


AN EXAMINATION
OF
GILBERT RYLE'S DISPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS
OF MIND

BY
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DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY



SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT OF
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This dissertation may be sent to the examiner for necessary formalities and evaluation.

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CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

Man is the most wonderful creature on the earth. It is the only being on earth who can appreciate and pass judgement regarding his creation. Whereas other creatures can not do all these things. They are different from human being not only in the sense that they have a different body but also in the sense that they do not have what is called the mind. A human being can be characterised both by physical and mental concepts. That is to say, there are certain concepts which can be applied in case of human beings only. The most important advantage of man over other animals is that the former can speak a language. Language serves not only to express thought but in a sense it makes thoughts possible which otherwise could not even exist without it. Therefore, the concept of thinking is applicable only to the class of human beings. Since they have got the power to think they only can do those sorts of things which follow from

thinking.) For example, man possesses the capacity to appreciate, to criticise the actions of other human beings and can take decision and so on and so forth. Moreover, the concepts like love, hate, jealousy, etc. all are peculiar to human beings only. It is not only that they can love and hate others and can also be jealous of others but they know what is to love, to hate and etc.. Sometimes it seems that animals also show such behaviour of love but they themselves do not know that they love such and such a person, or thing. Moreover, they do not know what it is to love. Therefore it seems that man is peculiar sort of creature possessing mind in the sense that mental conduct concepts can be applied to man only and not to other creatures, that is he is higher than other creatures so far as his intellect is concerned.

The problem - what is a mind? has been dealt with by philosophers from a very ancient time. There are different theories of mind based upon different conception of the relationship between mind and body, e.g. dualistic theory, the theory of parallelism, epiphenomenalism, interactionism

and so on. In my dissertation, I shall not discuss all these theories. My aim is to see how far Gilbert Ryle's dispositional analysis of mind can explain the mental conduct concepts.

Now we shall briefly discuss why Gilbert Ryle has to hold such a view regarding mind. According to Descartes, mind and body are two independent substances. Mind is a spiritual substance whereas body is a physical substance. Thought is the essence of mind and the essence of the body is extension. According to Descartes the relationship between mind and body is that of interaction. Mind can interact upon the body and the body can interact upon the mind. Descartes further argues that a human being is 'compounded of two disparate entities - a mind and a body - a ghost and a machine. But the problem arises - how can an immaterial spirit influence the workings of a material body? How can the ghost peer through the machine to the world around it? As against this Ryle argues that the person is neither a ghost nor a machine nor a ghost in a machine.

Ryle further argues that the 'mental' does not denote a status. According to him, Descartes

involves himself in what is known as a 'category mistake' when he treats mind as a substance par with body. We commit a category mistake when we treat the facts of mental life as if they belong to one logical type or category when they actually belong to another. According to Ryle, matter and mind are not two substances, for mind does not belong in the category of substance at all, and Descartes who believed that it does, was making a category mistake.

Ryle by criticising Descartes' theory of mind and to avoid dualism gives a dispositional account of mind. He holds such a view regarding mind because I think, he believes that his theory would not suffer from the drawback of dualistic account of mind. According to him,

"to talk of a person's mind is to talk of the person's abilities, liabilities and inclinations to do and undergo certain sort of things and of the doing and undergoing of these things in the ordinary world."¹

In my dissertation, I am not bothered whether Ryle's criticism of Descartes theory of mind is tenable to us or not but my objective is to examine Ryle's dispositional account of mind itself.

How far it is possible to explain mind by holding a dispositional account of mind. Can we really say that mind is only the dispositions of the body and nothing else? Is mind simply a disposition? However a dispositional account of the mind is not incompatible with Dualism unless each and every psychological predicates can be explained fully in terms of physical terms. And I will try to show that most of the psychological predicates can not be explained fully in terms of physical terms. I will also try to show that some psychological concepts are not meaningful to us if we try to rest our explanation in behaviour only.

In my Chapter-II, I will try to describe what philosophers have said about dispositions. I will explain what is actually meant by a disposition. I shall discuss different views about disposition and will examine whether dispositions can be regarded as causes or not.

In the Chapter-III, I shall mainly concentrate on Ryle. That is, I will explain and examine Ryle dispositional analysis of mind. In the fourth chapter which is somehow or other connected with

the 3rd one, an attempt will be made to say something regarding the innerness of Mind. This Chapter is made only to show that mind can not be explained simply as the dispositions of the body. That is to say, . . . to talk of psychological predicates is to talk of something which is not only behaviour but it refers to something more than behaviour.

In last Chapter, that is in my concluding chapter, I will give my own views regarding mind.

REFERENCES

- ¹Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p.190.

CHAPTER - II

DISPOSITIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to explain what is meant by a dispositional property and how does a dispositional property differ from a non-dispositional property. First, in this connection, I will explain what a property is and then I will try to explain and examine what philosophers have said about dispositions.

Generally we describe the physical objects by ascribing certain properties to them. It is with the help of properties only that we differentiate one object from another and identify two objects as similar. Properties are possessed by the objects. An object is an object only when it is in possession of properties. 'Property', 'Quality', 'feature', 'characteristics', and 'attribute' most of the time are synonymously used. A distinction is also made between essential attribute and accidental attribute. An essential attribute is an attribute without which a thing, say, for example, is not that particular thing. A mango, for example, can not remain without its essential attributes and characteristics.

Whereas a mango can remain as a mango even w.
it is devoid of some of the accidental attributes.
Locke's distinction between primary quality and
secondary quality corresponds to the distinction
between essential attribute and accidental attribute.
It is no more possible for a substance to exist
without qualities. For example, whenever there is
a substance it must have some properties. And it
is never possible to conceive of a substance with-
out qualities. Though Samkara and many others
have talked of featureless being yet the concept
of featureless being is unintelligible. Such a
being can never be known and can never be said
to exist. To be means to be qualified and to know
something means to know it as a qualified being.
It is argued that if an object does not have any
property then that object can neither be known nor
can be identified or reidentified. This is exactly
how Ramanuja refuted Samkara's doctrine of feature-
less reality (Nirguna Brahman) and advocated the
doctrine of featured reality (Saguna Brahman). A
bare substance bereft of all qualities and attributes
is as good as nothing. A substance is known through
its attributes, without attributes, it is, to use.

Locker's terminology, 'I know not what?' Similarly, it can be argued that it is never possible for qualities to exist without substance. Qualities cannot hang in the air. It has to be the qualities of something. Qualities cannot exist apart from substance. However, it is possible to point at qualities which do not reside in any substance. For instance, the blueness of the sky and a reddish after-image floating in my visual field. Here, surely the sky is not a substance. But one cannot point to any instance of substance existing without qualities. We can never identify a substance as a substance apart from any qualities. We describe the physical objects only by ascribing certain qualities to them.

Among the properties some are dispositional and some are non-dispositional, whenever we say that things are soluble, brittle, malleable, and people are generous, touchy or inconsiderate and so on, we are ascribing some dispositional properties to them. However, we sometimes describe objects by ascribing certain properties which seem to be non-dispositional. For instance, whenever we talk about

the colour of the objects we seem to speak about the non-dispositional property. Again, when in case of a person we say that "He is tall" or that "He is short", we are talking about non-dispositional properties or predicates.

Now let us discuss what is a dispositional property? In other words, what is meant by saying that certain objects have certain dispositional properties? 'Disposition' literally means an ability, tendency, capacity and liability to do certain sorts of things. Therefore, when we say that an object possesses a dispositional property we simply mean that it is liable to or is capable of doing something. For example, whenever we say that 'the glass is brittle' or that 'sugar is soluble' we mean that the glass is liable to break or that sugar is liable to dissolve in water. Similarly when we ascribe a dispositional predicate to a person we simply mean that he is capable of doing something. Gilbert Ryle says,

"when we describe glass as brittle, or sugar as soluble, we are using dispositional concepts the logical force of which is this. Brittleness of glass does not consist in the fact that it is at a given moment actually being shattered. It may be brittle without ever being shattered.

To say that it is brittle is to say that if it ever is, or ever had been struck or strained, it would fly or have flown, into fragments. To say that sugar is soluble is to say that it would dissolve, or would have dissolved, if immersed in water."¹

N. Goodman holds,

"Almost every predicate commonly thought of as describing a lasting objective characteristic of a thing is as much a dispositional predicate as any other. To find non-dispositional or manifests predicates of things we must turn to those describing event predicates like bends, breaks, burns, dissolves. To apply such a predicate is to say that something specific actually happens with respect to the thing in question. While to apply a dispositional predicate is to speak only of what can happen."²

Therefore we see that for Ryle to ascribe a dispositional predicate to an object is simply to say that the object has the capacity or tendency to behave in a certain way and not that it is at that moment manifesting that property. Similar is the case with N. Goodman. He holds that to apply a dispositional predicate is to speak only of what can happen. This means that whenever we ascribe a dispositional predicate to an object we are not saying that it is behaving in such and such a way but that it can or that it will behave in future in a certain way. Moreover, Goodman makes a

distinction between a dispositional and a non-dispositional predicate by holding that non-dispositional predicates are event-predicates i.e. whenever we apply such a predicate to an object it means that the object is undergoing some change, or in other words something specific is happening to that object. Whereas to say that 'sugar is soluble' is not to say that something is happening to sugar. Therefore we can say that dispositional predicates are not-occurrent.

A dispositional predicate is one which is manifested only under certain conditions, rather than unconditionally and therefore the abilities which are exercised continually under all circumstances do not count as dispositions. Moreover actions which occur too irregularly or too infrequently can not be treated as manifestations of dispositions. Therefore though dispositions are abilities yet all abilities are not dispositions. If a dull student once in a while by chance finds out the solution to a mathematical sum we do not usually say that that student has the disposition to solve difficult mathematical sums. Similarly, if a child is very strong and stout and can walk long distance with


much easy we usually do not say that he has the dispositions to walk long distance. What needs reiteration is this: A habitual action can not be treated as the manifestation of a disposition.

Now I shall try to explain the nature of non-dispositional predicates. In saying that "Ram is tall" or that "this book is red" we are ascribing non-dispositional predicate to them. First, 'tallness' or 'redness' are existing continually in the object all the time. These properties are not non-manifest. Moreover they themselves are not abilities or dispositions, in the sense, 'intelligence' and 'brittleness' express some sort of ability and disposition. Whenever we say that 'X is tall' it does not imply any sort of ability or disposition. Though one can say that it implies ability in the sense that, "'X' is tall," if one says that one can say that X can touch the top of the black-board. But this is quite different from saying 'X' is intelligent and therefore 'X' is able to do these things." Moreover in case of 'intelligence', I think, we can not say such things as "therefore he is able to do such things," because "doing of

certain things imply that he is intelligent and not that he is intelligent and therefore he does these things". Whenever we say that he is tall, it does not entail that he is able to do such and such things. Moreover, he is tall even if he does not do any sort of thing throughout his life. From all these I think, we can not say that a dispositional property e.g. 'brittle' and its manifestations that is 'breaking' are related in such a way that we cannot say that the glass is brittle but it does not break which would be self-contradictory. Therefore, the relationship between a dispositional property and its manifestations is a logical relation, whereas the question of the relationship between a non-dispositional property and its manifestations does not arise at all.

Different philosophers have advanced different views as to whether dispositions are causes or not. These are the realist and the phenomenalist views about dispositions.

Arm Strong is an advocate of the realist theory of disposition. According to the realist view -



"to speak of an object's having a dispositional property entails that the object is in some non-dispositional state or that it has some property (there exists a 'categorical basis') which is responsible for the object manifesting certain behaviour in certain circumstances, manifestations whose nature makes the dispositional property the particular dispositional property it is."³

For a thing namely 'x' to have a disposition 'd' is for 'x' to be in some state 's' which is causally responsible for any events which are manifestations of 'd' in 'x' or which would be causally responsible for such events. He identifies a particular disposition in a particular object with the underlying state or categorical basis and argues that this categorical basis is responsible for manifestations of that disposition in that object and hence claims that dispositions are causes. For instance, if belief is a dispositional property then it must be assumed that whenever I have a certain sort of belief my mind is in certain non-dispositional state which is the cause of my belief'. Moreover, Armstrong holds that an object can acquire or lose its dispositional property. Let us take, for instance, a statement "This glass became fragile at 't'. This proposition is a contingently true proposition and since all contingently true propositions

are true in virtue of something in the world therefore this proposition in order to be true there must be some change in the world. Since this proposition is about a particular object in the world it must be the object that has changed and Armstrong would say that if the object acquires or loses a dispositional property at 't' then there must have occurred some change in the world at 't' and indeed a categorical change which is the basis of the acquisition or loss of the dispositional property. Whereas according to the phenomenologists, a disposition does not imply that there is a non-dispositional state which is the categorical basis of the disposition. For example, if a glass breaks under certain conditions then we are to say that the glass is disposed to break under such and such conditions. However, so far as phenomenologists are concerned if it is asked - why is it that the glass breaks under such and such conditions then the phenomenologist would have no answer. Moreover, as against the phenomenologists it can be asked - How can we say whether a particular object has a particular dispositional property or not at a time when it is not manifested?

So far as the realists are concerned there is no problem for them. They would say that we have every reason to believe that a thing has a particular dispositional property at the time when it is not manifested because the categorical basis on which the dispositional property is dependent has not changed and therefore the dispositional property exists there. Since phenomenologists do not believe in the categorical 'basis' they cannot say such things. They would say that apart from the dispositional property an object also has certain categorical properties and since categorical properties have not changed we can think that the dispositional properties also have not changed. But there is only a contingent connection between the dispositional property and the categorical property and so far as there is only a contingent connection between the two we can think that there is no connection at all. We say that there is a contingent connection between the events when the two events occur at the same time without being necessarily connected. But from the fact that they come to occur at the same time it does not imply that there is a logical connection between the two. It may be a mere chance.

The phenomenologists only hold that a dispositional statement only refers to a non-material conditional statement. That is to say, a dispositional statement can be analysed into a non-material conditional statement and there is nothing more than the non-material conditional. However, as against the phenomenologist it can be said that an object may be suitably knocked at 't' and break at 't' even though the object is not fragile. Therefore it seems that there is something wrong about the phenomenologists account of disposition because in case of fragility, the non material conditional which is satisfied in some cases are not said to be fragile. Therefore the non-material conditional alone is not sufficient for the ascription of a dispositional property.

Mackie presents the realist view of disposition. He says,

"X is fragile at 't' = if 'X' is suitably knocked at 't', X breaks at 't' in virtue of its intrinsic nature."⁴

Therefore for the realists, dispositional predicates involve a basic property and whenever they say that dispositions involve a basic property they mean that this basic property is intrinsic to

the object and this intrinsic property of an object is the basis for the acquisition or loss of any dispositional property of that object, when it is said that "X is soluble in water" it can be explained thus - 'X is such that if it is put in water it dissolves which implies that 'X' has some property which is responsible for X's dissolution in water. If these properties are not in 'X' then it will not dissolve in water.

Further more, as we have already said, we can not ascribe a dispositional predicate to an object merely by observing the stimulus response behaviour. For example, an wooden table might break under certain conditions but still we never say that the intrinsic nature of the object or its properties are involved in ascribing such dispositional predicates to that object. Sugerness can be explained by micro-structural terms by saying that suger has such and such structure and this structure is what we normally call the basic property of suger. Thus there is an analytic relation between suger and its dissolution. Suger dissolves in water because there is a basic property and for the realists this basic property is causally connected

with dissolution of sugar in water.

Armstrong advocates the identification of a particular disposition in a particular object with the underlying state or categorical basis which is causally responsible for manifestations of that disposition in that object and hence claims that dispositions are causes.

However, Armstrong's view that dispositions are causes is not acceptable to some philosophers. Roger Squires¹ argues that Armstrong's argument involves a regress. He argues in the following manner,

"Suppose we have something 'a' with a disposition 'd'. Now according to Armstrong there must be some state 'S' of 'a' such that (1) 'S' would cause 'a' to manifest 'd' at 't' were conditions propitious. But (1) according to Squires attributes a disposition to 'S' for (1) says that at 't', 'S' is disposed to cause 'a' to manifest 'd'. Call the disposition attributed to 'S' by (1) 'd'. Armstrong's position requires that there must be some state 'S' of 'S' such that (2) 'S' would cause 'S' to manifest 'd' (i.e. would cause 'S' to cause 'a' to manifest 'd') at 't' were conditions propitious."⁵

Squires holds that (2), attributes a disposition 'd' to 'S' just as (1) attributes a disposition d to s. So Armstrong's theory requires a state S'

of S and it seems we are lunched in infinite regress. To be more clear, we can explain Squires theory thus: For Squires, Armstrong's theory involves a regress when he says that for a thing 'a' to manifest 'd' at t is for 'a' to be in some state 'S' which is responsible for 'a' to manifest 'd'. It involves a regress in the sense that first we have to assert that 'S' is disposed to cause 'a' to manifest 'd' in 'a'. We can for clarity call the disposition which is ascribed to 'S' as 'Y'. Secondly, it requires that for 'S' to be disposed to cause 'd', there must be some other state behind 'S' and we shall call it 'Z' which causes 'S' to cause 'a' to manifest 'd' at t. It then requires that we have to say like this - 'Y' is disposed to cause 's' to manifest 'd' in 'a' and we shall call the disposition which is attributed to 'y' as 'x' and there is some underlying state behind it and in this way the regress follows.

As against this Armstrong gives a reply and argues that his theory does not involve a regress. He admits that 'a' attributes a disposition

'd' to 's' and admits that his theory requires a state 's' which could cause manifestations of 'd' at 't'. But he holds that 's' is identical with 's' and hence there is no regress.

However, I think that Armstrong's theory does not involve a regress. Whenever we say that suger is soluble, we are ascribing (solubility) a dispositional property to suger. There is a categorical basis or underlying states of suger which is responsible for the manifestations of that disposition (solubility) in that object. We shall call that underlying state of Suger 's'. Here, I think, we need not have to postulate any further state when we say that 's' is disposed to cause suger to manifest solubility. Because in the former case, when we say that suger is disposed to dissolve in water then if it is asked why is it such that it is disposed to dissolve in water when put it in water, we can give a reply and say that there is a categorical state which causes it to dissolve in water. But in case of underlying state we never ask why is it such that it causes suger to dissolve in water? The structure

of the underlying state of suger is such that if it is put in water it dissolves and we need not have to postulate any further state, Armstrong's theory that 's' is disposed to cause 'a' i.e. suger to manifest 'd' i.e. solubility does not imply that we are attributing a disposition to 'S' and therefore there must be a further state for it. Further to say that 's' is disposed to cause suger to dissolve in water and to say that suger is disposed to dissolve in water is not to say the same sort of thing. The first one implies that 'S' is a state of something which disposes something to dissolve in water and 'S' is the cause of the manifestation of the dispositional property and the second one implies that the suger has the dispositional property to dissolve in water. Therefore I think that the question of regress does not arise at all.

Though we made an attempt to show that Armstrong's way of arguing does not involve a regress yet it does not imply that we agree with Armstrong's view that dispositions are causes. Armstrong holds that for a thing 'A' to have a disposition 'd' it is necessary for it to be in

some state 's' which is causally responsible for any events which are manifestations of 'd' in 'A'. Armstrong holds in addition that the state 's' must be specifiable independently of dispositional terms. Armstrong advocates the identification of a particular disposition in a particular object with the underlying state or categorical basis 'S' which is causally responsible for manifestations of that disposition in that object and hence claims that dispositions are causes.

We do not agree with Arm Strong that dispositions are causes. To say that dispositions are causes is to say something like this: when we say that a glass is brittle we are talking about a dispositional property and brittleness which is the dispositional property of the glass is the cause of its breaking. That is to say, the glass breaks because it is brittle. Now we will examine how far this causal relation holds between the two and whether there is any causal relation or not. We have to explicate first what the nature of the causal relationship is.

There are three things that can be said

regarding causal relationship. First, the truth of a causal statement depends on the world as it is. That is, to know whether a particular causal relation exists or not, we have to look at the world. Its truth can not be known merely by looking at the sentence. For example, whenever we say that "There is black cloud in the sky and it is going to rain" we can not know whether the proposition is true or not even if we do understand what does each word in the sentence mean. Second, in case of causal relation, the cause and the effect must be independently identifiable. That is one must be able to identify the cause independently of the effect and vice versa. Third, since the truth of the causal statement depends on the world as it is, therefore if what is the case in the world is different then the causal statement would be false.

Now holding the first point regarding causal relation namely the truth or falsity of a causal statement depends on the world as it is, we shall examine how far this can be applied in case of Armstrong's theory where he says that the glass

breaks because it is brittle. However we think that to see whether this statement is true or not we need not have to look at the world. That is to say, if we know what does brittleness mean and what does the breaking of a glass mean then we can decide whether the statement is true or not unlike in the case when we say that 'there is black cloud in the sky and therefore it is going to rain.' Here even if we know what do these words mean yet we can not say whether this statement is true or not merely by looking at this sentence. We have to see what is the case in the world and then only we can determine its truth or falsehood. Moreover, in case of 'black cloud' and rain it may be the case that there is black cloud but no rain follows where as we can never think of this possibility to be there in the case of brittleness and breaking. If 'X' is 'brittle' but it is not breaking under suitable circumstances then we will not call it brittle any more. It ceases to be brittle. But in case of black cloud even if no rain follows still we can say that these are black clouds. Therefore from all these I conclude that dispositions can not be treated as causes.

Now I shall see how far the theory that the cause and the effect must be independently identifiable applies to dispositions. Suppose, for example, some one asks what is the cause of a drug's putting someone to sleep. We reply that the cause is the drug's seporific power. But seporific power means only "the power to cause sleep". Therefore it follows that we cannot identify a seporific drug unless it induces sleep. Therefore there can not be any causal relation at all. Likewise, we think, the same can be said regarding 'brittleness' and 'breaking' whenever we say that "the glass breaks because it is brittle" then we have to identify 'brittleness' independently of breaking. But 'brittle' means that it is liable to break. Therefore, it follows that we cannot identify brittleness unless it sometimes breaks. We cannot identify the unfulfilled possibility (liability to break) independently of the categorical basis. Thus it seems that we cannot identify 'brittleness' independently of breaking and so it can not be said to be a causal relation at all. Moreover, dispositions are regarded as the states that actually stand behind their manifestations.

It is simply the case that the states are identified in terms of their manifestations in suitable conditions, rather than in terms of their intrinsic nature i.e. the categorical basis. That is to say, whenever we say that "the glass is brittle" we mean that it breaks and not that it has such and such a structure or categorical basis.

So far we have discussed whether dispositions can be regarded as causes or not. Now we shall deal with one particular question namely whether the categorical basis of a disposition is intrinsic or not? Armstrong restricts this categorical basis to the internal constitution of the object which possesses the disposition and therefore holds that the categorical basis is intrinsic to the object.

However, to refute this view of Armstrong, Mackie holds that the categorical basis can not be some intrinsic property of that object possessing the disposition and gives the following example. Suppose there are two glasses, A and B, both made at time 't' which not only look alike but are alike in all their intrinsic features. At time t_2 each is knocked hard in the same way, A breaks but B does not. Moreover this would have happened if they

would have been similarly knocked at any time between t_1 and t_2 . Thus Mackie tries to say that if the categorical basis of a disposition had been its only intrinsic feature then it would have been broken and therefore it implies that the categorical basis is not restricted to intrinsic features only.

It seems that what happens to A and B at t_2 is wholly inexplicable. But it can not be said that what happened at t_2 with respect to two glasses, occurred by pure chance, because then one can say that dispositions which are manifestation of capacities and tendencies occur by mere chance. But this example of Mackie is not enough to refute Arm Strong's view because his own example has shown that non material conditional which is same in both the cases does make one glass break and the other does not. Moreover, He does not offer any argument to justify the view that the non-material conditional should also be included in the categorical basis, since, he says that both in case of A and B the intrinsic features are the same and also that each is knocked hard in the same way with the result that one breaks and the other does not, then it makes no sense to accept one

and to reject the other without any reason. Therefore, it seems that Mackie has not succeeded in rejecting the view that the categorical basis belongs to its intrinsic feature. However, it does not imply that this example shows that intrinsic feature is the categorical basis.

We see that the manifestations of a dispositional property takes place in an environment and the object manifesting this disposition has certain intrinsic nature. The environment includes all the natural environment and these two together serve as the 'basis' of a disposition. However, since to assert that an object possesses a disposition is to say something about the object and not about its environment then it implies that it is the object's internal constitution which is important and it is quite conceivable to think of an object as possessing a disposition without thinking of the environment. However, one can say that the non material conditional is causally important to be counted as the basis of a disposition. Suppose, for example, an object which is such that while it is at some places on earth, if we knock it, it will not shatter but if we put it on different place and tap it sharply

then it shatters. Here it seems that this particular environment of the earth can be treated as the basis of a disposition because the above object shatters in a certain environment though its internal constitution remains unchanged. However, it seems to me that here we can not reject the internal constitution altogether. In this case, the internal constitution plays the vital role. We have to explain it in this way. It is because the object has got such and such structure, that is why, when it is put in that particular place on earth and is tapped, it shatters. Otherwise, if only the environment of that particular place had been the basis of its breaking, then any object which is put in that environment and is knocked must have broken. We can not explain the fact of its breaking without taking into account the fact that it has such and such structure and also that it does not break on other places but it breaks only when it is on that particular place. Therefore, I think, that whenever we ascribe a particular dispositional predicate to a particular object e.g. whenever we say that a glass is fragile we are

saying something particular about the glass. So there must be something in the glass i.e. the structure of the glass which is responsible for its breaking. Otherwise, if the internal constitution would have nothing to do with breaking then any thing put under such an environment must have broken and no one would have called the glass fragile any longer.

I think, the internal constitution i.e. the structure of the glass alone can be regarded as the 'basis' of a disposition and if such a structure had not been there then the object would not have manifested such a disposition even though it is put in such and such environment and is knocked or in other words, I can say that the environment and the tapping, knocking and dropping etc. are some of the conditions which bring forth the manifestations of a particular disposition. That is, they are the necessary conditions for the manifestations of a particular disposition. Whereas the internal constitution which we call the basis is the sufficient conditions for the manifestations of any particular disposition. Moreover I think that if the internal constitution had not been the sufficient condition then no amount of effort could make a thing fragile. They are manifested by certain

favourable conditions which are called its necessary conditions. Since internal constitutions alone are the sufficient conditions for the manifestation of a particular disposition therefore I think that the internal constitutions and the non material conditionals together cannot be treated as the basis of a disposition. It is true that the environment and the non material conditionals are required for the manifestation of a disposition but that does not mean that they alone are sufficient for the explanation of a particular disposition.

A dispositional property differs from a non-dispositional property in the sense that the dispositional property is conditional. That is to say, the manifestation of a dispositional property takes place under certain conditions. Therefore these conditions have to be present there if we want to explain any dispositional property. Thus knocking or tapping etc. are necessary if we want to explain the dispositional property namely 'brittle'.

Moreover, I think that the internal constitution or structure is sufficient to explain the

disposition of objects. If we examine a particular object in the laboratory and find that it has such and such a structure and that structure is the basis for the manifestation of a particular disposition then even if the non-material conditionals have not been satisfied we can say that this particular object is disposed to behave in such and such a way since it has such and such a structure.

Therefore, I want to say that an object in possession of a dispositional property is structurally different from an object which does not possess such a property and for me as I have already shown, dispositions cannot be treated as causes. That is to say, the categorical basis of a disposition can not be treated as the cause of the manifestation of a disposition.

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C H A P T E R - I I I

RYLE ON 'DISPOSITION'

In the previous Chapter, I made an attempt to show what is really meant by 'disposition'. In the present chapter my objective is to examine Ryle's view on mind and disposition.

Gilbert Ryle in the introduction of his book 'The Concept of Mind' argues that there are certain mental phenomena like perceiving, dreaming, knowing, thinking, willing, arguing and so on and the philosophy of mind deals with these concepts. Non-philosophers also use these concepts in their day to day life. They know how and where to apply such concepts as stupid, careful, careless, intelligent, sharp, etc. etc.. Psychologists also use and talk about these concepts. Both psychologists and ordinary people know to detect their mistakes in the use of these concepts.

However, Ryle argues that to know how to apply these concepts is different from knowing how to correlate these concepts with one another and also how to correlate these concepts with concepts

of other sorts. According to Ryle, it is the task of the philosopher to determine the logical geography of these concepts. To make it more clear Ryle argues that the common man may know each and every house of his own locality but might not be knowing at which point of the earth it stands and what are latitudinal and longitudinal point it occupies. That is he cannot draw a map of his own place. It is the task of the geographer to determine all these. Likewise, Ryle holds that a common man also knows how and where to apply the concepts like careful and else but he does not know how to correlate this concept with other similar concepts. A philosopher specifies the conditions of correct application of mental concepts in the sense that he is concerned with finding out the cases where we can apply these concepts. When we specify these conditions we can see that many philosophical problems arise. Philosophical psychology is not intended to increase what we know about our minds but to specify and earmark the logical geography of the knowledge which we already possess. Psychological theories provide causal explanations of mental

concepts. Psychologists are concerned with the case like what is it that causes dream, what is it that causes learning, forgetting, remembering etc. etc.. Their task is to describe that if such and such thing happens then such and such a phenomenon will occur. Therefore, to produce causal explanations is the main task of the psychologists.

Generally common men are not worried about the causes of a mental phenomena. For example, a common man whenever he dreams a particular dream he is not bothered about the cause behind such a dream. He is not bothered about what causes him to see such a dream. On the contrary psychologists try to find out the causes of dream. His function is to give only the causal explanation. Where as a philosopher is concerned with finding out the distinction between dreaming and waking. He tries to determine what are the criteria of dreaming and waking state and when the philosophers tries to analyse these concepts so many problems arise.

So far, we have talked about what according to Ryle is the task of the philosophers and the

psychologists in the study of mind. Let me explain how Ryle presents his own views regarding mind. According to Ryle, mind is logically different from the body. 'Mind' belongs to one logical category different from that of body. That is, mind in no way can be said to be a 'thing' as the body can be said to be a thing. Therefore, according to Ryle, whenever we speak of a person it does not mean that he has mind which is invisible to us. A person is not composed of both a body and mind. According to him, a person is said to have a mind if he can do certain sorts of things. To possess mind is not to possess an invisible entity.

In Ryle's language - to talk of a person's mind is to talk of the person's abilities, liabilities and inclinations to do and undergo certain sorts of things and of the doing and undergoing of these things in the ordinary world."¹ I think, we can interpret Ryle's view in the following way -

Human beings are different from other beings say, animals because human beings have got minds whereas animals do not have minds. Animals can

not be said to have minds because they cannot do certain sorts of things which human beings can do. Thus, it seems that Ryle wants to say that it is because human beings can do certain sorts of things that we can say that they have mind and not that they have something called a mind and therefore they are inclined to do certain sorts of things.

Man has some privileges over animals. Human beings are different from other beings say, animals not only in the sense that human beings have a physical structure which is different from that of the so called animals. It is not only that they differ physically but it is held that we can make a distinction between human beings and other terrestrial creatures so far as the intellectual ability of the two is concerned. We can say in other words, that human beings are rational creatures. But we have to see what is this rationality which makes a man different from other creatures. Jonathan Bennett holds rationality means - "whatever it is that humans possess which marks them off, in respect of intellectual capacity, sharply and importantly

from all other known species."² Therefore whenever we say that human beings are rational it implies that he is intellectually capable of doing something which the animals lack.

However, the ability to use language is crucial to rationality because that a creature is rational or that he is intellectually capable of doing so many things say think, imagine, is expressed through his use of different sorts of language. Here Bennett holds that if human language is an expression of rationality then one might ask what are the criteria by which we can say that human language is an expression of rationality? Or in other words why it is such that the using of language is said to be the mark of rationality.

Now, we can say that human language has certain features that are lacking in just babbling. First human language unlike babbling falls under certain rules in the sense that these rules relate what is said in the language to the facts about its subject matter. Whereas in the case of mere babbling there is no rule and therefore babbling does not have any relation to whatever it is there in the outside world.

Moreover, whenever a group of human beings have a common language, their language falls under certain rules and since this language follows certain rules therefore it is possible for one another to understand the same language and we know that the members of a particular group follows a particular language by looking at their behaviour and therefore there is a relation between language and behaviour or activity. And I think, that is why Wittgenstein also holds that "speaking of language is part of an activity or of a form of life".³ He holds that speaking of a language is a part of an activity. Both the language and the activity are woven together. To be more clear we can, for example, use the word 'Thanks', I understand the meaning of the word 'thanks' only through a particular form of gesture. If this particular form of gesture is not there, I can not understand what the word 'thanks' mean there. Therefore it follows from this that language is always related to activity.

Further, since language falls under certain rules, therefore, it is possible to detect mistakes in our uses of language. We can tell whether we are

following a rule correctly or not. And so far as we use language and so far as language is rule governed and also so far as we are capable of detecting mistakes in our use of the rules of language it implies that we show some kind of awareness for the rules. And this awareness to rules is sufficient to prove that we are rational.

Thus it seems that the first privilege of man over animals is that man can speak a language whereas animals cannot. Moreover, man can 'think', imagine and can do so many other things which are regarded as mental and animals are deprived of all these. Thinking always involves certain concepts. That is, we always think through concepts. Animals do not have any concepts. Moreover man can be aware of his own self. Animals can feel pain and can have other sensations like human being. However, Ryle holds that having a sensation is not an exercise of a quality of intellect or character. In other words, it does never mean that only intelligent creatures can have sensations. Sensation even can be had by creatures in whose case we can not apply any mental concept. It is never the case that a creature in

order to have a sensation 'it has to possess a mind." In short, a creature having a mind can feel and have sensations but to have some sensations is not to have a mind. For example, even an earthworm also feels pain when it gets hurt but it does not know that it is feeling pain in the sense I know that I am in pain now. Like human beings they do not have self awareness and the concept of a pain. That is to say, they do not know pain as pain. Therefore, Ryle says that having a sensation is not an exercise of a quality of intellect or character. Hence we are not too proud to concede sensations to raptiles. Since an animal can not think, therefore, he is debarred from doing so many things that a man can do. Man can solve and create problems only because he can think and therefore the concept of understanding can be ascribed to them. Therefore Ryle would say that human beings are said to have minds because they can do all these sorts of things and also some other similar activities which animals can not. Ryle holds that whenever a person is said to have minds it means that he can do certain sorts of things and he does these things in the ordinary

world and does not do it in the special mental world. In other words, it means that a person is said to be exercising the qualities of mind whenever he behaves in certain ways and his behaviour or conduct is observable to all. For example, Ryle would say that we ascribe the predicate 'intelligence' to a person whenever we see that he behaves in certain ways. For Ryle to say that a person is intelligent means that he is disposed to behave in such and such a way. It is not the case that his overt behaviours are the effects of something mental, that is, the manifestation of some occult state. It follows from this that, according to Ryle, we can not say that 'He is intelligent' and 'therefore he does these things.' On the contrary, we are to say that he does these things and therefore he is intelligent.

However, from this it appears to us that Ryle is out and out a materialist. He explains mind completely in terms of behaviour. But Ryle is not ignoring the fact that there is a difference between our behaviour and the merely physical

processes. For example, can we call a parrot witty if it makes certain sorts of muscular movements and uses certain sorts of language? A parrot may under proper instruction make remarks which may look intelligent. But we never say that the parrot is witty or we never attach any sense of humour to its utterance. Had Ryle been out and out a materialist he would have said that a parrot is also 'witty'. However, Ryle says that whenever we say that a person and not parrot is 'witty', it seems we are ascribing the sense of humour not to something which we can see and perceive but to something which we can not see. Ryle says that the reason why in one case we can say that the action was witty and in the other case it is not, is that an witty act is done on purpose, whereas witless act has no purpose behind it. However, Ryle holds that whenever it is said that an witty act is done on purpose it does not mean that there is an act of purpose and the action is the effect of it. He then says that whenever we say that an action is done on purpose it does not mean that there is an act of purpose and the action is the effect of it. He then says that whenever we say that an action is done on purpose

then it means that the action is the exercise of skill. But whenever we say that it is an exercise of skill it does not mean that the skill is the cause of his action. Skill is not an occult happening.. Skill is not an act or a happening but it is a disposition. That is to say, whenever we say that X is skilled in doing this or that or X is skillful, it does not mean that the skill is something internal and it is the cause of his doing this or that thing. On the other hand, whenever we say that X is skillful, it simply means that X is capable of doing such and such things. He is disposed to do such and such whenever the need arises. Therefore, skill is simply a disposition. Thus, Ryle holds that whenever a person is said to be 'intelligent' or 'humorous' it simply means that he is disposed to do certain sorts of things. 'Intelligence' and 'humorous' refer to those activity of his. We do not call a parrot humorous or witty even though it might utter the same thing as a humorist utters because it is not disposed to do certain other things which a humorist can do.

Moreover, Ryle holds that there is no such thing as mental act. He holds that whenever we

perform an action, our action cannot be said to be the result of our mental acts. The traditional theory holds that whenever somebody performs an actions, first, there is a mental act to be performed and then the action is performed. Hence there are two things; one is the mental act and second, the actual action. But Ryle argues that to hold such a theory is to commit a serious fallacy. It is the fallacy of infinite regress. Ryle holds that if it is such that whenever we perform an action there is an internal act of performing that action then we have to perform another internal act to perform the internal act of performing that action. So the question will arise how do we perform the initial act of theorising? It seems that no beginning can be made. So the regress follows. Ryle holds that whenever we say that X has such and such a belief, it does not mean that he is in a particular state or he is undergoing a particular process all the time but that he is disposed to behave in such and such a way.

Ryle by introducing the concept of 'heed' rejects the view that there are mental states of

believing whenever a person is said to believe something. He holds that whenever a person is doing something heedfully, it does not imply that he is undergoing a particular state which is observable only to himself. Ryle rather holds that to do something heedfully means to do various things when the need arises. Apart from these overt performances heed does not refer to any internal occurrences.

Similarly Ryle holds that whenever a person is said to be 'vain glorious' it does not mean that there is something going on in his mind all the time and that is why he behaves in the way he behaves. Ryle holds that it is something wrong to suppose that there is a mental process going on when a person is said to be vain glorious. Ryle holds that whenever a person is said to be vain it simply means that he talks a lot, rejects criticisms about himself and so on and so forth. Vain refers to those overt performances. That is to say, there is nothing more apart from these overt behaviour. One is vain means one is disposed to do lots of things and the person who is not vain is not disposed to do these things. Likewise, whenever

one is said to love or hate someone there is nothing mental about it in the sense that nothing goes on in one's mind all the time. It is not a mental state or there is no mental state of loving or hating somebody. To love someone or to hate someone means to be disposed to behave in certain ways. Whenever Ryle says that to love or to hate is to behave in a particular way it means that there can not be a case of loving or hating if these activities or behaviours are not there and love or hate refers to these behaviours and nothing more.

From all these it appears that for Ryle, there is no underlying state behind the manifestations of a disposition. Dispositions do not stand for any further underlying state. Therefore, he holds that whenever we apply mental concepts like 'intelligent', 'courageous', 'Witty' etc. to a person it simply means that he is disposed to do such and such. In other words, he behaves in a particular way whenever the need arises. They do not refer to any internal private states or processes.

Though Ryle seems to base his theory of mind on Wittgensteinian lines yet his theory differs from that of Wittgenstein. Like Wittgenstein he also holds that mind does not refer to any separate substance or entity. Though Wittgenstein holds that mind does not refer to any 'thing' or 'entity' yet he does not deny the innerness of mind. Whereas Ryle holds that mind does not refer to anything inner and it is simply the dispositions of the body, Wittgenstein argues "An inner process stands in need of outward criteria".⁴ In other words, if there is no inner then the 'outer' cannot be understood. Some behaviour is not intelligible to us if we do not link it with the "inner", whereas, Ryle holds that there is no "inner" and mind actually refers to certain sorts of behaviour or dispositions.

Now we shall see what does Wittgenstein mean by a criterion. In philosophical Investigations it has been used in this sense that a criterion for a given thing being so is something that can show the thing to be so and show by its absence that the thing is not so. It is something by which one may be justified in rejecting that the thing is so and by whose absence one may be justified in saying

that the thing is not so - all this by logical necessity evidence for a mental state or process which is not itself observable.

Therefore, criterion or criteria is such that if they are not there then the thing in question can not be said to exist. For example, if a, b, c is said to be the criteria of 'F' then if a, b, c is not there then the F can not be there. Thus it seems that Wittgensteinian definition of criteria is that it is the necessary and sufficient condition of a thing. Because only if something is the sufficient and necessary conditions of something then only the presence or absence of those conditions can make any difference to that thing. And it is true both logically and empirically. Moreover, when we say that something is the criteria of something it implies that it is something by which we can know that the thing is so and so. Now we can present one example, suppose a person is suffering from a particular disease called 'Z'. Since he is suffering from that disease his internal organisms are in a particular condition called 'F' and 'Z' has symptoms like a, b, c. Now, here, what can be called the necessary and sufficient

condition of 'Z' is that he is having 'F' and we shall say that he is suffering from that disease by observing those symptoms.

Now we shall have to see that whenever he speaks of the outward criteria which one does he mean. Take for instance the word 'pain'. Now if we say that the criteria is the necessary and sufficient conditions^{of} something then whenever anyone is in pain then these outward expressions have to be there. Because they are the necessary and sufficient conditions of pain. If it is such that outward behaviour is the necessary and sufficient conditions of pain then we can not conceive of pain if these behaviours are not there. But I think, if we take behaviour as the criterion of the so called 'inner' then we have to face some difficulties. Because then, to say that, 'he' is in pain' would mean that 'he is behaving in such and such a way'. Here pain would mean only 'pain behaviour' and nothing more.

However, I think, whenever Wittgenstein says that inner should stand in need of the outward 'criteria', he uses the term 'criteria' in the sense

that it is an observable phenomena by which we can know that something mental is going on which is unobservable to us. I think, if we take criterion in this sense then we need not have to face the above difficulty. Because this way of explaining the criterion would imply that it is necessary to the explanation of inner but it is not the sufficient condition. Since it is only necessary and not sufficient to the explanation of 'inner', we need not have to equate 'pain' with 'pain behaviour'. Wittgenstein would say that it is necessary in the sense that if these behaviours are not there then pain would not be a word in language. It is necessary for teaching and learning of the use of the word 'pain'.

Moreover, when Wittgenstein holds that 'inner' should stand in need of the 'outer' it appears that he gives more emphasis upon the 'outer' than the 'inner'. For him it is not the case that there is the 'inner' and therefore we behave in the way we behave i.e. the inner does not act upon the outer. On the contrary, he can be interpreted as holding that inner has to be there since there is the outer. In the same way, he holds "A wheel that

can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism⁵. With the help of this example also he tries to show that external behaviour may be there but if nothing goes on with this behaviour, then the behaviour is not meaningful. He holds that the particular wheel of a machine, if it is to be regarded as a part of the machine, then the other parts also must move with it and if the other parts move along with it, then only the first part can be said to be the part of the machine, otherwise not. Similarly, he holds that the external behaviour is not meaningful to us if there is nothing internal. The external behaviour to be meaningful, there has to be the inner character of mind. Therefore, we see that though Wittgenstein gave much emphasis upon behaviour yet he is not a behaviourist because he does not reject the innerness of mind. He holds that for the external to be meaningful, the inner has to be there, whereas, Ryle is completely a behaviourist because he rejects the innerness of mind.

So far we have explained what Ryle has to say about the dispositional analysis of mind and also how Ryle differs from Wittgenstein. Now let

me examine how far Ryle's theory is acceptable. Ryle in his book 'The Concept of Mind', holds that mind is simply the dispositions of the body like other dispositions e.g. 'brittle' 'elastic' etc. whenever we say that a glass is brittle, it simply means that the glass is disposed to break. But the main thing is that Ryle does not make any attempt to show why certain concepts are called physical and others are called psychological if both of them are dispositional concepts. We say, 'brittle' a physical concept and not a psychological concept. Likewise, 'witty' is a mental concept and not a physical concept. If mind is simply a disposition of the body, like other dispositional concepts, then there need not be anything as 'mental concepts'. In short, the main difficulty, that can be pointed out in Ryle's theory is that he all the time talks about mental concepts and physical concepts but he does not give any criterion by which we can distinguish the mind from the matter. If Ryle can not give any such criterion by which we can distinguish the mind from the matter then there is no point in saying that there exists two sorts of concepts - physical concepts and psychological

concepts. So the question will arise that why is it such that if there is no criterion by which we can make a distinction between the mind and matter then how is it that brittleness is a physical concept whereas intelligent, witty are mental concepts? Therefore, it seems that Ryle, though could not provide a criterion to distinguish mind from the matter yet he holds, a rather dogmatically that there is a distinction between the two.

Moreover, though Ryle in *The Concept of Mind* tried to show that the traditional theory of mind involves the fallacies of ad absurdum, circularity, and infinity regress, yet he was quite unaware of the fact that his own theory of mind involves the fallacy of arguing in a circle.

The fallacy of arguing in a circle is committed when one proposition is defended by another and the second is defended by reference to the first. This fallacy is also committed when we take for granted a general proposition or principle which already contains the conclusion to be proved. Ryle's theory involves the fallacy of arguing in a circle in these senses. He tries

to defend one proposition by reference to another which is already included in the first. For example, if we apply any mental predicate to a person i.e. whenever we say that X is vain' we try to explain it by saying that "X is behaving in such and such a way" and 'therefore X is vain'. Here we are trying to defend the proposition that 'X is vain' by reference to the second proposition that 'he behaves in such and such a way'. Then it implies that we already presuppose that these sorts of behaviour are called 'vain behaviour'. That is, if we want to say that X is vain, then we must justify it by saying or by giving such instances which does not include in it that he is vain. Otherwise, it would be just like saying that "He is behaving vainly", therefore, he is vain" which is not a case of proving that somebody is vain but it simply begging the question. Ryle holds that whenever we apply a concept to a person it means that the person is able to do such and such or that he has the capacity to do such and such. For example, whenever we say that 'X is witty or humouras' for Ryle it means that 'X behaves or will behave in such and such a way under such

and such conditions. But to say like this is to presuppose already that this sort of behaviour is called humorous and then it is said that he is humorist because he shows such type of behaviour. In short, an attempt is being made to explain what it is to be humorous by saying that it is to behave humorously. But in order to explain why is somebody called a humorist we have to give such an explanation where there is no presupposition of humorist already in it.

Further more, it seems that though Ryle tries to show that he is not out and out a behaviourist yet his explanation and the dispositional analysis of mind makes himself totally a behaviourist. He makes a distinction between our behaviour and merely physical process. According to him, a parrot may under proper instructions say something which is full of humour. But in case of parrot, we never say that it is humorous whereas we regard a person to be humorous whenever we see him exhibiting certain sorts of behaviour. Therefore it seems that in case of parrot we can never say that it is humorous whereas in case of a person we can say that he is humorous. However, Ryle holds

that the reason why in case of person we say that he is humorous is that whatever he does, does on purpose. Ryle explains what he means by purpose by saying that a humorous person is skilled at doing so many things. But in that case, skill or purpose is not the cause behind the action of the person. But so long as Ryle equates purposes with skill it seems that he is not answering back what he is supposed to answer. He is supposed to answer why is it such that we never call a parrot humorous though we regard some persons as humorous. This question presupposes one further question that is, why is it such that what a parrot is doing is only a physical process and not a piece of behaviour, whereas it is called behaviour in case of a person? In reply to this, Ryle would say that we call a person humorist because he is skilled in doing this. That is, he is disposed to do many other things connected with it. But in so saying he is trying to explain one action by some other actions which in turn need further explanations. The question will again arise why is it that these actions are called behaviour and not physical processes in their turn? I shall try to make the

point more clear. Suppose for instance there is a person who utters something and after hearing this we say that he is humorous. Again, suppose that there is a child who also utters the same sentence. Here we say that the person is humorous and we never say that the child is humorous. Ryle would say that in case of the child, it is merely a physical process. Further, we can not say in case of the child that in uttering this sentence, he is behaving or disposed to behave in such and such a way. Whereas in case of the person, we never say that it is merely a physical process. We say that the person is behaving humorously. Ryle would say that the person is said to be behaving humorously because he is disposed to do many other things which a mere child can not do. But here my question is: Why is it that, that in case of a person we do not say that his behaviour is not merely a physical process? What makes it behaviour than merely physical process? Ryle does not state clearly what makes a physical process a piece of behaviour.

Ryle never accepts the view that there is a mental process going on whenever we say such thing as "one is intelligent or that one is clever. For

Ryle, to say that someone is clever or intelligent is to say that he is disposed to behave in such and such a way under such and such conditions. It is not that he is in possession of an additional mental state or process which is observable only to himself. Ryle explains it with the concept of heeding. Whenever a person is said to pay heed to something it does not mean that he is undergoing a peculiar mental state or process which is observable to himself. Paying heed is such that we can not just pay heed and do nothing. Ryle argues that whenever a person is said to pay heed to something it means that he is capable of doing certain things. Paying heed is not something apart from what one does heedfully. Therefore, whenever a person is said to pay heed to something it means that he is doing something attentively. It cannot be that he is paying heed to something but he does not know what he is doing. For example, whenever a driver is driving heedfully it means that he will not pass over the white lines and will stop the moment the bus ahead of him looks like stopping. According to Ryle, whenever we say that a driver is driving heedfully it means only these and apart

from these overt performances there is no mental occurrences which the word heed refers to.

However, I think that Ryle is not wholly right in holding the view that paying heed means to perform certain sorts of behaviour and nothing more. As against Ryle, it can be said that 'paying heed' entails all these but they are not enough to explain it. That is whenever a driver is driving heedfully he does all these things plus he is continuously purposing to do all these things. In other words, whenever a driver is driving heedfully he is aware that he is doing these things and moreover he does those things on purpose. This means that there is something going on in his mind whenever he is said to be driving heedfully. At least, he is all the time aware of the fact that he is driving.

Moreover, I think we cannot altogether reject mental states in explaining mental concepts. We can not explain mental conduct concepts by proposing a dispositional analysis and eliminating mental states altogether. Ryle would argue that we need not have to suppose that there is a mental state

whenever a person is said to be clever. However, I think that this presupposition of a mental state is most important and we cannot explain any mental concept if we do not take for granted that there is a mental state. I agree with Ryle that overt behaviour has to be these so far as some of the mental concepts are concerned. But my point is that these overt behaviour alone cannot explain them. There is something more to this overt behaviour. In short, we can say that this overt behaviour is the key to our understanding of other persons but they are not sufficient. Wittgenstein also argues that if there were no behaviour related to the word 'pain' then we can never teach a child what the word pain means. He says, "What it would be like 'if human beings showed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace etc?) then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word "toothache".⁶ If there were no over manifestations or expressions of pain i.e. if people just inwardly had 'pains' but did not cry or groan or grimace or plead for help then there is no conceivable way that any one could learn the use of the word 'pain'. But then, 'pain' could not be a word in language.

Therefore the behaviour, or the expression plays an indispensable part in the teaching and the learning of the use of the word 'pain'. However, there is a distinction between pain and pain behaviour. Pain behaviour itself is not the pain. One can know that another person is in pain from his expressions. He can only watch his expressions but he can not feel another's pain. We cannot say that he is groaning and crying and that is what is called pain. Pain as such is different from pain behaviour. For example, when a child falls down and begins to cry, we tell him that it hurts, that he feels pain and we comfort him assuring that it will soon be better. From this, the child learns that certain modes of behaviour e.g. grimace, cry, groan etc. are the external manifestations of the inward feeling pain and these overt behaviours let other people know that one is experiencing that private sensations. Thus we have seen that behaviour is always there and it has got to be there so far as these concepts are concerned. That is, it is the key to our understanding of the mental concepts but they alone are not sufficient to explain these mental concepts, unless and until we assume that there is something

going on or that one is undergoing some state we cannot explain mental concepts. I think, we make mistakes whenever we think that behaviour is the whole thing and there is nothing more to that. Moreover, I think that in this case if we reject inner state altogether then we can not explain pain. That is, if we say that he is not undergoing any mental state but he is simply behaving in a particular way, then we can not say that he is feeling pain. For example, a person is said to be 'vain' not because he talks a lot, rejects criticisms and does so many other things. That is, a person cannot be said to be 'vain' if there is nothing going on in his mind but he simply behaves in particular way. No one will say that he is vain. It will be perhaps correct to say that actually he is not vain but he is such a sort of person that he always talks a lot and rejects criticisms. Since a child may also be taught to talk a lot and no one on that account will say that the child is vain. Therefore I think that since Ryle rejects the view that there is no mental state corresponding to certain mental concepts he can not explain those mental concepts by holding the dispositional analysis of mind.

Wittgenstein also can be interpreted to have accepted the view that we can not reject the mental state altogether in explaining certain mental concepts. Wittgenstein argues that we can not explain 'remembering' if we hold the view that in remembering there is no mental state going on. Wittgenstein maintains -

"But you surely cannot deny that, for example, in remembering, an inner process takes place." What gives the impression that we want to deny anything? When one says, "Still, an inner process does take place here" - one wants to go on: After all, you see it" - And it is this inner process that one means by the word 'remembering' - The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting our faces against the picture of the inner process. The assumption of an inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word "to remember". We say that this picture with its ramifications stand in the way of our seeing the use of the word as it is."⁷

Thus Wittgenstein wants to say that we can not hold the view that there is no inner process. Moreover, he can be interpreted as saying that

remembering is completely an inner process. For example, whenever, I try to remember something or whenever I try to remember what I did in the last evening, I just go on correlating one action with another and in this way, I finally remember what I did. This sort of correlating is completely a process of thinking. I need not have to behave physically in a particular manner. What I am required to do is to do some sort of thinking and this is completely a mental process. Otherwise, as Wittgenstein says,

"Why should I deny that there is a mental process? But "There have just taken place in me the mental process of remembering" means nothing more than I have just remembered." To deny the mental process would mean to deny remembering, to deny that any one ever remembers anything."⁸

Thus we see that Wittgenstein holds that whenever we say that we have remembered something it means that there has occurred in us some mental process of remembering. Without this process we can not say we have remembered. Therefore, to deny this process would be to deny remembering. Moreover, I think that the concept of remembering is such

that it does not involve any outward expression or behaviour. It is completely a mental state.

Ryle argues that we can not separate understanding or thinking from outward activity. According to Ryle, some sort of behaviour is always involved when we say that we understand. Ryle would say that whenever someone is said to have understood something he shows some sort of behaviour. If this behaviour is not there then he can not be said to have understood anything at all. Therefore, Ryle would say that we know that a person has understood something only from his behaviour. It is not only that we know from his behaviour that he has understood our point but it is such that if he is said to have understood our point then he is to behave in such and such a way. If he is not disposed to behave in such and such a way then he cannot be said to have understood anything. Therefore for Ryle, understanding is nothing mental. For example, suppose somebody is shown a sequence of numbers and asked which number should come next and after a moment he grasps the principle of the series and announces, "Now I can go on". Ryle would say that what makes us say that he has understood the

principle is the fact that he says, 'Now I can go on and subsequently behaves in a certain way.' Moreover when he is asked which numbers should come next, he gives the correct answer. Therefore, for Ryle, to understand something is to behave in a certain way.

However, I think we cannot explain understanding by holding the dispositional theory. Understanding is completely a mental state. In the previous section Ryle's analysis of understanding has been explained thus: whenever somebody was shown a sequence of numbers and asked which number should come next and after a moment when he grasped the principle of the series he announced "Now I can go on". This example indicates that understanding has occurred at a particular moment in time. In other words, the person seems to be reporting that he is in a particular state presumably this must be a mental state. Moreover, even if he does not utter these words yet it cannot be said that he has not understood these things. Again, the mere utterance of "Now I can go on" can not be said to be a case of understanding.

Moreover, I think, realization is completely

mental or in other words, to realize something is to undergo a mental state. Let us, for instance, take the case of morality. Morality is not something that can be taught to others. It is such that you can not preach one to be moral. This is why only the teaching "you ought not to do this" or "you should do this", never makes one moral. Children are sometimes told not to do this or that and some of them obey it and act accordingly. But those who do so also, do not know why it is that they should not do this or that. That is, morality cannot be learnt just by seeing how people use the word "good". It is something which comes from within. I brought the point of morality just to show that we can not altogether deny that there is something inner so far as mind is concerned.

Moreover, I think, whenever we say, "There is much understanding between us" it not only implies some sort of behaviour on our parts but it implies something more. The statement "There is much understanding between us" if analysed only in terms of behaviour exhibited by us then the statement is not meaningful at all. To make such statement is

to imply some sort of mentality on our part and therefore to reduce it only to behaviour amounts to the saying that there is no understanding between us.

There is a distinction between mental occurrence and mental dispositions. Mental dispositions are e.g. Jealousy, hatred, anger, thought, love and so on. These are called mental dispositions because whenever these predicates are applied to a person it implies that he is disposed to behave in certain ways i.e. he behaves in certain ways. For example, the use of the concept of 'jealous' is associated with the posture of the body. Therefore, these concepts imply that there is a connection between mind and body. It seems, as though, the mental state cannot exist independently of the bodily state. However, there must be such things as mental occurrences. For example, the concept like dreaming, imagining, thinking etc. cannot be exhausted in terms of physical expressions. They stand for pure mental occurrences. In the case of dreams physical expressions are immaterial to its meaning. Similar is the case with imagining. One may indulge in imagining without

showing any outward sign for it also. Thinking belongs to the same logical category as imagining. That is to say, whenever one imagines or thinks of something it is not that he has to behave in a certain way. It is purely mental in the sense that no amount of behaviour will exhaust its meaning. Its meaning cannot be absolutely exhausted in terms of any natural physical expressions. Therefore, I think, Ryle has to exclude this mental occurrence from his theory and he cannot explain these concepts by presenting a dispositional analysis.

We, the human beings, think and express our thoughts. We express our thoughts in the sense that we can express what we think. Therefore, there are two things - thought and expressing of thought. If thinking were identical with its expressions then we would at last have in common usage something common or definite expression for all cases of thought. Whenever some one is in pain he expresses it by groaning, howling, crying or by simply saying, "I am in pain." In most normal cases these expressions are there. Therefore if it is argued that thinking can be exhausted in terms of externally manifested physical behaviour then

there would have been a set of common expressions for all thoughts. We sometimes say what we think but that is not the expression of thought in the sense pain behaviour is the expression of pain. That is, there is no natural expression of thought. Therefore, I conclude that it is purely mental.

Ryle holds that to have mind is to be capable of doing certain things. Or in other words whenever a person is said to have minds, it means that he is capable of doing certain things. However, as against this, we can cite the case of a paralysed person. For example, someone who is paralysed but is still conscious neither can express the ideas which occur to him nor can tell others of their occurrences. He cannot express his ideas because he is paralysed. But can we on that account say that he has got no mind since he is incapable of doing any thing?

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C H A P T E R - I V

INNERNESS OF MIND

In this Chapter, first I will make an attempt to clarify what do we really mean by 'inner state' since in the previous chapter I most often referred to the 'inner'. Then I will try to bring out what are the implications of Ryle's theory.

We most often make a distinction between the mental and the physical states. Sometimes we describe a person by holding that he is in such and such a mental state. It is not only that we make a distinction between the mental and the physical states but sometimes we also talk about the so-called "inner states". Sometime we say of a person that "he has lost his inner strength", "He has inner fear", "He does not have any mental peace" and so on and so forth. But now we shall see what do we really mean when we say these things. For example, when we say that 'a person has lost his inner strength' we mean that though he is physically strong yet, mentally he feels so weak that he can not proceed to do any work. Similarly when we say of a person

that 'he has inner fear' what we really mean is that the person though outwardly does not show any fear yet in his mind he feels scared. It also means that a person who has done something wrong is always scared of the fact that something might happen but he does not exhibit his fear. In the same way whenever we say of a person that 'he does not have any mental peace' it simply means that though the person appears to be quite happy yet in his mind he feels quite unhappy and therefore he does not have peace of mind. We want to say that to be unhappy needs to be in a mental state. Now let us see why these states are called 'inner'.

We know that there is something called brain state. Human brains all the time undergo certain processes. Whenever we talk of inner state we first mean that they are different from physical states. Whenever we talk of inner in such terms as 'He has lost his 'inner strength' we do not mean that the person is having such 'mental state' in the sense that this state is going on inside his body just like a brain state. They are not said to be inner because they are inside the person. Brain states are not said to be 'inner state' or

mental state because brain states are purely physical states. And whenever we talk of 'inner state' it does not mean that these states are inside human body. Whenever we talk of inner by using such sentences as 'He has inner fear' or 'He has inner conflict', we do not mean anything as he has these things inside or outside him. It is some sort of state that a person is in. It is not that there are no manifestations of it. But the manifestations are not the whole of inner state. For instance, sometimes it so happens that we misunderstand some people. We think that a person, say 'X' is such and such whenever we see him doing something. But whenever we become friendly with him and have a lot of conversations with him then we realise that actually 'X' is such and such' and not what we thought him to be. Therefore, what follows from this is that in that case we assume that the so called behaviour is not the whole of a person. We also assume that there is something inner to 'X'.

Now whenever we talk of 'inner' it does not mean that we are talking of any process that is

going on inside a person. It means that whenever we talk of 'inner' we mean that it is some sort of state that a person is in. For example, whenever a person is said to have understood something it not only means as Ryle would say, that he is able to answer so many questions but it also means that he is in some sort of mental state. I think that if we rest on behaviour only and reject the mental state altogether in explaining 'understanding' then we can not explain it. For example, say x is a person who said something to 'y' and 'y' understood it. Now for 'x' to know whether 'y' has understood it, 'x' has to look to the behaviour of 'y'. If it is such that to understand is to behave in a certain way then for 'y' to know whether he has understood what 'x' has said is for him to look at his behaviour which looks quite absurd. It is absurd in the sense that for me to know ^{whether} I have understood a particular point is for me to see whether or not I am behaving in such and such a way, that is whether I am nodding my head or not or whether I am saying 'Yes, I have understood'. But in reality to know whether I have understood something or not, I need not look at my behaviour. On the

contrary, I think, we first understand a thing and then we say I have understood, and not that I first say, "I have understood" and therefore I have understood. For Ryle, the case is that to understand something is to be able to do so many things and if one can not do these things then one cannot be said to have understood the same. That is why Ryle argues that in understanding there is nothing mental about it and there is only some sort of behaviour. If it is such, then as I have already pointed out for me to know that I have understood something is for me, too, to look at my behaviour. Then every time I have to look at my behaviour to be sure whether I have understood something or not which is quite absurd. It is not only that it looks absurd but it makes the thing such that one can not say that one has understood something if one does not behave in a particular way. Therefore whenever I talk of 'inner' it means 'something more' than behaviour because of which some one can say that he has understood something. We usually say that since one has understood something one is capable of behaving in particular way. If there is nothing inner about understanding then how are we going to distinguish the fact that something being done with understanding from that

done without understanding at all? That is why we sometimes say that though I am doing this I have not understood anything. Moreover, if it is such that understanding rests on behaviour only then we can not distinguish an action which is done with much understanding from one done mechanically.

Moreover, whenever we tell someone to try to understand something we do not ask him to do this or that only. When we say that 'try to understand the matter' it implies that one should try to bring oneself in a particular mental state. Whenever somebody is said to have understood something it does not mean that he does something mechanically. One can order someone "Do this immediately" and whenever the person does accordingly, we say that he followed the order. Similarly suppose someone told me to understand the sum. Here I would be counted as have understood the sum if I can do the sum correctly. Now it may so happen that I got the correct answer by chance. Here it seems that I have obeyed the order by understanding the sum and I have understood the sum because I got the sum correctly. Can it ever be the case that

we can order some one to 'understand' something? Why can not we order someone to understand a thing? We can scold someone for not having understood something but it may so happen that he would not understand it. It is something that has got to do with the person himself. One can try one's best to make someone understand a thing but unless and until the person concerned is in that position to understand the thing he will not understand it. And that is why Wittgenstein also holds, "Can one order some one to understand a sentence? why can not one tell some one" understand that"? Could not I obey the order "understand this Greek sentence by learning Greek? Similarly one can say "Produce pain in your self" but not "have pain". One says "Bring yourself into this condition" but not "be in that condition".

So far I have talked about what I really mean by 'inner' by holding that in understanding there is not only the behaviour but there is something more to behaviour. Now I will try to bring out the possible implications of Ryle's dispositional theory of mind. For, a human person is not composed of two things called mind and the body. He is a

body which is disposed to do so many things. It is not that he has got body and a mind. He is a **body** and is said to have a mind because he is capable of doing so many things. To possess mind is not to possess any entity. Mind is not anything private or inner. It is simply the dispositions of the body. To ascribe a mental concept to a person is not to ascribe to him anything private or anything peculiar. To ascribe a mental concept to a person is to say that under such and such conditions he will behave in such and such a way. Therefore, mind is not anything peculiar or private but it is simply the dispositions of the body like the solubility of the sugar. Ryle's dispositional analysis of mind implies that human nature is predictable. That is to say, we can predict that under such and such conditions a man will behave in such and such a way. But I wish to maintain that mental conduct concepts cannot be treated on par with predicates like solubility and etc.. In case of sugar we can say it for certain that if we put it in water it will dissolve, because sugar is composed of those minute particles which make it dissolve in water. Whereas a human being

is not like a lump of suger. We can not say that under certain conditions a man will behave in such and such a way. Human nature is the most unpredictable. of all. We can not say for certain that a certain person will always behave in such and such a way if he is put in such and such conditions. Human nature is most uncertain to predict. Only when we take into account the composition of suger we can say that it will dissolve if we put it in water. Suger is so composed that it dissolves in water. That is why we can hold the hypothetical statement that if we put suger in water it will dissolve. Where as the case of a human being is quite different. Therefore whenever we ascribe a mental concept to a person it does not mean that if he is put in such and such conditions he will behave in such and such a way. We say suger is soluble because if we put suger in water it will dissolve. But we cannot say that a human being will behave only in one particular way. For example, say, 'X is a brilliant student'. When we say that 'X is brilliant' sometimes we mean that 'X is disposed to do such and such or that he is capable of doing well in the exam. But suppose in one case, by chance, he could not do well in the

exam. Then in that case, can we say that he is no longer brilliant. Whereas in case of sugar if all other conditions are satisfied then the sugar has to dissolve in water. If all other conditions are satisfied and if we put sugar in much water, then, if it does not dissolve in water we will not call it sugar any more. But the case of human being is completely different from that of the sugar. In case of human being we can not say it for certain that he will behave in such and such a way. Human nature cannot be treated on par with dead pieces of matter. The scientists make observations and make calculations and predict about the course of nature. Whereas in case of human being we can not say it for certain after such and such period of time whenever he will be put in such and such conditions he will behave in such and such a way. Moreover, certain concepts that we apply to human beings also go on changing in meaning in due course. For example, an action is treated as shameful at one time may not be treated like that at another time. It depends on the way we look at these actions. Take the instance of the concept of love. The concept of love goes on changing as we grow old. Moreover it varies

from person to person. There is not one particular type of action that we can associate with love. The concept has many dimensions. Moreover, it is quite conceivable to think of the concept of love without any action at all. In fact, it is quite conceivable to think of a person who is full of love but never exhibiting any action at all. Love might not be expressed either in words or in deeds. I wish to point out in this connection that Ryle's dispositional account of human mind treats man on par with pieces of material objects. This model as I have argued out is a deterministic model. But the concept of person can not be successfully explained by the help of this deterministic model. The 'if then' model is an inappropriate model for the explication of the concept of the person. -

Moreover, I think we can present the following argument in support of the view that there is an inner state or there is something inner so far as some of the mental concepts are concerned. For example, when we say that 'X is reporting 'Y' that such and such is the case, Here there are two things, something which is to be

reported and the reporting which is done in a particular manner. That report is issued in such acts as reporting. Same is the case with behaviour or expression. For example, whenever we say that "he is expressing his sympathy" it implies that he is in a state and his expressions says so. Otherwise if there is no such state then there is no point in saying that he is expressing sympathy. Expression means that there is some state or feeling and the person is only expressing that state. If love would have meant only the loving sort of behaviour then there would have been no need to say such things as "these are the expression of love or pain." The word 'expression' implies that it is the expression of something. Sometimes we say that 'he is expressing his hatred', 'he does not have any expression' and so on and so forth. Whenever we say that he is expressing his hatred, it means that he hates someone and he shows that he hates by behaving in such and such a way. He feels hatred for someone inwardly and his actions are the manifestations of it. But whenever I say that he feels hatred, I do not mean to take the word feel in the sense that he feels pain which is

simply a sensation. Similarly, some people are such that they have less expressions. That is, they can keep in themselves whatever they feel and do not express them. Since he does not express them, it is not therefore right to say that he does not have these feeling. For example, some people are such that whenever any one dies in their family, they never cry or burst into tears but that does not mean that they do not feel pain. They surely feel pain but they are such that they do not express their pains unlike others. Therefore, I like to say that we can not equate mental concepts as such with their expressions only. If there would not have been anything as inner then I think, the word expression would not have any use in language.

Moreover, I think, the concept of pretention presupposes that there is something more than behaviour. I can know very well whether I really feel sympathy for him or whether I am pretending to sympathise with him. I really sympathise with him when it is not only that I behave in such and such a way but I really feel something for him. Therefore without this sort of feeling which is

completely ones own every sort of behaviour would be some sort of pretention. Ryle holds,

"to describe someone as pretending is to say that he is playing a part and to play a part is to play the part normally of someone who is not playing a part but doing or being something ingeniously or naturally."²

So far as Ryle's dispositional analysis of mind is concerned he holds that to ascribe a psychological predicate to a person is to say that he is disposed to behave in such and such a way. Again to say that some one is pretending is to say that he is not disposed to behave in that way but he is wishing to behave in that way. So far as Ryle says that he wishes to behave in that way, we can say that in case of pretender the question of wish comes because in case of the pretender that actual feeling or state is absent because of which he wishes to behave in that way. Whereas in case of a person who is not pretending to love the question of wish does not arise because the person actually loves him and his behaviour is the expression of it. Therefore I want to say that it is not the wish that distinguishes actually loving some one from the mere pretending to love but it is that feeling which distinguishes the one from the other.

That is, in case of mere pretending that feeling is not there and that is why we have to wish to behave in that way. Thus I like to say that the pretending presupposes some thing more to behaviour in the sense that in case of pretending that feeling is not there and that is why the behaviour counts as only pretending behaviour.

Moreover, I think that the reason why psychological predicates imply something more, that the physical behaviour is that if we rest psychological predicates to behaviour only, then, the behaviour seems to be devoid of any significance. Unless and until we assume something more to behaviour, the behaviour seems to be quite vague. A description in purely physical terms of facial expressions or gestures and other bodily movements usually seems to be quite pointless. If we say that 'X' is shouting and throwing his arms and do not assume that 'X' is in a psychological state of anger and that is why he is behaving in that way, then the mere saying that 'X' is doing this or that' does not have any significance at all.

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¹Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, Sec. 52

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CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

In this concluding chapter, an attempt will be made to present an analysis of the concept of a person in the light of the criticism of the dispositional account of mind. The concept of a person is primarily based upon the concept of mind. In fact, the way we define mind ultimately determines the definition of the concept of a person. Let us take for instance, Descartes's view regarding the mind. According to Descartes, a person is characterised both by a body and a mind. But both body and mind are independent of each other in the sense that mind enjoys independent states and so does the body. The essence of body is 'extension' whereas the essence of mind is 'thought' and none of the properties or states of either can be treated as property or states of other. Consciousness belong to mind only and not to the body whenever we talk of physical quality it applies to body and whenever we talk of psychological quality it applies to mind. Therefore, whenever we talk of

a person, we are really referring to one or both of the two distinct substances. Thus the Cartesian view of a person is such that, it is analysable into consciousness and extension. The concept of a person is to be explained in terms of consciousness and extension. Thus the concept of a person is dependent on the concept of mind. Since mind is treated as an independent substance on par with body, a person is treated as an admixture of body and mind. Likewise if body is treated as an appendage of mind and mind is accorded primacy over the body then a person will be treated as purely and essentially a spiritual being.

However, P.F. Strawson holds completely a different view regarding the concept of a person. He holds that the concept of a person is a primitive concept in the sense that it is not analysable into consciousness and physical properties. He holds that the subject to which we apply corporeal characteristics is the same subject to which we apply predicate ascribing states of consciousness, and that subject is what we called a person. The concept of a person is the concept of a type in the sense that all the predicates ascribing states

of consciousness and all the corporeal characteristics which we apply to any individual are equally applicable to any other individual entity of that type. As against the Cartesian dualism Strawson holds that pure consciousness cannot exist independently. It cannot exist as something primary. So a person can not be explained in terms of consciousness alone. Strawson holds that the concept of a person cannot be explained totally in terms of consciousness, on the contrary, consciousness is to be explained in terms of the concept of a person.

According to Philosophical Behaviourism for something to have a mind is simply for it to be a material object that behaves or is disposed to behave in certain complicated ways. Therefore, the concept of a person refers to a body which is disposed to do so many things and persons differ from mere bodies in the sense that mere bodies cannot be said to be disposed to do so many things. Therefore, to give an account of a person in terms of dispositions is to give a behaviouristic account.

In this connection, I wish to reiterate

the fact that the problem of personal identity is one of the vital problems in the philosophy of mind. The problems of personal identity are connected with problems of the concept of a person. The problem connected with the concept of a person is that what is it that constitutes a person? It is said that persons have both physical characteristics and psychological characteristics. Sometimes we describe a person by saying that 'He is six feet high', 'weighs seventy kilograms', 'has fair complexion' and so on. Sometime we also describe a person by saying that 'he is intelligent', 'is going for a holiday', 'is in pain', 'believes in God' and so on. These latter predicates are ascribed to other people on the strength of our observation of their behaviour and these modes of behaviour provide us with logically adequate criteria for the ascription of these predicates to them. For example, whenever we say that somebody is happy, we are ascribing a psychological state to him. It is something that he feels that he is quite happy today and we ascribe these predicates to him merely from the observation of his behaviour. Now the question is: whether a

person is a person because of the possession of these physical characteristics or whether a person is a person because of the possession of these psychological characteristics? I wish to argue that if we take body as the criterion of a person then there is some difficulty. For example, whenever a person dies he does not cease to possess the same body as that when~~x~~ he was alive. But even though he possesses the same body we no longer call him a person. We declare him as a 'dead body'. Therefore, if 'body' is taken as the criterion ~~of~~ a 'person' then we would treat 'a dead body', also as a person and we would say that 'this person is to be cremated' instead of 'his body is to be cremated'. Similarly, if a parrot exhibits all kinds of behaviour like that of a human being perhaps we will be in a dilemma whether to call it a person or not.

We have already pointed out that the concept of a person is closely connected with the concept of mind. As we have rejected Ryle's analysis of mind the resultant concept of person is not also acceptable to us. Therefore, in this chapter I will try to present a view of the concept of person.

In the second chapter, I have already pointed out that a dispositional property differs from a non-dispositional property in that an object having a dispositional property is structurally different from an object which does not possess that property.

Therefore, two objects which are structurally the same or in other words, two objects which have same internal constitution or structure can be said to have been disposed to behave in the similar way, whereas, in case of person we can never say such things. According to Ryle, to say that a person has mind or to ascribe a mental predicate to a person is to say that he is disposed to behave in such and such a way. We have said in the previous chapter that an object having a dispositional property is structurally different from an object which does not possess that property. So far as, Ryle presents a dispositional analysis of mind, he has to say that a human being possesses a mind because he is disposed to do so many things. In the case of sugar, we can say that since sugar has the dispositional property of solubility in the sense that its internal constitution is sufficient to explain its solubility, if sugar from different

places are collected and put into water, then, it will dissolve, whereas, the nature of human being is such that even if two persons have exactly the same structure yet we can never say that if they are put in the same sort of situation, they will behave exactly in the similar way. If it is such that they never behave exactly even though they have the same physical structure then how can we accept the dispositional analysis of mind? Moreover, according to Ryle, whenever we ascribe a dispositional predicate to a person we mean that given such and such a situation he is disposed to behave in such and such a way. But what to speak of two person? Even in the case of same person it so happens that at two different times given the same circumstances the same person behaves so differently that we can not even 'imagine it. Therefore, it can not be said that to ascribe a dispositional property to a person means to say that he will always behave in the same sort of way whenever he is put in the same sort of situation. Therefore, as I have rejected Ryle's dispositional analysis of mind, I find no reason to agree with his supposed account of the concept of a person. His account of person is that a person is

a body which is disposed to do so many things. Therefore, persons have all the physical characteristics that we apply to them. That is, a human person is a body that behaves in such and such a way. According to philosophical behaviourist, it is the behaviour which is important in our explanation of the concept of a person. There is a distinction between behaviour and the merely physical processes. In case of human being only, we can say that he is behaving where as in case of other animals, say, a parrot, we can not say that it is behaving in such and such a way. In case of parrot, what ever it does, is said to be merely the physical process. It is merely physical process because the parrot can not be said to be disposed to do so many other things. Ryle seems to have treated dispositions as sole ~~criteri~~on for determining a particular being as a person.

I wish to argue that we can make a distinction between the so called animal behaviour and the human behaviour. Every one will agree with the fact that the behaviour of the animal is instinctive. Their so called behaviour can be explained with the help of their brain process, what ever the animal

does can be treated as stimulus response behaviour. Whenever an animal is presented with certain kinds of stimuli some sort of brain processes take place inside it and it responds in a particular manner. Therefore it can be said that what ever an animal does can not be regarded as behaviour but merely a physical process because whatever it does can be explained by observing the brain process that takes place inside it and its physical correlate in the outside world.

Now I shall argue why whatever a human being does is called an action. What makes a human behaviour a behaviour? I wish to emphasis that human beings are different from other animals because they are intellectually higher than other animals. Human beings are intellectually higher than other animals because they are endowed with what is called 'awareness' and this awareness may be the awareness of oneself and awareness of others. But by saying this I do not mean that animals do not have any feeling or awareness as it is. We do not mean that animals do not have any sensations or that they do not feel anything. In fact, animals also do have feelings and sensations. They are not like inanimate things

which do not feel any sensation. They also feel pain like human beings whenever they get hurt. In this sense they also can be said to have awareness. But there is a distinction between the awareness which animals have and the awareness which human beings have. The awareness of human being is higher in quality than that of the animals. Human beings have what is called self awareness and the awareness of others. They have self awareness in the sense that they are aware of their own self. Whenever they love someone or hate someone or whenever they are in pain, they can be said to be aware of the fact that they love or hate someone. Likewise whenever they are in pain, it is not only that like other animals they feel pain but they are aware of the fact that they feel pain. All these things are lacking in case of animals. Animals can not be said to have self awareness. They can not be said to be aware of their own identity. They can not be said to be aware of others also.

An animal is not aware of the fact that others are distinct from him. Therefore it is this type of awareness which distinguishes a man from other animals. For example, there is a distinction between

the sort of awareness which rats have of smell and the sort of awareness manifested by e.g., the remark 'it smells nice' made by a man. Here, in this case, though both the rats and the man are aware of the smell yet there is a distinction between the two kinds of awareness. In the case of rat, it so happens that it gets that smell only because of something in the outside world and because there is some organ inside its body. It is only a causal relation and it is just a sensation. But in case of human being the awareness is a bit higher in the sense that he is aware of the nice smell but it is not the case so far as the rat is concerned.

Whenever we are talking of human awareness it suggests that the awareness is not a relationship between a receiver and an object. And in case of animals the so called awareness is just a sensation which can be regarded as a relations between stimulus and the brain process. In case of human awareness the object of awareness might not exist and it is not necessary that it should exist. It is more than just a mere sensation. Moreover, the human being can justify his saying. That is why, since

an animal is not endowed with this sort of awareness, whatever it does can be regarded as only a physical process in response to stimuli and cannot be regarded as behaviour.

However, though I do not agree with the behaviouristic account of mind it does not mean that I agree with the dualistic account of mind. As we have already seen, behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour and holds that mind refers to behaviour only. But I do not agree with behaviourism as a theory of mind because it has many draw backs. Neither do I agree with the dualistic account of mind which hails from Descartes, because it regards mind completely as a seperate substance. I accept that analysis of mind which neither reduces mind completely to behaviour, nor holds that mind is something which is completely private and inexpressible.

It is truism to say that human beings have what is called the mind. Apart from the body, we possess something called - the mind which marks us off from other terrestrial creatures. I wish to argue that when we say that a human person is both a body and mind we do not mean that he possesses a body and a mind. To have a mind is not

to possess something special. Whenever we say that human beings have mind we mean that they differ from other creatures because they are intellectually higher than other creatures and not that they possess something special called mind inside them. Now we shall have to examine what do we actually mean by saying that human beings are intellectually higher than other animals.

Whenever we say that man is intellectually higher than other animals, the first thing we mean to say is that he possesses that so called 'rationality'. And it is this rationality which marks him off from other creatures so far as the intellectual ability of both are concerned. When we say that human beings are intellectually higher than other creatures it does not mean that men and animals differ in degree in respect of intelligence. It is not the case that since human beings are intellectually higher than other creatures, they are capable of doing so many things and other creatures in comparison to human beings possess lower intellectual ability and therefore they can do only few of the things. It does not mean that animals also possess intellect but it is somewhat lower than that of human beings.

If what we have said would have been the case then the difference between the two sorts of creatures would have been the difference of degree so far as their intellectual ability is concerned. But I wish to point out that so far as the mind or the intellectual ability of both man and animal are concerned it can be pointed out that the two differ in kind and not in degree. The following example can be cited in illustration of the idea of difference in degree. Suppose we say that the two persons X and Y both love Z. Their love for Z would differ in degree if X has much more love for Z than Y. Their love for Z would be said to differ in kind when X would love Z in the sense that 'X' would want to get married to Z whereas Y would love Z only to get as a neighbour. In that case, we can say that their love differs in kind. Since it differs in kind, we cannot compare the one with the other. The reason why we can not compare one with the other, is that different kinds of things are connected with these two sorts of love and so these two sorts of love are different in kind.

Likewise, whenever we talk of mind and say that only human beings have minds in the sense that

they are intellectually higher than other creatures, we mean to say that human beings are different in kind from other creatures. As we have already pointed out, it is self awareness that makes a human being intellectually higher than other creatures. Human awareness is not just a sensation but it is something more and something above sensations. In the case of animals we can say that it is just a sensation.

The second important thing which is connected with the fact that man is intellectually higher than other animals is the fact that he is endowed with language i.e. he can handle language. And animals do not use language. The ability to use language makes a man higher. Language is rule governed. The presence of these rules makes it possible to teach others a particular language. Moreover, these rules in a language makes it possible to detect mistakes and to correct mistakes in our use of language. Language is related to behaviour or activity. To use a language means to behave in a certain way. Since language is related to behaviour it is possible to know whether someone has understood what others have said. Moreover, for me to know whether I am using a particular

language correctly or not is for me to be aware of the rules. If I am not aware of the rules and if I do not know what is it to follow a rule, then I cannot be said to be using a language. Since a man has this awareness he can do so many things only because they can handle language. It is only with help of language that we can think. We can think because we have the concepts and we think through concepts. Animals cannot be said to have any knowledge of concept and language which is related to their behaviour and therefore they cannot be said to be thinking.

In my concluding chapter, I like to argue that human beings are different from other creatures not only because they have different types of bodies but apart from having that body they have what is called the mind, when I say that human beings have minds I should not be understood as accepting Descartes' view that human beings have both a body and a mind. I do not mean that they have something special - an entity which is a spiritual substance. What I mean by mind, in saying that one has a mind is that one is intellectually higher than other animals. In other words one is a rational creature. So many things are implicitly said when it is said

that one is intellectually higher than other animals. As we have already pointed out, human beings have that special kind of awareness which is lacking in the case of other animals. The followings are some of the examples of this special kind of awareness. Human beings love each other, hate each other, feel jealous of others, They also know what is it to love, hate and feel jealous of others. Whereas animals lack all these things. Moreover, since man is endowed with the capacity to use language and by using language he does many kinds of things, it very well shows that he is higher than other animals. However, in saying so I do not argue that mind is simply the disposition of the body. I do not mean that to have a mind means to be disposed to do so many things. I do not accept the theory that mind is simply the dispositions of the body and nothing else. This point has been argued out in the preceeding chapter.

However, I wish to argue that whenever we talk of a person it means that he is a body with a mind. A human person is different other creatures be cause he possesses mind or that mental conduct concepts can be applied to them only. I wish to

point out that the so called mental conduct concepts can not be completely described by behaviour. Behaviour is not the whole of mental concepts. Take for instance the mental concept 'belief', we can apply this concept to human beings and not to animals. We apply this concept whenever we see them behaving in a particular manner. To say that one believes in such and such does not mean that one is behaving in such and such a way. It is possible for a belief not to be manifested in behaviour. Some of our beliefs are such that they need not be uttered nor acted upon. Sometimes one's behaviour gives the clue that one believes in such and such a thing. One's Behaviour stands as an evidence for one's belief. But from this it does not follow that whenever one is said to be believing something it simply means that one has the tendency to behave in such and such a way. Moreover, belief like some other mental concepts are such that if 'S' believes that he has a certain mental state then no one else can falsify that 'S' does not have it. This provides a good ground for saying that there is something inner so far as belief and

other concepts are concerned. Behaviour is necessary but not sufficient condition for the explanation and description of mental concepts. I wish to point out that only complicated external behaviour does not make a man higher than other animals. There is something more to behaviour because of which we can say that man is intellectually higher than other animals. There is something inner to mind as I have already pointed out. Thus I would like to modify Ryle's analysis of the behaviouristic account of mind. But my modification of Ryle's analysis should not be interpreted as a case for the indication of dualism i.e. mind is completely a separate substance.

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