

China's ultimatum to India over Sikkim : Background and American reaction

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With the lapse of British paramountcy in India, the British rights over the 'protectorate' of Sikkim developed upon independent India. The status of Sikkim was defined by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890¹, and the Government of India Act of 1935 listed it among the Indian Princely States². An India-Sikkim standstill agreement maintained the *status quo* as on 14 August 1947 regarding Sikkim's position in relation to India³. This position was reaffirmed by the India-Sikkim Treaty of December 1950⁴. India's northern boundary for the purpose of defence, therefore, included the Sikkim-Tibet boundary. On the other hand, after the occupation of Tibet by China in 1950, the latter became directly responsible for the defence of the Tibet-Sikkim boundary.

This boundary was free from any controversy and tension until 1960 when China alleged Indian intrusions into 'Chinese territories' across it. During the India-Pakistan War of 1965, China served India with an ultimatum demanding demolition of alleged Indian military installations on the Chinese side of the Tibet-Sikkim boundary. In the face of strong American warnings, China could not implement it barring some face-saving military forays on the border.

The boundary between Sikkim and Tibet was defined by Article 1 of Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890⁵ as 'the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet'. The boundary thus ran along the crest of the Himalaya and the Donkya ranges, watershed between the Teesta in Sikkim and the Yaruchu and the sources of the Amochu (Mochu) in Tibet. The eastern boundary of Sikkim was demarcated on the ground in 1895, and the northern in 1902. The Chinese were perfunctory in both cases, and the Tibetans were not involved in the demarcation at all.⁶ Tibet, however, recognised the new boundary and status of Sikkim through the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1904⁷; and China confirmed this convention through the Anglo-Chi-

nese convention of 1906⁸. Further, the Anglo-Chinese-Tibetan Convention of 1914 also accepted⁹ the convention of 1890 as binding on all the three parties.

Prior to the British withdrawal from India, China never challenged the validity of Sikkim's status as a British protectorate and its boundary with Tibet. The change of regime in India and China, and China's occupation of Tibet also did not call for any explicit change in Chinese views. The new map of India (1954) depicted Sikkim as a part of India; and the legend on the map explained that it was 'attached to India by special treaty'¹⁰. Further, by the end of 1958, Indian armed forces held posts 'all along' the Sikkim frontier¹¹. China did not dispute either of these measures. Neither did she have any right to do so. The official Chinese map produced during the Sino-Indian official level talks of 1960, did not differ from the well-established Sikkim-Tibet boundary recognised by both India and China.¹²

Despite the absence of any theoretical difference on the Sikkim-Tibet boundary alignment, China's position was characterised by a studied ambivalence. Without challenging the validity of the convention of 1890, China intended to assert that Sikkim was completely independent of Indian control. She regarded the Sikkim-Tibet boundary as falling outside the scope of discussions with India¹³. At the same time, she accepted the boundary as 'long been formally delimited', and maintained that there was 'neither any discrepancy between the maps nor any disputes in practice'¹⁴. China however carefully avoided stating in clear terms that she had accepted the boundary as defined by the convention of 1890. In June 1963, China described the boundary as defined by the convention of 1890 but without clearly identifying it as the one she called 'long been formally delimited'¹⁵. An emphatic recognition of the convention of 1890 would have clearly estopped China from denying India's right of protection over Sikkim. On the other hand, the absence of any dispute between China and Sikkim could be helpful for substituting Indian rights in the state by those of China.¹⁶ The basic fact was that China recognised the boundary as well defined, and it was defined by the Anglo-Chinese convention of 1890.

India's description of the Sikkim-Tibet boundary under Item 1 of the Agenda (Location and Terrain Features of the Boundary) during the India-China official level discussion in 1960, as crossing 'Natu and Jelep passes'¹⁷ was utilised by China. The Indian description was given only for sector wise break-up of the India-China boundary as a basis of discussion¹⁸. Under Item No.2 (Treaties and Agreements; Tradition and Custom), India, however, described the 'crest of the Great Himalaya and the Donkya ranges' as the boundary¹⁹. This description was completely in accord with the one given by the convention of 1890. China however took advantage of the first Indian description without reference to the second. In 1963, China referred to the Indian description of the boundary as crossing Natu La as a justification for her allegations that India had encroached upon Tibetan territories²⁰. China's own description of the boundary 'as provided in the related article of the Sino-British convention of 1890' mentioned 'the watershed' to be the boundary and avoided the word 'crest'²¹. It is likely that no sooner had China seen the ambiguities in the Indian description of the boundary, then she decided to stake her claims over territories on the Sikkim side of the 'crest' describing them as Chinese (Tibetan) territories intruded into by Indian troops.

By 1965 mutual allegations of encroachments mainly focussed on the areas around Cho La (14,500 ft.), Nathula (14,400 ft.) and its neighbouring Dongchui La (described as 'Tungchula' by China), and Jerpla (14,390 ft.) on the Eastern Sikkim-Chumbi Valley front; and the areas around Kongra-lamo La (Kongrala, 16,000ft.) and Bomchho La (Bhom-tsho, 18,000 ft., described by China as 'Tagi La') on the Northern Sikkim front.²² Cho La was on the upper reaches of the Dik Chu, an affluent of the Teesta. It was on the watershed range between²³ the Teesta system and the Amochu system eastward. Nathula was about 5 K.M. south-east of Cho La clearly on the Sikkim side of the water-shed²⁴. Dongchui La (Tungchula) was south-east of Nathula on the boundary²⁵. About 5 K.M. south-east of Nathula, Jerpla was on the boundary, through which the old Chumbi Valley road passed. The watershed was clearcut at this

point. There was a descent of over 4,000 ft. from the summit of the Jelepla towards the Tibetan side in six miles²⁶. On the northern front, Kongra-lamo La (Lat. 28° - 03' - 48" N., Long 88° -37' -52" E) was about 16 miles S. S-E. from Khamba-jong and 4 miles southward below the Serpurbu pass. In 1902 the boundary was fixed at P 'u-chung-pang, north of Kongrala and about 3 miles below the Serpurbu Pass.²⁷ And Bomchho La was eastward from Kongra-lama La and on the border in the Cholamoo-Lake district included in Sikkim in 1902.²⁸ Contemporaneously with the first session of the India-China official level talks (15 June -25 July 1960), China for the first time alleged Indian intrusion across the Sikkim-Tibet boundary. On 2 July 1962, China alleged that Indian military personnel 'on many occasions' intruded into 'Chinese territory at the Natu-la'²⁹. In early 1963, China also alleged that India constructed 'fortified structures' with 300 metres of 'Chinese territory' across Nathula and blocked the pass erecting barbed wire and digging communication trenches 'at the Natu La'. China also asserted customary rights of the Tibetans to move across the pass to Sikkim³⁰. India asserted that she was taking defensive measures within 'the limits of, the International boundary'³¹ and that defence of Sikkim was an Indian responsibility³¹. Referring to the convention of 1890 (but without committing herself), China pointed out that Nathula was located on the 'only watershed along this section of the boundary'³². On this, India had no differences with China³³. But the most question was on which side of the watershed the Indian military works were constructed. China contested the Indian assertion that they were 'Protective defence works' on the Sikkim side of the border. She maintained that they were built beyond the watershed within Chinese territory³⁴. China in a photograph of the Nathula, and an inset map attached with a note explained that Indian military installations were on the Chinese side of the 'mountain ridge line'³⁵. However, the legend did not tally with the features shown in the map, and the Indian military installations were clearly on the Sikkim side of the slope of the ridge. On the other hand, India convincingly proved with the help of a photograph of the 'highest watershed ridge' that the Indian troops and military

structures were located entirely on the Sikkim side of the boundary in this sector. The photograph clearly showed that the 'highest watershed ridge' was beyond the area where India constructed the military works³⁶. Despite India's clarifications, China continued to accuse India of border violations across Nathula³⁷.

China also accused India of intrusions across 'Tungchula Pass' (Dongchui La) south-east of Nathula. India was also accused of building up 'aggressive military structures' on the Chinese side of the pass 'or on the boundary line'³⁸.

Around Jelepla, China's claims were at first limited to assertion of the rights of the Tibetan border inhabitants to enter Sikkim 'according to their usual practice'.³⁹ Through her note of 3 January 1965, China alleged that up to November 1964, Indian troops built 27 military structures on 'the Chinese side' of the Jelepla 'or on the boundary line'.⁴⁰

The same Chinese note also alleged that Indian troops had built 4⁴¹ military structures 'on the boundary line' at Cho La.

China alleged Indian soldiers as intruding into Chinese (Tibetan) territory north-west of Bomchho La (described by China as 'Tagi La' 'on the China-Sikkim boundary') and as⁴² erecting boundary markers 2 K.M. north of the pass. China also alleged that on 5 August 1963, Indian soldiers 'Kidnapped' two Tibetan shepherds and 'seized all the 800 and more sheep' from the Tibetan side of the boundary across 'Tagi La'⁴³. India maintained that the Tibetan shepherds 'illegally crossed' the border through Bomchho La into Sikkim. Therefore they were arrested and would be allowed to return after they 'served their sentences for the offence'⁴⁴.

Another Chinese allegation was that on 27 November 1964 Indian troops captured 59 yaks from Chinese territory beyond the boundary at 'Latuo La' which was described as located about 16 K.M. south east of 'Choding Gompa of Khamba Country'⁴⁵. India on the other hand denied intrusion across the boundary 'at any point' far less the seizure of the yaks.⁴⁶

Yet another charge made by China was that Indian troops abducted 2 Chinese women from Dai (28° - 09'

N., 88° - 39' E.) in the Khamba country on 29 May 1965⁴⁷. India however maintained that the women fleeing from Tibet entered Sikkim at approximately 28° - 04' N, 88° 38' E. for refuge and had no desire to go back⁴⁸.

Mean time, India also alleged major Chinese armed intrusions into Sikkim across Kongrala and Nathula⁴⁹.

Thus, by 1965 several issues between India and China relating to the Sikkim-Tibet boundary were left unresolved. Areas alleged to be encroached upon by India were small. It is possible that China intended to obstruct India's forward position on the Sikkim-Tibet boundary. India pointed out that since September 1962 some defence structures were constructed on the Sikkim side of the Sikkim-Tibet boundary⁵⁰. It is unlikely that Indian military installations were built within the Tibetan side of the boundary as China alleged. In that case China would have demolished them without entering into prolonged verbal exchanges with India. Since the Sikkim-Tibet boundary was well defined, China could not dispute the boundary alignment in explicit terms. It is possible that without challenging the validity of the boundary, China intended to marginally adjust it at strategic points under Indian possession calling those areas as under India's illegal occupation. It is also possible that the Chinese allegations were intended to build up tension on the border which could be helpful to establish a commonality of purpose with Pakistan which was involved in prolonged disputes with India.

China stepped up her accusations of India's violations of the Sikkim-Tibet boundary after the outbreak of India-Pakistan armed conflict over the Rann of Kutch in early 1965, which she condemned as 'the Indian provoked armed conflict'.⁵¹ The tenor of the Chinese communications to India on the Sikkim-Tibet boundary was also increasingly marked by bellicosity. China no longer 'urged'⁵² but 'demanded' the removal of her alleged grievances⁵². After the outbreak of the full-scale war between India and Pakistan in the summer of 1965, China warned that 'India and Pakistan in the summer of 1965, China warned that 'India's aggression against any of its neighbours' concerned 'all of its neighbours', and that India could not 'evade responsibility for the chain of consequences arising therefrom'⁵³. The risk of an actual Chinese

intervention in the war became all the more clear on 8, September 1965 when China establishing a nexus between the Sikkim-Tibet boundary issue and the India-Pakistan War, stated that India's 'expansionist actions against its neighbours' required China to 'strengthen' her 'defences' and 'heighten her alertness along her borders'. Along with this warning, China also demanded demolition of the Indian military structures alleged to be built 'beyond or on the China-Sikkim boundary'⁵⁴.

The danger arising from the Chinese warnings to India caused great concern in the United States. Secretary of State. Dean Rusk told newsmen on 8 September that the Chinese warnings were 'matters of concern if they mean that Peiping has in mind putting pressures on its southern neighbour'.⁵⁵ On the same day, a motion in the American Congress to amend the 'Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1966'⁵⁶ was withdrawn to enable the President of the United States to renew⁵⁷ military assistance to India in case of Chinese attack. American officials asserted that China's military action against India would 'raise grave issues', and according to a credible source it meant that 'the United States will feel compelled to help defend India'.⁵⁸ However, the United States was careful to maintain a common front with the Soviet Union which shared her views.⁵⁹ The strongest statement on the Chinese threat was made by Secretary Rusk on 13 September 1965 thus: "I think there are those who feel that China is trying to fish in troubled waters here. Our own advice to Peiping would be not to do that and to stay out of it and give the security council of the United Nations a chance to settle this matter"⁶⁰. However, behind the guarded American concern expressed in public, China was more severely warned through diplomatic channels. The American Ambassador to Poland, John M. Cabot bluntly warned the Chinese envoy, Wang Kuo-Chuan in Warsaw on 14 September that in case of China's intervention, the United States and the members of the United Nations would retaliate and would feel obliged to come to India's defence.⁶¹

For China, to do nothing in the face of American warnings meant being bludgeoned into inactivity. On

16 September 1965, China served India with an ultimatum demanding that India should 'dismantle all its military works on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary or on the boundary itself within three days'. China also demanded that India should 'immediately' stop all intrusions along the boundary, return kidnapped border inhabitants and seized livestock and pledge to refrain from harrasing raids across the boundary. Otherwise, China warned, 'the Indian Government must bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences arising therefrom'⁶². India however rejected most of Chinese⁶³ ailegations but agreed to a joint inspection on the border.

The Chinese ultimatum to India roused great concern in the United States. On 18 September 1965, following talks between the Indian Ambassador and Secretary Rusk, the Deputy Administrator of the U. S. Agency for International Development William F. Gand stated that United States would have to resume military assistance to India in case of Chinese attack.⁶⁴ According to a credible Indian source, American and British fleets were kept in alert for taking action if the situation warranted⁶⁵. At New Delhi, the Indian military officials in private told the American officials that a Chinese attack in division strength would require prompt intervention of American⁶⁶ combat aircrafts to help India defend her independence. According to information received by G.D. Birla, the United States in private warned the Chinese that in case of their actual intervention, the Americans⁶⁷ would feel constrained to intervene with A - bomb.

The impact of American warnings against Chinese intervention could be felt on 19 September when China taking the excuse of change in India's 'tune' extended the time limit of the ultimatum 'to before mid night of September 22'.⁶⁸ China now wanted herself off the hook.

In the wake of the chinese ultimatum to India, the United States along with the Soviet Union believed that the best way to prevent China's intervention was to get to India-Pakistan War terminated quickly. On 17 September, the U.S. Representative to the U.N. Arthur J. Goldberg observed in the Security Council that 'new and serious developments' had 'broadened the threat to the peace' which could 'complicate the

peace making efforts' of the U.N.⁶⁹ On 18 September, he emphasised that the security council 'must act firmly, decisively, and promptly' because 'in direct contradiction' to the U.N. efforts 'the Chinese communists are pursuing a course designed to aggravate' the situation further. He also emphasised that it was 'doubly necessary' to stand 'firmly against any efforts to spread the conflict' and end the war 'before it involves more nations'.⁷⁰

With the U.S.- Soviet convergence on the matter, the security council could pass the unanimous resolution of 20 September 1965⁷¹. The resolution 'Demands that a cease-fire should take effect on Wednesday, 22 September 1965, at 0700 hours GMT'. The dead line for the cease-fire was timed to expire almost simultaneously with the extended time-limit of the Chinese ultimatum. The 20 September resolution also included a call on 'all states to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation in the area'. And China was the state which the Security Council obviously had in mind. Further, the United States along with Britain exerted considerable pressure on Pakistan to accept the U.N. proposed cease-fire before the expiry of the Chinese ultimatum to India.⁷²

With the India-Pakistan cease-fire on 22 September, however, the declared *raison d' etre* of the Chinese ultimatum to India was not removed. Yet no 'grave consequences' different from the earlier ones apparently arose. There was no indication that Indian military works had been demolished before the terminal date of the ultimatum. On 20 September China took possession of about 800 yards of territories along with an Indian post⁷³ on the Sikkim side of the Dongchui La pass (Tungchula). Yet, it was far short of the demands made by China along with the ultimatum. China in order to save her face maintained that 'intruding Indian troops' were withdrawn and 'some of India's 'aggressive military works' were demolished 'within' the specified time-limit set by the Chinese Government'.⁷⁴ And China's demands for 'return' of the border inhabitants and livestock 'immediately'⁷⁵ was not met by India according to China's own admission.

The Sikkim-Tibet boundary was well-defined, and therefore China could not challenge the validity of the boundary alignment itself. She resorted to the cunning

device of calling the territories claimed by her on the Sikkim side of the boundary as Chinese territories under India's encroachments. She must have expected India to vacate the territories in order to avoid a two-front war. It is likely that the Chinese ultimatum expired without incident because China did not intend to risk war in the face of strong American reaction. The situation on the Sikkim-Tibet boundary only reverted to its earlier position after the lapse of the time-limit of the Chinese ultimatum.

Notes and References

1. Dated Calcutta, 17 March 1890. Text in C.U.Aitchison (Comp.), **A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries**. Vol. XII (Delhi, reprint : 1983), pp. 66-67. Art. 2 defined Sikkim as a 'protectorate' of the British.
2. Bengal Government Secretariat, **The Gazetteer of Sikkim** (with an introduction by H.H. Risley and additional note by Jamna Das Akhtar, Delhi, reprint: 1973), p. 394.
3. Dated 27 February 1948. *ibid.*, pp. 394-395.
4. Signed at Gangtok on 5 December 1950. Text in Lok Sabha Secretariat, **Foreign Policy of India : Texts of Documents 1947-59** (New Delhi : 1959), pp. 37-40.
5. n.1
6. Intelligence Branch Division of the Chief of the Staff Army head-Quarters India (Comp.), **North and North-Eastern Frontier Tribes of India** (originally Vol. IV of 'Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India', Delhi, reprint, second impress:1984) p. 53; Graham Sandberg, **The Explorations of Tibet: History and Particulars** (Delhi, reprint : 1973), pp. 264-265.
7. Dated Lhasa, 7 September 1904. Text in C.U. Aitchison (comp.), **A collection of Treaties, Engagements and Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries**, Vol.XIV (Delhi, reprint : 1983), pp. 23-25. Art. 1.
8. Dated Peking, 27 April 1906. Text in *ibid.*, pp. 27-28. Art. 1.
9. Dated Simla, 3 July 1914. Text in *ibid.*, pp.35-38. Art.1. read with schedule I.

10. Sree Mira Sinha, "China : Making and Unmaking of Nehru's Foreign Policy", **China Report**, Vol. XV, no.2 (March-April 1979), pp. 51-64.
11. B.N. Mullik, **The chinese Betrayal : My Years with Nehru** (New Delhi, popular edition : 1971), p. 190.
12. Ministry of external Affairs, **Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question** (New Delhi ;1962) (hereafter: **Report of the officials**), p. 199.
13. In his letter to the Indian P.M. on 8 September 1959, the Chinese P.M. stated that the Sikkim-Tibet boundary 'does not fall within the scope of our present discussion' and added that China was willing 'to live together in friendship with Sikkim and Bhutan' and she 'respected the proper relations between them and India'. **W.P.** II, pp.27-33. China also stated that she had 'no other intentions than that of living with them (Sikkim and Bhutan) in friendship without committing aggression against each other'. **C.N.**, 26 December 1959, **W.P.** III, p. 77 also see Chinese notes to India dated 24 August 1962, 10 January 1963, 31 July 1963, 19 September 1963, 11 June 1965 in **W.P.** VII, p. 39, **W.P.** VIII, p. 79, **W.P.** X, pp.20. 32-33, **W.P.**XII, pp. 23-24 (in order). China also implied Sikkim's independence from India, addressing a telegram directly to the Sikkim Maharaja. 1. N., 28 December 1963, **W.P.** X, p. 112.
14. **C.N.**, 26 December 1959, **W.P.**III, P. 77 also **C.N.** 24 August 1962, **W.P.** VII p. 39, **C.N.**, 16 September 1965, **W.P.** XII, p. 43.
15. **C.N.**, 4 June 1963, **W.P.** IX, p. 45.
16. In early 1960 senior Chinese officials in Tibet openly spoke about China's intention to incorporate Sikkim. See informal note by Indian Foreign Secretary to the Chinese Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, 25 April 1960, **W.P.** VI, p.100.
17. **Report of the Officials, Op.cit.**, p.2.
18. 1. N., 15 June 1963, **W.P.** IX, p.50.
19. **Report of the Officials, Op.cit.**, p.101.
20. **C.N.**, 4 June 1963, **W.P.** IX, p. 45.
21. **ibid.**

22. Heights as described in **The Gazetteer of Sikkim, op.cit.**, pp.2-3.
23. Intelligence Branch Division, n. 6, **op.cit.**, map facing p. 50.
24. See **ibid.**, and C.N., 3 January 1965, W.P. XI, pp. 29-30, and 'Photo showing the highest watershed ridge marking India-China boundary in the Nathula Pass' attached with 1.N., 19 September 1963, W.P. X, facing p. 34.
25. C.N., 28 September 1964, W.P. XI, pp. 21-22., 1. N., 19 September 1964, W.P. XI, pp. 21-22, 1 N., 21 September 1965, W.P. XII, p. 54, C.N. 24 September 1965, W.P. XII, p. 60.
26. Edmund Candler, **The Unveiling of Lhasa** (London: 1905), pp. 22, 28, also C.N., 3 January 1965, W.P. XI, pp. 29-30.
27. 1. N., 21 January 1965, W.P. XI, p. 30, and Graham Sandberg, **op.cit.**, pp. 269-270., **The Gazetteer of Sikkim** describes the boundary pass as 'Sebu-la' 'little further north' from Kongra-lamo. Sebu-la means side pass. **op.cit.**, pp. 3,45.
28. **The Gazetteer of Sikkim, op.cit.**, p.3, and Graham Sandberg, **op.cit.**, p. 264.
29. C.N., 2 July 1960, W.P. IV p. 20. for further allegations C.N., 27 August 1960, W.P. IV, p. 31, C.N. 24 August 1962, W.P. VII, p. 39, and 1. N. 10 September 1962, W.P. VII, p.63.
30. C.N., 10 January 1963, W.P. VIII, p. 79; also see C.N., 24 March 1963, W.P. IX, pp. 31-32.
31. 1.N., 16 January 1963, W.P. VIII, p. 80; also 1.N. 29 March 1963, W.P. IX, pp. 32-33.
32. C.N., 4 June 1963, W.P. IX, pp. 44-46
33. 1.N., 15 June 1963, W.P. IX, pp. 49-51.
34. C.N., 31 July 1963, W.P. X, p. 21.
35. "A sketch map of Indian military forces aggressively crossing the Sikkim-China Boundary at Nathula and constructing protective works", W.P., X, facing p. 21.
36. 1. N., 19 September 1963 and attached photo, W.P. X, pp. 33-34 and n.24.
37. Chinese notes, 14 November 1963, W.P. X, pp. 38-39, 30 November 1963, W.P. X, pp. 39-40, 7 July 1964, W.P. XI, pp. 9-10, 28 September

38. C.N., 28 September 1964, **W.P.** XI, pp. 21-22, C.N., 18 January 1965, **W.P.** XII, p. 6. for identification of the pass as Dongchui La see 1. N., 21 September 1965 & C.N., 24 September 1965, **W.P.** XII pp. 53-55 & 58-61.
- 1964, **W.P.** XI, pp. 21-22, 29 September 1964 **W.P.** XI, p. 23. India denied these allegations. Indian notes, 5 September 1964 (2 nos.), **W.P.** XI, pp. 20-21, 6 November 1964, **W.P.** XI, pp. 20-26, 21 January 1965, **W.P.** XI, p. 30.
39. In reply to India's allegation of Chinese intrusion near the pass. C.N., 20 October 1960, **W.P.** IV, p. 5. For India's allegations see 1. N., 27 September 1960, **W.P.** IV, p. 4, 1.N., 2 December 1960 **W.P.** V, p. 1, 1. N., 6 May 1961, **W.P.** V, p. 11, 1.N., 31 October 1961, **W.P.** V., p. 53.
40. C.N., 3 January 1965, **W.P.** XI, pp. 29-30.
41. **ibid.**
42. C.N., 24 August 1962, **W.P.** VII, p. 39. For identification of 'Tagi La' as 'the area north-west of Bomcho' or Bomch ho, see C.N., 28 November 1965, **W.P.** XII, p. 88 & Indian notes, 30 November 1965 & 14 December 1965, **W.P.** XII, pp. 90,96.
43. C.N., 19 September 1963, **W.P.** X, pp. 32-33, Charges were repeated. See C.N., 26 December 1963 **W.P.** X, pp. 40-41, C.N., 28 September 1964, **W.P.** XI, pp. 21-22, C.N. 3 January 1965, **W.P.** XI, pp. 29-30.
44. 1.N., 12 November 1963, **W.P.** X, p. 36.
45. C.N., 3 January 1965, **W.P.** XI, pp. 29-30.
46. 1.N, 2 February 1965, **ibid.**, pp. 31-32.
47. C.N., 14 June 1965, **W.P.** XII, p. 25.
48. 1.N., 13 July 1965, **ibid.**, pp. 25-26.
49. 1.N., 21 January 1965, **W.P.** XII, p. 30.
50. 1.N., 17 September 1965, **W.P.** XII, p. 45.
51. **Peking Review**, 14 May 1965.
52. For example, C.N. 11 June 1965, **W.P.** XII, pp. 23-24, C.N., 7 August 1965, **W.P.** XII, pp. 34-35.
53. Chinese official statement, Peking, 7 September 1965. Text in K.Sarwar Hassan (ed.), **Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan : China, India, Pakistan** (Karachi : 1966), pp. 428-431.

54. C.N., 8 September 1965, **W.P.** XII, pp. 38-39.
55. **New York Times**, 9 September 1965.
56. Motion moved by Frank T. Bow (Republican). Text in **Congressional Record**, Vol. 111, part 17 (House), 8 September 1965, p. 23188. The motion provided for mandatory prohibition of foreign aid appropriation 'to any country which shall engage in military action in opposition to another country, wuch countries having been the recipients of aid under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961'.
57. Representative Mahon, Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations, at whose opposition the bill was withdrawn, observed: "Let me say this : should Red China, following the passage of this legislation by the Congress, conclude that 'Well, we can now again renew our aggression against India because the hands of the President, the Commander in Chief, the hands of the military forces of the United States are tied by this Congress' ... (then) We could not go to the aid of India when attacked by Red China We would jeopardise the security of the United States by opening the door for Red China to attack India while circumstances are favourable for such an attack.... We must not tie the President's hands in an area where our system of government requires him to act". *ibid.*, p. 23186.
58. **New York Times**, 11 September 1965.
59. Soviet Union expressed the concern that 'third parties' would exploit the situation if the war did not end immediately. A **Tass** statement of 13 September condemned China's 'incendiary statements' and warned that 'many states might find themselves drawn into the conflict one by one'. **Pravda**, 11 September & 14 September 1965 (in order).
60. See Joseph Kraft, "Peace Making in Asia", **Washington Post**, 22 September 1965, included in **Congressional Record**, Vol III, Part 18 (Senate), 22 September 1965, p. 24732. The Security Council already

- passed two resolutions calling for cease-fire, (on 4 September and 6 September 1965). U.N. Doc. S/Res. 209 (1965) and U.N. Doc. S/Res/210 (1965). Texts in **Department of State Bulletin**, Vol. 53, No. 1370, 27 September 1965, p. 529.
61. **Washington Post**, 22 September 1965. Also see Richard P. Stebbins, **The United States in World Affairs** (New York : 1966), p. 220.
 62. C.N., 16 September 1965, **W.P.** XII, p. 44.
 63. 1.N., 17 September 1965, **ibid.**, pp. 44-45.
 64. **Indian Express**, 19 September 1965.
 65. **ibid.**, 20 September 1965.
 66. **Washington Post**, 19 September 1965
 67. **Hindustan Times**, 19 October 1965.
 68. C.N., 19 September 1965, **W.P.** XII, p. 47.
 69. **Department of State Bulletin**, Vol. 53, No. 1372, 11 October 1965, pp. 602-603.
 70. **ibid.**
 71. U.N. Doc. S/Res/211 (1965) Text in **ibid.**, p. 608.
 72. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, **The Myth of Independence** (Lahore : 1969), p. 118; and a revelation made by the then Pakistani High Commissioner to Britain, Aziz Ahmed, **Statesman**, 3 March 1977.
 73. 1.N., 21 September 1965, **W.P.** XII, p. 54.
 74. C.N. 24 September 1965, **ibid.**, p. 57.
 75. **ibid.**

Abbreviations

- C.N. Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China
- 1.N. Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India.
- W.P.(I-XII) Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, **Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged (and Agreements Signed) Between the Governments of India and China** (White Paper) Nos. 1 - XII.

* in case of No. 1.