact, the living religion of Śrīvaiṣṇavism today. Hosts of Śrīvaiṣṇava aspirants observe Prapatti either directly or through the mediation of their Āchāryas as the case may be. It is affirmed that Bhaktiyoga is not within the competency of one and all, whereas Prapatti has a Universal appeal. The Greatness of Ramanuja lies in the fact that he preached and practised Prapatti and threw open the gates of emancipation through it, to all humanity, irrespective of caste or attainments. All followers of Rāmānuja to whatever group they may belong, honour the path of Prapatti, though they may be divided on the manner of performing it.

Prapatti is mainly the root of all Sādhanas in all Philosophical systems. Even the Buddhist finds the need of it. He is required to take refuge with the Buddha, the Sangha and the Dharma. The Advaitin assigns a lofty place for surrender. Teachers of Advaita declare that Bhakti is essential for Jñānam and herein comes the need for Prapatti. The teachers of Dvaita ordain Bhakti as the means of liberation and Prapatti is inevitable for the attainment of such steadfast devotion. The Śakti Viśiṣṭādvaitin assigns a very high place to 'Śaraṅgathi' in his scheme of Sādhana signified by the 'Ṣatthalās'. The doctrine of self surrender is admitted by all these as a sub-means to perfect another means, may be Jñānam or Bhakti. But the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita has come to the conclusion, on the authority of the host of scriptures, that Prapatti can also function as a direct means to Mukti, as it can function as an indirect means. The Lord, it is affirmed, being pleased with the Prapatti performed by the aspirants would grant them even Mukti, just like Jñāna or Bhakti, as every thing is to be obtained only through that ever-merciful Lord.

Though most of the followers of Śrīvaiṣṇavism follow Prapatti, they do not discard Bhaktiyoga. The exposition of Karmayoga, Jñānayoga and Bhaktiyoga is also of immense good to the aspirants, for, by following the virtues ordained therein, they evolve and live a deeply spiritual and devotional life. Thus Bhaktiyoga also is of equal importance to a Śrīvaiṣṇava as Prapatti. The Doctrine of Sādhana in Viśiṣṭādvaita is thus of Supreme Importance to all Śrīvaiṣṇavas. It will interest others also as many of the doctrines described here are Universal in appeal.

APPENDIX



I. VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITIC EPISTEMOLOGY

Every sentient being forms certain assumptions right or wrong and this process of forming assumptions will be checked whenever there are certain obstructions. Non-rational beings have no power of discrimination and so cannot discriminate between the means, instruments, results, sources, validity or invalidity of their assumptions. But man is a rational being and he needs all these. Whenever he goes wrong he tries to rationalize his assumptions to avoid all kinds of misconceptions and misinterpretations. When he realizes that he has gone wrong he doubts about the means, sources, instruments, the application of procedure, the inter-relationship and the whole machinery and tries to locate the defect so that he may arrive at the correct position.

To achieve this accuracy he has theoretically postulated four actualities namely: *pramā*, *pramithi*, *prameya* and *pramāna*.¹ This has been followed by all savants of the past. The root माङ् माने meaning correct measurement has yielded these four words in combination with the preposition 'pra'.

These are standards of measurements by means of which we can test the validity of our knowledge. The means of valid knowledge are *pramānas* and *pramithi* is acquired valid knowledge. *Prameya* is the object of knowledge and *prama* is right apprehension. Valid knowledge is possible only when the whole machinery is valid and it depends upon three constituents, namely, the sense organs, the *samskaras* and the objects to be known.

The knowledge that we get through the external instruments such as the five sense organs is objective knowledge whereas desires, imaginations, fancies, fantasies, etc., formed by the mind, which are subjective, also belong to the attributive consciousness of the self. Pure subjective knowledge is self-existent. This is otherwise known as 'Svarūpa jñānam or Dharmijñānam' which is the native state of the spiritual entity. The Nyāya school postulates that this subjective or substantive knowledge is conceived by the mind—'आत्मा मनोमात्रे कर्गोचरः'. Absolute monism affirms that the subjective entity is unknowable. The Sankhyas opine that the self-luminous subjective entity can be known through the *Antahkaraṇa*. But Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology says that the subjective entity is self-luminous and is felt through the attributive knowledge or *Dharmabhūtajñānam*.

Even regarding objective knowledge there is controversy and different schools of thought posit different theories apparently opposed to one another.²

1. प्रकृष्टम् मानं (ज्ञानं) प्रमा ।

प्रकृष्टा मितिः प्रमितिः ।

प्रमात्मकज्ञानविषयं प्रमेयम् ।

प्रमाख्यनेन, प्रमीयते अनेन इति वा, प्रमाणम् ।

2. Vedānta Deśika refers to the different theories as follows:— Akhyāthi of the Prābhākara school, Anyathākhyāthi of the Nyāya school, Viśayarahita Dhī and Anadhīṣṭāna Buddhi of the Bouddhas, Bahyārthākārayoga of the Soutrantikas. Sadasaditara Dhī of the Advaitic school, Śūnya Dhī of the Mādhyamika school, Ātma Dhī of the Yōgāchāra school and yathārthā Buddhi of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school.

There is thus wide difference of opinion between one school and another regarding the theories of knowledge and error. It is therefore necessary to go into the doctrine of *pramāṇas*, as propounded by this school, to know the line of thought, on which the truths of this school are established.

Viśiṣṭādvaita epistemology is based on its ontology. Brahman is the only ultimate Reality according to this school. Both the material and the spiritual are attributes of the one and the only Transcendental Being. But, the concept of Brahman, according to this school of thought, is not an undifferentiated impersonal absoluteness of consciousness. On the other hand, it is an all-conscious being characterized by innumerable auspicious qualities. Brahman is 'Satya' or the real, which transcends both physical nature and finite selves. It is absolute consciousness and absolute Ānanda. It is infinite. It is the one substance par-excellent which has everything else as its Mode. The world of Nature and the world of selves cannot exist independently of Brahman. According to this school, the ultimate reality which is omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent reveals itself in its attributes, the *chit* and the *achit*, and knowledge is ultimately knowledge of Reality. The subject-object relationship is a fact of reality, where both of them meet together. The ultimate knowledge that is obtained in the ultimate analysis is of the real, as stated in the *Gīta*—
'अविभक्तं विभक्तेषु विभक्तमिव च स्थितम्' (भ. गी. 18-20).

Knowledge:

All Indian systems of thought admit that knowledge is got by the subject-object relationship, as in 'I know this'.

'अस्ति तावत् सर्वसिद्धान्तिनां इदमहं वेदमीति कर्मकर्तृघटितक्रियाविशेषावभासः ।'

(स. सि. P. 174)

Knowledge is possible only when there is a subject and an object. Knowledge is always about an object. There can be no knowledge, if there is no subject. Knowledge thus relates to the knower and the known. It is *viśayāvabhāsa* or illumination of an object to the subject. As Viśiṣṭādvaita holds that all objects are only revelations of Brahman, in the ultimate analysis, knowledge is not merely the illumination of some object, but the illumination of Brahman itself.

The Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Ārṇhata schools maintain that the *Antahkarana* itself is the subject or *Jñāta*, whereas the schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika hold that the Ātman or the self directly perceives, directly conceives, feels, understands and happens to be the propelling force. The Sāṅkhyas and their allies say that the Ātman or *Chetana* has no direct contact, and they attribute the fact of knowledge to the sensitive mind. The mental faculties by virtue of their emergence from the same substance, namely the primordial matter, are said to be capable of the process of knowing them, whereas the spiritual substance, being entirely different from the evolutes of matter, cannot work in consonance with it. But, in Viśiṣṭādvaita the *jīva* or the self is the subject of knowledge. The *jīva*, though atomic in nature, is verily capable of knowing anything through his *Dharmabhūtajñānam* or attributive consciousness. This attributive consciousness is capable of a double function, as it illumines itself, as well as other objects of knowledge.

The process of knowing commences with the sensations and finalises with the self. Objects are perceived and conceived and synthesized by the mind, with the unity of self-consciousness. The objects are relatively external to the self, and it knows the objects through its knowledge aided by the channels of the senses. The world of physical objects exists independent of consciousness, and the subject, or the self-conscious Ātman is different from the object. The real subject of every judgment is the supreme being who is the indweller and inner self of all things. He is the ultimate knower. Brahman is the knower in us as our inner self, and is the ground of all knowables in the ultimate analysis.

The attributive consciousness or Dharmabhūtajñānam reveals all objects of nature. Though this is different from the self and can be distinguished thus, it is inseparable from the self. The relationship between knowledge and the self is one of 'aprihaksiddhi' (non-separable relation), and not one of Samavāya as in the Nyāya system. Ātman is substantive consciousness and has attributive consciousness as well. This attributive consciousness is Svayamprakāśa (self-luminous) and has also Arthaprakāśakatva, or the characteristic of illumining objects. It reveals itself and also other objects. It is not self realized like the Ātman.³ It is like physical light which can only 'show but cannot know'. This attributive consciousness is eternally all pervasive to the Nityas and Muktas as well as the supreme Being. But for others, during the phenomenal state of samsāra, it is subject to contractions due to Karma. In the state of Mukti or liberation it attains its original state of infiniteness and all-pervasiveness. This attributive consciousness persists even in dreamless sleep and in swoon, though not experienced then.⁴ The experience 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' (I slept well) bears evidence to this. This consciousness is a spiritual quality of the Ātman. It is eternal but contracts and expands like a substance due to Karma, so is a substance also. It is both a Dravya and a Guṇa.⁵ This is similar to prabhā or luminosity which is verily the quality of a substance, prabhāvat.

Thus knowledge is the illumination of an object for the sake of the Ātman. The self or the Ātman is the subject. Each self is both subject and object. It is the subject when it illuminates but is an object when it is illuminated in turn by the attributive consciousness.⁶ Jñāna is not inert or jaḍa but self luminous or Svayamprakāśa. [It is Svāparanirvāhaka in its function of illuminating, and is realized as such. self-luminosity of consciousness lies in the fact that it illuminates an object to a subject at a particular time. It follows from this that it need not be self luminous to all at all times.

‘यत्त्वनुभूतेः स्वयंप्रकाशकत्वमुक्तं तद्विषयप्रकाशनवेलायां
ज्ञातुरात्मनस्तथैव, न तु सर्वेषां सर्वदा तथैवेति नियमोऽस्ति ।

(S. B. 1-1-1).

Nayyāyikas do not recognize the fact of 'Svayamprakāśatva' of knowledge. They argue that knowledge is cognized by 'mānasa pratyakṣa' or mental perception. They posit a second unit of knowledge for the revelation of the first unit, as knowledge by itself is not capable of revealing objects of experience. This is called Anuvyavasāya.

3. R. T. S. P. 89.

4. T. M. K. 4-4.

5. T. M. K. 4-7.

6. R. T. S. P. 89.

This theory of Anuvyavasāya is not admitted by the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita. If the second unit of knowledge called Anuvyavasāya is assumed for the revelation of the first unit, it must be pointed out that this second unit, being itself unrevealed, cannot reveal the first unit. It requires another anuvyavasāya and that again another and so on leading to infinite regress or 'anavasthā'. If it is argued that this second unit of knowledge called 'anuvyavasāya' is self revealed, we point out that it is better to regard the first unit itself as 'self-revealed'.

Anuvyavasāya is therefore not necessary for knowledge to reveal the objects of experience. Knowledge itself is self-revealed. We know that we know a thing at the same time.⁷ If this is not admitted, omniscience cannot be attributed to God. It cannot be argued that Omniscience is only self-experienced and not self-revealed. Further, the common experience of Dhārāvāhika vijñāna cannot be explained, if the characteristic of self-revelation is not admitted of knowledge.⁸ So it must be admitted that knowledge is self revealed.

The Kaumārilaś argue that knowledge is to be inferred on account of object revelation. This view is criticised by the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita as unscientific.⁹ It is said in the above school that prākāṣya or Jñātātā or Prakāṣatā is a product of the cognition of an object, and that this prākāṣya leads to the inference of the cause, namely cognition. It is natural that prakāṣatā should lead to the causal collocation and not to cognition. To argue that cognition which was unrevealed is inferred from cognizedness would take us no where as it serves no practical purpose. On the other hand, it is not possible to apply this principle of Prākāṣyānumēya regarding objects of the past and the future. It must therefore be admitted that knowledge is essentially self-revealed and is not inferred from some other characteristic of cognizedness.

The special features of Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology can be summarized as follows:—

1. Reality is knowable in all its levels and aspects.
2. Knowledge presupposes a knower and an object of thought.
3. The Ātman is of the essential nature of consciousness, qualified by attributive consciousness.
4. Substantive consciousness is self-realized, whereas the attributive consciousness reveals itself as well as other objects.
5. Substantive consciousness is a 'Self-aware' or 'pratyak' principle, whereas the attributive consciousness is not aware of itself being a 'parāk' principle.
6. The substantive consciousness is ever effulgent, and is unaffected by any transformation. But the attributive consciousness is subject to contraction during the state of Samsāra, owing to the impact of Karma.
7. The attributive consciousness regains its original state of purity and all-pervasive nature during the state of liberation.
8. The attributive consciousness or Dharmabhūtajñānam is both an attribute and a substance.

7. T. M. K. 4-3; See Sarvārtha Siddhi.

8. T. M. K. 4-1, 2.

9. T. M. K. 4-3; N. S., p. 238.

9. Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort are all different aspects of Dharma-bhūtājānam, and are implied in it.
10. Knowledge is 'Brahma Dṛiṣṭi', as Brahman is the ground of all knowledge, as well as the experiencer of all in the ultimate analysis.

Knowledge is self-valid:

Knowledge is 'Svataḥ pramāna' or self-valid in its essential nature. This self-validity is inherent in its very nature.¹⁰

The Mukta or the liberated self apprehends all things of his own accord as ordained in the Vedas as 'सर्वं ह पश्यःपश्यति' etc. The validity of the knowledge there, cannot be due to any adjuncts or any external factors. It means the intuition of the soul is essentially self-revealing and self-valid, and self-validity is natural to knowledge. This applies to all knowledge in general. All knowledge grasps the corresponding objects and reveals them. This is its self-validity.¹¹

Moreover Bhrānti or erroneous knowledge cannot be a fact, as knowledge is not divided into illusion and non-illusion at all.¹² Then what are we to say about the shell-silver illusion and the yellow-conch illusion? Illusion is caused by two factors namely, the Vaiparōtya of Svarūpa Nirūpakadharmas or the Vaiparētya of the Nirūpita Svarūpa Viśeṣana. The former is the example for the first, and the latter for the second. The shell-silver experience is an instance of Svarūpa Nirūpakadharmas Vaiparōtya. Here the Svarūpanirūpakadharmas or the characteristics that determine the silver are grasped, instead of those of the shell. The 'Yellow-conch' cognition is of a different type. Here, the determining characteristics of the conch, or the 'conchness', is grasped whereas the Nirūpita-svarūpaviśeṣadharmas, or the defining details are not completely grasped. The yellow colour instead of the white is grasped there. This invalidity is caused by certain defects in vision, or other extraneous factors, and as such, the self-validity of knowledge is not in any way hampered.

Difference between Pramā and Apramā:

As enunciated above, the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita admits that 'Jñānam' (knowledge) is self-valid and true. It also affirms that the real or the Sat alone is cognized and as such integrity of experience in all levels is accepted. The world of selves and matter is in Brahman—'तस्मिन्सर्वं प्रतिष्ठितम्' Brahman is Satyasya Satyam, as it is the indweller in the chit or the finite self, which is the inner self of the Achit and so distinct from it. It is only through Brahman that both the Chit and the Achit get their value. This divine immanence in the object and the subject forms the background of all knowledge.

10. 'सर्वं साक्षात्करोति स्वयमुपधिगणेरुज्जितस्संप्रसादः प्रामाण्यं तत्र नोपाध्युपनतमिति तत्तुल्यतान्यत्र युक्तम् ।' त. मु. क. 4-104.
11. T. M. K. 4-104.
12. 'अतःस्वाभाव्यमेव प्रामाण्यस्य समुचितम् । एषा भ्रान्तिः स्वरूपे क्वचन न स्यात् सर्वं ज्ञानं धर्मिण्य-भ्रान्तमिति वचनात् । तथा च विषयेऽपि स्वरूपांशे सर्वज्ञानसाधारण्यात् प्रामाण्यस्य स्वाभाविकत्वमेव युक्तमित्यर्थः ।' स. सि. p. 247.

According to this Theory of Knowledge there cannot be any division of Pramā and Apramā, into two watertight compartments as all knowledge is, in the ultimate analysis, of the Real Object and a Fact of Life. The knowledge of the omniscient Divine is always Pramā. The Dharmijñānam of the finite self is evershining, and it is always self-luminous, being far from any kind of contraction at all, and so is Pramā. The Dharmabhūtajñānam or attributive consciousness of the finite self is subject to limitations and contractions, under the stress of Samsāra, and this attributive consciousness is conditioned by physical defects and takes the form of truth or falsehood according to the situation. So the division of Pramā or Apramā is applicable to the attributive consciousness of the Samsārichetana or the bound-self only.

Some epistemologists of this school defined Pramā as 'Samyaganubhavaḥ' (or thorough apprehension of an object) as they wanted to exclude memory from right apprehension, though they admitted Anyathakāyāthi. Those who accepted both, namely memory and Anyathākhyāthi defined Pramā as Yathārtham jñānam or the knowledge of an object as it is. Some others who rejected both the above defined Pramā or right apprehension as Anubhūti. All these definitions serve the purpose of distinguishing Smṛiti from Pramā.

Smṛiti or memory is not denied the characteristic of Pramā by Desika. If memory has no characteristic of right knowledge, then recognition, based on this, will turn out to be Apramā. Memory functions in many fields of our life, and it is essential for unbroken meditation and selfless devotion. Knowledge born of mere reminiscent impressions is memory, and though it is mediate and does not grasp an object, it is necessarily due to the former apprehension, and so it is not baseless. It corresponds to objective reality experienced before, and so gets itself included within the province of Pramā.¹³ That is why Pramā is defined as:

'यथावस्थितव्यवहारानुगुणं ज्ञानं प्रमा' ।

न्या. परि. P. 92.

The two words namely *Yathāvasthita* and *Vyavahārānuguna* are significant in this definition. *Yathāvasthita* is a term that signifies the realistic attitude of this school. The term means the existence of things as they are and so includes all aspects of knowledge both subjective and objective. The term *Vyavahārānuguna* emphasizes the purpose of knowledge. Knowledge must be able to fulfil the purposes of our life. It should be conducive to the progress of humanity both material and spiritual. It must satisfy the practical interests of our life. *Vyavahāra* here applies to *hāna* (rejection) and *Upādāna* (acceptance) of undesirables and desirables respectively. Knowledge must be able to fulfil the purpose of also *śābdavyavahāra*, as human experience is not solely limited to *hāna* and *upādāna*. *Śābdavyavahāra* is one of the essential features of human activities and is therefore part and parcel of *Vyavahāra*. Internal consistency is thus implied by these two terms. The soul, suffering under the stress and strain of Samsāra, has certain objects to attain, and true knowledge helps him to realize his aims. Thus right knowledge or Pramā has a definite purpose to serve.

13. N. P. p. 171.

This definition of Desika is free from the defects of Viparyaya or wrong notion and Samśaya or doubt.¹⁴ Viparyaya or wrong notion is different from Pramā. Firstly, a wrong notion is to take one thing for another. Secondly, a notion of contradictory and untenable properties of a particular object, the essential attribute of which is cognized in general, is also an example of Viparyaya. This is of many types owing to the appearance of one or more of the opposite qualities. The 'Yellow-conch' experience is an example of the appearance (Sphurana) of one opposite property. The theory of being one and different at the same time, as put by the Jainas, is an example of viparyaya of many opposite viśeṣas or qualities. The Theory of the Monists, that the world is neither real nor unreal, is another example of viparyaya of the same type as above. All these instances of a wrong notion do not any how imply contradiction and are different from doubt.¹⁵

In all these instances there is a consciousness of the objects qualified by these qualities leading to a wrong identification. The experience of the 'Double Moon' and the 'Little Moon' is, again, a case of viparyaya, as the qualities of doubleness and littleness opposed to the oneness and bigness of the moon play a prominent part and push them aside, though the moon is cognized with its essential attribute. This is an example of परस्परविरुद्धानेकविशेषस्फुरण the appearance of many particularities that are mutually contradictory. The cause of viparyaya is either wrong identification, as in the case of the rope-snake, or super-imposition as in the case of the Yellowconch. The Gīta explains that Rajas and Thamas are verily responsible for a wrong notion. To mistake dharma for Adharma and Adharma for Dharma, as well as Kārya for Akārya and vice-versa, is a case of viparyaya. Viparyaya is far from pramā or right apprehension and to exclude this from pramā the term 'yathāvasthita' is used in the definition by Desika.

The above definition excludes Samśaya also from Pramā. What is Samśaya or doubt?

सामान्यधर्मस्फुरणे सति अप्रतिपन्नतद्विरोधप्रतिपन्नमित्यो विरोधानेकविशेषस्फुरणं संशयः ।'

न्या. परि. p. 92.

Doubt is caused by the cognition of contradictory and incompatible qualities of two objects at one and the same locus. Here the Dharmi or object of cognition is experienced along with incompatible features. 'Is it a post or a man?', is an example of doubt. The 'tallness', common to the post and the man, is cognized and this gives rise to a cognition of contradictory features, and the mind fails to decide whether it is a post or a man, as it finds in that one object both the qualities of 'posthood' and 'manhood' which are contradictory and incompatible to one and the same locus. There will be cognitions of these incompatibles alternatively and simultaneously as in the case of a swing that gains a forward and a backward move at the same time.¹⁶ Thus in doubt or Samśaya there is the cognition of contradictory alternatives and this leads to indecision. Though there is decisive

14. N. P. p. 92.

15. 'परस्परविरुद्धानेकविशेषवत् ईदृशस्य विपर्ययस्य संशयाद्भेदो मित्यो विरोधाभिमानविरहेण समुच्चिता ध्यवगायः ।'

न्या. परि. p. 92.

16. N. P. p. 92.

contact or 'Dhṛiḍasamyōga' of the attributive consciousness with the object there is also an indecisive contact of the same Dharmabhūtajñānam with the many incompatible features¹⁷. The loose sense object contact gives rise to the cognition of incompatible and contradictory qualities resulting in doubt. Such a kind of cognition cannot be 'Yathāvasthita and so is not right apprehension.

Anadhyavasāya is not Pramā:

Anadhyavasāya of the type of 'What may be the name of that tree?', which has been distinguished by some logicians as different from doubt, is also included under Samsaya as alternatives are implied there also.¹⁸

Even conjecture or Ūha is a kind of cognition which is not definite and so is not Pramā¹⁹. Here also there are two alternatives and the characteristics of one manifest suppressing the other, and so this also is a case of doubt alone. The definition of right apprehension or Pramā given by Desika is synoptic, and this excludes from its sphere, wrong notion, doubt, Anadhyavasāya and conjecture by the term Yathāvasthita, and applies to practical life by the use of the word Vyavahārānugūṇa. Thus Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology is not severed from life, but, on the other hand, is related to it wholly.

Apramā or erroneous cognition or Bhrama:

Strictly speaking there cannot be any distinction between Pramā and Bhrama in this school, in the ultimate analysis, as every cognition is of the real. The attributive consciousness of the finite self is subject to contractions on account of Karma as mentioned before, and as a consequence of this, it loses its purity and all-pervasive character, under the stress of Samsāra. In this stage error creeps in. Error is due only to Avidyā-Karma of the finite self and does never happen either to the Absolute or to the liberated or to the eternal.

This distinction between Pramā and Bhrama is also one of degree, and this disappears when the attributive consciousness is freed from its contractions of Karma. We must examine empirical experience in this light and find out whether they are Pramā or Bhrama. That which has a practical utility, and that which leads to the furtherance of the ends of life happens to be Pramā, whereas that which is contrary to this is Bhrama.²⁰

If the cognition of an object as it is, is Pramā or right apprehension the cognition of an object otherwise is Bhrama. To cognize the shell as shell is Pramā, but to apprehend it as silver is Bhrama. How are we to explain this then? According to the principle of quintuplication, a minute element of silver does exist even in the shell and this happens to be the cause of its cognition as silver. But that is not Pramā as that cognition of silver in

17. N. P. p. 92.

18. 'किसंजकोऽयं वृक्षः इत्येवमादिरूपोऽनध्यवसायो नाम अन्यो ज्ञानविशेष इति केचित् । तदसारम् . . . ।'
न्या. परि. p. 94.

19. N. P. p. 94.

20. 'ततश्च प्रतिपत्तो वा व्यवहारोदयेऽपि वा ।
तथाभावान्यथात्वाभ्यां प्रमाभ्रान्तिव्यवस्थितिः ॥'

न्या. परि. p. 91.

the shall becomes bādhitā on account of its infinitesimalness. So the criterion for the validity or invalidity of a cognition happens to be the fact of its being contradicted or not contradicted.²¹

Yathārthakhyāthi Theory of Viśiṣṭādvaita:

The theory of error according to the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita is described by Desika as Akhyāthisamvalitayathārthakhyāthi.²² According to this theory all knowledge is yathārtha or, knowledge of an object as it is. In the yellow-conch illusion the yellow colour of the eye is transmitted to the conch and that experience of the yellowness of the conch is real and is due to the real cause of the bile in the eye, and not due to self-deceptive Māyā. The finite self obscured by Avidyākarma is the seat of error. Error is therefore due to either real defects or Upādhis. Illusions of all types are erroneous perceptions but they are manifestations of consciousness that subsist and are facts of experience. These are not non-existent. They are real effects of real causes. The illusion of the double moon or the yellow-conch or the fire-brand circle, are all due to either the defects of the eye or real Upādhis. If they are not (Vyavahārānuguna or) able to satisfy our practical needs of life they are false or Apramā.²³ Pramā or right apprehension is not only applicable to practical life but must also be Yathārtha.

Then how is an error caused? Whenever there is an apprehension of the essential characteristic of a thing, the thinghood of that thing is cognized and becomes Pramā. If the essential part of a thing is not observed or missed, error or Bhrama ensues.²⁴

Theory of Error:

The Theory of Error according to Rāmānuja is Yathārthakhyāthi. Errors can be grouped into certain types such as hallucinations, dreams and illusions.²⁵ All these are facts of experience and manifestations of knowledge. They are real effects of real causes. Hallucinations are due to real psychic disorders and the experience is real to the subject at that particular time. Dreams experienced also are real, being the result of the past Karma of the dreamer. The objects of the dream world are all creations of God suited to the specific merit or demerit of that particular soul. Though dreams are subjective they are actually experienced. Illusions may be broadly classified into two types viz., perceptual and non-perceptual. Instances of perceptual error such as the shell-silver illusion, yellow-conch illusion, red-crystal illusion, a mirage, a fire-brand wheel and others are all real effects of real causes. These are due to the defective sense material on account of which

21. 'तदत्रव्यवहृतिरुभयो बाधिताबाधितास्या' त. मु. क. 4-10;
'कथमस्मिन् पक्षे प्रमाणाप्रमाणव्यवस्थादिकमित्यत्राह—व्यवहृतिरति-बाध व्यवहारहेतुर्ज्ञानमप्रमाणं भ्रान्ति-
रित्युच्यते ।' स. सि. p. 180.
22. T. M. K. 4-10, 11.
23. 'सत्स्यातिर्नाम ज्ञानविषयस्य सत्यत्वम् । तर्हि भ्रमत्वं कथम्? इति चेत् विषयव्यवहारबाधात् भ्रमत्वम् ।' Y. M. D.
24. Desika says—'योग्यायोग्यादिभेदाग्रह इह चरमां गाहते संप्रतिष्ठां ।' त. मु. क. 4-10.
25. Phil. of Vis., P. N. S., p. 49.

the thinghood of that thing is misapprehended. When it is found out that the water element in the mirage or the silver element in the shell is of no practical value, the illusion vanishes. The doctrine of panchikaraṇa or quintuplication affirms the fundamental unity of nature, and expounds that everything has an element of every other thing in itself. This happens to be the background of illusion. When the main part is revealed there is Pramā or true knowledge. But, when the thinghood of a thing, as well as its difference from others, is not grasped, illusion ensues. These are all, therefore examples of Yathārthakhyāthi alone. These did not become Pramā on account of their failure to promote the practical interests of life.

There are errors that relate to the moral and ethical conceptions also. Rajas and Tamas are described as causing non-apprehension and misapprehension. This kind of error is due to real defects of Samskāras of the finite self labouring under the impact of Karma. As Kaṇāda has put it Avidyā is due to either Indiyadōṣas or Samskāradōṣas. Patanjali points out that Avidyā is to mistake the non-eternal for the eternal, the impure for the pure, sorrow for pleasure, and the non-self for the self.

‘अनित्याशुचिदुःखानात्मसु नित्यशुचिसुखात्मख्यातिः अविद्या ।’

(P. Y. S. 2-5).

The province or error is thus very wide and includes within itself perceptual and non-perceptual error. All errors are real effects of real causes, and tests of pragmatic verification have got to be applied to correct those erroneous impressions. Error is real and relative and is due to extraneous factors and not due to Avidyā, the inexplicable principle of Monism. Rāmānuja comes to the conclusion in his Sri Bhashya, that all knowledge is real and of the real.

It is some times described by some scholars that Rāmānuja's Theory of Error is 'Anyathākhyāthi' of a special kind different from that of the Nayyāyikas.²⁶ The basis for this conclusion is evidently a statement of Rāmānuja in his Bhāṣya viz. 'स्यात्पन्तरत्नादिना सुदूरमपिगत्वा अन्यथावभासोऽवश्याश्रयणीयः' (S. B. 1-1-1). This statement occurs there to reduce all theories of error other than his, to Anyathākhyāthi, which of course gets refuted further giving room to his own Theory of Yathārtha khyāthi. The celebrated commentator of Rāmānuja, Śrī Sudarśana Sūri sheds much light on this conclusion²⁷. But the opinion of the above scholars favouring 'Anyathā khyāthi' is not altogether unfounded. From a careful study of Sarvārtha Siddhi of Desika under Stanzas Nos. 9, 10 and 11 of the Buddhisara, we learn that even among the followers of Rāmānuja there were two schools of thought from very early times, holding two different views of Anyathā khyāthi and yathārtha khyāthi. Desika's conclusion is of course in favour of the latter only.²⁸

When we examine the Theory of Error carefully we realize that the principle of Yathārtha khyāthi underlies all others, as all projections and presentations are only modal manifestations of the 'One Absolute', the 'Sat'. Just as the theory of Aparyavasāra vritti

26. Vedanta Desika: A Study. Dr. Satyvrath Singh, p. 186-187.

See also Intro. to V. S. Sri S. S. R., p. 17.

27. S. P. 1-1-1. p. 252.

28. T. M. K. 4-10.

explains that all words connote the Supreme in the ultimate analysis, the theory of error 'Yathārtha khyāthi' explains all instances of error, in the final analysis, as real experiences due to real causes.

To sum up;

- 1) Error relates only to the attributive consciousness or Dharmabhūtajñānam of the embodied self.
- 2) This is due to the non-apprehension of the determinate characteristics of an object and of its difference from others.
- 3) Error is part of Reality both as an act of thought and as the object cognised by that act.
- 4) Error is a real experience due to a real cause.
- 5) Error is due to extraneous factors like defective sense organs or defective Samskāras.
- 6) Error can be finally corrected by means of Pragmatic verification.

Theories of other Schools examined:

The Anirvachaniya khyāthi of the Advaitins says that all things apprehended here as shell-silver or any other thing are not real, but only distortions of the Reality. The Reality which is undifferentiated universal consciousness is unknowable. All these presentations are therefore mere products of Avidyā. In the shell-silver illusion neither the shell nor the silver is real. The silver in the shell is neither existent nor non-existent. So it is indefinable and is the result of the indefinable nescience or Avidyā. This view point of Anirvachaniya khyāthi is totally discarded by the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita as unreasonable and untenable. For, existence or Sattva and non-existence or Asattva cannot reside in the same thing at the same place and time. If something exists like Brahman it cannot be non-existent. If a thing does not exist as the hare's horns it cannot exist at all. These two are incompatibles and cannot exist in one and the same thing at the same time and place. So then, anirvachaniyata is not a fact of apprehension at all. Defining the indefinable is again a self contradiction.²⁹ It is further argued that the presentation of silver said to be indefinable, is not a product of Avidyā. It is not an illusory manifestation against the background of Brahman as maintained by monistic epistemologists. Silver as such is not totally discarded as illusion. The experience namely 'this is silver' is contradicted and there is only bādha and the presentation of silver in the shell in this instance amounts to only Anyathā Khyāthi and not Anirvachaniya Khyāthi.³⁰

The futility of Anirvachaniya khyāthi is established by Rāmānuja in his Śrī Bhāṣya. Seven kinds of incompatibilities namely (1) आश्रयानुपपत्तिः (2) तिरोधानानुपपत्तिः (3) स्वरूपानुपपत्तिः (4) अनिर्वचनीयानुपपत्तिः (5) प्रमाणानुपपत्तिः (6) निवर्तकानुपपत्तिः and (7) निवृत्यनुपपत्तिः are charged against the Theory of Avidyā. These charges are further elaborated by Desika in his Śatadūṣiṇi.

29. T. M. K. 4-16; सत्त्वासत्त्वयोस्सितामितत्वन्यायेन मिथो विरोधात् नैकत्रैकदा तयोः संभव इति भावः । . . . किञ्च निर्वचनीयत्वखण्डनोद्देश्यनिरूपिततः । विश्वनिर्वचनीयत्वमखण्डितमपेक्ष्यताम् ।' स. सि. p. 186;

30. T. M. K. 4-17; स. सि. p. 187.

The epistemologists of Monistic thought posit a substratum for Avidyā just to avoid Nihilism and their concept of Avidyā is proved to be unreasonable and untenable. When this itself is untenable what to say of the Niradhiṣṭāna Bhrama, or baseless illusion of the Buddhists. The Ātma khyāthi of the Buddhist idealist is also said to be self-contradictory. These Vijñānavādins say that only forms of consciousness caused by super-imposition are experienced and Vijñānas are said to be of two kinds namely Ālaya vijñāna and Pravṛitti vijñāna. Viśiṣṭādvaita refutes this Theory as opposed to all human experience. Our daily experience reveals to us many objects other than the mind and there cannot be any identity between the Grāhya and Grāhaka.³¹ How can cognition arise without a corresponding object? Moreover the four causes of cognition namely Adhipathi, Sahakāri, Ālambana and Samānatantra cannot be set aside. As such, various objects are responsible for varied cognitions. The Buddhist nihilist posits the theory of Asatkhyāthi. This theory of error negates not only external objects but also the Vijñānas of the Yogāchāra school. Reality according to the Śūnyavādin is Śūnya. The object of cognition is Asat and as such both Pramā and Apramā are Asat.

This theory is strongly refuted by Vedantic schools. Viśiṣṭādvaita has repudiated this theory of error with all its strength. The states of existence or non-existence apply only to things that really exist and so the theory of nothingness establishes, on the other hand, only the reality of things. Error cannot occur without having a locus or substratum. An object is experienced always with spatial and temporal relationship as 'this pot is here'. If 'there' is real, then an Ādhara becomes existent, and the theory of nihilism is smashed to pieces. If spatial relationship as 'there' is denied, there is no possibility of an error at all. As such the theory of Nihilism positing Asat khyāthi is also unfounded.

To sum up knowledge is an illumination of an object to the knowing self³². The self is self-luminous and is of the nature of substantive consciousness, Jñānaswarūpa. The universal self as well as the finite selves are thus self-shining consciousness. They have also consciousness as their attribute. Thus Jñānam is of two types namely Dharmi jñānam and Dharma bhūta jñānam. Dharmi jñānam is only self revealing, whereas Dharma bhūta jñānam reveals itself as well as others. It is Swaparanirvāhaka. Knowledge is self-valid and self revealed. The attributive consciousness is subject to contractions during the state of samsāra due to Karma, and it attains its original state in Mukti. All kinds of feelings like pleasure, pain, desire, anger and others are all various effects of the attributive consciousness. The unseen sin or merit is again the will of the Divine to reward or punish, and these are the results of the attributive consciousness of the Divine.

The Dharma bhūta jñāna has different states of both right knowledge and wrong knowledge in the state of Samsāra, but in the state of liberation it is perfect, all pervasive and ever shining.

The utility of knowledge in the furtherance of our moral, ethical and spiritual purposes is thus properly emphasized in the synoptic definition of Jñāna as adopted by this school.

31. N. P. p. 45.

32. 'ज्ञातुर्ज्ञेयावभासो मतिरिति कथितम् ।'

Pramāṇas and Their Number:

Significance of Pramāṇas: The analysis of the pramāṇas in any school relates to the prameya of that particular school. An exposition of the pramāṇas based on right authorities is also essential for the sound standing (for all time to come) of the philosophical structure of that school. The means of right knowledge must also necessarily be valid as the knowledge it is going to establish.³³ The statement 'I speak the Truth' must also be true, in the same way, as the statement it is going to make. Thus, pramāṇa establishes itself as well as other objects.³⁴ Pramāṇas are in a way standards for examination, verification, modification and confirmation of our knowledge.

A mention of pramāṇas is made in the *Thaithirīya Āraṇyaka* where four terms namely *Smṛiti*, *Prathyakṣa*, *Aithihya* and *Anumānam* are stated.³⁵ The *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* logic deals with pramāṇas in a significant manner. The medieval logicians treated this doctrine in such a way that it could be applied to the religious systems of all schools and on account of this pure treatment this came to be termed as 'The science of right knowledge'.

Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians have in their own way reconstructed the *Nyāya* logic according to their philosophy. *Śrī Vedānta Desika* has made a glorious contribution towards this cause by writing an important work namely *Nyāyapariśuddhi*. The very title of this work suggests that this is a purification or re-orientation of the system propounded by the great *Gotama*. The great *Gōtama* or *Akṣapāda*, the author of the *Nyāya sūtras* is renowned as a great thinker of authority and the foremost of sages, which implies in his *Āptatamaiva*.

Though *Gōtama*, the originator of the *Nyāya* system, is not counted as a *Thāmasa* or as a deceiver, yet his exposition cannot be totally acceptable to the school of *Viśiṣṭādvaita* as his Thesis is opposed in many respects to the teaching of *Vedānta*, and also as he is exposed by the author of the *Vedānta Sūtras*.³⁶ Therefore his school like *Vaiśeṣika* or the *Sāṅkhya* is not a proper authority for spiritual perfection.

‘काणावमाक्षपादं च कापिलं तन्त्रमेव च ।
तन्त्राप्येतानि सर्वाणि न तन्त्राप्यात्मनिर्णये ॥’

न्या. परि. p. 86.

The *Bhrama sūtras* make a categorical rejection of all such views as are opposed to the scriptures.³⁷ The great *Rāmānuja* comments in this context as follows;

‘एतेन वेदापरिगृहीतसांख्यपक्षक्षपणेन परिशिष्टाश्च वेदापरिगृहीताः
कणभक्षाक्षपादक्षपणकभिक्षुपक्षाः क्षपिताः वेदितव्याः ।’

श्री. भा. II—1-13.

Vedānta Desika, known for his *Sāmanvaya* dṛiṣṭi, has made an attempt to syncretise the *Nyāya* system into *Vedānta* wherever possible, but has summarily rejected such of the

33. Dar p. 212.

34. Dar p. 212.

35. T. A. 1-2.

36. N. P. p. 85.

37. S. B. I—1-13.

views of Gōtama which are irreconcilable with the ontological position of Viśiṣṭādvaita. The guiding principle for acceptance or otherwise of the theories of other schools is stated by himself as follows;

‘यद्वा नातिबहिष्कारः नातीव च परिग्रहः ।
सांख्यादिवदिहापि स्यात् समाधिस्तौषतण्डुलः ॥
उपजीव्यबहुत्वेन विद्यास्थाननिवेशनम् ।
विरुद्धांशकविषया सूत्रादिषु बहिष्क्रिया ॥’

(न्या. परि. p. 86).

Only such of the things that are diametrically opposed to the standpoint of the holy texts and the sūtras are rejected, whereas those that are not objectionable to the system are adopted.

Vedānta Deśika has analysed the Nyāya system with reference to the position of Viśiṣṭādvaita, and has, so to say, reconstructed viśiṣṭādvaitic logic with reference to the Nyāya system. We will now briefly go into the essentials of Viśiṣṭādvaita logic.

Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic accepts three means of right knowledge namely Prāthyakṣa or perception, Anumānam or inference and Śabda or verbal testimony. We may study the special characteristics of these means of right knowledge as admitted by Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians.

The importance of Pramāṇa śāstra has been significantly expressed by Desika as follows;

‘प्रमाणमेवास्य शास्त्रस्य प्राधान्यतो विषयः ।’

(न्या. परि. p. 90).

Pramāṇas are three fold—‘प्रत्यक्षानुमानशब्दभेदात् । This three fold division is acceptable to Manu also.

‘प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च शास्त्रं च विविधागमम् ।
त्रयं सुविदिनं कार्यं धर्मसिद्धिमभीप्सता ॥’

Sri Vishnuchitta states in his prameya samgraha:

‘प्रमाणसंख्याविवादेपीत्यत्र त्रिप्रमाणत्वं भाष्योक्तम् इति ।’

(न्या. परि. p. 94).

Though Smṛiti is established as a valid means of right knowledge, yet it is included in pratyakṣa, and so does not form a different pramāṇa.

Tatvaratnākara of Parāśarabhatta states:

‘प्रत्यक्षाविमूलानां स्मृतीनां स्वस्वमूलेऽन्तर्भावविवक्षया प्रमाणत्रित्वाविरोधः ।’

(न्या. परि. p. 94).

The Taittirīya āraṇyaka names four pramāṇas namely Smṛiti, Pratyakṣam, Aithihyam, Anumānam and it is implied here that Pratyakṣa is not inclusive of remembrance or Smṛiti and so there is no change in the number of pramāṇas.³⁸

38. See Y. M. D.

According to the above the number of pramāṇas in Viśiṣṭādvaita logic is only three, and could be reconciled thus by continuing Smṛiti as a pramāṇa, though included in perception. The statement of Prajñāparitrāṇa namely,

‘तत्रेन्द्रियार्थसम्बन्धो लिङ्गशब्दग्रहौ तथा ।
संस्कारोन्मेष इत्येते संविदां जन्महेतवः ॥’

(न्या. परि. p. 95).

enumerates the four fold means of knowledge as (1) sense-object contact, (2) Linga-grahana or grasp of pervasion, (3) verbal testimony and (4) Samskaronmēṣa. This four-fold nature of acquisition of knowledge does not admit Smṛiti as a right means of knowledge. The same author further states that there are five means of right knowledge according to Jaimini and Vyāsa :

‘स्वयंसिद्धिस्तथा दिव्यं प्रत्यक्षमनुमागमः ।
पञ्च सन्ति प्रमाणानि जैमिनिव्यासयोर्हृदि ॥’

(न्या. परि. p. 95).

The Thesis of the author of Prajñāparitrāṇa is not irreconcilable, as in the ultimate analysis the number of pramāṇas comes only to three. In the above quoted passage the two viz., Swayamsiddhi and Divyaṃ are counted as different pramāṇas to make up the number of five, along with perception, inference and scripture. But these two namely Swayamsiddhi & Divyaṃ get themselves included under perception alone as Viśiṣṭādvaita explains ‘divyaṃ’ as that kind of pratyakṣa which is acquired by the grace of the Lord.

‘भगवत्प्रसादलब्धयोगिप्रत्यक्षं दिव्यम् ।’

(न्या. परि. p. 95).

From the above analysis it becomes clear that though some of the celebrated logicians of this school counted four or five means of right knowledge, when closely examined, they get themselves included under only three Pramāṇas namely Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda.

II. PERCEPTION

Definition and significance of perception:

Pratyakṣa or perception is very significant as all our experiences begin with this. We perceive the external objects through the senses and know about them. What all we perceive is real according to this school. Perception reveals a part of Reality as only certain aspects of reality are perceptible. Many aspects of reality are not cognizable through the functions of the sense organs and that is why other pramāṇas, like inference and śabda, are admitted as valid means of right knowledge. Of the three pramāṇas, perception however is the first means, and this stops somewhere giving place to other pramāṇas.

Vedānta Deśika discusses the definitions of Pratyakṣa, as given by some of his predecessors, and after analysing them gives his own definition in his Nyāyapariśuddhi.

(1) Sri Viṣṇuchitta defined Pratyakṣa in his prameya samgraha as follows:

‘साक्षादनुभवः प्रत्यक्षम् । साक्षात्त्वं जातिः इत्यादि ।’ (Quoted in न्या. परि. p. 95).

(2) Sri Parāśara Bhatta defined perception in his Tatvaratnākara in the following words:—

‘अपरोक्षप्रमाध्यक्षमापरोक्ष्यं च संविदः ।
व्यवहार्यसम्बन्धिज्ञानजत्वविवर्जनम् ॥’

(3) Sri Varada Viṣṇu Mīśra defined the same in his Mānayaāthāthmyanirṇaya as follows:

अपरोक्षप्रमा प्रत्यक्षम् । प्रमाया आपरोक्ष्यं नाम विशदावभासत्वमिति ब्रूमः । किमिदं वेशद्यं नाम ?
असाधारणाकारेण वस्त्ववभासकत्वम् ।’ (या. परि. p. 95).

The first definition states that Prathyakṣa is an Anubhava or apprehension. This is said to be Sākṣāth or direct. This Sākṣātva is Jāthi or the characteristic feature (or directness) of this apprehension

The second definition points out that perception is direct knowledge based on the sense-object contact. This is not indirect as in the case of inference or verbal testimony that depend upon Vyāp̥thi and Śabda respectively.

The third definition declares that perception grasps the objects of sensation clearly, and results in a direct experience of the objects. The subject or the self-luminous self gets a direct and intuitive experience of the objects when its dharma-bhūta jñāna reaches them through the sense channels. This would be a very vivid illumination of the external objects to the knowing subject.

All these three definitions affirm that perception is an immediate experience of the objects. Immediacy or Sākṣātva is said to be the differentia of perception. But even in inference and Śabda, there ensue in the long run, an illumination of the object and a direct intuitive experience. Sākṣātva is the general characteristic of all kinds of knowledge as every type of knowledge naturally implies Viśadāvabhāsatva or vivid manifestation. So then, to differentiate perception from the other two means of valid knowledge, Deśika has posited his own definition of Pratyakṣa as mentioned hereunder:—

‘साक्षात्कारिप्रमा प्रत्यक्षम् । साक्षात्त्वं च जातिरूप उपाधिरूपोवा कश्चित् ज्ञानस्वभावविशेषः
स्वात्मसाक्षिकः ।’ (N. P. p. 95).


The above definition of Deśika is all-comprehensive and marks clearly the boundaries of perception. It also signifies the differentia of perception from other means of knowledge. Prathyakṣam is defined as Sākṣātkāripramā or knowledge that is immediate. It means that this does not need any other type of knowledge. This characteristic feature of not depending upon any other knowledge is the differentia of perception from other Pramaṇas, as they require Vyāp̥ti jñānam or Śabda jñānam as the case may be. Further, this Sākṣātvam is defined as an Upādhirūpā or a specially conditioned one. These peculiar conditions of perception are (1) the sense-object contact and (2) the absence of the dependence upon any other type of knowledge.

Perception has, thus, the nature of immediacy of awareness, in the sense that it depends upon itself and not on any other knowledge.

According to the Nayyāyikas, the mind is necessary for the fact of knowledge. According to them, the soul is a substance which has the quality of consciousness. Knowledge is possible through perception only when there is sense-object contact causing the perspective aspect of consciousness. According to them, the mind reflects the objective impressions to the self. But this is not agreeable to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin. For him, the soul is jñāna-svarūpa and jñāna-guṇaka, and he acquires knowledge only on account of his being a self-conscious being. Here the subject-object relationship is emphasized instead of the sense-object contact. The Indriyas are born of Ahamkara, and they have only the capacity of flashing or dyōthana.

Similarly, the treatment of perception by the Advaitin is also not acceptable to this school. According to them, all these experiences are illusions, whereas the non-second Bhraman is unknowable. According to this school, the subject is real, the object is real, the approach is real and knowledge is also real.

Vedānta Desika has classified perception as mentioned hereunder:—



First of all perception is of two types namely eternal and non-eternal. The jñānam of the Supreme, as well as that of the eternally free, is always eternal. Nityasākṣātkara is their characteristic feature. Anityasākṣātkara refers to us, and this again is twofold, namely the perception of yogins and that of non-yogins.

Yogic Perception:

Yogic perception is described by Vedānta Desika as follows:

‘योगिप्रत्यक्षम् प्रकृष्टादृष्टविशेषजम् । तत् युक्तावस्थायां मनोमात्रजन्यम् । वियुक्तावस्थायां तु बाह्ये-
न्द्रियजन्यमपि ।’
(N. P. p. 95).

Yogic perception is that which arises out of the operation of the mind only when they are absorbed in meditation. This is due to their extraordinary yogic powers. When they are out of absorption, the yogins can perceive things by contacting the objects with their

external sense organs. This kind of yogic perception that is possible even without the sense organ is called 'Indriyānapekṣam pratyakṣam'. Yogic perception is authentic. Yogins will be blessed with a Divine insight on account of their realization of abnormal yogic powers, or Divine inspiration. Bhagavan Rāmānuja does not deny this Divine insight of Yogins. But he does not admit the possibility of the Śākṣātkāra of the Divine through mere imagination or reflection.

'भावनाबलजमात्रं जगत्कर्तारं प्रत्यक्षं प्रतिक्षिप्तं शास्त्रयोन्यधिकरणे, अन्यत्र भाष्यकारैरेव साक्षाद्योगि-
प्रत्यक्षस्य कण्ठोक्तेः । तस्य सम्भवतोऽपि आगमिकेश्वरज्ञानमूलस्यागमानुवादत्वापादनशक्त्या तत्रोदासी-
न्यात् ।'
(न्या. परि. p. 95).

Yogic perception of this type will be on account of an Adṛṣṭaviseṣa which will be produced by Yogābhyāsa, penance and the like.³⁹ Ārṣa-jñāna is also produced likewise by Prakriṣṭadrṣṭa and so comes under 'Yogic perception'. Deśika quotes the authority of Prajnāparithrāna for this.⁴⁰ Having thus established the possibility and validity of yogic perception Deśika explains what is meant by the statement Indriyānapekṣam. In the opinion of Vedānta Deśika what is discarded here is only ordinary sense organs and not the total absence of all sense organs. The sense organs that are implied here are those that are not Divine. So then, the need for Divine sense organs is emphasised.⁴¹ The term 'Indriyanapekṣa' can be explained in two ways. Either it may be the non-requirement of non-divine sense organs or it may be the total absence of all sense organs just as in the perception of the Supreme the Nityas and the Muktas. The attributive-consciousness of the liberated self attains its original state of illuminating everything and then all things are perceived even without the aid of sense organs. Likewise the consciousness of the sages may be capable of cognising all on account of Bhagavatprasāda and this may be also 'Indriyānapekṣa'. Thus the twofold significance of the term Indriyānapekṣa is explained by Deśika. This Yogic perception itself is verily the mental perception of this school.

Denial of Mental Perception:

But for non-yogins or ordinary people mental perception is not possible.⁴² Mental-perception is not necessary in this school for knowing the self, as in the Nyāya school for the following reasons:⁴³

- (1) The substantive-consciousness is itself self-luminous.
- (2) The attributive-consciousness too is self-luminous.
- (3) The experiences of pleasure pain, desire, hatred and others are only manifestations of consciousness due to different causes.⁴⁴
- (4) The essential nature of the soul such as Nityatva and others are known from the Śāstras.
- (5) The past experiences of ours are known through recollection.

39. N. P. p. 95.

40. N. P. p. 95.

41. N. P. p. 96.

42. N. P. p. 96.

43. N. P. p. 96.

44. V. S. Conjeevaram Edn. pp. 400-401.

Mental perception or Mānasapratyakṣa is, therefore, not included in ordinary perceptions. Rāmānuja deals with this question in his Śrī Bhāṣya while commenting on the Third Sutra 'Śāstra Yonitvāt'. While describing the argument of the Mīmāṃsakas, against the objection that Bhraman is capable of being made out by other means of proof and hence that Brahman is not Śāstraika samadhigamya, Rāmānuja argues that Brahman can not be proved by both the kinds of perception namely, that born of the senses, and that born of Yoga. Further sense perception is subdivided into two types namely 'Bāhyasambhavam' and 'Āntharasambhavam'. After refuting that Bāhyasambhava pratyakṣam is not capable of proving Brahman, Rāmānuja says:

'नाप्यान्तरम् । आन्तरमुखदुःखादिव्यतिरिक्तबहिर्विषयेषु तस्य बाह्येन्द्रियानपेक्षप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः ।'

श्री. भा. I-1-3.

Here the celebrated commentator Sri Sudarsana Bhatta comments as follows:

'मनश्च तद्विषयबोधजनकमित्यर्थः । आन्तरमुखदुःखादीत्यत्रान्तरशब्दः आत्मतद्दर्शनपरः । तद्ग्राहित्वादेव हि मनसोऽप्यान्तरत्वम् ।'

शु. प्र. I-1-3.

The above illustration may create a doubt that Rāmānuja accepted the distinction between mental and non-mental perception. But, if the context is carefully followed, Rāmānuja is only referring to the view point of the Nyaya school here as remarked by Vedanta Desika in his Nyāya Pariśuddhi.⁴⁵ Thus, the view of mental and non-mental perception is not admissible in this school of philosophy.

The perception of non-yogins is that which is born of non-divine external sense organs—'Adivyaabāhyendriya prasūtam.' This sense perception is fivefold corresponding to the five senses namely the eye, the tongue, the nose, the skin and the ear.

Determinate and Indeterminate Perception:

Perception is further subdivided into two broad categories namely Savikalpaka pratyakṣa and Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. Determinate or Savikalpaka perception consists of the recognition of certain relationships and so is defined as:

'सप्रत्ययवमर्शं प्रत्यक्षं सविकल्पकम् ।'

न्या. परि. p. 96.

This is Indriya janya or born of sense-object contact and is also assisted by the retrospection of the object. This is rightly defined as knowledge born of the sense-object contact and assisted by the Samskāras.⁴⁶ There is Anuvritti or cognition of the relationship of a number of things in determinate perception. In the perception 'Iyam Gauh' or 'This is a cow', the object before us is related to the idea of a 'cow' known by us before. The relationship between the object before us and its name is remembered here. Thus there is sense-object contact followed by a recollection of its relation with the object known before.

45. N. P. p. 96.

46. Dar p. 214.

The former mental impressions that remain, help the senses to grasp the objects in all their details. Thus, the objects experienced in Savikalpaka pratyakṣa are distinguished from others as their essential characteristics will be distinctly noticed. The name of the object, its important features, its configuration, its qualities and functions will all be noticed. The object, its qualities and their relationship will all be thus conspicuous in Savikalpaka pratyakṣa.

Indeterminate or Nirvikalpakapratyakṣam does not signify the cognition of an undifferentiated and unqualified object. On the other hand, it is the cognition of an object unaccompanied with former mental impressions. Even in this kind of perception, the object is qualified by certain attributes such as configuration etc., but devoid of retrospection as it happens to be the first object of that kind cognized. There is no pratyavamarśa here as in Savikalpaka pratyakṣam.⁴⁷

The Nayyāyika takes Nirvikalpaka perception to signify a perception of an object devoid of attributes, relations, jāti and others, and gives the perception of an infant for this as an illustration. This view is not tenable according to the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Vedānta Desika argues that even the perception of an infant or a dumb person cannot be devoid of all attributes. Cognition of an object devoid of all characteristics is impossible and opposed to all human experience.

‘अविशिष्टवस्तुग्राहिणो ज्ञानस्यानुपलम्भात् अनुपपत्तेश्च । बालमूकद्वयं ग्राहिविज्ञानमपि हि संज्ञादिविकल्परहितमपि विशिष्टविषयमेव अन्यथा तेषां हेयोपादेयविभागपूर्वकप्रवृत्तिविशेषानुपपत्तेः ।’
(न्या. परि. p. 96).

The essential characteristics of the object are grasped in all kinds of perceptions either determinate or indeterminate. In determinate perception, the attributes are cognized as related to the object known before, followed with retrospection. But in indeterminate perception this kind of Anuvritti only is absent. But the grasp of the object qualified by certain attributes does exist. If this is denied, then the perception cannot lead us to any purposeful activity, and so does not become Vyavahārānugūṇa. Rāmānuja expounds the difference between Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa as follows:

‘सविकल्पकं जात्याद्यनेकपदार्थविशिष्टविषयत्वादेवसविशेषविषयम् । निविकल्पकमपि सविशेषविषयमेव । सविकल्पके स्वस्मिन्ननुभूतपदार्थविशिष्टप्रतिसन्धानहेतुत्वात् । निविकल्पकं नाम केनचिद्विशेषणवियुक्तस्य ग्रहणम् । न सर्वविशेषरहितस्य । तथाभूतस्य कदाचिदपि ग्रहणादर्शनादनुपपत्तेश्च । ... अतो निविकल्पकमेकजातीयद्रव्येषु प्रथमपिण्डग्रहणम् । द्वितीयादिपिण्डग्रहणम् सविकल्पकमित्युच्यते ।’

श्री. भा. I—1-1.

The above exposition makes clear the view point of Viśiṣṭādvaita and sets at naught the Nirvikalpaka conceptions of the Nayyāyikas and the Advaitins at the same stroke. Indeterminate perception of the kind proposed by the Nyāya school is untrue to all experience. Likewise the theory of the Advaitins that Sanmātram is the object of perception is also unsound.⁴⁸

47. Y. M. D.

48. S. B. 1-1-1; T. M. K. 4-32.

The gist of all this discussion is summed up by Desika and the definition of Nirvikalpaka is given as follows:

‘तस्मात् संस्कारशून्येन्द्रियजनितमतिः निर्विकल्पेतिवाच्या ।’ (त. मु. क. 4-32).

The process of perception is described by Srinivasa in his Yatīndramata dipikā.

‘आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते । मन इन्द्रियेण । इन्द्रियमर्थेनेति इन्द्रियाणां प्राप्यप्रकाशकारित्वनियमात् ।’
Y. M. D.

The sense organs come into contact with the several objects and when the mind is in union with the senses and when the knowing self is joined with the mind, perception is possible to the knowing self. The sense organs by themselves cannot create cognition. They are merely illuminators (Prakāśakāh). It is the self which is the knower through the mind-sense-object contact. If the mind is not in union with the senses, perception is not possible, and that is the reason why we do not perceive certain objects which are even before our very eyes. The mind, so, must have contact with the senses on the one hand, and the self on the other. The sense-relation of perception is Samyōga or one of conjunction, and not Samavāya as in the school of Nyāya.

This sense-object contact is, in all cases of ordinary perception, of two types: (1) one of conjunction or samyōga and (2) another of complex conjunction or Samyuktāśrayana.

Whenever an object is perceived the sense-object contact is one of conjunction. Whenever the attributes of the objects are perceived along with the object the sense-object contact is one of complex conjunctions.

‘द्रव्यगतरूपादिग्रहणे समवायानङ्गीकारात् संयुक्ताश्रयणसम्बन्धः ।’ Y. M. D.

When the visual sense comes into contact with any object, it comes into contact not only with that object, but also with its attributes, namely, the colour, configuration and others. This is through the relation of Āśrayana and this relation is called Samyuktāśrayana. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians do not admit the sixfold sense-object contact of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas.

Tatvaratnākara declares this as follows:

‘अत्र वृद्धा विवामासुः संयोगः सन्निकर्षणम् ।
संयुक्ताश्रयणं चेति यथासम्भवमूह्यताम् ॥’
न्या. परि. p. 96.

And again perception is twofold namely Arvāchēnam and Anarvāchēnam or recent and ancient. The Anarvāchēnam or ancient perception is capable of perceiving all things at the same time. Desika defines this as:

‘युगपदशेषविषयसाक्षात्कारक्षमं अनर्वाचीनम् ।’
न्या. परि. P. 97.

and this happens only to the Yogins, the released and the Supreme Being⁵⁰.

50. तत् योगिमुक्तेश्वराणां प्रभावविशेषाधीनमुपपादयिष्यते ।
N. P. p. 97.

Perception includes in itself recollection or Smṛti, Recognition or Pratyabhijñā, Non-existence or Abhāva, Conjecture or Ūha, Doubt or Saṃśaya and Special mental powers or Prathibhāh. These are not therefore different pramāṇas. Recollection has perception alone for its origin and so is not a different pramāṇa though it is Vyavahārānuṅga or workable in practical life. The residual mental impressions are responsible for recollection and previous experience is the cause of such impressions⁵¹. So recollection gets included in perception itself. Recollection is caused by Sādṛśya (similarity), Adṛṣṭa (effect of previous karma), Chinta (deep thought) and Sāhacharya (concomitance). When an object resembles another we are reminded of the other due to similarity. Due to the effect of our previous karma, we may remember spontaneously a prior experience. When there is conscious meditation we may recollect the auspicious figure of the Lord enshrined in any holy temple. If we are used to see two friends invariably together, the sight of one kindles the recollection of another. It is clear from the above analysis that recollection is based on previous perceptual experience. But it is not necessary that we should recollect all things we have experienced before for many of our Samskāras or residual impressions get obscured due to various reasons such as lapse of time, disease, etc.

‘क्वचित्कालदेर्घ्यात् व्याध्यादिना वा संस्कारप्रमोषात् स्मृत्यभावः ।’

Y. M. D. p. 13.

In recognition, the prior experience of our object is affirmed, by the present experience of the same object. This is perceptual experience as it is born of sense-object contact. Recognition is of the form of ‘This is that Devadatta’ and this is rightly included in perception according to Viśiṣṭādvaita logic⁵².

The system of Viśiṣṭādvaita considers Abhāva also as another form of existence and so the knowledge of non-existence is perceptual.

अभावस्त्वस्मन्मते भावान्तरात्मा । स चाक्षादिभिः यथासम्भवं सिध्यति ।

न्या. परि. p. 176.

Advaitins and Bhattas accept Abhāva as a pramāṇa where as the Nayyāyikas consider it as a distinct category, though they do not admit it as a pramāṇa. Ūha or conjecture, as well as Saṃśaya or doubt, arises out of perception, and so should be included in perception itself. Likewise, the special mental powers of great men are also included in pratyakṣa.

‘पुण्यपुरुषनिष्ठा प्रतिभापि प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्गता ।’

Y. M. D. P. 14.

It is the understanding of the Vedantins that all perceptual cognition has what is real for its object. The primary as well as the secondary texts affirm that the same indweller and controller is cognised in all cognition. The Sadvidyā has a bearing upon this theory⁵³.

51. स्मृतेः प्रामाण्याङ्गीकारेऽपि संस्कारसापेक्षत्वात् तस्याः प्रत्यक्षमूलभूतत्वात् मूलभूते प्रत्यक्षे अन्तर्भावइति न पृथक् प्रमाणात्वकल्पनम् ।

Y. M. D. p. 11.

52. Bhāttas and Advaitins take this as a cognition consisting of Pratyakṣa and Smṛti. Nayyāyikas take this as a special kind of perception-

53. Phil. of Vis., P. N. S., p. 60.

That cosmic principle, the 'Sat', thought of becoming many and created the elements. That primordial being got the tripartite combination of the elements and entered those elements, as the indweller of the Jīva and articulated names and forms. Thus all this is ensouled by the Supreme soul. And all kinds of elements are existing in all things on account of the fact of quintuplication. The Viṣṇu Purāṇa also speaks of evolution in the same terms. The Sūtrakāra also refers to the combination of these three elements, in the Sūtras⁵⁴. The existence of all elements in all things does not, anyhow lead to any confusion at all as the preponderant element shapes the thinghood of every object. One element becomes the Āśraya and the others the Āśritas. This concept of dependency implies variation in preponderance.

Cases of error in perception are due to existing ocular defects and when one is free from those defects there will be no illusion for one⁵⁵. In this school of thought all cognitions are real. The cognition of a dream is also real, as the scripture states that the supreme creates chariots etc., that remain for a certain time to be experienced by particular souls, according to their spiritual merit or demerit. The cognition of the yellow conch is real, due to the real cause of the effect of the bile, in the eye. The cognition of the crystal as red, when placed near a Japākusuma, is also real⁵⁶.

The cognition of water in mirage is true. The cognition of one direction being mistaken for another is also true, as one direction exists in another.

When the fire brand is swung round, that object comes in conjunction with all points of the circle, and the cognition of the fiery wheel is also real.

The cognition of one's own face in the mirror is also true as the visual rays moving towards the mirror are reversed by the mirror, and these cognize the persons own face after cognizing the mirror. This process is very rapid and so the interval between the perception of the mirror and the reflections is not apprehended. Even the apprehension of the double moon is real, as it is due to a real cause. Due to the pressure of the finger on the eye the visual rays are actually divided, and so the cognition of a double moon ensues, on account of the existence of two independent apparatus.

Thus all types of perceptions are real and have for their objects only those that are affected with difference.

Perception is not born out of a verbal statement:

The school of Viśiṣṭādvaita does not admit the possibility of perception born out of a verbal statement, as posited by the school of Śāṅkara. Knowledge has no doubt the element of perception as well as the element of scripture, but one should not be confused with the other. The causal collocation capable of producing knowledge indirectly cannot change its nature. If one kind of material is capable of producing different kinds of effects, then the incompatibility of all kinds of effects being produced by only one kind of causal collocation ensues. Then, the principle that the effect should be of the same kind as the cause also becomes endangered, for one type of causal collocation cannot produce all

54. 'आत्मकत्वात् भूयस्त्वात्'

55. S. B. 1-1-1.

56. S. B. 1,1-1.

kinds of effects. Scripture is capable of producing indirect knowledge only, and so cannot at any time produce direct awareness, through the sense-object contact.

‘नहि परोक्षस्वभावजननतया सिद्धसामग्री विशेषाभावे क्वचित् स्वभावमतिपतेत् । न चैकजातीय-सामग्रीतःप्रसूतं कार्यं विचित्रं स्यात् । एकस्यैव सामग्र्या सर्वजातीयोत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् एकस्य कार्यस्य विरुद्धजातियोग प्रसङ्गाच्च ।’
न्या. परि. p. 97.

In the statement ‘Thou art the tenth’, only ‘Thou’ is a perceptual cognition, and that ‘I am the Tenth’ is not born solely of the sense organs. This is a cognition generated from only the sentence uttered by the person.

‘दशमस्त्वमसि इत्यादिपृष्ठान्तेऽपि त्वमर्थमात्रं प्रत्यक्षम् । दशमोऽहमिति प्रत्ययो हि नेन्द्रियस्वा-
तन्त्र्येणोदेति किन्तु पुरुषवचनानुरोधेन ।’
न्या. परि. p. 97.

If it is maintained that this cognition is also perception, though caused by a statement, then by the same logic the statement ‘Thou art meritorious’ also must be treated as perception which results in athiprasanga, as Dharma is not admitted to be the object of perception. In that case, there will be nothing in this world which is imperceptible, and there would be no meaning in classifying and differentiating the different means of knowledge at all.

“एवं धर्मवान् त्वमसि इति कार्तान्तिकोपदेशादौ तावृशोऽहमस्मीति बोधे धर्मदिरपि प्रत्यक्षत्वप्रसङ्गः ।
ततश्च अप्रत्यक्षमिति जगति किञ्चिन्नस्यात् ।”
न्या. परि. p. 97.

Though scripture is admitted to establish Brahman, verbal cognition as such, does not result in an immediate awareness of Brahman, which, of course, has got to be achieved by means of spiritual discipline. The realization of the Supreme can be brought out not by the texts as such, but only through the Divine Will to save the soul that loves immensely the Divine.

It is, therefore, the conclusion of this school that a verbal statement is not capable of generating Aparokṣa jñānam.

Now, we may sum up, as follows, the essential features of perception according to this school:

1. Perception is Sākṣātkāri Pramā or immediate experience of the objects. It does not depend upon any other kind of knowledge, but is born on the other hand, solely due to sense-object contact. Perception is possible to all selves and the lord.
2. The perception of the supreme Being, as well as that of the Eternal and Liberated souls, is eternal where as the perception of others is non-eternal.
3. Yogic perception is the only kind of mental perception in this school.
4. Indeterminate perception implies cognition of an object necessarily qualified by certain ATTRIBUTES. The perception of the first object of the kind is indeterminate, whereas successive perceptions are determinate, being followed by retrospection.

5. All cases of perception are real. Perceptual error arises due to the fact of non-apprehension of the essential features of an object as well as its difference from others.
6. As all aspects of reality cannot be known by perception there is need for inference and scripture.

III. INFERENCE COGNITION

Inference a distinct means of knowledge:

There are different means of gaining knowledge and we have examined the very first means of our approach to the objects of the external world viz., perception, in the previous section. Perception must necessarily stop somewhere, for its scope is limited to the sense-object contact only. Even after the cessation of the sense-object contact, we arrive at knowledge by means of Anusandhāna or the process of mental assimilation. Likewise, verbal testimony or speech also is, by itself, capable of conveying sense, and so happens to be a distinct means of valid knowledge. Thus, these three namely perception, inference and speech, have different characteristics of their own, though they are alike in their function of illuminating an object to a subject.

The distinctive characteristics of inference are as follows:—

- i) Inference is capable of apprehending an object out of sight as it can function even after the cessation of the sense-object contact.
- ii) It requires the Anusandhāna or the mental process of correlation between the pervader and the pervaded as perceived before.
- iii) Though the residual mental impressions are involved in inference, it is distinct from mental perception. The sub-conscious impressions are in the background in perception, whereas in inference, they feature prominently in the comprehension of the concomitance between the general and the particular.
- iv) Inference is distinct from memory. Memory brings to our mind only those things that are previously experienced, whereas inference illumines things never before experienced. This fact of Adhikaviṣayatva differentiates inference from memory.
- v) Inference is different from verbal knowledge for this has quite different factors operating in the generation of knowledge.
- vi) Inference is based on perception, and yet it is distinct and different from perception and scripture.⁵⁷

57. The objection of the Chārvakas against the distinctive nature of inference viz.,

‘विशेषेऽनुगमाभावात् सामान्ये सिद्धसाधनात् ।

तद्वतोऽनुपपन्नत्वात् अनुमानकथा कुतः ॥’

is countered thus: तत् स्ववचनविरुद्धम् । अनुमाननिरासाय हेतूपन्यासात् तस्य च हेतोः स्वसाध्यव्याप्य-
नभ्युपगमे अनुमानस्य तेन बाधितुमशक्यत्वात् अभ्युपगमे तत्रापि विशेषेऽनुगमाभावः इत्यादि प्रसङ्गात् ।

(न्या. परि. p. 98.)

Definition and character of inference:

Inference is defined by Vedanta Desika as:

‘व्याप्यस्य व्याप्यत्वानुसन्धानात् व्यापकविशेषप्रतीतिरनुमानम् ।’

न्या. परि. p. 98.

Inferential cognition is the valid knowledge of the particular pervader or ‘Vyāpaka’ obtained from the observation of the pervadedness of the pervaded or Vyāpya. Here are three terms namely ‘Vyāpya’, ‘Vyāpaka’ and ‘Anusandhāna’. The Vyāpya or the pervaded is, as a rule not more extensive than the Vyāpaka or pervader in respect of space and time. We come to know from our daily experience that certain objects exist together in respect of space and time. Some objects exist in a wider range than others whereas some exist in a smaller range. Some sets of objects have an equal range of existence, and to include them also as pervaded, the definition of Vyāpya is given by this school as ‘Anadhika dēśa kāla niyatam.’ The vyāpya, therefore, does not cover a greater range than the vyāpaka. This means that the vyāpya might be smaller in range or might equally coexist spatially or temporally with the vyāpaka. The vyāpaka or pervader is defined as ‘Anyūnadēśakālavṛtti’ or that which is not less extensive than the vyāpya in respect of time and space. According to this the pervader has to cover a greater range than the pervaded, or atleast an equal range as that of the vyāpya⁵⁸.

We observe different objects existing together spatially and temporally and arrive at the principle of invariable concomittance, and later apply this law of invariable concomittance in particular cases, and this is known as Anusandhāna.

This application of the law that is previously deduced is the essential part of inference. The vyāpyatva or pervadedness of the pervaded or vyāpya is analysed in each case and fresh objects are found out by means of past experiences. So Anusandhāna is very important as the nature of the vyāpya is clearly shown by this. To give an illustration we may consider the relationship between fire and smoke. Fire is a particular pervader and smoke is invariably pervaded by fire. Wherever there is smoke there is fire, but smoke is not invariably existent wherever there is fire. In this instance we find that smoke is not more extensive than fire whereas fire is not less extensive than smoke. The knowledge of this particular pervader namely fire is cognised through inference.

For valid inference, it is very essential that we should grasp the unconditional correlation between the vyāpya and the vyāpaka. All objects of our experience are not vyāpya, and therefore, one has to deduce the law of association, by means of actual observation and accurate analysis. Logicians cannot, however, ignore the upādhis or counter-

This objection is self-contradictory as reasons have been duly put forward for the refutation of inference. If the inference used by the opponent for purposes of smashing down the validity of inference is admitted as not governed by pervasion it becomes, in fact, ineffective. If pervasion is admitted the charge against inference applies to it also equally. Thus validity of inference cannot be refuted at any rate.

58. यो यस्य देशकालादयो समो न्यूनोऽपि वा भवेत् ।
स व्याप्यो व्यापकस्तस्य समो चाभ्यधिकोऽपि वा ॥’

न्या. परि. p. 98.

laws defying the concomittance of objects. So we have to find out carefully these upādhis or counter-laws in every case of vyāpya and vyāpaka. What is an upādhi then? It is defined as:⁵⁹

‘साधनाव्यापकत्वे सति साध्यसमव्याप्तः साधनधर्मव्यतिरिक्तः धर्मः उपाधिः ।’

न्या. परि. p. 100.

A characteristic which is not extensively applicable to the sādhana or vyāpya, but which applies extensively to the sadhya or vyāpaka, being in itself different from the sādhana or vyāpya is an upādhi. In the proposition ‘The mountain is fiery because it has smoke’, the contact with wet fuel is found invariably in every place where there is smoke, but not in every place where there is fire. So this contact with wet fuel is less extensive than fire, but co-extensive with smoke. The presence of an upādhi does not allow unconditional correlation between the vyāpya and the vyāpaka and consequently vitiates the inference⁶⁰. This upādhi is of two types namely definite and doubtful. The following is an example for an upādhi of a definite type:

‘विप्रतिपन्ना सेवा दुःखहेतुः राजसेवावत् इत्यनुमाने पापारब्धत्वम् ईश्वरसेवायां नास्तीति शास्त्रतो निश्चितत्वात् व्याप्तत्वाच्च निश्चितोपाधिः ।

न्या. परि. p. 100.

‘Service is the cause of unhappiness just like the service of a king’. In the above instance our invariable association does not subsist between the vyāpya and the vyāpaka viz., service and unhappiness, as it is ascertained by the scriptures that unhappiness does not exist in the service of God. In the service of God there is no pāpārabdhata or result of previous demerit. This characteristic of pāpārabdhata is extensively applicable to the vyāpaka namely causing unhappiness but is not extensively applicable to the vyāpya or service. So there is no correlation between the sādhya and the sādhana, namely service and unhappiness. This upādhi is definite, as it is so ascertained by the Śāstras.

Upādhi is also of a doubtful nature as in the following example:

‘विप्रतिपन्नो जीवः एतच्छरीरावसाने मुक्तिमान् निष्पन्नसमाधित्वात् शुकादिवदित्यत्र कर्मात्यन्तपरिक्षयः उपाधिः । सच निष्पन्नसमाधौ विप्रतिपन्ने जीवे अस्तित्वा नास्ति वा इति सन्दिग्धत्वात् शङ्कितोपाधिः ।

न्या. परि. p. 100.

‘This self attains liberation at the end of this body as it has achieved samādhi just like śuka’. In this inference the upādhi happens to be the total destruction of previous karma. As it is doubtful whether the self in question has any residual karma or not, the sādhya and the sādhana cannot be unconditionally correlated. Though yōgins free themselves from the bondage of both accumulated and the future karmas they cannot get themselves rid of the prārabdhā karma, without actually exhausting it by experience. It may be that they

59. See T. M. K. 4-43, and 45.

60. व्याप्तिरुपाधिसम्भवेदुच्यते ।

take many births to exhaust it completely. So there can be no correlation between Niṣpannasamādhitva and Liberation. The total absence of any karma is the upādhi here, and as the existence or otherwise of this characteristic cannot be definitely known, This is designated as Śankithōpādhi.

The upādhi or the counter-law takes many forms and one has to observe carefully each case of correlation of the vyāpya and the vyāpaka. This upādhi has to be avoided by means of Tarka⁶¹.

So, it becomes established that Anusandhāna of the pervadedness of the pervader means the process of mentally analysing the un conditional correlation between the vyāpya or the reason and the vyāpaka or the point to be proved⁶².

Essential features of inference according to Viśiṣṭādvaita:

Though inferential cognition is accepted as a means of valid knowledge by the school of viśiṣṭādvaita, it differs from the other schools in its details and has some special features of its own. These are:

1. Observation of a number of instances for grasping pervasion.
2. The refutation of Kevala Vyathirēki Anumāna.
3. The refutation of Parāthānumāna.
4. No restriction regarding the usage of the component parts of the formal inference.
5. Inference includes Tarka also.

Let us now examine each of these in brief.

1. Vyāpti or the invariable association between two objects is ascertained by means of repeated observation⁶³. The view point of Parāśara Bhattāchārya as experienced in Tatvaratnākara is that pervasion is perceived by observing even a single instance if it is determinative.⁶⁴

But Varada Viṣṇu Misra is of the opinion that pervasion can be grasped only by observing a number of instances⁶⁵. The relation of vyāpti cannot be known only by perceiving it once. A single experience, it is said, cannot establish this, for one experience cannot bring out an extraordinary perception involving the cognition of things that are even afar, as Samānya-lakṣana-pratyāsatti is not admissible here. So the relation of pervasion is to be understood, according to Desika, who follows Varada Viṣṇu Miśra, only by means of repeated observation. Sahachāradarśana, or observation of concomitance, is essential, be it found in one or a number of experiences. Experience is necessary for the cognition of vyāpti. As a universal pervasion cannot be established by a single instance, it is maintained,

61. T. M. K. 4-47., See Sarvārtha Siddhi p. 216.

62. 'तदेवं निरुपाधिकसम्बन्धं व्याप्यमिति सिद्धम् ।'

(न्या. परि. p. 100).

63. यथोपलम्भं भूयोभिर्दर्शनैर्मीयते तुसा ।

सकृदेवानवच्छिन्नसम्बन्धो न हि भासते ॥

(न्या. परि. p. 99.)

64. 'सम्बन्धोऽयं सकृद्ग्राह्यः'

(न्या. परि. p. 99.)

65. 'तस्मादनुमानाद्भूता व्याप्तिः भूयोदर्शनावसेयैव ।'

(न्या. परि. p. 99)

to be on the safer side, that Bhūyōdarśana, or repeated observation, is needed for the establishment of vyāpti⁶⁶.

2. Inference is of two types according to this school namely Anvaya vyathirēki or affirmative-cum-negative and Kevalānvayin or bare co-affirmation⁶⁷. The anvayavyathirēkin probans has both positive and negative concomitance. It has got its vipakṣa or counter-instance as well. In the example 'The mountain has fire because it has smoke'—the positive concomitance such as, 'whatever has smoke has fire just as the hearth' is as prominent as the negative concomitance, such as, 'whatever has no fire has no smoke like a lake'. This kind of reason is affirmative-cum-negative. Every act of inference has two aspects or limbs namely vyāpti and Pakṣadharmatā. Vyapti or pervasion forms the subjective aspect whereas Pakṣadharmatā or subject-characterisation has an objective aspect. These two elements are involved in every act of inference. These together have five conditions as follows:—

Vyapti or pervasion has (1) Sapakṣa Satvam or presence in similar instances, (2) Vipakṣa vrittirahitvatvam or absence in counter-instance. The Pakṣadharmatā aspect has the aspects of (3) Pakṣavyāpakatvam or presence in the subject; (4) Abādhitā Viṣayatvam or unstultified object. Both have in common (5) Asatpratipakṣatvam or absence of opposite problems.

All these five phases are found in the Anvaya vyathirēki inference.

पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमात् ।
योयो धूमवान् स सोऽग्निमान् यथा महानसः ।
योऽग्निः स निर्धूमः यथा महाहृदः ।

The affirmative-cum-negative inference is that which has a counter instance as well and has all the five phases of vyāpti and pakṣadharmatā, required for a perfect inference.

*The kevalānvayi inference is pure positive reason and has no counter instance.

In the example, "Brahman is expressible by word, because it is a thing like a jar",

'ब्रह्म शब्दवाच्यं वस्तुत्वात् द्रव्यत्वाद्वा घटादिवत् ।

This reason of being verbally expressible is purely affirmative, and as there is not a vipakṣa, the negative reason is totally excluded. This is Kevalānvayi. It is defined as

'तादृशमेव विपक्षरहितं केवलान्वयि ।'

(न्या. परि. p. 102)

This kind of reason has only four of the five conditions as the fact of being absent in the counter instance is ruled out, due to the total absence of a counter instance itself. Even

66. 'तत्र सर्वेषु भूयोदर्शनम् न परित्याज्यम् । तत्रापि भूयोदर्शनजनितसंस्कारसमुदायाधीनविमर्शविशेषेणोपाधिसम्भावनामुच्छिन्दता निश्चङ्कं सम्बन्धनियमसिद्धिरिति च सिद्धम्' न्या. परि. p. 99. 'आद्येनैव दर्शनेन व्याप्तिगृह्यते । भूयसां तु दर्शनानां व्यभिचारनिराकरणमात्रं फलमित्यर्थः । तर्केण पुनः व्यभिचार-स. सि. p. 216.

67. N. P. p. 102.

this Kevalānvayi reason, according to Desika, is claimed to have all the five aspects of inferential cognition. The very fact of the Kevalānvayi reasons having no counter instance proves necessarily its Vipakṣa Vrittirahitatvam⁶⁸.

The Kevalānvayin cannot be deemed to be invalid, just because of the absence of the counter instance. The absence of a counter instance itself, once for all, rules out the possibility of the reason being present in the counter instance, and so goes to prove its validity itself. If it is contended that the Kevalānvayin cannot be admitted, as it would lead to unjustifiable conclusions such as, 'Fire is cold because it is an object just like a jar', it shall be answered that it is not so. In the given instance, the coldness of the fire is contradictory to all human experience, and so such an inference is smashed to pieces. But such Kevalānvayi inferences that are not contradicted by experience are perfectly valid.

The Kevalānvayi has certain definite advantages. Firstly, this kind of inference establishes the validity of the scriptures, and demolishes the counter attack of the Buddhists. Secondly, people of ordinary intelligence will not turn out disbelievers of the scriptures that declare the Absolute Brahman to be beyond speech and thought⁶⁹. Thus the bare-affirmative implies the contradiction of the opposite of the Sādhya, and in the long run, results in the establishment of the sādhyā itself.

Negation of Kēvala Vyathirēki Inference:

While there exists the bare affirmative reason, as well as the affirmative-cum-negative reason, there does not exist according to Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians, a bare negative reason. That is why the Kēvalavyathirēki inference or the bare negative inference is rejected.

The following are the reasons put forth for the rejection of the bare negative.

1. The bare negative has no factual foundation, as the very essential characteristic of 'Sapakṣa Satvam' is missing in it.
2. It is impossible to grasp in the Kevalavyathireki inference any invariable concomitance operating between the Sādhya and the Sādhana, just because the Sādhya happens to be the unknown as in the example⁷⁰.

'अनुभूतिः अननुभाव्या अनुभूतित्वात् । यवनुभाव्यं न सा अनुभूतिः यथा घटः ।

'Consciousness is uncognizable as it is consciousness. What is cognizable is not consciousness just like a pot'. When the very knowledge of the Sādhya is impossible, it is obvious that there cannot be any process of inference at all, which necessarily involves the knowledge of the Sādhya and the Sādhana.

'केवलव्यतिरेकिणि साध्याप्रसिद्धेः तद्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः दुर्ग्रहा ।'

(न्या. परि. p. 105.)

68. 'तर्हि विपक्षरहितस्य केवलान्वयिनो विपक्षवृत्त्यभावः कथमिति चेत्, हन्त किं तस्य विपक्षवृत्तित्वमस्ति? तदपि नास्तीति चेत् तर्हि तावदेवानुमानाङ्गमित्युक्तम् । तदभावेऽपि तद्वृत्तिलक्षणविशिष्टस्यासिद्धेः'

न्या. परि. p. 102

69. T. M. K. 4-51; न्या. परि. p. 102.

70. T. M. K. 4-52, 53.

3. Inference has got its own limitations according to this school, and cannot prove the existence of God and the individual self, and so it is restricted to only the sphere of humanly sensible objects. So much so, Kēvalavyathirēkī inference is not needed for proving super-sensible objects, as posited by thinkers of other schools.
4. Kēvalavathirēkī inference is not indispensable for accurately defining things, as argued by some schools. The Anvyavyathirēkī inference itself does this function of definitions very successfully. Even in Anvyavyathirēkī the affirmative concomitance itself is the most important, and the negative reason only goes to prove the former.

‘लक्षणस्य केवलव्यतिरेकित्वाभावात् ।’

(न्या. परि. p. 150).

The opinions of Varada Viṣṇu Misra and Parāśara Bhattāraka, appearing to be leaning towards the acceptance of the bare negative, when closely examined, appear to be the prima-facie view, being that of Akṣapada only. It is therefore the opinion of Deśika that the bare negative is completely inadmissible. Nyāyakulīśa of Ātreya Rāmānuja also clearly states that this is not the view of the Siddhāntin⁷¹.

So, the syllogism of the type of Kevalavyathirēkī is not acceptable to this school, as it is far from experience. It may be argued that the bare-affirmative reason is also subject to the same kind of defect, as seen in the following example.

‘घटः स्वप्रकाशः घटत्वात् । न यदेवं न तदेवं यथा घटः ।’

This argument is incorrect. All types of examples of the bare-negative are fundamentally defective as pervasion is totally absent there. Vyathirēka vyāpti is incomprehensible, as they are beyond human experience. But, an instance of bare-affirmative is not so. In this case, the most significant point is Anvaya Vyāpti and this can be surely grasped and so this bare-affirmative reason is quite valid⁷².

The argument that the bare negative is essential for accurately defining objects also falls flat as the bare-negative alone does not define a thing⁷³. The Tatvarathnākara affirms that the extraordinary features of an object have got to be noted to define them and to distinguish them from like and unlike objects.

‘असाधारणधर्मोपस्थापनेन व्यवहारव्यवस्थापकमाप्तवाक्यादिकमेव लक्षणम् ।’

(न्या. परि. p. 105)

The bare-negative cannot stand to this test. Prameya is defined as Pramāviṣaya, and this does not happen in the case of the bare negative.

‘प्रमाविषयः प्रमेयामित्यादियु च लक्षणतया संमतेषु विपक्षशून्यत्वेन केवलव्यतिरेकित्वभङ्गप्रसङ्गः ।’

(न्या. परि. p. 105).

71. N. P. p. 103.

72. N. P. p. 105.

73. N. P. p. 105.

The object of prama, then, must necessarily be an existent and never a bare-negative. The bare-negative is bound to be denied, even if Lakṣaṇa is defined as comprising of both positive and negative (Anvayavyathirēkī Viśeṣa), as this positive-cum-negative pervasion is absent in that bare-negative. The denial of the bare-negative is bound to ensure, even if Lakṣaṇa is defined as,

‘असाधारणो व्यापको धर्मो लक्षणम् ।’

(न्या. परि. p. 105).

Lakṣaṇam has nothing like Kēvalavyathirēkitva at any time. In the following example,

‘शरीरम् पार्थिवम् गन्धवत्त्वात् घटवत् ।

शरीरम् आप्यादिकं न भवति गन्धवत्त्वात् घटवत् ।’

the special characteristic of ‘Gandhavatva’ establishes the fact of pāṛthivatva or otherwise of objects. This characteristic is invariably present in earth and invariably absent in any others. This, therefore, happens to be the distinguishing characteristic of the body⁷⁴. So, the bare-negative has nothing to do with the definition of things, and it cannot help us to grasp the defining characteristics of things, as held by the objector.

The refutation of Parārthānumāna:

Some logicians classify inference into two kinds namely Svārthānumāna and Parārthānumāna. This kind of classification is not agreeable to the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita, for all inferences are only Svārtha, as they are brought out by one’s own Svārthānumāna. A person might understand the generalization viz., ‘Where there is smoke there is fire’, after observing the concomittance of fire and smoke repeated invariably in various places. This is said to be inference for one’s own self. After making out this generalization, he may use a five-membered syllogism to enable others to know the same inferential cognition. Then it is said to be inference for another.

This kind of division into Svārtha and Parārtha is wholly unreasonable, for self-comprehension of the invariable concomittance is the origin of all inferences⁷⁵. All inferences promote one’s own activity in life after enlightening one self about the invariable association of several objects. So inferences are all Svārtha alone.

Even when a syllogistic reasoning is presented to make others know of this inferential cognition, it must be said, that the person infers for himself and he does not cognize, only on the strength of the inferential statement. He becomes aware of the pervasion of things and this knowledge of invariable concomittance enables him to infer for himself after self experience. If inference is said to be for another or parārtha only, on the basis of the use of words by another, then it will have to result in the acceptance of perceptual and verbal knowledge also as inference. So, inference for another is out of question. The essentiality of self experience is emphasised, and the syllogism used only reminds of the

74. ‘तत्त्वतदितरयोः प्रतिक्षेपयोः साधनालक्षणत्वम् गन्धवत्त्वस्य ।’

न्या. परि. p. 106.

75. ‘तदयुक्तम् । सर्वेषामप्यनुमानानां स्वप्रतिसन्धानबलेन प्रवृत्ततया स्वव्यवहारमात्रहेतुत्वेन च स्वार्थत्वात् ।’

न्या. परि. p. 107.

pervasion, on the basis of which one has to infer for oneself. A verbal statement reminding one of the pervasion cannot, therefore, be treated as inference for another⁷⁶.

When we examine these issues carefully, we can conclude that all inferences are only for oneself, but that the *pramāṇas* of inferential cognition are two fold namely (1) Those that are self experienced and (2) those that arise out of the words of others.

‘एतदुक्तं भवति—द्विविधानि प्रमाणानि, स्वयमेव सिद्धानि,
परवाक्यपूर्वाणि चेति सामान्यत एव विभागः कार्यः इति ।’

(न्या. परि. p. 107).

The Component Parts of the Formal Syllogism:

The *Naiyāyikas* advocate that the formal inference should be composed of the five components namely, (1) the proposition (2) the reason (3) the example (4) the application and (5) the conclusion.

While the *Naiyāyikas* uphold this kind of a syllogism having all the five components, the *Mīmāṃsakas* are satisfied with only three viz. *Pratijñā*, *Hetu* and *Udāharaṇa*, The *Buddhists* need only *Udāharaṇa* and *Upanaya* and the rest they consider as superfluous. *Vedānta Desika* declares that there is no hard and fast rule regarding the usage of the component parts of the formal inference, if only *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* are clearly conveyed. So, the component parts are not fixed, and they may be used as the situation demands, and in accordance with the mental attainments of the individuals for whom they are meant. Syllogisms of all types such as the five-membered ones, three-membered ones, those without any part (*Avayava kalpanārahita*) and those having only affirmative-concomitance (*ekavyāptika*) and others are abounding in the works of savants like *Rāmānuja*, *Yāmuna* and other great teachers. What is essential here is that the aspect of pervasion is to be clearly conveyed, and this could be done according to the capacities of the persons for whom it is meant. There is no rule that only five-membered syllogisms should be used always, just because such usages are found in standard works⁷⁷.

Though the two namely *Udāharaṇa* and *Upanaya* are alone ample to establish pervasion, all the other limbs of inference are used just to achieve clarity so that the things to be proved might be clearly explained. So it is the conclusion of this school that all the five members might be used if the inference is meant for immature minds and the two membered or three membered syllogisms might be used when meant for fully mature minds.

Upamāna or Comparison is not a distinct means of Knowledge:

Upamāna or comparison is not a distinct means of valid knowledge according to this school. This school subsumes comparison under *Smṛti* itself⁷⁸. Comparison is composed of three parts, and these relate to perception, inference and verbal testimony respectively. A person hears from a forester that a *gavaya* is just like a cow, and when he goes

76. N. P. p. 107.

77. ‘उपपन्नश्च मृदुमध्यकठोरधियां विस्तरसंग्रहाभ्यां व्यवहारः ।’

(न्या. परि. p. 108).

78. N. P. p. 175.

to a forest sees an animal similar to a cow, and then makes out that it is a gavaya, on the authority of the words of the forester. First of all, the person comes to know the meaning of the word gavaya from a forester, and this part of acquisition of knowledge corresponds to verbal testimony. When that person sees an animal qualified by cow similarity, he remembers the meaning of the Atideśa Vākya, or the directive sentence. This part relates to perceptual cognition for he recalls all about the gavaya on account of his reminiscent impressions. Lastly, when he sees the gavaya in the forest the knowledge of the cow-similarity-cognition arises in him, and this is based on Vyāpti and so relates to inferential cognition. Thus, when Upamāna is analysed, we find that it is comprised of these three aspects of perception, inference, and word. So, this is not admitted as a distinct means of knowledge.

Inference includes Tarka also:

The Nayyāyikas distinguish Tarka from Anumāna or inference, but according to the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita it is considered as a kind of Anumāna, rather than a separate logical category. Vedānta Deśika discusses this issue in his Nyayāpariśuddhi in detail, and concludes that Tarka is a kind of inference itself. It appears that the great Rāmānuja himself distinguishes Tarka from Anumāna in the 'Vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa', "Jijñāsādhikaraṇa" and even in the Gīta Bhāṣya while commenting on the stanza 'मत्तः स्मृतिर्ज्ञानमपोहनं च'. Rāmānuja quotes while commenting on the Sūtra 'तर्कप्रतिष्ठानात्' the stanza 'तर्कोऽप्रतिष्ठः', and clearly distinguishes Tarka from inference. Tarka and inference seem quite different even on the surface.

'This is like this on account of this' is the form of inference whereas 'this may happen so if that were so' is the form of Tarka.

'किञ्च एवंवादेवमिति ह्यनुमानस्वरूपम्, एवं चेदेवं स्यादिति च तर्कप्रकारः ।'

(न्या. परि. p. 141).

So, these two are not held as identical as seen above. It also appears that Varada-nārāyaṇa and Viśṇuchitta hold Tarka to be different from inference. Vedānta Deśika has examined these views thoroughly and with his remarkable acumen, known for syncretism, has arrived at the conclusion that Tarka is not different from inference. Even in Tarka, the principle of Vyāpti is necessarily obtained and there is the Anusandhāna of the Vyāpyatva of the Vyāpya. In so far as the principle of invariable concomitance plays the central role, Tarka is the same as Anumāna. But, there is a slight difference between Tarka and Anumāna, as there is difference in the nature of the reason. The reason in inference happens to be the real as experienced, whereas the reason in Tarka might be falsely imposed for purposes of confutation⁷⁹.

The opinion of the Bhāṣyakāra does not go to prove that Tarka is different from Anumāna. Vedānta Deśika declares that the statement 'तर्को हि नाम' etc., of the Bhāṣya only establishes the validity of Tarka as a kind of inference only⁸⁰. Other statements of

79. N. P. p. 142.

80. न हि तत्रानुमानान्यत्वमुक्तम् । N. P. p. 142,

Rāmānuja regarding Tarka have to be carefully understood and explained, in the same way. Śrī Viśnuchitta has admitted in his 'Sangathimāla', while explaining the sūtra 'Rachanānupapattih', that Tarka necessarily contains invariable concomittance⁸¹. It cannot also be proved that the Bhāṣyakāra considers Tarka as different from inference in his commentary on the Sūtra 'तर्कप्रतिष्ठानात्'. Ramanuja has affirmed, in this context, that mere Tarka is incapable of establishing super-sensible objects. This feature is common to inference, as well as perception, and if Tarka itself is rejected then there is no possibility of any furtherance of knowledge⁸².

But the use of Tarka to substantiate the knowledge derived from scriptures is admitted by all.

Not only this much. The Bhāṣyakāra has expressly used the term Anumāna to mean Tarka in the 'Ārambhanādhikaraṇa'⁸³. Even the author of Tatvaratnākara opines that Tarka is not independently capable of establishing things but only can do so being supported by scriptures. The Tatvaratnākara, no doubt affirms after a detailed discussion in the Nyāya-Pāda that Tarka is not valid. But this cannot be decisive. Even the Bhāṣyakāra, who has expressly stated and placed the Nyāya school as a heretic school along with the Chārvākas, Bauddhas, Jains and others, has of course, used many technicalities of those schools also, while examining the validity of things in accordance with their own aphorisms. Whatever is said like this in the course of argumentation, cannot be defacto conclusions.⁸⁴ So, the validity of Tarka is unquestioned. If it is construed as 'This might be so' and happens to be non-decisive, it gets included in doubt or Samśaya. So, it is described as follows.

'संभवासंभवपरामर्शस्तर्कः'

(न्या. परि. p. 144).

Thus, Deśika has argued to establish the validity of Tarka, and after a synoptic survey of all the contextual texts dealing with Tarka, he concludes that it is identical with inference.

To sum up, we find out that the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita admits the validity of inference as a means of knowledge with some unique characteristics of its own, such as:—

1. The pervasion to be grasped after repeated observation.
2. The rejection of inference for another.
3. The refutation of the bare-negative reason.
4. Releasing the restriction in the usage of the five members in a syllogism.

and 5. Identifying inference with Tarka.

81. N. P. p. 142.

82. 'अतीन्द्रियार्थे शास्त्रमेव प्रमाणम् । तदुपबृंहणायैव तर्कः उपादेयः इति । . . . अन्यथा तर्कमात्रस्याप्रतिष्ठित-
तत्त्वे मीमांसेव हिंसिता स्यात् ।'
न्या. परि. p. 142.

83. N. P. p. 143.

84. N. P. p. 144.

IV. ŚABDA PRAMĀṆA

Verbal testimony is valid means of knowledge:

Verbal testimony or Śabda is a distinct means of valid knowledge different from perception and inference. This is significant in as much as this is the sole means for the establishment of, and enlightenment upon, the super-sensible entities. The experiences of all savants and saints are stored up in word, and this is the most important factor that promotes the furtherance of knowledge and adds to the phenomena of recollection and recognition. Word is the vehicle of human thought, and happens to be a very powerful guide. Verbal testimony is the sole authority for determining the ethical, spiritual and transcendental truths.

Definition:

Verbal knowledge is defined by Vedānta Deśika as

‘अनाप्तानुक्तवाक्यजनितं तदर्थविज्ञानम् तत्प्रमाणम् । कारणदोषबाधकादर्शनात् ।

(न्या. परि. p. 149).

‘The knowledge of the meaning got from the sentence unuttered by a non-trust worthy person is valid, for it is far from the errors of instrument and free from incompatibility’. The term ‘Anāptānukta’ in this definition is significant, as it is used to refute the theory of the personal origin of the veda. The Nayyāyikas define verbal testimony as ‘Āptōpadesah Śabdah’, and admit Divine origin to the Vedas. The Vedas are taken as authorities, as God, ‘The Most Trustworthy person’, has uttered these words. This standpoint is not admissible to Vedāntins who advocate the Apauruṣēyatva or impersonality of the Vedas. If the Vedas were personal, then the defects of the Person would inevitably creep in and result in its invalidity. But the uttered statement of a non-trustworthy person would not be valid, as it would betray defective sources.

If cannot be argued that verbal testimony is invalid, as it is merely a verbal statement. Then we ask whether the sentence, used to attack the validity of verbal testimony, is valid or invalid. If this verbal statement finding fault with scripture is mentioned to be valid, then it also turns out to be equally invalid for the same reason of being a verbal statement as alleged above. If it is admitted that this sentence used to find fault is invalid, then it cannot invalidate the authority of the scripture. Thus, the validity of scripture cannot be questioned. The words of the mad and the like become invalid and incompatible, originating from defective sources, and so the validity of scriptures becomes established.

This is Distinct from Perception, Inference and Recollection:

Verbal testimony is different from perception, as there is no immediacy of awareness through the sense-object contact in it. It is not included in inference, as it has no major or middle term or mental reflection. ‘Śabda has only Bōdhakatva whereas Anumithi has Vyāpti or pervasion. The opinion of Buddhists and Vaiśeṣikas that verbal testimony is

included in inference is not in accordance with our experiences. When we get knowledge from a sentence we never feel that we are inferring. Words have the power of connotation, and this is quite different from pervasion or Vyāpti. The Prabhākaras are of opinion that non-vedic or Laukika passages are included in inference, and this also is incorrect. Deśika affirms his stand that inference is beyond the sphere of verbal knowledge.⁸⁵ As we cannot establish any invariable association between the word and the object it signifies, we cannot at any time call this inference.

We cannot call verbal knowledge as recollection even. The subconscious impressions are essential for causing memory. This factor is not found in scripture which has for its object some thing not known before, and this Apūrvaviṣayatva distinguishes this from memory. We remember only what we have experienced before. But verbal knowledge relates to something with which we become newly acquainted. So, verbal knowledge is distinct and different from perception, inference and memory⁸⁶.

This special characteristic of verbal testimony, which is distinct from others, has been recognized by all savants of the past.

Word and its Meaning:

The propagators of the Nyāya school expound that the meanings of words are decided by either divine or human convention. This type of Vāchya-vāchaka-sambandha is not agreeable to this school. According to this school of thought, this convention is neither God-made nor man-made. The word and its meaning are eternally related to each other. Rāmānuja advocates this theory in his Vedārtha Sangraha, and Deśika strongly upholds it and contends that the words of the Veda need no such convention to convey meaning⁸⁷. All words that are in secular usage are also expounded to have originated from Vedic tradition, and so they do not need any prescribing authority⁸⁸. It is affirmed that all words are somewhere or other found used in the Vedas.

‘भाषाप्रयुक्तस्सर्वोऽपि वेदे क्वापि प्रयोगवान् ।
वेदकनियतः शब्दः नान्यत्रेति व्यवस्थितिः ॥’

(न्या. परि. p. 150).

Rāmānuja also strongly maintains in his Vedārtha Sangraha that all words are only Vedic.

Classification of Sentence:


A sentence is a particular group of words and this is of two kinds viz., personal (Pauruṣeya) and impersonal (Apauruṣeya). The original composition of a man is Pauruṣeya and sentences which are impersonal are Apauruṣeya.

85. T. M. K. 4-67.

86. N. P. p. 149.

87. T. M. K. 4-71.


88. N. P. p. 149.



The original compositions of human beings are both with and without sense, whereas the impersonal texts are always meaningful and never incompatible. The sentences like 'fire is cold', 'water is not liquid', are examples of non-sensible compositions.

Vṛtti or senses and the word:

Again, there are two kinds of senses namely the primary sense and the secondary sense. The primary denotation signifies the philological or conventional meaning. When the primary sense is stultified, the sense nearest to it is taken, and this is the secondary denotation. This secondary relationship is of a two-fold nature—one that is mainly connected with the primary sense itself, and another connected with its attributes. 'A hamlet on the Ganga', is an example for the former, whereas 'Devadatta is a lion' is an example for the latter. In the former 'the bank of the Ganga' is implied, and in the latter, Devadatta is ascribed with the qualities of valour and strength connected with the word lion. This can be shown in the following way:



The Theory of the Verbal Knowledge:

A number of words make a sentence, and when we hear a sentence we get some knowledge. How do these words convey this knowledge? We find here two aspects. Many words are used and these have various meanings in a sentence in connection with various words. The words must have something to do with the different meanings independently. But this is not all. The words alone cannot produce verbal knowledge. A group of disorderly and ungrammatical words can convey no sense. So, the connection between word and a word in a sentence is also an important factor. Then does verbal knowledge depend upon the connection in a sentence among the meanings expressed by words individually or does it depend upon the meanings expressed by the words in a sentence only that pro-

duce in us a knowledge of the mutual connection among them? This is an important question that has been elaborately discussed from very early times. Some philosophers give primary importance to the Anvaya, or connection among the words of a sentence, and affirm that the words of the sentence disappear after conveying their respective meanings, after which the meanings themselves produce in us a knowledge of their mutual connection which is called verbal knowledge. This theory of verbal knowledge is called the Abhihitānvaya vāda and is advocated by Bhatta mīmāsakas and Nayyāyikas. The followers of Advaita vedānta also uphold this theory of the connection of the expressed alone.

The other view point about verbal knowledge gives primary importance not to the connection or Anvaya, but to the words. They argue that words by themselves cannot convey sense, but, that they can have the power of sense only in a sentence. So mutual connection is produced only in a sentence. So it is not the connection of the expressed which is important but the expression of the connected which is really essential for conveying verbal knowledge. The Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas are the propagators of this theory of verbal knowledge which is known as Anvitābhīdhāna vāda.

What is the theory of knowledge that is adopted by the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita? The school of Viśiṣṭādvaita is divided on this issue. Some teachers of this School held the theory of Abhihitānvaya as theirs, in accordance with the exposition of some sūtras by Rāmānuja, whereas others like Yāmunačārya and others were advocates of the Anvitābhīdhāna theory. Deśika upholds the theory of Anvitābhīdhāna as the accepted theory of this school. Every word is formed of the Prakṛthi and the Prathyaya or the affix, and both these convey together a united sense. Likewise, all the words of a sentence together convey a total sense, as in the word 'Dandya'. Though the word is divisible into the prakṛthi part and the prathyaya part, it conveys one Viśiṣṭārtha or a single combined sense. Similarly, the words of a sentence also convey a unitary sense comprising of the meanings reminded by the respective words.

‘यथा पदानि प्रकृतिप्रत्ययविभागेन विभक्तान्यपि विशिष्टमेकं पदार्थं वदन्ति; एवं पदान्यपि परस्पर-
स्मारितार्थं विशिष्टमेकं अर्थं वदन्ति ।’ (स. सि. p. 240).

This theory of knowledge is free from the fallacies of Chakraka or the wheel, or Punarabhidhā or tautology. The fallacy of chakraka in the other theory is as follows. First, the several words convey their respective senses. Then there is the process of reflection regarding the relationship of the words. Thirdly, the words yield their senses again according to the connection. Lastly, there is the awareness of the meaning. This is chakraka:

‘पद्वर्यंप्रतीतिः । अनन्तरमाकांक्षाविपरामर्शः । पश्चात् पदं: अर्थाभिधानम् । ततोऽर्थंप्रतीतिरिति
• चक्रकम् ।’ (स. सि. p. 241).

The fallacy of Anyōnyāśraya is inescapable in the theory of Abhihitānvaya. The meanings are possible to be conveyed only after reflecting over the Ākamaṣka and others. The Ākamaṣka or expectancy and others are possible to be made only after knowing the meanings. All these defects are avoided in the theory of Anvitābhīdhāna. The theory of

Abhihitānvaya, on the other hand, is very cumbersome, for one has to admit a triple power of sense.

- 1) Firstly, the power of the word to convey its sense.
- 2) Secondly, the power of the meanings of the individual words to convey their connection.
- 3) Thirdly, the power of the words conveying sense-connectedness in the individual word meanings.

‘पदानां स्वार्थबोधनशक्तिः पदार्थानां संसर्गबोधनशक्तिः, पदानामेव पदार्थेषु संसर्गबोधनशक्त्याधान-
शक्तिरिति शक्तित्रयं कल्प्यमभिहितान्वयवादिनः ।’
(स. सि. p. 241).

But, the theory of Anvitābhidhāna is not so. It is very simple. The individual words have got only Smāratva or the power of bringing a glimpse of their meanings to the hearers. But, consistent meaning is possible only in a sentence.

When a sentence is heard by a person the process will be as follows:

The several words recall to the mind of the listener a glimpse of their respective meanings. When the hearer has recollected the meanings of the words, he apprehends the meanings according to Ākamkṣa or expectancy, Yōgyatā or compatibility and Āsatthi or juxtaposition. The power of denotation of words aids the hearer to get at the inter-related sense of the sentence. He gets a unitary idea out of the inter-related diverse meanings of the words⁸⁹.

Deśika has, in his Nyāya Pariśuddhi, profusely quoted from ancient thinkers to support the view of Anvitābhidhāna, but, he is not very critical of those thinkers of the same school who are for the theory of Abhihitānvaya. In his Tattva Mukta Kalāpa he pronounces that even the theory of Abhihitānvaya, is not in any way damaging the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Based on the arguments of Rāmānuja, advanced in his Śrībhāṣya, some followers of this school admit Abhihitānvaya as the theory of verbal knowledge. Deśika, known for his syncretist tendency, admits of the possibility of conveying the sense of the sentence through the sense of the words, especially to the young children, at the time of their learning. But, it is an established fact, he says, that, whatever be the theory of verbal knowledge Abhihitānvaya or Anvitābhidhāna, it is impossible to establish the Nirviśeṣa Brahman through verbal testimony⁹⁰.

The Aparyavasāna Vṛtti:

The theory of verbal knowledge as adopted by the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita, namely the Anvitābhidhāna Vṛtti, signifies that the words have the power to denote the respective meanings along with the qualities or differences. The power of giving unitary meaning or ‘Viśiṣṭārthabhidhayitva’ of the words is the conclusion that is drawn from the above theory of verbal knowledge.

‘एवमन्विताभिधानसामर्थ्याद्विशिष्टप्रतिपत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्तेश्च पदानामपि विशिष्टार्थाभिधायिवं सिद्धम् ।’
(न्या. परि. p. 152).

89. N. P. p. 151.

90. T. M. K. 4-93; स. सि. p. 214.

The power of the word to denote is not, therefore, limited to the Viśeṣana part, but it implies the Viśeṣya together with the Viśeṣaṇas. This deeper sense of denotation is called *Aparyavaśana Vṛtti*. The substratum and the attributes go always together, and so words denote, according to the *Anvitābhidhāna Vṛtti*, the individuals qualified by the generic attributes.

‘तस्मात्तां तद्विशिष्टामभिधत्ति पदानि ।’

(त. मु. क. 4-78).

The Vaiśeṣika analysts are of opinion that the *jāti* or generic attribute is a distinct and eternal entity underlying all objective reality and they advocate that the *jāti* is the import of the words. The *Mīmāṃsakas* also opine that the words directly mean the *jāti* or the general, and that they indirectly indicate the individuals. This theory of the *vaiśeṣikas* and the *mīmāṃsakas*, propogating the primary denotation of *jāti* to the words, is against experience and so inadmissible. The school of *visistadvaita* upholds that *Brahman* is the sole ground and sustainer of all others in this multi-universe, and that there is not an eternal entity like *jāti*. After all what is *jāti*? It is an attribute only that gives objectivity and reality to the objects. The words signify the individuals alone and not the generic attribute, for the generic attribute is in no way helpful to the furtherance of our activities. Moreover, our mind cannot conceive of the *jāti* without the individual at any time.

‘व्यक्तिशून्यां जातिं कदाचिदापि न स्पृशति धिषणा ।’

(स. सि. p. 233).

The words we use are of different kinds and categories. Some words definitely mean the *jāti*, such as *jāti* and *sāmānyam*. Some other words mean only the individual such as *vyakti*, *svarūpam* etc. words, other than these that form the majority, mean the individual qualified by the generic attributes. So, it is justified to maintain that words in general denote the individual invariably accompanied with their characteristic features⁹¹.

The *mīmāṃsaka* view point that words have a two-fold import, a primary one meaning the *jāti*, and a secondary one meaning the individual or *vyakti*, is not tenable as all the words signifying the *jāti* must imply the substratum or the *vyakti*. *Gōtva* or cow-hood can be known only when the cow is known. It is impossible to know the genus without knowing the particular. The *prathyaya* and the *sthiti* of *Gōtva* depend upon its substratum, the cow, and this dependence of genus on the individual affirms that it is impossible to imply the genus in the absence of signifying the individual. So the import of the words like cow and others is undoubtedly the individual⁹².

Deśika has thus criticised other theories of verbal import and has established his theory that the words meaning the *jāti* must imply the *vyakti* or individual. This theory is extended to words signifying the attributes or *guṇas* also to imply their locus the *guṇi*.

‘गुणवाचिन्यपि पदे जातिशब्दोक्तनीतितः ।
अप्यक्सिद्धवाचित्वात्त यक्ता गुणिलक्षणा ॥’

(न्या. परि. p. 153).

91. स. सि. p. 233.

92. T. M. K. 4-79; S. S. p. 233.

The attributes are inseparably related to their substratum, and so, all words meaning the Dharma or *guṇa* imply their substratum. This leads to the conclusion that words signifying the inseparable attributes denote their substratum, unless otherwise ordained.

All words meaning different material and spiritual objects mean ultimately Brahman the innerself of all. This school has propounded this import of Aparyavasāna Vṛtti, as it has realised the oneness of the Absolute Brahman as the Immanent principle, amidst the multiplicity of the sentient and the non-sentient entities. So, all the words, used to signify all objects sentient and non-sentient that are the inseparable attributes of Brahman, denote in the primary sense Brahman, the super subject, the All-self⁹³.

All words used to denote the bodies primarily mean the indwelling conscious being, and so they denote the Absolute who is the inner self of all. It is in this sense that Brahman is described as 'Sarva Śabda Vāchya'⁹⁴.

It may be objected to this that any kind of transaction in this world would become impossible, if all words used by all would only refer to the cosmic principle. But it is not so. Though the import of all the words is ultimately the Absolute Reality, yet the denotation of some words is restricted by us according to our purposes to signify the attributes only, and these words are called Niṣkarṣaka śabdās. When we intend to signify objects other than Brahman, the scope of denotation of particular words is limited to such objects only. So, there happens to be no confusion.

It is according to this convention alone, that in the statement 'That thou art' the word 'Thou' refers only to Śvētakētu and not to Brahman, the Innermost self. If not, there would have been no chance of an advice at all. The nominative of address Śvētakētu is limited only to that individual as the situation of enlightenment naturally demands. The statement is expressed very clearly as 'That thou art'. In this instance, 'Sāmānādhikarāṇya' is desired either through the relation of cause and effect or through the relation of body and soul. In both cases, the sense of the word thou results in that of the word 'That'.

So, it is concluded that except in the case of words purposefully used with limited denotation, all words signify Brahman only. Rāmānuja has expounded this theory of import of words by means of sāmānādhikarāṇya according to the principle of Aruṇādhikarāṇa. So, all words denoting various objects sentient and non-sentient, denote Brahman only, as the world of matter and finite selves happen to be its inseparable attributes⁹⁵.

Verbal knowledge does not require kāryārtha only for being valid:

The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas maintain that words have Ādya-vyutpatti only in activity which is observed from the activity of elders⁹⁶, and so all words are said to indicate something to be done. They are valid with regard to prescribing some activity or other. Only such sentences among the Vedas that enjoin action are valid, and others that denote existent things are invalid to the above school. Their theory is that the power of words to

93. N. P. p. 153; T. M. K. 4-85.

94. S. B. II—3-17.

95. T. M. K. 4-84, 85, 86.

96. T. M. K. 4-72.

express things can be determined, only according to certain actions prescribed by them. An old man orders one, near by, to bring a cow and he goes and leads the cow there. The child, nearby, understands by this activity of the elders the meaning of the sentence—'Bring the cow'. After listening to various sentences like 'Tie down the cow', 'Bring the horse' and others, the child makes out the import of the words bring, tie down, cow, horse and others. Thus, the Mīmāṃsakas contend that verbal knowledge depends upon only 'Karyārtha', and that words cannot denote existing thing or 'Siddhārtha'. This theory of the Mīmāṃsakas is not admissible to the Vedāntins who posit the theory that the words convey primarily the 'Siddhārtha', or the existing things, as Brahman.

Even though the view point of the Mīmāṃsakas that the words depend upon Karyārtha is admitted, it must be agreed that the power of the words does necessarily denote even the existing things. Of the four senses of the word, namely Mukhya, Gauṇa, Lākṣanika and Tātparya, though a word has primary sense, it denotes something else by the power of intention or tātparya, and so there is no hard and fast rule that words do not denote things other than those determined by actions. Though the school of Mīmāṃsa considers the Veda as signifying 'sacrificial action', other Existing things or Siddhārthas, such as the different agents like the Ritvik, the Yajamāna and others, the different means such as kāpala, purōdāṣa and others, and the different results such as Svarga, svarājya and others, are also implied. These are all accomplished things and are implied by the power of intention, dependent upon the sentences enjoining sacrificial action.

'अतः कार्यविशेषतया सिद्धस्यापि कार्यवाक्येषु तात्पर्यभूमित्वात् द्युत्पत्तेः कार्यपरत्वनिर्बन्धो
निनिवन्धनः ।'

त. म. क. 4-72; स. सि. p. 230.

The Prābhākaras classify words as vedic and non-vedic, and contend that vedic words mean karyārtha, whereas the non-vedic mean siddhārtha. This classification is not reasonable as no such watertight division could be made between vedic and non-vedic words⁹⁷.

There is no rule that words either vedic or non-vedic have meaning, only with reference to things that are to be done, for we see many statements like 'पिता ते सुखमास्ते' 'your father is safe', serving some purpose. These words denote facts that are existing. It is in our ordinary experience to teach children gradually and repeatedly, by pointing out with our finger at different objects and using words that denote them. As a result of this, the children get an idea that such and such a word denotes such and such a thing. This strengthens the conviction that words have the power to denote even things that are already existing. So vedic words have the power to denote Brahman that is ever existing in all entities, as their immanent principle. What is of primary importance here is the relation of Bōdhya Bōdhaka Bhāva between the words and their relative objects. It is on account of this that the words convey both Karyārtha and Siddhārtha⁹⁸.

97. T. M. K. 4-73.

98. T. M. K. 4-74; A. S. 27, 28; S. B. 1-1-1; Y. M. D.; S. S. p. 231.

The Principal Texts of Verbal Authority:

The school of Viśiṣṭādvaita believes in the authority of the entirety of the vedas, the eternal sacred teaching. The veda is impersonal or is Apauruseya, in as much as it is not the original composition of any person, just like any poetry, drama or story. The several references found therein such as 'the composers of the hymns', 'this is the breath of the Lord', 'the Riks and the Sāmans were produced', 'the yajus was born out of that' etc. do not go to prove its personal origination, but only its propagation at different times and ways. The vedic statements are inherently valid and authoritative. It is maintained that the order of the letters of the vedic scripture is also eternal, due to the eternal desire of the Supreme. The Lord is going to preach the Vedas to the four faced Brahma at the beginning of every cycle of cosmic creation, according to the order that existed in previous creations. The Nayyāyika view that God is the author of the vedas and that the vedas are authoritative on account of their being His words, is not acceptable to the Viśiṣṭādvaitins. The Veda is equally authoritative, and it is on account of these Vedas that we can reach the supreme Being. These infallible texts establish the existence of the Divine being. The vedas contain the commands of the Divine Being, and they are the only means to know the Absolute Brahman, Lord Nārāyaṇa.

The vedas comprise of two parts namely the Karmakānda and the Brahma Kānda. The former deals with the ways and means of worshipping the Almighty, whereas the latter describes that worshipful Supreme Being.

The Smṛtis clarify and elucidate the significance of the former part, whereas the epics substantiate the teachings of the latter part.


The Itihāsa, Purāṇas and Smṛtis have the vedas for their origin. The Smṛtis of Manu and others are authoritative in toto, as they never go against the teachings of the vedas anywhere. The Dharma śāstras are many, and they are valid as long as they agree with the vedas. The Purāṇas are classified into different types meant for different types of men. So such of the Purāṇas that are in full agreement with the teachings of the vedas are fully authoritative. Of the Āgama texts the Pancharātrāgama is an important authority, as it does not contradict the veda anywhere. Whenever there is a difference of opinion between one purāṇa and another, it is advised that the validity of such statements is to be judged, according to their belonging to the satvic or rajasic or tamasic group. When there is a difference between the veda and the purāṇas, the purāṇas that are against the Veda are to be discarded.

In this school, nothing is accepted or discarded dogmatically only on the score of their belonging to certain texts, but the different texts are carefully examined in the light of the teachings of the veda, and such portions of even opposite schools, like the Pāśupata, Sāṃkhya and others, as are not opposed to the sacred teachings of the vedas, are accepted wholeheartedly. Utmost importance is, therefore, given to the validity and authoritativeness of the vedas, and the validity of all other texts is verified with reference to them.

The main features of Viśiṣṭādvaitic conception of verbal knowledge may now be summarised as follows:—

- 1) Verbal knowledge is the most important as it is the only means to know Brahman.

- 2) The theory of Anvitābhidhāna is the theory of verbal knowledge.
 - 3) Verbal testimony cannot signify unqualified objects.
 - 4) All words have the power to signify Brahman the Innermost self of all by the Aparyavasāna Vṛtti.
 - 5) Verbal statements signify even existent objects.
 - 6) All texts are valid so long as they agree with the Veda.
-



INDEX

A

- Abādhitā Viṣayatvam-271
 Abhāva-264
 Abheda-37, 59
 Abheda śrutis-94
 Abhihitānvaya Veda-110
 Abhinnanimittopādānakāraṇatvam-43
 Abhimāna-137
 Abhyāsa-155, 161, 179
 Abhyasa-yoga-160, 161
 Abhyasta viṣaya-110
 Abhoga-30
 Achhedya-23
 Achetana-210
 Achit-4, 27, 131, 244, 247
 Achyuta śatakam-87
 Adhikaranas-14
 Adhyayanavidhi-181
 Advaita-16, 36, 39, 94, 131
 Adṛṣṭa-24
 Adwāraka-198
 Agni-232
 Agnihotra-179
 Agniśtoma-187
 Ahamkāra-29, 106, 208, 209, 259
 Ahamartha-19
 Ahamtva-19
 Ahirbudhnya Samhitā-228, 237
 Ahimsā-156
 Aithihya-255
 Aikanthya-129
 Aiśvaryam-67
 Aiśvaryaṛthi-169
 Ajātaśatru-13
 Akalmaṣam-138
 Akarṇa-118
 Akarmavaśyatva-140
 Akartṛtvānusandhāna-114, 116, 117
 Akarana-115
 Akhilaññeyapratyanikatvam-40
 Akṛtābhyāgama-23
 Akṣaranīṣṭhā-160
 Akṣayam-151
 Alābha-106
 Amalam-40
 Amalatva-143
 Amṛtasvarūpa-151
 Amśa-31
 Amśāmsībhāva-31
 Anabhidhyā-156
 Anadhyavaśāya-250
 Anāśramins-167
 Anāśramitva-167
 Anantam-21, 39
 Ananya-169
 Ananyachetāh-167
 Ananya bhakta-171, 173
 Ananya gatitvam-201, 202
 Ananyārhaṣeṣa-209
 Ananvita-119
 Anabhinandana-125
 Anarvāchinam-263
 Anga-128
 Angaprapatti-198
 Angi-91, 128, 205
 Angi prapatti-198
 Anirvachaniya khyāti-253
 Anitya Sākṣātkāra-259
 Aniruddha-63
 Antarātman-182
 Antaryāmin-44, 54, 63, 170, 183
 Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa-46
 Antarangatva-26
 Antahkaraṇa-17, 18
 Anuddharṣa-156
 Anubhūti-16
 Anubhavavāsanā-14
 Anujñā Karma-127
 Anusandhana-112, 115, 210, 267, 268, 270
 Anutva-20, 26
 Anukūlatva-20
 Anuvyavasāya-245

- Anumānam-255, 257, 276
 Anuvādas-51
 Anuvṛtti-261
 Anvaya-281
 Anvaya Vyatireki-273
 Anvitābhīdhānavāda-281, 282, 287
 Anyathā Khyāti-218, 252
 Aparādha-211
 Aparā prakṛti-30
 Aparā Vidyā-90
 Aparyavasāna Vṛtti-252
 Apachhēda-41
 Aparichhinna-55
 Apavarga-90
 Aparōkṣa jñānam-266
 Apramā-248
 Aprākṛta-82
 Aprithaksiddhi-245
 Apr̥thaksiddha viśeṣaṇa-2, 38
 Apunaravṛtti-84
 Apūrvaviśayatā-279
 Archā-223
 Archanam-189
 Archirādi-84
 Arjuna-160, 174
 Artha-185
 Arthārthin-84, 164, 167
 Arthakāma-176
 Arthavāda-180
 Arthakriyākāritva-225
 Artha prakāśatva-245
 Arvācheenam-263
 Asambandha-142
 Asangakarma-162
 Asamkuchita Jñānam-141
 Aśarīritva-41
 Asat Pratipakṣatvam-271
 Asat khyāti-254
 Aśruta kalpana-36
 Aṣṭāṅgayoga-182, 200, 205
 Astra Bhūṣaṇādhyāya-79
 Atideśa Vākya-276
 Atiprasaṅga-7
 Atyantā Paratantra-226
 Avatāra-64
 Avantī-223
 Avāptasamasta kāma-79
 Avasthāvāda-3
 Avayava-6, 7
 Avayavasamudāya-7
 Avayavi-7
 Avidyā-17, 30, 91, 94, 253, 254
 Avidyā karma-4, 116
 Avirōdha-26
 Avikāratva-41
 Āviveka-222
 Ābhichārikakriyā-233
 Āchāra vyatikrama-174
 Āchārya-31, 148, 212
 Āchārya Niṣṭha-211, 212
 Ādeśa-43
 Ādhāra-57
 Ādhāratva-31
 Ādheya-53
 Ādyavyutpatti-284
 Āgantuka pāpa-174
 Ājñā Karma-127, 219
 Ākāmkṣā-281, 282
 Ākaśā-12
 Ākhyā-178
 Ākinchanyam-201, 202, 212
 Ālambha-228
 Ālavandār-192, 195, 219
 Ālayavijñāna-15
 Ālwars-91, 148, 192, 217
 Ānanda-27, 40, 244
 Ānandatva-143
 Ānandamayam-40
 Ānanda Swarūpa-27
 Āndāl-193
 Ānukūlya Samkalpa-205, 210
 Āparokṣya-100
 Āpastambha-93
 Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa-277
 Ārhata-244
 Ārjava-70
 Ārṣajñāna-260
 Ārta-84, 64, 167

Ārta Prapatti-213
 Ārta Prapanna-214
 Āruṇi Uddalaka-53
 Āruruḥṣu-136
 Āsana-205
 Āśramas-167
 Āśrama dharmas-167
 Āśramitva-167
 Āśrayaduṣṭa-154
 Āstikya-200
 Āsuric-219
 Ātman-6, 105, 244, 245
 Ātma darśana-112, 126, 146
 Ātmajñāna-119
 Ātmayāga-228
 Ātmayāthātmyānusandhāna-121
 Ātmayāthātmya Jñānam-122
 Ātmābhimāna-13
 Ātmasamarpaṇam-230
 Ātmāvalokanam-119, 121, 130
 Ātmasvarūpa-20
 Ātmānubhava-89
 Ātreya Rāmānuja-273

B

Būdarāyaṇa-181, 182
 Bālāki-13
 Bālyam-184
 Bauddhas-277, 278
 Bhagavān-171, 212
 Bhagavatkāma-144, 165, 169
 Bhagavat karmaparātva-163
 Bhagavatprasāda-260
 Bhāgavatābhimāna-213
 Bhagavadupāsana-160
 Bhagavadviśayavāsa-213
 Bhagavadyajins-170
 Bhajana-175
 Bhagavadgīta-114
 Bhakti-95, 96, 107
 Bhaktiyoga-101, 102, 130, 146, 149, 162
 Bhakti yogin-150
 Bharasamarpaṇa-208, 209
 Bhartṛprapancha-3

Bharanyāsa-210
 Bhāṣkāra-3, 36, 46, 47
 Bhasyakara-78
 Bhāṭṭa mīmāṃsaka-28
 Bhāvanā prakarṣa-98
 Bhedābheda-36
 Bhogya-29
 Bhogaikya-26
 Bhoktā-29
 Bhrānti-247
 Bhrānti paramparā-17
 Bhrama-250
 Bhūtahitam-156
 Bhūtāvayava viśeṣa-8
 Bhūman-77
 Bhumādhikaraṇa-83, 84
 Bhūvana sundara-74
 Bhuyodarśana-271
 Bōdha-22
 Bōdhakatva-278
 Bōdhya Bōdhaka Bhāva-285
 Brahman-3, 21, 69, 131, 244
 Brahma Dṛṣṭi-247
 Brahma Kāṇḍa-283, 286, 287
 Brahma Mīmāṃsā-89
 Brahmātmaka-121
 Brahmamaya-121
 Brahmabhūtam-138
 Brahmānubhavam-83
 Brahmōpāsana-101, 166, 167, 179
 Brahmapariṇāma-3
 Brahma Samstha-191
 Brahmavidyā-166, 180
 Bṛhadāraṇyakōpaniṣad, -13, 21, 59, 96
 Baddhiviśeṣam-172

C

Chakraka-281
 Chaitanya-6, 7, 17
 Chāndōgya Upaniṣat-97, 167, 168
 Chāndrāyaṇa-187
 Charamaśloka-194, 203, 216
 Chārvākas-277
 Chāturya-70

Chetana-244
 Chichhāyāpatti-17
 Chidbhivyanjakatva-18
 Chidachidviśiṣṭatva-49
 Chikirṣā-56, 115
 Chit-4, 131, 244, 247
 Chittaikāgrya-131
 Chittasamādhāna-163, 184
 Chitsamparka-18
 Chittaśuddhi-131
 Chittavijñāna-15
 Chōdanā-178

D

Daharavidyā-54
 Dānta-217
 Dāsa-31, 58
 Dāsyam-189
 Dayā-62, 150, 156, 204
 Dayāśatakam-66
 Deepa-192
 Dehātmavāda-12
 Dehātmaviveka-114
 Dehātmabhrama-222
 Dehātmābhimāna-116, 122
 Devatābhakti-153
 Dhārāvāhika vijñāna-246
 Dharma-185, 284
 Dharmabhūtā jñānam-11, 20, 49, 139,
 244, 245, 246, 248, 253, 254
 Dharma Dharmi Prateeti-15
 Dharmātman-174
 Dharmi-16, 249
 Dharmibhūtajñānam-20, 243, 248, 254
 Dhātuviśeṣa-8
 Dhruvānusmṛti-154, 155
 Dhyāna-94, 96, 98, 128, 146, 151, 156,
 205
 Dhyānayoga-155, 205
 Dhyānaniyōgavādin-94
 Divyam-257
 Divyamangalavigraha-42
 Divya prabandhams-192
 Divyātma-42

Dravya-245
 Dṛdhasamyōga-250
 Dṛpta prapatti-213
 Dṛpta Prapanna-214
 Dvandvātītatva-137
 Dvēṣa-108, 125
 Duṣkṛta vāsanā-14

E

Ēkabhakti-165
 Ēkantin-165
 Ekasantāna-14
 Ēkatva-20
 Eka Vyavahāra-26
 Eka Vijñāna-43
 Ekendriya Samjñā-124, 125

G

Gadyam-212
 Gāmbhīrya-70
 Garuḍa-79
 Gavālabhāna-233
 Gīta-23, 119, 125, 129
 Gītāchārya-118, 121, 139
 Gītābhāṣya-66, 84, 132, 137, 149, 192
 Gītārtha Samgraha-148, 219
 Ghataka śruti-59
 Gōpṛtva Varāṇa-206, 210
 Gōṣṭhī pūrṇa-195
 Gōtama-255, 256
 Guṇas-149, 179, 245
 Guṇakṛta-116
 Guṇōpasamhārapāda-178
 Guru-157
 Guruparamparā-210

I

Indra-232
 Indriyas-30, 116, 259
 Indriyātma-10
 Indriyānapekṣam pratyakṣam-260
 Isāvāsya-191
 Isvara-27, 117, 118, 226
 Ithihāsas-232, 286

J

- Jada-39
 Jadadravya-12
 Jagat Śarīra-10
 Jains-277
 Jāti-283
 Jātiduṣṭa-154
 Jijñāsu-164, 167
 Jitantā stotram-193
 Jitendriya-112
 Jīva-11, 139, 140, 201, 213
 Jīvanmukti-82, 88
 Jīvasāmyam-139
 Jīvātmayoga kāṣṭhā-141
 Jñānam-15, 21, 39, 95, 115, 131
 Jñānābhyāsa-120
 Jñānaguṇaka-16
 Jñānākāratā-119
 Jñānākāratāprakāra-118
 Jñāna niṣṭhā-108, 113, 119, 132
 Jñānānandātmakatva-8
 Jñānasantānaikya-14
 Jñāna samudāya-15
 Jñāna Svarūpa-16, 21, 26
 Jñānāśrayatva-21
 Jñānayoga-109, 110, 111, 113, 118, 129,
 131, 145
 Jñānayogin-111
 Jñānavipāka-123
 Jñānātmika-153
 Jñātā-9, 11, 15, 244
 Jñātṛtva-16, 18, 56
 Jñātṛtva-bhranti-17
 Jneyam-15

K

- Kaivalya-84, 89, 144
 Kaivalyārthin-168
 Kalpa-200
 Kalyāṇa-155
 Kalyāṇaikatāna-40
 Kāma-124, 155, 185
 Kāmānaphiṣvanga-155

- Kāmya Karma-103, 104
 Karaṇa-11
 Kāraṇa Brahman-90
 Karaṇa-Kāraṇa-10
 Kāraṇānavasthā-17
 Karma-50, 74, 95, 96, 214
 Karmabhāvanā viśiṣṭa-132
 Karma Vāsanā-19, 30, 113, 166
 Karmādhyakṣa-63, 140
 Karmayoga-85, 101, 103, 106, 107, 108,
 109, 111, 113, 116, 117, 118, 127, 129,
 145
 Karmayogin-104, 108
 Karmayogadhikārin-114
 Karmayogopadeśa-119
 Karma mīmāṃsā-89
 Karma Sangins-114
 Karmavipāka-164
 Karma Kānda-33, 286
 Karmamārga-148
 Karmāṅga-187
 Kārpanya-206, 210
 Kaṣāya-124
 Kartā-11, 55
 Kartṛtva-56, 118
 Kartṛtvyāga-106, 130, 210
 Kartṛtvābhimāna-114
 Kartṛtvānusandhāna-114
 Kartṛvaiguṇyam-237
 Kāryārtha-285
 Kārya Brahman-36
 Kevalanvayi-271, 272
 Kevalin-84, 143, 145
 Kevalvyathireki-270, 272, 273
 Kīrtanam-150, 189
 Kriyā-153, 155
 Kriyāvān-155
 Kṛtajñātā-71
 Kṛtakṛtya-214
 Kṛtapraṇāsa-23
 Kṛtītva-71
 Kṣaṇikavāda-13
 Kṣetra-138
 Kūṣmānda-187

L

Lābha-106
Lāghava Nyāya-13
Lakṣaṇa-274
Lakṣmī-75
Lakṣmītantra-205, 208
Lāvanya-67
Lilāvibhūti-28, 79
Lōbha-156
Lōkasamgraha-114

M

Mada Śakti-8
Mahābhūta-171
Mahānarāyaṇa Upaniṣad-112
Mahat-29
Mahattva-49
Mahātmā-165, 168, 173
Mahāviśvāsa-204, 206, 210
Maitreyī-96
Mamatā-122
Mamatā tyāga-210
Mamattva-142
Manana-93, 96, 97, 98, 152
Manana Śīla-185
Mānasa pratyakṣa-245
Manavāla Mahāmuniḡal-196
Mārdava-69
Maunam-185
Māyā-30, 251
Mīmāṃsakas-94, 180, 275, 283, 285
Mokṣa-73, 195, 211
Mrtyu-128
Mudaliyāndan-212
Muktas-28, 83, 88, 260
Mukti-26, 65, 94, 245
Mūla prakṛti-29
Mūlamantra-2, 194, 203, 216
Mumukṣu-89
Muṇḡdaka-140, 155, 192
Muni-125

N

Nachiketas-2

Naimittika-118, 119, 219
Naiṣkarmya-112
Naiṣṭhikas-167
Nāmadheya-179
Nammālvar-75, 76, 192
Nāmasamkīrtanam-158
Namaskāra-150, 199
Nāthamuni-67, 192
Nayyāyikas-8, 51, 61, 245, 262, 264, 275, 276, 278
Nididhyāsa-91, 98, 99
Nikṣepa Rakṣā-197
Nimbārka-36
Nimitta Doṣas-155
Nimitta Kāraṇatva-48, 50
Niranjanam-36
Niranvayavināśa-15
Nirāśih-120
Nirāśraya-16
Niratiśayabhogya-204
Niravayava-23
Nirdaryatva-55
Nirgunam-36
Nirgunavāda-40
Nirveda-157
Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa-42, 261, 262
Nirvikāratva śruti-49
Nirvikāra Kāṣṭhā-142
Nirviśeṣatva-42
Nirviśeṣa chinmatram-41
Nirūpita svarūpa Viśeṣaṇa-42, 178, 247
Niṣkāma Karma-105, 109, 111, 127
Niṣprapanchikaraṇaniyogavādin-95
Nityakarma-127
Nitya Kainkarya-147
Nityanaimittika Karmas-127, 128, 220
Nitya Samsārins-28
Nityattva-20, 143
Nityavibhūti-79, 81
Nityayukta-165, 167, 169
Niyama-205
Niyantā-38
Niyantṛtva-31, 54
Nyāsa-205

Nyāsa Tilakam-212
 Nyāya-25, 48, 49, 244, 245
 Nyāya Kuliśa-273
 Nyāya pariśuddhi-257, 261, 282
 Nyāya Siddhānjanam-54, 61
 Nyaya Sutras-273

P

Pakṣa-35, 52
 Pakṣadharmatā-271, 275
 Pakṣavyāpakatvam-271
 Panchamahāyajñas-155
 Pāncharātrāgama-286
 Pāndityam-184
 Pāpa-55, 139
 Para-63
 Paramātmachintanam-137
 Parāśara-28, 74, 234
 Paramātman-31, 100, 117
 Parāśarabhakta-258, 273
 Parāk-9
 Parārthānumāna-270, 274
 Parabrahmātmakatva-121
 Parabhakti-147, 153
 Parārthayajana-205
 Paraḥbrahman-63, 66, 131
 Parajñānam-188
 Paravasudeva-63
 Parākrama-66, 71
 Parama puruṣa-76
 Paramjyothi-77
 Paramapada-87
 Paratva-88
 Parama prāpya-88
 Parama Bhakti-188
 Pāratantrya-226
 Parikara-237
 Pariṇāma viśeṣa-8
 Parimānavāda-46
 Paripūrṇa Brahmānubhava-33
 Paripūrṇopāsaka-174
 Pariṣkṛta Śaktivāda-3
 Periya Vāchhan pillai-193
 Phala-14

Phala Tyāga-106, 130, 210
 Phalopāyatyāga-210
 Phala Pradatva-158
 Phala śruti-180
 Phalasarpaṇa-208, 209
 Pillai Lokāchārya-193, 196
 Piṭharapāka prakriyā-8
 Pouṣkara Samhitā-77
 Prabandhams-148
 Prabhā-245
 Prābhākaras-273
 Prābhākaramīmāmsakas-281, 284
 Prācheenakarma-129, 185
 Pradhāna pratitantra-31
 Pradyumna-63
 Prajñāparitrāṇa-257
 Prakāra-30
 Prakārin-3
 Prakāriprakārabhāva-4, 37
 Prakatya-246
 Prakatyānumeya-246
 Prakriyā-179
 Prakṛti-29, 65, 79, 106, 115
 Prakṛtivāsanā-116
 Prakṛtisambandham-29, 30
 Prakṛtivyuktatvam-84, 143
 Pralaya-63
 Pramā-243, 248, 250
 Pramāṇa-21, 41, 232, 243
 Pramātā-21
 Prameya-21, 243, 273
 Pramithi-243
 Prāṇa-12, 116
 Prāṇātmavādin-12
 Praṇava-203, 211
 Prāṇāyāma-205
 Prapadana-208
 Prapatti-96, 102, 153, 187, 190, 192
 Prāpya-176
 Prāpaka-176
 Prārabdhakarma-126, 175, 215, 269
 Prasāntamanasam-138
 Prasnopaniṣad-21
 Pratardana vidyā-232

- Pratyagātman-122
 Pratyagātmadarśanam-121, 135
 Pratyak-9, 42
 Pratyāhāra-205
 Pratyaktva-20, 26
 Pratyakṣa-256
 Prātikūlyavarjana-205, 210
 Pratisandhāna-16
 Pravachana-98
 Pravṛttidharma-236
 Prayatna-50
 Prayatnānuvidhāna-153
 Prāyaschitta-167, 220
 Prayojana-113
 Preritā-29
 Preyas-33
 Puṇya-55, 139
 Puṇyakarma-185
 Puṇyapāpakartṛtva-115
 Purāṇas-148, 286
 Puruṣa-65
 Puruṣakāratva-75
 Puruṣasūkta-76
 Puruṣottama-76
 Puruṣārthas-202
 Pūrvamimāṃsā-90
 Purvavijñāna-14
- R
- Rāga-108, 125
 Rāgatva-153
 Rahasyas-203
 Rahasyatrayasāra-163, 188, 196, 214, 224
 etc.
 Rahasyāmnāya-77
 Rajas-29, 128, 252
 Rakṣābharanyāsa-210
 Rakṣaka-61
 Rakṣakatva-72
 Rakṣaṇaphala-209
 Rāmānuja-4, 118, 121, 124, 128, 192 etc.
 Rāmāyaṇa-192, 227
 Rīgveda-146, 147, 190
 Ruchi-30
- Rūpa-149, 178
- S
- Śabda-257, 258, 278
 Sādāchāra-200
 Sādhaka-4, 33
 Sādhana-125
 Sādhanabhakti-198
 Sādhya-4, 35, 269, 272
 Sādhyopāya-74, 95, 102, 223, 232
 Sādhya Sādhanabhāva-121, 225
 Sādhu-173
 Sadvidyā-4, 36, 43, 264
 Sadvāraka-198
 Sādṛśya-264
 Sahachāra darśana-270
 Sāhacharya-264
 Sahakārins-184, 196
 Sakhyam-189
 Sākṣātkāra-97, 133
 Sākṣātkāripramā-266
 Sākṣātsādhana-231
 Sakṛtkartavya-211
 Sakinchana-237
 Śakti-62
 Śaktilakṣaṇa-3
 Śaktivāda-3
 Śaktiviśiṣṭadvaitin-239
 Śama-126, 184
 Samadarśana-123, 124, 142
 Samādhi-140, 205
 Samadarśitva-123
 Samabuddhitva-136
 Samatva-104, 136
 Samhitās-147
 Samānaguṇakatvam-86
 Sāmānya-283
 Sāmānya Bhakti-159
 Sampūrṇāvayava samudāya-7
 Sāmānya Lakṣaṇā pratyāsatti-270
 Sāmānādhikaranyā-4, 37, 39, 284
 Samkarṣaṇa-63, 71
 Sūnkhya-9, 25, 56, 108, 179, 244
 Sameepyam-86

- Samsāra-19, 62, 73, 91, 103, 130
 Samsāya-249
 Samskāras-14, 200, 261, 264
 Samskāronmeṣa-257
 Samyuktāśrayaṇa-263
 Samyoga-178
 Samuchhaya-91, 128
 Sanchita Karma-202
 Śāndilya-153
 Sangatyāga-130
 Sangatimālā-277
 Śankara-27, 265
 Santānaikya-15
 Santānapadartha-15
 Sānvayavināśa-14
 Sanatkumāra Samhitā-227
 Śānta-217
 Śānti-123
 Śāntarajasam-138
 Sannipatyopakāri-128
 Sāparādhātva-62
 Śaraṇāgati-191
 Śaraṇāgatigadya-69, 78, 188, 192, 193
 Śarira-60, 209
 Śaririn-60
 Śariraśariribhāva-31, 58
 Śāriraka Śāstra-89
 Śāriraka Mimāṃsā-61
 Sarvamokṣa prasanga-226
 Sarvagatah-25
 Sarvādharma-31
 Sarvaniyantā-31
 Sarvaśeṣin-31, 79
 Sarva Śabda Vāchya-35, 284
 Sarva Kāraṇatva-48
 Sarvaphalaprada-38
 Sarveśvara-37, 39
 Sarveśvareśvara-67
 Sārūpyam-86
 Sārṣṭita-87
 Sarva bhūta hite rata-124
 Sarvabhūtasthitatva-141
 Sarvabhūtātambhūtātma-112
 Sarvasulāpha-170
 Sarvāntaryamin-171
 Sarvātman-129, 164
 Śaśariratva-41
 Śataduṣaṇi-253
 Satkāryavāda-4
 Satva-guṇa-223
 Satvic-158
 Sātvika tyāga-129
 Sātvikaham kāra-12
 Satyavachana-227
 Sātvata Samhitā-227
 Satya Kāma-71
 Satya Samkṛpa-71
 Savikalpaka pratyakṣa-261, 262
 Sāyujyam-86
 Śeṣa-31
 Śeṣatva-20, 26, 38, 143
 Śeṣatva jñāna-159
 Śeṣatvānusandhāna-230
 Śeṣavṛtti-229
 Śeṣi-57
 Śeṣitva-31
 Siddhārtha-285
 Siddha Sādhana Sahakāritva-232
 Siddhitrayam-6, 193
 Siddhopāya-72, 74, 75, 95, 102, 231, 232
 Śighra Samchāritva-8
 Śiṣṭas-233
 Śiṣya-31
 Smārakatvam-283
 Smaraṇam-189
 Smṛtis-192, 256, 257, 275
 Sparśa guṇa-23
 Sparśajas-138
 Sparśa tanmātra-12
 Śravaṇa-93, 97, 98, 152, 189
 Śreyas-33
 Sri Bhāṣya-34, 154, 192, 193, 217
 Śri Ranga Gadyam-193, 195, 228
 Śri Rāma miśra-229
 Śri sāvata-77
 Śri Sudarśana Sūri-188
 Sriṣṭi-36
 Śri Viṣṇuchitta-22

Śrutahāni-36
 Śruta Prakāśikā-57
 Sthairyam-70
 Sthitaprajña-126, 133
 Sthitaprajñatā-130
 Stotra Ratna-148, 193
 Śuddhayajin-232
 Śuddha Satva-64, 79, 81
 Sukṛta-105
 Sukṛtavāsanā-14
 Suṣupti-9
 Sūtrakāra-19, 20, 34, 37, 39, 40, 54, 55,
 265
 Sutrakāra Śandilya-153
 Svabhāva-27
 Svābhāvika Bhedābheda-27
 Svādutama-217
 Svakīyatā sanga tyāga-106
 Svāmitva-204
 Svanīṣṭhā-213, 215
 Svanīṣṭhābhijñānādhikāra-215
 Svaparanirvāhaka-245, 254
 Svapneśvara-153
 Svaprayatnanivṛtti-229
 Svārthānumāna-27
 Svarūpa-27, 115, 149
 Svarūpa Jñānam-243
 Svarūpa bhuta jñānam-20
 Svarūpāśrita-31, 53, 57
 Svarūpaikyam-3
 Svarūpajanyadharmā-49
 Svarūpanirūpakadharmā-40, 53, 247
 Svarūpa Samarpaṇa-208, 209
 Svataḥ Satya Samkalpatvam-38
 Svatantrātmabhrama-222
 Svātmānusandhāna-140
 Svayamprakāśatva-22, 81, 245
 Svayam prayojana-217
 Svayam Siddhi-257
 Śveta dvipa-86
 Śvetaketo-43, 284
 Śvetaśvatara-54, 191, 227
 Swādhyāyayajña-127
 Swamy-58

T

Taithirīya Āraṇyaka-39, 77, 255, 256
 Tamas-29, 128, 252
 Tāmasa Tyāga-180
 Tanmātras-29
 Tapas-130
 Tapoyajña-127
 Tarka-270, 276, 277
 Tātparyachandrikā-121, 132
 Tattvajñāna-177
 Tattvaratnākara-256, 277
 Tattva Ṭikā-98
 Tejas-68
 Tiruppāvai-193
 Titikṣu-217
 Trigūṇam-29, 81, 84, 168
 Trijatā-207
 Tyāga-129

• U

Ubhayalingatva-36, 41, 158
 Udārās-168
 Udāharaṇa-275
 Uddālaka-43
 Ukti Nīṣṭha-211, 212
 Upādhi-46, 269
 Upakaraṇas-137
 Upalakṣaṇa-75
 Uparata-217
 Upāsana-92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102,
 102, 128, 129, 146, 151, 211
 Upāsanātmakamjñānam-102, 154
 Upāya-123, 195, 198
 Upāyadvitva-75
 Upeya-76
 Ūha-250, 264
 Utkranti-23
 Utpatti-17

V

Vaikunṭha-64, 81
 Vaikunṭha Gadyam-192, 193, 238
 Vairāgya-89, 136, 161
 Vaiśeṣika-48, 244, 278

Vaiśvānaravidyā-178
 Vajasaneyaka-178
 Vākyakāra-78, 97, 154
 Vākyārtha jñānam-93, 94
 Vālmiki Rāmāyaṇam-192
 Vanamālā-79
 Vandanam-189
 Varadanārāyaṇa-276
 Varadaviṣṇumiśra-258, 270, 273
 Vargas-185
 Varṇa-167
 Varṇāśramadharmas-129, 226
 Varuṇa-232
 Vaśikāra Samjñā-124, 125
 Vāsudeva-78, 94, 117, 120, 131, 146
 Vātsalya-66, 69, 203
 Vedana-96, 97, 128, 151
 Vedānta-203
 Vedānta Dīpa-193
 Vedāntasāra-193
 Vedānta Deśika-1, 5, 125, 148, etc.
 Vedartha Samgraha-46, 61, 192, 193, 279
 Vibhava-63, 65, 71, 72
 Vibhiṣaṇa-192, 207, 212
 Vibhu-38
 Vibhūtiḥ-158
 Vidhiṛākya-92
 Vidyās-178
 Vidyāniṣṭha-186
 Vijitātma-112
 Vijñāna-13
 Vijñānātma-22
 Vikāratva-49
 Vikarma-118
 Vipakṣa-271
 Vipakṣa Vṛttirahitvatvam-272
 Viparyaya-249
 Vimoka-155
 Virakti-157
 Virata-177

Viṣayarāga-89, 126
 Viṣayāvabhāsa-244
 Viṣayavāsanā-110
 Viśeṣana-13
 Viśeṣya-15
 Viśiṣṭaikya-3
 Viśiṣṭavidhi-98
 Viṣṇuchitta-256, 258, 276, 277
 Viśuddhātma-111
 Viśvātman-169
 Vivartavāda-3, 46, 47
 Viveka-157
 Vṛtti-289
 Vṛttikāra-89
 Vyāja-199
 Vyaktalakṣaṇa-3
 Vyāpaka-268, 269, 270
 Vyāpī-24
 Vyāpti-271, 275, 276, 278, 279
 Vyāpti jñānam-258
 Vyāpya-268, 269, 270, 276
 Vyavahārārhatā-22
 Vyāvahārika Sattā-46
 Vyavasāyatmikābuddhi-105
 Vyūha-63

Y

Yādavaprakāśa-3, 27
 Yajña-130
 Yāmunāchārya-69, 117, 136, 148, 194, 281
 Yatachittatma-120
 Yatamāna Samjñā-124
 Yathārtha Jñānam-248
 Yathārtha Khyāthi-251 253
 Yathavasthita-208
 Yatindramata Deepikā-263
 Yōga-21, 133, 244
 Yōgayajña-127
 Yōgābhyāsa-136

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. SAMSKRIT

Rigveda Samhita

The Ten Principal Upanishads.

Mahanarayana Upanishad.

Svetasvatara Upanishad.

Ranga Ramanuja's Upanishadbhashyas.

Valmiki Ramayana.

Bhagavata Mahapurana.

Bhagavad Gita.

Vishnu Purana.

Ahimbudhnya Samhita.

Yamunacharya's:

Siddhitrayam—Uttamur Vecraraghavachar's edition.

Gitarthasamgraham.

Stotraratnam.

Chatushloki.

Ramanujacharya's:

Sribhashyam —Dharmadhikari Chakravarthy Iyengar's edition.

-do- —P. B. Annangaracharya's edition.

Vedanta Deepa

Vedanta Sara

Gita Bhashyam

Vedartha Samgraha —Edited by Sri S. S. Raghavachar.

-do- —P. B. Annangaracharya's edition.

Gadyatrayam

Nityam

Vedanta Desika's:

Nyaya Siddhanjanam—P. B. Annangaracharya's edition.

Nyaya Parishuddhi — -do-

Tattva Mukta Kalapam— -do-

Tattva Teeka — -do-

Tatparya Chandrika — -do-

Abhikarana Saravali—Ahobila Mutt's edition.

Shata Dushani —P. B. Annangaracharya's edition.

Gadya Bhashyam — -do-

Nikshepa Raksha — -do-

Stotrani

Sarvartha Siddhi —P. B. Annangaracharya's edition.

Gitartha Samgraha Raksha— -do-

Stotraratna Bhashyam— -do-

Sudarsana Suri's:

Sruta Prakasika —Dharmadhikari Chakravarti Iyengar's edition.

Sharanagati Gadya Bhashyam—

Tatparya Deepika

Srinivasa's:

Yatindramata Deepika—Swami Adidevananda's edition.

Kapisthalam Desikachar's:

Adhikarana Ratna Mala

L. Sreenivasacharya's:

Darsanodayam.

Gotama's:

Nyaya Sutras.

Madhavacharya's:

Sarva Darsana Samgraha.

Narada:

Bhakti Sutras.

Shandilya:

Bhakti Sutras.

Isvara Krishna:

Samkhya Karikas.

B. ENGLISH

Bharatan Kumarappa

—The Hindu Conception of the Deity.

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan

—Indian Philosophy.

Dasa Gupta

—History of Indian Philosophy.

Bhandarakar

—History of Vaishnavism and Shaivism.

Hiriyanna

—Outlines of Indian Philosophy.

Deussen

—System of Vedanta.

P. N. Sreenivasachari

—The Philosophy of Visistadvaita.

—The Philosophy of Bhedabheda.

—Ramanuja's idea of the Finite Self.

—Mystics and Mysticism.

—The Ethical Philosophy of the Gita.

Swamy Vivekananda

—Karmayoga, Jnanayoga and Bhaktiyoga.

S. S. Raghavachar

—Introduction to Vedartha Samgraha.

M. R. Rajagopala Iyengar

—Translation of Srimad Rahasya Trayasara into English.

Dr. Satyavrata Singh

—Vedanta Desika.—A Study.

K. C. Varadachari

—Theory of Knowledge

—Bhakti yoga.

C. TAMIL

Vedanta Desika

—Srimad Rahasya Traya Saram

—Abhaya Pradana Saram

—Sara Saram


Vedanta Desika's

- Paramapada Sopana
- Paramata Bhanga
- Virodha Parihara
- Sara Samgraha
- Upakara Samgraha
- Tattvanavaneetam
- Rahasyanavaneetam
- Rahasya Padavi
- Tattva Matrka
- Tattva Samdesam
- Rahasya Samdesam
- Tattva Ratvavali.
- Tattva Traya Chulukam
- Rahasya Traya chulukam.

ERRATA

Incorrect	Correct	Page
तदुपर्यपि	.. तदुपर्यपि ..	1
वैशिष्ट्यविवक्षया	.. वैशिष्ट्यविवक्षया ..	2
परमपुरुष	.. परमपुरुष ..	2
त्रयणां	.. त्रयाणां ..	2
रूपादिन्	.. रूपादीन् .. p. 12	Foot note 14
बृहन्	.. बृहन् .. p. 13	
with doership is endowed	.. is endowed with doership .. p. 19	
उपलभ्यतो	.. उपलम्भतो .. p. 19	Foot note 36
हि द्रष्टा ध्राता	.. हि द्रष्टा ध्राता .. p. 21	
यथावस्थता	.. यथावस्थिता .. p. 21	Foot note 39
destinction	.. distinction .. p. 28	
निराश्राय	.. निराश्रय .. p. 35	Foot note 4
ब्राह्मणः	.. ब्रह्मणः .. p. 37	
उत्सर्गापिवादन्त्याय	.. उत्सर्गापिवादन्त्याय .. p. 41	
ब्रह्मणो	.. ब्रह्मणो .. p. 42	
वस्तुमात्रसाम्यत्	.. वस्तुमात्रसाम्यात् .. p. 45	
सर्वेषामेकं	.. सर्वेषामेकं .. p. 51	Foot note 38
सर्वाजीवानां	.. सर्वजीवानां .. p. 56	Foot note 60
havo volated	.. have violated .. p. 62	
षड्गुणाः	.. षड्गुणाः .. p. 69	
स्वव्यतिरिक्त	.. स्वव्यतिरिक्त .. p. 69	Foot note 92
षड्गुणस्त	.. षड्गुणस्तु .. p. 72	
नथाभूत	.. तथाभूत .. p. 72	
सुमजजनये	.. सुमज्जनये .. p. 74	Foot note 120
लक्ष्मीतन्त्र	.. लक्ष्मीतन्त्र .. p. 75	Foot note 123
connate	.. connote .. p. 76	
गुणादिकमिहेषु	.. गुणादिकमिहेषुं .. p. 76	
निरतशय	.. निरतिशय .. p. 77	
नित्येऽप्यनिच्छायां	.. नित्येऽप्यनिच्छायां .. p. 78	

स्सिध्यद्गुणाषुक	.. स्सिध्यद्गुणाषुक	.. p. 82	
अनावृत्तिशब्दात्	.. अनावृत्तिशब्दात्	.. p. 87	Foot note 160
षट्कभेदवत्	.. षट्कभेदवत्	.. p. 89	
द्रष्टव्यश्श्रोतव्यो	.. द्रष्टव्यश्श्रोतव्यो	.. p. 96	
पृथगुक्तत्वात्	.. पृथगुक्तत्वात्	.. p. 97	
यानोपासनादि	.. ध्यानोपासनादि	.. p. 100	
इन्द्रियाकारेण	.. इन्द्रियाकारेण	.. p. 116	
ज्ञानं लभते	.. ज्ञानं लभते	.. p. 123	
मिविषमना भव	.. निविषमना भव	.. p. 149	
नान्यः पन्था	.. नान्यः पन्था	.. p. 152	
भगवत्युत्तमश्लोके	.. भगवत्युत्तमश्लोके	.. p. 158	Foot note 37
मुक्तभङ्गस्य	.. मुक्तसङ्गस्य	.. p. 158	Foot note 38
भक्तियोगाङ्करूपं	.. भक्तियोगाङ्करूपं	.. p. 162	
ब्रह्मविद्यानिष्ठत्वं	.. ब्रह्मविद्यानिष्ठत्वं	.. p. 167	
मदुत्कृष्टैव	.. मदुत्कृष्टैव	.. p. 173	
मामनन्यभाक्	.. मामनन्यभाक्	.. p. 174	
this also in only	.. This also is only	.. p. 208	
persent	.. present	.. p. 208	
सर्वफलार्थिनाम्	.. सर्वफलार्थिनाम्	.. p. 210	
तदेकोपायत	.. तदेकोपायत	.. p. 228	
self-luminority	.. self-luminosity	.. p. 245	
यत्त्वनुभूतेः	.. यत्त्वनुभूतेः	.. p. 245	
किसंज्ञकोऽयं वृक्षः	.. किसंज्ञकोऽयं वृक्षः	.. p. 250	
त्रयं सुविदिनं	.. त्रयं सुविदिनं	.. p. 256	
इत्यादिपृष्ठान्तेऽपि	.. इत्यादि पृष्ठान्तेऽपि	.. p. 266	
यो यस्यदेशकालश्यां	.. यो यस्यदेशकालाभ्यां	.. p. 268	





مكتبة

