

# LANGUAGE OF MUSIC

By

**ROSHMI GOSWAMI**

Department of Philosophy  
School of Social Sciences

SUBMITTED  
IN  
FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT OF THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

TO



THE NORTH-EASTERN HILL UNIVERSITY

SHILLONG

AUGUST 1986

Phil.

MEMO LIBRARY  
Acc. No. D1018912  
Acq. by ---  
Class by ---  
Sub. Heading ---  
Date. by ---  
Transcribed by A. Noyes  
15.5.89



Phone :  
Grams : NEHU

# North-Eastern Hill University

Mayurbhanj Complex  
Nongthymmai Shillong - 793014 ( Meghalaya )

Dr. Mrinal Miri  
Head  
Department of Philosophy

Certified that the subject matter of this thesis is the record of work done by Shrimati Roshmi Goswami, that the contents of this thesis did not form a basis of the award of any previous degree to her or to the best of my knowledge to anybody else, and that the thesis had not been submitted by her for any research degree to any other University.

In habit and character Roshmi Goswami is a fit and proper person for the degree of Ph.D.

*Mrinal Miri*

( Mrinal Miri )

## CONTENTS

		<u>Page No.</u>
	ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	... (i)
	INTRODUCTION	... 1 - 14
CHAPTER - I	: WHAT IS A WORK OF MUSIC?	... 15 - 30
CHAPTER - II	: EMOTIONS, THE EXPRESSION OF EMOTIONS, AND MUSIC	... 31 - 67
CHAPTER - III	: STHĀYIBHĀVA	... 68 - 92
CHAPTER - IV	: THE EVALUATION OF MUSIC	... 93 - 117
	APPENDIX: A NOTE ON SENTIMENTALITY IN MUSIC	... 118 - 127
CHAPTER - V	: MUSIC, RASAS, AND THE SCHEME OF PURUSHARTHAS	... 128 - 141
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	... 142 - 151

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I take this opportunity to express my deep gratitude to my teacher and guide, Professor Mrinal Miri, for his invaluable, selfless, and patient guidance. The constant discussions I had with him have gone a long way in shaping the course of this work. In the course of guiding this work not only has he introduced me to new dimensions in the field of philosophy, but has also created in me a sensitive awareness of the subtleties of music, art and literature, for which, I remain ever indebted to him.


I owe very special thanks to my mother-in-law, Kiranbala Goswami, without whose support and cheerfully given help this work would not have seen the light of day, and to my husband, Dhruva Goswami for his tremendous encouragement and for having made it possible for me to undertake this work.

I would also like to record my gratitude to my teachers of the Department of Philosophy, and to my friends and colleagues for their help and goodwill.

I am grateful too to Mr. Joseph F. Khongbuh for typing out the manuscript with utmost care.

And last but not the least, I remember my sister for her active help and my parents, who have been the silent but constant inspirers for me to finish this work.

SHILLONG  
THE 8<sup>th</sup> AUG 1986

  
( ROSHMI GOSWAMI )

---

## INTRODUCTION

Verbal language, is undoubtedly, man's most important and characteristic means of communication, but it is not the only one, nor necessarily, the most expressive one. My endeavour in this work has been to explore the immense expressive potentialities of music, and in that light bring out the significance of music and musical experience.

1. But before going on to say what I have done, I must, first of all, clarify what I have not done, and this I believe is necessary, because the title of my dissertation is somewhat misleading. The title "Language of Music", could roughly raise two kinds of expectations. One would be, to expect a discussion of the general problems of philosophy of language; and the other, taking music to be a kind of language, a discussion of the structure of music, of meaning in music in musical terms, the possibility of a vocabulary of music and so on. Although I do touch on some of these problems in the course of my discussion, I have not discussed any of them at length. This is so, because my intention has not been to analyze the concept of language, and see whether music can properly be called a language or not. My primary concern has been to understand expression in music, and the significance of musical expression, and the relationship between musical expression and life in general.

2. In the first chapter, I take up the general philosophical problem of the identity of a work of music. It may be said that, of the identity of a work of art, two kinds of questions may be asked - one metaphysical, and the other logical. My concern has really been with the logical question, which may be of the form; "What in actual fact, are the criteria of identity of a particular work of art?" I have shown that a work of music is a generic entity, and a particular performance of it, is an element that comes under the generic entity. I have come to this conclusion after having made a distinction between three different kinds of generic entities namely, a type, a class and a universal, with tokens, members and instances as their elements respectively, and seeing that, a musical work could be said to be closest to the generic entity called type. An important characteristic of the type/token relationship is that, a type and its tokens may not only share properties, but properties are also transmitted from one to the other. However, although all properties of a token may be transmitted to the type, it is not necessary that they will do so. In fact, it is necessary, that not all properties should pass from type to token, although any single property might do so. This point is of great importance in music, for it brings out a salient feature of music; that of the possibility of any number of

new interpretations of a given work of music. In fact, it may be said that the very nature of music as a creative art would be distorted if there were no such possibilities.

To emphasize this point, I have briefly discussed Susanne Langer's contention that a musical composition is essentially incomplete, i.e. it needs completion through its tokens. I find the Langerian view unacceptable, for, to suppose that something is incomplete, necessarily implies that it is, in principle, capable of being completed. But any attempt to complete a musical work will have the unbearable consequence of introducing a degree of mechanicality to a musical performance, which in fact is alien to it. This is all the more evident in the Indian Classical Tradition, for here any attempt to introduce "completeness" to a musical work will reflect a total misunderstanding of the very tradition. Hence it may be said that interpretation in music is open ended, and for music to be music, it must be impossible to delimit the possibilities of new interpretations.

3. In the second chapter, I take up the more specific problem of emotions and the expression of emotions in general and in music. I have said that though language is the most characteristic means of expressions, it is somewhat

inadequate in expressing that which contains too many minute, yet closely related parts. There are certain emotions and delicate nuances of emotions which cannot be projected into discursive forms, and it is music, which shares the same properties of dynamism as emotions, which is better equipped to do this. In this connection I have briefly discussed the concept of emotion and expression and have attempted to draw up a distinction between an emotion and a feeling or a sensation, and also between natural or conventional expression from expression in music.

The expression of an emotion forms part of our understanding of the emotion. An emotion may thus be said to be an organic unity or what might be called a "hermeneutic mesh" of the feeling, the expression of this feeling, and the object of the feeling. In bringing out the differences between a feeling and an emotion, I have shown that it is essential for an emotion to have an object of reference. But in bringing this idea to bear on music, there appears to be a difficulty, for in music especially instrumental music, there is nothing which might be said to be the object. It is seen however, that in art the expression of emotions is different from that in real life and the

depiction or presentation of an emotion is possible without bringing in all the elements of meaning of an emotion. The creative potential of music is such, that while primarily presenting the feeling or bhāva associated with a particular emotion, it points inevitably to a completeness of the hermeneutic circle. Further, it may be said that the absence of an object does not detract anything from the musical expression of emotions, for music expresses not the facticity of an emotion, but rather, it captures, or tries to capture the prāna or essence of an emotion.

Towards the end of the chapter, I take up the discussion of whether the emotions expressed in a piece of music are those of the performer's or the composer's. My contention has been that it is not. Besides raising the rather usual objections, I have also shown that perhaps one main reason why emotions are attributed to the composer or the performer, is that it is thought that an emotion expressed must have an object, but I have already shown that it is possible to have an objectless expression of emotions. Another objection that I have raised, and one that has been variously emphasized by different philosophers is to do with music's expressiveness. I have shown that to attribute expressiveness of a musical piece to the self expression of the artist is to make musical expressiveness an extrinsic

feature of a piece of music, when in fact it is built into the music itself.

4. In the third chapter, I take up the discussion of two related questions raised in the previous chapter. They are:
- (i) Can specific expressive properties be attributed to a piece of music? and (ii) Is the specific property so attributed, dependent on any particular or specific aspect of the musical work? My intention has been to show that it is the sthāyibhāva, which determines the expressive character of a musical work. The sthāyibhāva is the basic persisting emotion which binds together, the total aesthetic situation of a musical composition and which guides the entire structure and form of a musical work. The sthāyibhāva could thus be likened to Langer's "commanding idea", for in its expression the entire structure as also the emotive character of a musical composition is created.

After having discussed sthāyibhāva, I have made an attempt to specify the musical elements in a raga through which the sthāyibhāva or the permanent mood could be sought to be embodied. Though the most obvious choice here seem to be the vādi and samvādi notes of a raga, I have shown that it is the pakad or the catch phrase of a raga in which the sthāyibhāva could be said to be embodied. The reason for

my choice is that in Indian music the unity of the entire rendering of a raga is a flowing unity, and it is the śrutis which give this flowing quality to a raga. Moreover it is the subtle intricacies of expression of the different śrutis, which give each raga an individual character, and help to present and accentuate the mood of the particular emotion being presented. In musical terms, the pakad because it shows the characteristic use of śrutis of a particular raga, is better suited to suggest and bring out the emotive flavour of a particular raga. But though I say that it is the pakad through which, the sthāyibhāva could be said to be presented, my intention is not to suggest that these musical elements can be separated from the whole. A raga is an organic unity, and the pakad enhances and accentuates the sthāyibhāva, but the sthāyibhāva is not confined to particular aspects only, but permeates the entire musical work. While discussing sthāyibhāva, I have drawn up a distinction between sthāyibhāva of a musical work and the rasa of the work. It may be said that, while the sthāyibhāva is that which determines the basic form, structure and mood of a musical work, rasa is the resulting relish which the said mood brings about. Rasa is the resultant of an aesthetic configuration, hence it is not an emotion, not even a primary emotion, but that which vitalizes an emotion.

5. In the fourth chapter I take up for discussion a somewhat different but important topic, that of evaluation in music.

When a piece of music is appreciated or evaluated, it appears to be done so in reference to some valued characteristics. My endeavour has been to discover whether there are in fact such characteristics or properties of music which are considered to have intrinsic value. Having been arguing for the stand that music expresses emotions the question posed has been of the form, whether any emotion or emotions can be said to have intrinsic value?

Before attempting an answer to this question, I have dwelt on the general problem of aesthetic evaluation. I have maintained, that though the critic or would-be critic does not evaluate a work of art by applying a set of fully articulated, readily available set of principles or standards, yet comparative evaluation is possible, and general claims about norms do get made. One such claim has been to show that art of any kind must present "truth". In literature the truth could be said to be insights into human nature, in the visual arts "essences" and so on.

Music has frequently been thought to be connected with the spiritual and thence with the moral. The claim would then be to show that the "truth" of music is the moral and spiritual message that it conveys and the effect that it is meant to have on the listener. It may be said that while the moral and the spiritual go together, they are not logically connected with one another. However, though the spiritual and the moral are distinguishable, the only available criterion of authenticity of the spiritual is the moral. It is easy enough to see how spirituality comes into music, in fact, it may be said that, the spirituality of a piece of music is something which cannot be separated from the piece of music itself. The problem is to show how morality is connected with music, such that the aesthetic appeal or aesthetic merits of a musical work is not lessened.

I have attempted to show that morality which can be shown to be welded with the aesthetic, consists in the individual's progressively altering one's consciousness towards "unselfishness" or towards what I call "unselfing". In music, the meditative prayerful beginning of a khaval and the final letting go of the conclusion are symbolic of this "unselfing", of the banishment of the ego and

self deceiving fantasies. One way in which art and music is able to progressively alter one's consciousness towards unselfishness is by virtue of something it shares with nature — a perfection of form which invites unpossessive contemplation and resists absorption into the selfish fantasy life of the consciousness. Thus it is said that great music transcends selfish and obsessive limitations of personality and can frequently enlarge the sensibility of the hearer.

6. An interesting question that arises in connection with problems relating to evaluation of music, is that of sentimentality in music. I take up a brief discussion of this question in an Appendix to Chapter Four of the dissertation. I endeavour to show that sentimentality results not so much due to the over indulgence of emotions, as due to misintepretation of reality. Another way of putting it would be to show that sentimentality results from overstating or over-attending to the dramatic quality of experience and neglecting the mundane aspects, when rightly life consists of both types of experiences. Over-attending to a certain aspect and neglecting others results in making that particular aspect static, and this is what happens in music.

Langer has said that music is an "unconsummated symbol". Unconsummated could be taken to apply to music whose potentiality for expression has not been exhausted, or has not become supersaturated, and when music's potentiality for expression is not exhausted, its dynamic flow is also not arrested. Sentimentality in music is to arrest music's dynamic flow, which is again the result of exhausting all potentialities of expression.

It is then not the feelings and emotions which make a musical work sentimental but how they have been presented, and how they have been presented is again dependent on how one understands them. To avoid sentimentality in music, an emotion must be seen in its proper perspective and in entirety, for only when an emotion is taken in isolation that its flow is restricted and in music, creativity is arrested.

7. In the concluding sixth chapter, I make further remarks about the connection of music as a form of art and morality and spirituality. These remarks are made against the background of the Theory of Rasas, and the scheme of purusharthas in Indian Philosophy. In this connection I reiterate my stand that music is an autonomous form of art.

There could be said to be two senses of the idea of autonomy: (i) That music is not connected with anything extra-musical; (ii) that music does not need the help of anything else in its expressive function. It is obvious that I do not accept the alleged autonomy of music in the first sense of the term but rather uphold music's autonomy in the second sense. The second sense implies that music is complete in itself, in the sense that in its expressive function it does not need the help of anything that is essentially non-musical. I have pointed out that it is perhaps an overemphasis on the causal powers of music that has led many to reject autonomy of music in the second sense. It is important to note that music is not a mere instrument of causal manipulation, although attempts can be made and are made to do this.

Another way of rejecting the autonomy of music would be to show that music cannot be an autonomous form of art because it is incapable of presenting all the rasas independently. In a way this may be true for rasas like vibhatsa and adbhuta to be properly presented in music would require the help of non-musical contexts like dance or drama. But there are other rasas, the chief ones being śṛṅgāra and karuna, which are capable of purely musical

presentation. I have attempted to bring out the significance of this by showing that a possible, what might be called "interactive" hierarchy of the rasas, could perhaps be worked out on the basis of how any rasa informs the others, so that they become appropriate objects of aesthetic presentation. I have shown that it is śṛṅgāra rasa, which could be said to perform this supremely unifying and vitalizing role. Hence the fact that there may be some rasas which may not be amenable to purely musical presentation, is not something that can affect the wholeness of music, for such rasas in any case cannot be proper subjects of aesthetic treatment in isolation, but need to be unified by śṛṅgāra, and śṛṅgāra is an indisputable subject of total musical treatment.


Lastly, I have tried to bring out the significance of the rasas, more precisely śṛṅgāra rasa, by making an attempt to connect the rasas with the scheme of purusharthas. The purusharthas could be said to be an attempt at a philosophical definition of the concept of man. The significance of the purusharthas lie in that it is logically impossible to conceive of a state of human existence, or to conceive of a man who is not involved in some way with the pursuit of the purusharthas. While maintaining that the

purusharthas, like the rasas and the virtues seek, by their very nature, unity and completeness in a mutual, life-enhancing, "interactive" inter-relationship, I have shown that aesthetic pursuit is principally pursuit of kama. I obviously do not take the narrow view of kama but kama as tempered by dharma, and in that light kama as, love of others, of natural objects, of objects of art and of God. And I have shown that the rasa connected with the experience of such love is śṛṅgāra. Hence it may be said that while aesthetic pursuit is a truly human pursuit, its product — the aesthetic object as well as its enjoyment, is the embodiment of the rasa of that, which holds human life together. And as this rasa finds its purest expression in music, music affords us more than all the other arts, intimations of moksha and ananda.

---

CHAPTER - I

WHAT IS A WORK OF MUSIC?



15 101891

In this chapter I shall concern myself with the general philosophical problem of the identity of a work of music. The problem is general to all works of art, although the answer given to the identity seeking question, "what is a work of art?" may be different from one kind of art to another.

1. In what I have to say in the following pages I am guided primarily by an argument of Richard Wollheim's in his rather difficult and terse essay entitled Art and its Objects.<sup>1</sup> One may distinguish between two kinds of questions concerning the identity of a work of art. They are very roughly: (i) a metaphysical, and (ii) a logical question. The metaphysical or ontological question might have the form "Is a work of art a physical or a non-physical object?" - The logical question might be thought to arise after we have settled the metaphysical question and it is this, "what, in actual fact, are the criteria of identity of a particular work of art?" However, both these types of questions are inextricably linked up and an answer to the one would, in most cases, imply an answer to the other.

In the case of music, as generally in the case of all performing arts, the answer to the first question is easy

enough. It may be thought that a musical work is identical with a particular performance of it, just as it may be thought that, for instance, a novel is identical with the particular copy of the novel that I have with me (although one must, of course, note here that a novel does not belong to the class "performing arts"). The mistake here is quite apparent and can be shown in several ways. One of these ways would be to point out that one may find fault with a particular performance of a musical composition without thereby implying that the musical composition is itself faulty in a similar way. Correspondingly, to have, for instance, lost my copy of the novel Anna Karenina is not to have lost the novel itself. The important point to realize is that there are two distinct ways of talking about works of art, at least in the context of the performing arts such as music; in one way of talking about it we speak of the work of art itself, and in the other way of talking about it, we speak of a particular performance of it. Although in practice these two ways are occasionally mixed up, they are nonetheless logically distinct.

So, if a musical work is not to be identical with a particular performance of the work, one can perhaps

quite safely say that it is not a physical object in the sense in which the particular performance might be thought to be a physical object i.e. in the sense that it, the performance, must have a spatio-temporal location. Nor is a musical work to be identified with the notations made by the composer, in case he does so decide to make them, for the very simple reason that these are simply marks on a piece of paper and as such are not heard. Perhaps there is no need to labour this point because of its obviousness, the point, namely, that a musical work is not a physical entity.

2. A more important question, however, for my purpose, is what I call the logical question about the identity of a musical work. I think a careful answer to this question will bring out some powerful peculiarities of music as a form of art. In attempting to answer this question I follow once again the lead of Richard Wollheim.

We might begin by making a distinction between a general entity, or more correctly a generic entity and elements that come under this generic entity. And a general answer to the logical question "what is a work of music, say, a khayal?" might be as follows – the khayal is a generic entity, and a particular performance of it is

an element that comes under the generic entity. But it is important to distinguish between three different kinds of generic entities. A generic entity may be a type, a class or a universal. Types have tokens as their elements, classes have members and universals have instances. An example of a type would be the ambassador car and a particular ambassador car is its token, an example of a class would be the class of sweet smelling things with any sweet smelling thing as its member — and an example of a universal would be redness with its instances being particular cases of the colour red.

3. The distinction between these three generic kinds of entity may be more illuminatingly made in terms of the kind of relationship that there is between their elements and them. One might say that the relationship varies in the degree of what Wollheim calls "intimacy", or "intrinsicity", that an element might have with its corresponding generic entity. Thus the relationship between the members of a class and the class may be said to be the least intimate or intrinsic. The relationship between a type and its tokens is perhaps the most intimate; with the relationship of a universal and its instances coming somewhere in between. A universal must be present in all.

its instances, thus redness must be there in all red things. A type also must be present in all its tokens, but a type is itself frequently thought of as some kind of token which is not the case with the universal and its instances. Thus the ambassador car is itself frequently thought of as a particular ambassador car.

To carry on this rather dreary discussion a little further. The different kinds of relationship that we have been considering between an element and its corresponding generic entity are also reflected in the different ways in which properties may be shared between an element and a generic entity. A generic entity and its elements may just happen to share certain properties or it may be that an element has a property because the generic entity has it and vice versa. In the latter case we might say that properties are transmitted between an element and the generic entity. Thus between a class and its members there are no transmitted properties, although they may happen to share properties. For instance, the class of large objects may itself be large but this is a property which is not transmitted from the member to the class or the other way round. The class of large things is not large because its members are large. The fact that they

share this property is purely fortuitous. Between a type and a token and between a universal and its instance there are usually a large number of shared properties and most of these shared properties are also transmitted. In the former case the number of transmitted properties is greater than the latter. For instance, what we might call necessary properties of an instance or a token (necessary because the token or the instance has these properties simply by virtue of the fact that they are tokens or universals) are not transmitted between an instance and its universal whereas they are transmitted between a token and its type. Thus an instance of red is itself red by virtue of the fact that it is an instance of the universal redness, but of course it cannot follow that the universal redness is itself red. On the other hand, if a particular ambassador car is, for instance, rugged because it is a token of the type ambassador car it follows that the type itself must also be rugged.

The point of all this rather abstract discussion has simply been to say that a musical work is a generic entity, which is closest to the generic entity we have called type and particular performances of the work are the tokens of this type. This is perhaps not absolutely accurate in view of somethings that I shall say a little

later on, but for the purposes of the question with which we began this discussion it is perhaps accurate enough.

4. Having made this point, the important question now to ask is, "How do types come into being?" There may be a great variety of ways in which types may come into being, but one can perhaps say this as generally correct: we feel the need of a type under circumstances in which we can correlate a group of particulars with a piece of human invention. And this covers a wide range of cases, a range which may have at one end of it the creation of a particular, say, a song, which then is performed, each performance then being a token. At the other end of the range we may just have a set of instructions which can then generate indefinite number of tokens e.g. the khayal or the thumri or the symphony.

We have already seen that a type and its token may share properties. Moreover there are properties which are transmitted between tokens and their types and vice versa. It is important to make, for an understanding of the general nature of music, the following points about properties that may be predicated of a type. These are (i) there are no properties which cannot, in principle, pass from the token to its type, i.e. everything that can be

predicated of a performance of a musical work can also be in principle predicated of the work itself. If the performance is, say moving or rousing, the work itself may be moving or rousing. (Here of course we are leaving out a consideration of properties which a performance has by virtue of its being located in space and in time). (ii) although all properties (leaving aside the spatio-temporal properties, of a performance mentioned in the parentheses at point (i) above), of a token may be transmitted to the type, it is not necessary that they will all do so. This, taken along with the next point, brings out something of great importance about performing arts particularly of music and drama. (iii) It is necessary that not all properties should pass from token to type, although any single property might do so. Among the properties of which it is necessary that they should not pass from token to type, are the properties generated by the act of interpretation or rendering of, say, a particular piece of music. Such properties of a token might be said to belong to the token in excess, as it were, of the properties that it has by virtue of being a token of the type in question.

5. It will, I think, be true to say that every performance of a piece of music involves interpretation. A purist in

music criticism might say that there is at least one performance of a piece of music which cannot involve any interpretation and this is the very first performance of the piece of music in question. Thus it may be said that every recital of the Raga Darbari involves interpretation except its very first recital by Tansen. A little reflection will however show that this is not correct, for even Tansen's rendering of the raga is but an interpretation of it.

A question that might be raised at this point is, "Does this fact about the necessity of interpretation make the performing arts, and music in particular, radically different from other kinds of art?" The question is complicated by the fact that performance itself is an art apart from the work of art which is being performed. However, into the complications raised by this point, I do not wish to enter at this stage. Here I would like to consider an interesting remark relating to the point about interpretation made by Susanne Langer.<sup>2</sup>

6. Langer thinks that a musical composition is essentially incomplete; it needs completion through its tokens. The implication of this is that a work of music is necessarily defective, unlike the case of other forms of art.

This way of looking at the matter distorts, to my mind, the very nature of music as a creative art. Also it exaggerates the differences in this respect, which undoubtedly do exist between the performing arts and the other forms of art. To take the latter point first, the point about "the essential incompleteness of a musical composition", may be restated in the following way. In music the composer cannot enjoy the kind of freedom over his work that, for **example**, the poet does over his poem. The composer must, of necessity, concede some freedom to the performer, but is this really so? Is it not the case, even in the case of poems, that a poem can be interpreted or taken in different ways? In fact one might even say that this is an inalienable mark of all great poetry. It might perhaps be said that the fact that a poem can be taken in different ways is not a limitation of poetry itself as a form of art but is a function of the inadequacy of any particular reading of it. It is possible to think of the definitive interpretation of a poem, which, when available, becomes its correct meaning. This claim however cannot be sustained, if not for any other reason, for the simple reason that interpretative openness of a poem can, in practice <sup>can</sup> never be ruled out.

Even if however the point that the control of the composer on his work is less than the control of a poet over his poem is granted, a serious acceptance of the Langerian claim about the essential incompleteness of a musical composition leads to consequences involving a radical revision of the very idea of music as a form of art. And this brings me to the first point made above. To suppose that something is incomplete necessarily implies that it is, in principle, capable of being completed. Now suppose one were to undertake the task of completing, in the Langerian sense, a musical composition. This would involve the composer indicating every single detail of how it is to be performed. Perhaps in the case of Western Classical Music this is imaginable because here the modern practice is for the composer to write down at least every note that is to be sung or played on an instrument with some indication of how it is to be done. One can think of the same process being continued until we have a work over which the performer has no freedom other than to follow to the minutest detail the instructions of the composer. But this will have the intolerable consequence of introducing a degree of mechanicality to a musical performance which is, in the ordinary view of things, alien to it. To envisage this kind of completeness of a musical composition

is also to imply the ultimate replacibility of the performer by, say, the computer. Such a thing might indeed come to pass but what we shall then have will no longer be music in the normal meaning of this word.

7. However when we turn to the Indian Classical Tradition, any attempt to introduce "completeness" to a musical work will reflect a total misunderstanding of the very tradition. Here in a composition in the classical mode the practice never is to indicate even all the notes that are to be sung or played on an instrument. The freedom of the performer here is an essential part not only of his art as a performer but is also a part of the idea of the work itself. Take for instance, the guru-shishya tradition or the gharana system of Indian Classical Music. The discipline imposed by the guru on the shishya always leaves, must leave, an area of freedom to the shishya in his performance. For the first five or six years the shishya relies completely on the guidance of his guru who teaches the shishya everything individually and directly but gradually the shishya learns to improvise, and then in the rendering of a raga he adds to his methodical musical training that which he draws from within himself. Similarly the discipline of the gharana system must equally

leave room for the freedom of a particular member of the gharana. Ustad Bade Ghulam Ali Khan's renderings of Raga Rageshwari or Lankeshwari, Goonkali, and Kaushi Dhani could serve as revealing examples of this, where, while retaining the broad characteristics of Patiala gayaki, the artist transcends the limitations of his own school showing that his individuality is greater than the tradition he imbibed. Pandit Bhimsen Joshi is another consummate artist, who stands out as having added new dimensions not only to Kirana gayaki but to the entire tradition of Indian Music. In his rendering of Raga Shudh Kalyan, while maintaining the systematic note by note elaboration of a raga, so characteristic of the Kirana gharana, he adds intricate taan patterns characteristic of the Gwalior gharana, and presents the raga with subtle innovation and rare artistry. The idea of the freedom of the performer then, is not peripheral but central to Indian Music.

8. The difference between music or the performing arts generally and other forms of art implying the necessity of interpretative properties of a token could however be exaggerated. I have already indicated that the poet for instance, must "suffer", if that is the correct word, from a similar lack of control over his work. But this is

also largely true of paintings and sculptures. A painting may be taken in a great variety of ways just as a piece of sculpture may. And it is impossible to put a limit on the possibility of new interpretations. It only needs a genius, such as, say, Freud, to open up the possibility of generating a whole range of new interpretations in respect of any particular work of art or any particular kind of art and one can neither predict the birth of a genius nor of course predict the new possibilities of looking at things that he might introduce into our awareness. However, there is one difference between the performing arts and others which it is impossible to deny and this is that these arts necessarily involve human beings, as opposed to say pigments or stone or wood. And man's control over other human beings can never achieve the degree of completeness that it might over pigments or stones or wood.

What I have said so far is quite obviously far from being an adequate answer to the logical question about the identity of a work of music that I posed at the beginning. However I do not wish to pursue this question any further and would instead like to consider what I take to be more substantial issues about the understanding of music as

a form of art, and these are: the expression of emotions and their significance in a piece of music, the importance of the theory of Rasa, the idea of musical appreciation and the essence of a musical experience.

---

REFERENCES

1. Art and its Objects (Cambridge, 1980).
  2. Feeling and Form (London, 1976).
-

CHAPTER - II

EMOTIONS, THE EXPRESSION OF EMOTIONS, AND MUSIC

1. Verbal language is undoubtedly man's paradigmatic means of communication, performing a great variety of communicating functions like stating, describing, asking, expressing feelings and emotions, eliciting them, prescribing, ordering etc., but it is not the only one, nor necessarily the most expressive means of communication. Although words are our most important instruments of expression, in the world of emotions there are experiences which do not fit the grammatical scheme of expression, and then, it is apparent that our confidence in language as a means of expression is perhaps overstressed for it is somewhat limited in expressing that which contains too many minute yet closely related parts and too many "relations within relations", and certain emotions and delicate nuances of emotions which cannot be projected into discursive forms. As Susanne Langer puts it, "Ordinary language does not have enough names for the infinite number of subjective states that a man experiences."<sup>1</sup> She maintains that ordinary language is a poor medium for expressing our emotional nature adequately, for language

... merely names certain vaguely and crudely conceived states but fails miserably in any attempt to convey the ever moving patterns, the ambivalences and intricacies of inner experience, the interplay of feelings with thoughts

and impressions, memories, transient  
fantasy or its more runic traces all  
turned into nameless emotional stuff.<sup>2</sup>  
(See footnote)\*

Thus when we say that we understand what some other person is feeling or experiencing, what we mean is that we understand why the person must be sad or happy or excited i.e. we can comprehend the cause of his attitude. We do not mean that we have an insight into the actual flow and balance of his feelings, into what might be considered to be "an index of the mind's grasp of its object". It is art, and more specifically music, which alone can adequately articulate such a conception.

2. A prerequisite in understanding how music expresses and articulates emotions is having a clear conception of the ideas of "emotion" and "expression". Etymologically the word emotion is derived from the Latin word "emovere" which means to 'stir up', 'to agitate' or 'to excite'. The common idea of emotions is also similar, for our idea of having an emotion or of being in an emotional

---

\*It may, on the face of it, look as though this claim might have to contend with the Wittgensteinian thesis about the impossibility of a private language. But this is not really so, because all that it requires is a distinction between verbal language and language, which although public, is not verbal; and this is a distinction which, to my mind cannot be denied.

state, is the idea of being 'stirred up', agitated or excited. Clearly then, when one is in an emotional state one is in a state of tension which varies in intensity according to the type of emotion concerned and which, frequently, is resolved by the expression of the said emotion.

Taking their cue from the etymological meaning of the term, various thinkers define "an emotional state" variously. Some call it a moved or stirred up state of an organism, others, "an affective experience that shows itself in overt behaviour", and yet others speak of it as "the feeling tone of a particular quality", the affective colouring of experience that one finds by introspection. But 'emotion' is a highly complex concept and mere definitions cannot really bring out all the intricacies of this protean concept. Besides other aspects, one difficulty in attempting to define emotion arises due to its close association with "feeling" which itself is a difficult term. (An essential step in clarifying the concept of an emotion would be to ascertain whether an emotion is a kind of feeling or sensation, or a cognition or psychological condition, or just a behaviour pattern).

A sensation is a mental occurrence which is immediately and surely felt by the person having the sensation. Sensations like an itch or a tickle or pain, may also be publically displayed by means of more or less typical behaviour, like scratching, giggling etc., i.e. some sensations may be associated with distinctive behavioural patterns or at least tendencies to distinctive physical activities. An emotion on the other hand, cannot be identified with either a particular behaviour pattern or a tendency thereto; of course some emotions are or may be associated with distinctive behaviour. For example, a man who has the emotion of fear will normally try to run away from the thing which is the object or the cause of the fear, either physically, or else mentally by refusing to think of the problem, or even if he does not do either and deliberately refuses to run away he will at least have the tendency to do so. But most emotions are not associated with any distinctive behavioural patterns. A person who is overjoyed or embarrassed does not perform any typical activities. Squirming and broad expansive movements which may be associated with these emotions do not pinpoint the emotion. A point to be noted here however, is that although emotions are not necessarily connected with overt behaviour, for one can have an

emotion without acting in characteristic ways x, y, z, a person's behaviour, verbal or non-verbal, does provide evidence of a certain emotion and in fact, in some circumstances, a person's behaviour provides the sole evidence for saying that a person has emotion x, because no other criterion is available, so much so, that it has been pointed out by Kenny, that if there were no characteristic expression of emotions the meaning of emotion words could not be learnt and third person ascription of emotions impossible. This does not however, show that there is a non-contingent connection between an emotion and behaviour for the connection may sometimes be conventional. That is to say, it may indeed be the case that it may be impossible to learn the meanings of certain words except on the basis of conventional rules, but the meanings themselves need not be exhausted by these rules. I will be referring to this point again.

A sensation or a feeling is a very private phenomenon, the person having the sensation being the best judge of the sensation, and leaving aside controversies like pretenses etc., when a person claims that he is having sensation S he cannot be contradicted. But on the other hand, though emotions cannot be associated with typical

physical activities or behavioural patterns, another person may know that person X is having such and such an emotion without verbally being told by the first person. In fact, very often a second person is a better judge of another's emotional state than the person himself, so much so, that when a person asserts that he is having emotion E, he can be contradicted. It may be said then, that an emotion can be shared in a way a sensation cannot. One cannot experience another's pain, nor can one feel another's grief, but one can understand another's grief and in understanding, feel the form of the grief. This is so because an emotion touches one's very being, and is thus contagious from one person to another, because one's being, in this sense, is necessarily situated in a community of beings.

A sensation is localised in the sense that, it occurs here and now, and is limited in its occurrence to the time and place where it is experienced. When one says "My head is aching" or "My throat is tickling", or "that flower is red", he refers to a specific area and says it at a specific time, or even if a sensation like, e.g., coldness is not limited or confined to a specific point like the hand or the leg, still there is a specific area

of reference. Moreover the sensation coldness, can be got rid of or contained if the area of reference is taken care of i.e. if the person clads himself in warm clothes, sits by the fire etc. But on the other hand, no spatio-temporal limitations can be put on an emotion. "My grief", as it were, envelops my whole being, and the reasons and causes may be so multifarious and deep rooted that they cannot be summarily removed as in the case of sensations. My grief may be accompanied by sensations like heaviness of limbs or heart etc., but it cannot be said that the heaviness of my limbs is my grief. A person may cry when he is in pain as well as when he is grief stricken, but there is a definite difference between the two kinds of crying. Initially only the sensations of physical discomfort make a child cry, and only as he grows in maturity does he begin to associate crying with feeling sad.

Coming to expression, we find that there is a crucial difference between expression of a sensation and the expression of an emotion. A wince may be an expression of pain but it cannot normally be said that a person expresses his pain by wincing. There is a difference between expressing feelings and evincing feelings by groaning, crying etc., and this is so because in emotions, feelings play

a very crucial role, which has led many thinkers like Kant, Hume, William James etc., to equate emotions with feelings. These thinkers maintain that what makes a condition an emotion and what makes it the particular emotion it is, is the presence in consciousness of a certain felt quality, which like sensory qualities is completely accessible to introspection and accessible in no other way. These theorists thus give a central place to determine feelings, showing that, emotion words are nothing but the labels of these feelings. The current opinion however is to deny giving such a prominent place to feelings, some theorists even denying the existence of feelings altogether and instead giving their analysis in terms of "situation appraisals plus an undifferentiated general excitation". Emotion terms are indeed very complex for when we say that "A feels remorse", "B is indignant" or "C feels bitter", we do something much more complex than claim that A, B, C, behave in certain identifiable ways and experience types of inner turmoil. "C feels bitter", about the way he was treated carries as part of its meaning, C believes he ought not to have been so treated, or C believes he was treated badly, i.e. being bitter involves making certain evaluations, not simply having a feeling or acting in particular ways.

There is a certain amount of deliberation or evaluation involved, though of course, the evaluation is not made in the purposeful manner of a person making a moral judgement. The person evaluating the emotional situation does not ponder on the situation and then react, rather, the person has some kind of a general "apprehension" or "misapprehension" of the various aspects of his emotion.

This then brings us to the essential difference between a feeling and an emotion. The crucial point of difference is that it is essential for an emotion to have an object (e.g. we feel love or anger towards or because of x); when a person experiences the emotion 'remorse' his feeling of this emotion is dependent on an object. He is remorseful of past deeds and the true meaning of remorse must have the idea of a past object in it. However, the object towards which an emotion is directed does not necessarily have to be some individual thing or person, rather, there is a reference to something beyond the person experiencing the particular emotion, a reference beyond the emotion itself. There is what has been called "intentionality." In the traditional Indian way of thinking also, which I shall discuss later, this aspect of an emotion plays a crucial role in that it is taken to form part of the meaning of an emotion.

While on emotions and feelings it may be further added that, if only feelings are given a prominent place in the concept of emotions it would be impossible to distinguish between emotions solely on the basis of the feelings involved. For instance, annoyance does not seem to feel any different from indignance but what distinguishes the two is the way the person apprehends the situation. He feels indignation when he thinks some rightful expectation has been violated, whereas annoyance is what he feels at something having gone wrong.

3. Not all emotions are the same type. There are emotions which are immediately felt and expressed and there are abiding or persisting emotions. The first, sometimes termed occurrent emotion, is the emotion a person experiences at a particular instance. A person has an occurrent emotion when he gets angry, feels sad or is indignant, whereas the love a person feels for his loved ones is an abiding emotion in the sense that it is ever present and occasionally overtly expressed. The sensational element is undoubtedly there in both occurrent and abiding emotions, but there are what Pitcher calls "calm passions" which do not include any such sensational element, as for instance, hope, and sometimes even those emotions which

do have characteristic sensations like fear and anger, sometimes exist without the sensational element.

Whether the expression is overtly or subtly done, the important point is that, expression of an emotion forms part of our understanding of an emotion. In fact there are those like Collingwood,<sup>3</sup> who maintain that an emotion is known or identified only through its expression. Expression gives an emotion its distinctive character. Prior to expression an emotion exists as a vague unconscious perturbation, and the person experiencing it is not aware of anything else but this perturbation or excitement. Collingwood is right in a way when he says that an emotion gets its distinctive character by its expression, but the whole process is not quite the way he puts it. His idea of a "helpless oppressed condition,"<sup>4</sup> from which a man extricates himself by expressing himself implies a sense of deliberation on the part of the person and gives the idea of breaking up the whole process of emotion and its expression into clearly defined steps. As stated earlier, the whole process is not a case of definite apprehension and deliberation. It is not possible to break up into bits the various components of an emotion, for an emotion is an organic unity. It is what may be called a

"hermeneutic mesh" of the "feeling", the expression of this feeling, and the object of the feeling. For instance, the characteristic feeling of anger can be meaningfully articulated only by reference to its expression; the going red in the face, the facial distortions and so on. But both the feeling and the expression get their meaning by being hermeneutically placed in relation to the object of the emotion.

5. Whichever way it is put, the idea of an emotion is that it involves tension, agitation or pressure which is relieved or reduced by the expression of the particular emotion; in some emotions the expressions are very obvious, whereas in others the expression is hardly perceptible. This is due to the fact that the tension accompanying emotions vary in intensity, thus the tension in a grief stricken person, or a person in a fury would be considerable, whereas the person in a state of depression would be sunk in apathy and passivity, his emotion would be dull and undifferentiated. Thus if a man's emotive life were to be projected on a graph, it would not always consist of peaks and pits, sometimes the graph, like the wave of the sea, would rise to sublime heights and then subside to serene cadences, sometimes there would be a

gentle ripples and its resolution and sometimes there would be the merest hint of a rise.

6. There are different kinds of expression of emotions and accordingly they have been classed as natural and conventional, rule governed or not rule governed, verbal or non-verbal. Natural expressions are involuntary expressions e.g. blushing, change of colour, horripilation etc. They are unlearned and universal. In Indian aesthetics they are said to be eight in number and are called Sattvikabhāvas. They are considered to be the infallible signs of emotions for they can take place only when the emotion of which they are recognised to be the effects is actually experienced by the person concerned. The wilful expression of emotions such as the movement of eyes, eyebrows, gesticulations etc., are called anubhāvas and are voluntary in nature. They are not considered to be infallible signs of any particular emotion, for they can be enacted even when the said emotion is not experienced by the person. Conventional expressions of emotions are learned and subject to cultural variations and necessarily rule governed, but not necessarily voluntary e.g. in India the conventional expression of welcome is by folding the hands, this is initially learnt by convention and later on becomes an involuntary expression

of welcome. O. H. Green in his article on the "Expression of emotion",<sup>5</sup> defines conventional and natural expression as, "Expressions of emotions which cannot be referred to in giving a partial definition of the relevant emotion words and which do not constitute a form of behaviour characteristic of the emotion in question except in virtue of being defined as expression of the emotion are conventional expressions of emotions",<sup>6</sup> and expression of emotions, "which can be referred to in giving a partial definition of the relevant emotion term and which constitute a form of behaviour characteristic of the emotion in question without being defined as expressions of that emotion are natural expressions of emotions...."<sup>7</sup>

Having discussed the general notion of emotions, I would now like to consider emotions and expression of emotions in art, particularly in music, and see whether the same principles of expression are applicable here too.

It is seen that in art, the expression of emotion is different from that in real life, for the depiction or presentation of an emotion is possible without bringing in all the elements of meaning of an emotion. In music the situation is even further removed from real life, for in music neither object nor feeling is present, and expres-

sion is also not related in any ordinary way to the natural and conventional modes of expression of emotions; yet, musical expression of emotions, is of all emotional expression, the most immediate, inward and intimate. One may say that this is possible because music makes, so to speak, straight for the inner life, the prāna of an emotion, and this it is peculiarly suited to do, for music shares with emotions its characteristic properties of dynamism and flow. As has been pointed out by Susanne Langer.

Music bears a close logical similarity to the forms of human feeling forms of growth and of attenuation, flowing and stowing, conflict and resolution, speed, arrest, terrific excitement, calm or subtle activation and dreamy lapses — not joy and sorrow perhaps but the poignancy of either and both — the greatness and brevity and eternal passing of everything vitally felt. Such is the pattern or logical form of sentience; and the pattern of music is that same form worked out in pure measured sound and silence.<sup>8</sup>

One way of putting the matter might be to say that music expresses not the emotions proper, but the "forms of emotions". It reveals as it were, the rationale of feelings, and the rhythm and pattern of their rise. And music is expressively unique in that music gives expression to objectless emotions. It is seen that in music, especially

instrumental music or even khayals, there is nothing which may be said to be the object of the emotion presented. But in spite of this, nothing is detracted from the musical expression of emotions, for music expresses, not the facticity of an emotion, but rather captures, or tries to capture the prāna or essence of an emotion. The absence of an object or an objective situation is never felt because of the tremendous expressive quality of the medium itself. The creative potential of the medium is such that while primarily presenting the feeling or bhāva, associated with a particular emotion, it points inevitably to a completeness of the hermeneutic circle.

8. Langer shows not only that music is a tonal analogue of our emotive life, but also that music represents time, not measured time but lived or experienced time.

Musical duration is an image of what might be termed 'live' or 'experienced' time — the passage of life that we feel as expectations becomes 'now', and 'now', turns into unalterable fact. Such passage is measurable only in terms of sensibilities, tensions and emotions, and it is not merely a different measure but an altogether different structure from practical or scientific time.<sup>9</sup>

In fact Langer seems to imply that the primary function of music is to represent time, for she says that, the

semblance of this vital, experiential time is the primary illusion of music, and it is in music that we have its image.

... completely articulated and pure; every kind of tension transformed into musical tension, every qualitative content into musical quality, every extraneous factor replaced by musical elements. The primary illusion of music is the sonorous image of passage, abstracted from actuality to become free and plastic and entirely perceptible.<sup>10</sup>

Although Langer is right in emphasizing the relationship between music and temporality, as passage or flow is an essential feature of music, her views on this matter seem to suggest that emotions in music only have an instrumental function i.e. emotions have to be used because it is through the tension and resolution of emotions one perceives the 'subjective' or 'real life'. But progression in music consists in building up of musical tensions and their resolutions and a particular musical work or passage presents the life of a feeling in musical terms, and the tensions which are inevitably there are the tensions of this feeling. And it is really the other way round, that although music is an image of time, what is important is what fills this time - the

feeling, its 'breaking' or diminishing or merging into other feelings.

9. The important point is then that, while it is undeniable that music presents emotions and that it is possible for us to recognize them not merely as feelings but as emotions, the musical presentation of emotions is what it is, and not another thing in a different guise, i.e. musical expression of an emotion is not translatable or reducible into some other non-musical expression. Only when we try to present musical expressions of emotions in some other medium do we feel that an objectless expression of emotions is impossible. But in music itself, the absence of an object or objective situation or reference is quite irrelevant in determining its expressiveness, for as said earlier, music, because of its tremendous creative potential is in itself complete. Of course other things may be added to music (e.g. operas) but this is not done because music is in itself wanting in expressing any desired emotion, but because, the composer tries to achieve a new medium of artistic expression or tries to express in a different way. A Wagner opera does not achieve something more complete than a Beethoven's symphony, but something different. Similarly in Indian music,

simply by enunciating the words of a khaval clearly does not make a rendering of a raga more expressive than one where the artist chooses to employ words like Re Tum Ni etc. What is required then to complete the hermeneutic circle is the internal, purely musical coherence, fittingness and aptness of a musical work, which is possible because of the unmediated expressive power of music. This then brings us to another important aspect of musical expression, that of "expressiveness".

10. Analyzing the term expression in his article, "Expression and Emotion",<sup>11</sup> John Nolt points out that it is seen that there are some senses of the term which do not follow the general analysis where, "a expresses p" means "a is p", Nolt explains this point with the help of an illustration.... "A political cartoon expresses Theodore Roosevelt's patriotic fervour in a lighthearted and satirical way. The cartoon expresses fervour but is not fervent".<sup>12</sup> The cartoon also expresses lightheartedness and that is obviously the intended expression. A distinction between the two expressions is made by showing that whereas, the cartoon expresses fervour, fervour is not the expressive quality of the work itself, but rather the work depicts or represents fervour. Lightheartedness on

the other hand, is an expressive quality of the work itself; that is to say, it is a quality of the work as a whole and is not necessarily connected to its representational function. It is to be remembered that the aesthetic concept of expression cannot be identified with the non-aesthetic concept of natural expression, for natural expression need not be expressive but in art and, especially so in music, it can be said that there is no expression without expressiveness. A work of art is an expression of love or grief, only if it is expressive of love and grief, and the eloquence of art in expressing the inexpressible is due precisely to the expressiveness of art. In a way language is also expressive, but language is expressive through the conventions that give it reference, whereas the expressiveness of art, moreso music, cannot be pinpointed or cannot be determined by other references. And as expressiveness has to do with impact, expressiveness of a piece of music cannot be grasped by second person descriptions — the experience must be immediate and personally felt.

There has been an attempt to pin down expressiveness in art to external factors. A work of art is said to be expressive if it expresses emotions, and a work of art

can be said to express emotions or a mood, if and only if, it exhibits qualities identical with, or at least, similar to those used as criteria for ascribing emotion or moods to people's behaviour and this is especially true in music. This is the view held by Hospers who says:

... let us remind ourselves of the most basic sense of the term expression, namely, that of outer behaviour manifesting or reflecting inner states. When people feel sad they tend to exhibit certain types of behaviour: they move slowly, they walk softly, they talk in hushed tones, their movements are not jerky and abrupt, nor are their tones strident and piercing and so on. Now music can truly be said to exhibit at least some of these same qualities. Music that we immediately identify as sad, is normally slow, the interval between the tones is small, with few large tonal intervals, and the tones are not strident but hushed and soft.<sup>13</sup>

In general then: a work of music has feeling quality X, when it has features (the more the better) that human beings have when they are in feeling state X<sup>2</sup>. Similarly, Hospers points out that a line in a painting is graceful because it possesses similarities to the contour of the limbs of human and animal bodies when they are said to be graceful. Horizontal lines corresponding to the human position for rest is graceful etc. Hospers's behaviouristic

analysis however, cannot apply to all arts and it fails to account for the expressiveness of colour. Hospers is however aware of this, for he gives an alternative when he says, "Expressiveness is rooted in association". The colour green for instance, acquires its expressiveness through its association with certain other human experiences. Hospers' association theory can be schematized as, where a is an art object and p an affective state, a expresses p, if and only if a has some (or many) qualities commonly associated with p in human experiences.

Although this theory is, to a large extent, true, it is however neither necessary nor sufficient that for an art object to express an affective state it must have properties commonly associated with that affective state. This is particularly true in literature (especially poems) which is expressive of any particular emotion and in whose context there are no words which one commonly associates with that particular emotion. In literature emotions and moods are expressed by means of suggestions, by what in Indian Aesthetics is called Dhvanikavya. In fact here, great emphasis is laid on the expressiveness of poetic language by means of suggestions or Dhvani. It is maintained that the ideal element of poetic visions can only

be expressed by means of suggestions for direct expression in ordinary language would not only fail to bring out the intricacies of the vision, but would also tend to lead to an over exaggerated or affected expression, for the intensity of feelings cannot be expressed without loss of beauty through ordinary <sup>language</sup>, but only through language which suggestively brings out the rarity of the poetic vision. In a piece of literary work, say a poem, it is then the combination of the meanings in the whole that makes the poem expressive of any particular emotion. And one understands the expression of any emotion when one understands the suggested words and situations. And just as it is not necessary that for an art object to express a certain affective state it must have properties generally associated with that state in human experience, it is not a sufficient condition either. Having qualities associated with an emotion, it is not sufficient for expression of that emotion for example, instances of art objects which have a superabundance of some qualities generally associated with human experience do not express that emotion but something else, maybe even its opposite. A performance which is too sad thus becomes ludicrous, and a piece of music too sweet, becomes nauseating and stagnant.

Whether it is through association or through some other means, the fact is that music is infinitely expressive. One may, at this point, perhaps ask the following set of questions; can one attribute specific expressive properties to a piece of music, and, if so, then, is the specific expressive property dependent on any particular or specific aspect of a piece of music, and can one attribute specific expressive properties just on the basis of what is presented i.e. is the rendering of a particular raga sufficient to determine the expressive property of the raga, or is there need to know something more? I have already briefly touched on these questions and here I repeat, that while one may have no difficulty in recognizing the complex of similarities between a sad scene in a play and an actual sad occurrence in real life, it is much more difficult to point out phenomenal features of a **raga** that will justify our calling it sad. This is so because musical expressiveness is unmediated or objectless. But in spite of this, it is possible to recognize specific expressive properties of a piece of music, because music is, as it were, inherently expressive. Of course it may not be possible for the inexperienced listener to immediately identify or pinpoint a particular emotion in a raga, but the expressive medium brings in

one a kind of awareness which is immediate and unanalysable, and in that sense intuitive. And gradually, depending on one's experience and exposure, one can give a name to that specific expressive experience. Expressiveness is always an immediate experience and it cannot be known through second person descriptions. Hence the identity of expressiveness is not determined by the application of an external standard, for the identity is the identity of an experience - the experience of recognizing expression and for this no criterion is required.

This brings me to a consideration of some interesting remarks of Gombrich's in his book, Art and Illusion; <sup>14</sup>— remarks that are relevant to the question posed above. His observations are mainly of the visual arts, but they can be taken to apply to music as well. As opposed to what he calls the Theory of Natural Resonance, according to which certain elements which can occur outside as well as inside art have an intrinsic connection with inner states which they are thereby, able to express as well as to invoke, Gombrich points out that many instances of art testifies that one and the same element or complex of elements can have an entirely different significance in different contexts. He says, "what strikes us as a

dissonance in Haydn might pass unnoticed in a post-Wagnerian context and even the fortissimo of a string quartet may have fewer decibels than the pianissimo of a large symphony orchestra."<sup>15</sup> And hence, Gombrich argues, that a particular element has significance only if it regarded as selection out of a specifiable set of alternatives, i.e. in order for one to see a work as expressive one must know the set of alternatives within which the artist is working, or what might be called his "repertoire"; and it is only by knowing what point in the repertoire the work emerges can one ascribe to the work a particular expressive significance. The Expressionists by talking as if a given shape or colour were inherently 'charged' with an expressive meaning totally ignores this important point. Here I do not intend to go into a detailed discussion of Gombrich's theory, but extending it to music this much is obvious, that though it might provide some important points in the topic of musical appraisal, it cannot be applied in understanding musical expressiveness. By bringing in the concept of 'repertoire', a limit is put on the musician's expressive capabilities, where rightly there should be none. And this is so for it is seen that, just as words describe that which we have not seen before,

similarly, music can present emotions and moods one has not felt before, and passions one has not known before "... the artist need not have experienced in actual life every emotion he can express. It may be through manipulations of his created elements that he discovers new possibilities of feeling, strange moods, perhaps greater concentrations of passion than his own temperament could ever produce...";<sup>16</sup> and not only that, but it is possible, just as it is possible in language as pointed out by Chomsky, for another person well experienced in musical expression to understand expressively fresh works of music. No limit can be put on a person's capability to understand the expressive qualities of a piece of music, however strange and alien the mood. This is so because, although a piece of music like any other work of art reveals the character of subjectivity, it is itself objective, and its purpose is to objectify the "life of feeling. As an abstracted form, it can be handled quite apart from its sources and yield such dynamic patterns that may even surprise the musician himself.

12. We come then to the debate whether the emotions expressed in a piece of music are those of the composer's or performer's or not. The Expressionists like Collingwood and

Croce point out that a work of art expresses what an artist experiences and undergoes on being stimulated by some external or internal factor. Collingwood points out that the artists only find out what their emotions are in the course of finding out how to express them. They cannot begin the work of expressing by deciding what emotion to express, emotions thus do not exist independent of their expression, and from this he shows that, the aesthetic experience or artistic activity is the experience of expressing one's emotions and that which expresses them is the total imaginative activity called indifferently language of art. Briefly the Expressionists stand can be represented in two different ways. Firstly, works of art are expressive of a certain emotion, say grief, because the composer or artist was in this mental or emotional condition when he produced the particular work of art, or in other words, to call a piece of music sad, is to say that it expresses the sadness of its composer or performer. Secondly, works of art are expressive of grief because they produce or are able to produce a similar emotional state of mind or feeling in the spectator or, in other words, to call a piece of music sad is to say that it causes sadness in the hearer. Some modify the latter by saying that music does not cause sadness

but, rather that, were one sad, the music would be a fit object of one's feeling.

Leaving aside philosophical analysis even a simple examination shows that the Expressionist's stand is not acceptable, for it is seen that if one takes musical expression of emotions to be nothing other than the outpouring of the feelings of the musician, then one cannot explain how an artist could perform two different ragas expressing such diverse emotions like Raga Yaman whose dominant mood is that of love's longing and Raga Marwa which expresses renunciation at the same sitting, or if the artist were performing in the Western tradition, would he even be able to perform a complete sonata, for instance, successfully for the allergo, adagio, presto and allegretto would all express different moods. As Langer puts it "... such mercurial passions would be abnormal even in the notoriously capricious race of musicians". The facial expressions and gesticulations of the hands etc. of the musician are not signs indicating the expression of personal emotions, these outward physical expressions are part and parcel of a performance and very often they are learnt conventionally. It is really the flow, tension and resolutions of the music, which the artist

indicates by waving his hands, closing his eyes etc. and not confessing his emotions to the audience. The sentimental lover of music would of course like to think that all the pathos and poignancy expressed in a piece of music is nothing but the expression of the longing or ecstasy or despair of the artist's own 'vie amoureuse', contending that the artist can only express those sentiments which he has experienced sometime in his lifetime. But, as already pointed out, an artist can express feelings which he has not experienced before. Moreover, sheer self expression does not require an artistic form — the proper reaction to extreme grief is loss of speech, palpitation, crying etc., but not music. But the fact that pathos and poignancy is expressed and enjoyed shows that personal emotions are not expressed by the performer, and neither are they subjectively felt by the audience, and the aesthetic appeal of artistic presentation of emotions lies precisely in this fact that there is a distance, between what the artist presents and his subjective self, and the same goes for the audience too. Feelings revealed in music are then not the passion, love, or longing of any particular individual, inviting one to put oneself in that person's place, rather the feelings are presented directly to one's understanding

such that one may grasp, realize and comprehend these without pretending to have them nor to impute them to another. Thus even though the subject matter of music may be similar to self expression and the symbols might also be borrowed from the realm of expressive symptoms yet the "borrowed suggestive elements are formalized and the subject matter distanced in an artistic perspective."<sup>17</sup>

Examining the different versions of the Expressionist Theory, it is seen that the main reason why emotions expressed in a piece of music are attributed to the artist is because it is believed by these theorists in some way or another — that emotions must always have an object or cause, whereas in music, more so in instrumental music and khayals, there is nothing in the music itself, which can be said to be the object or cause of any particular emotion being expressed. Hence the emotion is given an object by saying that the emotion expressed is the self expression of the musician. But as seen earlier, in music, the creative potential of the medium is such that, the absence of a cause or an object does not detract anything from music's primary function of expressing emotions. Even without an object or cause the emotions presented can be identified as a particular emotion. What

is important is to grasp the 'essence of a feeling' and pure experience is possible only if the artist is not weighed down by his personal woes and cares. An artist conveying his personal feelings might perform passionately, but the performance being a symptom of emotion, be contagious only for the moment, it would lack intensity because its expressive forms are inarticulate.

One of the more fundamental objections to the theory of art as self expression and one that is emphasized by recent philosophers is to do with music's expressiveness. Attributing the expressiveness of a musical piece to the self expression of the artist is to make musical expressiveness a separate feature of the musical piece, but expressiveness is built into the music itself and it is something we apprehend directly. The qualities of expressiveness that we attribute to a piece of music is essential to our understanding and appreciating the piece of music. But by attributing the expressiveness of music to the self expression of the artist we make these features extrinsic to the music and make it belong more to the biography of the musician.

13. Music expresses emotions but not the emotions of its composer or performer — the difficulties involved in

understanding this idea is lessened when we understand (as shown by philosophers like Langer) music as expressing emotions symbolically. While a signal merely indicates, a symbol presents ideas i.e. the function of a symbol is expression or presentation of concepts. Music is a symbolic presentation of man's sentient life. Although music does not use fixed symbolic references, yet it logically expresses man's inner life of emotions. Susanne Langer thus calls music a highly articulated symbol which can be analyzed but which cannot, like verbal language, be,

Constructed by a process of synthesis of elements, because no such elements exist outside it. They only occur in a total form; as the concave and convex surfaces of a shell may be noted as characterising its form but a shell cannot be synthetically composed of the 'concave' and the 'convex'. There are no such factors before there is a shell.<sup>18</sup>

And this highly "articulated sensuous symbol", by virtue of its dynamic structure, can express the forms of vital experience which language is unfit to convey. The function of music is then, not the stimulation of feelings, but the expression of it, and not the "symptomatic expression of feelings that beset the composer but a symbolic expression of the forms of sentience as he understands them".<sup>19</sup>

The cognitive value of symbols is such that they can present ideas transcending the individual's realm of subjective experience, and hence there is no limit to what the artist can express. Again the "commanding form", of a piece of music presents the artist with infinite emotive possibilities and expressive value. Thus the musician's greatness in presenting feelings and emotions is not so much because of his own feelings, as because, of his,

Intuitive recognition of forms symbolic of feelings and his tendency to project emotive knowledge into such objective forms. In handling his own creation, composing a symbol of human emotion he learns from the perceptible reality before him possibilities of subjective experience that he has not known in his personal life. His own mental scope and the growth and expansion of his personality are therefore deeply involved with his art.<sup>20</sup>

What is important, is to remember that man's emotive life is highly complex. It is clear by now that emotions and their expressions do not follow a watertight connection in the sense that Emotion E need not always be followed by expression X, but may be followed by X or Y or Z. Man's sentient life is inseparable from the man himself, man being ever in a state of emotional experience; some emotions he consciously experiences, others he is vaguely

aware of, and yet others he is totally unaware of i.e. there are those he experiences primarily and others he cannot pinpoint. Music being the most abstract and elusive of all the arts is also an adequate and lucid symbol of man's emotive life. Due to its immense potentialities for expression, music is able to present both the conscious and unconscious feelings and emotions of man. And in fact, not only of man, but the inner spirit of whole civilizations may be comprehended through its music, for it is said that music is so intimately interwoven with changes in the shapes of time that it can be of extraordinary historical and psychological interest.

14. The function of music, however, is not just the expression of emotions but the presentation of emotions such that the "relishability", what in Indian Aesthetics is called Rasa is presented. Rasa literally means "juice" or "extract", but as an aesthetic concept it refers to the essence or basic character of a work of art, and the purpose of all forms of art is the exposition or presentation of the basic rasa. Mere technique may bring out all the forms of a raga, yet fail to present rasa. So although there is distance between the artist and what he presents, yet the artist must not be far removed from the feel (bhāva)

of the raga. The concept of rasa then focusses on the core emotive content of a raga around which revolves its sensuous characteristics, like metre, magnitude, rhythm etc. There are recognized rasas - Nava Rasa, namely, śṛṅgāra, hasya, karuna, raudra, veera, bhayanaka, vibhatsa, adbhuta and śānta rasa. This list is not arbitrarily made up, but is based on man's emotive life and consists principally of these nine sentiments and other sentiments are nothing but the combination of these in different ways. Each artistic creation is supposed to be dominated by the presentation of any one of these Nava Rasas, although other related rasas may also be presented in a lesser degree.

The artistic warmth and ardour or dard that the artist presents in a performance is thus, not due to a personal passion, but the passion of rasa presentation; the bhāva of presenting, say, śṛṅgāra rasa; and the feelings that the audience experience also depends on how well he apprehends the rasa presented. Human experience is such, that it is easier to say something is not, than to confirm something is in clearly articulated terms, and that something is, is sometimes best confirmed intuitively. Rasa-nubhuti is such an experience which is to be experienced immediately and intuitively.

---

REFERENCES

1. Philosophy in a New Key. (London, 1951), p. 101.
  2. Ibid., p.101.
  3. Principles of Art. (London, Oxford, New York 1974).
  4. Ibid., p. 109.
  5. The Expression of Emotion. (MIND, Vol. 79, 1969).
  6. Ibid., p. 562.
  7. Ibid., p. 562.
  8. Feeling and Form. (London, 1953), p.27.
  9. Ibid., p. 109.
  10. Ibid., p. 113.
  11. Expression and Emotion, (The British Journal of Aesthetics. Vol. 21, No.2, 1981).
  12. Ibid.
  13. Philosophy of Art. (The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol. I).
  14. Art and Illusion. (London, 1972).
  15. Ibid.
  16. Feeling and Form, p. 374.
  17. Philosophy in a New Key, p. 222.
  18. Feeling and Form, p. 371.
  19. Ibid., p. 28.
  20. Ibid., p. 390.
-

CHAPTER - III

STHĀYIBHĀVA

Here I take up the discussion of two related questions raised in the previous section viz. Can specific expressive properties be attributed to a piece of music? And secondly, is the specific expressive property so attributed dependent on any particular or specific aspect of the musical piece?

1. Music expresses emotions — not the particular emotions of the composer or the performer, but emotions which are in a sense, "in" the music. Music distils as it were ordinary subjective emotions, and capturing the fleeting nuances of emotions, presents the very life (prāna) of an emotion, or as S. K. Langer puts it, music expresses the 'forms of feelings', it reflects the 'morphology of feelings'. And this presentation of the "life" or "prāna" of an emotion is what Bharata elaborates in his theory of Rasa in the Nāṭya Śāstra.

Bharata shows that the function of an 'aesthetic object', (Bharata refers primarily to drama, but the same could be extended to music as well) is not just to cause a pleasurable sensation in the perceiver of the object — the function is much more profound. Bharata holds that the aesthetic object is a configuration of various

elements and the configuration expresses the 'rasa', or the quintessence of an emotion or what some call the aesthetic fact.

Rasa, as already stated, literally means 'juice', 'extract', or that which gives relish and in the aesthetic context it is that which gives life or vitalizes an emotion. The function of all art and music is the presentation of rasa or the resultant of the aesthetic configuration which "consists of situations, mimetic changes, transient emotions and basic emotions, so harmoniously mixed up that the configuration presents to the aesthete something which is entirely different from that which results from the mere juxtaposition of various elements". Realizing the flavour or rasa of a melody could be likened to wine tasting in Europe or to the cultivated sensitivity possessed by some Chinese for the assessment of the tactile qualities and the appearance of jade, but of course, it is much more subtle, for whereas one could describe the flavour of a new wine accurately enough to enable the experienced wine taster to know what to expect it is impossible to realize rasa merely from descriptions, or by being told by another. Again rasa is essentially a product of dramatic art and music and not

to be found in the "creations" of nature:

It is not pure unity but unity in multiplicity. The unifying factor in the multiplicity is a basic state of mind (Sthāyibhāva) which binds together in an organic whole (1) The emotive situation in human setting, consisting of the physical cause of the basic mental state (Vibhāva); (2) the mimetic changes, which are inspired by the aroused basic mental state and as such are indicative of the internal state (Anubhāva) and (3) the transient emotions (vyabhicāribhāvas).<sup>1</sup>

To understand clearly the concept of rasa then, one must first understand how the sthāyibhāva keeps the unity of a work of art or a musical composition, and also what is (if any) the musical element in a musical composition in which the sthāyibhāva is embodied. And of course to understand the concept of sthāyibhāva one must also understand what is vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva.

2. In a typical emotive situation in real life three essential features are clearly discernible. Firstly, there is the cause of the emotion — here a distinction is made between cause as reason, and cause as a specific object or a situation with a focal point. Wittgenstein distinguishes between an object of fear and the cause of fear, saying that a force which inspires fear or delight is not on that account its cause, but its target. The object

of fear, of which the following questions can be asked — "On what grounds do you believe this?" or "From what are you now deducing it?" etc. can be said to be the reason. In the Indian context however, no such distinction is made for the cause of an emotion which is called kāraṇa seems to cover both cause (reason) and object. Then it is seen that the particular emotion caused, expresses itself in various physical changes e.g. change of colour, palpitation of the heart etc. and these physical changes which may be said to be the effects of the emotion are called kārya. Then lastly it is seen that the persisting emotions are invariably accompanied by various transient emotions — the invariable concomitants or sahacāris. When an emotion is expressed or presented as expressed in an aesthetic situation (more precisely in drama) the same distinction can be made but here the situation is slightly more complicated because here the emotions are not really felt but merely presented, for instance, in drama the actor enacting the role of the historical Rama cannot feel for the enacted Sita the same love that the historical Rama felt for Sita rather the actor might feel for Sita not love but reverence considering that Sita is a much revered historical character. Thus in an aesthetic situation since the cause is not there neither can the effect be there in the typical way it is in real life.

The important point to note here is of course, that although the actor enacting the role of Rama does not experience the love which the historical Rama felt for Sita, yet it cannot be said that what the actor presents on stage is not love but merely the pretense of love, for by expression of emotions in an aesthetic situation we do not mean mere expression of feelings but the articulation of the forms of feelings — not self expression of love, neither the pretense of love, but the expression of love itself, or as Langer puts it, art reveals as it were the "rationale of feelings". Moreover, if the expression of emotions in an aesthetic situation were nothing but a pretense, in drama one would not talk of authentic or honest acting, yet very often the greatness of an acting is judged on the basis of authenticity and honesty.

Because the kāraṇa, kārya and sahacāri does not adequately describe the expression of emotions in an aesthetic situation Bharata has substituted for these terms the more technical terms — vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva, and the emotion itself — the sthāyibhāva.

3. VIBHĀVA, ANUBHĀVA & VYABHICĀRIBHĀVA: Corresponding to kāraṇa in real life, in an aesthetic situation there is

vibhāva, which stands for the emotive situation and which in real life could be said to be the cause of the emotion. But as already stated in an aesthetic situation the relation between emotion and situation is not one of cause and effect, rather the relationship is that of a medium to a state of mind in quite the same way as the relationship between the mystic medium and the experience got through it. Vibhāva has two important aspects: (i) ālambana - or the object which is primarily responsible for the arousal of the emotion and on which the emotion is dependent for its being and (ii) uddīpana - or the idyllic surrounding which enhances the emotive effect of the object.

Corresponding to kārya in real life in an aesthetic situation we have what is termed anubhāva which broadly speaking is the expression of feelings. Anubhāva is an immediate and as it were momentary response. In drama anubhāva is presented through behaviour and action by the actors, and it is through anubhāva that the idea of the emotion is communicated. The two terms vibhāva and anubhāva are also translated as determinant and consequent - vibhāva is then that state of affairs that initiates a response and anubhāva is the response. Anubhāva literally means

to apprehend or feel, and here, anubhāva implies that the artiste perceives or apprehends the rationale of feelings to be expressed and having so apprehended, expresses it. This type of expression is then different from both self expression and a mechanical well rehearsed expression. The actor or the musician expresses the essence of love through anubhāva thereby giving his expression the artistic warmth which is so essential in all aesthetic experiences. Artistic warmth is something which cannot be planned or assured by anything technical but it is indispensable, for it is that which makes a piece of music "alive" and gives it the quality of "impassioned utterance."

In music to bring out this quality of impassioned utterance the musician must have a proper understanding of what his piece of music expresses, i.e. what he expresses must be within his "emotional ken". It is not important that the artist must actively have experienced every feeling he expresses for as long as he can grasp the "form of the feeling" he expresses, his expression will have "vital import". Anubhāva then adequately covers the concept of artistic or aesthetic expression of feelings.

Vyabhicāribhāvas are the transient emotions in an aesthetic situation. As they correspond to sahacāris in real life they are the invariable concomitants of a persistent or basic mental state. Like the comic relief in a drama the vyabhicāribhāvas may be directly opposite to the basic mental state, but this opposition itself enhances or brings out the effect of the sthāyibhāva more prominently. Vyabhicāribhāva raises the "sthayin from being a mere matter of inference and brings it as it were directly before the spectator".<sup>2</sup>

Sthayibhāva: At the heart or core of an aesthetic configuration is the sthāyibhāva or the basic persisting emotion which binds the total aesthetic situation of a musical composition together. In the Nāṭya Śāstra, it is said that — with actions, speech, bodily actions, natural reaction, the vibhāvas and anubhāvas articulate a meaning which is intelligible — that meaning is bhāva and sthāyibhāva is thus the most important aspect of an aesthetic situation and the objective of the other bhāvas is really to focus one's attention on the sthāyibhāva. The sthāyibhāva has thus been likened to a king with all his paraphernalia. Here although the regalia of the king is not totally insignificant they play only a subordinate role,

the centre of attention is obviously the king and the importance of all the paraphernalia lies only in that they help to focus attention on the king thereby increasing his importance. In an aesthetic configuration it is the sthāyibhāva which keeps the unity of the work together while all the other emotions are like "... waves which arise from the ocean of the basic mental state and subside into it". It is the sthāyibhāva which commands or guides the entire structure and form of an artistic creation. It can thus be likened to Berlioz's "idea fixe", or Langer's "commanding idea", for in its expression the entire structure of the composition is created. As Langer says...." The great moment of creation is the recognition of the matrix for in this lies all the themes — a theme may be imported if it fits the place — but the tendencies of the piece, the need for dissonance and consonance, novelty and reiteration, length of phrase and timing of cadences".<sup>3</sup> This 'seizing of the motif', which thereto becomes the guiding force, from the patterns of sounds and colours is the most vital point in an artistic creation.

4. In the initial stage of an artistic creation, various themes and bhāvas may figure together in a loose fantasy

until one idea or bhāva takes over, and as a result, a definite structure emerges from the wandering sounds and from then on the musician or artist composes or creates guided by the structure and form of this basic idea or emotion.

Although this basic idea or bhāva puts a check on artistic imagination it is not restrictive, or restrictive only in a limited sense i.e. only in so far as it structures too free an artistic imagination. And precisely because of imposing this restriction the sthāyibhāva or "commanding idea", is immensely generative. By restricting too free an imagination the sthāyibhāva helps the musician to spontaneously, but with understanding, compose something which is infinitely rich and distilled. Having got a basic guide the musician's mind does not wander from theme to theme, key to key, or mood to mood, or perhaps if it does wander from one mood to another in a single musical piece, say Raga Nalkauns whose principal mood is utsaha or zeal, but in the exposition of the raga the moods of śoka, or grief, or vairāgya or renunciation may also be expressed, but once the principal mood of utsaha, has been grasped the other moods are brought in only to accentuate the basic mood and add to its expression.

The way sthāyibhāva restricts yet generates is especially marked in Indian music, for Indian music to the uninitiated is seemingly unstructured. An Indian recital has unforeseen possibilities and yet though the structures are so flexible that there seems to be no structure at all, yet there is in the exposition of a raga an inner logic, which is essentially dependent on how the sthāyibhāva has been grasped by the performer.

The sthāyibhāva is embodied in the entire work of art, permeating and unifying the work say a raga but at the same time not restricting creativity, rather providing the musician with an inexhaustible source of inspiration to create. I say the source of inspiration is inexhaustible, for the sthāyibhāva as seen is an emotion, and not only is the very concept of emotion, a very complex one but the connotations of a single emotion are infinite. Taking a single emotion, love: in expressing it we can express the joy of love, the ecstasy of love, the yearning of love, the tragedy of love, the expectancy of love and so on. Earlier I had likened man's emotive life to the sea, maintaining that if man's emotive life were projected on a graph, the graph would be assorted sometimes with peaks and pits, sometimes the graph would rise to

sublime heights and then subside to serene cadences, sometimes there would be gentle ripples and its resolutions and sometimes there would be the merest hint of a rise. This imagery gives the idea of how an emotion operates but an emotion in real life is of course much more complicated and complex. It is not always the case that there is an emotion which brings about tensions, and in expressing the emotion the tension is resolved.

Very often in real life due to various factors, social or otherwise, an emotion is not allowed expression either by the individual himself or by society. But the tension of the emotion can only be resolved if it is expressed, and if it reaches that point on the graph where it is normally resolved then it has to be resolved in the only way it is normally resolved. To prevent emotion X from reaching this point, counter tensions are set up which, as it were, draws the original emotion X from resolution point P, and draws it in some other direction. The original emotion drawn in an opposite direction may not reach the peak where it is entirely resolved but it may be gradually resolved in parts, and in fact in cases of wilful resolutions of tensions the emotion is usually resolved in parts rather than as a whole, and these parts

in turn, set up counter currents and waves which criss cross and overlap one another and form infinite number of combinations. Music articulates these countless intricacies and ambivalences of emotions.

When it is said that the sthāyibhāva of a piece of music is love, the reference may be to a more specific aspect or aspects of love. A raga does not express love so much as it expresses a mood of love and not a general mood of loving or being loved but a more specific mood — take Raga Yaman, this late evening raga sung after the day's fevers and frets are over, suggests an idyllic setting of repose and indolence which gives rise to a yearning for love and one's loved one. The vādi or sonant note of this raga is Ga and the samvādi or consonant note is Ni. All the other notes or svaras are śuddha except Ma which is tivra (sharp). Generally speaking ragas with a dominance of the śuddha svaras are likely to have romantic associations, but in this raga because the Ma or the fourth note, is tivra or sharp the mood is not merely one of romantic passion or ecstasy but contemplative and pensive too. The stress on Ni and Ga also induce this mood of quiet contemplation of love, which in turn give way to yearning for one's loved one. The sthāyibhāva is thus

Love's longing and this is the mood which permeates the entire rendering of the raga.

But even such a specific mood as "love's longing", may be variously expressed depending on the intensity of the yearning. Raga Mian Malhar also expresses "love's longing", but here the yearning is quite different from Raga Yaman. Mian Malhar is a raga of the rainy season which follows the scorching Indian summer heat, and which brings with it life and jubilation and at the same time accentuates romantic yearnings. The rains bring respite from the heat but also brings about separation of lovers, as there is work to be done and thus the heart's yearnings are more acute and poignant. This intense yearning and poignancy is the mood expressed in Raga Mian Malhar.

The vādi and samvādi notes of this raga are Sa and Pa respectively. Ga is komal (flat) and both the nishāds or seventh notes are used. The passion and intensity of love's yearning is presented through the use of both the nishāds in different combinations and the descent from Ni to Pa with a gamak and from Pa to Ga (komal) with a meend brings in the feeling of brooding intensity. The prolonged use of both the nishāds traversing several

śrutis increases the tension of yearning before the tension is released in the vādi note Sa.

Having said that the sthāyibhāva of Raga Yaman and Raga Mian Malhar is "love's longing"; one would be faced with the question, what are the musical elements in a raga through which, the permanent mood or sthāyibhāva is presented, and the most obvious choice would be that the vādi and the samvādi notes being the dominant and subdominant notes of a raga express the sthāyibhāva, which in turn keeps the unity of the raga. In fact the traditional imagery used to describe the vādi and samvādi notes also correspond to the description of the sthāyibhāva, for the vādi is said to be the king, the samvādi the commander-in-chief, the anuvādi an ally and the vivādi or discordant note an enemy. But in spite of these factors I do not feel that the vādi or the samvādi notes can by themselves express the sthāyibhāva of a raga. To bring out the intricacies of the mood of an emotion something much more intricate and subtle is needed.

5. In Indian music the unity of the entire rendering of a raga is a flowing unity and it is the śrutis which give this flowing quality to a raga. The coherence of a raga is achieved through "...balance of expressions inherent

in the specific intervals of a particular raga..." An octave in Indian music is subdivided into 22 microtonic divisions called śrutis of which twelve are named and ten unnamed. In Indian music a note or svara is hardly ever used by itself — the quality and colouring of each note is invariably established by the śrutis and it is the unnamed śrutis which give life and lustre to a raga, and in the rendering of the raga bring out the intricacies of the principal bhāva. These unnamed śrutis are manifested in a raga are referred to by such technical terms as "duran", "muran", "gamak" or a "meend". The first two are tonal graces used in the dhrupad style of singing. The gamak is a fast movement from one note to another note in which the intervening śrutis are used quite audibly though not with the same ease as in a meend, which is a gentle tapering of one note into the other during which the intervening śrutis are used successively. The audial impression of a gamak is that of a fast vibration between two notes while in a meend, it is that of a single note being stretched over several śrutis.

It is these subtle intricacies of expression of different śrutis which gives each raga an individual character and which helps to present the delicate nuances and

shadings of the mood of the particular emotion which is expressed in a raga. And in musical terms, it is not the vādi or samvādi which can present this but the pakad or the catch phrase of a raga. The pakad usually consists of both the vādi and the samvādi plus other notes, thus the pakad of Raga Yaman is NiReGa, but of course this Ni Re Ga does not and cannot be translated into its Western counterpart of B D E on the piano, rather it would be in the form of a meend traversing several śrutis. Roughly speaking Ni would probably include śruti I in the madhya saptak and śrutis 22 21 20 of the mandra saptak, all sung in a circular manner around the fixed śruti of Ni i.e. śruti 21 of the mandra saptak. Then Re again would include śruti 21 in the mandra saptak and then rise up from 1 to 7 in the madhya saptak and back again to śruti 5 which is the standard śruti position for Re. Ga is then sung at its original śruti position the 8th, before it sweeps downwards with a languorous sweep traversing several śrutis to rest at tonic Sa. These languorous sweeps of the pakad itself then suggests and presents the mood of repose and indolence which as indicated earlier are the moods Raga Yaman evokes. The meend over Ni used variously bring out the yearning quality of the raga.

This yearning is not heart reading, it is more like cajoling and this is effected through the use of gamaks. The pakad sung in the form of a gamak would give the effect of cajoling. The gamak is not always jerks, sometimes the jerks are given a slight caress of a meend and this given a kind of tenderness to the cajoling.

In Raga Mian Malhar which also expresses 8 "love's longing" the pakad Ni Dha Ni Pa Ma Pa Ni Dha Ni Sa Pa Ga, by using different variations of both Nishads. Here Ni would start from śruti 21 of the mandra saptak and go down to about śruti 17 and then back to Ni and repeat this circular motion before going right down to śruti 14 and then rising up again in the same circular motion caressing śruti 22 before rising through 22 to the tonic of the madhya saptak. Then with a sudden gamak Pa, and then the descent to Ga (komal) which brings out the brooding intensity of the yearning. Of course here it must be mentioned that only for theoretical purposes I have thus broken down or elaborated the pakad. In practice it cannot be thus broken, i.e. one cannot understand the pakad without having heard it, nor can one learn to perform merely by looking at the notations. The lucidity and expressive quality is something which is to be experienced immediately.

It is seen then that the meend and the gamak play a very integral role in Indian music for the successful presentation of a sthāyibhāva of a raga is dependent on how proficiently and with what artistry the performer uses the different śrutis. The musician has to employ the śrutis in such a way that although different svaras suggestive of different emotions are put together, the continuity of the basic mood is maintained and the overall effect is one of an unbroken totality. Grace which is achieved through meends and gamaks thus seem to be absolutely essential in Indian music. The stress here is not what notes are being used for many ragas may have similar notes, even similar vādis and samyādis e.g. Raga Hindol and Raga Hamir have vādi Ga and samyādi Dha, but rather on how the notes are being used — whether it is by slurring upward to a certain note or by "breathing" a gentle hint of many overtones", before coming to a rest. The meends and gamaks thus seem to breathe life into a raga.

It is perhaps impossible to capture these fleeting elusive movements between tones and semitones on the tempered Western scale but Peggy Holroyde suggests that in Bach and Handel there are many moments where, like in the hearing of a raga, the ear longs to be drawn to a resolu-

tion of the preceding sounds as in a cadence towards the tonic. Bach too seems to be slurring over the tonic and withholding the resolution.<sup>4</sup>

6. "The principles of articulating music are so various that each composer or performer finds his own idiom even within the traditions he happens to inherit". The sthāyibhāva or the commanding idea may inspire different performers in different ways, thereby making the performer bring to his music that elusive touch which enhances the spirit of the music. In Indian music where every performance is itself an act of creation, each musician may bring out different aspects of the same raga, by his relative use of śrutis and the varying emphasis he gives to different notes and this is dependent on how the sthāyibhāva has moved him. Thus Raga Marwa played by Pandit Ravi Shankar evokes an austere, impressive and devotional mood, whereas Ustad Amir Khan transforms it into a tender, sensuous raga. Another apt example is Raga Malkauns which has been rendered by almost all the great artistes, and each one given to it a different flavour. Ustad Amir Khan aspiring for depth and repose brings out the profundity of the raga while Pandit Yeshwant Rao Purohit with his typical style brings out the fluidity and poignancy of the raga. Bade

Ghulam Ali Khan's powerful rendering makes it an epitome of utsaha and veera, while Pandit Bhimsen Joshi through his resilient style and creative use of śrutis makes it sublime.

In fact the same performer at different sessions may also create different moods depending on how the sthāyibhāva has moved him. Thus in Raga Mian Malhar, at one session the performer might stress on Ni thereby increasing the poignancy of the raga, while at another the stress would be on Pa and Ga (kōmal), which brings in a sense of brood. A raga then, can be presented in an infinite variety of ways and no way will be wrong as long as the musician is guided by the sthāyibhāva in such a way that the inner spirit..."the fragile intangible core of sukshan svaron" is presented i.e. as long as rasa which is the resultant of the organic whole is presented. A similar view is expressed by Susanne Langer when she says:

As soon as a musical idea acquires organic character... it expresses the autonomous form of a work, the commanding form, that controls its entire subsequent development. It is the comprehension of this organic unity and individuality that enables a composer to carry out a protracted piece of work on the strength of one initial inspiration, and make the produce more and more integral, instead of less and less so,

by the constant importation of new ideas, sometimes even themes that occurred to him long ago, developments he has used elsewhere, traditional preparations — all to be assimilated and transfigured by the unique composition. As long as he can keep the musical organism alive in his imagination he needs no other rule or goal.<sup>5</sup>

7. My discussion of the sthāyibhāva will, I hope, have thrown some light on how expressiveness is effected in a piece of music. My purpose has been to show both that a specific expressive property is attributable to a piece of music, and also that although I have said that in Indian musical terminology it is the pakad through which the sthāyibhāva is presented my intention is not to suggest that these musical elements can be separated from the whole. A raga is an organic unity and the pakad enhances and accentuates the sthāyibhāva of the raga, but the sthāyibhāva is not confined to particular aspects only but permeates the entire rendering. Besides this, my discussion I hope, has clarified the point that the sthāyibhāva is not the rasa, but rather that it is that which determines the basic form and structure of a musical piece while rasa is the resulting relish which the said mood brings about. Rasa is not any individual feature but the resultant of all the ingredients put together

in a concoction, using a simile from food, it is not that which is better, or sweet or sour or savoury, but that which gives relish. In music it is that which gives prāna to a raga and makes it "vivant". This distinction between the sthāyibhāva and rasa is also clearly made in the Nāṭya Śāstra, for there a list is given of the eight sthāyibhāvas with their corresponding rasas. Thus we have śṛṅgāra and rati, hasya and hasa, karuna and śoka, raudra and krodha, veera and utsaha, bhavānaka and bhaya, vibhatsa and jugupa, adbhuta and vismaya.

Rasa then, is not an emotion, not even a primary emotion but that which vitalizes and emotion. The important point in an aesthetic configuration is the context i.e. it is not so much what emotion is being expressed but how the emotion is presented. Thus when it is said that Raga Malkauns expresses Veera rasa Raga Gaur Malhar expresses śṛṅgāra rasa, what is meant is that in these ragas the quintessence of heroism and love has been captured. The dominant rasa of the Abhijñāna Śākuntalam is undoubtedly śṛṅgāra and śṛṅgāra is presented as a result of the depiction of the myriad facets of love in the work. From the beginning till the end the different aspects of love — first there is the bashfulness, then the expectancy,

the fulfillment followed by ecstasy, then the anguish of separation, the hurt of rejection, the grief of dejection, the regret, the remorse, then the joy of reunion and finally the tranquility of mellowed love -- are presented such that the overall relish is that of love or śṛṅgāra.

REFERENCES

1. Comparative Aesthetics Vol. 1. (Varanasi. 1959), p.22.
2. Ibid., p. 29.
3. Feeling and Form. (London. 1953), p. 123.
4. Indian Music (London, 1972).
5. Feeling and Form, p. 130.

CHAPTER - IV  
THE EVALUATION OF MUSIC

1. When any object or situation is appreciated or valued it is done so in reference to certain valued characteristics which the said object or situation may or may not possess. Similarly, when a piece of music is appreciated or evaluated it appears to be done so in reference to some valued characteristics. The problem would then seem to be to discover what are these valued characteristics and whether these valued characteristics are common to all musical compositions and performances. Having been arguing for the view that music expresses emotions, the obvious stand to be taken, would be, to show that musical appraisal is also in some way connected to the expression of emotions in music, — either a piece of music is to be valued because it adequately expresses a particular emotion (the stress being on the expression), or a piece of music, say **X**, is to be rated more valuable than another piece of music **Y**, because **X** expresses **P**, where **P** is a specific emotion, — here the stress is not on the expression but rather on the kind of emotion being expressed. Hence emotion **P** appears to have intrinsic value, for **X** is considered to be more valuable than **Y**, simply because it expresses **P**.

Before embarking on the task of finding out which of the two alternatives actually hold good in musical appreciation and whether any emotion can be said to be intrinsically valuable, I would like to briefly consider some problems of aesthetic evaluations. These pertain primarily to literature and painting, but may be extended to music as well.

2. The questions which have been asked and which have been variously answered are: is the critic, in making evaluations of works of art and literature, committed to a set of principles; and if so, what are the justifications and the nature of the justifications of such principles? The important point to be noted is that, unlike many other things, works of art are unique and, in Strawson's words, there can be no general descriptive criteria for aesthetic assessment. The uniqueness of art is all the more pronounced in music, where every performance is itself a unique phenomenon. The individual and specific features of a work of art, or a piece of music, are thus what is to be considered, for in appreciating a piece of music, say Raga Mian Malhar, we concern ourselves not with its general features but with its individual and specific features. We say the **raga** is poignant not merely because

of the use of the two nishads, but because of the particular kind of way of using the nishads, in the form of a long circular meend. And in individual performances it is not merely because of this characteristic way of presenting the nishads, but because of the particular way the individual performer presents it.

Having appreciated Raga Mian Malhar for its particular kind of poignancy is however, not to be committed to the view that poignancy is always a virtue in a musical exposition. There is a view of criticism according to which, whatever is relevant to any evaluation is relevant to every other evaluation. This view is clearly an attempt to contain critical evaluation within certain prescribed or recognized formula or norms, or at least to assign value on the basis of certain "essential" features.

This supposed need for fixed standards and essential features is what F. R. Leavis refutes in his reply to Wellek; and I reproduce here part of Leavis' reply, which, while being explicitly concerned with one's critical response to poetry, does also throw some light on the process of assessment in the other arts too. Leavis says "...The critic — the reader of poetry — is indeed concerned with evaluation, but to figure him as measuring with a

norm which he brings up to the object and applies from the outside is to misrepresent the process".<sup>1</sup> What is required is a heightened awareness on the part of the critic of the art object, both of the parts and their unity, and this is precisely what Leavis' means for he adds:

... the critics aim is, first to realise as sensitively and as completely as possible this or that which claims his attention; and a certain valuing is implicit in the realizing. As he matures in experience of the new thing he asks, explicitly and implicitly: 'Where does this come? How does it stand in relation to....? How relatively important does it seem?' And the organization into which it settles as a constituent in becoming 'placed' is an organization of similarly 'placed' things, things that have found their bearings with regard to one another, and not a theoretical system or a system determined by abstract consideration.<sup>2</sup>

And again he says:

Of course, the process of 'making fully conscious and articulate' is a process of relating and organizing, and the 'immediate sense of value' should, as the critic matures with experience, represent a growing stability of organization (the problem is to combine stability with growth). What, on testing and retesting and wider experience, turn out to be my more constant preferences, what is the relative permanencies, in my response, and what structure begins to

assert itself in the field of poetry with which I am familiar? What map or chart of English poetry as a whole represents my utmost consistency and most inclusive coherence of response?<sup>3</sup>

F.R. Leavis' views on the critical assessment of poetry sound equally convincing and revealing when extended to painting and music as well. It is indeed true that the first step in a critical appreciation is an intelligent "wide-eyed" exposure to a number of instances of genuinely creative art. By repeatedly listening to music of the great masters — listening with discriminating attention not with "one ear on the standard" approach, but taking in all that the medium has to offer, one gradually begins to notice different features of the medium and as one gains in experience, these features which are at first not clearly perceived become distinct and characteristic and one begins to apprehend the "character" of the object of art. Earlier, speaking on the expressiveness of music, I had made a similar observation because expressiveness being an immediate experience cannot be known through second person descriptions. To determine the identity of the expressiveness of a piece of music, what is required is not an external standard or principle, but frequent exposure to the medium, accompanied by acute awareness on the part of the audience.

It is through such a patient and persistent process of exposure and discovery, that one comes to acquire a conception of a tradition of music, and a critical vocabulary in terms of which to find one's way about in that tradition. There would be loose ends in this conception, and the critical vocabulary would not be a hierarchial system with every element in its logically assigned place. But this is no hindrance either to the legitimacy of a particular evaluation or to the sharpness of a specific vision.

3. It is interesting in this connection to compare the way in which one is educated in moral principles and the way in which one acquires a more or less systematic critical self-awareness in the arts. One may be told "It's wrong to do that", and have it made clear to one that it is not only this particular action, but this kind of action, that is wrong: notoriously one is given rules of thumb as a child, without their point being made clear to one. That one does learn moral values in this way is because, it is vitally important that people should behave in certain ways, before they are able to appreciate the justification of the injunction. In art, the situation is a different one: one's taste develops through encounter with

a number of individual works, from which something like a scheme of values gradually emerges, if it does; one is educated in art not by being told to admire certain things and disapprove of others, in the hope that one will understand the point of these admirations and disapprovals later -- such a procedure would be evidently absurd.

Speaking very broadly, one might say that both in morality and in art, there is, ultimately a tie-up between likings, desires etc., on the one hand, and "values" on the other, or between expressions of one's feelings about things and one's evaluative judgements. In morality, if we bring these together, it is first of all by learning that values may not be related to one's likings: in fact, this is the inevitable way we learn the moral language. We might say that we learn the language of wanting etc. and the language of goodness, to a large extent, in separation; and some people never succeed in bringing them into a satisfactory relationship. But in our training in art the procedure is more of the following kind: we read stories and poems or listen to this piece of music and that, and find ourselves getting certain sorts of pleasure from them; and at this stage there is little use for an evaluative vocabulary which serves a separate purpose from the expression of

liking etc. It is only after a very considerable amount of reading or hearing, when we find that the pleasure we get from some works is much more intense than others, that some works are moving while others are merely exciting, that in some we get new things every time we go back to them, while others wear thin, and so on, that we begin to have a serious use for an evaluative vocabulary. And just as some people never succeed in relating moral language to the language of wants etc. so many people never manage to tie up the language of liking, enjoying etc. with the language of aesthetic value.

4. So far we have been considering how it is that we develop a critical frame of mind with regard to works of art, but the question still remains: when we do evaluate or assess a work of art why is it that from amongst a number of characteristics we select certain characteristics as valuable and leave out others, or again why do we assess certain works of art to have greater value than others? Can we give any justification or justifications for our selection and if so, what is, or are, the justifications we give for our choices.

We might, then, ask here, are we to accept after all, the legitimacy of the demand for a clearly articulatable



101 101891.

standard or principle of criticism? The point which, I hope, has emerged from the discussion of how a critical self-awareness develops, is that the critic or the would-be critic does not begin with a set of fully articulated, readily available set of principles or standards of criticism. And, if we are to believe Leavis', he need not, even after his critical awareness has achieved a degree of coherence and completeness, embark upon what may be called a philosophical justification of "standards of criticism". The coherence and completeness of his "system", together with its "justification", is embodied in his work as a critic. There is no question of any justification in abstraction from this work.

Leavis may well be right about the extent of the philosophical commitment of a critic. Nevertheless, whatever the critic might think about his philosophical responsibilities, general claims about norms do get made, and one doesn't see how a philosophical consideration of such claims can be thought entirely futile.

One such claim is that art of any kind must present "truth", and the reason why we judge some works to be greater than others, or within the same work, some aspect

to be more significant than another, is by virtue of the fact that it contains greater "truth" than another or in a particular case, certain aspects are valued because they accentuate or help to accentuate the "truth" presented. "Truth" is a very ambiguous term implying several things; we have truth equivalent to sincerity, to acceptability, then we have truth as value for mankind, truth to stand for coherence of parts, truth as consistency and so on. The problem would be to decide which among these several meanings of truth is implied in the arts, and whether there is a common notion of "truth", in all the arts or whether "truth" varies from art to art or within the same art form, from work to work.

There is a view according to which, the presentation of "truth", is connected with one's ability to make true or false statements. But since statements rightly are made only in literature, we must restrict our examination only to literature. Literature, it is seen, can make true or false statements about historical facts or scientific discoveries. But then the functions of art and history are quite different, for although historical or scientific truths may occur in works of art and often do occur, this does not make them art. Great works of

literature may present historical facts accurately, and may enlighten us about many historical truths, but these are presented only incidentally. It is not by virtue of the fact that they contribute something to historical or sociological knowledge that they are valued as great works. If they are valued for the facts or information they contain then they are not genuinely valued. And this is so because, as has been often pointed out, nothing in a work of art has a real aesthetic value unless it can reach the consciousness of the spectator or listener through the evidence of the art alone.

This idea has, of course, been frequently exaggerated. One form that this exaggeration has taken is in the insistence, by some, that any reference beyond the work of art itself to, say, historical circumstances of the artist, commits the so called "intentional fallacy". My view is that the "intentional fallacy" is not a fallacy at all. One cannot, by a logical fiat, rule out the possibility of some kinds of considerations, including those of the artist's psychological and sociological circumstances, and of the actual course of history, being relevant to the understanding of or to gaining clarity about a particular work of art. Having said this, however,

I would like to insist that while many kinds of consideration can be brought to bear upon one's understanding of a work of art, the "truth" of a work of art is different from historical truth, or psychological truth about the artist, or the correct application of a technique. The truth of a work of art is rather the valid universal insight that it conveys in and through its very particularity or uniqueness.

"Poetry", says Aristotle, is a more serious thing than history, for poetry is chiefly conversant about universal truth, history about particular, ... in what manner for e.g. any person of a certain character would speak or act, probably or necessarily — this is universal and this is the object of poetry. But what Alcibiades did, or what happened to him — this is particular truth.†

To express universal truths then, art must not only be "true about" something, but it must give us "insights" into human nature, into life and into oneself, and all great literature gives us this profound human insight. Shakespeare's genius lies in his presentation of a wide range of characters, and the tremendous "insight" he has in each. The greatness of any novelist lies precisely in his ability to select and present a character and having

presented him, probe inwards into the human heart and mind and accentuate the human truths, as well as to have a near-clairvoyant understand of a wide range of types and of social milieu.

An important point to be noted here, is that the career of any single individual is filled with all sorts of conflicting cross currents of actions and events. But a novelist cannot put into his novel every aspect of a person's life and personality. Therefore he chooses only such incidents and events which help to accentuate his particular "insight" of the particular character, and does not clutter up his novel with all kinds of factual truths, but otherwise irrelevant details. Thus, one causal chain of events may be pursued, and in a great work everything is precise and relevant to the presentation of the artist's "insights". In fact relevancy is important not only in literature but in all the other forms of art too; nothing in a raga, or a symphony or a concerto, is ever redundant. The use of vivadi notes in the exposition of a raga, does not detract but rather adds to or helps to accentuate the particular mood of the raga by offering contrasts, of course the consummate skill of the musician is an important contributing factor.

Thus although, literature does not present us with propositions which are empirically verifiable like those of science and factual like those of history, it gives an unlimited perspective of human life, and profound "insights" into human nature.

Similarly in the visual arts, the painter or the sculptor presents not merely what he sees, but tries to get to the "essence" of things. And although some artists are capable of presenting powerful and continuing characterization, this getting to the "essence" of things seem to be the kind of truth the artist aims, and one reason why the same theme may be variously presented is because different artists capture different essences. An appropriate example would be Rembrandt's celebrated "Susanna and the Elders". The outstanding quality of this painting, the theme of which has been dealt with by earlier painters, has been dealt with by Rembrandt, imparting to it a novel and sensitive dimension. Lastman and Rubens before him had conceived of the scene as a contrast between the sensuous vulnerability of the nude Susanna and the pawing lechery of the old men around her. In Rembrandt's portrayal, the artist has veered away from the standpoint of viewing Susanna as a sexual object,

and instead, he has portrayed her in such a way so as to evoke compassion and a sense of the poignant. Her posture expresses the tautness of an animal trapped, and in her eyes we see the voice of mute appeal. Juxtaposed to the Baroque which laid great stress on dramatic significance with the use of devices such as striking colour, female voluptuousness, all conveyed in composition with a sense of the grandiose, — Rembrandt's paintings evoke freshness in the quality of a dialogue and in the attempt to reveal the intrinsic essence of his subjects. The painting that comes to my mind here is Rembrandt's "Aristotle contemplating the bust of Homer". While the master conveys the meditative mood of the philosopher with powerful use of colours and chiaroscuro, the famous Rembrandtesque technique — that of light and shadow reveals to the viewer the inner recesses of the philosopher's mind, as does the golden chain emblazoned around the neck against the opulent black velvet robe.

Thus whether it is the Rembrandtian characteristics given above, or the three dimensional solidity of Cezanne or the two dimensional decorative character of perceptual objects of Matisse, it is the 'essence' of things that an artist tries to portray in his art and this is the

'truth' of the visual arts. The presentation can differ depending on the type of "essence" being captured, which only goes to further emphasise the earlier point, that in aesthetic evaluation, each work being unique, must be seen in its own perspective.

We come then to music. Can there be said to be "truth" in a musical piece, and if so, then what kind of "truth" is presented and how is it presented?

5. Music has frequently been thought to be connected with the spiritual and, thence with the moral. (It is sometimes claimed that the moral and the spiritual, while they may go together, are really not logically connected with one another. I do not, here, wish to enter into a detailed argument against this claim. I shall be content with merely saying this: while the spiritual and the moral are certainly distinguishable, the only available criterion of authenticity of the spiritual is the moral. The spiritual cannot at the same time be immoral. Immorality empties spirituality of its very core). One obvious way in which the connection can be made is by bringing to the centre of one's consideration the kind of music known as devotional music. (It might even be said that this kind of music is at the centre already,

whether one takes the Western or the Indian tradition). And the claim, then, would be that the "truth" of music is the moral and spiritual message that it conveys and the effect that it is meant to have on the listener. But the question is, does the moral message necessarily increase the aesthetic value of the music? This view has been vehemently opposed and criticized, and I quote here Tovey's remarks in his book on Beethoven, to show the nature of the criticism that this view has been subjected to. Tovey says:

... we have always to remember that the business of the work of art is to be itself, whereas neither the science of ethics nor the structure of society can thrive for long on that denial that it is the duty of man to improve himself. A sense of duty imposed upon a work of art from without is artistic insincerity. Whatever goes into the work of art must belong to it. We must not impute it as a defect in Wagner's aesthetic system that his music dramas tend to glorify irresponsibility, or at all events to remove from his heroes and heroines even by means as crude as magic potions — every hindrance to the attainments of their desires. *A*

The gist then is that a musical piece can have real aesthetic value only if it reaches out to the audience through the intricacies of music alone, and without the help of moral values and messages. According to Tovey's

view then, a raga is not a vehicle for moral truth but a thing which explains itself.

Is Tovey justified in making these divisions between the aesthetic objective and the moral objective? One agrees with Tovey that didactic art, as such, may have very little aesthetic merit, but morality does not necessarily have to be didactic; a moral objective need not be expressed or conveyed in the form of an overt message. This imbalance between aesthetic value and moral or spiritual value arises because a division has been made between what is music, and what music is for. But to separate what music is, from what music is for, is to attempt to break up the organic unity of a piece of music. Musically speaking, the "truth" of a piece of music is the "truth" of the sthāyibhāva, hence the "truth" of a piece of music is inextricably bound up with the musical work as a whole, for it is the sthāyibhāva that determines as well as embodies the "truth".

To put the point in another way, although a piece of music may become defective, qua a piece of music, by too explicit an attempt at spiritualizing" (e.g. Raga Priyadarshini composed and played by Amjad Ali Khan,

in spite of his obvious skill), it will be erroneous to infer from this that the spirituality of a piece of music is something which can be separated from the piece of music itself. It can be shown, I think, that there are possibilities of spiritual enlightenment which can be achieved only through music; and indeed, the realization of such possibilities has, especially in our own tradition, been regarded as the supreme task of music.\* (See footnote). The ideal is to weld together the aesthetic and the spiritual so that one cannot have the one without the other.

---

\*In Indian music, a distinction is drawn between marga (highway) and desi (by way) music. Marga music is defined as that which was followed after by Siva (druhinena) and practised (prayuktam) by Bharata, while desi, as that which serves for worldly entertainment (lokanuraniakam), in accordance with customs. Nowadays it is common to classify all forms of classical music as marga, and folk music as desi. But to classify thus, is to miss the implication of the terms marga and desi. Marga derived from root mrg, means to chase or hunt especially by tracking and in the Rgveda, it is connected with the idea of tracking the hidden light — the occulted Agni or Sun. Marga music then, implicitly conveys the idea of vimuktada or liberation, for it is by finding the hidden light that moksha is attained. Desi on the other hand derived from dis is taken to indicate and imply local or regional or pertaining to a limited or contained area. From the celestial or solar point of view desi is mundane and limited, while marga is sacred and limitless. The distinction of marga from desi is then not necessarily a distinction of aristocratic and cultivated from folk and primitive music, but rather a distinction between

This point may be granted, but one may still have a doubt about morality, being connected with music, springing from the idea, mentioned above, of the separability of spirituality from morality. There is, however, another, to my mind, more effective way of showing how the moral does essentially enter into the aesthetic generally, and into the aesthetics of music, in particular.

6. The central concern of morality, to my mind, is, "how can I make myself a better person — better in my ordinary, day to day, self-awareness as well as in my actions?" The simple answer to this question, given, say, by religion is that I can become better by ever altering my consciousness in the direction of unselfishness and by turning this altered consciousness into a source of energy for my action. The religious person feels that

---

sacred and traditional from profane and sentimental music. A piece of classical music could be desi, if it were used just as a vehicle of self expression of the musician, or if all that the musician was concerned about was to give a "brilliant performance", with the display of virtuosity and technique, and with no attempt to capture the spirit of the music, and transcend mundane limitations. A good example would be Ustad Amir Khan's renderings of Raga Marwa and Raga Lalit. The first rendering of Raga Marwa is marga in the true sense of the term, and it can truly be said that the Ustad's rendering of Marwa has established a norm which is difficult to transcend. Whereas, in his rendering of Raga Lalit, he seems to be more concerned with fanciful and mundane techniques, and his use of badhat only divides the raga into "atomistic blocks", and does not present a picture of completeness.

he needs help for such alteration of consciousness, and that, frequently, he does also receive help. "Not I, but Krishna". The real existence of such help is often used as an argument for the truth of religious doctrines. Of course, prayer and sacrament may be "misused" by the believer as mere instruments of consolation. But whatever one thinks of its theological contexts, it does seem that prayer can actually induce a better quality of consciousness and provide an energy for good action which would not otherwise be available.

It is precisely this role of progressively altering our consciousness towards unselfishness that art — or at least great art — also performs. Following a hint in Plato (Phaedrus 250), I shall start by speaking of what is perhaps the most obvious thing in our surroundings which is an occasion for "unselfing", and that is what is popularly called beauty. Beauty is the convenient and traditional name of something which art and nature share, and which gives a fairly clear sense to the idea of change of consciousness that I have talked about. I am looking out of my window in an anxious and resentful state of mind, oblivious of my surroundings, brooding perhaps on some damage done to my ego. Then suddenly I observe the

jacaranda tree in full bloom at a distance. In a moment everything is altered. The brooding self with its hurt vanity has disappeared. There is nothing but the mauve grandeur of the jacaranda. And when I return to thinking of the other matter it seems less important. And, of course, this is also something which we may do deliberately: give attention to nature in order to clear our minds of selfish care.

I have started by talking about beauty in nature not because I think it is the most important place of moral change, but because I think it is the most accessible one. It is so patently a good thing to take delight in trees and animals that people who plant trees in their homes and watch animals in their natural habitat, might be surprised at the notion that these things have anything to do with virtue. The surprise is a product of the fact that, as Plato pointed out, beauty is the only spiritual thing we love by instinct.

There is continuity between beauty in nature and beauty in art, but the latter introduces us to a more difficult region. The experience of art is more easily degraded than the experience of nature. A great deal of art is actually self-consoling fantasy, and even great art cannot

guarantee the quality of its audience's consciousness. However, great art exists and is sometimes properly experienced, and even a shallow experience of what is great can have its effects. Art - that is great art, not fantasy art - affords us a pure delight in the independent existence of what is excellent. Both in its genesis and its enjoyment, it is a thing totally opposed to selfish obsession. It invigorates our best faculties, and, to use Platonic language, inspires love in the highest part of the soul. It is able to do this partly by virtue of something which it shares with nature: a perfection of form which invites unpossessive contemplation and resists absorption into the selfish fantasy-life of the consciousness.

Art, however, considered as a sacrament or a source of good energy, possesses an extra dimension. Art is less accessible than nature; but also more edifying since it is actually a human product. Art is a human product and virtues as well as talents are required of the artist. The good artist, in relation to his art, is brave, truthful, patient and humble. And not merely in representational arts, but in music especially, we receive intuitions of these qualities. The discipline that is required of the

shishya is not just a means towards the acquisition of the necessary skill by him, it is also, what I have called, the "unselfing", the necessary training in humility which must inform his art. The meditative, prayerful, beginning of a khaval and the final letting go of the conclusion are also symbolic of this unselfing — of the banishment of the ego and self deceiving fantasy from great music. In great music we are presented with a truthful image of the human condition — of the structure of our emotional life in a form which can be steadily contemplated. Great music transcends selfish and obsessive limitations of personality and can frequently enlarge the sensibility of the hearer. Most of all, it exhibits to us the connection, in human beings, of clear vision with compassion and love. The clarity of vision, of, say, a Ravi Shankar, is not a mirror-like representation of the form of our life of emotions, it is essentially compassion and justice, in musical terms, born of close intimations of the truth of the spirit.

---

REFERENCES

1. Criticism and Philosophy. (The Common Pursuit  
Peregrine Book 1962), p. 213.
2. Ibid., p. 213.
3. Ibid., p. 214.
4. Beethoven. (Oxford University Press, London 1965),  
p. 1.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER - IV  
A NOTE ON SENTIMENTALITY IN MUSIC

1. The problem of sentimentality is a subject in itself, and needs greater and more detailed analysis than I propose to do, but as the title of the work suggests, by endeavour here would be to understand only a part of the problem as related to music.

Earlier in discussing emotions and expression of emotions, I had remarked that in music or in any other art form, as in real life, more of a certain characteristic which is said to be expressive, or contribute towards the expression of a certain emotion, does not necessarily increase the intensity of expression of the emotion but projects something else. Too "sad" a rendering of a raga makes the performance affected and sentimental rather than poignant. From this it appears that overmuch of an emotion or indulgence in an emotion is what leads to sentimentality. But then not all kinds of emotional indulgence can be called sentimental. There seems to be some kind of connection between the emotion itself and sentimentality. Suspense thrillers, where the author indulges, and sometimes even wallows in suspenses and thrills, cannot be called sentimental. An emotional indulgence in Raga Malkauns which expresses utsaha would not be called sentimental but pompous. It has been said that some emotions

are intrinsically sentimental. Michael Tanner in his article on Sentimentality,<sup>1</sup> says that some emotions are of a kind which inhibit action because they themselves are enjoyable to have, but if acted upon one would cease to have them and one does not want to stop having them. The range of feelings which help to increase one's own superiority, so long as no activity is required e.g. righteous indignation, is according to Tanner, intrinsically sentimental. I believe that certain emotions, perhaps the three Spinozean primary emotions of desire, joy and sorrow could perhaps be said to be intrinsically sentimental; sentimental, not in the sense that where they occur they have to be sentimental, but in the sense that, they have propensity towards sentimentality.

2. Besides the view that to be sentimental is to indulge in feelings, and one can indulge in feelings only when one has had them on the cheap, or without any effort, to be sentimental is also said to be shallow. This may perhaps throw more light on the problem of sentimentality. In our normal understanding of the term "shallow", means to have merely a superficial knowledge or understanding of any problem or situation. Thus when sentimentality is likened to being shallow, what is implied is that in

a given situation just the periphery of an emotion is grasped, and not only that, but the periphery so grasped, is taken to be the core and only essential feature of the emotion or emotive situation. Sentimentality is then not just "morbid sensibility composed of gross multitude", but is due also to "emotional failure and dissemblance", and the morbid sensibility results from this failure. It is not as though the individual misrepresents the world solely to indulge his feelings, but that having grasped only a peripheral knowledge of any truth, lays emphasis on the wrong features.

3. Again it has been said that a response is sentimental, if it is too great for a particular occasion, or when because of the interaction of sentiments, it is inappropriate to the situation which calls it forth. It becomes inapt, either by restricting itself to one feature of the many that a particular situation presents, or by substituting for it an illusory situation, that may sometimes have hardly anything in common with it.
4. In all these accounts of sentimentality the main feature that stands out, is that; there is a reference to a situation or an object. The question would now arise,

that if an object or situation plays such a crucial role in sentimentality, then how does one account for sentimentality in music? This problem is all the more pronounced in pure instrumental music, for here there appears to be no reference to any object or situation, and yet some musical compositions are unmistakably sentimental. As I have already discussed earlier, musical expression is unmediated or objectless, and in music it is not on account of a situation or an object that a piece of music is judged to be sentimental; even in works of programme music like Berlioz's or Liszt's where there is an evoked or implied situation, it is not on account of that evoked or implied situation that the music is characterized as sentimental but the music is in itself sentimental. Similarly Tchaikovsky is incessantly berated for the sentimentality of his symphonies without a clear suggestion that they are exaggerated responses to some programmatic situation, and in the Indian context, Ustad Vilayat Khan is sometimes exceedingly sentimental, but in the rendering of a raga there is definitely no reference to any situation or object.

It is seen then that just as music is expressive without being about anything, it can also be sentimental without

there being any reference to any object or situation. Hence Tanner seems to be right when he concludes that sentimentality is not about, the aboutness of an emotion.

5. Man's sentient life is a dynamic flow, consisting of pits and peaks. No emotion remains static either at the peak or the pit. Sentimentality is the attempt to make an emotion remain static at one point, when the natural life of the emotion is that, there should be ebb and flow. When an emotion is made to remain at one point, it becomes super-saturated and becoming supersaturated loses its character and relevance. An appropriate and vivid example of this would be Miss Havisham in Dicken's Great Expectations, who is jilted on her wedding day, and who, makes life come to a standstill, clock on the mantelpiece, clothes, drapery, dress, emotions, precisely at the moment she is jilted. Miss Havisham is of course, eccentricity personified but normally the persons involved in great tragedies gradually get out of the pit if they let life take its normal course. It is not that the grief is forgotten but for a person directly and greatly involved in a tragedy, the grief is not a part of a fragment of one's existence, but envelops one's whole being and entire life; the grief flows on and becomes poignant.

Whereas for the person not directly involved in a tragedy, the grief is fragmented i.e. the grief and sense of loss affects only a certain part of the person's existence and thus it is made to remain static. Remaining static, the situation becomes supersaturated with grief and hence sentimentality comes in.

Sentimentality is thus overstating or overattending to the dramatic quality of experience and neglecting the mundanity. Everything in life has more than one side to it and if the essence of any particular situation is not grasped then only one aspect is emphasized. Wordsworth's poems could serve as a good example of sentimentality, where Wordsworth being exposed to the benign influence of nature of the Lake Districts, emphasizes only the tranquility and the curative touch of nature. Aldous Huxley is right when he states that perhaps Wordsworth's view of nature would have been different had he visited the tropics.<sup>2</sup>

Coming to music and having said that music is sentimental without being about anything, the problem arises, on what basis is music to be characterized as sentimental or unsentimental. If there is no referential point, how is a piece of music said to be sentimental.

6. Susanne Langer has said that music is an "unconsummated symbol",<sup>3</sup> and this could perhaps give us an insight into the way sentimentality comes into the expression of emotions in music. By "unconsummated symbol", I understand music, as that whose potentiality for expression has not been exhausted, or applying the term I had used earlier, music that has not become supersaturated.

Sentimentality by being static exhausts all potentialities. Music as "unconsummated symbol", of man's sentient life, is ever flowing and dynamic with endless possibilities; creating new dimensions and revealing strange depths of emotions or any particular emotion. In Indian music the śrutis take on this important role of keeping this flow on. Śrutis increase the expressive quality of a raga but at the same time do not exhaust creativity. Similarly in the Indian Theory of Dhvani, the expressive quality of poetry is said to be increased by the power of suggestions rather than direct expression; suggestions do not exhaust creativity. Sometimes in the rendering of a raga the flow is internalized. This is especially so in the Indian classical dance forms of the south. There are certain points in the course of the dance when the music flows on and the dancer becomes seemingly static —

but in actuality the dancer does not become static but rather the movements go inwards. There has been an attempt to fill in these static moments with actual movements by the famous ballet dancer Rudolph Nuriyev, in his dance composition entitled "Bhakti", where against typical Carnatak music, he presents a new dance form by filling in all the places of potentiality i.e. corresponding to all movements in the music there is a body movement. Though very creative and innovative as a synthetic dance form of the east and the west, I do not think this kind of dance form would have enduring appeal and this is so because of the attempt, as it were, to exhaust all potentialities.

7. It is then not the feelings and emotions which make a piece of music sentimental but how they have been presented, and how they have been presented is again dependent on how one understands them. The ideal state is then neither to do away with emotions altogether and concentrate only on the formal aspects of music nor to go about expressing emotions without understanding them at all. The idea is neither to shirk or avoid, nor to indulge — the ideal condition of man being one in which, he has no fear of his emotions however powerful and

voluminous, because of his confidence in their vitality which results from one's grasping of the essence of an emotion. It is true that a man who is emotionally educated is as rare as a phoenix, but that does not mean that one need to do away with emotions altogether. As Tanner put it, "... it is the recalcitrance of the world in refusing to suffer one's emotional expressions that leads to so many of them remaining wholly within and either dying of in activation or burgeoning without point, thus leading one nilly willy to sentimentality."<sup>4</sup>

To avoid sentimentality in music one must see an emotion in its proper perspective. Only when an emotion is taken in isolation that it restricts flow and becomes static and allows no creativity. An emotion expressed in a piece of music, must be presented as it would really be in life and for this a greater insight into emotions is required.

---

REFERENCES

1. "Sentimentality"
2. "Wordsworth in the Tropics"
3. "Feeling and Form" (London, 1953).
4. "Sentimentality"

CHAPTER - V

MUSIC, RASAS AND THE SCHEME OF PURUSHARTHAS

In this concluding chapter, I wish to make some remarks in reiteration of some of the points I have made in the last chapter about the connection of music as a form of art and morality and spirituality. These remarks are made against the background of the Theory of Rasas, and the scheme of purusharthas in Indian Philosophy. Thus, I consider them, as a matter of fact, to be a confirmation of my views expressed in the previous chapter, rather than as mere reiteration.

But before this, I wish to say something about music and its purely causal powers. In spite of the fact that the causal evocative powers of music are so obvious, not much attention has been paid to them by the theoreticians of music. The problem of course belongs properly to the area of psychology of music rather than philosophy of music. I have neither the competence, nor, fortunately the need, to embark upon the task of a detailed discussion of this problem. I mention this at all here, because of its possible relevance to what I have to say in a more substantial way a little later on.

Of all the forms of art, music alone seems to have almost an instinctive power of affecting us in a distinctive way

both psychologically and even physically. There is frequently, an immediate, that is, unmediated, causal connection between the hearing of a piece of music and what follows in the listener's mind and body. Think of a child's response to a piece of music by thumping his feet on the ground or an adult's propensity to start marching on hearing martial music. It is because of this immediate instinctive nature of music's effect on us that, often it is not possible to subject it to any kind of intellectual articulation or grasping. We are in a certain sense, "pure sufferers" of music rather than enjoyers of it. It is because of this that music has been looked at with much suspicion by some, otherwise respectable, intellectual and spiritual traditions. Think here for instance, of Islam's attitude to music or of Tolstoy's strange reservations about music as a form of art. In "suffering",\* a piece of music, there is also an abandonment of the self, but this abandonment of the self is very different from the "unselfing", that I have talked about in the previous chapter.

---

\*I use the word "suffering" here to indicate this sort of helplessness and self abandonment that music often induces.

My reason for raising this point is the possible connection with the view that music is not, or at least ought not to be, treated as an autonomous form of art. There are two senses of the idea of autonomy in this context: (i) music is unconnected with anything extra musical; (ii) music does not need the help of anything else in its expressive function. I have in the major part of this work, argued against the first kind of autonomy, hence all the discussion about music and its essential relationship to our emotional life. I have, however, upheld music's autonomy in the second sense of that term. Music is complete in itself in the sense that in its expressive function it does not need the help of anything that is essentially non-musical (See Chapters I & II).

However, if one reflects on the purely causal powers of music and the almost instinctual nature of these powers, it may not at all be surprising to think that music has been given by some a status lower than the other forms of art. Art requires a kind of responsiveness on the part of the audience which demands a self consciousness which is frequently absent in the otherwise attentive listener to a piece of music. In Indian aesthetic this responsiveness that is demanded has been called sa-hrydaya.

Sa-hrydaya requires one's becoming attuned in a self-conscious intentional way to the emotional situation presented. (hrydaya samvada): and then being absorbed, (very different from abandoning oneself) in its presentation (tanmayi bhāvana). It is this self controlled absorption that results in rasanubhāvana.

An overemphasis on the causal powers of music may therefore lead one into thinking that music by itself is not a form of art at all; it achieves this status only in association with things other than music such as poetry, dance, drama, and so on. It is possible to sympathize with such a view when one thinks of, say, Western pop music or even or jazz. One has only to think of the hysteria that such music is intended to induce in the audience and which frequently it does induce. Again one talks of the so-called vitality of jazz music, but this vitality perhaps is much more a matter of its effect rather than of an intrinsic quality of the music itself. Perhaps it is considerations of this kind that lead even the great Indian aesthetician, Bharata, into thinking that music's role as art is peripheral rather than central. Music helps drama in its central role of the presentation of rasas rather than present them in its own.

In maintaining that music as a form of art is complete in itself I have of course rejected this view of music. Music is not something which is a mere instrument of causal manipulation, although it can be sought to be used as such an instrument. To listen to a piece of music is similar to being addressed by a speaker in the sense that in addressing a potential hearer, the speaker does not merely seek to cause the hearer to attend to him, but rather invites the hearer's attention to him.

However, when we think of music in connection with the rasas it does seem as though some at least of the rasas are not amenable to purely musical expression or presentation. Thus, take for instance, vibhatsa and adbhuta. These do seem to require the help of non-musical contexts (e.g. drama or dance) for their successful presentation. But equally there are other rasas, chief among them śṛṅgāra and karuna which are capable of purely musical presentation. The fact that there may be rasas which are beyond the ken of purely musical presentation, does not however detract music either from its essential completeness or from its status as a form of art. This point becomes clear from a reflection on the nature of the relationship between the rasa and their essential unity.

Let me approach this point through a discussion of the relationship of the so-called virtues to one another. A reflection on the virtues naturally leads us to think about the relationship to one another which yields the idea of an order of virtues. It is difficult to state this in anything like a systematic way but the order is there nonetheless, and it is by virtue of this order that our moral life acquires a coherence. For example, if we reflect upon the virtue of courage and ask why we think of it to be a virtue, what kind of courage is the highest, what distinguishes courage from rashness, ferocity, self assertion and so on, we are bound in our explanation to use names of other virtues. The best kind of courage is steadfast, calm, and temperate, intelligent and loving. This may not in fact be the right description, but is the right sort of description. If we carry on our reflection in this direction I think it is inevitable that we will come up with a single unifying principle of all the virtues, a principle which unites them into an order which must inform the truly moral life. I think the one virtue which alone can perform this unifying role is love. Thus, think of courage without love or temperance without love, or intelligence without love. All these can easily

become the instruments of the immoral or the evil. It is love that binds them together as the necessary fabric of the moral life.

It seems to me that exactly the same point can be made about the eight rasas that Bharata talks about. It is not in isolation, but in unity or coherence that the rasas inform the aesthetic object or the work of art, (at least what can be considered a great work or even a proper work of art). And in the order of rasas, the rasa that performs the supremely unifying and vitalizing role is the śṛṅgāra rasa, which interestingly is frequently translated as love; that is, śṛṅgāra is not just the highest of all the rasas, it is also something which must inform the others so that they become appropriate objects of aesthetic presentation at all. Thus take the eight rasas of Bharata: śṛṅgāra, hasya, karuna, raudra, vira, bhayanaka, vibhatsa, adbhuta. While hasya, for instance, can by itself, be the subject matter of a purported work of art, if that was the only rasa presented in the work, the work, while it might be "enjoyable", will necessarily lack the completeness and unity of the kind that would normally be demanded of a "proper" or significant work of art. This is even more clearly the case with rasas

like raudra, bhavanaka and vibhatsa. While karuna, vira and adbhuta (the marvellous) can certainly be the dominant rasa of a work, they achieve their full potentiality of aesthetic worth only when tempered by śṛṅgāra. Karuna, devoid of love, may at best be pity; vira merely ferocity, and adbhuta merely astonishment. It is the completing power of śṛṅgāra, that turns each of them into a suitable subject of aesthetic treatment.

Thus the fact that there may be rasas which may not be amenable to purely musical presentation, is not something that can affect the wholeness of music. For such rasas, if there are any, are not in any case proper subjects of aesthetic treatment in isolation. It is sufficient that the principle of all the rasas, viz., śṛṅgāra can be an indisputable subject of total musical treatment. It is also significant that śṛṅgāra is associated with the emotion of love in its bewildering multiplicity of dimensions. One might even venture to suggest that there is an order of śṛṅgāra itself just as there is an order of the rasas. The highest form of śṛṅgāra must involve the kind of "unselfing" that we talked about in the last chapter, the "unselfing" which is the basis of morality as well as true spirituality.

But what is the connection of all this with the purushar-  
thas? That is, granted that the rasas need to be united  
 in śṛṅgāra, in order for them to become suitable or  
 worthy subjects of aesthetic treatment, what has this to  
 do with the goals of life, which is what the purusharthas  
 are supposed to be? But before I attempt to answer this  
 question, a word about the theory of purusharthas. "Puru-  
 sharthas" literally means "the meaning of man", and the  
purushartha theory is, to my mind, an attempt at a phi-  
 losophical understanding of the concept of man. In other  
 words, I consider the theory as a non-empirical, concep-  
 tual delimitation of the idea of man, puruṣa. Man is such  
 that, he would not be man at all — that is, he would be  
less than man, or perhaps, even more than man — if he  
 were not engaged in the pursuit of the purusharthas:  
artha, kama, dharma and moksha. And this statement is  
 not an empirical generalization about man. It is, if you  
 like, an analysis of the concept of man, or perhaps, a  
 synthetic a priori truth about man. (An interesting dis-  
 tinction is sometimes made between the first three by  
 themselves which might be sufficient for a philosophical  
 definition of the concept of man, and that the last is  
 more a prescription than a constitutive element in the

in the concept of man. I do not agree with this distinction, but, unfortunately cannot go, in any detail, into my reasons for this disagreement. But some justification of my position can be found in what follows). The purusharthas, like the rasas and the virtues, seek, by their very nature, unity and completeness in a mutual, life-enhancing, "interactive" inter-relationship. The pursuit of artha alone, or kama alone or dharma, or moksha alone is self-destructive in its own way. As K. J. Shah puts it, "artha alone as a goal is greed, kama alone is lust, dharma alone is mechanical ritual, and moksha alone is escapism".<sup>1</sup> And greed, lust, ritualism and escapism are necessary forces of alienation: each, in its own way, alienates man from his humanity, is destructive of the puruṣa in him. What unites them into a humanity generating whole is a mutual interdependence with dharma as the sustaining principle of this inter-dependence.

Now, what is the place of aesthetic pursuit in the scheme of purusharthas? Aesthetic pursuit is principally pursuit of kama. But, as we have already seen (Chapter IV), a work of art, both in its genesis and in its enjoyment, requires a disciplining of the self, and a progressive banishment of the ego which is also the essential demand

of morality or dharma. And a good description of moksha is the "actual abolition of the ego altogether". The movement of our consciousness towards self-lessness is also a movement in the direction of love. Self-lessness is the necessary and it will not be too much of an exaggeration to say - sufficient condition of love - love of others, of natural objects, of objects of art and of God. And the rasa connected with the experience of such love is sr̥ṅgāra.

To sum up: While aesthetic pursuit is primarily pursuit of kama — it is also a pursuit of progressive self-lessness, of progressive "unselfing", and, therefore, of love. Such pursuit is thus a paradigmatic example of the interactive unity of the purusharthas. But if what unites the purusharthas is love, what unites the rasas in an aesthetic object is sr̥ṅgāra. Thus, while aesthetic pursuit is a truly human pursuit, its product, — the aesthetic object as well as its enjoyment — when it is authentic, is the embodiment of the rasa of that which, holds human life together. And in music this rasa finds, as it were, its purest expression. In achieving such expression, music also affords us more than all the other arts intimations of immortality, of ananda and moksha, of genuine spirituality.

In conclusion, I wish to say a word, once again, in justification of the title of my thesis. As I had already pointed out in the Introduction, the title might arouse expectations which would not be fulfilled in the course of the work. For instance, I might, quite understandably, have been expected to devote a substantial part of the work, to discussing problems in the philosophy of language, problems such as, "What is it for anything to have a meaning at all?" "Is meaning always a matter of convention?" "Does intention have anything to do with meaning?" "What are the peculiarities of linguistic rules as opposed to other kinds of rules?" And, "Can these questions be asked of music?" "If so, how is one to answer them?" It is by now obvious that these questions were not asked in anything like a direct way. If some of them nonetheless find an answer, it is only incidentally that they do so. In spite of this, however, I do think that the title is appropriate. And my reason for saying this is as follows: Music shares with language the latter's central property, that is, music, like language, is a conveyer of meaning. Also, like language, it conveys meaning in a non-causal way. Music does not just causally manipulate our attention, it rather invites our communicative response to it.

I have been primarily concerned with the nature of this invitation, and with the nature and norms of propriety of the response. And it is this concern of mine that I wished to emphasize by calling this work "Language of Music".

---

REFERENCES

1. "Of Artha and Arthasastra", in Way of Life. Ed. T.N. Madan.
-

BIBLIOGRAPHY

## (Books)

- Aldrich, Virgil C. : Philosophy of Art. Prentice-Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs N.J. (1963).
- Aristotle's Poetics Philosophy of Art and Aesthetics, Frank A. Tillman and Steven M. Cahn. Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, Evanston and London (1969).
- Barrett, Cyril (ed.) : Collected Papers on Aesthetics, Basil Blackwell (Oxford 1965).
- Barzun, Jacques : Berlioz and his Century. The World Publishing Company, Meridian Books (Cleveland 1956).
- Charlton, W. : Aesthetics, Hutchinson and Co. Ltd. (London 1970).
- Colling Wood, R.G. : The Principles of Art. Oxford University Press. London, Oxford, New York (1971).
- Cooke, Derek. : The Language of Music. Oxford University Press (1965).
- Coomaraswamy, Ananda K. : Christian and Oriental Philosophy of Art. Dover Publications Inc. (New York 1956).

- Croce, Benedetto's : "Aesthetics", Philosophy of Art and Aesthetics. Frank A. Tillman and Steven M. Cahn, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, Evanston and London (1969).
- Deva, Chaitanya : An Introduction to Indian Music. Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India (New Delhi 1973).
- Elliot, R.K. : "Poetry and Truth", Philosophy of Art and Aesthetics. Frank A. Tillman and Steven A. Cahn, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, Evanston and London 1969.
- Ember, Ildiko : Music in Painting, Budapest (1984).
- Gombrich, E.H. : Art and Illusion. Phaidon Press (London 1972).
- Hanslick, Eduard : "The Beautiful in Music", Philosophy of Art and Aesthetics. Frank A. Tillman and Steven M. Cahn, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, Evanston and London (1969).

- Hari Haran, M. and Kupuswamy Gowri : Readings on Music and Dance, B.R. Publishing Corporation (New Delhi 1979).
- Holroyde, Peggy : Indian Music, George Allen and Unwin Ltd. (London 1972).
- Izutsu, Toshihiko Toyo : The Theory of Beauty in the Classical Aesthetics of Japan. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. The Hague (1981).
- Kant, Immanuel's Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Smith, Norman Kemp Macmillan & Co. Ltd. (London 1970)
- \_\_\_\_\_ : The Critique of Judgement. Trans. Meredith, James Creed. Oxford University Press (London 1973).
- Karnani, Chetan : Listening to Hindusthani Music. Orient Longman Ltd (1976).
- Kenny, Anthony. : Wittgenstein, Penguin Books (1973).
- Langer, Susanne K. : Feeling and Form. Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. (London 1953).
- \_\_\_\_\_ : Philosophy in a New Key. Oxford University Press (London 1951).
- Leavis, F. R. : The Common Pursuit. Peregrine Books (1962).

- MacDonald, Margaret : "The Language of Fiction".  
Philosophy of Art and Aesthetics.  
Tillman, Frank A & Cahn Steven M.  
Harper & Row Publishers, New York,  
Evanston and London (1969).
- Madan, T.N. (ed.) : Way of Life. Vikas Publishing  
House. (New Delhi 1982).
- Miri, Mrinal : Philosophy of Psychoanalysis.  
Indian Institute of Advanced  
Study, Simla (1977).
- Narayan, R.K. : The Ramayana, Viking Press Inc.  
(New York 1972).
- Osborne, Harold (Ed.) : Aesthetics, Oxford University  
Press, London (1972).
- Pandey, Kanti Chandra : Comparative Aesthetics Vol.I,  
The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series  
Office (Varanasi 1959).
- Prajnanananda, Swami : A Historical Study of Indian  
Music, Munsiram Manoharlal  
Publishers Pvt. Ltd.
- Pitcher, George : Wittgenstein, Doubleday & Company  
Inc. New York (1966).

- Plato's Phaedrus : Philosophy of Art and Aesthetics.  
Tillman, Frank, A. and Cahn,  
Steven M., Harper & Row Publishers  
New York, Evanston, and London  
(1969).
- Raghavan, Dr. V. : Abhinavagupta and his Works,  
Chawkhamba Orientalia Chowkhamba  
(1980).
- Rosen, Charles : The Classical Style. Faber and  
Faber Ltd. London (1972).
- Sarasvati, Swami : Parables and Dialogues from the  
Satya Prakash Upanishads. S. Chand & Co. Pvt.  
Ltd. (New Delhi 1975).
- Scruton, Roger : Art and Imagination. Methuen  
& Co. Ltd. (London 1974).
- Shankar, Ravi : My Music, My Life. Vikas Publi-  
shing House Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi  
(1969).
- Sibley, Frank : "Aesthetic Concepts" Philosophy  
of Art and Aesthetics. Tillman,  
Frank A. & Cahn, Steven M.,  
Harper & Row Publishers, New  
York, Evanston and London (1969).

- Tolstoy, Leo. : "What is Art". Ibid.
- Tovey, Donald Francis : Beethoven ed. Foss, J. Hubert,  
Oxford University Press. London  
(1965).
- Vlastos, Gregory (ed.): Plato II. Anchor Books, Doubleday  
& Company Inc. (1971).
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig : "Lectures on Aesthetics"  
Philosophy of Art and Aesthetics  
Tillman, Frank A. and Cahn,  
Steven M. Harper and Row Publi-  
shers, New York, Evanston and  
London (1969).
- 
- \_\_\_\_\_ : Philosophical Investigations.  
Trans: Anscombe, G.E.M. Basil  
Blackwell, Oxford (1974).
- Wollheim, Richard : Art and its Objects. Cambridge  
University Press (London 1980).
- Zuckerkand L. Victor : Sound and Symbol. Trans. Trask,  
Williard R. Routledge and Kegan  
Paul Ltd. London (1956).

## (Journals)

- Anderson, James C. : "Musical Kinds" - The British  
Journal of Aesthetics. Vol.25  
No. 1 Winter 1985.

- Best, David : "The Objectivity of Artistic Appreciation", The British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 20, No. 2. Spring 1980.
- Budd, Malcolm : "The Repudiation of Emotion: Hanslick on Music", The British Journal of Aesthetics Vol. 20, No. 1. Winter 1980.
- 
- \_\_\_\_\_ : "Motion and Emotion in Music: How Music Sounds". The British Journal of Aesthetics Vol. 23, No. 3, Summer 1983.
- Davies, Stephen : "Is Music a Language of Emotions" The British Journal of Aesthetics Vol. 23 No. 3, Summer 1983.
- Gordon, Lorene M. : "Conventional Expression of Emotion", Mind, Vol. LXXVIII No. 309, January 1969.
- Green, O.H. : "The Expression of Emotion" Mind, Vol. 79 No. 316 October 1970.
- Jhanji, Rekha : "Bharata on Aesthetic Emotions", The British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 18 No. 1 Winter 1978.

- Harrison, Nigel : "Creativity in Musical Performance", The British Journal of Aesthetics. Vol. 18. No. 4, Autumn 1978.
- Hoaglund, John : "Music as Expressive", The British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 20 No. 4, Autumn 1980.
- Katz, Ruth and Sharma, Arvind : "The Aesthetics of Abhinavagupta", The British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 17 No. 3, Summer 1977.
- Kulka, Thomas : "The Artistic and the Aesthetic Value of Art", The British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 21 No.4, Autumn 1981.
- Lathe, Mukund : "Creation as Transformation", Diogenes, 1984.
- Leavis, P.B. : "Wittgenstein on Words and Music", The British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 17 No.2, Spring 1977.
- Magnolis, Joseph : "The Identity of a Work of Art", Mind, Vol. 68 No. 269, January 1959.

- Meidner, Olga  
MacDonald : "Emotion and E-motion in Music",  
The British Journal of Aesthetics,  
Vol. 25 No. 4, Autumn 1985.
- Mew, Peter : "The Expression of Emotion in  
Music", The British Journal of  
Aesthetics, Vol. 25 No. 1,  
Winter 1985.
- \_\_\_\_\_ : "The Musical Arousal of Emotion".  
The British Journal of Aesthetics,  
Vol. 25 No. 4, Autumn 1985.
- Monelle : "Levels of Rhythm in Vocal Music",  
The British Journal of Aesthetics,  
Vol. 22, No. 1 Winter 1982.
- Newell, Robert : "Music and the Temporal Dilemma",  
The British Journal of Aesthetics.  
Vol. 18 No. 4, Autumn 1978.
- Nolt, John : "Expression and Emotion", The  
British Journal of Aesthetics,  
of Aesthetics, Vol. 21 No. 2,  
Spring 1981.
- Osborne, Harold : "What is a Work of Art", The  
British Journal of Aesthetics,  
Vol. 21, No. 1, Winter 1981.

- Pitcher, George : "Emotions", MIND Vol. LXXIV  
No. 295, July 1965.
- Stecker, Robert : "Nolt on Expression and Emotion",  
The British Journal of Aesthetics,  
Vol. 23 No. 3 Summer 1983.
- Tanner, Michael : "Sentimentality", Proceedings  
of the Aristotelian Society, 1977.

ENCYCLOPEDIA

- Edwards, Paul (ed.) : The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,  
Vol. 1 - 2. Macmillan Publishing  
Co., Inc. and the Free Press,  
New York Collier Macmillan Publi-  
shers London 1967.
- Hindley, Geoffry : The Larousse Encyclopedia of  
Music, The Hamlyn Publishing  
Group Limited, London-New York-  
Sydney-Toronto (1971).

---

SERIALIZED  
 Acc. No. 101891A  
 Acc. by *PM*  
 Class by *PM*  
 Sub. Heading *670/87*  
 Cate. by *PM*  
 Transcribed by *PM*

BIO-DATA

NAME : ROHMI GOSWAMI  
DATE OF BIRTH : 21 FEBRUARY 1958  
FATHER'S NAME : GIRINDRA NATH SHARMA  
PRESENT ADDRESS : "INDRALAYA"  
LA-CHAUMIERE  
SHILLONG  
EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS : M.A. (1ST CLASS)  
PHILOSOPHY  
NORTH-EASTERN HILL UNIVERSITY