


FATH AND REASON

JAMES DROTT ROBERTS



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To Professor M. Yamunacharya,
my Guru in Vedanta, with the
best wishes and thanks of the
Author:

J. De Otis Roberts

April 28, 1965

At the Center for the Study of
World Religions,

Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.



FAITH AND REASON

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A Comparative Study of Pascal, Bergson and James

By

JAMES DEOTIS ROBERTS



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PRINTED IN
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DEDICATED

TO

MY WIFE, ELIZABETH; MY DAUGHTER, CHARMAINE

AND MY SON, DEOTIS, JR.

PREFACE

The problem of faith and reason is contemporary; for it keeps ever before us ultimate questions and the values of time and eternity. The problem is, what is the rapport of faith and reason in the search for truth and reality?

The aim of this study is to compare what Pascal, Bergson and James have to say about the problem of faith and reason. This problem has been for the author a live issue for some time and for this reason this study has been of great interest in the clarification of his thought. Dorothy Eastwood, in her *Revival of Pascal*, has stated that Bergson and James are responsible in part for the recent revival of interest in the thought of Pascal. Accordingly, the author considers her book a very valuable one in this study, especially in comparing the basic presuppositions of the men here being studied. It is the author's opinion that the agreement between them is basic though not organic in the sense that a definite line of development may be traced from Pascal to the others.

There is a further observation, viz. that the philosophical climates of the philosophers of this study reveal a remarkable similarity and that attitudes toward their various backgrounds are also similar. They make a radical break from the position to which they object (the autonomy of the rational method) and swing to the opposite view (the affirmation of intuition). The "reasons of the heart" of Pascal are basic to all three

philosophers. We shall attempt to show, however, that each has his own metaphysical framework in developing his notion of immediate apprehension of truth, and thus the differences are as pronounced as the similarities.

In this study I am endeavoring to compare the views of Bergson and James with that of Pascal; for it is my candid opinion that Pascal's view is the more reasonable and is supported by Christian thought. The attempt will be made to substantiate this claim by using Pascal as a standard of judgment throughout this study.

The author is indebted to R. G. Collingwood for the method used in this study, i.e., the denial and affirmation of philosophical positions both as applied to the philosophers whose thought is used in this study and to the treatment given to the problem in the following pages.¹ All true philosophers are influenced by their predecessors, directly or indirectly, positively or negatively, and, as Collingwood declares, the philosopher knows what he denies and what he affirms at once.

The plan of this study is as follows:

Chapter I will examine the discovery by Pascal, Bergson and James of the limitations of rational knowledge. Chapter II will be concerned with the affirmations of these philosophers as to the nature of faith or supra-rational knowledge (to be used as synonyms in this study). Chapter III will evaluate the findings of previous chapters and the conclusion will attempt to draw out the implications that have been discovered in this study.

The author is grateful to Prof. William L. Bradley for his guidance as advisor of this study; to Prof.

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Ford Battles for many stylistic suggestions; to Mrs. Anna M. Nesbitt for her services as typist; to my family for their long-suffering and to all others who made this study possible.

J. DEOTIS ROBERTS

Washington, D.C.
1961

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Faith and Reason

CHAPTER I

THE DISCOVERY OF THE LIMITS OF RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE

A. INTRODUCTORY

Pascal, Bergson and James agree that rational knowledge is limited. We turn now to the development of their thought, endeavoring to discover what led each of them to this conclusion. We are reminded, at the outset, of a difference among the philosophers of this study — with Pascal on one hand — and Bergson and James on the other. Pascal's discovery of the limits of rational knowledge is more subjective than the others. Once he has made the discovery he gives a great deal of effort to establish the reasons for his objection to the autonomy of the rational method. Accordingly, we may receive from his own writings a clear statement as to why he drew his conclusion. It is likewise to be understood that Pascal treats specifically the problem of faith and reason in his *Apology* and that it is the strategy of this work to compare the two ways of knowing that we might choose the better. When we turn to Bergson and James we are not so fortunate, for their approach is more objective and they never feel the conflict which Pascal experiences. They seek

CHAPTER II

THE ATTAINMENT OF
SUPRA-RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE

We have shown that Pascal, Bergson and James agree that ultimate reality is beyond the limits of rational knowledge. This fact leads to an examination of what they have to say concerning knowledge of ultimate reality. We have viewed their conclusions with regard to reason; now let us observe their contribution to faith. The use of the term supra-rational knowledge is to be interpreted as faith in this study. However, faith as used here has a broad meaning. It is not limited to religious faith. First, it includes taking a chance on the basis of possibilities. Second, it embraces knowledge immediately apprehended. Finally, faith includes religious belief in a general sense and also in its unique sense, i.e. general as used by James in his *The Will To Believe* and unique as used by Pascal who speaks of a saving knowledge through Jesus Christ.

There is agreement between Pascal, Bergson and James upon religious faith defined in its broad sense. Pascal is the only one who uses faith in the unique sense of saving knowledge. He speaks of illumination of the personality by Grace and insists that God inclines the heart to believe. Let us turn first, then, to the examination of Pascal's writings to see what he means by faith, and how he relates it to reason.

CHAPTER III

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF FAITH
AND REASON
A CRITIQUE – CONCLUSION

A. PASCAL AS CRITERION OF JUDGMENT

In Chapter I we were concerned with the discovery of the limitations of rational knowledge by Pascal, Bergson and James. We discussed how this discovery was made and hinted at their proposal to go beyond the rational method. In Chapter II we examined their definitions of supra-rational knowledge or faith. Our aim in this chapter is to criticize all that has gone before and to see what contribution each philosopher makes to our problem of faith and reason. At the close of this chapter we shall attempt to draw the resulting conclusions.

Pascal expresses in his *Pensées* an immediate knowledge of faith *par excellence*. We shall consider him as the criterion of judgment in this critique. He *lives* his faith, while Bergson and James *study* or *observe* those who experience faith. Even Bergson's *divine sympathy* is no substitute for a personal experience of faith on the order of Pascal's Second Conversion. Pascal confesses a divine illumination by Grace. He is true to the Augustinian doctrine of divine illumination of the human mind. Accordingly, he realizes that there are things man can never know unless God reveals

self and a better world. Accordingly, we all have the right-to-believe. This makes life worth living; for without faith life is nonsense.

In the wager of James we are urged to believe in *possibilities*. This is better than no faith at all; for he makes faith the basis of our entire life. Like Pascal, he bids us search our hearts for reasons which are beyond rationality and admonishes us to stake everything upon our faith. James seeks to verify faith by the support of the psychological principle of the subliminal self and his pragmatic theory. He has at least partial success in establishing the reasonableness of believing where we cannot prove. However, when we compare James with Pascal concerning the argument of wager, we discover that Pascal's insight of faith is more profound. While James in his notion of passional decision approximates what Pascal calls "reasons of the heart," James hinges his wager upon his pragmatic theory; while Pascal bases his entire argument upon the existence of God. Pascal asserts that knowledge and moral principles have significance only if God exists. Our heart feels Him, according to Pascal, and this is possible because God inclines the heart to believe in Him. As Brunner has said: "There is but one word strong enough to conquer despair and that is faith. Either we despair or we believe."⁵¹ This is the theme of Pascal's *Pensées* including his wager.

E. CONCLUSION

We are aware of the contribution made to the problem of faith and reason by the authors whose writings we have here examined. However, we are only partially satisfied with what Bergson and James offer, but

we feel that what they seek Pascal has found. Joy, peace, certainty are expressed in his affirmation of faith and this is the kind of faith we need. He communes with God to receive a saving knowledge which comes through revealed truth and by the illumination of Grace.

James calls our attention to the flux of consciousness and the subliminal self for knowledge of our true self, reality and truth. He defines for us a faith that takes chances on possibilities. He emphasizes our right-to-believe and admonishes us to realize that there are many forced options; the faith of religion being one. This contribution is valuable so far as it goes; but it does not go far enough. James is limited by his method. For this reason, he limits God and places too much trust in what man *can* do. He is unable to decide upon any particular faith, for all is unfinished, and for this reason we must trust the future to make known which religious faith is best. We may observe from this, that there can be no certainty derived from the view of James; there is only probable belief based on possibility. However, his faith does take us beyond the rational and gives us courage to risk our lives for the good and the true; for inasmuch as we must take chances he urges us to do so for truth.

When we turn to Bergson, we find his answer to the problem of faith and reason in his mystic intuition. He speaks of a love that takes action. He contributes to the notion of faith, but we are immediately aware of shortcomings in his scheme of thought. His epistemology does not harmonize with Christian presuppositions. In Bergson, the *élan vital* is central, while in Christian thought (Pascal), the revelation of God in Christ is central. Bergson does mention some ethical

and theological principles maintained by the Christian mystics, i.e. a God who reveals Himself, the Christian emotion of love, Christ as an example for mystics, and the Sermon on the Mount as an example of open morality; but it is evident that this is secondary to his view, while the *élan vital* is primary. He speaks as an outsider or observer in relation to the Christian mystics, while Pascal is a Christian mystic. The Christian mystic, according to Bergson receives his inspiration from the *élan vital*, while to Pascal we commune with God only through Jesus Christ. Accordingly, Bergson makes no significant contribution to the Christian faith. His contribution must be viewed in the light of his insistence upon intuition as a way of knowing reality in itself, and his emphasis upon the inner life as the seat of supra-rational knowledge. It is at this point that he draws nearest to Pascal. It is apparent that if Bergson had only followed his heart instead of his method he would have made a greater contribution to the problem of faith and reason. If he were accurate in presenting the message of the Christian mystic his affinity with Pascal would be much closer. However, when we are done with the Bergsonian conception of faith we are unsatisfied, but we do feel that his intentions are good and that he points us in the right direction. We are grateful to him for suggesting that the Christian mystics are the greatest, but we find it best to go directly to them ourselves; for this reason we turn to Pascal.

There is no doubt that Pascal's faith is deeper than that of Bergson or James, for his faith includes the good in theirs and more. He knows all they know by intuition plus what God reveals to him and while they study other mystics, Pascal has personal acquaintance with the mystic experience. Pascal knows whereof he

speaks and can witness with authority to the value of this experience in his personal life and, for this reason, he is qualified to recommend it to others. We observe that the wager of James is limited by his pragmatic theory; while Pascal's wager is concerned with the existence of God and the gain of eternal life. James urges us to take a chance completely upon possibility; while Pascal urges the unbeliever to take a chance upon a God he knows to exist. This makes Pascal's argument more effective; for he can point out that our finite loss is nothing when compared with an eternal gain, being certain that God is and that He offers eternal life to those who believe in Him. Pascal feels God in his own heart and his affirmation of faith may be summed up, "I know whom I have believed and I am sure that he is able to guard until that Day what has been entrusted to me."⁵²

Pascal, Bergson and James contribute a faith beyond discursive reason and one which is based upon "reasons of the heart." Faith is defined as supra-rational knowledge. Theirs is a faith seeking to know.

FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES

PREFACE

1. See R. G. Collingwood, *An Essay on Philosophical Method*, 1933, Chapter III, pp. 54-91.

CHAPTER I

1. See Pascal, *Pensées*, 684. The *Pensées* used in this study were translated by the present writer from F.S. Stewart's *Apology of Religion* unless otherwise designated by an asterisk (*) which indicates that they were taken from Chevalier's *Pensées De Pascal*. The numbering is that of Brunschvicg. The Appendix (pp. 97-98) presents a table which compares the numbering of Stewart with that of Brunschvicg and gives the page reference in Chevalier where the respective thought is to be found.

2. See G.M. Patrick, *Pascal and Kierkegaard*, 1947, Vol. I. pp. 108-109.

3. See *Ibid.*, p. 109. — According to Patrick the word "geometry" was used, not only for the purely spatial aspect of mathematics, but also in the generic sense, subsuming mechanics (the science of movement) and arithmetic (the science of numbers) as well as geometry in the sense now current.

4. For a more comprehensive view of Plato's world of ideas see — *Cratylus* 390 E; *Phileb.* 16 C; *Soph.* 253 B; *Theaet.* 184 C; J.A. Stewart, *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*; A.E. Taylor, *Plato: The Man and His Work*; and Ross, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*.

5. See *Pensées*, 460.

6. See Patrick, *op.cit.*, p. 110; cf. *Pensées*, 61.

7. See Patrick, *op.cit.*, p. 113. He bases his judgment upon Chevalier's *Conclusion of Treatises on Equilibrium of Fluids and the Weight of the Mass of Air*, p. 241.

8. See Patrick, *op.cit.*, p. 113. Here he refers to Chevalier's *Letter to Father Noel*.

9. See Patrick, *op.cit.*, p. 114. To substantiate his observation he uses Chevalier's *De L'esprit geometrique*, Chap. I, Sect. iii.

10. Cf. *Pensées*, 394.

11. See Patrick, *op.cit.*, pp. 114-115.

12. See *Ibid.* Here Patrick refers to Brunschvicg's *Genee de*

Pascal, p. 56ff. and Chevalier's statement, *op.cit.*, pp. 367, 368, 374, 375.

13. See *Pensées*, 72.
14. See *Ibid.*, 233; Cf. below, Chap. II, Sect. A.
15. See *Pensées*, 144.
16. See *Ibid.*, 466.
17. See *Ibid.*, 63.
18. See *Ibid.*, 65.
19. See *Ibid.*, 411.
20. See *Ibid.*, 305.
21. See *Ibid.*
22. See *Ibid.*, 556.
23. See *Ibid.*, 277, 278, 279; Cf. below, Chap. II, Sect. A.
24. Cf. Patrick, *op.cit.*, p. 125.
25. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 126; See also *Pensées*, 278, 567, 460, 793.
26. See *Pensées*, 72.
27. See *Ibid.*
28. See *Ibid.*
29. See *Ibid.*
30. See *Ibid.*
31. See *Ibid.*
32. See *Ibid.*; Cf. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, pp. 233-238; *Mind-Energy*, Chap. II.
33. See *Pensées*, 267.
34. See *Ibid.*, 231.
35. See Dorothy Eastwood, *The Revival of Pascal*, 1936, Chap. IV, pp. 37-47.
36. See Chevalier, "William James et Bergson," *Harvard Et La France*, e.t., n.d., p. 106 ff. (e.t. — tr. by present writer).
37. See *Ibid.*
38. H. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, 1912, pp. xiii, 297, 293, 295, 296, 120, 121.
39. See Chevalier, *op.cit.*, pp. 112-115.
40. See C. Péquy, *Note Sur M. Bergson et la Philosophie Bergsonienne*, (e.t.), 1935, pp. 21-23.
41. See *Ibid.*, p. 47.
42. See James, *Pluralistic Universe*, 1909, p. 227.
43. See Th. Flournoy, *The Philosophy of William James*, 1917, pp. 19, 21.
44. See *Ibid.*, p. 21. Here Flournoy calls our attention to an article written by James, "Louis Agassiz," (*Memories and Studies*), 1911.
45. Cf. James, *Pluralistic Universe*, p. 330 ff.
46. See Flournoy, *op.cit.*, p. 29.
47. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

48. Cf. James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, 1919, p. 165; See also "Reponse Aux Remarques De M. Renouvier Sur Sa Theorie De La Volonte," 1888. The latter may be found in James' *Collected Essays and Reviews*, 1920, edited by R.B. Perry.
49. Cf. James, "Bradley or Bergson?" *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. VII, no. 2, 1910, pp. 29-33; See also James, *Collected Essays and Reviews*, pp. 333 ff., 491 ff.
50. Flournoy, *op.cit.*, p. 43.
51. Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, 1951, Vol. I, pp. 42-43.
52. See James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 5 ff., 31.
53. See *Ibid.*, p. 16.
54. See *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.
55. See *Ibid.*, pp. 221, 222.
56. See *Ibid.*, p. 223.
57. See *Ibid.*
58. Cf. Josiah Royce, *The World and the Individual*, 1891, p. 204.
59. F.R. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 1891, p. 204.
60. James, *Pragmatism*, 1908, pp. 29-31.
61. See *Ibid.*, p. 20.
62. Chevalier, "William James et Bergson," *op.cit.*, pp. 109-110; cf. Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*, 1935, pp. 407, 422, 426-430.
63. See Eastwood, *op.cit.*, p. 80.

CHAPTER II

1. See *Pensées*, 277.
2. See *Ibid.*, 388; cf. Eastwood, *op.cit.*, p. 25.
3. See *Pensées*, 268; cf. *Ibid.*, 269, 267, 270, 272.
4. See *Ibid.*, 278.
5. See M. Tollemache, *French Jansensists* (n.d.), p. 193; cf. Patrick, *op.cit.*, p. 193.
6. See *Psalms*, 119, vv. 2, 7, 10, 11, 32, 34, 36, 69, 70, 80, 111, 112, 145, 161.
7. See Chevalier, *Pascal*, pp. 269-273.
8. See *Pensées*, 5.
9. See *Ibid.*, 277.
10. See *Ibid.*, 556.
11. See Jn. 17:3, (Bible quotations of the N.T. are from the R.S.V.).
12. See *Ibid.*, 1:17.
13. See *Pensées*, 556.
14. See *Ibid.*
15. See *Ibid.*, cf. Matt. 11:27.

16. See *Pensées*, 556; cf. *Ibid.*, 317, 142, 225.
17. See *Pensées*, 556; cf. 684.
18. See *Ibid.*, 684; cf. 547, 556.
19. See *Ibid.*, 549; cf. 548, 547, 785; cf. Brunner, *The Mediator*, (n.d.), p. 172; here Brunner calls the Bible the "crib of Christ"; See also *Ibid.*, p. 13 ff.
20. See *Pensées*, 284; cf. *Ibid.*, 286, 287.
21. See *Ibid.*, 288.
22. See *Ibid.*, 599.
23. See *Ibid.*, 230.
24. See *Ibid.*, 233.
25. See *Ibid.*, — The underlining is mine for stress. For a discussion on this statement see below Chap. III, Sect. D.
26. See *Ibid.*, 233, 234.
27. See Chevalier, *Pascal*, p. 241 f.; cf. *Pensées*, 195.
28. See *Pensées*, 233.
29. See *Ibid.*
30. See below Chap. III, Sect. D.
31. See Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, p. 139.
32. See *Ibid.*, pp. 140, 173.
33. See *Ibid.*, pp. 173, 176.
34. See *Ibid.*, pp. 177, 178.
35. See Eastwood, *op.cit.*, p. 35.
36. See *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39; cf. Bergson, *Creative Mind*, p. 306 ff.; *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 1 f.
37. See Eastwood, *op.cit.*, pp. 40, 44 ff.
38. I prefer to use the French *morale* instead of the English "morality" because the French word conveys the author's meaning best. It is a more comprehensive and spiritual term than the English.
39. See Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, (tr. by R.A. Audra, C. Brereton and W. Carter, 1935), pp. 24-28.
40. See *Ibid.*, p. 202.
41. See *Ibid.*, pp. 209-210.
42. See *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36 — The new emotion is identified with the *élan vital* and is described, by Bergson, as an emotion surging forth from the depths of reality and making contact with the inmost being of the mystic.
43. See Bergson, *op.cit.*, pp. 37-38.
44. See *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.
45. See *Ibid.*, p. 51.
46. See *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.
47. See *Ibid.*, p. 60.
48. See *Ibid.*, p. 90.
49. See *Ibid.*, pp. 250-259.
50. See *Ibid.*, pp. 202-203. Bergson mentions in this passage

the God who reveals Himself and adds that He illuminates and warms privileged souls with His Presence. For a discussion on this see below, Chap. III, B, E.

51. Cf. Isa. 6.
52. See Bergson, *Two Sources*, pp. 219-220.
53. See *Ibid.*, pp. 221-223.
54. See *Ibid.*, pp. 227-228.
55. See *Ibid.*, p. 228.
56. See *Ibid.*, p. 229.
57. See *Ibid.*, cf. James, *The Will To Believe*, 1898, pp. 118-120.
58. See Bergson, *Two Sources*, pp. 243, 241.
59. See below Chap. III, B, C.
60. See James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 259.
61. See *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 239, 237, 236.
62. See *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 333-334, 298, 336.
63. See *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 336 ff., 343, 212.
64. See R.B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, 1912, p. 232.
65. See James, *Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 249-252.
66. See Emile Boutroux, "William James et l'expérience religieuse," *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. XVII, 1908, p. 289; cf. J.B. Pratt, "The Religious Philosophy of William James," *The Hibbert Journal*, Vol. X, 1911-12, p. 225 ff.
67. See Pratt, *op.cit.*, p. 229.
68. See James. *The Will To Believe*, p. 1 ff.
69. See James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 321.
70. See James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902, p. 53.
71. See *Ibid.*, p. 58.
72. See *Ibid.*, p. 246.
73. See *Ibid.*, p. 247.
74. See *Ibid.*, pp. 380-381, 485-486.
75. See *Ibid.*, p. 312 ff.
76. See *Ibid.*, pp. 512-513.
77. See *Ibid.*, pp. 515-517; cf. James, *The Will To Believe*, pp. 111-144.
78. See James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 519.
79. See James, *Pluralistic Universe*, p. 307.
80. See *Ibid.*, p. 308.
81. See *Ibid.*, pp. 311, 318.
82. See James, *Pragmatism*, pp. 283-285.
83. See *Ibid.*, p. 289.
84. See *Ibid.*, p. 297.
85. See *Ibid.*, p. 298.
86. See James, *The Meaning of Truth*, 1909, p. 22; cf. *Pragmatism*, p. 301.

87. See James, *The Will To Believe*, p. 11.
88. See *Ibid.*, p. 17.
89. See *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24, 25.
90. See *Ibid.*, p. 26.
91. See *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.
92. See *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.
93. See *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 54-55; cf. Mark 9:40.
94. See *Ibid.*, p. 61.
95. See *Ibid.*, pp. 175-176, 181-182.
96. See James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, 1919, p. 225.
97. See *Ibid.*, p. 227.
98. See *Ibid.*, p. 230. The italics are mine for emphasis.

CHAPTER III

1. See Col. 1:9.
2. See above Chap. I, Sect. A.
3. See *Ibid.*, Sect. B.
4. See *Ibid.*, Sect. C.
5. See P. Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I, p. 77; cf. *Pensées*, 277 and above Chap. II, Sect. A.
6. See above, Chap. II, A.
7. See O.W. Wright, *The Thoughts, Letters and Opuscles of Blaise Pascal*, 1861, p. 40.
8. See A. Vinet, *Studies on Pascal*, 1859, p. 230 ff. where he uses as his source M.V. Cousin's *Essay on the Truth of Pascal*, Chap. X, pp. 248-292.
9. See W. Clark, *Pascal and the Port Royalists*, 1902, p. 226.
10. See Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 231, 232.
11. See Perry, *op.cit.*, p. 234.
12. See *Ibid.*, pp. 239-240.
13. See James, *The Meaning of Truth*, pp. 42, 230; cf. *Some Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 101-102; *Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 339-340. James considers reality as more than the conceptual order, but not as distinct from the conceptual order.
14. See Perry, *op.cit.*, p. 231 ff.
15. See *Ibid.*, pp. 246-247, 248.
16. See James, *Pluralistic Universe*, Chap. VI; cf. *Ibid.*, note 1, p. 338 ff.
17. See *Ibid.*, p. 240.
18. See *Ibid.*, cf. Flournoy, *op.cit.*, p. 198 ff., and W.B. Pitkin, "James and Bergson," *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. VII, 1910, p. 225 ff. for a more comprehensive study of the relationship of the thought of Bergson and James.

19. See Bergson, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 1912, p. 1.
20. See *Pensées*, 282.
21. See *Ibid.*, 278.
22. See Eastwood, *op.cit.*, p. 166 ff.
23. See *Ibid.*, pp. 181-182.
24. See Bergson, *Two Sources*, pp. 219-220.
25. See *Ibid.*, p. 241.
26. See Eastwood, *op.cit.*, p. 44 ff.
27. See Berdyaev, *Freedom and the Spirit*, 1948, pp. 247-248.
28. See *Pensées*, 489.
29. See J. Maritain, *Ransoming the Time*, (tr. by H.L. Binesse), 1941, p. 90; cf. *Ibid.*, p. 85 ff.
30. See *op.cit.*, p. 100; cf. Chevalier, *Pensées De Pascal*, pp. xxi-xxii.
31. See Bergson, *Two Sources*, p. 256; cf. *Pensées*, 242.
32. See *Pensées*, 242.
33. See Chevalier, "William James et Bergson," *op.cit.*, pp. 114-115; cf. Maritain, *Ransoming the Time*, p. 107, and *Degrees of Knowledge*, 1937, pp. 354, 355, 305.
34. See Eastwood, *op.cit.*, pp. 173-174.
35. See *Ibid.*, pp. 171 ff.
36. See *Ibid.*, pp. 120-121.
37. See *Ibid.*, p. 170.
38. See J.B. Pratt, "The Religious Philosophy of William James," *op.cit.*, p. 232.
39. See *Ibid.*, pp. 233-234.
40. See *Pensées*, 242.
41. See Patrick, *op.cit.*, p. 154.
42. See Eastwood, *op.cit.*, pp. 81-82.
43. See James, *The Will To Believe*, p. 58.
44. See *Ibid.*, Chap. I, p. 3 ff.
45. See Eastwood, *op.cit.*, p. 84.
46. See Heb. 11:6.
47. See E. Caillet, *The Clue to Pascal*, 1943, pp. 128-129; cf. *Ibid.*, p. 127 where Caillet suggests that Pascal probably based his wager on the Bible (Deut. 30:19) and Patrick, *op.cit.*, p. 158.
48. See James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 221-231.
49. See *Ibid.*
50. See James, *The Meaning of Truth*, Chap. X, p. 231 ff.
51. See E. Brunner, *Our Faith*, 1936, pp. 2-3, 6, 92.
52. See II Tim. 1:12.

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APPENDIX

The table below compares the numbering of Stewart in his *Apology of Religion*, (1942), which is an extract from the *Pensées* and the page numbers of Chevalier's with the Leon Brunschvicg's own numbering of the *Pensées* in (*Granss Ecrivains de la France, et minor chez Hachette*). Chevalier's work is entitled, *Pensées De Pascal*.

<i>Brunschvicg</i>	<i>Chevalier</i>	<i>Stewart</i>
5	19	20
61	34	27
*63	39n.	38
55	40	38
72	42	41
142	115	109
144	40	40
195	174	197
225	193	207
230	257	199
231	256	200
233	259	210
234	267	211
242	195	234
267	272	43
268	271	645
269	272	246
270	272	647
272	272	648
277	278	607
278	280	608
279	280	609
282	278	610
284	549	611
286	550	612
287	550-551	613
288	551	622
*305	155	

<i>Brunschvicg</i>	<i>Chevalier</i>	<i>Stewart</i>
*317	160	
388	206	644
394	210	267
411	146	160
460	460	243
466	460	265
489	239	347
547	477	526
548	476	568
549	476	569
556	476	11
566	384	507
567	521	600
599	215	290
684	368	503
785	478	545
793	543	549



