

THEORY OF MEANING


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**Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirement
of the Degree of Master of Philosophy**

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
In habit and character Begum Qurratun Hosna is a fit and proper person for the degree of M.Phil.

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

It would be correct to call the twentieth century be the age 'Age of analysis' in philosophy. This is not to say that analytic philosophy began with the early writings of Bertrand Russell on the contrary, analysis has a long history. But great philosophers from Plato to present day have failed to employ analytic tool as a philosophical technique. The word 'analysis' when used in philosophy bears obvious affinities to the word's use in a science such as chemistry. The chemist is concerned with the analysis of complex physical substances into their constituent parts, (The philosopher, on the other hand, is interested in analyzing linguistic or conceptual units. Philosophical analysis is essentially the study of language but it must not be confused with other important studies of language. Linguist, philologist, grammarians etc. are also interested in study of language. Their interest, however, is primarily in empirical investigation. They are interested in discovering facts about how our language is used, what meaning words have etc. which can only be answered through use of scientific method. The analytic philosopher studies language not in order to formulate scientific hypothesis

because he believes that such a study is not useful in setting philosophical questions. Although all analytic philosophers would agree that study of language is of the greatest importance, there is no general agreement about which language can most fruitfully be studied by philosopher. Some of them have concluded that philosophical analysis ought to consist primarily in construction of new, artificial language system. Other analysts have disagreed with this argument. They contend that such artificial languages are of little help in resolving philosophical problems. According to their view, philosophical problems can best be approached by a careful analysis of ordinary, natural language we all use to communicate with each other. The two main 'schools' of analysis are artificial language analysis and the ordinary language analysis. The logical positivists rely on artificial language analysis where as the ordinary language philosophers rely on ordinary language analysis. The founder and guiding spirit of logical positivism was the philosopher Moritz Schlick. In addition to having some familiarity with the thought of Wittgenstein, Schlick has himself been developing independently ideas similar to some of those expressed by Wittgenstein. In course of time the group headed by Schlick came to be known as Vienna circle. Logical positivism has probably gained wider public recognition than any other part of analytic movement. Positivism -

believes that all metaphysical sentences without exception are meaningless. The positivism agreed with Wittgenstein that metaphysical questions are pseudo questions, and are unanswerable. In England the most famous logical positivist was A.J.Ayer. Ayer placed great emphasis upon what he called 'The principle of verification'.

Language is the most complex and sophisticated of human possessions. Animals are not users of language. Many animals of course, are capable of providing noises. But these noises are quite different in kind from human speech, that is, language. Our production of speech is independent of stimulus control in a way in which animal noises are not. All known human societies have possessed a language, whatever else each of them may have lacked.

It is important to distinguish philosophy of language from linguistic philosophy. Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy in which philosophers attempt to analyse, investigate certain crucial linguistic concepts such as meaning, reference, truth etc. Linguistic philosophy, on the other hand, tries to solve philosophical problems by analysing the meaning of words, and by analysing logical relations between words in natural language. Philosophy of language and linguistic philosophy are intimately connected because the methods linguistic philosophers employ depend crucially on philosophy of language. Russell,

Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine, Austin, Strawson are some of the well known philosophers of language. Wittgenstein in his book 'Philosophical investigation' says 'philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language'.¹ According to him, the job of a philosopher is to show how past thinkers have failed to understand a bit of language. Among human beings language is the principal instrument of communication. Every language is composed of words and words are combined to form a sentence. A word is a spoken noise or written marks with a meaning. A meaning can also occur in sign language which is neither written nor spoken but only a gesture or bodily movement. Meaning is an attribute not only of language but of all sign and symbol systems and the study of meaning is called semantics² which therefore, embraces a wider range than language alone. However, since language is by far the most extensive symbol system in man's use, as well^{as} the central one, much of semantics and of semantic theory is concerned with language and languages. Language is composed of signs and symbols, and sign symbols again are what have meaning.

Philosophers in all areas have an interest in meaning. Schlick says "philosophy is an activity through which meaning of a statement is asserted or explained".² Before discussing the theory of meaning here I want to discuss certain points

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1. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigation, 3rd edn.. Macmillan, 1969. Section 109.
 2. Quoted in A. Schaff, Introduction to semantics, Pergamon, 1964. p. 59.

about sentence, statement and proposition. By the term 'proposition' we mean any sentence which must be either true or false but which of course can not be both true and at the same time false. For example, arsenic is poisonous, $7 + 2 = 9$ are propositions. Similarly arsenic is nutritious, $2 + 7 = 10$ are also propositions. The most common means of expressing a relation among several terms is proposition. When we say "Brutus killed Caesar", "The winters in Siberia are cold" ~~here~~ each proposition asserts certain relation holding between the terms. Any linguistic statement of proposition must contain words for terms and there must be at least one relation. Propositions are either true or false and in this they differ from questions, commands and explanations. Only propositions can be either affirmed or denied, questions may be asked and commands given and explanations uttered, but none of them can be affirmed or denied or judged to be either true or false.

Sentence is a collection of words, spoken or written. Sentence expresses a proposition. In ordinary language, the verb usually performs both functions, it names the relation and asserts that it holds among the elements. But if as is often the ^{case} / relation is named by a proposition or other kind of word than an extra verb is required to assert the relation. This is the 'auxiliary' use of the verb. For example in 'Brutus killed caesar'

the verb furnished both the name of the relation and the assertion that it holds but in 'the book upon the table' the proposition upon merely names a relation, without making any assertion, to make the structure a proposition we need an auxiliary word eg. the verb is 'to assert' that the relation holds between 'the book' and 'the table'. 'The book is upon the table' is a proposition. The relation is named and is said to hold between the elements.

It is necessary to distinguish sentences from their meanings. Two sentences, which are clearly two because they consist of different words arranged, may have the same meaning. For example 'John loves Mary' and "Mary is loved by John", are two different sentences, for the first contains three words, where as the second contains five, the first begins with the word 'John' where as the second begins with the word 'Mary', and so on. Yet the two sentences have exactly the same meaning. It is customary to use the term 'proposition' to refer to meanings of such sentences as these. The difference between sentences and propositions is brought out by remarking that a sentence is always a part of a language, the language in which it is pronounced where as propositions are not peculiar to any of the languages in which they may be formulated. Let us take the

following three sentences :-

- (a) It is raining
- (b) Il pleut
- (c) Es, regnet.

All these three sentences are perfectly different. For the first is in English, the second is in French and the third in German. Yet they have a single meaning and this common meaning is propositions of which each of them is a different formulations. Many logicians have given different definition for sentence. According to some, it is a collection of words of given language following grammatical rules and convey some meaning. According to some others, grammatical rule is more important than meaning. But both of them are equally important, for example 'It is raining' now it is both grammatically correct and meaningful. There are certain sentences which are grammatically correct but do not convey any meaning, for example, 'today is saturday' this sentence is grammatically correct but does not convey any meaning. According to some other logicians, meaning is more important than rules of grammar. For example 'you are crying yesterday' though this sentence is grammatically wrong yet we can understand its meaning. From the above we can say that both grammatical correctness and meaning are equally important for a sentence. Wittgenstein defines sentence

as that which is a combination of some words and possess some meaning and use in language. According to him meaning of a sentence is judged by its use in language.'

Before discussing the theory of meaning, first we have to know what meaning is. There are many diverse questions which can be asked about meaning. What conditions must an expression meet to be meaningful ? what is it for two expressions to mean the same ? We will take into consideration these two questions. These are the questions which are of common interest to both philosophers and linguist. When we ask, "what sort of thing or entity is ~~de~~ meaning ", we are not saying that everything that has a meaning must refer to something. So when I say ' I did it for the sake of John', here I am not saying that, there is something or some entity 'sake' which belongs to John and for which I did something. Here I mean that I did some thing to help John. Again, we can ask questions about meaning without using the word 'meaning'. Instead of asking 'Is x is a word with meaning ? ' we can ask ' is x meaningful ?.

The term 'meaning' may be taken in different senses, when I say ' I mean to go' here I am using intention sense of meaning. Again when I say 'what is the meaning of your ~~laif~~liveness ? here I am using meaning as an explanation sense. When I say 'those black clouds mean rain' here I am using

meaning as a symbol. There are numerous other uses which are used to talk about persons, actions, events, things, etc. But here we are mainly concerned with the symbol sense.

When we say that there are different senses of the word 'meaning' there may be overlapping between them. Because there can be different meanings of the same word. Child learns the meaning of many words by hearing them in other people's uttered sentences and practising such utterances. Through these they can learn many words and extend and increase their knowledge. There are certain words whose meaning may be learnt and taught by pointing. But the relationship between the word and that to which it may be said to refer is not a simple one. Proper names refer to individuals as single individuals. Boy, girl etc, refer to an infinitely large class of individuals.

A variety of theories of meaning are advocated in the west such as verification theory, verification principle, denotation theory, image theory, concept theory, picture theory, use theory, causal theory, intention theory, and so on. ^{Since} I consider four theories to be more important than others, I will attend to these theories only. These four theories are (1) The principle of verification (2) The denotation or referential theory (3) Use theory or use doctrine, and (4) intention theory. Accordingly, I have divided my thesis into four chapters, namely

(1) meaning and verification, (2) meaning and denotation
(3) meaning and use, and lastly (4) meaning and intention.

CHAPTER - I

MEANING AND VERIFICATION

When the word 'meaning' is taken in its symbol-
sense there are two problems, namely nature of meaning and
criteria of meaning. These two problems are two different
problems. While discussing meaning and verification I
would like to discuss, Schlick and Ayer, The verificationist
theory was profounded by the logical positivist. Originally
they were a group of philosophers, scientists and mathemati-
cians who during the 1920's gathered around Moritz Schelick,
Professor of philosophy at Vienna and became known as
Vienna Circle. Many of them who belonged to this circle
became wellknown philosophers for example, Carnep and
Waismann. Wittgenstein was never a member of this group
but he associated with Schlick, and the circle was deeply
influenced by his "Tractatus logic~~e~~-philosophicus". The
best known British exponent of logical positivism is
A.J.Ayer. The notion of verification covers two views and
both are associated with logical positivists. The first
view is known as verification theory of meaning and this
theory is about the nature of meaning, and it is profounded
by Schlick. The second theory is known as 'verification
principle' and it is the theory about the criterion of
meaning, and it is profounded by A.J.Ayer. I would like

to discuss Ayer's view and Schlick's view while discussing meaning and verification.

First, I would like to discuss Schelick's view, that is, verification theory of meaning. The purpose of every proposition is to express its meaning yet meaning of a proposition constitutes a serious philosophical difficulty when we are concerned with a proposition we usually think that we know its meaning already but if we do not then we can have it explained to us. Sometimes, it consists in repeating the same thing. So we have seen that in ordinary life and even in science to answer a question concerning meaning of a proposition is simply repeating it either more distinctly or in slightly different ways. Here the question arise , "Can there be any sense in asking for the meaning of a statement which is well before our eyes or ears ?" The possible answer is that we have not understood it. Here what is before our eyes or ears is nothing but a series of words and such series of words is for us simply a complex of signs without meaning, but it is not a proposition it is a sentence. So we cannot enquire after the meaning of a proposition but can ask about the meaning of a sentence. We should not think that we know the meaning of a sentence, if we are familiar with all the words occurring in it. It is necessary but not sufficient. Every word has a definite signification only within a definite context into which it has been fitted and

it will have no meaning outside this context, for other contexts, we will have to produce new rules. Here we can consult the example which Schlick has given. If a friend says to me 'take me to a country when the sky is three times as blue as England' his phrase would appear to me non-sensical because the word 'blue' is used in a way which is not provided by the rules of language. Though the sentence indicates certain command or wish, yet the combination of a number and name of a colour can not be used together. If we ask "what is the meaning of 'three times as blue' he can give certain physical circumstances which he wants his phrase to be the description of and then his wish will be meaningful to us. So when we ask about a sentence 'what does it mean?' what we must know is the circumstance in which the sentence is used. According to Schlick "the meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification". The 'grammatical' rules partly consists of ordinary definitions that is explanation (by means of other words) of words/and this is what is called **ostensive** definition. For example, when we teach a child 'blue' we show certain blue object. But in most cases the ostensive definition is of a more complicated form. We can not point to an object corresponding to words like 'because', 'immediate', again here we must require the presence of certain complex situation. From the above it is clear that there is no way of understanding meaning without ultimate reference to ostensive definition. This means reference to 'experience' or 'possibility of

verification'. Therefore Schlick points out that meaning of a proposition can be given only by giving the rules of its verification in experience. According to Schlick, linguistic rules refer ultimately to ostensively defined experience, to discover meaning we have to observe the world. Schlick tried to explain what he meant by 'experience'. To understand a proposition, he wrote in 'A New Philosophy of Experience', 'we must be able exactly to indicate those particular circumstances that would make it true and those other particular circumstance that would make it false'. "Circumstances" means facts of experience and so experience decides about truth or falsity of a proposition experience verifies propositions and therefore the criterion of solubility of a proposition is its reducibility to possible experience'³.

Schlick also wants to discuss the question 'how do we define verifiability?'. He points out that verifiability means possibility of verification. Again, the word 'possibility' can be used in two ways - empirical possibility and logical possibility. Schlick defines empirical possibility in the following way - any thing that does not contradict the laws of nature that means compatibility with natural laws. A state of affair is empirically possible when it is not contrary to laws of nature. Thus, it is empirically impossible for us to jump 10,000 feet in the air or to jump out of a tenth storey window and not go downward. The state of

3. Publication in Philosophy, ed. College of Pacific(1933).

affairs expressed by laws of nature do not change hence what is empirically impossible at one time is empirically possible at any other time. What we thought hundred years ago to be empirically impossible may have turned out to be empirically possible after all that means we were simply mistaken about the laws of nature. But our knowledge about natural laws is not complete therefore we can never assert with certainty the empirical possibility of any fact. The possibility of verification which is relevant to meaning cannot be of the empirical sort. We have to be sure of it before we can consider the empirical circumstances and investigate whether or no, or under what conditions they will permit of verification. Therefore, ~~schlick~~ and other philosophers give importance on logical possibility. A process or fact is called logically possible if the sentence which is supposed to describe it follows the rules of grammar of our language. For example 'the child was naked but wore a long white night gown' obviously violated the rules of grammar. It does not describe any fact at all. It is meaningless because it represents logical impossibility. It is logically impossible for there to be a square circle. The definition of 'square' and 'circle' contradicts each other. A circle is by definition something which is not four sided hence saying that circle is four sided would be self contradictory. If it is circle it cannot be a square, if it is square it

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cannot be a circle. The 'cannot' here is 'logical cannot' meaning that it is logically impossible for it to be so. It is logically impossible to ^{fall} upwards because 'fall' means to go downwards. So falling upwards would be self contradictory, it is also empirically impossible. The verifiability criterion does not say that a statement is meaningful only if it is verified. We have not found how many mountains are on the other side of the moon, but the statement that there are two thousand mountains there is surely meaningful. We cannot verify it, until we know the meaning of the statement to be verified. We know the meaning only when we know how it would be verified, whether anyone has actually done so or not. Meaning depends not on actual verification but on verifiability in other words, possibility of verification, when we talk about possibility we are not talking about technical possibility or empirical possibility but logical possibility of verification. Logical possibility once again means only that there is no contradiction in the proposition. We may also say in case of moon that the meaning requirement is fulfilled by imagining the situation which would verify our proposition. But this can apply only in a restricted sense. Imagination could not take place where possibility is of an empirical kind. We must not identify meaning with any of the psychological data. Carnap is right when he says that questions of meaning has nothing to do with the psychological question,

To understand the word 'red flag', I would point to an object which I should call 'flag' and whose colour I could recognize as 'red'. It is not necessary that I should actually call up the image of red flag. Imagining a red patch is different from referring to an ostensive definition of 'red' - verifiability has nothing to do with images.

// Now I would like to discuss Ayer's principle of verification. According to this principle a sentence is literally meaningful to a given person if and only if he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express. In this case verification referred to is verification by means of observation and experiment.

Before discussing verification principle we must remember one thing that only indicative sentences must be verifiable in order to have meaning. Command, questions although they are meaningful they can not be verified because they are neither true nor false. Again not all indicative sentences have to be verified because in case of analytic sentences we need not have to verify it since we know them in virtue of their definitions of the components words. Again performative sentences also need not be verified. Thus only non-analytic, non-performative sentences must be empirically verifiable in order to have meaning. Unless a sentence was literally meaningful it would not express a proposition because proposition is either true

or false and to say that sentence was either true or false would entail that it was literally meaningful. But if principle of verification was formulated in this way then there would be a difficulty, because all sentences does not express propositions. To explain this difficulty Ayer introduces a third candidate 'the statement' to dispute the honour with the sentence and proposition. Ayer defines sentence as grammatically significant set of words, a 'statement' as what such symbol expresses and a 'proposition' as sub class of statements which contains only such statements as are expressed as literally meaningful statement. According to Ayer, it is sentences that are meaningful and it is statements that are verifiable. Now we can reformulate the principle of verification in this way-a statement is held to be literally meaningful if it is empirically verifiable. But what do we mean when we say 'verifiable'. Ayer makes a distinction between strong sense and weak sense of verifiability. According to the strong principle, a proposition is meaningful unless experience can conclusively establish its truth and according to weak principle a proposition to be meaningful some observation should be relevant to the determination of a proposition's truth or falsity. Ayer takes principle of verification in the weak sense because we cannot reduce universal laws and statement about past to present experience. Here I want to talk about one thing that when we say meaningful sentence

must be verifiable we are not saying that it should be verifiable in practice but we are saying that it should be verifiable in principle. "It must be emphasized that when we speak by verifiability we mean the logical possibility of verification and nothing but this.⁴ In discussing Ayer's weak sense of principle we find one word 'relevant'. But the meaning of this relevant is vague thus Ayer put forward his second version of principle by using the phrase 'observation statement' in place of 'experiential proposition. So principle of verification can be reformulated in this way - a statement is verifiable and can be sequently meaningful if some observation statement can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain other premises, without being deduced from those other premises alone. According to Ayer, a statement is directly verifiable if it is either itself an observation statement or is such that in conjunction with one or more observation statements it entails at least one observation statement which is not deducible from these other premises alone. A statement is indirectly verifiable if it satisfies the following conditions - firstly that in conjunction with certain other premises it entails one or more directly verifiable statements which are not deducible from these other premises alone. Secondly these other premises do not include any statement that is not either analytic or directly verifiable or capable of being independently established as indirectly verifiable.

4. M.Schliok, 'Meaning and Verification', in Theory of Meaning Ed. A and K. Lehrer, 1970.

The views of Ayer and Schlick have been criticized by many philosophers. But I will concentrate only on the criticisms of Berlin and Waismann. According to Berlin, a sentence is an arrangement of words which obey the rules of grammar, a statement in a sentence which obeys the rules of logic and finally by a proposition he means any sentence which conveys to some one that something is or is not the case. The essence of the principle of verification will appear clearly if one considers its progressive modification in the face of difficulties. Berlin criticises the positivistic assertion that is, all significant statements were concerned with **facts** about experience or with the symbolic means of expressing them. According to him Metaphysicians and theologians also reported facts of experience but in a way different from empirical scientists. Berlin also criticizes the positivistic claim that is, meaning of a proposition resided in the means of its verification. According to positivism the question 'what does the statement p mean?' and 'what must one do to discover whether p is true?' were logically equivalent. Here 'p' stands for empirical proposition. According to Berlin this argument is not correct and it involves the Fallacy of hysteron proteron. According to him we must know the meaning first before discovering the possible ways of verifying the statement. That means understanding what the sentence means - what proposition it expresses must in some sense prior to the

investigation of its truth. But this criticism is not very strong. Supporters of positivism says that the expression 'to know the means of the verification of 'p' is knowing what circumstances one would judge the group of symbol 'p' to convey something which was or was not the case. Berlin says that the conception 'means of verification ' is too narrow, because of the fact that it takes care of only empirical statement about the present and immediate future experience. It can not take care of statement about past and future. In order to bring out this point we can take the following example - it rained half an hour ago. It is an empirical statement about past experience. The claim of this proposition can be proved by giving more than one evidences - (a) my coat is wet (b) The ground is wet (c) my friend says that it really rained half an hour back. Here all the evidences may be true yet what the proposition mean may be false. The above evidences may be true not because of rain but because of other reason. There is no logical equivalence between the empirical proposition and evidential proposition. To this the defender of the theory says that the meaning of p resides in the means of its verification did not literally mean any equivalence. What they were claiming is simply this - p is significant entails and is entailed by p is verifiable when 'verification' is taken into consideration, it is not verification in practice but verification in principle. For example the

proposition 'There **are** mountains on the other side of the moon' is clearly significant and yet cannot be verified on account of technical difficulties. Again in case of proposition like 'Julius Caesar was bald', we cannot verify the proposition by direct inspection. To verify the proposition that such observers actually exist and have experiences which are not **ours** is of course a very different and difficult task. Thus 'p' is significant have now come to mean, **it** is conceivable that some one should observe or should have observed what is correctly described by 'p' ~~from~~ the above it can be said that ~~the~~ singular categorical propositions as **are** conclusively verifiable at any rate in principle, by a suitably situated observer. But according to Berlin, this criterion leaves three classes of proposition unaccounted namely proposition which are not **singular**, propositions which are not **categorical** and propositions which seems to be both singular and categorical but not be conclusively verifiable by observation. General propositions offers the most obvious difficulty. The general proposition 'all s is p', here 's' denotes infinite number and it can not be verified by finite number of observation. This is not conclusively verifiable at all. This kind of proposition can be falsified by future. Ramsey says that all general proposition must be considered as rules or prescription therefore the truth or falsity of this proposition does not arise at all. **Ramsey** also says that this general proposition can be ~~refuted~~ refuted by

single negative instances and it is non-sense to say of rules can be refuted. To meet this difficulty we can take two versions of weak verifiability which is given by A.J.Ayer. According to the first we ask about a given proposition 'would any observation be relevant to the determinations of its truth or falsehood? If so the proposition is significant. Here there is a difficulty and difficulty is concept of relevance. This concept is a vague concept and cannot be properly defined. According to the second version it is the mark of a genuine factual proposition that some experimental propositions can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain other premises without being deducible from those other premises alone. Let us take the following example -

All men are mortal

Socrates is a man

∴ Socrates is mortal

Thus 'all men are mortal' is weakly verifiable because 'Socrates will die' which does not follow from 'socrates is a man' by itself, follows from the two in conjunction. According to Berlin this second version is also not acceptable. To discuss this point let us take the following syllogism -

This logical problem is bright green

I dislike all shades of green.

∴ I dislike this logical problem.

Here though it is a valid syllogism and its major premise has satisfied the definition of weak verifiability as well as rules of logic and grammar, Yet its conclusion can not be conclusively verifiable because here the major premise is merely non-sense.

According to some logicians, all hypothetical propositions are general and all general propositions are hypothetical, that means 'all s is p' is equivalent to "if s then p" and vice versa. This view cannot be accepted. Though some hypothetical propositions are general not all hypothetical propositions are general. For example 'if I look up I shall observe a blue patch'. This is a hypothetical proposition but in no sense general. This hypothetical proposition can conclusively verifiable. I verify this proposition by looking up and observing a blue patch. This hypothetical proposition involves two conjunctive proposition - I shall look up and I shall see a blue patch. But these conjunctive and hypothetical propositions are not equivalent. The conjunction is falsified if (i) I do not look up and see a blue patch (ii) I do not look up and do not see a blue

patch and (iii) I look up and see no blue patch. The hypothetical proposition can be falsified by the occurrence of this last conjunctive proposition alone. If (i) and (ii) is the case then hypothetical proposition is neither true nor false. According to some philosopher even a single hypothetical proposition can not be conclusively verifiable. For example -

If I remain in the class, I shall feel sleepy.

If I do not remain in the class I shall feel guilty.

∴ Either I remain in the class or I do not remain in the class, either I feel sleepy or I feel guilty.

Remaining and not remaining can not be logically verifiable in principle. The above inductive evidence can weakly verifiable.

Lastly, the proposition which appears to be singular and categorical but they are not. Let us take the example - 'this table is brown'. Though it appears to be singular but it is not. It is a cluster of many statements. Even a material object statement cannot be conclusively verified .

Let us consider the view of Friedrich Waismann, the modern empiricist who tries to defend the verification theory of meaning. Waismann viewed that when the verification

theory claims that the meaning of a statement is the method of its verification, we must be quite clear what we mean by the term 'method of verification'. From a logical point of view we are not interested in various activities that are involved in verifying a statement. To make this point clear let us take the example which is given by Waismann himself. Suppose there is a metal ball and in order to know whether the ball is charged with electricity we have to connect the ball with an electroscope and watch whether the gold leaves diverge. The statement 'the gold leaves of the instrument diverge(s)' describe the verification of the statement 'the ball is charged'(p). Here we find that the statement 'p' follows from statement(s), therefore we make a connection here. According to Waismann here we lays down a rule of inference which allow us to pass from the statement 'the ball is charged with electricity' to another that describes an observable situation. According to Waismann, meaning and verification are connected thus he says that explaining the verification is explaining the meaning and changing the verification is changing the meaning. Empiricism does not claim any identity nor any logical equivalence between empirical statement and evidential statement. These two statements are different from one another. Empirical statement cannot be reduced to evidential statement. Because of the fact that empirical and

evidential statement have different logical status. Therefore one cannot be reduce to other. According to Waismann, phenomenalist fails to translate empirical statement to statement about sense data. The failure is because of 'open texture' involved in empirical concept. Suppose there is a cat in the next room. In order to prove this we will have to go and see whether there is a cat or not. Here there is a problem how do we know that it is a cat not other animal. The possibility of cat changing into another thing can not be ignored. Let us take the other example - 'the notion of gold'. According to Waismann it is not possible to define a concept like gold with absolute precision, because something unforeseen might happen, we cannot block every nook and corner against entry of doubt. Waismann says that 'open texture' is different from 'vagueness' 'vague' is opposite of precise' or 'definite' and words and phrases that are vague are accordingly lacking in precision. The simplest form of vagueness occurs when there is no precise cut off point between applicability and non-applicability of the words, in some situations the word is clearly applicable in other situations it is not clearly applicable. If we know exactly at what speed someone was driving we need not to use the words 'fast' or 'slow', we simply state the speed, But if we do not know exactly we might say, some what vaguely 'around 65' are more vaguely still 'pretty fast'. We have indeed a whole series of vague words such as slow,

medium, pretty fast, fast, very fast which we need to use when our information is not precise. Vagueness can be removed but open texture can never be corrected. Open texture is possibility of vagueness. Open texture is a very fundamental characteristic of all empirical concepts and it is this open texture which prevents us from verifying conclusively all empirical statements. There will always remain a possibility that we have not taken into account something or other that may be relevant to the use of terms involved in empirical statement and we can not also foresee completely all the possible circumstances in which the statement is true or in which it is false. There will always remain a margin of uncertainty. Thus the absence of a conclusive verification is directly due to the open texture of the terms concerned. Logically speaking it is always possible to extend the description of an empirical statement by adding some more detail or **other. Every description stretches into a horizon**

of open cases where we can attain the completeness. If ~~in these cases, the description is~~
X in Geometry I describe a triangle e.g. by giving its ~~three sided, the description is~~
complete, nothing can be added to it. Empirical statement is as a rule not conclusively verifiable for two different reasons firstly because of existence of unlimited number of tests, secondly because of open texture of the terms involved. The incompleteness involved

in these two cases is different. In the first case we can not complete the description of material object or situation. Something more can always be added to it. In the second case there is always a chance that something unforeseen might happen because our factual knowledge is incomplete, that is, I should get acquainted with some new experience which at present I cannot even imagine. Let us take the case of a blind person who later obtains the experience of seeing. Again our interpretation of certain facts may change completely because of some new discovery.

Conclusion

As I have pointed out there are two problems when meaning is taken in its symbol sense. These problems are the nature of meaning and criteria of meaning. It is not wrong to say that these two problems are different. The problem of nature of meaning is concerned with the answering of the question, 'what is it for a word to be meaningful?'. The criteria of meaning on the other hand, tries to answer a different question namely, what conditions must a word fulfill in order to be meaningful. The logical positivists have advocated two theories of meaning, namely, verification theory of meaning and verification principle. The verification theory of meaning is concerned with problem of nature of meaning, where as verification principle concerns with problem

of criteria of meaning. M.Schlick is the protagonist of the former and A.J.Ayer of the latter. It cannot be denied that logical positivism is a powerful movement in philosophy and therefore, its place in the development of philosophy is secure. Needless to say that logical positivism brought about a significant change in the attitude and outlook of subsequent philosophers. It is logical positivism which determined to a great extent as to what questions should be raised in philosophy, and what questions should not be raised. It is no exaggeration that philosophy have never be same since the advancement of logical positivism. Schlick goes wrong in identifying meaning with true or falsity. But he will be remembered for a long time to come for his clear cut distinction between logical possibility and empirical possibility on the one hand, and the distinction between ^{/empirical impossibility} logical impossibility/on the other. It is obvious that schlick's theory fails to account for all meaningful words and statements. Because there are many meaningful words and statements which cannot be verified in experience.

Ayer's weak sense of verifiability also fails to carry conviction as Berlin has rightly pointed out Ayer is guilty of something that is meaningless into something that is meaningful. The main criticism against

these two theories is that they failed to cover general propositions, conditional propositions and propositions regarding statements about material objects and minds. I think that this criticism has been adequately met by F. Waismann. Another main criticism is that conclusive verification and conclusive falsification are not possible not only in practice but also in principle. I am of the view that this criticism has also been demolished by Waismann. Waismann emphasises the peculiar logical status of all empirical statements. He points out terms involved in all empirical propositions consists of what he calls 'open texture'. Due to this open endedness of empirical concepts it is neither possible to conclusively verify empirical statements nor it is possible to conclusively falsify them.

Though these two theories failed to account for all kinds of propositions, they, I think, at least account for all empirical propositions.

CHAPTER - II

MEANING AND REFERENCE

Suppose, one is asked what it is for a word to have meaning? It is perhaps natural to answer that a meaningful word stands for something, where as a meaning-less one does not. Thus the meaning of word is a kind of object. What kind of object is the meaning of a word supposed to be ? One answer has been that the meaning of word is that of which the word is the name or in other words, meaning of a name is the bearer of the name, and since a name is traditionally said to 'denote' its bearer, the theory may be called the 'denotation' theory. Such a theory of meaning was presupposed by Bertrand Russell and Strawson. Though this theory does not claim that it is applicable to all words and phrases, the critics point out that it breaks down even in the use of the words and phrases which it does claim to cover. I think that it would be worthwhile to give a brief account of Bertrand Russell's views regarding denotation in order to determine the relation between meaning and reference. He says - "By a 'denoting phrase' I mean a phrase such as any one of the following a man, some man, any man, every man, all men, the present kind of England, the present king of French, the centre of the mass of the solar system, the revolution of the sun round the earth".

Here we find that denoting phrase depends on its form (a) phrase may be denoting and yet not denote anything for example, the present king of France (b) a phrase may denote one definite object; for example; present king of England, denotes a certain man (c) a phrase may denote ambiguously; for example 'a man' denotes not many men but an ambiguous man. In theory of knowledge, the subject of denoting is very important. There are certain things with which we have no immediate acquaintance but which can be known only by description. The distinction between acquaintance and knowledge about is the distinction between the things we have presentations of and the things we only reach by means of denoting phrases. Denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves, but that every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning. Every thing, nothing and something are not assumed to have any meaning in isolation, but a meaning is assigned to every proposition in which they occur. When we say that 'I met a man' here it is true that I met a definite man but it is not what I affirm, what I affirm according to the theory is "I met x and x is a human" is not always false. Again, when we say 'all men are mortal' then it is a hypothetical proposition and it states that if x is a man, x is mortal whatever x may be. There are certain phrases containing

'the' and these are the most interesting and difficult portion of denoting phrases.

According to Meinong, any grammatically correct phrase stands for an object. Thus 'the present king of France' 'the round square' etc are supposed to be a genuine objects. These objects do not subsist and yet they are supposed to be objects. But this view involves self contradiction.

Frege in his theory avoids violating the law of contradiction. In a denoting phrase. Frege distinguishes two elements -- the meaning and the denotation. For example 'the centre of mass of solar system at the beginning of the twentieth century is a certain point', here 'the centre of mass of the solar system at the beginning of twentieth century' is complex in meaning and the solar system, twentieth century etc. are constituents of meaning. Here the denotation 'is a certain point' is simple and denotation has no constituent at all when we analyse with Frege's view there is a difficulty. If we say 'The king of England is bald' here it is not a statement about complex meaning but it is a statement about the actual man denoted by meaning. But when we say 'the king of France is bald' here it has the same meaning provided by 'the king of England' but it has no

denotation in obvious sense. So it ~~is~~ not nonsensical that 'the king of France is bald' but it is plainly false. Thus if we say denoting phrases have two sides of meaning and denotation, the cases where there seem to be no denotation, cause difficulties. //

Let us now examine word meaning in particular. What is the relation between a word and what it means ? Words refer to the things in the world. The question of reference deals with the relation of words and the world. Sentences are combination of words, they are made up of words. Each word stands for an object or name an object. The meaning of a word is the object for which it stands. We use the word 'cat' to refer to cats, the word 'run' to refer to various acts of running and so on. To determine what a word means is to find out what things we use it to refer to. The referential theory can not be the whole story, this theory can be applied only to a limited class of words and those words we call proper names. If I call my sister 'Mary' and my dog 'polly' then I am referring to them by means of proper names, because they are used to label one thing only. 'One word, one thing' - this formula applies only to proper names. Proper names are clearly used to refer to individual things. But they are the only words that are used solely to refer. Most words do not refer to things at all not even if we use the word 'thing' in a very broad

sense to include material object, animals, people, activities, qualities and relations. There are many words that clearly do not refer in any way at all. For example, conjunctions, interjections etc, 'oh', 'aha', 'hurrah' and so on which do have a meaning of some sort but do not refer to any things, any qualities of things, any activities or any thing else that could be called things. These words are ordinarily used to express or evoke feelings and attitudes. Again, there are certain words, for example, 'and', 'as', 'or', 'but', 'because', 'not', 'yes', these words do not behave the way name behaves. They are used to introduce phrases and clauses, but they do not refer to things. Yet they do have meanings, and their meanings make a difference to the sentences in which they occur; Again, some words refer but their reference is not the same as their meaning. For example, the word 'I' changes its reference all the time. When John uses it, it refers to John, when Smith uses it, it refers to Smith, and so on, for millions of users of the language. Yet the meaning of 'I' does not change these millions of times, it always has the same meaning. A person who uses it always talking about himself that is 'I' refers to speaker himself. Thus while 'I' does refer, what it refers to constantly changes, so what it means cannot be the same as what it refers to. The same is true of 'this', 'that', 'here', 'now' etc.

By a description Russell means any phrase of the form 'a so and so' or 'the so and so'. A phrase of the form 'a so and so' he calls 'ambiguous' description and a phrase of the form 'the so and so' (in the singular) definite description. Russell calls definite description as propername.

'A man' is an ambiguous description and 'the man with the iron mask' is a definite description. Russell calls definite descriptions such phrases as 'the author of Waverely', 'the present king of France', 'the tallest building in London', and so on - phrases which purport to name one definite object and the no other.

Many people assume that the meaning of any word or phrase is the object it names. For example, the word 'Socrates' names a certain man, that it means that man and thus he is the meaning of the word 'Socrates'.

"As to what one means by 'meaning', I will give a few illustration. For instance, the word 'Socrates', you will say, means a certain man, The word 'mortal' means a certain quality..."¹

1. Bertrand Russell, 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', reprinted in his Logic and knowledge, ed. by R.C. Marsh (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1956) p.186.

If we accept this presupposition that every word or phrase does name something then it leads to a difficulty. Because the phrases like 'the golden mountain', 'if', etc., do not name anything. According to Russell, if a word or phrase does name something - if it is true proper name, a logically proper name, then the meaning of that word or phrase is what even it names. Let us take the example of nouns. Russell views that if a noun does infact name a certain object then that object is ~~its~~ meaning and it has that meaning in all contexts.

Let us now return to Russell's / ^{ambiguous} and definite description. When I say 'I met a man' it is an ambiguous description. Let us assume for a moment that my assertion is true that I met John. It is clear that what I assert is not 'I met John'. if I say 'I met a man but it was not John' here though I lie I do not contradict myself where as I do contradict myself if I say I met a man when I really mean that I met John. We may go further not only to John but no actual man at all. The statement would remain significant, though it could not possibly be true, even if there were no man at all. According to Russell, the proposition 'I met a unicorn' is a significant proposition if we know what it would be to be a unicorn. Even the word 'unicon' applies to no animals in the world, we know the meaning of the word

because we know what we would call a unicorn if we came across it. Again, we say that 'a man exists' if the propositional function 'x is a human' is sometimes true and 'a so and so exist', "if 'x is so and so' is sometimes true. This can be put in another way. The proposition 'Socrates is a man' is equivalent to 'Socrates is human' but both of them are not the same proposition. The 'is' of 'Socrates is human' is the relation between subject and predicate and the 'is' of 'Socrates is a man' is the relation of identity. The identity in 'Socrates is a man' is the identity between an object and an object ambiguously described. An object ambiguously described will exist when at least one such proposition is true i.e. when there is at least one true proposition of the form 'x is a so and so' where 'x' is a name.

Though Russell talks of ambiguous and definite ~~descri-~~ption but by description he means definite description. Thus a description will mean any phrase of the form 'the so and so' in the singular. An object is 'known by description' when we know that it is 'the so and so' that is when we know that there is an object and no more, having a certain property and it is implied that we do not have knowledge of the same object by acquaintance. For example, we know that the candidate who gets the most votes will be elected,

and in this case we are very likely also acquainted with the man who is in fact the candidate who will get most votes but we do not know which of the candidates he is, that is, we do not know any proposition of the form 'A is the candidate who will get most votes' where A is one of the candidates by name we have 'merely descriptive knowledge' of the so-and-so when, although we know that the so-and-so exists and we may possibly be acquainted with the object which is in fact, the so-and-so, yet we do not know any proposition 'a is the so-and-so'. When we say 'the so-and-so exists' we mean that there is just one object which is 'the so and so' when we say 'Mr. A is the Unionist candidate for this constituency' we mean that 'Mr. A is the Union candidate for this constituency and no one else is'. 'The Union candidate for this constituency exists' means 'some one is the Union candidate for this constituency and no one else is'. Thus, when we are acquainted with an object which is the so and so we know that the so and so exists but we know that the so-and-so exists when we are not acquainted with any object which we know to be the so and so, and even when we are not acquainted with any object which, in fact, is the so and so..

Let us take the example 'Scott is the author of waverley'. Here, we apply the name 'Scott' and the description 'the author of waverley' to the same person. But there is a distinction between name and other symbols. A name is a simple symbol whose meaning is something that can only occur as subject, again a simple symbol is one which has no parts. Thus 'Scott' is a simple symbol. So we have two things to compare (a) name and (b) the description. A name is a simple symbol which directly designates an individual which is its meaning and a description which consists of several words, and whose meanings ^{are} already fixed.

The assumption that definition descriptions are proper names cannot be accepted. Let us take the following two examples, namely (a) Scott is the author of waverley (b) Scott is Scott. These are two different propositions, because a proposition containing a description is not identical with what that proposition becomes when a name is substituted even though the name, names the same object as the description describes. In case of 'Scott is the author of Waverley' if we put any one else other than Scott in place of 'author of Waverley' then our proposition will become false. But our proposition is essentially of the same form if we say 'Scott is Sir Walter' in which the two names apply to same person.

So long as names are used as names 'Scott is Sir.Walter' is the same trivial proposition as 'Scott is Scott'. Let us talk of law of identity that is $x = x$. Here we can substitute x any name we choose for example Socrates, Aristotle, Plato and so on, and we can infer from law of identity that Socrates is Socrates, Plato is Plato. But from this we cannot say author of Waverley is author of Waverley because if we substitute a name for 'author of waverley' in a proposition, the proposition we obtain will be a different one. In fact, in the propositions of the form 'the so and so, the so and so, are not always true. It is necessary that the so and so must exist. Thus 'the present king of France' is the present king of France', 'the round square is round square' is always false. When we substitute a description for a name, propositional function which are always true may become false, if the description describes nothing.

"Take, for example, the following proposition: "Scott is the author of Waverley" - This proposition expresses an identity, thus if 'the author of waverley" could be taken as a proper name and supposed to stand for some object C, the proposition would be 'Scott is C'. But if C is any one except Scott, this proposition is false, while if C is Scott, the proposition is 'Scott is Scott' which is trivial

and plainly different from 'Scott is the author of Waverley'².

Definite description in isolation have no meaning but sentences containing them may have a perfectly good meaning. (Words and Phrases of which this is symbols). Russell claims that if we complete the proposition expressed by such a sentence for example 'the author of waverley is Scott' we can see that it is a complex one. The proposition expresses by the sentence 'the author of waverley is Scott' has for its meaning the three propositions expressed by these three sentences -

- a) at least one person wrote waverley
- b) at most one person wrote waverley
- c) who ever wrote Waverley was Scott.

From this we can see that 'the present king of France is bald' . now have a perfectly good meaning but they are false, since part (a) of their analysis is false thus making the whole proposition false.

Strawson while whole heartedly supports Russell's intentions and appreciates his 'feeling for reality' thinks that Russell's theory of description should be rejected

2. Russel and Whitehead, Principia Mathematica, I, Second Edition (London Cambridge University Press, 1925).

as it is based on certain misconceptions and confusion. Strawson's 'on referring' is the most famous challenge which has been directed against Russell's 'theory of description'.

Strawson says that Russell made at least two mistakes. He did not fully realize that a sentence can have variety of uses and he mistakenly thought that every meaningful sentence must be either true or false. Strawson says that we commonly use expressions of certain kinds to mention or refer to some individual person or single object or particular event or place or process. According to Strawson, these expressions have a particular use which he calls 'uniquely referring use'. There are mainly four classes of such expressions which have uniquely referring use. They are as follows:

- (a) Singular demonstrative pronouns (this and that),
- (b) Pronouns (London, Napoleon, John)
- (c) Singular personal pronouns (She, he, I), Singular impersonal pronoun (it).

(d) and the phrases beginning with the definite article followed by a noun qualified or unqualified, in the singular (eg. the table, the old man, the king of France).

Strawson is not saying that these phrases have only one use but they have other uses also. Let us take the following two sentences (i) the whale is a mammal and (ii) the whale

struck the ship. In the first sentence one is not mentioning one particular whale whereas as in the other sentence one is mentioning a particular whale. When we say 'the whale struck the ship, here we are using each of the expressions 'the whale' and 'the ship' to mention a particular object, we are using each of these expressions in the uniquely referring way.

✓ Russell in his theory of description tries to solve some of the problems relating of the phrase of the form 'the so and so' when they occur as a subject in a singular subject predicate sentence. Let us take the example 'the king of France is wise'. This is a significant sentence. But there is not at present the king of France. Then how can it be a significant sentence when there is nothing which answers to the description it contains. To avoid this difficulty Russell says that 'the king of France is wise' has grammatically a subject and predicate. But it is not a logical subject predicate sentence at all. That is, the subject in this sentence 'the king of France' is only a subject grammatically not logically. Strawson tries to find out that the implications of Russell's theory of descriptions in the following way- (1) In case of sentence like 'the king of France is wise (a) which is grammatically of the subject predicate form (b) its grammatical subject does not refer to anything, the only

alternative to its being meaningless is to take it to be not really of subject predicate form at all. This, in turn, implies - (2) If there is a sentence which is genuinely of subject-predicate form (grammatically and logically) then there is something referred to by its logical subject. To have meaning it must refer to something. According to Russell there are genuine subject-predicate sentences and in these sentences 'logically proper names' occur as a subject. By logically proper names Russell means the following things -

(1) That they and they alone can occur as subjects of sentences which are genuinely of a subject - predicate form.

(2) that an expression intended to be a logically proper name is meaningless, unless there is some single object for which it stands, for the meaning of such an expression just is the individual object which the expression designates. To be a name at all therefore, it must designate something.

According to Russell, only in two ways sentences which are about some particular person or individual object or event can be significant (a) the misleading sentences like the discussed one, that is, the sentences which can be analyzed as a special kind of existential sentence

(b) the sentences, with 'logically proper names' as their subjects.

Strawson tries to show that there are sentences which are significant, which begin with an uniquely referring way but which falls into neither of these classes. Again, there are sentences which are about some particular person etc and which are significant but they are not analyzable in the Russellian way nor their subject are 'logically proper name'.

In order to bring out Russell's confusion, Strawson draws some distinctions. These distinctions are very important because on them he builds up his whole arguments against Russell. Here he refers to an expression which has a uniquely referring use as 'an expression' and refers to a sentence beginning with such an expression as 'a sentence'. The distinction are between -

- (A₁) a sentence
- (A₂) a use of a sentence
- (A₃) An utterance of a sentence and correspondingly
between
- (B₁) an expression
- (B₂) a use of an expression
- (B₃) an utterance of an expression.

Let us take the sentence 'the king of France is wise'. This one and the same sentence may be uttered at various times. This one and the same sentence stands for a 'sentences'.

There are obvious differences between different occasions of the use of this one and the same ~~sentence~~. One man uttering it in the reign of Louis XIV would be making a true assertion where as another man uttering it in the reign of Louis XV would be making a false assertion. Though the sentence is same it has got different uses. So we cannot talk of the sentence being true or false assertion. So sentence is not about a particular person because it can be applied to so many persons. We can say that a particular use of the sentence is about a particular person. Similarly, mentioning or referring to some thing is a characteristic of a use of an expression, just as being about something and truth or falsity are characteristics of a 'use of a sentence'.

Two persons may utter the same sentence 'the king of France is wise' that is one may speak and other may write. Here we find that same use but two different utterances.

According to Strawson, the expression 'I' has a uniquely referring use. Strawson says -

Meaning is a function of sentence or expression, mentioning and referring and truth or falsity are functions of the use of the sentence or expression. Meaning simply consists of general directions for use either to refer (in case of expression) or to make true or false assertions (in case of a sentence). It consists of rules, habits, conventions governing its (expression or sentence) correct use on all occasions to refer or to assert.³

Strawson says that Russell is wrong when he thinks that referring or mentioning must be meaning. Russell could not distinguish between expression from the use of an expression he confused expression with ^{their} use and meaning with mentioning. If I talk about my handkerchief I can produce the object I am referring to out of my pocket, but I cannot produce the meaning of the expression 'my handkerchief' out of my pocket. People use expressions to refer to particular things. But meaning of an expression is not the set of things or the single thing it may correctly be used to refer to, the meaning is the set of rules, habits, conventions to its use in referring.

3. P.F.Strawson "On referring".

According to Strawson, Russell fails to notice the particular use of a sentence i.e. whether its present use is genuine or a spurious one, whether it is used to talk about something or is used in make believe etc. If to-day some one utter the sentence 'the king of France is wise' then we will not say that the sentence uttered by the man is true or false. We will simply say that now a days there is no king of France. It is a pseudo use of the sentence. Truth and falsity are properties of a sentence when it is genuinely used. But the sentence 'the king of France is wise' is not meaningless. It is significant when it is uttered.

According to Strawson, there are two sets of rules, one set of rule is referring or mentioning and other set of rule is attributing or describing. One of the main purposes of language is to state the facts about things, persons and events. In order to state the facts of the world we must take care of two questions "what (who, which one) are we talking about?" "what all we saying about it (him, her)?" The first question is about the referring task or identifying task and second question takes care of attributing, ascribing or descriptive or classificatory task. Strawson says that usually the subject of a sentence takes care of referring task or identifying task and predicate takes care of descriptive task. But

there is nothing sacrosanct about the employment of separable expressions for these two tasks. Strawson says that to perform the first task is to use an expression in uniquely referring way. But the question arises how do we perform this? In order to make a unique reference certain devices are necessary for showing that a unique reference is intended and what unique reference it is. In securing this result the context of utterance is of primary importance. By 'context' Strawson means the time, the place, the situation, the identity of the speaker, the subjects which form the immediate focus of interest and the personal histories of both the speaker and those he is addressing. There is linguistic communication. All these contextual conditions are conventionally required for the correct referring use of expressions. The requirement for the correct application of an expression in its ascriptive use to a certain thing is that that thing should be of a certain kind, have certain characteristics.

The fulfilment of the conditions for a correct referring use of an expression is never part of what is stated, though it is implied by such a use. The meaning of an expression is the definition of that expression. A definition is a specification of the conditions of the correct ascriptive use of an expression we reach at it through analysis. Russell fails to notice that problems of use are wider than problem of analysis and meaning. Russell

tries hard to make the uniqueness of unique and existence of matter of logic and language but failed. Strawson says that expressions which have uniquely referring use differ in their descriptive use. Russell's reply to Strawson's 'On referring' first appeared in Mind in 1957. Strawson identifies two problems namely problem of descriptions and problem of egocentricity. Russell says that since he considers with these problem to be different problem he has dealt with them separately. This enables Strawson to pretend that Russell has over looked the problem of egocentricity.

*In his theory of description, Russell dealt with two examples 'the present king of France is bald' and 'Scott is the author of Waverley'. The later example does not suit Strawson. As regards the example 'the present king of France' Strawson fastens upon the egocentric word 'present' and does not seem able to grasp that, if for the word 'present' he had substituted the word 'in 1905' the whole of Strawson's argument would have collapsed. According to Russell, it is not difficult to give other examples of the use of descriptive phrases from which ego centricity is wholly absent. For example 'the square root of minus one is half the square root of minus four' or 'the cube of three is the integer immediately preceding the second perfect number.

"'This' denotes what ever, at the moment when the word is used occupied the centre of attention. With words which are not egocentric what is constant is something about the object indicate, but 'this' denotes a different object on each occasion of its use, what is constant is not the object denoted but its relation to the particular use of the word. Whenever the word is used, the person using it is attending to something and the word indicates this something. When a word is not egocentric, there is no need to distinguish between different occasions when it is used, but we must make this distinction with egocentric words, since what they indicate is something having a given relation to the particular use of the word"⁴

Strawson says that there are no logically proper names and there are no description(in this sense) Russell tried to explain the meaning of the word 'in this sense' which Strawson puts in the brackets. Russell says that what Strawson objects to is the belief that there are words which are only significant because there is something

4. Human knowledge(Page 107).

that they mean and if there were not this something they would be empty noises not words. There must be such words if language is to have any relation to fact. The necessity for such words is made obvious by the processes of ostensive definition. How do we know what is meant by such words as 'red' and 'blue'? We can not know what these words mean unless we have seen red and blue object. If there were no red and no blue in our experience we might perhaps invent some elaborate description which we would substitute for the word 'red' or the word 'blue'. For example if we were dealing with a blind man we could hold a red hot poker near enough for him to feel the heat and we could tell him that red is what he could see if he could see, but of course for the word 'see' we would have to substitute another elaborate description.

Some philosophers pointed out that common speech is good enough not only for daily life but also for philosophy. But Russell does not agree with this point. Russell says, common speech is full of vagueness and inaccuracy and that any attempt to be precise and accurate requires modification of common speech both as regards vocabulary and as regards syntax. Everybody admits that physics, chemistry and medicine each requires a language which is not that of everyday life. Let us take an illustration, one of the commonest words of everyday speech namely the word 'day'. Jews

have defined it as the period from one sunset to the next. Astronomers, with other reasons for seeking precision have three sorts of day- the true solar day, the mean solar day and the sidereal day. These have different uses - the true solar day is relevant if we are considering lighting up time, the mean solar day is relevant if we are sentences to fourteen days without the option and the sidereal day is relevant if we are trying to estimate the influence of the tides in regarding the earth's rotation. All these four kinds of day - decalogical, true, mean and sidereal day are more precise than the common use of the word 'day'.

According to Russell, every significant sentence is either true or false) But according to Strawson it may be either true or false. For example suppose that in some country there was a law that no person could hold public office if he considered it false that there is God. According to Russell, an avowed atheist who took advantage of Strawson's doctrine to say that he did not hold this position false but he says that it is not true. It is not only as to names and as to falsehood that Strawson shows his conviction but he shows the same feeling as regards universal affirmatives i.e. sentences of the form 'All A is B'. Traditionally such sentence are supposed to imply that there are A's. Russell agrees with Strawson that ordinary language has no exact logic.

According to Keith S. Donnellan, definite descriptions have two possible functions. They are used to refer to what a speaker wishes to talk about, but they are also used quite differently. To use a definite description a speaker may use an expression which denotes some entity and this the only relationship between the entity and use of definite description recognized by Russell. But according to Donnellan there are two uses of definite descriptions. Donnellan says that Russell's definition of denotation can be applicable to both of these uses. In this sense the speaker uses the definite description to refer to something and this is known as 'referential use' of a definite description. According to Donnellan referring is not same as denoting and the referential use of definite description is not recognized by Russell. Donnellan calls the two uses of definite descriptions as the attributive use and the referential use. A speaker who use a definite description attributively in an assertion states something about who ever or what ever is the so and so. A speaker who uses a definite description referentially in an assertion, on the other hand, uses the description to enable his audience to pick out ^{whome} / : or what he is talking about and states something about that person or thing. Let us take the sentence 'Smith's murderer is insane'. In a quite ordinary sense we do not know who murdered Smith. According to Donnellan, this is an attributive use

of definite description. Again let us suppose that John has been charged with Smith's murder and has been placed on trial. From John's odd behaviour we might sum up our impression by saying that 'Smith's murderer is insane'. Here if some one asks to whom we are referring our description naturally the description will be about John. According to Donnellan this is referential use of definite description. Here we may point out one thing that the two uses of the same sentence will be quite different if we consider that assumption that Smith had no murderer that is he in fact committed suicide. In using the definite description 'Smith's murderer' the speaker in same sense implies that there is a murderer. But when we suppose that this implication is false then there will be different result for two uses. In the first case if there is no murderer then we need not have to attribute the predicate 'insanity' to any body. In the second case we were speaking about John's even though he is not in fact Smith's murderer and it was his behaviour we were commenting upon. A person hearing our comment in the context imagined might know we are talking about John even though he does not think John's guilty. In the referential use of a definite description we may succeed in picking out a person or thing to ask a question about even though he or it does not really fit the description but in the attributive

use if nothing fits the description no straightforward answer to the question can be given. According to Donnellan, the important difference between the referential and attributive use in the beliefs of the speaker. In case of Smith's murderer there was in one case no belief as to who did the deed, where as in other case it was believed that John did it. But this is not an essential differences. It is possible for a definite description to be used attributively even though the speaker believes that a certain person or things fits the description. Similarly it is also possible for a definite description to be used referentially where the speaker believes that nothing fits the description. If a speaker does not believe that anything fits the description or does not believe that he is in a position to pick out what does fit the description, it is likely that he is not using it referentially. Again, we suppose that John is the murderer. We also comment that any one who murdered poor Smith in that horrible way must be insane. If it turns out that John is not the murderer but some one else then my claim would be right if the true murderer is after all insane. ~~Here we are using definite description~~ Here we are using definite description attributively even though we believe that particular person fits the description.

Both the attributive and the referential use of definite descriptions seem to carry a presupposition or implication that there is some thing which fits the description but in a two different way. When a person uses a definite description referentially he believed that what he wishes to refer to fits the description because the purpose of using the description is to get the audience to pick out or think of the right thing or person. Misdescription of that to which one wants to refer would mislead the audience. Therefore, the speaker presupposes that there is some thing which fits the description. In case of attributive use there is not the same possibility of misdescription because we are not referring to John ^{ncr} to any one else by using the description. Here the presupposition that the speaker believed same is Smith's murderer does not arise. Here the speaker will not succeed in saying something true, if he makes an assertion, he will not succeed in asking a question that can be answered, if he has asked a question and he will not succeed in asking a question that can be answered, if he has asked a question and he will not succeed in issuing an order that can be obeyed if he has issued an order. But in case of referential use it is possible to say something true or to ask a question that get answered or to issue a command that gets obeyed.

Conclusion:

I have discussed in this chapter the relation between meaning and reference. I have highlighted the views of Russell, Strawson and Donnellan. I have also highlighted the famous philosophical quarrel between Russell and Strawson. The referential theory fails to explain the problem of meaning adequately. However, I think that it has succeeded in account for certain kinds of utterances.

Strawson is right in pointing out identifying meaning with reference. But as Strawson points out Russell does not identify the problem of description with the problem of egocentricity, more over Russell is right in wanting a precise technical language for doing philosophy.

Though Strawson criticise Russell's theory of description, yet this criticism is not very strong. Strawson might mean that 'uses' etc. are not attached to the expressions rather they change from time to time, place to place and from context to context. If this is so then expression would be an empty one. Every expression will be syncategorematic in itself and depend on so many other things to become categoramatic. They will wait for time, place, context etc. to get their meaning.

Again Strawson says that there is a difference between a sentence and use of the sentence. Truth or falsity are properties of the use of sentence not of a sentence. In the previous discussion we find that he distinguishes an utterance of a sentence from its use. Every case of an utterance of a sentence is certainly a case of use of that sentence. How can a sentence remain separate from its use at any time whatever it comes in to being it comes because it is used. Though he divides 'uses' into two types - one spurious and the other genuine one, but it is not very clear to us. From the above it is clear that Strawson has failed to give any internal criticism of Russells theory of discriptions. But he is successful in constructing his theory 'on referring' and there he rightly points out the importance of rules, habits, conventions circumstances as they bear on one's referring act. but his distinction between meaning and reference cannot be taken into consideration. We think that this distinction is the only ground on which he has built his superstructure of arguments and criticism against Russell.

I agreed with Donnellan that neither Russell nor Strawson's theory represents a correct account of the use of definite descriptions. He says that Russell ignores the referential use and Strawson fails to make a distinction between referential and attributive use.

CHAPTER - III

MEANING AND USE

In the beginning of twentieth century there arose a strong reaction against speculative metaphysics, which gave rise to two important trends in philosophy such as positivism and analytic philosophy. Idealists of the past were charged that they were using words without proper meaning. The terms such as substance, thing, phenomenon, object truth meaning, validity were used ambiguously. Stuart Chase viewed that words which have no correspondence in experience and the world are meaningless and therefore they should not be used in philosophy. Although ambiguity is to be avoided yet significant assertions can be adequately thought and meaning required to be fulfilled in concrete situations. Words cannot altogether be dismissed but their significance and context ought to be properly cognized. This enables us to remember the famous saying of Wittgenstein "Do not ask for meaning, ask for use".

The question 'what do we do in order to mean something' ? or 'How do we go about meaning something', presupposes that meaning is something we do, but it might also be something that happens in us. Meaning something is a distinct phenomenon. We say 'I said it and I mean it' and this looks like two things, not one and when we say

'I said it without meaning it' or 'I said it but did not mean it' this looks like a report of the absence of one of these things, which would normally be present. There is a manifest difference between on the one hand, saying something in jest or as a joke or without thinking and so on, and on the other hand, saying something and meaning it. Every day remarks that is normal circumstances cannot be described as cases of speaker's saying something and meaning it nor as cases of the speaker's saying something and not meaning it either. In cases of excitement we ~~we~~ sometimes raise the question whether the speaker really meant it when he said something. When some one says something and means it, just before he speaks he says to himself the same sentence or its equivalent. Where as, if someone says something and does not mean it he says nothing to himself inwardly. In this connection Wittgenstein admits -

"It is much more often the case that when a person says something and means it, he experiences a characteristic feeling of meaning what he says. Compare the difference in feeling between saying to an old and good friend you have not seen in years. 'I shall be delighted to see you to night' and saying this to a crashing bore who has just invited himself to your party to night".

1. See B.B., P.146.

When we use the verb 'to mean' there is an inner state of ours that is importantly connected with our expressing ourselves the way we do. If we **make** a dire threat and mean it, we may be conscious of a feeling of **firm** determination. When we are struggling to say what we mean, there is always an experience of the imminence of successful expression which could be thought to be a preverbal knowledge of what we mean or what we want to say. There are various uses of the verb 'to mean'. A red sky in the evening is said to mean fair weather tomorrow and certain medical symptoms mean that a person has a certain disease. Sometimes it is also about equivalent to 'intend' as in 'I have been meaning to write for a long time'. A person is the subject of the verb 'to mean' and his meaning something is directly tied up with his saying something. When we explain ourselves **further**, saying, 'what I mean is.....' we are not explaining the meaning of what we have just said, but simply saying more along the same lines, when we say something and add that 'we mean it' we are not further explaining what we have said, but indicating that it should be taken just as it stands.

There is a view that words produce a mental content in the person who reads or hears them, and that he understands if the content produces is the same as that in the mind of the author of the words. Here the word 'understand'

must refer to something, something we do or that happens in us and we can think of a lot of cases in which words do produce something in us, mostly cases of hearing or reading descriptions, when we imagine the scene or the object described. We want to say that the picture we imagine is the understanding and that we have understood if we have the right picture. From this we can say that understanding is imagining what is described, by again and again thinking of a description and then imagining something. But how often we do the imagining in the ordinary course of events when we read a description in a novel or a news paper? In some cases without imagining also we can understand. Now, what does the word 'understand' refer to? It does not refer to mental state nor a description, pattern of behaviour nor any thing else. The word understand has various uses. One such use is to explain the sort of difficulty one has with what some one has said. If I say 'I did not understand that last sentence' here I am not questioning whether it is true or false, but that I am uncertain what it means and that I would like the other person to try saying it another way. Negative and hypothetical uses of 'understand' are much the most common. We say 'I do not understand' and 'If I understood you rightly' but we are a good deal more hesitant about saying that we do understand. Wittgenstein says -

'I understand is a glad start, a cry of joy or relief. We let out this cry when some block age in the normal conversational flow has been removed'.²

When we try to assert something our utterance of appropriate sound is not enough. We must also mean something by that. There must be some thought behind the words or some mental acts or processes must be there. For example, if some one utter the sentence 'the cat, is in the corridor' then he must mean by 'the cat' one particular animal and 'by corridor' one particular place. If he utters this sentence in sleep then we cannot say that he has made an assertion. Wittgenstein says -

"It seems that there are certain definite mental processes bound up with the working of language, processes through which alone language can function. I mean the processes of understanding and meaning. The sign of our language seem dead without these mental processes and it might seem that the only function of the signs is to induce such processes and that these are the things we ought really to be interested in".³

When we talk about something our language does not point to it nor mirror it. Pointing or mirroring could refer

3. Wittgenstein: (Philosophical Investigation, Sect. 358.)

to things only within a convention that is only when there is a way in which pointing is understood and the way in which mirroring is understood. Our words refer to things by the way they enter in discourse by their connections with what people are saying and doing. There is a difference between what we say and what expressions we use and the notion of a rule goes with that. When we speak of 'use' we may think of general practice and we may think of rule. Sometimes they go together, sometimes not. By observing what other people do I learn what it means and if I know what it means I know that others who speak the language will use it in that way, and this is what I have learnt a rule. But there are some difficulties also. A rule is something that is kept. That is why we can know what we are talking about, when we have learnt how the expression is used then we cannot merely behave as other people do. For example 'this is red' does not mean that 'every one calls this red'. Unless the word had a regular use I should not know it was red and I should not know what colour it was because there would be nothing to know. I know what colour it is because I know red when I see it, I know what red is. The colour red is not the word 'red'. If a man cannot see he will never know what it is. I cannot learn the colour unless I can see it, but I cannot learn it without language either. I know it because I know the language. It is

similar with sensation. I know a head ache when I feel it, and I know I felt giddy yesterday afternoon because I know what giddiness is. The meaning of a word is something that is kept. It is for this reason that I can say this is the same colour I saw a moment ago I can see the same colour just because I know red when I see it when words are to refer to anything they must be understood. Words cannot refer without connecting it with use, a use which we learn when we learn what the words means. Words can not refer to anything unless there is a way in which the language is spoken. The expressions of a language get their significance and ^{their} force from their application from ^{their} extensive uses. Using an expression in their meaning is what we call following a rule. For language there must be 'the way the expression are used'. Using an expression in the same way does not mean using it for the same purpose. Wittgenstein admits -

" Philosophical problems are of course not empirical problems, they are solved, rather by looking into the workings of our language and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings in despite of our urge to misunderstand them"⁴

4. (p.1. Sect 109).

In philosophical Investigation, Wittgenstein talks about use of words as well as function of words, of the aims of words, purpose of words, rule's of words and so on. There are various aspects of the use of a thing, the notion of use of something is not at all a simple aspect. When we use the word 'olive oil' there are different aspects - what it is used in, what it is used for etc. when we speak or write something, words are used as material of our utterance or writing. Words are used to perform certain speech act such as issuing an order, asking question and so on. Speech act comprises at least two and typically three, sub acts. They are locutionary, illocutionary and per locutionary acts. When a person makes an utterance and we ask the question what he is doing ~~it~~ this can be answered in three different ways. One answer is to describe the noises he makes, the grammatical construction these noises are in and their meaning. The locutionary act includes the utterance of certain noises, the utterance of certain words in a certain construction and the utterance of them with a certain meaning. Illocutionary acts are such speech acts as describing something, issuing an order, asking a question, greeting some one, announcing an intention, making a promise, and so on. Perlocutionary acts are such speech acts as persuading some one to do something,

upsetting someone, pleasing someone and so on. Let us now return to the question of what Wittgenstein means by the use of word.

Wittgenstein remarks -

" One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that " ⁵.

When Wittgenstein speaks of the use of words it is usually the speech activities that he has in his mind. The use of words to do something ought to be distinguished from the use of words in doing something for example, telling a joke, relating an experience, presenting a report and so on and this is what is called speech activities. Wittgenstein calls this speech activities, the language game. He includes among language games pure speech activities that is, activities which involve little or nothing, except the use of words, such as telling a joke, reporting an event, describing a room etc.

To speak a language is to exercise certain techniques, to behave in certain highly complex ways, which exhibits various abilities. Let us take the example of the word 'ball'. In case of child's learning the meaning of the new word 'ball', it is not enough that he could make the sound 'ball' or write the word 'ball'. He must also behave

5. (p.1, Sect 340).

in certain ways that is, when point to a ball if someone ask him 'what is this ?' he must be able to response that. This is what is called ostensive definition and ostensive definition of the word 'ball' consists in pointing at a ball and saying this is ball. But we must remember one thing that ostensive definition alone is not enough. In pointing to a ball one is at the same time pointing to a round thing, to a thing of certain weight, to a thing of certain colour, to a thing of certain size etc, Speaking a language includes understanding things said in it, to act or behave in certain ways and to do so under appropriate conditions. If a person is to be said to know the meaning of the word 'ball' he must be able to do at least some of the following things - to fetch ball, to draw pictures of balls, to distinguish ball from ether things and so on, and he must know how to apply this in what circumstances. Same is to the apply to other words also.

* For Wittgenstein, words are not pictures, but pieces used in various language games. The meaning of a word is its role in various language game in which it figures, how we behave with it that is meaning of a word depends also how we use the word. For Wittgenstein -

'words have meaning only as "pieces" in the language games which are their "original home(s)"'⁶

6. (P.1, Sect, 11c).

According to Wittgenstein, meaning of a word is its use in the various language games in which it plays a part.

"For a language class of cases though not for all in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language".⁷

To know the meaning of the word 'time' we must know in what context the word is used, the framework of actual situation in which it occurs. From the above it is clear that in order to know the meaning of a word we must know its use. In telling some one what a word means we are putting him in a position to be able to use it, hence that knowing what it means is a function of how it is used. It is natural to think that when we teach a child the meaning of a word what we teach him is its use. There is no connection between knowing the meaning of a word and knowing how to use it. We think that if a person knows the meaning of a word he also knows the use and vice-versa, still it is quite possible to know the meaning of a word and yet not know its use and to know the use without knowing the meaning. For example, most people know how to use the word 'amen' but far fewer know their meaning. Similarly proper name have uses but no meaning.

7.(P 1, Sect 43).

Wittgenstein says -

"Philosophy attempts to construct an 'ideal language' a language the terms of which are all of them precisely defined and the sentences of which unambiguously reveal the logical form of the facts to which they refer, such a perfect language must rest upon atomic propositions, the fundamental philosophical problem is to describe the structure of these, atomic proposition".

Wittgenstein points out that word - uses can be linked without being describable in a single comprehensive formula. Consider for example the word 'game' Board games have many points in common with card games, but share only some of these similarities with football.

The result of our survey, Wittgenstein argues, is that 'we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing, sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail'. Such a network he calls a 'family'. The 'essence' of a game will consist in these complex, interlacing ways of using the word 'game' a conclusion Wittgenstein seems up in an epigram: 'essence is expressed by grammar; grammar tells us what kind of object anything is'.⁸

8. (H. Khatchadomian 'Common names and "family Resemblance"', PPR 1958)

As regards meaning Wittgenstein views every word as a name which leads to Meinong's manner, to postulate mysterious pseudo-entities to serve as the objects of reference for abstract nouns and to think that 'understanding a word' or learning a word's meaning' is some sort of mental process involving the contemplation of what Locke called an 'idea' or Schlick a "content".

Wittgenstein describes a mode of social behaviour and also tries to consider the sort of language which would be practically useful within such a 'form of life'. Let us take the following example which is given by Wittgenstein himself. Suppose a builder is working with a labourer, he teaches his labourer to bring him a slab when he says 'slab' a brick when he says 'brick' and so on. Wittgenstein thinks that this is the kind of language philosopher must have had in mind, he quotes Augustine when they wrote of language as if it wholly consisted of names. Though such a language is obviously very much simpler than the English language yet we cannot regard words as mere names. To understand the word 'slab' is to grasp how it is used in a certain language game in this case the 'game' of receiving and giving orders. Wittgenstein thinks that name is a label and the word 'slab' might actually be printed on the slabs, then we should have to learn how to read this word before we could obey the builder's instruction. This purpose of 'learning the names of objects' are according to Wittgenstein

preliminaries to use of language not examples of it. The meanings of 'slab', then does not consist in the objects it names but in the way it is used in a language. If meaning of 'slab' is part of actual physical object then Wittgenstein argues we ought to be able to say things like 'I broke part of the meaning of the word 'slab''. Such sentence is obviously non-sense and Wittgenstein suggests that the 'naming' theory of meaning is also non-sense.

Let us talk about some quotations given by leading philosophers -

"Elucidating the meaning of a word is explaining how the word is used".⁹

"The meaning of a word is simply the rules which govern its use and to ask for its meaning is to ask for rules".¹⁰

"To give the meaning of an expression is to give general direction for its ^{use} to refer to or to mention particular objects or persons, to give the meaning of a sentence is to give general directions for its use in making true or false assertion".¹¹

9. Patrick Nowell Smith, ethics, (p.67)

10. J.L. Evans, 'One meaning and Verification' Mind LXII, p.3.

11. P.F. Strawson, 'On referring' Mind LXIX p, 327.

"To know the meaning of a sentence is to know how to use it, to know in what circumstances its use is correct or incorrect. A sentence is meaningful if it has a use, we know its meaning if we know its use"¹²
"...to know what an expression means is to know how it may and may not be employed..."¹³

According to Ryle, there is a distinction between language and speech. Ryle points out that language is a stock, fund or deposit of words, construction, intonations and so on. On the other hand our activity or class of activities of saying things is denoted by speech or discourse. Without capital trade is not possible like wise without language speech is not possible. When language is taught to us we learn that language. By picking it up also we learn the language. While learning language three things can be happen that is, we learn the language and forgotten, or learn it and not forgotten or we have half learned it and half forgotten it. Without language it is difficult to teach anything. So language is the corpus of teachable things.

12. G.G. Warnock 'Verification and use of Language'. Review Investigation de Philosophie (V.p.318)

13. Gilbert Ryle 'Theory of meaning' in British Phil. in Mind Century, p.255.

Words, construction etc. ~~we~~ are ^{atoms} / of languages and sentences are units of speech, Word constructions are what we have to learn in mastering a language, sentences are what we produce when we say things, Words have histories because they are already there but sentences do not have histories. We produce sentences while saying things. I am the author of my sentence. We do not acquire sentence but we compose sentences. Hyle also says that to know a language is to have acquired its vocabulary and grammar and so ability to construct and construe sentences in which that vocabulary is employed, whereas to say something in a language it is necessary to produce not just some words but a sentence. But his implication that 'sentences are the units of speech' seems much more stronger than this, for a sentence, he goes on to say, is not nearly what I have produce in saying something, it actually is my saying it or it is "what I say". In our daily life we produce many sentences, but we do not call them sentences we call them allegations, complaints, promises, requests, commands etc. But people like grammarians, composers, translators editors are concerned with sentences. They are interested in ^{all} instances of someone, actual or imagined, alleging, complaining, warning, joking etc. though their special concern is with the punctuation of them not with their humorousness, with their length not with their truth, with their moods and tenses and not with their relevance

or rudeness. But this view cannot be taken as a whole. Because firstly 'people like' grammarians etc. are actually interested in very different things - { grammarians in syntax, compositions in spaces strings of letters, translators in style and meaning and editors in lots of other matters. Secondly, nor is a sentence an 'instance' of 'someone actual or imagines, alleging, complaining etc. For example someone may allege that Smith's dog won't eat bananas and I may complain that my dog won't eat bananas. What we do and say is different but the sentence we uttered may be the same. We can talk simply about the sentence without bringing in anybody's allegations or complaints, whether actual or imagined. Lastly, a sentence is a grammatical item that can have moods and tenses, but it cannot have relevance or rudeness though in uttering that sentence something relevant or rude might be said from time to time. A joke does not have punctuation, though the sentences may have in which a joke is told.

Ryle says that only philosophers are concerned with the meaning of a sentence or truth of sentence. In order to discuss this point I would like to discuss Ryle's example. Ryle has given a very interesting example uttered by Julius Caesar - Vini, Vidi, Vici (I came, I saw and I conquered). Then the question arises 'Is vice a word or a sentence ? Ryle says that there is something queer about the question but he seems to misidentify what is queer about

it. Firstly there is the word 'vici' , a word in Latin Language, then there is Caesar's boast 'vici' and there perhaps was on some other occasion, the nervous gladiator's query 'vice' ? That is there is the word, there are various speech episodes, cases of boasting, enquiring etc. ~~in~~ in which that word is used. According to Hyle sentences are speech episodes. The boast 'vici' is a different sentence from question 'vici' ? This difference is not because Ceasar's boasting was a different episode from gladiator's enquiring. For a sentence could not be a boast though it might be uttered in boasting and a sentence could not be a question though it might be interrogative i.e. its utterance would standardly be the asking of a question 'vici' and 'vici ?' are different sentences not because boasting is different from enquiring but because Caesar's boasting is different from someone else's enquiring. 'vici' can be said boastfully and modestly but we can not distinguish this though we can distinguish 'vici', and 'vici ?'. Thus what is queer about "Is 'vici' a word or a sentence" is nothing so extreme as what is wrong with "Is that a bat or a cover drive" ?

A sentence is a certain kind of verbal structure, syntactically ordered sequence of words of some language and we do not in general devise such sequences just for fun. Usually we want to do something with them, we produce them for a purpose, we do not just compose them. . But this seems to go against Hyle's own example. He compares

the composer of a sentence with a cook, somewhat as a cook uses ingredients and also uses kitchen utensils, in making a pie so we may use certain words in composing a sentence. But a cook is unlikely to make a pie for no reason, purely for the sake of making it. In case of sentence I shall make some use of it will use it in saying and doing something or other. The cook uses here ingredients and utensils, she does not in this way use the pie that the speaker who uses certain words in composing a sentence does not in this way use the sentence. It may be the case that the cook does use the pie she has made and the speaker the sentence he composes. Cook keep the ingredients they need to use 'in stock' like wise words are stock of language in a way in which sentences are not, there are no dictionaries of sentences. But it is not do to suggest that only items 'in stock' are ready for use or are ever used. I may construct something out of such items and proceed to use that. Bat makers use pieces of wood in making bats and the bat they make are used by cricketers.

According to Kyle the famous saying 'Do not ask for the meaning, ask for use' might have been a piece of advice to philosophers and not to translators. This famous saying is associated with the idea of rules of use. Kyle says that knowing what a word means can use fully be said to be a matter of knowing 'how to use' that word, knowing what a sentence means cannot be said to be a matter of knowing how to use that sentence. In many cases 'if knowing the

meaning of a word is knowing how to use it..." should be recognized as a very strange thing to say. I know how to use a word but I should not find it easy to say what it means. But there are lots of words which go other way around. We should not contrast 'knowing how to use the sentence' with 'knowing how to use the word', on the supposition that in the latter there is no whiff of oddity at all. Knowing how to use the sentence does not seem a very pointful thing to say, it certainly does not even begin to make clear what exactly it is that one knows, in knowing what the sentence means or what this knowing consists in. It is also certainly a pretty strange thing to say, very much as in the case of some words. To understand a language is to be able to operate with some finite stock or set of sentences, the uses of which one has individually learned.

In discussing meaning and use I would like to include the view which is given by J.N. Findlay. According to Findlay Ryle's definition of language is arbitrarily narrow. Findlay says -

"I should have thought it would be wrong to include in language the various **syntactical** and other rules which restrict our employment of the capital **of expressions mentioned by professor Ryle**, though perhaps I am wrong in thinking we meant to exclude them."¹⁴

14. Findlay "use, usage and meaning" (Theory of Meaning) edited by G.H.R. Perkinson,

In Ryle's view sentences are units of speech and thus he exclude sentence from language. But Findlay does not agree with this point of Ryle. Findlay talks of the idea of concepts of language that is, narrower conception and wider conception. Narrower conception includes vocabulary and rules and wider conception includes all possible sentences that could be frame out of the vocabulary in accordance with rules. As far as sentences are concerned language of use or employment is more natural than language of production.

Findlay critically discussed the famous slogan 'do not ask for the meaning ask for use' which has dominated the philosophical discussion for the past twenty years. Findlay is the view that there are two usage of 'use' one is ordinary and the other is a 'use' of characteristic of the later writings of Wittgenstein. This later use is different from ordinary use and this use is largely accepted by philosophers because it has the clearness and straight forwardness of ordinary use.

Findlay says "since the suggestion that use and usage in some acceptable sense are philosophically very important, certainly underlines Ryle's paper, I need not apologize for relevance in preceeding to demolish this suggestion." It is believed that the notion of use presupposes

the notion of meaning therefore we must concentrate on the use rather than meaning of an expression. The notion of use is a wider notion than the notion of meaning and besides notion of meaning it includes other things also and without presupposing meaning function it is not possible to give a clear account of use. We must remember one point that when an expression is used we must refer to some thing. That is we can not fully say how an expression is used, without saying what sort of things it is intended to refer to. Let us take an example of the word 'dragon' we use it to refer to a human being or beings, generally mature and female and it also represents some terrifying human beings. From this it is clear that the notion of use covers denotation and connotation. In the above example it is not only denotes a mature female but also connotes some characteristics such as terrifying etc. But the modern semantics does not agree with this kind of explanation. It is one of the extremely important discoveries of modern semantics that there are some expressions whose use neither denote nor connote anything but they are expressions of feelings and wishes or they perform certain social acts e.g. promises which have certain definite social consequences. But this non-referential and non-connotative use depends upon referential and connotative use and they can not exist without it. The use concept covers the hidden implication and suggestion when we write something or utter

a word or a sentence. Let us take the example 'he is a nice boy'. The use of this sentence implies that he is often otherwise and at the same time it also suggests that every body should be nice. Now the question arises what is the implication of the slogan 'Do not ask for meaning' ask for use. The slogan does not mean that the concept of use covers much more than connotative and denotative function of language rather it explains the denotative and connotative function of language. The slogan also implies the reference and connotation of expression by taking note of the way people operate with such expressions. It also includes the varying circumstances in which the expression or sentences are found appropriate or fully justifiable.

There arises a controversy whether meanings exist 'out there in the things we deal with or they exist 'in the mind or the understanding before we find words to express them? We must not suggest that there are **per existent** meanings. Words enjoy meaning and reference in and by our use of them and our use cannot be explained in terms of any meaning **anticipates** the use of words. To follow a rule is not necessarily to be guided by a spoken or written formula; since each such formula admits of interpretation in terms of another and so on infinitely. Following of a rule cannot be identified with any sort of inner personal

understanding of that rule which can guide one's subsequent performance, since to hold this would be to accept pre-existent meanings resident in the queer medium of the mind. Following a rule is something one can know how to do without being able to know how that one does is done.

Some philosophers have said that knowing the meaning of the word is simply a matter of knowing the rules for its use or employment. If meaning is a matter of rules of use, surely we ought to be able to state the rules for the use of expressions in a way which would express the meaning of those expressions. Let us discuss about the two sorts of rules - some regulate antecedently existing forms of behaviour, some rules on the other hand do not merely regulate but create or define new forms of behaviour. The rules of football, for example, do not merely regulate the game of football but as it were the possibility of or define that activity. The activity of playing football is constituted by acting in accordance with these rules, football has no existence apart from these rules. This latter kind of rules is known as constitutive rules and the former kind regulative rules. Regulative rules regulate a pre-existing activity, an activity whose existence is logically independent of the existence of the rules. Constitutive rules constitute and also regulate the existence of which is logically dependent on the rules.

The model or paradigm of a rule which most philosophers have is that of regulative rule. There are no doubt social rules of the form 'one ought not to utter obscenities at formal gatherings', but that hardly seems a rule of the sort that is crucial in explicating the semantics of a language. The semantics of a language can be regarded as a series of systems of constitutive rules.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed the relation between meaning and use. The theory of meaning or use doctrine is a powerful theory which has been accepted by many. Though use theory accounts for many kinds of meaningful utterances, it fails to account for all kinds of meaningful utterances. More over, it is open to other criticism as well.

Wittgenstein, seems to identify meaning with use. This identification is wrong for the following reasons. The notion of use presupposes the notion of meaning. Therefore, the notion of use neither can do duty for meaning nor can it replace meaning. Moreover the notion of use is much wider than that of notion of meaning. Wittgenstein is guilty of making meaning completely objective. He is of the view that meaning of an utterance is manifested when it is actually used. This is wrong because we also attach meaning before we utter a sentence. This conclusively

shows that meaning is subjective-objective, not completely objective as Wittgenstein supposes nor it is completely subjective as idealism holds. I think Wittgenstein is the first philosopher who makes the distinction between surface grammar or ordinary grammar and depth grammar or logical grammar very clearly. There is no denying fact that the philosophers are concerned only with a latter, that is, logical grammar. Philosophers are interested only in rules of logical grammar. This contribution of ~~Wittgenstein~~ ^{cannot be overemphasised. Wittgenstein} explicates the concept of meaning in terms of the concepts that are embedded in ordinary language. But we must remember that there are certain fundamental concepts which are not embedded in ordinary languages. In order to explicate these concepts one has to go behind language as it were. Language cannot be considered a reliable guide here.

CHAPTER -IV

MEANING AND INTENTION

Intention theory of meaning tries to develop the relation between an account of what an expression means and an account of what a person means by an expression. We think that this sort of attempt is open to certain serious difficulties. The difficulties which we consider to be serious will be looked into. This theory should try to develop a relation between an account of what an expression means and an account of what a person means by uttering an expression. In this connection, the logic of intention will also be discussed.

What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not ? is the first question which has to be answered, when we try to discuss intention. This question can be answered in this way the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'why' ? is given application, the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. From this we hardly get any further information because the question 'what is the relevant sense of the question 'why' ? and 'what is meant by reason for acting ?' are the same.

Philosophers have ordinarily presumed that those actions we mark of as 'intentional', are preceded by or

incorporate, a special kind or internal act - the intention to act in that way. The distinguishing feature of an intentional act is that the question 'why' asked in relation to it can be a request for a reason, not for a cause. There are certain cases when request for a reason has no application. For example, when the agent does not know that he is performing the kind of action for which we are seeking the reason. That is if when asked why he was driving at sixty miles an hour a person sincerely replies 'I did not know that I was doing so ? then he was not intentionally driving at sixty miles an hour. But if we asked why he was driving at more than thirty miles an hour, he might be able to give us a reason . An act can be intentional under a certain description but unintentional under different description.

When we ask the question 'why' the person may reply the question by referring to some past act. Here the question arises, "Is he offering a reason or a cause" ? If we ask some one 'why did you kill that man ? and if he replies that 'because I felt just had to kill some body' then we will say that he is giving a mental cause. But if he replies 'I acted in revenge because he killed my father' then here we will say that he is giving a reason.

According to Anscombe, knowledge of our intentions is practical knowledge not theoretical knowledge. For example, with my eyes shut, I write on the black board 'this is

mango,' if in fact the black board is too wet and no words are visibly appear there yet I know that this is what I am doing. To 'know what I am doing' in this sense is to have 'practical knowledge'. Here my performance is a bad performance, because I alone can know what I am doing but I do not have a mistaken belief that I am writing on the black board though no words appear there.

The term intention is closely related with the term purpose. Indeed they are sometimes used as synonymous. But purpose refers to mental activity and intention to the end towards which mental activity is directed. The complexity of a purpose or intention may be compared with that of a cause. Usually, when we speak of the cause of any particular occurrence, we mean some other conspicuous occurrence, happening a little earlier, which has led, in accordance with some regular order of sequence, to the particular event with which ~~we~~ are concerned. Likewise, when we speak of our intention in any particular case we generally mean some conspicuous change that we aim at bringing about. For example when we say that it is our intention to go to a particular place, here we not only intend to go to a particular place, but also to do something when we get there. But often the things that we intend to do are too complex and sometimes too indefinite, to be conveniently summed up. Hence we prefer not to say that we intend to do these things, but rather than these are the motives

that induce us to go to that particular place. Sometimes these inducement may be described as our intention. If we go to a place to consult a book, to see a friend or to recover our health, these objects may be nearly or quite as definitely intended as the act of going to the place. Here we may say that our immediate object as being that of going to the place and the other things that we intend are rather our motives.

Intention may be distinguished under different categories. For example immediate and remote intention, direct and indirect intention, conscious and unconscious, formal and material intention etc. Two men may both have the immediate intention of saving a third from drowning. But one may save his life from drowning because his life may be preserved and others may be reserved for hanging. Here the immediate intentions are same but the remote intentions are very different. Again by an unconscious intention we mean an intention which the agent does not definitely avow to himself. A mans conduct is often in reality profoundly influenced by such intentions. Again, there is a distinction between formal and material intention of an act. The material intention means the particular result as a realized fact, the formal intention means the principle embeded in the fact. Two men may both aim at the overthrow of a particular government. Here, we find that their material intentions are same but formal intention is different because one may aim at its overthrow because he thinks it too progressive and the other because

he thinks it too conservative. From the above discussion we may sum up by saying that an intention in the broadest sense of the term means any aim that is definitely adopted as an object of will and that such intentions may be of various kinds. While discussing intention we also have to discuss motive, The term 'motive' is not less ambiguous than 'intention'. The motive means, what makes us or causes us to act in a particular way.

In philosophy a distinction has sometimes been drawn between 'motive' and 'intention in acting' as referring to quite different things. A man's intention is what he aims at or chooses and his motive is what determines the aim or choice and the 'determines' must here be another word for 'causes'. Popularly 'motive' and 'intention' are not treated as so distinct e.g. we hear of 'the motive of gain' according to some philosopher gain must be the intention and desire of gain the motive. Asked for a motive, a man might say 'I wanted to' or 'I did in order to ...', here the meaning of the two phrases are identical when a man's motives are called good, this may be in no way distinct from calling his intentions good.

Nevertheless, there is even popularly a distinction between the meaning of 'motive' and the meaning of 'intention'. For example, if a man kills some one, he may be said to have done it out of love and pity, or to have done it

out of hatred, these might indeed be cast in the forms 'to release him from this awful suffering or 'to get rid of the swine' but though these are forms of expressions suggesting objectives they are perhaps expressive of the spirit in which the man killed rather than descriptive of the end to which the killing was a means - a future state of affairs to be produced by the killing. And this shows us part of the distinction that there is between the popular senses of motive and intentions. According to some philosophers, 'motive for an action has a rather wider and more diverse application than 'intention with which the action was done'.

Let us take some examples of game to discuss intention (i) suppose in a game Smith is offered ten dollars if he can shoot a bottle placed on a distant wall. (ii) we take here the example of board game. In case of playing board game Smith has to roll a six with a die to win the game, thereby winning ten dollars. In (i) let us suppose that Smith is not an expert marks man and he himself knows it. The chances that he will hit the bottle at this distance is remote (one in a hundred). He takes aim as carefully as he can and fired, hoping to hit the bottle. The shot hits the bottle and Smith gets the ten dollars. In (ii) let us suppose that Smith has no special manipulative powers with dice, yet he throws the dice, hoping to throw a six, the die is a fair die and Smith wins the ten dollars. In (i) Smith shot the bottle intentionally but that Smith did not throw a six intentionally in (ii) From the first case it

is clear that one can do something intentionally without having the ability to do it. But then why is not Smith's action intentional in case (ii) ? Smith's actual chances of succeeding were much better in second case (one out of six) than they were in first case (one out of hundred). One has the minimal ability to do an act if the chances of one's doing the act are improved by one's trying to do it. Smith's chances of throwing a six were not improved by his trying to throw a six, but Smith's chances of hitting the bottle were improved by his trying to hit the bottle with shot. But one objection can be raised here that if one is a nervous sort of individual, it may be that one's chances of doing something decrease when one tries to do it. In the second case, Smith does not have the ability to throw a six, and there is no act he has the ability to do. In first case on the other hand, while Smith does not have the ability to shoot the bottle at that distance, it is the case that there is some act that Smith has the ability to do, namely, aim and fire the gun;

Acting intentionally can be explained in terms of one's action satisfying or matching what one will do. If one lacks the minimal ability to do an act, that is because one cannot will to do that act (though one can desire or hope to do it) The actual presence of a volition to do an act reveals itself in having some impact on probability of the agent's succeeding in doing an act.

In the modern times, H.P. Grice is considered to be the foremost proponent of this theory. In order to understand his theory, we need to understand two types of examples Let us take the first example

(a) Those spots means measles. From the above example it is clear that once we see those spots we cannot go on to say that he does not have measles . Those spots entail measles. It can not be otherwise . Again, from the sentence 'Those spots means measles' we cannot draw the conclusion 'what is meant by those spots', we are not entitled to say, what was mean by those spots was that he had measles. Another point is that if we want to have a restatement of this sentence then the verb 'mean' cannot be followed by a sentence or phrase which is found within inverted commas. That means 'those spots means measles' cannot be reformulated as 'those spots means "measles"'. If at all we want to have restatement then it must be of following form: the fact that had those spots meant that he had measles'. Let us take the second case of example.

(a) Those three rings on the bell of the bus mean that the bus is full. In the second example after making the statement (a) it is possible for me to say that the bus is not full. It is possible here that the conductor has made a mistake. After saying those three rings on the bell of the bus means the bus is full we can go on to the conclusion what is meant by the three rings. But we are not allowed to draw this type of conclusion in the first ~~of~~ example. In case

of second example, I can argue from the sentence (a) the conclusion that somebody that means the conductor meant or at any rate should have meant by the three rings that the bus is full. In case of second example we are allowed to put the phrase in question within inverted commas "The bus is full".

Grice makes a distinction between natural and non-natural sense of meaning. The examples of the first case is the example of natural sense and other example is the example of non-natural sense. He calls the non-natural sense as meaning NN. Grice is interested in non-natural sense of meaning not the general or natural or standard meaning. He also uses another terminology that is natural and conventional. He distinguishes between natural and conventional sign. Gestures have meaning NN but they are not conventional, gestures differ from person to person. Again, words can mean NN but they are not signs. Even when something has natural meaning that is not a sign at all. Here the question arises *what* is meaning NN ?

Stevenson says :-

"that for x to mean NN something, x must have (roughly) a tendency to produce in an audience some attitude (cognitive or otherwise) and a tendency in the case of a speaker to be produced by that attitude, these tendencies being dependent on an elaborate process of conditioning

attending the use of the sign in communication"¹

Grice does not agree with this type of explanation. Let us take the example of belief in order to discuss this point. 'John is an athlete.' It must mean that John is tall, non-tall athlete can not be think. We always belief that if some one is an athlete then he must be ~~surely~~ tall. Does this satisfy us that John is an athlete mean NN that John is tall ? Surely not. Grice says that suppose some body utters X and X was ~~intended~~ to produce a belief in the audience, will that utterance have meaning NN ? According to Grice, ~~is~~ is not because X was intended to produce a belief in the audience that would not be enough the audience must have to recognized the intention then only utterance have meaning NN. To say that A meant something by X is to say that ' A intended the utterance of to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention'. It shows a close relationship between the notion of meaning and notion of intention and it also captures something which is essential to speaking a language. My speaking of a language involves my communication of things to my hearer by means of getting him to recognized my intention to produce just that effect. For example I may make someone to believe that I am French by speaking French all the time, dressing in the French manner, cultivating French acquaintances etc. on the other hand I may also attempt to get you to believe that I am French by simply telling you that I am French. Here we find a difference between getting some one to know and telling. In the former case I attempt to get others to

1. Ethics and Language, Page 57 (New Haven, 1944).

/getting others to recognize,
that it, is my purported intention
to get others to believe that
I am French by

believe that I am French by my acting which is discussed above
then in this case others recognition of my intention cannot
be a means I am employing. The suspicion of others will be
strong in this case. But this account of meaning does not
show the connection between one's meaning something by what
one says and what that which one actually means in the
language. Let us take the following example. ~~Suppose an example.~~
Suppose an American soldier in the second world war was captured
by Italian troops. In order to release himself, the American
soldier would have to produce some believe in the mind of
Italian soldier that he is not an American but he is an
German Officer. In order to do so he would have to know
German or Italian language. Let us suppose that the American
soldier knows only one German sentence 'Kinnst du dasland, we
die Zitronen blühen'. So if we consider from Gricean point of
view then we find that the American soldier intent to pro-
duce certain effect in Italian troops namely the effect of
believing that he is an German officer. But does it follow
from this account that when the American soldier says
"Kennst... blühen?" what he means is 'I am a German officer?'
surely not, because what the words mean is 'Knewest thou the
land where the lemon trees bloom'. From this example it is
clear that meaning is more than the matter of intention.

There is clearly an important connection between
meaning and intention. We speaks of people meaning things
by their words and the word 'meaning' can often be replaced
by intending, here. The connection between meaning and intention

intending seems to be of the following sort. The basic point of employing meaningful expressions is to communicate with others. ^{Now for a person to communicate a message to another} ~~it is typically required~~ that he at least (a) intend to produce certain effect in the hearer and (b) intends that the hearer recognizes this intention. For example my telling you that Smith is a murderer is an act of communication in a way in which my leaving Smith's lighter at the scene of the crime for you to find it is not enough. In both cases I intend a certain effect that you should believe Smith to be the murderer ^{but} only in the former case do I intend that you should recognize that this is my intention. Now for speaker to succeed in this double intention (a) and (b) it will be in general be necessary for him to use meaningful expressions. If he does not, he is unlikely to produce the required effect in the hearer and even less likely to get the hearer to recognize his intention to produce that effect. So it seems that there are at least ^{two} ways in which meaning and intentions are tied up first we possess and employ meaningful expression in order, primarily to carry out our intentions to communicate, second we can only succeed in communicating by employing meaningful expressions which the hearer will recognize our intention there by.

For X to have meaning **MN**, the intended effect must be something which in some sense is within the control of the audience ^{or} that in same sense of reason and not merely a cause. An utterer is held to intent to convey what is normally conveyed and we required a good reason for accepting that a particular use diverges from the general usage. In case of

doubt when two more things an utterer intent to convey, we tend to refer to context of the utterance. From the above discussion it is clear that Grice gives more importance to non-natural meaning. According to him meaning ~~is~~ is more fundamental than, natural meaning.

J.R.Searle says:

(1) Understanding the sentence "Hello" is knowing its meaning.

(2) The meaning of "Hello" is determined by semantic rules, which specify both its conditions of utterance and what the utterance counts as. The rules specify that under certain conditions an utterance of "Hello" counts as a greeting of the hearer by the speaker.

(3) Uttering "Hello" and meaning it is a matter of (a) intending to get the hearer to recognized that he is being greeted by means of getting him to recognize one's intention to greet him.(b) intending to get him to recognize one's intention to greet him in virtue of his knowledge of the meaning of the sentence "Hello".

(4) The sentence "Hello" then provides a conventional means of greeting people. If a speaker says "Hello" and means it he will have intention (a),(b) and (c) and from the hearer's side, the hearer's understanding the utterance will simply consist in those intentions being achieved.

The intentions will be achieved in general if the hearer understands its meaning, i.e. understands that under certain condition its utterance counts as a greeting!² Grice makes the following generalizations (1) 'A meant something by X' is (roughly) equivalent to 'A intended the utterance of X to produce some effect in audience by means of the recognition of this intention'.

(2) 'X meant something' is (roughly) equivalent to 'somebody meant NN something by X'. Here again there will be cases where this will not quite work. I feel inclined to say that, as regards traffic lights' the change to red meant NN that the traffic was to stop, but it would be very unnatural to say, 'somebody meant NN by the red light change that the traffic was to stop'. Nevertheless, there seems to be some sort of reference to somebody's intentions.

(3) 'X means NN (timeless) that so and so " might as a first should be equated with some statement or disjunction of statements about what 'people' intend to effect by X.

Paul Ziff criticises Grice's account of meaning. Ziff is a scholar of semantics which is a study of meaning. Grice says that natural meaning must be explained in terms of non-natural meaning. He also says that natural meaning is the species of non-natural meaning. But Ziff says that non-natural meaning is a species of natural meaning. His thesis runs counter to Grice's thesis, natural meaning is the type and non-natural meaning is token.) His thesis runs

2. (J.R. Searle, Speech Acts, An essay in philosophy of language (Cambridge, 1969, p.48-49).

counter to Grice's thesis, natural meaning is the token. His thesis runs counter to Grice's meaning. (They do not run parallel to one another but they are opposed to one another.) The account of meaning given by Grice is a counterfeit coin. . Paul Ziff starts his discussion by giving two examples (1) The sentence 'snow is white' and (2) The adjective 'ungulate' means having hoofs. 'ungulate' is not a sentence, but (1) is a sentence. Grice says that 'mean' in (1) and (2) is used in what he calls 'non-natural' senses of the verb. He uses the abbreviation 'mean-ⁿⁿ' to mark the 'non-natural' senses of mean.

Let us consider (1ⁿⁿ) and (2ⁿⁿ) - (1ⁿⁿ) The sentence 'snow is white' meansⁿⁿ snow is white.

(2ⁿⁿ) The adjective 'ungulate' meansⁿⁿ having hoofs.

Now the question arises whether A(1ⁿⁿ) is simply a restatement of (1) ?

In order to discuss this question let us consider Grice's three 'generalizations'.

(i) 'A meant-ⁿⁿ something by X' is (roughly) equivalent to 'A intended the utterance of X to produce some effect in an audience by means of recognition of this intention'.

(ii) 'X meant -ⁿⁿ something' is (roughly) equivalent to 'somebody' meant - ⁿⁿ something by X'.

(iii) 'X means ⁿⁿ (timeless) that so and so might as first shot be equated with some statement or disjunction of statements about what 'people'(vague)intent (with qualifications about 'recognition) to effect by X.

In these, generalization letter 'A' is supposed to be replaced by a name and letter 'x' may be replaced by a sentence. This last generalization that is (iii) can be apply to (1 nn). But this generalization is not very clear. In order to make it clear let us take two other examples. Suppose a man named John joined in army, when the officer asked him what his name is ? , his answer was ugh, ugh, ugh. Here John's intention was to produce some effect by means of recognition of his. Here the officer recognizes his 'intention, because the intention was to insult the officer. Here we see that Gricean account of intention is applied yet we see that the utterance does not have any meaning. Let us take the same example again. This time another officer asked John a question which he replied by uttering phi.hi.y Pi.hi.y. In this case the officer could not recognize John's utterances but the utterance have a meaning because John is speaking in Hopi, Therefore Paul Ziff says that Grice confused two different things 'A meant something by uttering X' and 'A meant something by X'. These two are completely different. John meant something by uttering ugh, ugh, but he did not mean anything by it. According to Paul Ziff, Grice is guilty of converting nonsense into sense, that is, something meaningless into meaningful. Paul Ziff says +

"To be concerned with what people intend or would intend to effect by uttering an expression is to be concerned with the use of expression. As I have else where pointed out and argues at length the use of

of an expression is determined by many of which have nothing (or have nothing directly) to do with meaning: acoustic shape is one such factor, length another".³

People generally intend or would intend this or that by uttering an utterance has at best as much **significance** as a statement to the effect that when 'pass the salt ' is uttered, generally mean that people are eating thus what is called the statement of a 'regularity'. An expression is normally used only when certain conditions are obtained for example, when certain events have taken place, when the speaker is in a certain kind of position, when certain kind of object is present and so on. To say this is to say that there are semantic regularities associated with the utterance of a given expression or a given sentence. If two people A and B are having their dinner, will all the usual items on the table and with the salt cellar near B, A can say '**please** pass the salt' without least oddity because this is the kind of situation in which those words are generally uttered. Not all regularities are semantically relevant - a regularity **couched** in terms of people's "intentions" is not likely to be.

3. Semantic Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960).

CONCLUSION

It is no exaggeration to say that intention theory of meaning is one of the most powerful theories of meaning. Grice makes a strong plea for the intention theory of meaning. He first formulated his theory in his article 'meaning' when criticisms were levelled against this formulation, he formulated his theory in the article "Utterer's meaning, sentence meaning and word meaning". As far as human communication is concerned, I think, intention plays a very important role. Although the attempt to develop the relation between an account of what an expression means and an account of an expression leads to certain serious difficulties, these difficulties can easily be overcome by reformulating the thesis. The reformulation is as follows. The relation is between an account of what an expression means and an account of what a person means by uttering an expression.

Paul Ziff's criticisms are directed against the first formulation only. He contests the Gricean view that non-natural meaning is more fundamental than the natural meaning and that natural meaning is a species of non-natural meaning. I agree with Paul Ziff that Grice goes too far in claiming that natural meaning is a species of non-natural meaning. Though, as Ziff points out, non-natural meaning is a species of natural meaning, the importance of non-natural meaning in human communication cannot be ignored.

In human communication, I think, non-natural meaning is much more important than natural meaning. ~~Meaning belongs after deriving from the natural meaning.~~ For example, 'good morning' can be uttered by different persons to mean different things. 'Good morning' has the natural meaning of a wish. But it can be uttered to have the non-natural meaning to convey different things other than a wish.

I believe that Grice's theory of meaning can be fruitfully applied to understand legends, folklores, cultures and world view of human race.

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