ABSTRACT

MEANING, TRUTH AND HUMAN ACTION

By

LALDINENI

Dissertation

SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT OF THE DEGREE OF

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The dissertation is an attempt to differentiate man *from* nature. It is possible to make a clear distinction, in the case of man, between an explanation in terms of reasons, and explanation in terms of causal processes. In the case of natural phenomena it is extremely doubtful if any explanation in terms of reason is ever admissible. In connection with this the thought of two thinkers, Freud and Marx, who are close partners in their ideas of human bondage is discussed. Besides, the thought of Sartre, who rejects the scientific explanation as being relevant to the understanding of man is also discussed.

In the first chapter, Aristotle's view of man and nature is discussed. For Aristotle explanation whether nature or of man must ultimately be in terms of reason (purpose, telos).

In the second chapter, the controversy arising out of the distinction that is frequently made between explanation in terms of cause and explanation in terms of reason is discussed.

Man is free and we can say that the conditions of his action can be the cause of his action as well as the reason as he is the one who decides, the states in us are reasons as well as causes and such states do not make a man victim of that, but make persons voluntary agents.

In the third chapter, the thought of Freud is presented. Freud sees man as a closed system driven by two forces the self-preservative and the sexual drives. Man, for Freud is the unfinished product of nature, struggling against reason.

Human irrationably dominates in the unconscious, whereas logic governs the conscious. But and this is decisive, the unconscious steers consciousness and thus the behaviour of man.

Freud believes that society imposes unnecessary hardship on man, which are conducive to worse results rather than the expected better ones. He believes that this unnecessary harshness as it operated in the field of sexual morality, led to the formation of neuroses, that in many cases, could have been avoided by a more tolerant attitude. Freud believes that human progress necessarily leads to repression and neurosis.

Freud is considered to be the most important authority who studied the phenomenon of dreaming. And it seems clear enough that for him dreams are something which are experienced and they also indicate unconscious mental process.

In the fourth chapter, Marx and his concept of alienation is discussed. Marx's treatment of alienation concerns the problem of the self in relation to nature and society, and the conflict between thought and reality. Alienation which is a major theme of the human condition in the contemporary epoch appears central in the early writings of the young Marx.

Man is alienated spiritually when he feel himself to be the victim of a system he cannot control. And when the process of production is geared to the egoistic need of making more money. Marx considers it as evidence of human alienation.

For Marx, the communist world revolution is a revolution of self-change, an act by which man is to end his alienation, restore his lost harmony with himself and actualize himself as man.

In the fifth chapter, Sartre and his ideas of free man is discussed. Sartre quite self-consciously rejects the covering law or what might be called scientific variety of explanation as being relevant to the understanding of man. Explanation in terms of reason is supreme for him not only supreme but exhaustive.

For Sartre it is not time but nothingness that is the core of human existence and that man brings to all reality. Only nothingness, for Sartre, can perfectly reveal reality. Only nothingness lacks identity with itself and is totally of nothing. Being for Sartre, cannot reveal something other than itself.

Sartrean man creates his own justice and invents his own essense or justification for existing. This is therefore good in the Sartrean sense, since it is the expression of a

sudden eruption of freedom. It is only bad if one accepts that good and evil are permanent unshakable realities.

In conclusion the important role of meanings in understanding the truth of man and man's understanding of himself is pointed out.

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the subject matter of this dissertation is the record of work done by **Laldineni**, that the contents of this thesis did not form a basis of the award of any previous degree to her, or, to the best of my knowledge, to anybody else, and that the dissertation had not been submitted by her for any research degree in any other University.

In habit and character **Laldineni** is a fit and proper person for the **Degree of Ph.D.**

Mrinal Miri

(Mrinal Miri)
Supervisor

SHILLONG

THE MAY, 1988.

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This work is but an humble offering at the feet of the Lord, without whose benign grace the work could not perhaps see the light of the day.

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Laldineni

SHILLONG (LALDINENI)

THE 16th MAY 1988.

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The title of the dissertation may appear somewhat misleading to the reader, because it may lead to the expectation that the work will consist centrally of exploring philosophical links between the concept of meaning, the concept of truth and our understanding of our own actions. The dissertation thus indeed deal with these problems, but perhaps in an indirect way; and although some kind of a solution is suggested, it is not worked out in a way which might be expected of me going by the title alone. My main reason for this approach is that I do not wish to enter directly into a debate which, in spite of its great importance, has in recent philosophy, reached somewhat of a dead end. Instead therefore I take three great systems of thoughts in modern western philosophy whose central concern is the understanding of the truth of man and the part that meanings play in this understanding.

I begin however with Aristotle because (1) he was the first philosopher in the western tradition to think systematically about the nature of explanation and understanding, and (2) his influence particularly about what we suppose to be uniquely human is still quite tremendous.

The Galilean revolution led eventually to the view that the unitariness of an explanatory system proposed by Aristotle must be given up in favour of a duality of explanatory systems - one

valid for man in his capacity as man and the other valid for non-human nature.

In modern times this duality view finds expression in the distinction that is made between cause and reason, between meaning and brute-data, between intention and motive on the other hand, and stimulus and impulse on the other.

In my second chapter, I take up this debate about the distinction between cause and reason etc. and the conclusion I reach is that while man's uniqueness is indubitable in some sense and while reason, meaning, intention, etc. must find a central place in any endeavour to understand the truth of human reality, it is wrong to divorce this concept from causality altogether. The next three chapters - Freud, Repression and Human Bondage; Marx and Alienation; Sartre and Freeman - are in a way meant as an illustration of the validity of this conclusion. But my choice of these three thinkers has also been guided by the fact that all the three of them regard freedom as something which is not only a unique possession, but also as the most valuable human possession which is to be achieved through an understanding at the centre of which is the idea of meaning as oppose to brute-fact and the causal powers that this idea inevitably acquires. In these three chapters I explored the thoughts of the three philosophers in some detail and somewhat mutually independently of each other, but a common thread is still there and this is that meaning,

truth and causality, for all these three thinkers, are, or rather, must be seen as inalienably link with one another in the understanding of human actions.

CHAPTER - I

ARISTOTLE AND MAN

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It is a common place, but nonetheless important fact that philosophical problems are not cumulatively and progressively solved unlike perhaps problems in the natural sciences; they have rather an awkward habit of recurring almost indefinitely although perhaps in somewhat different guizes. The problems that I shall be concerned with in this work finds perhaps their first philosophical expression in Aristotle. Hence this starting of the work.

Human being, according to Aristotle is a living being or animate being. Any discussion of the motions and changes that are characteristic of living being will apply to human beings as well. Human being do grow, digest food, reproduce themselves. But, human beings are not merely living beings, they are physical bodies as well. In consequence, as physical bodies, human beings are subject to the various natural and violent motions that pertain to the four elements and their compounds.

Human beings perform all of the lower vital functions, nutrition, growth and reproduction, and on top of these, sensation and locomotion - but in addition, they are capable of a still higher cognitive operation than those of mere sensation, namely, of rational cognition and understanding. In the case of each living substance - plants, animals and men - it is the soul which determines each kind of substance to the performance of the functions or changes appropriate to substances of that kind with

the result that it is the formal, final and efficient causes of those characteristic functions and changes. Thus to consider human soul as being determinate of the various human functions that human beings perform. The distinctive function of men lies in the exercise of rational knowledge and understanding, it is naturally this function that one need to concentrate upon in any study of man as man.

Aristotle wants to insist that it is the soul or form or psyche that informs and animates and orders the human life according to their distinctively human functions in a human being. Moreover, the distinctive character that the human soul or human substantial form gives to the life of the human body lies precisely in the fact that such a being turns out to be a corporeal being that is no less capable of knowledge and understanding. Human beings - as rational beings aim at living intelligently (that is, living in accordance with such knowledge and understanding as they are able to achieve) as their natural end or good, and they deliberately set out to attain them.

Human being, as a rational animal, is one who is consciously aware, often painfully aware of his own lacks and needs which is to say of his own unfulfilled potentialities. A human being's life is not only shot through with desires, drives, and one might even say that the life of a man resembles one long sustained, conscious, deliberate, and get multi-directed effort to fulfill his multifarious needs and potentialities. If one may properly speak of

a man's truly achieving what he aims at, in the sense of a fulfilment or completion or perfection of his life as a human being, then the attainment of such a thing will amount to the actualization of his potentialities, and as such will constitute what is indeed his true satisfaction and happiness.

For Aristotle, man's proper function or activity is not simply one of having intelligence in the sense of certain I.Q. which one can then show off upon occasion, but rather in the sense of actually being intelligent in the living of one's life and of actually using one's intelligence in making the day to day decisions of one's life.

Man's function or man's perfection or full development does indeed consist in no more and in no less than in his living in the manner of someone with knowledge and understanding. Man is by nature a political animal. A human being is not truly human except in a political association.

Man possesses reason, and is therefore, quite distinct from the other beings of nature, he is for Aristotle, like them, a hylomorphic beings (composed of matter and form in union) who is subject to change, and who has arisen as the result of a long process of cosmic evolution. The human soul is bound to its body, and even the power of reason cannot function without the assistance of the corporeal organs of sense. This reason is to

the apprehension of the forms of surrounding bodily things about which it needs to know something in order to survive. Hence, it is only with difficulty and indirectly that the soul can come to understand the nature of itself and to non-physical operations. Our human reason, chained to a body, is the lowest possible type. In spite of its serious limitations, Aristotle held that with the aid of sense, our rational faculty can gain accurate insight concerning physical things, a very broad though confused knowledge of being and its all pervasive structure, and even some understanding of non-physical existence and God, the unmoved mover of nature.

Human intelligence is found to a body and dependent upon sense. It can give us some insight into the composite nature of changing things, but with respect to immaterial beings, like the human soul, its knowledge is indirect and negative. Nevertheless, it is by far the most penetrating of all our intellectual faculties, and is capable of revealing many aspects of being which are totally opague to sense.

Plato had believed that there was universal intelligible entities outside the mind, which simply floated in to be passively received. Aristotle pointed out that all the evidence indicate that everything in nature is concrete and singular. The matter of such entities is opague to reason. Only form as such is intelligible. Hence, before this structure can be understood, it must be separated

from its material matrix. This means that reason is active, not passive. It grasps the structure, or nature, of a physical thing only by constructive acts of its own.

The human soul is the first animating form of a natural body, and cannot as a whole exist without it, the rational part is separable and immortal. This organized body was prepared by a long process of evolution to receive the essential form of reason which is the differentiating feature of man. It was first of all a physical thing located in a space, and subject to the laws of motion. Then such a body was endowed with a vegetative principle which enabled it to nourish itself and to grow. When this plant life became established, it was then infused with an animal form which was capable of sense and locomotion. Being material, this animal life retained the potency for a still higher form. At a certain stage in its accidental development, it became ready, and received the rational form of man.

This final rational form fused with the other lower patterns to which it was added, and found them all into a higher unity, making this new organized body into a man. This is no mere set of separate properties strung together, for each is combined with a potential matter prepared to unite with a further matter, as the molten gold is able to receive the form of a ring. Thus body and soul are not two separate entities, but two interdependent principles, each of which exists only by virtue of the other.

Without the human body, there would be no soul, and without the soul, no human body. Each is distinct but not separable from the other.

The rational form fuses with the other of lower forms in such a way as to give them a new unity, but in doing this, it also becomes dependent upon them.

The vegetative soul is responsible for the function of intuition, growth and reproduction. Without these, the higher faculties cannot operate or even exist. But at the same time, they are under the general control of reason. Thus, while we have to eat in order to live, we can choose when to eat and what food we shall take. The lower functions are necessary but always potentially open to further determinations from a higher source. Thus hunger and sexual need arise automatically in all men. but they can be controlled in an infinite variety of ways. The animal factor in the human form provides us with faculties of sense and organs of locomotion. The sense organ must receive an actual stimulation from physical pressures, sounds, colours etc. but this is only the beginning, a first necessary condition for sensory feeling. Sense enables us to become aware of physical things around us so far as they possess the special sensible properties.

Language, distinguish man from other animal and nature. Man alone possesses speech. Without the possibility of communication

the individual is not a man, and if he ceases to desire it he must be either a beast or a God. (Pol, 1, 125, 3^{a} 19_{f}). Man can think and reminisce, Beast lacking, the ability to see generalizations which reveal causal structure cannot determine their future actions in terms of a stable concept of the world.

For Aristotle, the universe is a cosmos, or order of changing entities at different levels of being, inorganic things, plants, animal and men. All are dependent on an ultimate first principle which Aristotle held was in perfect act.

Everything in nature is in flux. This is true. But change cannot be reduced to a mere succession of forms in an alien medium. The material principle never exists alone by itself, but always together with some form by which it achieves its potency for other structures. Even in the union with form it still retains its potency for other structures. Change is the actualization of such potency, which always includes the factor of continuity as well as one of formal succession or discontinuity. Natural substances not only suffer change they also have active powers and exercise causal efficacy. Aristotle was deeply concerned with the phenomenon. He distinguished four types of cause, which were implicit in Platonic thought, and analysed each in great detail.

Aristotle arranges all living beings in a scale, according to the complexity of the physical faculties they display, placing man

towards the top of the scale, and this idealistic, and perhaps fanciful view to some extent impedes any attempt at a sober classification of animal.

In the hierarchy of nature, plants are ranked above mere physical bodies. But to say that plants are thus 'above' physical bodies means no more than that plant themselves are, of course, physical bodies, and that all of the laws of motion and change that apply to physical bodies apply also to plants, but at the same time, plants, in addition to obeying the laws of motion of physical bodies, also manifest a type of change or motion of their own - what we have called developmental daze - which mere physical bodies as inanimate things do not manifest at all.

Animals are above plants, in that, in addition to performing the ordinary vital functions associated with mere plant life, animals also perform the functions of sensation and locomotion. With respect to the latter point, Aristotle obviously felt that animals are capable of moving about from place to place under their own power, whereas plants are not.

Aristotle's interpretation of all natural processes is frankly teleological, the physical scientist must in his view aim at the discovery and statement of the final cause, as well as the efficient cause and material condition. This mode of explanation, is for obvious reasons, even more prominent in Aristotle's account of living things,

their organs, instincts and mode of life, than it was in his astronomy and physics.

Aristotle is what would be called a vitalist. There is for him a clear division between the movement and qualitative change of lifeless bodies and the processes which appear first in living and growing things, and though he does not seem to argue at length in favour of this position, he holds that there is a prospect of explaining organic change in mechanical or chemical terms. Such change must necessarily be described in terms of psyche, defined as explained in de Anima.

The life of plants is relatively simple, (a) they take nourishment, already prepared for them, from the earth, and (b) they grow and at a fixed season reproduce themselves. The distribution of their organic parts is such as is dictated by these two functions. Aristotle indeed argues that growth or nourishment and the production of offspring are connected (de Anima, II, Ch. 4) and assigns these functions jointly to the most elementary species of psyche. Some beings are of a dubious character, being motionless, but apparently endowed with sensation.

> Nature proceeds little by little from things lifeless to animal life in such a way that it is impossible to determine the exact line of demarcation, nor on which side thereof an intermediate form should be. Thus, next after lifeless things comes the plant, and of plants, one will differ from another as to its amount of apparent vitality, and in a word, the whole genus of plants, whilst it is devoid of life as compared with

> an animal is endowed with life as compared to with other corporeal entities. So, in the sea, there are certain objects concerning which one would be at a *loss* to *determine* whether they be animal or vegetable. For instance, certain of these objects are fairly rooted, and in several cases perish if detached. In regard to sensibility some animals give no indication whatever of it, whilst other indicate it but indistinctly. And so throughout the entire animal scale there is graduated differentiation in amount of vitality and in capacity for motion.1

Whereas the plant draws its nourishment fully prepared from the earth, animals (a) are designed to range about the world in pursuit of nourishment, and must have the instincts and faculties requisite for the purpose, among which sense-perception is evidently the most essential, and this entails the sense of pleasure and some degree of imagination and memory, (b) must concoct or prepare the nutriment for themselves. Nature has therefore built into the animal frame itselt an apparatus whereby the body building nutriment is separated, turned into blood and distributed to all parts of the body while the superfluous 'residue' is either discharged altogether or economically devoted to the formation and growth of subordinate parts, such as hairs, nails, horns etc.

Man is unique among the animals and has some primacy among them, he does not, of course, doubt, he alone, of living beings, with which we are acquainted, partakes of the divine or at any rate

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1. Historia Animalium, VIII, Ch. I, translated by D' Arcy W. Thompson.

partakes of it in a further measure than the rest (de Partifus 11, 656a 8). Elsewhere nature's work is complete when she has given her creatures the sense necessary to their preservation. But in man at least the higher senses (sight and hearing) have something more than the mere 'survival value' they give the information from which, in the course of time, the practical arts, and science, and philosophy will be evolved, and the philosopher's delight in the truth for its own sake is already foreshadowed in the natural man's pleasure in the exercise of his senses. (Metaphysics I, Ch.1). All this can be said without appealing to the additional and supremely important fact that man alone has the use of reason. The lower animals have at least five forms of sense perception, sense of pleasure, desire, power of locomotion, the capacity to restore their energy in some instances and memory which enables habits to be formed.

Man, in addition to all these powers and to the vegetative powers, has the gift of reason, theoretical and practical.

For Aristotle the antithesis between nature and convention or law is a false one (because the truth is itself natural to rational beings) it is also a misleading one, because the word 'nature' has various senses and may denote either the primitive state or the acme of development, but if we insist on applying it to the forms of human association, we are found to say that the state is more natural than the family, because in it alone human nature is developed to its full extent.

So nature according to Aristotle, means (1) the original state of thing, as opposed to its state when modified by culture and education, hence those tendencies in any growing thing which are first displayed as opposed to others not less natural which come out at a later state, and

(2) The acme of development which is reached when every inherent capacity has been brought.

(3) The power of spontaneous movement and change as opposed to movement which is induced from without or by force.

(4) The total aggregate of bodies which display such movement.

Aristotle sometimes seems to regard nature as designing power which has provided every living being with those faculties which it needs in order to survive. He is never weary of calling attention to the marvellous accuracy and economy of her design. Some passages suggest the view that nature is not merely an immanent forces, but a person having reason and foresight. He certainly criticises other thinkers for trying to explain natural processes in mechanistic terms, and goes to an extreme length in the opposite direction. The fact is that he holds that a process may be purposive, and yet not be the outcome of conscious choice. Aristotle calls attention to the marvellous skill and economy of nature throughout his description of living things and their organs. The movement of the planets is likewise viewed as rational and purposive. In the history of science, there has been no more strenuous defender

of final causes. Yet, nature has no real existent as a personal force. Nature is a kind of unconscious art, situated within the living and growing things, an art which is careless of the individual and aims only at the preservation of the specific type. (Nature is present also in the lifeless elements; but here the tendency of each body to attain its natural situation and remain there until it is forcibly withdrawn, takes the place of the quasi-purposive development of the form). As for the matter which provides the fabric of the bodies of living beings, and the framework of the world in which they move, its changes are certainly governed in general, by causal law, but Aristotle never speaks of an iron nexus of cause and effect and seems to think that it is only in the outer region of the universe, which is most completely dominated by mind, that absolute uniformity of movement, is to be found.

By these views he obtains liberty to interpret the course of nature in terms of purpose, which making as few explicitly metaphysical assumptions as possible, and he probably hopes that the success and coherence of the explanation thus given will be taken as a guarantee which he was chiefly interested, settle down in the end to some such view as his. And a philosophy which pronounces that this exquisitely designed world has existed for an infinite time, and that there is no emergence of new forms in response to a changed environment, is relieved from some task, which would be onerous to modern science. In the end, you can either

succeed in visualising a world which is thoroughly permeated by a rational plan, and yet was never planned, or you cannot. Aristotle is thoroughly convinced by his own picture and goes so far as to claim that it is the very unconsciousness of nature's design that accounts for its superior accuracy when compared with human art. (Ethics II, Ch. 6. § 9)

Nature is the primary immanent element of a thing which is the starting point of its growth and the genesis of growing things. It is the primary matter, shapeless and unchangeable from its own potency, of which any natural object consists or from which it is produced and it is the essence of natural object. Nature consists of primary matter, and the form or essence, and is the end of all becoming.

Every essence in general is called a nature because the nature of a thing is a kind of essence. The primary and proper meaning of nature is the essence of a thing which have in themselves (qua themselves) a principle of motion. The matter is described as nature only because it is susceptible of that principle, generation and growth, because they proceed from it. Nature in this sense is the source of movement of natural object, present in them either potentially or actually.

Aristotle held that the hylomorphic substances of nature have an independent and fully real existence of their own. This led him

to study their complex internal structure more carefully, and also the mysterious processes of change and evolution out of which they come into being through which they endure, and to which they finally return. Change, in fact, was recognized by Aristotle as the most pervasive fact of nature and his categories can be understood only in the light of the role they play in different kinds of change.

There is a factor of indeterminacy or potency, called matter, which is found everywhere in nature. It is nothing, but rather an incomplete mode of being which is not actual. Yet able to become an infinite number of forms. When one such determination is received, however, the matter still remains incomplete. It is able to lose the form and to receive an indefinite variety of others. It is never found alone, but always united with some form. Change is the actualization of the potential.

Spiritual beings have no matter and do not evolve out of anything else. They cannot be understood in the usual way by means of genus and difference. Hence, we cannot grasp them directly as they are. We have to approach them indirectly by comparing them with what they are not. This gives us only an analogous, negative knowledge of them which is expressed when we say they are immaterial. Material substances are however, more accessible to our limited intelligence. They evolve out of preceding substances which are destroyed when the new essential form is received. These new substances are always individual and are capable of enduring

through the three modes of accidental change, locomotion, growth and alteration. Once a species becomes established the individuals reproduce others like themselves.

Aristotle suggested that the lower species of life came first and that from these evolved the later and higher forms. He did not believe, however, that this was working towards some final end, since the cosmos is everlasting in time. Many such evolutions have happened before and have ended in great catastrophe. Many will doubtless happen again after our particular history is finished.

CHAPTER - II

CAUSE AND REASON

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In this chapter, I shall discuss in some detail the controversy arising out of the distinction, that is, frequently made between explanation in terms of cause and explanation in terms of reason. But, the chapter is not altogether a break from the previous one. Before going into the details about the distinction between cause and reason, let us say at the outset that for Aristotle all explanation whether of nature or of man must ultimately be in terms of reason (purpose, telos). Although it is also quite clear Aristotle was more than just aware of the distinction between cause and reason. Modern science seems to have broken away from the Aristotelean recommendation for the search of the telos of things. But explanation of human action does remain a problem. Must each explanation be in a sense Aristotelean or must it also be like natural objects Galilean? This is where discussion of the distinction between cause and reason assumes such enormous importance. In order to give a satisfactory explication of cause and reason, we need to explain and illustrate the concept of cause first.

Cause brings about an effect and is followed by an effect. Without cause effect cannot happen and effect cannot precede the cause. When we give causal explanation of an event we have the idea that the same cause will produce the same effect always.

Causal explanation explains the conditions which is sufficient for an event to happen. Causal explanation usually deals with natural phenomena.

Causal explanation is applicable to natural events. In natural events one never asks the intention and motives behind the effect. Causal explanation explains the cause and effect relation as it is, without speculating about something going on behind the events. There is a brute matter-of-factness in natural events and causal connections are either there or not there and it does not make sense to say of a causal connection that it ought to be there or ought not to be there, that it is right for it to be there, that it is proper or improper, that it is good or bad. Even when we say that the cause is a good cause we use it in a sense quite different from the sense in which it is used for an explanation of human action which is primarily explanation in terms of reason.

It is no exaggeration to say that the ironist of Philosophy, David Hume is one of the foremost exponents of the concept of cause as explained above. I shall therefore give a succint exposition of Hume's account of the concept of cause.

According to David Hume, we may define a cause to be an object followed by another and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second.[1]

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1. Hume, Treatise of Human Nature.

If we analyse the Humean idea of a causal relation that must hold between two events when one is the cause of the other, we can say 'A' causes 'B' if,

(a) It is logically possible of 'A' to exist without 'B' and vice versa.

(b) There is a non-trivial empirical generalization to the effect that whenever there occurs an event of a type to which 'A' belongs there occurs a subsequent event of a type to which 'B' belongs.

It is clear that cause and effect are two different entities. They are two events. Hume says 'the idea of cause and effect are evidently distinct ... They are logically independent in such a way that the existence or non-existence of the one must in no way logically entail the existence and non-existence of the other.'

Cause and effect relationship are instances of inductive generalization. Whenever we see a cause we appeal either explicitly or implicitly to a generalization which links cause and effect by stating that whenever the prior circumstances obtain the event follows.

A causal relationship can be known only on the basis of inductive evidence. In the ordinary cases, to know that 'A' is the cause of 'B' rather than a mere accidental predecessor of B' one must have evidence.

There are different views regarding the relation between cause and reason. I shall consider only three views, since in my opinion, they are more important than the others. The three different views are as follows:

1. Explanation by reason can never be causal explanation.
2. Explanation by reason is nothing but causal explanation.
3. Reason may be thought of as a special kind of cause.

I shall discuss the first view first. In this connection, the views of Melden, Anscombe and White will be discussed. Even though these three philosophers agree that reason cannot be treated as cause, they give different arguments to prove the same.

For Melden reason for an action can never be a cause of the action because the reason of our action-willing is not logically distinct from our action. Melden says that a cause must be logically distinct from the alleged effect. But our reason for an action is not logically distinct from our action. If a motive of one kind (M_1) is causally connected with an appropriate action (M_2) then M_1 must be a description which is available to the agent which meets the requirement of causal isolation but such a description has not yet been found. Intention, willing and motive cannot be individuated or identified as mental processes without mentioning their logical relation to the objectives or

actions. A human action is inseparable from the will to perform that action. We cannot therefore equate causal explanation and explanation in terms of reason and one cannot replace causal explanation by explanation in terms of reason, as the reason we give for our action, motive, intention, will etc. are not logically distinct from our action. Besides, according to Melden, causal explanation is wholly irrelevant to human action.

G.E.M. Anscombe says that the reason or motive for doing something, interprets and explains an action, but the reason supplied for an action cannot be said to be the cause of an action. Anscombe says,

> Motives may explain actions to us, but that is not to say that they 'determine' in the sense of causing actions. We do say, his love of truth caused him to ... and similar things and no doubt such expression help us to think that a motive must be what produces or brings about a choice. But this means rather 'He did this in that he loved the truth' it interprets his action.2 [i.e. gives a meaning to it.]

Anscombe says that motive in general explains actions and giving a motive is something like 'seeing the action in this light' i.e. seeing the action as the agent does. If an action is described as a mere response then one comes closer to the 'cause' of an action, if it has a significance for the agent or, as a response, is surrounded with thoughts and questions, the explanation comes closer to the 'reason' of the action.

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2. Anscombe, Intention: Philosophy of Action, p. 148.

But the discovery of one's reason would not affect an assertion of mental causality as reason shows a motive only not a mental causality. Anscombe says,

> What the agent reports in answer to the question 'Why?' is a reason for acting if, in treating it as a reason he conceives it as something good or bad, and his own action as doing good or harm. If you could e.g., show that either the action for which he has revenged himself, or that in which he has revenged himself was quite harmless or beneficial, he ceases to offer a reason, except prefaced by 'I thought'. If it is a proposed revenge he either gives it up or changes his reasons. No such discovery would affect an assertion of mental causality.3

So, explanation in terms of reason cannot be explanation in terms of causal process as the reasons we give for our action are not the causes of our action.

White argues that even avowed reason could not amount to a causal explanation because there is no causal condition and a person usually avows his reason which is not his primary reason. Even if my avowed reason refers to some past even it does not mean that it is necessarily a cause. Besides, I can be ignorant of the cause of my action and give quite a different reason for ny action.

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3. Ibid., p. 151.

So, causal explanation can never be explanation in terms of reason even though reason is avowed reason. The reason that I avow for my action is that I choose a particular reason from a number of possible reasons.

Avowed reason for an action is not cause of that action. Even if my avowed reason for insulting did refer to some past event, this past event would not necessarily be a cause. My remark may only be an expression of contempt for this stranger. Even not only I might be ignorant of the cause of my behaviour, but the cause might be completely different from my avowed reason. The cause may be that I am angry because I had a quarrel with my friend and this is the cause of my outburst. Thus explanation in terms of reason is not same with causal explanation and even an avowed reason cannot be explanation in terms of cause.

If explanation in terms of reason is really explanation in terms of causal process, then human action is caused and there is no room for choice, but there is always openness between performing or failing to perform an action. If there was a causal link between a reason and action, the action would cease to be voluntary. It may be that there is causal generalization to the effect that those who have been without food for some days cannot help grasping the first food they see irrespective of all consideration for others. If so, there is a good case

for saying that their movements are causally determined by their hunger and they cease to be voluntary actions. In the normal case of motivated actions this is not so. A man who gives a present out generously is not compelled to give by anything, not even by his generosity. The voluntary actions of an agent are not caused by anything neither by the agent's desires nor by the agent himself. Whatever he does, he does it according to his own will power and knowingly. There is no mysterious causal link between volition and action. So, explanation in terms of reason can never be explanation in terms of cause as the action of human being is done freely not determined like in the causal process.

The second view takes reason as the causes of actions. Philosophers who assimilate reasons to causes have pointed out that both causal explanation and explanation in terms of reason can be signified by the words <u>because</u> and <u>cause</u> and even reason. Even explanation in terms of a suitably described reason may give the necessary and sufficient conditions of the occurrence of what is to be explained. McCracken holds that one's aroused motive or one's character is the fundamental cause of one's actions. Some explanation of actions in terms of reason seems to appear as causal explanation. For example, I came late <u>because</u> it was raining.

Davidson may be considered as the protagonist of the view. He says,

> If as Melden claims causal explanations are wholly irrelevant to the understanding we seek of human action then we are without an analysis of the 'because' in he did it because ... where we go on to name a reason.4

The first difficulty in treating primary reasons as cause is that primary reasons are states, dispositions and not events. Davidson replies that events are closely associated with the primary reasons. States, dispositions are not events but the onslaught of state and disposition is, those who try to show that mental states are not events have the idea that an event must be observable or they must be like a stab, a qualm, a prick or a quiver etc. But in driving a car the driver knows his arm is coming up and he signalled. If we ask the driver, 'Why did you raise your arm?' We learn from his answer the events that caused his actions. We sometimes even cannot mention the reason and give answer like, 'finally I made up my mind', here we are ignorant of the event that caused my actions but there are events. When a bridge collapses because of its structural defect, we do not see the preceding event. But Davidson says that though we are ignorant of the events we are sure there was such an event or consequence of events.[5]

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4. Davidson, 'Actions, Reasons and Causes' Philosophy of Action, p.87.

5. Ibid., p. 89.

"Causal relation demands two distinct events but reason is not logically distinct from an action" - Davidson tries to explain this problem by saying that our primary reasons like desires, wants etc. cannot be defined in terms of action they rationalise. Primary reason and action are distinct. Our desire for doing an action cannot explain an action in the way the solubility of a thing explains its dissolving. Here the very nature of the thing is found in the thing itself.

To describe an event in terms of its cause is not to identify the event with its cause. When I flip the switch, I am caused by my wanting to turn on the light and my wanting and actions are not identical. If there is any link between my turning on the light and my wanting to turn on the light it must be grammatical rather than logical. Thus our primary reason i.e. our desire, belief, want etc. are distinct from our action.

Against the opinion that we can know our own reason for action without any inductive evidences, and causal relation demands evidences, therefore, the relation between reason and action is not causal. Davidson holds the view that sometimes we are wrong about our own reason. Especially, when there are two reasons for an action e.g. one wants to save Charles from pain and wants him out of the way. In such a case one may be wrong about which motive made him poison Charles. One may after sometimes accept public or private evidences

showing that he is wrong about his reason, but he does not have evidence and makes no observations. Here one's knowledge of one's reason is not inductive, because where there is induction, there is evidence, but the lack of this inductive evidence does not prove that the relation between reasons and actions is not causal. Induction is no doubt a good way of learning the truth of a particular law but that does not mean that it is the only way to learn the truth, according to Davidson, causal relation exists even without any direct inductive evidence.

Davidson opines that in case of motives and desires which are the causes of actions, we cannot apply generalization. Humean causal relationship does not hold between a motive and action: Hume's definition of cause - effect relation is ambiguous, it may mean that a causal statement of the form 'A' caused 'B' entails some particular law in terms of the description 'A' and 'B' or it may mean that 'A' and 'B' entails only that there exists a causal law instantiated by some true descriptions of 'A' and 'B'. On the first version, a causal statement of the form 'A' and 'B' would entail covering law. But on the second version, it would not be used to predict the occurrence of 'B' without replacing its descriptions of 'A' and 'B' with the description 'A' and 'B'.

Davidson avoids the difficulties of making reason fit the covering law model by holding that only the second version

of Hume's account does not fit the covering law model, can be made to fit most causal explanations including explanation in terms of reason.

The view, that, whenever we are caused to act in a certain way, we are helpless victims and we are not responsible for our action is not true. Davidson holds that the source of this mistake is that we tend to assume that a cause demands a causer. But some causes have no agents. The states in us are reasons as well as causes and such states do not make one a victim of it, but makes a person a voluntary agent.

Davidson claims that a primary reason must also satisfy the conditions of being a cause. But the term 'cause' stands for a thing which we cannot choose whose very nature is that it is determined by some other thing. Whereas a reason is that which I choose from a number of possible reason.

According to Davidson, actions are identical as the same bodily movements are involved. Davidson in the articles 'Individuation of event,' suggest that 'events are identical if and only if they have identical causal role.'

Davidson says 'I flip the switch, turn on the light and illuminate the room'. Unknown to me I also alert a prowler to the fact that I am home. Here I do not do four things, but only one of which four descriptions have been given.[6]

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6. Ibid. p. 81.

Davidson fails to distinguish two very different ways in which a primary reason can result in an action.

a) The primary reason is the agent's reason for acting.

b) It is the cause of his action or it caused his action.

D.E. Milligan gives one example of a man whose desire for alcohol may be his reason for taking a drink, or it may cause him to take a drink, the first would be a voluntary action, second a compulsive involuntary action. If we compare the case of an ordinary drinker, with that of an alcoholic then in each case we may find the same primary reason. Each of them has a desire for alcohol, each of them believes that the action in question is of a sort to satisfy that desire. If what Davidson says is accepted, then in order for the drinker's desire for alcohol to be his reason for his action, it must also be the cause of that action.

In the first case the desire for alcohol was something the agent could have decided not to satisfy and as this was a deliberative action the agent decided how far, his desire for alcohol was to affect his action. In the second, the agent is addicted to alcohol he has a craving for it he cannot but try to satisfy his desire. Thus in explaining the two actions the desire is related to the action differently in each case. In the one, a decision of the agent makes the desire his reason

for the action, in the other, the desire directly causes the action, whatever the agent may think or feel about the desire. Thus if the agent can make that decision and he can act on it, then the action is to be explained in terms of the agent's reasons. If he cannot the action is to be explained causally.

Davidson's view that events are identical if and only if they have identical role has been criticised by Goldman. He points out that many pairs of acts Davidson would class as identical do not have exactly the same cause or do not have exactly the same effect. Goldman[7] gives the example that by playing piano John put Smith to sleep and awakened Brown. Goldman argues that while John's playing the piano used Smith to doze off. John's awakening Brown did not cause Smith to doze off. Thus his playing and his awakening differ in their effects, and on Davidson's view of events, they cannot be the same event. Events are identical only if they have exactly the same effects.

By the same reasoning it seems Davison must say John's playing is different event from his putting Smith to sleep, since the playing did awaken Brown and putting Smith to sleep did not.

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7. Goldman, Action: A Theory of Human Action, Princeton, University Press, 1976, pp. 37-38.

Different events cannot be the same action. So either sameness of causal role or sameness of bodily movement must be rejected as the criterion of identity of actions.

In the above example of flipping the switch and turning on the light Davidson uses same bodily movements as the criterion of identity of actions. Goldman sees a difficulty here for Davidson. He says that since no assymetric and irreflexive relation can hold between a given thing, and itself we must conclude that the acts in example are not identical.

G.E.M. Anscombe also criticises Davidson's view, in her book "Intention" and makes a point that the same bodily movements cannot be treated as the criterion of the same actions. She gives an example of a man who moves his arm in a way which under the circumstances constitutes working a pump, replenishing a water supply, and poisoning a household with tainted water. On Davidson's view he has performed just one action, to which four descriptions differently refer. But Anscombe asks 'Are we to say that the man who moves his arm, operates the pump, replenishes the water supply, poison the inhabitants, is performing four actions? Or only one?' She answers - moving his arm up and down with his fingers round the pump handles is in these circumstances, operating the pump, in these circumstances it is replenishing the household water supply, and in these circumstances, it is poisoning the household.

Having the intention of operating the pump explains moving one's arm up and down on the pump handle - explains it, as Anscombe says by interpreting the action by answering a certain question 'Why?' Thus, though one set of bodily movement is involved here we cannot treat them as the same action. Interpretation plays an important role here for explaining human action. One's intention to operate the pump does not explain the poisoning of the inhabitants at all, in the sense of providing reasons for the action done. Anscombe says that the reason or motive for doing something interprets an action explains it thus, but the reason supplied for an action cannot be said to be the cause of an action. A particular series of movements may be interpreted in a number of different ways, for example, a movement of A's foot into B's shin may be interpreted as A's kicking B. A's clumsy attempt to perform a certain dance step or a completely involuntary movement. Thus a particular movement may be interpreted in a number of different ways.

The third view tries to reconcile the two kinds of explanation of human behaviour. There is no inconsistency between according a privileged status to an agent's report of why he acted, and counting his reasons among the cause of his deed. Whitely, in his article "Reason and Causes" has given an example that Smith being threatened with a beating up unless he hands over his wallet promptly does so, and accounts for his action by saying

'I was so scared to do anything else'. This looks like a causal explanation because he might says that his fright compelled him to hand over his wallet. But here we can very well say that the avoidance of a beating up is an excellent reason for parting with one's money.

According to those who try to reconcile both the kinds of explanation, when we enquire into the causes of a man's behaviour we find that what they do is rational and purposive. Reasons do not operate in the absence or to the exclusion of causes they function in a context in which causes are also functioning. The relevant differences that exist between reason and causes are differences of degrees. Reason for an action can never account for being done without reference to other factors which make an agent ready to accept them as reasons. Thus, there does not exist any dichotomy between an action done from reasons and action done causally.

I shall try to show the possibility of reconciling the two kinds of explanation of human behaviour (i.e. explanation in terms of causal processes and explanation in terms of reasons).

One way of looking at the distinction between cause and reason is to see it as the same as the distinction between explanation and description of human action. Thus, when Anscombe says that the motive of an action which is also the reason of an action interprets the action what she perhaps means, so

it will be said, is that the motive provides the description of the action rather than an explanation of it. Only causes, it will be said, explain, reasons provide descriptions of an action . My attempt at reconciling the dichotomous views on cause and reason will consist in trying to show that description and explanation are not mutually exclusive activities. To describe is also to explain and such explanation may indeed refer to causes.

Let us take the following passages from A. MacIntyre's book, entitled, The Unconscious.

> What did Freud do? Not just suggest a set of causes for the data, the neurotic symptoms and the rest, but tell us for the first time what the data were.8

> ... of the prestige of causal explanation makes us rush past the ascriptions of purpose in order to concentrate attention on Freud's causal explanation of the neurotic patient's inability to recognise his symptoms for what they are, and to control and to alter his behaviour we shall miss a whole dimension in Freud's achievement. For an essential part of Freud's achievement lies not in his explanations of abnormal behaviour but in his redescription of such behaviour.9

> His (Freud's) recognition of purpose is logically independent of his causal explanation. But when Freud refers to the patient's behaviour unconsciously motivated he compresses the two parts of his explanation into one.10

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8. MacIntyre, The Unconscious, p. 62.
9. Ibid., p. 61.
10. Ibid., p. 63.

Implicit in these statements is the idea that Freud's descriptions of neurotic behaviour can be divorced from his explanation of it in such a way that the validity and correctness of the former may seem to be quite independent of the validity and correctness of the latter: We may accept the description and reject the explanation altogether. Now this dichotomy between description and explanation in Freud's work is to my mind, a spurious one. Of any genuine description it must be possible to ask whether it is a correct description. In other words there must always be criteria of correctness or any genuine description. Of any putative description where there are no obvious criteria of correctness, it must be doubled whether it is a genuine description at all. In Freud's case the criteria of correctness of his redescription of abnormal behaviour are embodied in his explanatory theory. His explanation of abnormal behaviour and his redescription of such behaviour cannot thus be divorced from one another in the way that the statements quoted above seem to do.

Let us take one of the ways in which the kind of distinction in the passages quoted above is sought to be made. MacIntyre says 'the concept of wishfulfilment which we have seen to be so important in Freud's theoretical structure is not a genuinely causal concept'. The idea is that if these were true then wishfulfilment would not be regarded as a genuinely explanatory concept.

What I wish therefore to do is to try to show the position that the notion of wish-fulfilment cannot be genuinely a causal notion is not a tenable one. Indeed I will not argue for the extreme position that wishes are necessarily causes. All I need to show is that there's nothing wrong in the supposition that wishes can be causes. I assume the kind of argument MacIntyre has in mind is similar to arguments (say those of Melden's) produced in support of the thesis that desires, intentions etc. cannot be causes of actions. The main thrust of these arguments as we have seen, is that there is a conceptual connection between desires and actions, and that these rule out the possibility of their being causally connected.

The thesis is a vague one but I suppose, in its most clear and plausible form, it is this, the causal theory is wrong because you'll be forced to admit, under logical pressures, that there is no intellectual access to a desire, intention etc. except as the cause of the action which is supposed to be its effect. If these were true there would seem to be here a clinching argument against the causal thesis. Let me take specifically the notion of a wish. There is certainly a conceptual connection between a wish and its objects, but this connection cannot prevent the possibility of their being a causal connection, (a) between a wish and the realization of its objects, and (b) between a wish and the action if any directed to the achievement of the object. A wish is not in fact, causally connected

with the realization of its object (i.e. a wish by itself is not a cause of its fulfilment) but there is no logical incoherence in suggesting that it might be. As David Pears says, "Fairy stories, which treat wishes as causes and describe a wish simply as concentrated willing that such and such would happen, may be incredible but they are not conceptually incoherent." Having made this point however, Pears does not go on to discuss the nature of wishing any more. But I think a proper understanding of Freud's talk of neurotic behaviour as wish-fulfilment crucially depends on a deeper appreciation of this point. Freud's statement that, say, neurotic behaviour or dreaming is wish-fulfilment is usually taken to mean that neurotic behaviour or dreaming, is action of some kind directed somehow towards the fulfilment of a wish. Taken in this way, the statement is immediately in danger of succumbing to, say the following question: How can anybody soberly believe that lunging systematically at lamp posts, for instance, is action directed towards fulfilling the wish to kill one's father? No, the statement must be taken to mean just what it says, namely, that neurotic behaviour or dreaming embodies (in a symbolic way) the fulfilment of a wish, the attainment of its object. Once we see the statement in this light the analogy between the logic of wishing in fairy tales and in Freudian psychology becomes clear. The differences, of course, are enormous, but the crucial thing is in both wish is a genuinely causal notion; there is no conceptual incoherence committed by either on this account.

But, it will be asked how are we to show the plausibility of the suggestion that there can be a causal connections between a wish and its fulfilment in a dream? The important thing to note is that dreaming is not something which the subject does in order to fulfil the wish. The dream represents - one might even say - it is a state of affairs which is describable as the fulfilment (one must of course add 'in dreams') of the dreamers' wish. The relationship between the wish and its fulfilment is of the same logical order as that of a wish and its fulfilment in a fairy tale. Both are causal. The only difference is that when the former is a genuine causal relationship, the latter is not, but it might be thought there is another crucial difference and this is that while in the fairy tale the object of the wish is realized in the objective interpersonal world (no doubt of the fairy tale), in a wish fulfilment dream the object is realized only in the dreamer's private world. But this difference while undoubtedly it is a real one, is really collapsible into the first. The second difference springs from the fact that the causal relationship in the fairy tale is only an imaginary one and that this relationship in dreaming is a genuine one (justifiable one); a genuine cause and effect relationship between a wish and the fulfilment of its object can exist only in the subjects own's private world, and no doubt when this is the case, the subjects private world in which the wish is fulfilled takes on some of the characteristics

of the interpersonal public world. It is quite easy to see that this happens in dreaming because of the analogy between dreams and hallucination. The same is true of neurotic behaviour although at first sight it may seem difficult to make out. The space of the dream world is a private space: it is unrelated to the space of the inter-subjective public world. But neurotic behaviour takes place in this common space. How can then neurotic behaviour be regarded as embodying the fulfilment of a wish in a private world? One thing that is certain is that neurotic behaviour cannot be regarded as a fulfilment of the wish in the public world. But the following can be said, neurotic or behaviour and all the elements of the common world to which it seems to be connected are bound together by meanings which are derived from particular experiences of the patient, and are peculiar to him. These meanings are different from the meanings which constitute the world of common objects. It is not simply that neurotic behaviour and the elements of the public world which are connected with it have a symbolic significance in the way in which 'concrete imagination' in poetry has a symbolic significance, but although these are elements in the common world they get detached from the network of common meanings and come together in a new nexus of meanings which are the patient's own and this detachment is not something that is voluntary - within the patient's control. It is something that happens as it were

in spite of himself. This is what gives it somewhat of the characteristic of objectivity which is not unlike the "objectivity of a dream world." The patient in more than a metaphorical sense lives in this world of which his own neurotic behaviour is a central part. The latter as it were gets detached from the real world and forms the nucleus of the neurotic's private world.

All that I have shown so far is that wishes which undoubtedly are involved in the descriptions of their objects (i.e. which give meanings to them) can also be their causes. But it might still be said it would be possible yet to detach the descriptive function (meaning-giving function) of wishes from their causal function if any: We could - so it would be said - replace Freud's explanation by some others either without any loss or even with some positive gain while Freud's description could be retained as they are. Now let us first grant that all genuine explanation must tell a causal story. If what I have argued about is correct it follows that references to wishes can legitimately occur in a causal story told in the explanation of a piece of neurotic behaviour. A difficulty however is created by the fact that these wishes (which are part of the causal story) must be regarded as unconscious, or as residing in the unconscious. Somewhere in his book MacIntyre seems to suggest that this difficulty can be circumvented on the

one hand, by turning our attention on the fact that wishes perform a descriptive role and on the other hand, by ignoring the possibility that wishes can be causes as well. Let us pursue this suggestion. Take the case of neurotic behaviour. MacIntyre's own example is, as follows: The patient performs an obsessional ritual, say, before going to sleep. Jugs, clocks, everything that might fall or make a noise must be removed from the room. When all is done then the room once again must be inspected to make sure that nothing has been left undone. Pre-Freudians we say that this unaccountable behaviour is such that the patient is unable to sleep and so to have a normal life. Freud points out that the patient performs the ritual in order not to sleep. The ritual expresses the patient's fearful avoidance of sleep. Then he accounts for this attitude of the patient by a causal explanation in terms of what the patient experienced when as a child she woke in the dark and when she was taken into her parent's bed.

Now there is not really much that is specifically Freudian in MacIntyre's suggested 'description'. "The patient performs the ritual in order not to sleep. The ritual expresses the patient's fearful avoidance of sleep." Such a description may well form part of a larger description of the case which is clearly non-Freudian. Thus, we might say that the patient is possessed by a devil which is afraid of sleep and thus

invents excuses for not sleeping. Such a description sees purpose in the ritual and nicely accommodates MacIntyre's suggested redescription, and yet Freudianism can hardly have anything to do with it. A Freudian redescription of the case will no doubt recognise a purpose in the ritual, but will inevitably go further in connecting all the elements of the pattern of neurotic behaviour with one another and with the patient's past experiences - both immediate and remote - in such a way as inexorably to point to an explanation in terms of the workings of a wish formed as a result of childhood experiences. The redescription, in other words, is the result of a causal enquiry the object of which is an unconscious wish. To retain the Freudian description, and, at the same time to reject his explanation, would be something like accepting the description of a case of death, as a case of murder, while at the same time, rejecting any explanation of the case in terms of deliberate killing by one or more other human beings.

Here we must note a distinction between wish-fulfilment in neurotic behaviour and wish-fulfilment in fairy tales. In a fairy tale the situation which is describable as the fulfilment of a wish, can be so described even though the wish itself had nothing causally to do with the coming into being of that situation. Thus instead of the wish bringing the situation about, it might have been God or a kind of spirit.

However, the wish-fulfilment meaning underlying neurotic behaviour can be there at all, because the behaviour can be explained, as having resulted from the operations of the wish. One reason for this may be that the connection between the wish-fulfilling situation and the wish in fairy tale can be established without any enquiry into the origin of the former, whereas neurotic behaviour gets its Freudian meaning at all only by virtue of its origin in the wish which it represents as fulfilled. In Freud the semantic and the genetic enquiry go necessarily hand in hand; the meaning of neurotic behaviour is determined by its origin. A consideration of any case history in Freud will make this point abundantly clear. Take an actual case of obsessional neurosis discussed by Freud. A young girl of 19 suffered from two-nightly obsessions. She must have silence at night and must exclude all possibility of noise, and she must arrange her bed in one particular way. The latter obsession consisted of making sure that the bolster at the head of the bed did not touch the back of the wooden bedstead. Also the pillow must lie across the bolster exactly in a diagonal position and in no other; she would then place her head exactly in the middle of the diamond, lengthwise.

Analysis revealed that the ritual expressed the fulfilment of the girl's wish to separate the parents and prevent intercourse from occuring. The bolster 'meant' her mother and the upright

back of the bedstead her 'father'. Now the elements in the ritual could have acquired such meanings for the patient only through a (causal) chain of association of ideas (meanings) which linked them eventually with the elements of the wish. In spelling out the meanings of the ritual, one will have to tell a causal story in terms of association of ideas which will terminate in the wish itself.

To conclude this part of my argument, MacIntyre's suggested "Freudian" description of the neurotic ritual of his example is not Freudian at all, except in a trivial sense. It can become Freudian only by being expanded in a particular way. And this will consist in filling in details whose justification will depend on the possibility of telling a certain causal story. This Freudian redescription of neurotic behaviour is similar to the historian's redescription of historical events. To say that the independence of India was the triumph of Indian nationalism is to imply the truth of a certain causal story about Indian independence. For the event(s) described as independence of India to have this meaning (i.e. triumph of Indian nationalism), a certain causal (genetic) explanation of these events must be true.

An objection at this point might be that if Freudian redescription of neurotic behaviour involves the truth of the Freudian explanation of such behaviour, then wouldn't Freud

be really arguing in a circle? The description would be justified in terms of the explanation; but also the explanation in terms of the description. But, of course, this is really not so. As I pointed out a little earlier, in Freud the causal and semantic enquiry go hand in hand. The possibility of a certain description points to a certain explanation and the possibility of a certain explanation points to a certain description. But there can be no doubt that the primary enquiry is the causal enquiry. The objection would have a degree of plausibility if it were the case, as MacIntyre sometimes seems to believe, that Freudian redescription of neurotic behaviour replaces (displaces) our ordinary description of such behaviour. For them it would be reasonable to suppose that Freud, from the start, presents the data in such a way as to presuppose the truth of his explanation of the data. The truth, however, is that Freud does not dispense with our ordinary description of neurotic behaviour; rather he arrives at a redescription of such behaviour by means of pursuing a certain conception of their causal explanation.

What I have said about Freudian theory (which will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter) is generally correct about all theories which, wittingly or unwittingly claim to provide interpretative explanation of human behaviour. A science of interpretation consists in spelling out meanings - meanings of bit of actions, patterns of behaviour, dreams,

thought processes etc. whose surface meanings are obscure. The interpretations (redescriptions that, for example, psychoanalysis offers) flow from certain fundamental assumptions about the workings of the human psyche. And these assumptions are essentially causal. Empty a Freudian description of a piece of neurotic behaviour of all its explanatory contents: What you will have left is something more like poetic imagery and not really description in the ordinary sense of the term. Take the following: "Wilt thou (sleep) upon the high and giddy mast/Seal up the ship boy's eyes and rocks his brains/In cradle of the rude imperious surge". This is an image and this does not involve explanation of any sort, and, deeply moving as it is, a question of truth or falsehood does not arise in respect to it. The explanatory content of a piece of psychoanalytic description of neurotic behaviour, on the other hand, marks it off from mere imagery of this kind, and turns it into a statements whose truth or falsehood can be assessed. This is what makes the sciences of man, sciences at all in spite of the enormous differences between them and the natural sciences. Thus, cause and reason, explanation and description, meaning, interpretation and understanding must mingle together inalienably in order that a science of man is possible at all.

In conclusion I must make clear that what I have argued for is not the validity or correctness of any particular theory (in this case, the Freudian theory) which involves this mingling but only for the view that any authentic theory whether valid or not must involve this.

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*The argument of this chapter is borrowed to a very large extent from the article entitled, "Explanation and Description of Action: A Philosophical Defense of Freud' by Mrinal Miri, in Knowledge, Culture and Value (Ed. R.C. Pandeya and S.R Bhatt).

CHAPTER - III

FREUD, REPRESSION AND HUMAN BONDAGE

FREUD, REPRESSION AND HUMAN BONDAGE

Although, the distinction between explanation in term of cause or covering law as it is sometimes called, and explanation in term of reason seems to be clear enough in some of the great masters of modern thought, there is a conflation between the two which may seem surprising. But perhaps the conflation is not just a matter of a simple mistake. Indeed it seems to me to involve a complexity of a rather profound kind - the complexity that consists in being human at all. Cause and reason, are, paradoxical as it may sound, inalienably woven into human action. And it is this rather than a simple mistake on the part of the thinkers that I have in mind that is responsible for the so called conflation.

My next task is to present a thought of two thinkers, Freud and Marx (in the present and the following chapter) partly to illustrate this point and also to bring out their intellectual powers.

Freud constructed a 'model of human nature' on the basis of which not only possibilities, and necessities of man can be explained and understood. Freud saw man as a closed system driven by the two forces; the self-preservative and the sexual drives. Man, for Freud is the unfinished product of nature, struggling against unreason. Man is primarily an isolated being, whose primary interest is the optimal satisfaction of both his ego and his libidinous interest. Freud's man is the physiologically driven and motivated homo machine.

But, secondarily, man is also a social being, because he needs other people for the satisfaction of his libidinous drives as well as those of self-preservation. The child is in need of mother (and here according to Freud, libidinous desires follow the path of the physiological needs) the adult needs a sexual partner. Feelings like tenderness or love are looked upon as phenomena that accompany and result from, libidinous interests. Individuals need each other as means for the satisfaction of their physiologically rooted drives. Man is primarily unrelated to others, and is only secondarily forced or seduced - into relationships with others.

Freud was a rationalist who believed in the power of reason and the strength of the human will: he was convinced that social conditions, and especially those prevailing in early childhood were responsible for the evil in man. But Freud had already lost his rationalistic innocence, as it were, at the beginning of his work and had recognised the strength of human irrationality and the weakness of human reason and will. He fully confronted himself with the opposition inherent in the two principles, and found, dialectically, a new synthesis. This synthesis of rationalistic enlightenment thinking and twentieth century skepticism was expressed in his concept of the unconscious. If all that is real were conscious, then indeed man would be a rational being, for his rational thought follows the laws of logic. But the overwhelming part of his inner experience is unconscious, and for this reason is not subject to the control of

logic, or reason, and will. Human irrationality dominates in the unconscious, logic governs in the conscious. But, and this is decisive, the unconscious steers consciousness, and thus the behaviour of man. With this concept of the determination of man by the unconscious, Freud, without being aware of it, repeated a thesis which Spinoza had already expressed. But while it was marginal in Spinoza's system it was central to Freud.

Although it is true that man is driven by irrational forces - the libido, and especially in its pregenital stages of evolution, his ego - his reason and his will are also not without strength. The power of reason expresses itself in the first place is the fact that man can understand his irrationality by the use of reason. In this way, Freud founded the science of human irrationality - psychoanalytic theory. But he did not stop at the theory because a person in the analytic process can make his own unconscious conscious, he can also liberate himself from the dominance of unconscious strivings; instead of repressing them, he can negate them, that is, he can lessen their strength and control them with his will. This is possible, Freud thought, because the grown-up person has an ally a stronger ego than the child once had. Freud's psychoanalytic therapy was based on the hope of overcoming, or at least restraining, the unconscious impulses which, working in the dark, had previously been outside of man's control.

Even though, man is determined by the unconscious, the id and the super ego, man is not wholly determined. With the help of the

analytic method he can gain control over the unconscious. With this position of alternativism; which resembles in its essence that of Spinoza and Marx, Freud accomplished another fruitful synthesis of two opposite poles. Man can liberate himself from the dominance of unconscious strivings, instead of repressing them. He can negate them, that is he can lessen their strength, and control them with his will.

Freud describes neurotic behaviour in terms of wish-fulfilment. But neurotic behaviour cannot be regarded as the fulfilment of a wish in the public. In neurotic behaviour, there can be only 'neurotic' fulfilment of wishes. There are meanings which are peculiar to his experiences for the neurotic patient which are different from meaning which constitute the world of common objects.

The neurotic patient cannot control his neurotic behaviour and it is something that happens, as it were, in spite of himself and the causality involved in unconscious wish-fulfilment is quite different from the causality of physical processes. The neurotic behaviour has to do with ideas, elements of meaning, and somehow the repressed wish will find expression and fulfilment in some behaviour pattern or other of the patient, because there are indefinite number of ways in which the wish can find expression and fulfilment.

Neurotic symptoms represented compromise formations between repressed impulses and censoring agents of the mind. Freud concluded

that neurotic anxiety arose from sexual sources. To Freud, neurosis had a physical basis in dammed-up sexuality. Through repression sexuality gets converted into anxiety. He stated in 1898 that "the most immediate and for practical purposes, the most significant causes of every case of neurotic illness are to be found in factors arising from sexual life."[1]

When Freud referred to a patient's sexual life, he had in mind both "disorders in his contemporary sexual life" as well as "important events in his past life".[2]

Yet he sometimes set limits to how far his sexual theory could be pushed. Sexual need and privation are merely one factor at work in the mechanism of neuroses; if there were no others the result would be dissipation, not disease. The other, no less essential, factor, which is after all too readily forgotten, is the neurotic's aversion from sexuality, his incapacity for loving, that feature of the mind which I have called, "repression".[3]

Freud tried to plumb the mysteries of memory, amnesia and false recollections. The compromises that the mind makes in its constructions of memory, he proposed, are like those behind neurotic symptoms.

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1. Freud, S. My Views on the Part Played by Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses, p. 263.
2. Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses, 3.149.
3. On Psychotherapy, Standard Edition, 7.267.

Not only did Freud turn his psychologist's eye from dream to neurosis, but he also found that memory played a part in ordinary slips of the tongue and pen. Here, too that which has been previously been taken to be meaningless could be fetched up from the unknown for science. Slips were, in Freud's theory a product of inner conflict. The forgotten lunch engagement, the slip of the tongue, the barked shin could no longer be dismissed as accident by Freud.

Freud treated neurotic behaviour as a form of human action of which it is appropriate to ask for the point and purposes. Freud, treated neurotic behaviour as being goal directed. Until the purpose of the neurotic are understood, his behaviour will necessarily be misdescribed. When we understand these purposes we discover that in adult neurotic behaviour there are elements of a re-enactment of childhood episodes, and even when the adult behaviour is not a re-enactment of specific episodes, the neurotic symptoms can be understood as the expression of essentially childish fears and anxieties.

Freud believed that society imposes unnecessary hardship on man, which are conducive to worse results rather than the expected better ones. He believed that this unnecessary harshness, as it operated in the field of sexual morality, led to the formation of neuroses that, in many cases, could have been avoided by a more tolerant, attitude. Freud believed that human progress necessarily leads to repression and neurosis. He says,

> When people came to know about the mechanism of the neuroses which threaten to undermine the medicum of happiness enjoyed by civilized man, it was discovered that a person becomes neurotic because he cannot tolerate the amount of frustration which society imposes on him in the service of its cultural ideals, and it was inferred from this that the abolition or reduction of those demands would result in a return to possibilities of happiness.4

Freud sees man as conditioned and limited by his own nature by his biological heritage (in the id) by his long cultural history (in the super-ego). He believes that man in the society will always be subject to more or less painful tensions, the result of ascertainable causes. Man as Freud conceived him makes his own limiting necessity by being man. Freud sees the condition of man as bound to suffer. He says,

> One feels inclined to say that the intention that man should be 'happy' is not included in the plan of 'Creation'. What we call happiness in the strictest sense comes from the (preferably sudden) satisfaction of needs which have been dammed up to a high degree, and it is from its nature only possible as an episodic phenomenon. When any situation that is desired by the pleasure principle is prolonged, it only produces a feeling of mild contentment. We are so made that we can desire intense enjoyment only from a contrast and very little from a state of things. Thus our possibilities of happiness are already restricted by our constitution. Unhappiness is much less difficult to experience. We are threatened with suffering from three directions: from our own body, which is doomed to decay and dissolution and which cannot even do without pain and anxiety as warning signals; from the external world, which may rage against us with overwhelming and merciless forces of destruction; and finally from our relations to other men. The suffering which comes from this last source

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4. Freud, S. Civilization and its Discontents, p. 24.

> is perhaps more painful to us than any other. We tend to regard it as a kind of gratuitous addition, although it cannot be any less fatefully inevitable than the suffering which comes from elsewhere.5

According to Freud, there is a possibility of communal neuroses due to cultural and civilizational demands which repressed the physical urges of human being. He says,

> If the development of civilization has such a far-reaching similarity to the development of the individual and if it employs the same methods, may we not be justified in reaching the diagnosis that, under the influence of cultural urges, some civilizations, or some epoch of civilization - possibly the whole of mankind - have become 'neurotic'? An analytic dissection of such neuroses might lead to therapeutic recommendations which could lay claim to great practical interest. I would not say that an attempt of this kind to carry psychoanalysis over to the cultural community was absurd or doomed to be fruitless. But we should have to be very cautious and not forget that, after all we are only dealing with analogies and that it is dangerous, not only with men but also with concepts, to tear them from the sphere in which they have originated and been evolved. Moreover, the diagnosis of communal neuroses is faced with a special difficulty. In an individual neurosis we take as our starting-point the contrast that distinguishes the patient from his environment, which is assumed to be 'normal'. For a group all of whose members are affected by one and the same disorder no such background could exist; it would have to be found elsewhere. And as regards the therapeutic application of our knowledge, what would be the use of the most correct analysis of social neuroses, since no one possesses authority to impose such a therapy upon the group? But in spite of all these difficulties, we may expect that one day someone will venture to embark upon a pathology of cultural communities.6

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5. Ibid., pp. 13, 14.

6. Ibid., p. 81.

Freud claims that the neurotic symptom is the negative of the perversion. Freud also claims that in a normal sex life no neurosis is possible. The neurosis is proved to be the result of a psychic confliction, between two dynamic forces. impulses and resistances, in the course of which struggle the ego withdrew from the disagreeable impulse.

Freud's early association of repression with peculiarly traumatic event in the life of the deeply neurotic person was replaced by a picture of normal human development in which repression plays an indispensable role. In repressing what is felt as a threat to the personality, the ego defends itself against disruption, the concept of defence of the ego resorting to strategies became increasingly important in Freud's thought.

Freud elaborated a scheme in which the ego's fundamental task is to reconcile the instinctual biologically given demands of the id, the socially desired internalization of parental control that constitutes the super ego, and the demand of reality itself. The price that the ego must pay for its defence against the pain of external reality, the conflicts within, in both, may of course be too high, either modes of behaviour that are essentially neurotic and which disable the ego in its relations with reality or even a psychotic withdrawal from reality. The mature ego denies the <u>demand</u> of neither the id or the super ego, but translates them into terms in which the admission of these demands is no longer destructive. To

reach this stage is at one level the task of every child who grows up; at another level it is the task of psychoanalytic therapy.

Freud's discovery of infantile sexuality was in part an enlargement of the concept of sexuality, as well as a factual discovery about small children. Anal and oral pleasure become intelligibly related to genital pleasure in Freud's scheme of development, where different zones of the body are at different stages focusses for sexual attention. At the same time the child's instinctual reaching after satisfaction is continually checked and redirected in encounters with the parents and the social environment generally. Child development is thus not a smooth and uncontradictory evolution but a more or less successful movement through a series of conflicts, in which not only actual events but also the child's own phantasies play key roles. Freud's discoveries of the importance of childhood phantasy was a product of his first refinements upon an initial picture of the causation of a neurotic symptom. According to his picture of the development of neurotic symptoms, a child's trauma brought about repression of the memory of the traumatic event laden with painful emotion, and a difficult situation in adult life re-awakened the now unconscious complex of memory and emotion.

Freud believed that there is an empirical correlation between the occurrence of certain types of event in early childhood and the exhibition of certain traits in adult life. Thus an obsessional character that manifests itself in overscrupulosity about disorderli-

ness or an intense concern with cleanliness or tidiness is in Freud's view correlated with certain anal experience and more particularly with a certain kind of toilet training.

The key concepts in the Freudian theory includes those of repression, of sublimation, and of the unconscious itself. What is repressed is what is too painful for consciousness to continue to hold in view, the human organism which naturally seeks pleasure is continually forced to adopt to external social and physical reality. Drives which cannot find an outlet are consequently rechannelled; this is called sublimation. Not all that is unconscious is repressed for the unconscious has its own dynamic patterns, and both repression and sublimations take place in accordance with laws of transformation that are native to unconscious. The unconscious is thus a theoretical entity, in principle unobservable, without which the connections between early childhood and adult life would remain unintelligible.

Freud assumes that the chief principle of psychic activity is the 'pleasure principle' that is, the urge to discharge instinctual tensions in a way that will bring the maximum amount of pleasure. This pleasure principle is modified by the 'reality principle' taking reality into account may lead us to renounce or postpone pleasure in order to avoid a greater discomfort or to gain even greater pleasure at some future time.

Freud sees the specific instinctual structure of the individual conditioned by two factors, his inherited physical constitution and his life experiences in particular, the experiences of early childhood. Freud proceeds on the assumption that man's inherited constitution and life experiences form a 'complementary' chain and that the specific task of analysis is to explore and uncover the influence of life experiences on the inherited instinctual constitution.

In order to make as clear as possible that sex instincts can be modified and adapted to reality, we must point out certain characteristics which clearly distinguish them from the instincts for self-preservation. For example, unlike the instincts for self-preservation, the sex instincts are postponable. The former are more imperative because if they are left unsatisfied too long, death will ensue, in short, prolonged postponement of their satisfaction is psychologically intolerable. This means that the instincts for self-preservation have primacy over the sex instincts not that they play a greater role in themselves, but in case of conflict they are more urgent.

In addition, the sex-rooted drives can be repressed, while the desires emanating from the instincts for self-preservation cannot simply be removed from the conscious and place in the unconscious. Another important distinction between the two groups of instincts is the fact that the sexual instincts can be sublimated, in other words, instead of being satisfied in a way that may be far

removed from the original sexual goal and blended with other ego accomplishments. The instincts for self-preservation are not capable of such sublimation. Furthermore, the drives toward self-preservation must be satisfied by real, concrete means, while the sex drives can often be satisfied by pure fantasies. A man's hunger can only be satisfied by food; his desire to be loved, however, can be satisfied by fantasies about a good and loving God and his sadistic tendencies can be satisfied by sadistic spectacles and fantasies.

A final important distinction is that sex drives, unlike the drive towards self-preservation, can find expression in ways that are highly interchangeable and replaceable. If one instinctual drive is not satisfied, it can be replaced by others whose satisfaction is possible for either internal or external reasons. The interchangeability and replaceability of the sex drives is one of the keys to understanding both neurotic and healthy psychic life, and it is a cornerstone of Freudian theory. It may seem somewhat surprising to the reader that I have not yet talked about the phenomenon of dreaming in my exposition of Freud's thought so far. And this surprise will be well justified, for Freud, dream theory is really the core and at the same time the emanating source of most of his thinking about other matters. I hasten therefore to a treatment of Freud's doctrine of dreams.

Dreams for Freud is the mind's reaction in sleep to the experience of the previous day and it is the life of the mind during sleep, dreams are the reaction to a stimulus disturbing sleep.

Psychologists now-a-days talk about contemporary external evidence for the occurrence of a dream, REM i.e. Rapid Eye Movement. Freud did not have access to such 'evidences' and we do not know how he would have treated them. But Freud used the report of dreams as the criterion of occurrence.

Freud postulated that a dream represents 'an attempt' by the dreamer 'at the fulfilment of a wish'. Primarily visual in character, dreams to Freud were a sort of picture puzzle whose meaning is subject to distortion. Feelings and thoughts may be presented as well as wishes, but the 'hidden meaning', of a given dream gets distorted because of the role of inner conflict, a kind of inner dishonesty. In Freud's view, dreams have a secret meaning and he tried to interpret them to their last secret. Freud believed that every dream deals with the dreamer himself and they are completely egoistic. We find in dreams which are repressed in waking life, and the understanding of a dream required the conquest of an inner resistance to self-knowledge.

According to Freud's formulation, the child brings into the world an unorganised choatic mentality called the Id, the sole aim of which is the gratification of all needs, the alleviation of hunger, self-preservation, and love, the preservation of the species. However, as the child grows older, that part of the id which comes in contact with the environment through the senses learns to know the inexorable reality of the outer world and becomes modified

into what Freud calls the ego. This ego, processing awareness of the environment, henceforth, strives to curb the lawless id tendencies whenever they attempt to assert themselves incompatibly. The neuroses as we see it here was therefore a conflict between the ego and the id. The ego, aware of the forces of civilization, religion and ethics refused to allow motor discharge to the powerful sexual impulses emanating from the lawless id, and thus blocked them from attainment of the object toward which they aimed. The ego then defended itself against these impulses by repressing them. But despite constant exertion of the Ego the repressed wish often finds an outlet through some by-path e.g., in dreams or some disturbances in the person's psychic life as hysteria, hallucination etc.

The narration of dreams is important in analysis because in the dream the manifest content, what the dream is apparently about, is an expression in symbolic form of a latent content an unconscious wish or motive. The unconscious wish is too strong for its expression to be altogether denied, but its direct expression encounters censorship in the form of the internalized prohibitions and repression which demand that the wish take on a symbolic form if it is to be acknowledged at all. The dream is thus an attempt at a surrogate wish - fulfilment. The sexual character of our basic wishes which we cannot acknowledge to ourselves because of the prohibitions of adult culture and above all the incestuous character of our desire result in a proliferation of sexual symbolism in our dreams.

This theme of a tension between the instinctual sexual drives and the demands of culture was basic to Freud's whole world view. The world of cultural achievement is won only by denying to the instincts the direct gratifications which they seek and by using the energy so released in sublimated forms for the task of art and science. The myth that Freud believed in abandoning all inhibition and constraint on instinctual drives is at the opposite pole from the truth.

Freud insists that the dreams actually possess a meaning and that a scientific method of dream interpretation is possible.

The content of the dream is the fulfilment of a wish, its motive is a wish. When the work of interpretation has been completed the dream can be recognized as a wish-fulfilment.

Freud used the method of free association for interpreting dreams, on the basis of report given by a dreamer. In this method after a person reports a dream to his analyst he is instructed to say everything that comes into his mind. When each successive element of the dream is presented back to him, by using the method of free association which his patient used in the dream report, Freud was able to formulate a comprehensive theory of dreams.

For Freud the important thing in a dream interpretation is not only the report of dream given by a dreamer but the thing which a dream indicates. He treated dreams on par with the

symptoms of the malfunctioning of the psychic life, so dream interpretation for him was a method of curing mental disorder. This can be possible only by keeping the view that dreams are caused by something. As we have seen, according to Freud infantile repressed wishes cause dreams. What gives meaning to a dream for Freud is its explanation in terms of the causal powers of a wish. His interpretation of dreams follows from certain fundamental assumptions about the workings of the human psyche. And these assumptions are essentially causal.

For Freud dreams were not isolated phenomenon but as he said, the interpretation of dreams is the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind. For him dream interpretation provided previous evidences for the deeper workings of the mind in normality and abnormality. Dreams then according to Freud's theory were useful in establishing the content of the unconscious.

Freud tried to find a place for dreams in the nexus of psychological process. In his book 'The Interpretation of Dreams', he drew a picture of the workings of the mind. There he pictured the instrument which carries our mental functions as, resembling a compound microscope or a photographic apparatus, or something of the kind. On the basis physical locality will correspond to a point inside the apparatus at which one of the preliminary stages of an image comes into being.

The unconscious has no access to consciousness except via 'the pre-conscious' in passing through which its excitatory process is obliged to submit to modifications.

Now it is clear that the motive force for producing dreams is supplied by the unconscious. This dream instigation makes an effort to advance into the preconscious and from there to obtain access to consciousness. Freud feels that the repressed infantile impulses are the universal motivating force of dream construction. Dreams, then according to Freud's theory are useful in establishing the content of the unconscious.

Dreams are given their shape in individual human being by the operation of two psychic forces, one of which forms the wish repressed by the dream while the other exercises a censorship forcibly brings about a distortion in the expression of the wish. Nothing can reach consciousness from the first system without passing the second agency and the second agency allows nothing to pass without exercising its rights and making such modifications as it thinks fit in the thought which is seeking admission to consciousness.

The critical agency stands in a closer relation to consciousness than the agency criticized. The critical agency is identified with the agency which directs our waking life and determines our voluntary conscious actions. Freud replaces these agencies by

systems and locates the critical system at the motor end of the apparatus.

Wishes which are unconscious due to repression give rise to the 'latent' content of the dream, which is discovered through the method of free association. We have seen that the censor does not let wishes reveal them as in reality they are, so they turn into distorted way, this is called 'Dream work' which results in manifest content. The manifest content of the dream is that which is experienced and remembered by the dreamer. The dream interpretation involves replacing the manifest with the latent content. The course of the latent content is an unconscious infantile wish accompanying the day residue that is memories of the experience and thoughts that the dreamer has had on the previous day. The dream work consists of four activities: (a) condensation, (b) displacement, (c) representation, (d) secondary revision.

There is another aspect of dreams that is symbolism according to which there are certain invariants in dream representation, so a certain basic thought or pre-occupation find a regular form of expression e.g., the parents are represented by kings and queens etc.

The dream work is necessary because the wish that finds expression in the dream is invariably a repressed one. Freud believes that dream is a (disguised) fulfilment of a suppressed wish.

This means that wishes which are disagreeable to the Ego can find expression only in a disguised way. A dream not only gives expression to a repressed wish but at the same time represents that as fulfilled. For example, if the wish, 'I should like to go on the lake' instigates a dream, the dream has for its content 'I am going on the lake'.[7]

Freud thought that for the proper functioning of psychic life repressed wishes should get fulfilment and dreams are a means of that. Here one can ask for the evidence of his theory about ascription of dreams to wishes and the characterization of the wishes as disguised.

Freud tried to do that by explaining all dreams in terms of wishes. There are dreams that directly express wishes. Such dreams are commonest among children.

The dreams of little children are often simple fulfilment of wishes, and for this reason are, as compared with the dreams of adults, by no means interesting. They present no problem to be solved, but they are invaluable as affording proof that the dream in its inmost essence is the fulfilment of a wish.

The dreams which do not overtly express wishes can be undisguised. In such dreams, associations can be produced to

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7. Richard, Wollheim. Freud, p. 74.

each element in the dream in turn and these associations after running for a certain while will terminate on a point that seems natural.

Further support to this theory can be given by the fact that by undisguising wishes we are led to a wish whose existence can be independently established. Even in the cases of dreams as example of primal symbolism, we are led to wishes that are independently verifiable.

Wherever, a wish-fulfilment is unrecognizable and disguised there must be present a tendency to defend oneself against this wish and in consequence of this defence the wish is unable to express itself save in a distorted form.

Anxiety dreams are dreams of sexual content and the libido appertaining to this content has been transformed into anxiety.

Freud, who believed religion as an illusion constructed a dogma and in the place of a jealous God whom he had lost, he had substituted another compelling image, that of sexuality. It was no less insistent, exacting, domineering, than the original one.

Although, for Freud, sexuality was undoubtedly numinosum, his terminology and theory seemed to define it exclusively as a biological function. It seems that he wanted to teach that sexuality included spirituality and had an instrinsic meaning.

Jung said:

> He gave me the impression that at bottom he was working against his own goal and against himself, and there is, after all, no harder bitterness than that of a person who is his worst enemy. In his own words, he felt himself menaced by a 'black tide of mud' - he who more than anyone else had tried to let down his buckets into those black depths.8

Freud never asked himself why he was compelled to talk continually of sex, why this idea had taken such possession of him. He remained unaware that his 'monotony of interpretation' expressed a flight from himself, or for the other side of him which might perhaps be called mystical. So long as he refused to acknowledge that side, he could never be reconciled with himself. He was blind towards the paradox and ambiguity of the contents of the unconscious, and did not know that everything which arises out of the unconscious had a top and a bottom an inside and an outside. When we speak of the outside and that is what Freud did - we are considering only half of the whole, with the result that a counter-effect arises out of the unconscious.

Jung said,

> I was never able to agree with Freud that dream is a 'facade' behind which its meaning lies hidden - a meaning already known but maliciously, so to speak, withheld from consciousness. To me dreams are a part of nature, which harbours no intention to

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8. Jung. Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 175.

> deceive, but expresses something as best it can. These forms of life, too have no wish to deceive our eyes, but we may deceive ourselves because our eyes are shortsighted. Or we hear amiss because our ears are rather deaf - but it is not our ears that wish to deceive us.9

Freud's greatest achievement probably consisted in taking neurotic patients seriously and entering into their peculiar individual psychology. He had the courage to let the case material speak for itself, and in this way was able to penetrate into the real psychology of his patients. He saw with the patient's eyes, so to speak, and so reached a deeper understanding of mental illness than had hitherto been possible. In this respect he was free of bias, courageous and succeeded in overcoming a host of prejudices and he mercilessly exposed the rottenness of the contemporary psyche. He did not falter in the face of the unpopularity such an enterprise entailed. By evaluating dreams as the most important source of information concerning the unconscious processes he gave back to mankind a tool that had seemed irretrievably lost.

The most creative and radical achievement of Freud's theory was the founding of a 'science' of the unconscious. As Freud himself observed this was a continuation of the work of Copernicus and Darwin. They had attacked the illusion of man about this planet's place in the cosmos and his own place in nature and in society.

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9. Ibid., p. 185.

Freud attacked the lost fortress that had left untouched - man's consciousness as the ultimate datum of psychic experience. He showed that most of what we are conscious of is not real and that most of what is real is not our consciousness. Philosophical idealism and traditional psychology were challenged head on, and further step was taken into the knowledge of what is really real.

Freud did not simply state the existence of unconscious processes in general, but showed empirically how unconscious processes operate by demonstrating their operation in concrete and observable phenomena neurotic symptoms, dreams, and the small acts of daily life.

The theory of the unconscious is one of the most decisive steps in our knowledge of man and in our capacity to distinguish appearance from reality in human behaviour. As a consequence, it opened up a new dimension of honesty and thereby created a new basis for critical thinking. Before Freud it was considered sufficient to know a man's conscious intentions in order to judge his sincerity. After Freud this was no longer enough; in fact, it was very little. Behind consciousness lurked the hidden reality, the unconscious, which was the key to man's real intentions. By analysing a person (or using the analytic point of view of bourgeois or any other) respectability, with its hypocricy and dishonesty, was, in principle shaken in its foundations. It was no longer enough for a man to justify his actions by his good intentions. These

good intentions, even if subjectively, perfectly, sincere, were subject to further scrutiny, the question was addressed to everyone. What is behind it? "Or better who are you behind yourself?" In fact, Freud made it possible to approach the question 'Who are you, and who am I?' in a spirit of new realism.

Freud who opened the way to the understanding of false consciousness and human self-deception was a radical thinker who transcended the limits of his society to a certain extent. He was to some degree a critic of society especially in 'The Future of an Illusion'. But he was also deeply rooted in the prejudices and philosophy of his historical period and class. The Freudian unconscious was mainly the seat of repressed sexuality, 'honesty' referred mainly to the vissitudes of the libido in childhood and his critique of society was restricted to its sexual repression. Freud was a bold and radical thinker in his great discoveries, but in their application he was impeded by an unquestioning belief that his society, although by no means satisfactory was the ultimate form of human progress and could not be improved in any essential feature.

Freud had developed a system that was attacked and ridiculed by almost all 'respectable' professionals and academicians, because he challenged many taboos and customary ideas of his time.

CHAPTER - IV

MARX AND ALIENATION

MARX AND ALIENATION

Perhaps the one concept which makes Freud and Marx extraordinarily close partners in thought is the concept of alienation. Although Freud himself did not use the word alienation it is quite clear that the core of his thought can be restated in terms of this concept. For Freud, the neurotic - and most of us are neurotic anyway - is a man alienated from himself (his Unconscious) and therefore from the world at large. In his earlier writings Marx lays great emphasis on the concept of alienation, and it is to a consideration to this that now I turn.

The concept of alienation is a central concept in Marxian theory of man. Theologians, poets, and ordinary men in reflective mood have spoken of man as if he were lost in the world, or as if he were oppressed, by it, or have said of him that he is his own enemy, the victim of his own actions. Man at odds with himself and man a stranger in a hostile world are themes as old as poetry and as myth. Alienation is anything that makes man a degraded, enslaved, neglected, contemptible being. Alienation can be described as: loss of self, anxiety states, anomie, depersonalization, rootlessness, apathy, social disorganization, pessimism, loss of orginality, and loss of belief or values. Alienation refers to the distorted picture of man and the world presented by the conceptual mirror in which modern man has grown accustomed to seeing himself and is increasingly being recognized as a symptom of man's contemporary crisis, a human malady which is found in diverse forms in different walk of human life. The nature of Marx's struggle

appears to be similar to the contemporary experience of alienation in terms of its urgency, ineffability, and the revolutionary demands that accompany them. The relational character of the problem involves the estrangement between the individual and society, the relation between man and nature, between man and the very structure of thought that govern the concrete realities of existence, and the human consequences of the thingification of man imposed by the existing structure of the State and society.

Marx's treatment of alienation concerns the problem of the self in relation to nature and society, and the conflict between thought and reality. Alienation, which is a major theme of the human condition in the contemporary epoch, appears to be central in the early writings of the young Marx. His matriculation essay of 1835, 'Observation of a youth concerning the choice of a calling' is pregnant with the idea of alienation. He says:

> The deity has given to man a general goal to improve mankind and to dignify himself, but left it up to him to seek the means by which he could attain this goal, left it up to him to choose the position in society which is most appropriate and from which he could best elevate both himself and society.1

Marx starts with the affirmation that the deity has given to man and nature a general goal leaving it to man to work out details.

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1. Easton, Karl Marx: The German Essay, 1835, p.35.

But alienation can be the outcome of social relations and we are not the determiner of our vocation. Marx says:

> But we cannot always choose the vocation to which we believe we are called. Our social relations, to some extent, have already begun to form before we are in a position to determine them. Even our physical nature often threateningly opposes us and no one dare mock its rights.2

Our physical nature opposes us too. Alienation as a contradiction between the determined social relations and the deity's calling, becomes obvious all the more when one seeks to overcome it. Marx says:

> To be sure we can lift ourselves above it, but then we fail all the faster. We then venture to construct a building on rotten foundations and then our entire life is an unfortunate struggle between the spiritual and corporeal principle.3

Alienation here refers to a pitiful situation and a hopelessness of mankind in his struggle to free himself from alienation. Marx says:

> If we have chosen a position for which we do not possess the talents, we shall never be able to fill it properly, we shall soon recognise with shame our own incapability and say to ourselves that we are a useless creature a member of society who cannot fulfill his calling.4

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2. Ibid., p. 37.
3. Ibid., p. 37.
4. Easton, pp.37-38.

Marx has not considered here the traditionally theological or philosophical framework of alienation. Marx indicates clearly the seriousness of the problem and he sought to solve the problem through the medium of well-being of humanity. Marx says:

> When we have chosen the vocation in which we can contribute most to humanity, burdens cannot bend us because they are sacrifices for all. Then we experienced no meagre, limited, egoistic joy, but our happiness belongs to millions, our deeds live on quitely but eternally effective, and flowing tears of noble men will fall in our ashes.5

In Marx's matriculation essay we can see the tensions between actualities and potentialities, in being full human and a struggle to overcome the problems in fulfilling the deity's calling.

Marx locates the source of alienation at the very door of the theoretical consciousness as expressed in Hegelian philosophy.

In the practical real world self-alienation can appear only in the practical real relationship to other men. When theoretical consciousness in so far as it imposes upon life something extraneous abstract and absolute, it prevents the natural and social relationship from being fulfilled. This is what Marx calls alienation.

Marx's criticism of religion, is precisely that the fantastic reality of heaven which religion represented, for Marx, served

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5. Easton, p. 39.

as a source of alienation for man. However, the cutting edge of this criticism is that it paved the way for a radical criticism of those conditions in human society that actually alienates man from himself from other men and from society as a whole.

Marx says:

> Man makes religion, religion doesn't make man. And indeed religion is the self-consciousness and self regard of man who has either not yet found or has already lost himself. But man is not an abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the world of men, the state of society.6

Marx criticises religion because he is against the role of religion which leads mankind to the actual human self-alienation. He then attempts to get to the root of the matter through his criticism of religion. Besides, he finds that the religious spirit does not actualize itself in its human ground and hence remain an impossible ideal, unsecular consciousness of its members. Marx also criticises philosophy as the source of alienation. In his 'Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General', Marx says:

> The whole history of the alienation process and the whole process of the retraction of the alienation is therefore nothing but the history of the production of abstract (i.e. absolute) thought of logical speculative thought. The estrangement, which therefore forms the real interest of this alienation is the opposition of in itself and for itself, of consciousness and self-consciousness, or object and subject - that is to say, it is the opposition within thought itself, between abstract thinking and sensuous reality or real sensousness.7

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6. Easton, p. 285.

7. Critique of Hegelian Dialectic, EPM, p. 175.

Marx thought that the actual sources of the alienation of man is brought about by abstract thought whereas Hegel considers 'all alienation of human nature' to be 'nothing but the alienation of self consciousness'. Marx attempts to begin with man in his activity (in relation to nature and other men) and wishes to remain on earth with earthly things. Therefore instead of viewing man in relation to God (as in theology) or in terms of the absolute spirit or idea (as in the philosophy of Hegel) and instead of viewing him empirically as a movement of matter (as in mechanical materialism). Marx chooses to view man on the basis of his activity and in relation to nature and to other men, not only in terms of past activity, but in relation to potential future activity. Marx describes man in his 'Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General' and says:

> Man is a natural being of immediacy. As a natural being and as a living natural being he is on the one hand endowed with natural powers of life - he is an active natural being. These forces exist in him as tendencies and abilities as drives. On the other hand, as a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is a suffering, conditioned and limited creature, like animals and plants. That is to say, the objects of his drives exist outside him as objects independent of him; yet these objects that he needs - essential objects, indispensable to the manifestation and confirmation of his essential powers. To say that man is a corporeal, living, real, sensuous, objective being full of natural vigour is to say that he has real, sensuous, objects, as the object of his being or his life, or that he can only express his life in real sensuous objects.[8]

When Marx describes man as 'corporeal, living, real, sensuous, objective being full of natural vigour', who can 'only express his

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8. EPM, p. 181.

life in real sensuous objects', man is not viewed in isolation from nature, from earthly things, and from his activities. But when man is isolated from nature and other men, when the very objects that man needs are denied to him, his natural human abilities cannot be realized and hence it is alienation. Alienation is thus the experience of man where a human relationship with man, and a sensuous experience with nature, are denied to man in his practical activities, whether it is expressed in terms of isolating man from his integral relationship with nature, or in terms of abstracting thought from being. Just as nature fixed in isolation from man is nothing for man, thought abstracted from being is nothing for man. Similarly, man who is atomistically separated from man cannot be fully human. The natural man therefore for Marx is the whole man, the 'social man', the 'mated-being' the Gattungswesen.

Marx considers man as part of nature and yet neither empirically as in positivism and in the behavioural sciences, nor mechanically as matter in motion, but humanly in practice. As Marx says in his Paris Manuscripts.

> In practice I can relate myself to a thing humanly only if the thing relates itself humanly to the human being.9

Marx believed in the possibility of such a human relation to nature, and only when these possibilities were denied, Marx considered it as alienation. To Marx, man is part of nature as his inorganic body,

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9. EPM, p. 139.

man's relationship to nature is not in itself alienated. It is a wholesome relationship which enables man to be in tune with his life activity. Idealism is also a source of alienation for Marx, not merely because abstract and absolute thought reduces the world of objects into a thought entity, but also because it negates the primacy of man by reducing him to the status of predicate. When human existence is explained simply in terms of an external idea or spirit, man becomes a tool of these external forces and man is alienated in his primarily human essence.

Marx's meaning of alienation must be sought in the very activities of man in society. Marx's criticism of society is a ruthless criticism of all existing conditions which aims to show the world "what it is in fact fighting for." And his criticism is directed towards a recovery of the human by changing the very conditions that alienate man. Marx says:

> My work would be free expression of my life and therefore free enjoyment of my life .... Secondly, in work the peculiarity of my work would have been affirmed since it is my individual life. Work would thus be genuine, active property .... And finally my labour can only appear in my object or what it is according to its nature. It cannot appear as what is not.10

Work, according to Marx should be a free expression of one's life, and a sort of enjoyment not like the work where one

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10. On James Mills, Excerpt Notes of 1844, p. 202f.

accepts it as an inevitable misery, mentally debased and physically exhausted in his work instead of developing freely his mental and physical energies, and where man feels himself at home in his leisure time and feels burdens at work. When the things that are produced by a worker does not belong to him and when the product of his own work confronts him as an alien object threatening to subjugate or destroy the worker, Marx describes it as alienation.

Man, according to Marx is a creature who knows what he does in relation to a world, and he makes schemes unlike other animal who can create nests or their houses very beautifully. Man is a maker of explanations, a construction of conceptual systems, and a self-creative social being. His worth in his own eyes and in other people's depends on his work, on the deliberate and controlled efforts he makes to achieve something worth achieving or at least which he thinks it so. Work is a rational and disciplined activity calling for a use of both mental and bodily powers. You must work in order to live, and you cannot live only on your own products; you must work to produce what others want, and they must work to provide for your wants. You are your own master not because you are free to work or not to work; or you are able to produce what satisfies all your wants, but because you are the manager of your own work. You are a deliberate provider for wants; you take decisions about how to use the resources and skills at your disposal to produce what satisfies wants. Labour is not felt to

be oppressive because man must work hard to keep himself and his dependants alive, it is felt to be oppressive only when man is so placed that he cannot get a living by doing the kind of work that would satisfy him. Work is a burden when it belongs to someone other than him, when he is not his own master. The alienated worker, says Marx,

> does not fulfil himself in his work but denies himself, has a feeling of misery rather than well-being does not develop freely his mental and physical energies but is physically exhausted and mentally debased .... His work is not voluntary but imposed, forced labour. It is not the satisfaction of a need but only a means for satisfying other needs. Finally, the external character of work for the worker is shown by the fact that in (his) work he does not belong to himself but to another person.11

What man is, is revealed in his works, he develops his capacities and comes to know himself for what he is by being active and reflective. He is a species being that is to say, a being that develops its distinctive capacities through the activities whereby it comes to know itself as the kind of being it is. Man rises to self-knowledge, and so becomes fully human, by working on nature with other men, to produce what satisfies his wants. To satisfy his wants man cannot only consume or use what is external to him, he also transforms it to meet his wants, to serve his purposes, he enlarges his understanding both of what he uses and adapts to his use, and of the activities involved in this use and adaptation. But these

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11. Karl Marx, Early Writings, p. 125.

activities are his own activities, and so in enlarging his understanding of them, he comes to understand himself. Therefore, through his actions, he necessarily educates himself he comes to understand both his environment and himself, both nature and man as a part of nature differing in a fundamental respect from the rest of nature. As he enlarges his understanding, he extends his control of himself and of what is external to him.

When Marx speaks of alienated man on the worker to himself or to others or to the economy or social order, he has in mind a psychological condition of a self-conscious being. Man is alienated spiritually when he feel himself to be the victim of a system he cannot control. This spiritual alienation does not consist in his not being able to control the system only, nor yet in his taking it for granted; it consists in his looking upon himself as the victim of it, of something beyond his control and external to him, though it is in fact only a system of human behaviour. Alienated man has energies or abilities or aspirations that he cannot satisfy. His idea of himself which depends so much in his work and his social roles, is a burden to him, he is dissatisfied with himself as well as with what he does and his place in society.

Nobody wants work to be monotonous and degrading but it is so because the economy is industrial and capitalist. Both the worker and the capitalist feel themselves to be at the mercy of a masterless economy. Man, the species being, aspires to be his

own master and to affirm himself, and feels that he is an instrument and a victim. He is frustrated, and is degraded in his own eyes.

When the process of production is geared to the egoistic need of making more money, Marx sees in it a 'universal exploitation of human communal life'. Not only are real human needs denied here, but insofar as the need for money claims priority over the well-being of man, it becomes the only bond that finds men to human life, nature and society. Marx considers it as evidence of human alienation.

For Marx, the central problem of alienation results from the egoistic spirit of civil society. The necessary revolution that Marx visualizes is, therefore, not so much a 'social revolution with a political soul' but rather a 'political revolution with a social soul'.

In so far as the institution of private property and industrial capital exercises domination over the life activity of man, dehumanizing him, thingifying him, Marx's revolutionary struggle appears to be justified.

We have discussed before that Marx has in mind a psychological condition of an alienated man, looking upon himself as the victim of something external to him, which is beyond his control. Marx's alienated man is a man who produces 'under the domination of egoistic need'. This is the need outside the labour process to which the process is subordinated. The compulsion that transforms free creative self activity into alienated labour is the compulsion to amass wealth.

Marx is speaking of money as the 'alien being' and of the worship of this 'worldly god' as the force that alienates man from himself in his productive activity. Marx describes greed (Habsucht) as a kind of acquisitive mania that sees in money the means of exercising power over everything. Man worships money as the externalized potentiality of mankind and almighty being that confers unlimited power upon its possessor. Money is the divine power that overturns all things and transforms fidelity into infidelity, love into hate, hate into love, virtue into vice, vice into virtue, servant into master, master into servant, idiocy into intelligence and intelligence into idiocy. Under the despotism of the acquisitive passion man develops no free physical and spiritual energy but mortifies his body and ruins his spirit. Just as in religion the self-activity of human imagination of the human brain and human heart, operates independently of the individual i.e. as an alien, divine or diabolic activity, so the activity of the worker is not his self-activity. It belongs to another, it is the loss of himself. The worker, in other words, experiences his own productive activity as though it belonged not to himself but to his externalized being, his own creation - capital.

Marx reasons that the religion of money-worship is the practical and material counterpart of the religious belief that 'to enrich God, man must become poor, that God may be all, man must be nothing'. Enslaved by the acquisitive mania, the human species pours the whole

wealth of its species powers into the worldly god, and impoverishes itself in the process. The self-alienated working man is a being who has lost himself. Devoid of all spontaneity, all sense of self-determination in action, and all joy in living he has grown quite depersonalized. To such an extent has he become a stranger to himself that his own energies and activity seem to him to belong not to himself but to an alien power that holds sway over him, and all that he does, he does at the bidding of this power. All the activity is alienated labour. Yet his estrangement from himself is not yet total. For he resents the state to which he has come. He recognizes it as wrong, evil, unnatural, a dehumanized condition. He wants to emancipate from it, to repossess his energies and activity, to regain himself.

If man is driven instead of himself as a driver, the activity belongs not to him but to others. Then, to whom does it belong? Marx believes that the other being other than himself can only be man himself. Thus, the alien being in whose service alienated man labours can be no other than himself. If this is the case, we can make comparison of Marx's position with R.L. Stevenson's classic tale, 'Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde'. The original man is lost, and in his place two personalities, the worker and the capitalist stand in hostile confrontation. Neither is fully human. The worker is a non-man, a dehumanization, a proletarian devoid of every human attribute save the essential one - creativity. On the other side, the

insatiable acquisitive urge, the alien power within man that transforms his productive activity into alienated labour, has been detached and housed in 'another man outside the worker'.

The self-alienated man has become in the full sense, a split personality.

How is man to come back to his original position? What will be the best possible means to regain his long lost originality?

For Marx, the communist world revolution is a revolution of self-change, and act by which man is to end his alienation, restore his lost harmony with himself, and actualize himself as man. The infinite degradation under raw communism is pictured by Marx as a short stage of purgatory on the accent of alienated man to his post-historical destiny in ultimate communism. Communism is the transcendence of private property and of human self-alienation. Man is liberated from their bondage, a bondage of having and a bondage of monotonous activity. Man will be at last released from the suffering condition of alienated labour. Freed at last from the lust for wealth in whose service he has laboured, he will not, however, subside into universal indolence. Instead, he will become for the first time the free conscious producing animal that it is his essence and species character to be. Productive activity will become joyous creation. Man will regain his artistic sense and finds satisfaction in his own activities. He will cease to be divided against

himself in his life activity of material production and will no longer experience this activity as activity of and for another alien, hostile, powerful man independent of him. Consequently, the products of his activity, the objectification of himself in a world that he has created, he will no longer see before him an alienated world. As Marx puts it, the positive transcendence of private property means the 'annihilation of the alienated character of the objective world. But human self-realization means much more to Marx than the return of man to himself out of his alienated labour in the life of material production. It means also the transcendence of the various subsidiary modes of production in which man has historically led a life of alienation. Religion, the family, the state, law, morality, science, art etc. are only particular modes of production, and fall under the general law. The positive transcendence of private property, as the appropriation of human living, is therefore, the positive transcendence of all alienation and thus the return of man from the religion, the family, the state etc., to his human i.e. social existence. Religious alienation as such takes place only in the realm of consciousness of man's inner life, but economic alienation is that of real life.

The ending of economic alienation will means the end of the state, the family, law, morality etc. as subordinate spheres of alienation. Social man is man returned to himself out of what has historically been known as society, all of whose major institutions have been modes of alienated productive living. Man will realize

his natural tendency to arrange things according the laws of beauty. Economic activity will turn into artistic activity, with industry as the supreme avenue of creation, and the planet itself will become the new man's work of art. The alienated world will give way to the aesthetic world. The positive transcendence of private property will mean the liberation of the human senses to appreciate man-made objects of utility and potential possession. By way of illustration Marx says that the dealer in mineral sees only their market value but not the beauty and unique character of minerals, he does not and cannot know and appreciate things in themselves as long as his perspective faculties remain prisoners of the acquisitive attitude or as Marx now calls it, 'the sense of having' (der Sinn des Habens).

Man liberated from alienation in communism is for Marx not only a man whose productive activity has ceased to be subjugated to the acquisitive urge. His knowing activity or perception of the world has likewise been freed from it, because the desire to own and possess things vanished. In the man of the future, greed that defiled man in the past will be purified.

Marx says,

> Private property has made us so stupid and one sided that an object is ours only when we have it, when it exists for us as capital, or when we possess it directly, eat it, drink it, wear it on our body, live in it, in short, use it .... For all the physical and spiritual senses, therefore, the sense of having which is the simple alienation of all these senses, has been substituted .... The transcendence of private

> property is, therefore, the complete emancipation of all the human senses and attributes .... They relate themselves to the thing for the sake of the thing, but the thing itself is an objective human relation to itself and to man, and vice-versa. Need or enjoyment have consequently lost their egoistic character, and nature has lost its mere utility in that using has become human using.12

This is Marx's picture of 'socialist' man, or man returned to himself 'as social i.e. human man, complete, conscious, and material within the entire wealth of development of date'. Man is to become 'social or socialist' in the sense that he will dwell in aesthetic communion with the humanly produced world around him after he has arranged it according to the laws of beauty and trained his senses to relate to each thing for the sake of the thing. Communism, for Marx is the regaining of the self, the regaining of the alienated world-self as well as the alienated inner self or productive powers. Marx's communism ultimately signifies the establishment of an aesthetic community in the self-relation between man and his alter ego the objective world. Man is to enter into an I-Thou relation with the human nature that exists outside himself. Communism is the emergence of 'society' as a communal relation between the future aesthetic man and his de-alienated world.

Marx is no doubt a profound thinker, and we cannot deny the fact of his tremendous influence to human being but he is a difficult

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12. MEGA, pp. 118-19.

writer, some of his famous utterances, if they are not exactly empty, stand in need of so much interpretation and qualification and except for the reader who has made the painful effort of trying to understand him, he is very difficult to understand. He is apt to be much undervalued or much overvalued, undervalued by impatient readers who resent being put to so much trouble by arrogant and unnecessarily difficult words, and overvalued by readers who like to put a high price on what it has cost them much effort to acquire. A difficult writer, his reputation once made soon gets himself a cloud of admirers who feel the wiser for repeating profound utterances whose meaning they cannot explain, admirers blessed as it were by the alien touch of genius and mystery. Marx is not very clear in his classless society. Did he really believe that a developed industrial society could do without legislature meeting regularly to repeal old laws and make new ones, without administrative departments and courts of law? Did he believe that the common or public business of such a society could be done by the workers in their spare time, or by people who do not make a profession of it?

Marx is too much engrossed with the problem of 'what is' and he has not time to spell out clearly his classless society. There is room for disagreement about how much good or evil has been done by Marx. Marx's passionate attack on our type of society is, at bottom, a moral condemnation of it, and is impressive and moving precisely on that account, but it is an attack which does as much

to confuse as to enlighten his readers. He makes them feel that there is a great deal that is wrong with society and the human condition as they are without making it clear to them just what it is, and above all without providing them with realistic and coherent principles to guide them in their efforts to set it right. There can be lot of confusions and a great harm can be done if one criticises the present condition without offering a better one which is applicable. But, Marx at least, contributed a lot to mankind by arousing the attention of the working class to build a better society than the present one.

Every economic thesis and every political opinion of Marx rests on the presupposition that man's volitional motives, which bring about social progress, are dictated first and foremost by economic interests. Present-day social psychology would express the same thoughts in terms of the effect of the acquisitive drive on social conduct. If Marx himself regarded such formulations as superflous, that is because he took it for granted that this was the object and aim of contemporary, political economy.

Marx fails to realize that man's ideologies are the product of certain wishes, instinctual drives, interests, and needs, which themselves, in large measures, unconsciously find expression as rationalizations i.e., as ideologies. Marx also fails to realize that while instinctual drives do develop on the basis of biologically determined instincts, their quantity and content are greatly affected by the individual's socio-economic situation or class. Marx says that men are

the producers of their ideologies; analytical social psychology can describe empirically the process of production of ideologies, of the interaction of 'natural' and social factors. As Marx fails to show how the economic situation is transformed into ideology via man's drives.

An important point to note is the fact that this interaction between instincts and environment results in changes within man himself, just as his work changes intra-human nature. Here we can only suggest the general direction of this change. It involves, as Freud has stressed repeatedly, the growth of man's ego organization and the corresponding growth of his capacity for sublimation.

Marx fails to provide a more comprehensive knowledge that is operative in the social process, the nature of man himself, and facts to locate man's instinctual apparatus among the natural factors that modify the social process, although there are also limits to this modificability. Man's instinctual apparatus is one of the 'natural' conditions that form part of the substructure (Unterbau) of the social process.

Marx postulated the dependence of all ideological processes on the economic substructure. He saw intellectual and psychic creatures as the material basis reflected in man's head. In many instances, to be sure, Marx could provide the right answers without any psychological pre-suppositions. But only where ideology was the

immediate expression of economic interests, or where one was trying to establish the correlation between economic substructure and ideological superstructure. Lacking a satisfactory psychology, Marx could not explain how the material basis was reflected in man's head and heart.

Marx fails to realize that the impact of an idea depends essentially on its unconscious content, which appeals to certain drives, that it is, as it were, the quality and intensity of the libidinal structure of a society which determines the social effect of an ideology.

Marx was not in a position to explain clearly the nature and source of human forces such as: love for the group, and the desire for freedom and how these play part in history and he could not explain the role they played in social process. So, Marx fails to realize that these seemingly ideal motives are actually the rationalized expression of instinctual, libidinous needs and that the content and scope of the dominant need at any given moment are to be explained in terms of the influence of the socio-economic situation on the instinctual structure of the group that produces the ideology.

CHAPTER - V

SARTRE AND FREE MAN

SARTRE AND FREE MAN

In this chapter I consider a thinker, Sartre, who in some ways might seem to be radically different both from Freud and Marx, but who in my opinion belongs firmly, as indeed Sartre himself admits, in the Marxist-Freudian intellectual milieu. This seemingly radical difference arises from the fact that Sartre quite self-consciously rejects the covering law or what might be called scientific variety of explanation as being relevant to the understanding of man. Explanation in terms of reasons is supreme for him - not only supreme but exhaustive.[1] However, as it should be clear from our exposition of Freudian thought and Marx's conception of alienation, the Freudian and Marxist insistence on causal determination is of a variety which is quite different from the one that is familiar to the natural sciences. Here causal determination cannot be understood except through notions such as meaning, intention, motive, reason, and so on. And it has never been shown either by Freud or by Marx that this kind of determination is even in principle reducible to Galilean mechanistic determinism. In any case Marx's ultimate concern and conviction was the possibility of authentic human freedom; and although Freud did not quite believe in the possibility of total liberation of the soul as it were, he did believe in at least the intelligibility of the effort at achieving freedom. Sartre's primary concern is also freedom and in a way he comes, as it were between Marx and Freud.

Sartre's man is already totally free but unlike Marx's free man, the Sartrean free man is doomed to an existence of dark hopelessness. The Freudian free man unlike both the Marxist and the Sartrean free man has only necessarily limited freedom but like the Freudian man the Sartrean man must ultimately look into himself rather than anything else if he is ever to understand himself.

The best starting point for an exposition of Sartrean thought is his concept of nothingness.

'Nothingness' was a kind of gap in separation which lay between a man and the world or rather between a man's consciousness and the world of objects of which he was conscious. The second sense of 'Nothingness' was that almost of futility of the vanishing and evaporating of objects in the world. Without an awareness of nothingness in this sense, a man could not begin to move from inauthentic to authentic existence.

For Sartre, it is not time but nothingness that is the core of human existence, and that man brings to all reality. Only nothingness, for Sartre, can perfectly reveal reality. Only nothingness lacks identity with itself and is totally of another. Being, for Sartre, cannot reveal something other than itself. Sartre is referring to a concrete nothingness, such as is often experienced in the perception of someone's absence (perceiving that a friend is not at an accustomed meeting place, and not to an abstract concept of

nothingness, such as the concept of a void or a square circle. Sartre describes a situation in which I go into a cafe, expecting to see a friend, Pierre, and immediately discover by perception, that he is not there. The cafe and all the other people fall immediately into a background, against which I expect to see Pierre stand out. but he does not, I witness the successive disappearance of all the objects before my eyes, particularly the faces, which hold my attention for a moment (Is that Pierre?) then immediately disintegrate, just because they are not Pierre's face ....

What is apparent to the intuition is a fluttering movement of non-existence, the non-existence of the background whose nihilization calls for the existence of a form and of the form itself, a non-existence gliding like nothing over the surface of the background. Of course many other people besides Pierre are not in the cafe at any particular moment. But that they are not something which I may think, rather than perceive. The absence of someone whom I had expected to see is a perceived absence, an actual experienced, negation or nothingness, which simplify by its clarity, illuminates the general fact that negation can and does enter our perceptual experience of the world.

Sartre does not believe in the existence of any spiritual realities, he also rejects materialism as an oversimplification of the human condition, the only existent for Sartre is matter. It is notningness that distinguishes man from the purely material.

For Sartre, there is no God and no spirit. There is only matter and nothingness-existence and nothingness-being and nothingness. From these two, man and the world arise. Nothingness is used by Sartre to call attention to the fact that 'concrete' nothingness somehow functions in a most fundamental way within being.

Existence and Absurdity

A human being is a being with unrealized potential for Sartre whereas a Being-in-itself is solid, massive, entirely actual. A human being has no essence (his existence precedes his essence) he is therefore not wholly determined, but is free to fill the internal gap in his nature in whatever way he chooses. Existence precedes essence both in man and in things according to Sartre.

Essence was viewed as the answer to the question of what a thing is, it was considered to be the basic nature, or 'structure' of a thing. Existence on the other hand, answered the question whether a thing is, it was, for him, that fundamental act that causes a thing to be, independent of our thinking of it.

Existence has, for Sartre, a priority over essence because existence is 'the very paste of thing'. But if existence is prior to essence, existence is prior to meaning, since essence designates the fundamental in things. Sartre accepts this logic. Existence precedes all possible meanings, both in man and in nature.

For Sartre, the material world is meaningless and existence is absurd. Sartrean man feels 'de trop' unnecessary, unjustified

in a world of unjustifiable objects in the way 'obscene and vulgar'; What is he doing there? This is clearly pictured in the life of Roquentin. Things exist without any reasonable justification, without any pre-established 'essence', without any absolute necessity for existing. They simply 'are'. Existence is an incomprehensible proliferation of Beings, none of which have any reason for 'being there'. As absurdly unjustified as inanimate matter, man is thrown into the world without choice, devoid of purpose. He has no 'essence' to bolster him up, which would define him in advance and lend a reason to his existence; he simply 'is'. And yet, however much his existence may lack design or purpose, he cannot cease to be. He is there, utterly naked and vulnerable against a backcloth of absurdity, amid a profusion of unjustifiable and worrying entities, with no recourse to theories or systems which might justify his being there in the first place.

Existence is a bald, grotesque, ugly, disconcerting but inescapable fact, beyond the realm of definitions or explanations. It is concerned with concrete reality, for which the existence of an object precedes the definition, or possible definitions of that object. Furthermore, this truth is felt rather than thought out, it starts from an intuition which manifests itself in physical terms, and produces a kind of nausea. The revelation of the contingence of existence makes Sartrean man in turn frightened, agonized, disgusted, and deeply angry. If nothing can excuse explain or

justify a purposeless and motiveless existence, man is thereby plunged into a profoundly solitary anguish. Deprived of an established system of meanings and motives with which to explain the world, man is alone and unprotected. Sartre's work is full of references to man's emptiness bewilderment, and puzzlement in the face of the absurd.

Reality is contingent, gratuitous and absurd, both in its application to man and to the multifarious objects which surround him. Neither he nor they have any essence which justifies their existence.

But the first breakthrough in this depressing vision of the world comes when man realizes that he is the only reality which can change the power of consciousness or awareness invests him with the ability to create his own essence a posteriori, whereas thoughtless, inanimate matter is fixed for ever in its absurd state. Essence may precede Existence as far as abstract concepts are concerned, but man does not have to live with abstractions, he must live with reality, so abstract values are worthless to him. In the world of reality, existence precedes essence. He therefore exists first and subsequently creates his own essence, which things cannot do. Things are trapped, imprisoned in the mire of non-meaning. Man is free, free from pre-conceived definitions, free from pre-ordained values. He is free to define himself and to create his own values. The knowledge of this

freedom which lifts him above the world of things comes as a blinding revelation.

In the face of freedom - human beings can adopt either of two fundamentally, different attitudes. They can attempt to conceal their freedom from themselves by a variety of devices, the most typical of which is a belief in some form of psychological determinism. All of these efforts are doomed to failure, Sartre argues, because human beings can try to conceal their freedom only to the extent that they recognize it. The attempt succeeds only in producing a paradoxical internal duality of consciousness in which consciousness thinks of itself as a thing at the same time that it gives covert recognition to its freedom. This state, which has to be carefully distinguished both from lying to others and from the Freudian conception of a manipulation of consciousness by subconscious forces is called 'bad faith'. Its antithesis is an acceptance of one's own freedom and recognition that human beings are the absolute origin, of, and are solely responsible for their own acts. On the contrast between these two life - attitudes is based the whole of Sartre's ethics. But while Sartre severely condemns all attempts by human consciousness, to objectify itself and put itself on a level with things, he basically defines human beings as precisely this self-contradictory effort to achieve the status of a thing while remaining a consciousness that contemplates itself as a thing. Indeed, he goes so far as to define

value as this impossible combination of being for-itself and being-in-itself, and in this impossibility he sees the ultimate reason for the hopeless character of the human enterprise (which he also describes as the attempt to make oneself God). This effort must fail for while human beings are absolutely responsible for their choices, their existence is not the result of a choice. It is simply a fact and its uneliminable contingency makes it impossible for human beings to be ontologically self-sufficient in the way that a God must be.

Once man has acknowledged the all important liberty which distinguishes human reality from the rest of reality, he must cast aside all abstract notions of good and evil. Such values no longer exist in a determined state. They are movable values, which are relative to each given situation and are impossible to define in advance in a rigid code. Every man is free to create his own good and evil, at every moment of his life. He is suddenly released from the shakles of dogmatic morals and inflexible absolutes. And once he is aware of this freedom, there is no turning back, and there is no power which can deprive him of it.

Sartrean man creates his own 'justice' and invents his own essence, or justification for existing. This is therefore, 'good' in the Sartrean sense, since it is the expression of a sudden eruption of freedom. It is only 'bad' if one accepts that good and evil are permanent unshakeable realities.

Sartrean freedom though absolute does contain an element of restriction. It is a terrifying freedom because there is no release from it. One is obliged to invent values, at every minute. We are free to interpret anything at any time, free to give sense to a senseless world, but we are continually and constantly obliged to exercise this freedom. We cannot abdicate. We have not chosen to be free, we do exist and we are free, and we are therefore constrained perpetually to use this whether we like it or not. Freedom is not optional, there is no escaping it. Since man is the only being that can invent essences, he is obliged to be free and constantly to exercise this freedom. Whatever he does, he will be creating meanings. Freedom is therefore stated as a fact, not as a value. There is no arguing with the fact that man is free. It is by exercising this freedom that he creates values. By facing up to it and embracing it, he is able to make of it a valuable power.

The vast majority of men however, spend their lives in a frantic flight from freedom. Unable to face the solitude and anguish which we have seen are affective results of an awareness of freedom, they attempt to avoid it in various ways and to construct a protective security for themselves which will absolve them from the awful necessity of being free.

In Sartrean morality the worst criminal is he who, through fear attempts to mock his freedom elude the personal effort

which must be required to give meaning to the world and make himself as fixed and rigidly determined an entity as the immutable things which surround him. By denying that he is free, he evades the unpleasant responsibility of having to do anything, he can remain safe in the belief that he is what he is because he has always been so. He has his rightful place in a world which is meaningful and sensible, he can merely 'be' as a thing 'is' passively, he can only obey the rules. He who makes a wilful effort to 'be' the person others see in him and to consciously play the role they have cast for him, is alienating his freedom. For Sartre, man has no dignity until he creates for himself. Man is alone unjustified and irremediably free and there is no eternal values to support him, he will have to interpret and re-interpret the world around him, by making fresh judgements in every new situation and above all, by an ever-renewed effort of self-justification. Man needs to make choices between various possibilities of behaviour. In his total liberty, he can only give significance to the world and justification to himself by the choices he makes and by the definitions he invents, he will define himself by his choices.

Since man is condemned to justify himself by the choices he makes by his perpetual re-creation of values, it follows once more that there can be no good and evil as absolutes, they are concepts which must be relatives to each situation,

and which are impossible to tabulate before that situation occurs. Morals are not to be observed in a blind obedience to a code, but in the free and conscious expression of autonomous choice. There is no place for the notions of good and evil which is absolute. There can be no fixed standard, rules and norms which can be applied to different situations. Every person is responsible to make his choices in every situation. The obligation to make choices and accept responsibility for those choices is an obligation which is ceaselessly renewed and ever present. We cannot even describe a man according to the attributes he possesses, since he cannot have a personality composed of acquired characteristics. Sartrean freedom is freedom to behave authentically without reference to the past, to the other or to abstract concepts, the choice is a choice between different actions.

Since Sartre is an atheist he simply dismisses God as an exercise which people use, in their 'mauvaise foi' anxiety not to have to do anything. His vision is entirely anthropocentric. Sartre's concern is the human world and its problems. There is no one to blame or praise beside human being who is responsible for human conduct. We are alone in the world, without meaning and reason to explain, we are only what we do. And by our acts, we create and invent values. Sartre gives full responsibility to every human being, to give meaning and dignity to their lives and control their own destiny. Man is only what he does and

can be judged, if at all, only by his actions, Sartre demands that we should be honest, sincere and true to our own values which we continue to create every day.

There is no place in the Sartrean view of the world for theological discussion, no room for metaphysical discoveries, no need for the natural world in the Rousseauesque or Romantic tradition, no place for the animal kingdom. Having placed man at the centre of his universe, Sartre does not consider God as a valid topic for consideration.

Maurice Cranston has accused Sartre of putting the cart before the horse in claiming that man must invent his own values because God does not exist. Moral values are not derived from God anyway says Cranston. They may be historically derived from some religious systems, but logically they are prior to a conception of the Deity, since the Deity is supposed to epitomize all that we consider to be 'good', therefore, a concept of 'goodness' must precede a concept of a Being who possesses such virtue.[1] But Sartre has made it quite clear that his contention we must create our own moral values, is not made on the grounds that God does not exist, but irrespective of whether he exists or not. He only considers the existence of God because it is invoked by those with mauvaise foi as

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1. Masters, Brian. A Student's Guide to European Literature Jean Paul Sartre), p. 67.

an explanation. He himself regards the matter as an irrelevance, belonging as it does to the realm of metaphysics (which deals in hypotheses) and not the realm of existence (which deals in facts).

Cranston does, however, make the interesting point that Sartre's existentialism belongs historically to religion. 'Sartre' he says; 'is an atheist who understands nothing better than Man's thirst for God, and whose lesson is that Man must learn to live with that thirst for ever unsatisfied'.[2]

Given then that Man's search for God is fruitless, he must devote his energies to a search for himself, and to a search for Man. The Sartrean man displays a love for mankind in its deepest and most honest form, witnessed by what he does not by what he thinks. Sartre has frequently been accused of preaching amorality or, still worse, immorality. While it is true that the Sartrean idea of authentic action seems counter to the precepts of most established moral codes, it would be totally wrong to consider that this renders him an 'immoral writer'. On the contrary, we can say that Sartre's morality is noble because men must act as the result of a personal choice, and not as a simple obedience to written orders where people usually act without thinking the motives and the meanings of their acts. So, men must carry the burden of responsibility

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2. Ibid., p. 67.

for their acts and their behaviour and indeed, each man carries responsibility for the whole of mankind.

What constitutes immorality for Sartre is blind adherence to past values, the refusal to take part in the drama of creating and defining man each day, the cowardly abnegation of life in favour of a comfortable, death like being.

One may make the objection that absolute freedom and the inalienable right to individual personal choice might lead logically to anarchy. If each man is free to act as he deems fit, to invent his own values, what would happen if no two men were to act in the same way, and were to create values which differed from and conflicted with each other? What if a hundred men can invent a hundred moralities? Would not this promote utter chaos?

For Sartre, the situation acts as a frame within which and in relation to which man exercises his freedom, he insists that the situation can be changed or improved by the individual. The situation cannot determine an individual's behaviour, it does in a way enclose it, in the sense that any personal or social action must be taken in the context of that situation and be relevant to it if it is to be effective. Man is free, but he must take into account the situation in which he is free; to choose a course of action which is irrelevant to the

situation would be to act irresponsibly, and one's act would be meaningless.

Sartrean man wishes to overthrow the established order so that he may create a more meaningful life for himself and his fellows. In other words, a Sartrean existentialist would never act irresponsibly, his is a difficult and constructive task, subject to constant revision, the anarchist's is an easy and destructive task.

It is in the concept of action that Sartre's morality reveals all its severity. For he says in effect, that a man is only what he does, and can be judged if at all, only by his actions. Therefore, Sartre demands that we should be honest and true to our own values, which we continue to create every day. It is a morality to which one cannot pay lip-service it must be seen in one's deeds. One is constrained to 'practise what one preaches'.

Sartre is criticized as advocating a pessimistic philosophy where one is doomed or condemned to be free and cannot help but choose the responsibility of free choice at every moment of his life. But Sartre is full of hope that men can and will give meaning and dignity to their lives and control their own destiny. On the face of it, Sartre's teaching that life has no meaning until we give it one, may appear to be a counsel of despair. But his

conviction that we can give life a meaning by our actions, and that we can make the future bright for humanity as a whole by accepting our engagement, makes the possible horrors of our present condition more endurable, by making them transient. Sartre's counsel is the voice of encouragement.

The Problem of Other Minds

In his analysis of the reciprocal relationships of consciousness, Sartre very clearly goes beyond Heidegger. He argues, first, that it cannot be proved by analogical arguments or otherwise that there are other minds (and to this extent, he thinks, solipsism expresses a truth) rather, it is the case that my own apprehension of my existence is so structured that it pre-supposes the existence of other conscious beings. This is particularly clear in the case of feelings of shame, which pre-suppose that my body is accessible to another observer. In general, my experience of myself is inseparable from this public dimension of my existence. In Husserl Sartre finds this fact recognized only in the form of a logical requirement that has to be met if there is to be an intersubjectively shareable world, not in a way that accounts for our actual encounters with others. Only Heidegger is said to have grasped the relationship of consciousness in a way that makes it not just an internal requirement of our conceptual system but a feature of our being that is pre-supposed by that system. Sartre, however feels that Heidegger's

very general account of Mitsein ('being-together') has to be supplemented by an analysis of the experience in which I apprehend myself as I am perceived by another consciousness - that is, as an object, reified and deprived of the transcendence that is central to my own sense of my being. This is the experience of being looked at by someone else. In relation to this intrusive 'other', I can adopt either of two courses of action: I can try to dominate it and suppress its transcendence by which my own is threatened, or I can try to make myself into an object to be dominated by the liberty of the other. In either case, I am destined to fail because I must recognize my liberty (or that of the other) in order to suppress it.

In our two opposed relations with the other we can either attempt to assimilate the other's freedom into our freedom while simultaneously trying to preserve his freedom and our otherness; or we can attempt to reduce his freedom into an object. Both projects fail because each implies the other. Thus, in the very attempt to preserve the other's freedom, there is the danger of making this freedom into an object, since we wish to preserve it. On the other hand, if we make the other into an object, we recognize in the objectivized freedom, the freedom of a subject.

The project of love is to possess the very freedom and subjectivity of the beloved in such a way as to keep it free; it

is only by a freedom totally dedicated to my freedom that my absolute contingency can be removed. The project of love is therefore to be loved. But how can the lover obtain the beloved's free love?

It is clear that the ideal of love carries within it the seeds of its own failure. Since to love is to wish to be loved, the beloved can love only by wishing to be loved. Thus, the beloved also aims at seducing the lover's freedom; and the beloved seeks to be the same unique center of meaning and value as the lover. The project of love can continue because the lover does not realize that the beloved has the same project.

In masochism, we reverse the attempt of becoming an object of fascination before the other and attempt to become an object of fascination for ourselves. We attempt to become identified with our own objectification before the other. We wish to be nothing but our objectivity and would totally surrender our freedom to the other. We willingly acknowledge the other to be truly free and ourselves to be the other's mere instrument. Masochism, Sartre declares, is a type of vertigo before the other's freedom.

Although both love and masochism result in the for-itself's failure to be united with the other, and although each is a conflict of freedoms, nevertheless Sartre hints at fundamental

ifferences between the two. The masochist, from the very eginning, is well aware of his failure to lose his subjectivity in he other. It is this very failure that he then begins to seek and njoy.

It is as an enjoyment of failure that masochism is a vice and istinguished from love, which, as a goal, seems to be a project f good faith doomed to failure because of the nature of the or-itself as a nihilation and failure.

If human relations are a failure, it is for one of two reasons: ither they are in bad faith, or one demands of them, something 'hich they cannot give and which would be self-destructive f attained. Sartre discusses both of these causes in Being and othingness, but there is no denying that he leaves us with a ajor question unanswered. In introducing the subject of 'Concrete elations with others', Sartre makes the preliminary statement hat all human relations are variations on two primitive attitudes: 1) I attempt to absorb the other's freedom while still maintaining t as freedom; I allow myself to be an object before it, but ladly in the hope that it will sustain me in my being, thus llowing me at long last to be coincident with myself. As manifestation of this attitude, Sartre considers love and masochism. 2) I try to possess the other as an object so as to prevent him rom ever threatening my own sovereign subjectivity. In this onnection, Sartre analyses indifference, sadism and hate.

Neither of these attempts can succeed. The first seeks to deny that I am a free subject and responsible for my being; the second more violently would do the same thing to another. Sartre seems to say as emphatically as anyone that there is no other alternative.

It might seem that Sartre's view of the world was entirely solipsistic, but this would be misleading. The individual consciousness does not consider itself the only real existant, the only giver of significance to the things which surround it; it is also acutely aware of the existence of other consciousnesses which are also instances of 'pour-soi', and which are also therefore free. I (as pour-soi) have awareness (a) of things (l'en-soi) and (b) of other people (more 'pour-soi'). But two 'pour-soi' entities cannot meet without a collision, since each is free and each will seek to use its freedom to interpret, define, delineate the other, which, being free, will resist being interpreted, defined, delineated. Therefore, the freedom of the other is incompatible with mine.

When I look at the other, I transfix him in his present state; he becomes the thing - that-is-looked-at - and ceases to be free. When he looks at me, similarly, I am captured in a thing-like state of 'en-soi', and cease to be free. A harmonious social life becomes impossible under these conditions, and still more so, a happy relationship between two people. In a

love-relationship, each partner, by virtue of the simple exercise of his or her consciousness, is destroying the freedom of the other partner, the moment the pour-soi operates (and it cannot cease to operate, or, in other words, we are condemned to be free), the object of its consciousness becomes, precisely, an object. Relationships between free people are inevitably based on conflict. In my relationship with the loved one, the only way in which I can resolve the conflict is for my freedom to be victorious and for his or her freedom to succumb and allow itself to be enslaved. This is another way of saying that human relationship are based on power, and are successful only on a sado-masochistic level. If my freedom wins, I am being sadistic, and the other is being masochistic.

Sartre finds more evidence for masochism in human relationships than for sadism. He says that the desperate desire of men to mean something, to have an essence, to possess the passive tranquility of a thing, leads them masochistically to renounce their freedom and allow the other to solidify them, to petrify them. It works like this; I am terrified of the loneliness of the 'pour-soi', of the terrible necessity to create myself all the time. Freedom is not anything, it makes other things be; so if I continue to exercise my freedom, I can never myself be anything, the only way I can be anything, carry within myself the dignity of a fixed significance or essence, is to allow myself to be

petrified in the gaze of another, to become a thing. I cannot mean anything except in his eyes; I therefore succumb, he dominates me, and my 'pour-soi' becomes 'en-soi'. I am now happy.

It is clear that all the relationships in Sartrean literature reflect this view of sado-masochistic struggle. No two people ever achieve a harmonious relationships with each retaining his freedom and the respect of the other; by the very nature of Sartre's view of human - intercourse, such a relationship is impossible. Daniel, in Les Chemins de la Liberte, is the best example of the man who attempts to achieve tranquility through masochism; he yields himself up to the power of the others; he will be the homosexual that they see him to be; he will no longer have to worry about creating his own essence, it has been created for him. In ontological languages Daniel has allowed his pour-soi to become en-soi. Matthieu accuses him of self-martyrdom.

The pour-soi yearns for the stability of the en-soi and would like to achieve such stability but still retain, at the same time, its freedom. It aspires to be an en-soi-pour-soi, an impossible goal since it is a contradiction in terms. If such a being were possible, he would be God; is the being who creates essences and is at the same time the possessor of the sum of all those essences, or the being who is what he wants to be.

Only despair can result from such an effort. Sartre has said that man is fundamentally the desire to be God, but his message is that this desire is unrealizable and that one must accept the despair which results from it. Only when the despair has been accepted, can the authentic, constructive life begin. It does however require a resolute effort beyond the capacity or willingness of many people to accept the despair which Sartre says is inevitable; in the face of their inability to be an en-soi-pour-soi, many men will take the easiest way out, which is to make themselves simply an en-soi. In other words, if they cannot have stability and freedom they would prefer to have stability alone. This is a desire which can only be attained by what Sartre has called la mauvaise foi.

At one point in his career, Sartre seemed about to suggest that a relationship between two people was after all possible. In his review Les Temps Modernes in 1949, he published the first two chapters of Volume IV of Les Chemins de la Liberte; entitled Une Drole d' Amitie'. He described the beginnings of a love relationship between Brunet and Vicarios, which was based neither on masochism nor on sadism, and which appeared to be successful. But the relationship was never developed, and the book was never finished. Since that time, Sartre has abandoned his study of individual relationship, which he now regards as fruitless, and concentrated more and more on the only relationship which

does not compromise individual freedom, and that is the relationship of the individual to mankind as a whole. The only action which maintains the autonomy of the pour-soi and creates meaning in the world which does not entail the draining of another pour-soi, is social commitment. The salvation of the individual lies in his conscious work towards the progress of mankind, towards a better life for his fellows.

Sartre seems to believe that good faith and positive human relations are possible. Only a forlorn hope, say the hostile critics, and one which his ontology would not support. They have gone on to insist that whatever 'radical conversion', Sartre may have had in mind when he wrote Being and Nothingness, the one which actually occurred in Sartre's life was his realization that subjective individualism could lead to no constructive social theory and that he consequently decided to commit his own freedom to Marxism.

Whether in love or in brutalization, our attempt is to capture the consciousness of another by making the other an object. When he is an object, I get my freedom back because I am not an object any longer for him, since nothing is an object for an object. I thus disarm that consciousness from a reciprocal disarmament of mine. While I attempt to free myself from the holds of the other, the other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the other, the other seeks to enslave me. I

am never successful in this, and cannot be. But there is no resting place and no shrugging off of the effort to repeat the effort. It is to pre-empt a phrase of Hobbes, a restless striving for power after power which ceaseth only in death. 'Conflict' Sartre goes on, 'is the original meaning of being-for-others. 'Love must always end in sorrow, runs the song in O Lucky Man' and everyone must play the game.

I must in a certain way conceal my freedom, as it were, enslave myself in order to enslave him, I cannot treat him as an object, for when I do, his subjectivity or freedom disappears, and since it is just this that I want, the enterprise would fail. Speaking figuratively, I must avoid looking at him.

And now suppose this strategy succeeds, and the beloved becomes a lover in his own right, in love with me. Surely this is what I thought I wanted. But what now happens is that, like me before, he seeks to become my whole world, enslaving himself in order to enslave me, and so to possess my freedom as I sought to possess his, by concealing his freedom. So if I succeed, I fail since his freedom escapes me, there is no balance point in the affair. 'Love' Sartre writes, 'is the desire to be loved'. And this is reciprocal and foredoomed in as much as the love on the other side is also the desire to be loved. The result is a kind of unedifying comedy, in which both unhappy protagonists lose the main thing each wants namely the other's

freedom. Until he loves me he is free, and when he loves me his freedom is dissipated. In neither case can I have it neat; 'hence the lover's perpetual dissatisfaction'. In seeking to throw off my freedom by flattering myself into an object for purposes of netting the freedom of the other, my freedom is returned to me when the purpose is fulfilled; but when it is I have lost the freedom of the other as well.

If love gets its wish, the other becomes an object, but in a way through the other's own choice. It is thus an exercise of freedom rather than an enslavement. The sadist then tries to take matters into his own hands and acts upon the other's body in order to incarnate that freedom. But Sartre argues, the moment of success is the moment of failure for the sadist. The sadist has to see the body as an instrument to catch the will, but when the end is achieved the body loses its status as a means and there is nothing to do with it any longer. It is there and it is there for nothing: a disconcerting mass of flesh. Sartre is not especially convincing here. Sartre's analysis of sadism and love is lame so far as serving its philosophical purposes is concerned.

Sartre's analysis of love (l'amour) is of erotic love or of the state we call 'being in love'. It might by extension apply to certain forms of parental love or of my love which is primarily a means of personal fulfillment. It is not to be identified with

compassion or a sense of human solidarity. Within this limited context, Sartre declares that love is the desire to be loved. In love, I want to act on the other's freedom but still want to maintain it as freedom. I value and respect his subjectivity; in one respect I even place it above my own, for what I desire from him is that he should found my being. Yet this does not mean that I want to be an object for him in the way that I am an object for anybody else. I do not wish simply that I should be an object for him but that through his intermediacy he might constitute me as an object for myself. In short, I want him to serve as the foundation of my being by objectifying the subjective world which I have established. If I can act on his freedom that he will freely support and make my world the centre of his, then it seems that I - through identifying my freedom with his - have become my own foundation. I need no longer fear the other's look, for he consents to look as with my eyes; yet since he is outside my consciousness, he gives to my being the objectivity which it could never find by itself. It is my free subjectivity which I want to be loved, not what I have done. This is the origin of the pathetic desire for those promises that one will be loved forever no matter what he may do or become. I seek a pledge to ensure that I, a free existence, am endowed with an absolutely valued essence, that I am myself.

Aside from the ontological contradictions in such a demand, Sartre asserts that there are three pitfalls which bring about the failure of love. First, if my love is returned, if the other consents to found my being by securing it as the centre of his concern, his love demands being loved in turn by me. Therefore, I am thrown back on my own being once again. I cannot avoid the responsibility of pursuing myself rather than being it. Second, the other may always revoke his consent. I may suddenly find that instead of being an encapsulated subject-as-object, I am purely an object. Finally, even granted that one, other and I succeed for a brief moment in asserting the absolute being of one another's private worlds, we are not invulnerable to the look of a third person who may suddenly transform us both into alienated objects. Love as an escape from my own subjectivity is a blind alley.

The claim that conflict is the essence of human relationships must not mislead us. If there is an unremitting war of all against all, it is a special metaphysical sort of war in which the stakes are freedom is some special metaphysical sense, which has nothing much to do with political freedom or economic enslavement. And it leaves room for all sorts of co-operative enterprises - like working together with pals to bring out, Les Temps Modernes, to choose a Parisian instance. Sartre would have been as aware of this as any and it cannot have been his intention to deny

plain facts. The outcome of all those futile projects catalogued under 'Concrete Relations with Others' merely underscores the metaphysically inalienable freedom of others and ourselves. One cannot but treat men as ends and not as means the moment one is aware of one's own freedom and, colaterally, of the freedom of the other by the very advent of self-consciousness one realizes the Categorical Imperative, and it is presupposed in all these attempts to violate it. Thus all of these relations are exercises of Bad Faith in the sense that one condition of morality as constructed by Kant is absent. They are, indeed, moral postures all, in as much as they are assumed in the full recognition that the other is an agent and a free being. Sartre's personages are not tyrants who see men merely as means. If they did not first recognize other freedoms, there could not be conflict of the sort their enterprises exemplify. The existence of other's consciousnesses penetrates the structure of their own, and if they did not acknowledge those freedoms, they would have nothing to try to capture.

In his brilliant paper entitled, 'Freedom and Resentment', Strawson makes a distinction between an 'objective attitude and a 'reactive' or 'participatory' attitude in one's relationship with other human beings. To adopt an objective attitude for Strawson is to see him perhaps as an object of social policy; as a subject of what in a wide range of senses might be called treatment; as certainly to be taken account, perhaps precautionary account,

of; to be managed, or handled or cured or trained; perhaps simply to be voided. The objective attitude may be emotionally toned in many ways, but not in all ways, it may include repulsion or fear; it may include pity or even love, though not all kinds of love. But it cannot include the range of reactive feelings and attitudes which belong to involvement or participation with others in interpersonal human relationships: it cannot include resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, anger or the sort of love which two adults can sometimes said to feel reciprocally for each other. If our attitude towards someone is wholly objective, then though you may fight him, you cannot quarrel with him, and though you may talk to him even negotiate with him, you cannot reason with him.[3]

The 'reactive' attitude or 'participatory' attitude consist in the mutual expectation of good-will and suppression of ill-will which is expected in normal inter-personal relationship. It includes resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, anger, love, friendship etc.

It is very easy to fall back on the objective attitude even while one is having participant attitude. We tend to adopt the objective attitude towards another to the extent that we see him as incapable of normal human interaction, as something

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3. Miri, M. The Journal of Value Enquiry, 18-3-12 (1984).

less than a human person (as acting under abnormal stresses or acting under post-hypnotic suggestion). The proper object of knowledge, therefore, while one adopts a wholly objective attitude towards another, is not a person in the full sense of that term, is someone who is capable of being genuinely involved in the reciprocity of emotions such as gratitude, resentment anger, love, friendship and so on. In principle, the object of knowledge - here - belongs to the same class of objects which we might characterize as 'natural objects'.

In the neurotic case where our attitude is objective one of the things that prompts us to adopt this attitude is precisely the need to abandon this attitude and we wish to bring about a change which will enable him to return to the full reciprocity of the reactive attitudes. The life of participation leads to the patient's self-knowledge, his cure and return to the normal life of the reactive attitudes. In the case of the normal person also reactive attitude is an essential prerequisite for knowledge and self-knowledge. It is possible to adopt a wholly objective attitude towards a normal person but we easily fall into reactive attitude when we try to interact communicatively.

In his paper, entitled, 'On Knowing Another Person',[4] Mrinal Miri says, it is indeed possible that I may love somebody

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4. Ibid.

while I suspend my reactive attitudes towards him with regard to a particular action of his or with regard to some of his actions which form a temporary phase of his life. But it is not possible for me to love somebody while I regard him as totally beyond the range of my reactive attitudes. This is not just because love flourishes best in the reciprocity of "mutual feeling", but primarily because it requires the assumption that the object of love is capable of genuine expressions of good-will; and a totally objective attitude to another person must be free from any such assumption. It is an indisputable general fact about human nature that the ego distorts, to a greater or less extent, most perceptions of human reality. The ego has a way of finding its way, into even our most altruistic emotions e.g., kindness, generosity and so on. And here the most co-operative and effective ally of the ego is the mechanism of self-delusion which is the privileged possession of man.

The ego, the generator of illusions, is to be overcome in order to have a right perspective of the other's reality and in order to know our own reality. So, the old saying 'know thyself', is necessary and very important in order to know other's reality.

In his discussion of relation with the other, 'the love' Sartre discusses is the state of 'being in love', not loving the person and this creates confusion and problems. If Sartre ever

dicusses relation of human being on the level of true love, his picture of human relation will be quite different from the one we have now. This true love is possible only when one overcome his ego which tragically but almost unfailingly deludes one's own reality and of other's too.

An appraisal of Sartre's achievement as a philosopher must reckon with the fact that even in his most technical philosophical works he is never really purely philosophical in the sense of one who is primarily concerned to secure the theoretical underpinnings of some system of ideas. His argumentation is often both skimpy and lacking in rigour, he seems to be unaware of, or unconcerned by, the grossly metaphorical character of many of his leading ideas; and he has allowed free rein to the special bias of his sensibility in a way that is indefensible in abstruse theoretical work. At the same time, his work shows many of the defects that are typical of the grand tradition of philosophical system builders - in particular, and almost total lack of any capacity for critical detachment in relation to his own philosophical theses. His ideas may quite literally be said to define reality for him in a way and to a degree that makes it impossible for him to submit them to any kind of empirical or pragmatic test by which their merits might be compared with those of other philosophical points of view. This is most unfortunate since it often seems that what Sartre is

trying to do, while continuing to use for his own purposes the philosophical vocabulary of rationalism and idealism is to work out ideas that at many points have clear affinites with tendencies in contemporary pragmatism and sometimes even in analytical philosophy. In any case, after all these criticisms have been registered, the extraordinary fecundity and energy of Sartre's mind must be recognized. Again and again, when he seems most deeply involved in some hopelessly sterile logomachy, he will offer an insight that makes the tortuous complications of his terminology seem a small price to pay in return. In this respect he is like Hegel; whom, among the great philosophers, he may most resemble. Sartre himself will probably not be ranked as a 'great philosopher' in the histories of the future, but he is without doubt an immensely stimulating and acute critical mind.

CONCLUSION

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We began this work with a discussion of Aristotle. This beginning was prompted by several considerations, the chief among which is the fact that Aristotle was argueably the first philosopher in the western philosophical tradition who expounded a systematic theory of explanation of man and nature. Aristotle believed in the uniqueness of the explanatory system - whatever the object of explanation might be, that is, whether it is a nature that we wish to explain or human action. The central concept of his theory of explanation were those of essence and telos. In other words, what has come to be known as teleological explanation was something which Aristotle thought, must, in the ultimate analysis, override all other varieties of explanation. While the Aristotelian tradition still survives in very significant ways, the Galilean revolution brought about a very important difference for the later development of western thought. Mechanistic explanation, the essence of the Galilean way, came to be increasingly accepted as the only proper way of explaining natural phenomena. And today in spite of the vast complexity of the entire scientific enterprise, the Galilean idea still forms the core of the notion of scientific explanation.

However, the Aristotelian idea of explanation in terms of telos still holds a powerful sway over what is known as the sciences of man. Many philosophers think that the Aristotelian way must be the irreducible way of explaining what is uniquely human and they

gladly accept the consequence that this means that there is an unbridgeable gap between what we call nature and human reality. Sometimes this idea is expressed in terms of the supposed mutually irreducible distinction between the concept of a cause and that of a reason. Although the recent philosophical debate about the distinction between cause and reason has been instructive and insightful in many ways, this debate, like most philosophical debates, has remained inconclusive. What has however interested me is the subtle interplay of the Aristotelean and the Galilean in the thought of three of the great masters of modern western thought (Freud, Marx and Sartre). And the lesson perhaps to be learned from this is that causal explanation and explanation in terms of reason, although there are profound philosophical differences between them, cannot yet be separated from one another in a complete understanding of what is even uniquely human (It is interesting that perhaps none of these great thinkers will count as a philosopher in the paradigm of philosophy in the Anglo-American variety of analytic philosophy).

In my critical exposition of these three thinkers my primary aim has not however been to prove this point, although perhaps indirectly it does give some support to this point. If I were asked why it was these three thinkers that I chose for special consideration, my answer would be that each of them in his own special way is profoundly concerned with the idea of human freedom. And in my work I have tried to seek clarity about the concept in

and through the thinking of these philosophers. I called them philosophers in spite of the Anglo-American reluctance to bestow this accolade on them - and if what I have written throws any indirect light on how to sort out the Aritotle/Galileo divide I must consider myself rather fortunate.

To put the point about the distinction between explanation in terms of reason and in terms of cause somewhat differently, and also to bring the title of my dissertation finally to the picture, the vehicle through which the truth about man and his action is to be understood and explained is meaning and not data which are brute or devoid of meaning. This is the so called hermeneutic approach to human phenomena. Human actions are identified not by some shared physical traits but in terms of what they mean to participants. Sometimes this fact is held wholly or partly to entail the exemption of human or social phenomena either from causation or from external empirical investigation or of course from both. The argument can be put as follows. The nexus which exists between natural phenomena or classes of events are independent of any one society or culture, common to them all, and blind to the meanings prevailing in any one of them. but actions are identified by what they mean to the participants, and the meanings which identify them are drawn from them, as it were, semantic pool of a given culture, which need not be, and perhaps never is, identified with the store of meanings used by another culture. Hence, there cannot be a valid causal

generalization in which one of the links is a class of actions, i.e. events only bound together by the collective meanings which happen to be in use in a given culture for these do not overlap with any so to speak natural kind or category.

The above statement is as extreme a statement as possible about the irreducibility of the distinction between cause and reason between purpose, motive, intention on the one hand, and stimulus, impulse and so on on the other. As I have already made clear although it is correct to say that the truth about human actions and institutions is primarily to be sought in terms of meaning, such understanding cannot exclude causal understanding as well. And it is the peculiar mixture of meaning and cause that is unique to the understanding of man and his action and not just meaning divorced from cause. Again it is in the context of this that my choice of the three philosophers for special study is to be understood.

To return now to the three philosophers and to the theme of freedom that I mentioned, that freedom is possible for human beings is something that I take to be a major fact about man. And the concept of freedom can be understood only in the context of the availability of the network of concepts such as meaning, intention, purpose, ideal, goal, and so on. For Freud and Marx and even for Sartre man can be profoundly unfree and yet the only way of realizing the fact of this unfreedom is through an understanding of it in terms of as it were the causal powers of meanings, ideas, concepts and so on.

Take Freud for instance. The fundamental idea that man's action is controlled by and is at the same time the manifestation of repressed wishes which lie buried in the unconscious is expressed in unmistakable causal terms. Yet these 'causes' are discovered not by an empirical investigation of brute, meaningless data, but through a careful analysis of the meanings that these data have acquired in the individual's experience of himself as a person (a meaning - seeking and meaning-endowing creature) and of his relationship to others and to the world.

These data are essentially carriers of meanings or, in one word, 'symbols'. The repressed wishes have the causal powers that they do only because of the possibility of investing objects of awareness with meaning. Causality operates in the case of man necessarily through a nexus of meanings. The idea that in the Freudian account freedom is possible becomes intelligible only against this background. Man is unfree when meanings acquire a life of their own and are hidden, by whatever mechanism, from his consciousness. Freedom consists in uncovering the meanings of objects in one's consciousness and thereby coming to an understanding of what one's actions are all about. To understand oneself is also at the same time to free oneself from the causal powers of the unconscious. Man is free because he really knows why he is doing what he is doing and has thus a self-conscious grasp of himself.

A similar account can be given of the Marxian idea of alienation and the bondage that this alienation imposes on man. An alienated man is unfree because his labour is enforced labour and its products are devoid of any significance to him in his capacity as a person. The only significance they have is essentially a causal one in that these are objects that he must produce in order that he may keep himself alive; he cannot invests on these objects any other meaning than as the source of his wages in terms of money. Marxian freedom consists in the possibility of de-alienated labour, labour which leads to production of objects on which the worker invests his own meaning independently of the money that it may or may not bring him. A truly free society is a community of people who are engaged in de-alienated labour.

For Sartre man is essentially free but this freedom is as it were nothing to him (Nothingness) unless he is capable of unself-deceivingly and genuinely creating meanings for himself for his actions and the world. The purely causal compulsions (compulsions generated by meanings created by others) on abandoning one's inalienable freedom are so great that most men prefer to live a life under such compulsions than accept the responsibilities of authentic creation of meanings. Such men, although they are free - because for Sartre a man cannot but be free - exercise their freedom in a mechanical causal fashion. Genuine or authentic man is man who is free from such mechanicality of actions.

It is thus clear that for all these thinkers, in spite of their radical differences of views in many ways, man's understanding of himself or of the truth of himself consists in the recognition of the possibility of the exercise of genuine freedom. And this understanding is achieved through an overthrow of the causal powers of meanings and restoring to them the spontaneity which is their natural habitat.

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