

**SOME PROBLEMS
IN
JAINA PSYCHOLOGY**

T. G. KALGHATGI

KARNATAKA UNIVERSITY, DHARWAR

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
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SOME PROBLEMS
IN
... **JAINA PSYCHOLOGY**

BY

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
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
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Registrar, Karnatak University,
Dharwar (Mysore State), India.



To
Shri D. C. Pavate, M.A. (Cantab.),
Vice-Chancellor, Karnatak University,
Member, University Grants Commission,
sometime Director of Education, Bombay State,
brilliant mathematician,
eminent educationist,
dynamic administrator;
in token of
sincere admiration, respect and gratitude,
this book
is dedicated.



PREFACE

A study of Jainism in terms of Western thought is much needed to day. With over-specialization in the empirical sciences and in philosophy, we are apt to lose the wood in the trees. In this age of 'analysis' it is necessary to re-assess the place of a synthetic approach to the fundamental problems of philosophy and psychology.

The present publication is essentially the same as the thesis submitted by me for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Karnatak University, Dharwar. It is an attempt to interpret the problems of Jaina psychology in terms of Western thought. I am aware that it is not possible to compare the ancient Indian thought with the concepts of modern psychology. However, it would be sufficient if I could succeed in pointing out some possible similarities between ways of thinking out problems by ancient Indian Philosophers including the Jainas and thinkers of the West.

I am grateful to the Karnatak University for getting the work published. I acknowledge my indebtedness to the eminent scholars—C. A. Moore of the University of Hawaii, A. N. Upadhye of Rajaram College, Kolhapur and Principal A. Menezes, Professor of English, Karnatak University, who have suggested ways of improving the work. Principal Menezes went through the entire manuscript with an eye to language and diction. It is not possible to mention the names of all the persons who have been of help to me in the completion of the work. However, mention must be made of my colleague Shri A. M. Jalihal and my friends Shri S. K. Mutalik and Shri B. B. Hungund who have read the proofs. I also thank the Śārādā Press, Mangalore, for their cooperation.

Vijayadaśamī,
19th October, 1961.

T. G. KALGHATGI.

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
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**SOME PROBLEMS
IN
JAINA PSYCHOLOGY**



INTRODUCTION

The aim of this treatise is to present some problems of Jaina psychology with reference to ancient Indian and Western thought including Western psychological thought, specially of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Jainism is a realistic philosophy. As a religion it is a polemic against the authority of the *Vedās* and the pseudo-spiritualism of the elaborate sacrificial system of worship. Jainism is an old religion which prevailed even before Pārśva and Vardhamāna, the last two tīrthaṅkaras. The *Yajurveda* mentions Rṣabha, Ajita and Ariṣṭanemi as tīrthaṅkaras. The *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* endorses the view that Rṣabha was the founder of Jainism.¹ Jainism reflects the cosmology and anthropology of a much older pre-Āryan upper class of North-Eastern India.² Jacobi has traced Jainism to early primitive currents of metaphysical speculation.³ But the Jaina metaphysics, epistemology and psychology have arisen as a result of the interaction of the 'orthodox' ways of Indian thought. The Jaina system of thought arose out of the need to re-assert the Jaina faith against the academic invasions of Hindu thought. Elements of the Hindu and Buddhist theories have been incorporated in the Jaina theory of knowledge. As an example of such interaction we may mention the Jaina theory of *pratyakṣa* as a source of knowledge. The original Jaina theory of *pratyakṣa* as a direct source of knowledge of the soul and *parokṣa* as knowledge due to the sense organs were modified in the light of the prevailing views of other systems of Indian thought. However, in this treatise we are not directly concerned with the problems of the antiquity of Jainism and the chronological order of the Jaina epistemological and psychological theories.

The Indian mind is synthetic. It is the synthetic view that has made our philosophy embrace all branches of knowledge into one comprehensive view. In recent times, the sciences have become independent and they have freed themselves from the bonds of philosophy. But in ancient India, as also in the ancient West, philosophy included all the sciences. For instance, there was no special science of psychology. It was a philosophy of the mind. The term psychology belongs to our 'new world'. Even half a century ago it was a philosophy of the mind or it was at least a mental physiology.⁴ Contemporary psychology, especially the British and the American psychology, may be considered as a science detached from the

1 Radhakrishnan (S.): *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I., p. 287.

2 Zimmer (H.): *Philosophies of India*, p. 217.

3 Jacobi (Hermann): *Studies in Jainism—Jainism*.

4 Rhys Davids (Mrs.): *Birth of Indian Psychology—Introduction*.

prevailing philosophical systems. But, as Murphy shows, German psychology was and still is related to philosophy, and changes in psychology can be traced to developments in philosophy.⁵

In the Jaina thought, as also in the ancient Indian thought, the problems of epistemology and the problems of psychology were indistinguishable. Epistemology was the basis for the psychological analysis of mental states and events. Many problems of psychology were unintelligible without consideration of the basic metaphysical problems. Psychology was possible only under the shadow of metaphysics. And the Jaina psychology, if it may be called psychology, may be considered to be academic and rational psychology. It did not use the method of experiment. It relied on introspection and the insight of seers and to some extent on the observation of the behaviour of others. The insight of the ancient sages of India gave them a vivid picture of the reality in its various colours. It is the insight and the vision of the Jaina sages that built the superstructure of the mental philosophy of experience for the Jainas. They did not base their conclusions on experimental investigations. This was because the Jaina, as also the Indian mind generally, was not interested in the analysis of the things of the world. Experimental investigation had little meaning for them.

PLAN OF THE WORK

This treatise is analytic and interpretative. It is not possible to compare the problems of Jaina psychology with the present problems in psychology, because psychology in the present day has become an objective and a concrete science using experimental methods for investigation. In the modern age, increase in knowledge has meant increase in specialization. The specialized developments of the problems of modern psychology cannot be easily compared with the ancient psychological problems that the Jaina and the other Indian thought presented. We can only show that some problems in Western psychology have developed on similar lines to those presented in the Jaina philosophy. The problems of modern psychology have developed in a more exact and measurable direction. This cannot be said of the ancient Jaina thought. However, the basic problems were the same and the approach was similar. In this sense, some theories of psychology have been mentioned here by way of comparison. The object is to show a few possible similar developments in the field of psychological investigations in the Jaina, ancient Indian and Western thought.

This work begins with the study of the *self* in Jaina philosophy. Discovery of the *self* was the main problem of Indian philosophy. The effort of Indian philosophy has been to know the *self* and make the knowledge effective in human life.

⁵ Murphy (G.): *Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology*—Preface.

The first chapter, therefore, discusses the problem of the soul in Jaina thought. The idea of the soul has occupied an important position in Indian thought. Jainism makes a dichotomous division of the categories into *jīva* and *ajīva*. Jainism considers the soul from the noumenal point of view, *nīścaya naya*, and the phenomenal point of view, the *vyavahāra naya*. The psychological implications of the nature of the soul have been discussed in this chapter.

The second chapter deals with the Jaina theory of mind in all its aspects. Jainas make a distinction between the two phases of the mind as (i) the material phase (*dravya manas*) and the mental phase (*bhāva manas*). The first phase refers to the structural aspect, and the second refers to the mental and functional aspects. The Jainas make the mind a quasi-sense organ. Similarly, it is *aprāpyakāri*, as it does not come into physical contact with the object. These problems have been fully discussed with special reference to Indian and Western thought.

The main problems in the third chapter are the interpretation of *upayoga*, *jñāna* and *darśana*. *Upayoga* is the essential characteristic of the soul. It is interpreted here as the *forme* of the modern psychologists. *Cetanā*, or consciousness, is the psychic background of all experiences. *Jñāna* and *darśana* are the manifestations of *upayoga* in the light of the psychic background of *cetanā*. Other problems concerning consciousness, like the states of consciousness and self-consciousness, have also been analysed. The Jainas, as other Indian philosophers, were aware of the unconscious in its psychological and metaphysical aspects. In the end, a note on *paśyattā*, interpreted as *mneme*, is also added.

In the fourth chapter we come to the analysis of sense organs and sense qualities. The Jainas have given a detailed description of the nature and function of the sense organs. They have accepted five sense organs. They do not recognize motor organs of experience. They make a distinction between the structural aspect (*dravyendriya*), and the psychic aspect (*bhāvendriya*). The visual sense organ is *aprāpyakāri*, as it does not come into physical contact with the object. The other four sense organs are *prāpyakāri*, because of the physical contact with the object for cognition. Similarly, the psychological analysis of the sense qualities, as presented by the Jainas, is given in this chapter.

The fifth chapter deals with the problem of empirical experience. It is the problem of perception. The Jaina analysis of perception is complex and elaborate. It has a great psychological significance. The Jainas mention four stages of perception: (i) *avagraha*, the stage of sensation, (ii) *ihā*, the stage of integration of sense impressions, (iii) *avāya*, perceptual judgment, and (iv) *dhāraṇā*, retention. These problems have been discussed in the light of the analysis of perception.

In the sixth chapter we come to the problem of other sources of empirical experience. Retention (*dhāraṇā*), recollection (*smṛti*), and recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) are factors involved in memory. This chapter gives the analysis of retention as the condition of memory, and recollection and recognition as forms of expressing memory. Similarly, the psychological implications of inference (*anumāna*) as a source of knowledge have also been analysed.

In the seventh chapter the problem of supernormal perception is discussed. The Jainas believe that sense experience is not sufficient to give the experience of reality. They accept the possibility of direct experience without the instrumentality of the sense organs and the mind. They called this *pratyakṣa*. This is the supernormal perception. All schools of Indian thought, except the *Cārvāka*, accept the possibility of supernormal experience. The Jainas have given three levels of supernormal perception: (i) *avadhi*, (ii) *manahparyāya* and (iii) *kevala*, although *avadhi* may not be called supernormal experience. *Avadhi* may be compared to clairvoyance, and *manahparyāya* may be likened to telepathic cognition. The two forms of supernormal experience have been analysed with reference to the investigations of modern psychical research. For the *kevala* there is no comparison. It is the state of omniscience.

Chapter eight gives the description of the fourteen stages of the struggle for the realization of the *self*. They are called *guṇasthānas* in Jainism. The transcendental *self* is to be realised. The way to self-realization is long and difficult. It is a struggle for emancipation and for the attainment of perfection. In the fourteenth stage one reaches the consummation of self-realization. This is the stage of *kaivalya*, or *nirāṅjana*. The struggle for perfection in the fourteen stages is psychologically important, although empirical psychology will not be able to explain the significance of these stages.

CHAPTER I

THE JAINA THEORY OF THE SOUL

The problem of the soul has been a perennial problem in religion and speculative philosophy. Primitive man had made a distinction between body and soul. The burial of the dead with their belongings and even the mummification of the Egyptians are based on such a distinction between body and spirit. The philosophical concept of the soul has developed from such primitive distinctions.

In modern psychology, the idea of the soul is no longer important. In its place has come the notion of *self* or 'the centre of interest.' The word 'soul' is ambiguous. Sometimes it stands for mind, sometimes for *self* and sometimes for both. The English word points to an entity as the cause or vehicle of physical or psychical activities of the individual person. The soul is a spiritual substance. In Indian thought the word *ātman* has undergone various changes. It is little used in the *Vedas*. It primarily meant breath. In the *Upaniṣads* another word, *prāṇa*, is used for breath, and *ātman* stands for the innermost part of man. Man was *ātmavat*. For the Upaniṣadic seers, the soul was a presupposition for all experiences. Indian philosophies, with the exception of *Māyāvāda* of Śaṅkara and *Kṣaṇikavāda* of the Buddhists, fundamentally agree about the nature of the soul as a permanent, eternal and imperishable substance. But the primitive Āryans believed that the life of man is continued after death in a shadowy existence in some subtle bodily form. This is not the soul of the later philosophers. Jacobi calls it the psyche.¹ This is the development of the primitive notion of life after death lingering in some form. It is found even to-day in the practice of *śrāddha*. The psyche is frequently spoken of as *puruṣa* and of the size of the thumb (*aṅguṣṭha-mātra*). At the time of death it departs from the body. In the oldest *Upaniṣads* the psyche is described as constituted by the *prāṇās*, psycho-physical factors. Still, these factors were not regarded as principles of personality.

The idea of the soul has occupied an important position in Jaina philosophy. Jainism aims at the liberation of the soul from the cycle of birth and death. The saving of the soul is the Christian ideal. In the *Apology*, Plato makes Socrates say that his mission was to get men to care for their souls and to make them as good as they can be.

Jainism is dualistic. There is a dichotomous division of categories. All things are divided into living and non-living, souls and

¹ Jacobi (Hermann): *Studies in Jainism.—The Place of Jainism in Indian Thought*.

CHAPTER II

MIND IN JAINISM

Morris in his *Six Theories of Mind*, has stated that there have been three stages in the history of speculation concerning mind: (i) a period in which mind and nature are vaguely conceived and differentiated; (ii) a period in which they are regarded as different and sharply opposed; and (iii) a period in which the effort is to restore, at a more complex level, the relation between mind and nature which was vaguely conceived in the beginning. Early man made no distinction between mind and nature, between his personal experience and the world outside. The *lisplings* of the early philosophers in the West faced the same problem, and they could not free themselves from the difficulties of primitive man. There was no opposition between mind and the world. It was not regarded as a private isolated substance but as a principle of motion and the order of the world. It lacked psychological orientation. Anaximenes held that air was the life of the world just as breath was the life of the body. Heraclitus suggested that reason guides all things. Empedocles spoke of God as only mind, sacred and ineffable mind. Anaxagoras said that mind is infinite and self-ruled and is mixed with nothing. "Over all mind is the ruler", he said, "and over the whole revolving universe mind held sway so that it caused it to revolve in the beginning."¹ These were the gropings of the early philosophers regarding the principle of the universe, and there was a marked absence of any clear distinction between mind and the world of sense. Aristotle writes that, on the one hand, the atomists and the sophists identified sense and reason, and, on the other, Parmenides and Democritus made a distinction between thought and sense.² The early Greek philosophers struggled with the problem of mind and its relation to the physical world.

The problem of mind eludes the grasp of philosophers and psychologists, because it can be analyzed into both metaphysical and psychological problems. Metaphysically, it refers to mind as the principle of the universe standing in relation to the phenomenal world. This is the cosmic principle which is emphasized by the idealists as the primary principle. Psychologically, it is the individual mind, the individual's system of psychic states in relation to the world of sense. We are, here, more concerned with the psychological significance of the mind, although the metaphysical shades do influence the psychological analysis. The early philosophers could not make a distinction between the two aspects of the

¹ Morris (C. W.): *Six Theories of Mind*, p. 4.

² Aristotle: *De Anima*, Ch. 2.

CHAPTER III

THE JAINA THEORY OF UPAYOGA

The Jaina philosophers talked of *Upayoga* as the fundamental characteristic of life. *Upayoga* is the defining characteristic of the soul.¹ *Upayoga* is that by which a function is served: *Upayujyate anena iti upayogaḥ*. It is also described as that by which a subject is grasped.² In the *Gommaṭasāra: Jīvakāṇḍa*, *Upayoga* is described as the drive which leads to the apprehension of objects.³ It is the source of the psychical aspect of experience. All the three aspects—cognitive, conative⁴ and affective, spring from it. It gives rise to the experience of objects, and the experience expresses itself in forms of *jñāna* and *darśana*. *Upayoga* is of two types: *anākāra*, formless, and *sākāra*, possessed of form. *Anākāra upayoga* is formless, indeterminate cognition. *Sākāra upayoga* is determinate cognition, a defined form of experience. It would not be out of place to point out that *upayoga* is not the resultant of consciousness as it is sometimes maintained. This was one of the earlier attempts to translate *upayoga*. Nor is it a sort of inclination arising from consciousness. It is the conative drive which gives rise to experience. It is, in fact, the source of all experience. The Jaina philosophers were aware of the driving force of experience, the force by which experience is possible. This may be likened to the 'horme' of the modern psychologists.

The biological studies of the lower animals from the amoeba onwards show that all animals are centres of energy in constant dynamical relation with the world, yet confronting it in their own characteristic way. A name was needed to express this fundamental property of life, the drive or a felt tendency towards a particular end. Some psychologists called it 'conation' or the conative process. But this drive may not always be conscious.

There is the presence of an internal drive in such processes. "To this drive or urge, whether it occurs in the conscious life of men and the higher animals we propose to give a single name—horme".⁴ This activity of the mind is a fundamental property of life. It has various

1 *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*, II. 9, and *Bhāṣya* on the same.

Dravyasaṃgraha - Jīvo upayogamaḥ. Pañcāstikāḥasāra, 27.

2 *Prajñā*, 27. *Vīśeṣāvakya-kabhāṣya*.

3 *Gommaṭasāra: Jīvakāṇḍa*, Ch. XX, Verse 672.

vatthunūttam bhūvo jūdo jivassa jo du upajogo.

4 Nunn (Percy): *Education-Its Data and First Principles*: pp. 28-29, 3rd Ed.

CHAPTER IV

THE SENSE ORGANS AND THE SENSES

The soul gets embodied through the accumulation of *karma*. Then starts the wheel of *saṃsāra*. The embodied soul comes into contact with the objects of the world and tries to grasp the nature of things through the specialized sources of the body. They are the sense organs.

The Jaina thinkers, like other ancient philosophers of India, recognized two varieties of comprehension—sensory and extra-sensory. Sensory comprehension is conditioned by the senses and the mind, whereas extra-sensory comprehension occurs directly in the pure consciousness. Sensory comprehension is possible through the sense organs. The sense organs are very often considered as windows through which the soul cognizes the external world. In *Gaṇadharavāda* we get a description of the process of cognition as coming out through the senses, as Devadatta looks through the five windows of his palace.¹ *Pañcāstikāyasāra* describes the function of the sense in a similar way. The sense organs are denoted by the word *indriya*, and *indriya* refers to the instrumental nature of the source of knowledge. There are two ways in which the word *indriya* can be looked at. *Indriya* is referred to as the capacity of experience: it is *paramaiśvarya upabhoga samartha*. It is also referred to as that through which experience is possible: *idyate iti indriyam*.² The Jaina philosophers called such cognition *parokṣa jñāna* (indirect knowledge), because it comes through the sense organs, which are different from the soul. Later, it began to be called *saṃvyavahāra pratyakṣa*.³ The Jainas considered that the *indriyas* are impediments to the attainment of pure consciousness and also to the purification of the soul. *Indriyas* are the source through which *karma* can flow in, and the source of empirical cognition. In the *Upaniṣads*, the nature and function of the sense organs have been described. The *Ātman* was first alone. He knew. He was self-conscious. Then he became embodied. The sense organs became instruments through which experience is possible. Regarding the number of sense organs, Prajāpati is said to have described sixteen parts of the body.⁴ In the *Prasna Upaniṣad* the parts are enumerated. The *indriyas* are considered as one. The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* also gives such a classification. The distinction between the sense organs, *jñānendriyas*,

¹ *Gaṇadharavāda*: Discussion with the Third Gaṇadhara Vāyubhūti. Also refer to *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga*, 33. (Commentary).

² *Abhidhānarājendra*, Vol. II, p. 548.

³ *Vīṣeṣāvāśyaka bhāṣya*, 95.

⁴ *Prasna Upaniṣads* as quoted by Deussen in *Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 268.

CHAPTER V

THE JAINA THEORY OF SENSE PERCEPTION

The Jainas have made a significant contribution to the theory of sense perception. In order to understand the Jaina theory of sense perception it is necessary to study their epistemology.

The Jaina attitude is empirical and realistic. The Upaniṣadic philosophers found the *immutable reality* behind the world of experience. Goutama, the Buddha, denounced everything as fleeting and full of sorrow. Mahāvīra stood on commonsense and experience and found no contradiction between permanence and change. The Jaina philosophy is based on logic and experience. *Mokṣa* is the ultimate aim of life. It is realized by the three-fold path of right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct.¹ Right knowledge is one of the major problems of Jaina philosophy. It is necessary to understand the Jaina theory of knowledge and experience for the proper understanding of Jaina thought. The Jaina epistemology is very complex and developed gradually in response to the demands of time.

The *Āgama* theory of knowledge is very old and probably originated in the pre-Mahāvīra period.² *Jñāna pravāda* formed a part of the *Pūrvaśruta* which formed a part of the ancient literature. Jinabhadra, in his *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, quotes a *pūrva gāthā* on *jñāna*.³ There seems to have been no difference of opinion between the followers of Pārśva and Mahāvīra regarding the division of knowledge. Both of them accept the five-fold distinction of knowledge. The *Āgamas* have also presented the five divisions of knowledge.

Knowledge is inherent in the soul, but owing to perversity of attitude arising out of the veil of *karma*, we may get wrong knowledge, *ajñāna*. Knowledge is perfect when the veil of *karma* is totally removed. It is imperfect even when there is partial subsidence or destruction of *karma*. The soul can get perfect knowledge directly when the veil of *karma* is removed. That is *pratyakṣa jñāna*. But empirical knowledge, experience of this world, is possible with the help of the sense organs indirectly. Such knowledge was called *parokṣa jñāna*. *Matijñāna* (sense experience), and *śrutajñāna* (knowledge due to verbal communication), are *parokṣa jñāna*; while *avadhi* (extra-sensory perception), *manahpariyāya* (telepathy), and *kevala jñāna* (omniscience), were called *pratyakṣa*.⁴ But

1 *Tattvārthadhigamasūtra*, 1.

2 Tatia (N.): *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 27.

3 *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, 121.

4 *Sthānāṅgasūtra*, II. 1. 7.

CHAPTER VI

OTHER SOURCES OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE

It was seen in the last chapter that the concept of *dhāraṇā* has occupied the attention of the Jaina logicians and that they are not entirely agreed on its function. *Dhāraṇā* has been considered as a condition of recollection. The psychological analysis of memory shows that retention is a condition of memory, and recollection and recognition are the forms in which memory expresses itself. We are, therefore, concerned here with analysing the concept of memory. We shall study retention, recollection, and recognition as factors involved in memory.

Retention

The Jaina philosophers are not agreed on the function of *dhāraṇā*, retention. *Nandisūtra* has mentioned three stages of *dhāraṇā*. Umāsvāti has also accepted the three stages. They make *dhāraṇā* a condition of recollection, although some logicians, like Vādi-Deva, do not accept this. It was mentioned in the last chapter that Hemacandra reconciles the two views regarding the function of retention. He makes it both a factor in perceptual cognition and a condition of recall. This raises the problem of the analysis of memory and the function of retention in memory.

Psychological analysis of memory is representative. It is the process of remembering objects of past experience. Perception, on the other hand, is a presentative experience—the interpretation of sense impressions produced by external stimuli. Sometimes, the word memory is used as synonymous with retentiveness in general. But Stout says that this application of the term is inconvenient. Retention is a factor involved in memory. It is, as was stated, a condition of memory. "Memory is ideal revival, so far as ideal revival is merely reproductive and does not involve transformation of what is revived in accordance with present conditions."¹ Hume has said that, when an impression has been present with the mind, it again makes its appearance as an idea; and this it may do in two different ways. In its new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity. This he calls memory.² Retention is a condition of memory. In retention, the past experience is retained in the form of mental traces or mental dispositions, (*samskāraś*). In physiological terms, it leaves a structural modification in the brain owing to the

¹ Stout (G. F.): *Manual of Psychology*, p. 520.

² Hume (David): *Treatise on Human Nature*, Sec. 3.

CHAPTER VII

SUPERNORMAL PERCEPTION

Introduction

The nature of empirical experience was discussed in the last chapter. It was, by the earlier philosophers, called *parokṣa*. Later philosophers, trying to adjust the original views with the prevailing concepts of *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* called it *saṁvyavahāra pratyakṣa* and made it arise from the contact of the sense organs and the *manas*. But the empirical way of knowing may, at the most, give us knowledge of the things of the world through the instrumentality of the sense organs and mind. As such, according to the Jainas, it is not a direct experience. It does not give us knowledge of reality. The Jainas believe that the soul is pure and perfect, and omniscient. But through the obscuration of the soul by the *karma*, the knowledge that the soul has is obscured and vitiated. Once the veil of *karma* is removed, the soul knows directly. That is *pratyakṣa*. The knowledge acquired through the sense organs and the *manas* is knowledge obtained indirectly by means of external sources. The Jainas, therefore, said that such experience is *parokṣa*, or what they later called *saṁvyavahāra pratyakṣa*. We have, however, the possibility of getting direct and immediate experience without the instrumentality of the sense organs and the *manas*. The soul directly cognizes as it is freed from the veil of *karma*. This is *pratyakṣa*. It may be called supernormal perception. Modern psychical research recognizes some such phenomenon and calls it extra-sensory perception.

The problem of supernormal experience is not new. Indian philosophers were aware of supernormal perception. Many of them made a distinction between *laukika pratyakṣa*, empirical perception, and *alaukika pratyakṣa*, supernormal perception. All schools of Indian philosophy except the Cārvākas and the Mīmāṃsakas believe in supernormal perception. The Cārvākas do not accept any other source of knowledge than sense perception. The Mīmāṃsakas also deny the possibility of supernormal perception, because, according to them, the past, the future, the distant and the subtle can be known only by the injunctions of the Vedas. Supernormal perception is not governed by the general laws of perception. It transcends the categories of time, space and causality. The facts of empirical experience cannot explain the nature of supernormal perception. However, the Indian treatment of supernormal perception is more descriptive than explanatory. It is not based on experimental analysis. The Indian philosophers arrived at the conception

CHAPTER VIII

THE JOURNEY OF THE SOUL

(The Doctrine of *Gunasthānas*)

“Man’s history”, writes Tagore, “is the history of his journey to the unknown in quest of the realization of the immortal *self*—his soul”.¹

In the Homeric epic, Ulysses descended to the nether world to seek counsel of the departed, and there he saw the shades of his former companions who were killed in the siege of Troy. They were but shadows, but each one retained his original form. For the Western mind, personality is eternal. It is indestructible, not to be dissolved. This is the basic idea of the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body. In the Western thought, the individual retains the individuality he had in his empirical life. When the play is over, the persona cannot be taken off; it clings through death and into the life beyond. ‘The occidental actor, having wholly identified himself with the enacted personality during his moment on the stage of the world, is unable to take it off when the time comes for departure, and so keeps it on indefinitely, for millenniums—even eternities—after the play is over’.² But, as Zimmer says, Indian philosophy, on the other hand, insists on the difference emphasizing the distinction between the actor and his role.³ Indian philosophy emphasizes the contrast between the empirical existence of the individual and the transcendental nature of the *self* which is unaffected by the vicissitudes of empirical existence.

The Jainas believe in the inherent capacity of the soul for self-realization. Self-realization is not the realization of the empirical *self*, but the realization of the transcendental *self*. The goal is to reach perfection, ‘siddhahood’. In the *Tattvārthasūtra* we get an account of the nature of the soul as possessing the characteristic of *ūrdhva gati*, tendency to move upwards. It is the tendency of the soul to escape from the cycle of worldly existence and to reach perfection. This tendency, this force leading upwards, is called the centrifugal force.⁴ The capacity of the soul for perfection is, however, obstructed by the obscuration of the soul by the veil of *karma*. The tendency for upward motion is thwarted by the perversity of attitude, *mithyatva* that develops through the accumulation

¹ Tagore (R.): *Sādhanā*, p. 33.

² Zimmer (H.): *Philosophies of India*, p. 237.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Tatia (N.): *Studies in Jain Philosophy*, p. 269.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this treatise has been to present some problems of Jaina psychology. But no attempt has been made herein to build up a science of Jaina psychology; for, a positive science of psychology, in the sense in which the term is used to-day, was not possible at that early stage of knowledge. Psychological analyses were merely shades of the epistemological problem, and both, in turn, were parts of metaphysical investigation. However, the psychological theories and problems have been woven together here to present a coherent picture as far as possible.

The Idea of the Soul

The idea of the soul has been a fundamental principle in the rational psychology of the Jainas. The existence of the soul is a pre-supposition in Jaina philosophy. It is a *pratyakṣa*. The soul is described from the noumenal and the phenomenal points of view. From the noumenal point of view, it is pure consciousness. *Upayoga* is the fundamental characteristic of the soul. *Upayoga* is interpreted, in this treatise, as *horme* in the sense in which McDougall used the term. It is the purposive force which is the source of all experience. All the three aspects of experience—the cognitive, the conative and the affective—spring from it.

Cetanā is a fundamental quality of the soul. It is pure consciousness, a kind of flame without smoke. This consciousness is eternal, although it gets manifested in the course of the evolutionary process of life in the empirical sense. The empirical experience arises out of the contact of the sense organs with the object.

Thus, *upayoga* is a driving force which is purposive and which is responsible for experience. It expresses itself into *jñāna* and *darśana*. This expression is possible in the light of *cetanā*. *Cetanā* is the background of the light of cognitions—of *jñāna* and *darśana*.

The Jainas recognize three species of conscious experience—the cognitive, the conative and the affective. They make a distinction in consciousness as knowing, feeling and experiencing the fruits of *karma*. As a rule, we have first feeling, then conation and then knowledge.¹ McDougall's view of the primacy of the affective element in experience and especially in instinctive behaviour may be mentioned in this connection.

The Jaina thinkers were not unaware of the unconscious. The *Nandisūtra* gives a picture of the unconscious in the *mallaka dṛṣṭānta*. The doctrine of *karma* as analysed by the Jainas comes nearer to Jung's

¹ *Pañcāstikāyāsāra*, 39.

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