EMPIRICIST APPROACH TO SOME PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the subject matter of this dissertation is the record of work done by Alpana Chakraborty, that the contents of this thesis did not form a basis of the award of any previous degree to her, or, to the best of my knowledge, to anybody else, and that the dissertation had not been submitted by her for any research degree in any other University.

In habit and character Alpana Chakraborty is a fit and proper person for the degree of M. Phil.

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CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

A great amount of work has already been done by many distinguished philosophers on the empiricist tradition. However, the main aim of most of the philosophers seems to be highly critical rather than appreciative of this approach. But in spite of these criticisms we find that the empiricist tradition remains a powerful tradition and it, therefore, deserves a fresh philosophical look. I have, therefore, made an attempt to consider certain central problems of philosophy which empiricism tries to tackle. Thus for my work for M. Phil dissertation, I shall concentrate primarily on the following issues which arise in the context of the general empiricist philosophy.

In the second chapter, my aim is to explain the different philosophical issues held by the empiricists philosopher as the historical background of the empiricist tradition. Here we find that empiricism is the theory that experience is the only source of knowledge and that, in this sense it is opposed to rationalism. This form of empiricism can be generalized into the thesis that all knowledge comes from experience.

In the third chapter, I have attempted to critically evaluate modern empiricism in the light of idealism and

phenomenalism. In doing so the question such as whether empiricism could be considered as a version of phenomenalism or whether phenomenalism is more viable than empiricism etc. would be critically examined. In this chapter, I want to explain the idealistic position held by Berkeley and also want to compare Berkelian idealistic position with that of the phenomenalistic position held by the different phenomenalists such as A.J. Ayer, Jonathan Bennet and with reference to positions held by Anthony Quinton.

The fourth chapter consists of a critical examination of the empiricist approach to the problem of self and its identity which is the perennial problem of philosophy. This chapter would also bring out the importance as well as the difficulties of the empiricist theory of the self and its identity.

The next chapter is a critical discussion about the distinction between judgements i.e. between analytic and synthetic and also with the problem of synthetic apriori judgements. This would also include a critical examination of the dogma of empiricism that there is a fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, are grounded on meanings independently of matters of fact, and truths which are synthetic and are grounded on fact. The possibility or

impossibility of the synthetic apriori in the light of the dichotomy between analytic and synthetic will also be highlighted.

CHAPTER - II

EMPIRICIST TRADITION - IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) is a philosopher whom it is very difficult to classify. He is an empiricist like Locke, Berkeley and Hume. But he differs from them by being an ardent admirer of mathematical method, not only in pure mathematics, but in its applications. British empiricism, in general, is little influenced by mathematics. But Hobbes is an exception. He is not given to subtleties. Though his solution of problems are logical, he tends to omit awkward facts.

Hobbes advocates a thorough going materialism. According to him, life is nothing but a motion of the limbs, and therefore is artificial. He is also of the view that the 'common wealth' has an artificial life.

Hobbes is aware of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities but he does not give any philosophical basis for this sort of distinction as Locke has done. According to him, the secondary qualities such as colours, sounds, etc. are not in the objects. Hobbes is out and out a nominalist like many empiricists. According to nominalism, there is nothing universal but names, and without words we cannot conceive any general idea.

Hobbes is of the view that reasoning is of the nature of reckoning, and should start from definitions. He holds that self-contradictory notions in definitions must be avoided at all costs. For him 'incorporeal substance' is nonsense. He proclaims that God is not an object of philosophy. This position reminds one of Hume and logical positivists. Both Hume and logical positivists go to the extent of saying that metaphysics should not be a part of philosophy.

According to Hobbes, the succession of our thought is not arbitrary but governed by laws - sometimes those of association. Immediately, this position reminds one of the Humean laws of association. Hume tries to account for the connection between our thoughts on the basis of the three laws of associations, namely, (1) law of continuity, (2) law of similarity, and (3) law of causation. He regards these laws as a string that binds the different thoughts into one 'bundle.'

From the above discussion, I think, it is not very difficult to come to the conclusion that Hobbes can be regarded as one of the early empiricists. He may not be so explicitly an empiricist as Hume, Locke, Russell and the logical positivists but it would be a mistake to exclude him from the empiricist tradition.

Locke seeks to analyse knowledge by studying human understanding. Its most detailed formulation is to be found in his "Essay concerning human understanding." Locke uses the word 'idea' to stand for "whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks"[1] and thinking here includes perceiving, imagining and willing, as well as thinking **in the strict sense** of cognition. Thus having thoughts and having ideas are the same for Locke. He conceives thoughts as the materials of thinking, as the items that come and go and which a mind must furnish if it is to think at all. Thus one of the main questions of Locke is 'where do all of our ideas come from?' or in other words, 'what makes our knowledge possible?'

Locke offers an answer to this question in a very simple way. He says that all of our ideas are derived from experience. He divides ideas into two kinds (1) the ideas of sensation and (2) the ideas of reflection; the ideas of sensation are derived from sense experience whereas ideas of reflection are not derived from sense experience.

Locke says:

> "Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas: - How comes it to be furnished?

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1. John Locke - (1) Vol. 1, p.32.

> Whence comes it by that vast stare which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer on one word, from EXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either, about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the foundations of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do, Spring."2

The ideas are manifestations or effects of which the person is the percipient, and these phenomena also represent some particular qualities which exist independently and externally to our individual consciousness. They are "effects in us" produced by the things that are independent of us. Thus the ideas or phenomena are something in which the existence shows itself. Ideas are not present in the understanding from the beginning nor are they originated by the understanding but they are all received through sensation, or by reflection. Accordingly, the source of knowledge lies in experience, and so the more experience that a man has, the more knowledge he attains. Perception, according to Locke, is of two types: external, i.e. derived from sensation and internal, i.e. derived from reflection, and these perceptions are the only windows through which the light of all

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1. John Locke - (1), Vol. I, p.121-2.

ideas penetrates into the dark chamber of the understanding. Of course these two 'windows' are not open simultaneously but they appear one after another in the sense that the perception of the sensible qualities do not require any effect or attention, whereas in internal perception it is absolutely needed, a child receives the ideas of sensation before those of reflection, and in this sense internal perception presuppose external perception.

Locke further observes that all original ideas are representations either of the external sense or of the internal sense. From the point of view of genesis, such ideas are classified into four categories.

Firstly, Ideas of colour, sound, taste, heat, solidity etc. which are perceived through external senses.

Secondly, the ideas of extension, motion etc. originating not from one sense organ but from more than one sense organ.

Thirdly, Reflection or operation of our mind generates in us the ideas of thinking with various modes such as remembering, judging etc.

Fourthly, the ideas of pleasure and pain, power and existence, unity and succession are originated in our mind

by the joint effect of external and internal perception. In the opinion of Locke these original ideas are related to knowledge just as letters are related to written discourse.

Locke holds that all these ideas are simple. By simple ideas he means those ideas which contain in it nothing but one uniform appearance, or conception in the mind and is not distinguishable into different ideas. These simple ideas are suggested and furnished to the mind only by sensation and reflection.

However, in addition to the capcity for passively receiving simple ideas, mind possesses, a power of combining and extending these original ideas and to this extent, mind is both passive and active. It is not able to form new simple ideas except that it frequently and freely combines them in various ways. Complex ideas according to Locke are formed from the voluntary combination of several simple ideas.

Locke says that the understanding is first furnished with those simple ideas. Moreover, the understanding has the power to repeat, compare and unite those various simple ideas. Even if those ideas are of different variety, they can be made complex by the understanding.

Thus it is important for us to note that these simple ideas are the materials of all our knowledge and it is impossible to think of any complex idea without the constituent simple ideas.

In respect of the origin of knowledge, Locke points out that perception is the first step of knowledge; the second step consists in relating the discrete ideas into complex wholes. In the third step, there is reproduction by means of memory. Memory, according to Locke, is the basis for the intellectual functions of discernment and composition and abstraction. Complex ideas are numerous, and they may be divided into three classes, namely, Modes, Substance and Relation.

By modes, Locke means such combination of simple ideas which do not contain in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves but they may be considered as application of substances. Modes fall into two classes, depending on whether they consist of simple ideas of the same kind or of different kinds. Modes are conditions which do not subsist by themselves but require always a basis or support. They are not conceivable apart from a thing whose properties or states they are.

The second type of complex idea is substance and this substance is not something self-existing but is something which may be called as substratum of the qualities.

Third form of complex ideas are 'relation.' Relations are free and product of the understanding, and they can never be copies of real things.

Three kinds of knowledge:

Locke defines knowledge as the perception of the connection of agreement or disagreement between the ideas. According to him, the object of knowledge is not simple ideas, nor the relation of ideas to things but relation of ideas amongst themselves. Locke makes a classification of knowledge into three types (1) sensitive, (2) intuitive, and (3) demonstrative.

Sensitive knowledge is the knowledge of the external object obtained through our external sense organs. Intuitive knowledge is also a form of immediate knowledge and it is a knowledge of our own existence. The third kind of knowledge is called demonstrative or mediate in the sense that it is obtained through the medium of certain authority or testimony.

Of all these three kinds of knowledge, intuitive knowledge is the highest and most certain because it is gained when our mind perceives agreement or disagreement of two

ideas, at first sight without any hesitation, without the intervention of any third idea. This intuitive knowledge is self-evident and 'irresistable' and thus it is indubitable.

Thus whatever the mind perceives in itself, or whatever is the immediate object of perception, whether it is a thought of a certain kind or any understanding, that is in Lockean view, an idea. But he points out that these ideas produced in us are the various sorts of qualities which the different kinds of subjects or the bodies possess by themselves. Locke says that these qualities are of two types, (1) primary, and (2) secondary. The primary qualities are inseparable from the body and the qualities such as solidity, extension, figure and mobility etc. are primary qualities because they are capable of producing simple ideas in our mind. The secondary qualities like colours, sounds, tastes etc. are barely powers to produce various sensations in us. These sensations are nothing but the idea of different objects or substances. Locke says further that, in such cases the mind is completely passive in the reception of the whole of its simple ideas, and so it exerts several acts of its own. Whereby out of these simple ideas as the materials and conditions of the rest of the mind, where it exerts its power over its simple ideas are chiefly these three, (1) combining several simple ideas into one complex idea and

thus all complex ideas are made. (2) The second is bringing two ideas together (whatever, simple or complex) and setting them one another, so as to take one of them at once without uniting them into one, by which it gets all ideas of relations. (3) The third is separating from all other ideas that accompany them, in their real existence, this is called obstruction and thus all general ideas are made.

Locke would maintain that whatever we apprehend - whether it is mental or material or a mere image or the phantasy, that is, whatever we are conscious of intuitively or symbolically is called an idea. When I am conscious of a pleasant or of a disagreeable smell, or sound - when I see the sun or touch the tree - when I remember any of these - when I form a mental picture of a certain thing, when I understand scientifically the meaning of 'circle', 'planet', 'wisdeom', or any other common abstract terms, Locke would say that I am having ideas of these things. But he opines that in receiving such ideas the mind must be conscious or there must be modes of consciousness.

In order to discuss Berkeley's philosophy, it is important to remember that Berkeley's immediate starting point is without doubt in Locke. The two problems of Locke - his classification of ideas or phenomena of which we are conscious

and his account of the causes of the self-conscious experience - gave Berkeley his immediate starting point.

Let me discuss the main philosophical themes on which his empiricist procedure develops. Berkeley's philosophy can be divided into three parts, namely, (1) he tries to prove the non-existence of the world outside our human mind or he rejects the materialistic hypothesis. (2) In the second part of his philosophy he tries to prove that mind is the receptible of all ideas, and ideas are the only truths and there is nothing real other than this. (3) on the third part of his discussion he proceeds to prove the spiritual existence of God as the true self or consciousness from which and through which all the different kinds of knowledge are originated and developed.

Let us first try to know what his immaterialistic hypothesis is and his rejection of materialism.

Berkeley is a well known exponent of immaterialism on epistemological grounds. His basic argument is that what we immediately perceive are sensations or ideas, that is sensations and ideas are necessary objects of perception and that what we call physical things, such as tables and chairs, etc. are adualy groups or are collection of sensation or ideas and these are thus mind dependent. This



argument proceeds on the assumption that sense experience is the basic and reliable. He rejects matter on the ground that sense inform us of ideas but not of material substances which are distinct from the sensible qualities or ideas.

Berkeley's claim is that his view is in agreement with the common sense. His claim is that material objects, even if they are conceivable, would be problematic existents and as a result, the theory in which they are figured would give rise to scepticism about the existence of familiar things like trees and rocks and tables or chairs. Immaterialism, in contrast, claims that it does not lead scepticism. Berkeley also supposes that it is not possible to conceive of anything existing apart from being thought of it, for it must be thought of in the very act of being conceived.

Thus Berkeley's philosophy can be treated as an immaterialistic hypothesis, that is, the denial of the very possibility of inert, mindless material substance. His fundamental view is that, for something to exist it must either be perceived or else be the active being that does the perceiving. Thus in his philosophy we find references of such view that existence is 'percipi' in the principle 'Esse-est-percipi' and he adds that there can be nothing except spirits on the one hand, and passive sensible things on the other hand, and the latter cannot exist without the former.

As to the origin, growth and limitation of what we call matter, according to Berkeley, is an aggregate of sensation and it is so because as soon as these sensations are removed the perception of the object automatically stops, and as a result what we think to be an object of this world outside the mind also disappears. We can never know an object which has no colour, sound, taste, smell or touch. Substance is also known in the form of our sensation and perception.

From the analysis of knowledge as such Berkeley comes to the conclusion that the existence of anything in this world depends solely upon its being perceived, and in this way he tries to establish his famous doctrine of 'esse-est-percipi', meaning, to be is to be perceived.

Berkeley says that the materialistic hypothesis that matter exists independent of our mind is unnecessary. It is unnecessary firstly because the fact explained by the materialistic hypothesis can be better explained without assuming the same extramental existence. Berkeley's second argument in support of his view is that, the materialistic hypothesis involves in itself an element of contradiction by supporting that an object can exist unperceived and the sensation of an idea is the copy of anything which is by itself is not a sensation or idea. Berkeley holds that ideas are the only

object of the understanding and sensible qualities like 'whiteness', 'sweetness', are simply some subjective states of the soul. Sensed, objects like 'sugar' are only some sensation which are complex. Berkeley thinks that if sensation needs a substantial support then that support may come very well from the mind which perceives them and not from what is called an external object which can neither perceive nor be perceived. Berkeley thinks in this way that simple ideas can exist no where, other than in the mind, and thus the being or existence of sensed object exists in its being perceived.

Thus the materialistic theory is in fault mainly for the reason that we never perceive material things directly, for to do so we require direct or immediate acquaintance with the object. Berkeley has one objection to the view that material objects are perceived immediately by means of ideas. His view is that since it is held that we never perceive material things directly, but only through the medium of ideas. We can never know whether any of our ideas are like the qualities of material substances as we can never compare our ideas with them; for to do so we should require direct or immediate acquaintance with them (principles, 18). Indeed, if we accept Lockean position, the very existence of material substance is in doubt, and we are constantly under the threat of skepticism (principles 86).

From the above considerations it appears that, the considered view of Berkeley is that, it is inconceivable that anything should exist apart from mind. This argument is put forward by Berkeley in similar terms both in 'Principles' (22, 23) and in the 'Three Dialogues' (i) and takes the form of a challenge to the reader to conceive of something, for example, a book or a table or a tree-existing absolutely unperceived. Berkeley argues that the attempt is impossible of fulfilment, since in order to conceive of a tree existing unperceived, we who conceive of it, and by the very fact of doing so, bring it into relations to our conception and hence to ourselves.

Berkeley's argument shows that all sensible qualities or ideas exist only as perceived, and that, things in nature are nothing but groups of ideas which cannot exist unperceived or 'without the mind.' It is now necessary to complete the account of Berkeley's argument to show not only that the sensible qualities or ideas exist in the mind, but that nothing like them can exist outside it. Those who believe in materialism would believe that our ideas, although in our minds, are copies of material archetypes. Berkeley's objection is that an idea can be like nothing but an idea, which he illustrated by saying that a colour or shape can only be like a colour or shape.

Berkeley explains the meaning of ideas in his 'Three Dialogues' (1) into two different ways. Firstly, ideas are regarded by some as the perceived representations of imperceptible originals but 'can a real thing in itself invisible be like a colour; or a real thing which is not audible, be like a sound?' His other reason for holding such a view is that - ideas cannot be like any supposed external originals because ideas are continuously changing upon every alteration in the distance medium or instrument of sensation.

There are certain arguments of Berkeley in favour of immaterialism. Firstly, he points out that they arose out of materialism and inconsistencies in the then current scientific view of the world, with its distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Berkeley holds that since primary qualities cannot exist apart from secondary qualities and since all sensible qualities as well as secondary qualities cannot exist 'without the mind' then it appears that the independent material world of the then current view is a conceptual absurdity. This is supposed by the argument that our ideas cannot be likeness of an external material world, since there is nothing conceivable, they can be likeness of except mind dependent existences of their own type.

Thus Berkeley claims that his own theory, according to which we directly perceive ideas and groups of ideas that exist only as perceived eliminates skepticism, and accords with common sense.

Berkeley further attacks the Lockean conception of substance and the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, by pointing out that there is no such distinction between primary quality and secondary quality in respect of their dependence on mind.

Berkeley's objection is that there can be no distinction between the primary and secondary qualities such as to make secondary qualities related to mind in a way in which primary qualities are not. In the 'Three Dialogues', Berkeley elaborates the argument already used by Locke to show that the ideas we have to secondary qualities are relative to the percipient. Things have no colour in the dark, the same matter can feel hot or cold, in different hands. To Berkeley both the primary and secondary qualities are dependent upon the mind. But he points out that both the primary and the secondary qualities are dependent upon the knowing mind. If the mind is absent, if attention is not there, nothing of these qualities can be perceived or known. As such, there cannot be any certainty about their existence independent

of mind. He also argues that nothing can have the primary quality without having the secondary quality, so that if the latter cannot exist without the mind the former cannot exist without the mind either.

Berkeley also differs from Locke on the point that there is an unknown substratum of all qualities because to say something exist unknown to anybody involves contradiction.

In order to understand his argument, it is necessary to understand his use of the word 'idea'. He gives the name idea to anything which is immediately known. Thus a particular colour which we see is an idea; so is a voice which we hear and see. There are also things remembered or imagined, for which such things also have immediate acquaintance of the moment of remembering or imagining. All such immediate data he calls ideas.

Berkeley considers common objects such as trees, rocks etc., all of which are immediately perceived, consist of ideas in this sense of the word, he further argues that, there is not the slightest ground for supposing that there is anything real about the tree except what is perceived. Its being, he says, consists in its being perceived, 'esse-est percipi'. He fully admits that the tree must continue to

exist even when we shut our eyes or when no human being is near it.

This continued existence is due to the fact that God perceiving the 'real tree' which corresponds to what we call the physical object, consist in ideas in the mind of God.

Thus the ideas we perceive are more or less like those of physical things which we perceive. He further holds that all the perception which we have, consists in a partial perception in God's perception and it is only because of this perception that different people see more or less the same thing. Thus apart from minds and their ideas there is nothing in the world nor is it possible that anything else should ever be known, since whatever is known is necessarily an idea.

Berkeley in his 'Tree in the Quad' example, has given a few arguments in order to prove the same. The argument goes as follows:

(1) No idea, and therefore no collection of ideas, can, exist when not perceived by some spirit;
(2) objects are collections of ideas, and therefore cannot exist when not perceived by some spirit;
(3) objects do sometimes exist when not perceived by any human spirit; therefore,

(4) there must be one or more non-human spirit which perceives objects when no human spirit perceives them.

Thus it appears that according to Berkeley perception is the only source of knowledge. What is perceived may be granted of its existence and whatever is not perceived can never be assured whatever it is really existing or not. Berkeley rejects the existence of such a thing which has not been perceived by anyone at any time.

As a result of this, Berkeley admits the existence of mind as the only substance and denies the existence of matter, because it is simply the perception of certain qualities taken together. A substratum behind the qualities is not anything perceived by anyone and as such Berkeley does not accept it as anything really existing. By perceiving the qualities by the sense organs and also by analysing the nature of such consciousness Berkeley comes to the conclusion that mind alone is real and not matter, which is extramental. Again by positing the existence of mind as a co-ordinate of different sensations, and different perceptions Berkeley further admits the existence of God and the Universal Mind. To explain the unity and uniformity and homogeneity of different thoughts in different individuals mind, according to Berkeley there is one God or one universal

mind prevailing the whole of the universe and it is the universal mind from which variety of thought in different individual mind have come out and spread in different ways at different times.

According to Berkeley, what we call nature is simply, a sum total of different ideas originating in the universal mind or God, mind is communicating itself to us through nature and in this sense all laws of nature are the laws of God, or truths of the universal mind. The main purpose of studying philosophy is, therefore, to realise the existence of the universal Mind and also its revealing through the different happenings in nature.

Hume is one of the greatest philosophers, probably the greatest philosopher who ever wrote in English language. Among his philosophical works 'A Treatise of Human Nature', 'The Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding' and 'The Principle of Morals' are very important. The latter two works of Hume can be regarded only as a diluted version of the 'Treatise of Human Nature' which is his masterpiece in philosophy. I think that his philosophical work should be judged on the basis of his treatise and not on the basis of inquiry. Though Hume wrote the treatise in his early twenties it is of great philosophical significance. I want to

base my evaluation of Hume as a philosopher mainly on the basis of the treatise. I would go to the extent of claiming that Hume is the father of modern empiricism.

Hume's philosophy is much more tough than that of Locke and Berkeley, for the reason that as an empiricist he is willing to come to the logical conclusion of his premises.

The main purpose of the treatise is to study the science of man by examining the nature of man. Hume's empiricism may be summed up into two propositions which are as follows:

(1) All our ideas are derived from impressions of sense or inner feeling.
(2) A matter of fact can never be provided by reasoning a priori. It must be discovered in or inferred from experience.

From these two propositions it follows that for Hume metaphysical systems telling us of the existence of God, the origin of the world, and other matters transcending human experience, have no meaning, and even if they had, it could not be shown to be true.

Hume is a thorough going empiricist. He is the first philosopher to make a distinction between analytic

and synthetic propositions without using the said terms. He makes a distinction between relation of ideas and matters of fact. Let me first discuss Hume's theory of ideas because Hume's account of idea of existence is of great philosophical interest. In the treatise, Hume argues that every idea is the idea of a being. Existence must either be derived from a distinct impression or must be the very same with the idea of the perception or object. Hume chooses the second alternative and says 'Any idea we please to form is the idea of a being; and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form.'[1] From this position, two main consequences follow, namely,

(1) We cannot form an idea of anything specially different from ideas and impressions.
(2) Since to conceive of God or any other being and to conceive of the existence of that being are the same thing, it is non-sensical to say that the idea of God has the peculiar characteristics of entitling the idea of existence.

Hume is of the opinion that idea of anything or anybody necessarily implies that the idea is existing. So in order to understand his philosophy we have to know his

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1. David Hume, 'Treatise' Book I, Pt. II, Sec. vi, p.67.

theory of ideas first. Let me now explain Hume's theory of idea because the theory of idea plays a very important role in his philosophy.

Hume uses the term impression in a somewhat different way from as we usually use the term. An impression, for Hume, designates any sensation, passion or emotion as it takes our first appearance in the mind. As for example, all our lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. An impression is different from an idea which are less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of these sensations or movements. Hume maintains that all the materials of knowledge are derived either from our outward or inward sensations and the mixture and composition of these belong alone to the mind and will, or all our ideas or feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions, the more lively ones.

Hume draws his distinction between impressions and ideas as follows:

> The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean

> the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse; excepting only, those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure of unconsciousness it may occasion.2

He thinks that the distinction does not need much explanation, since as he says, 'every one of himself will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking.'[3] We know there is a difference between actually perceiving something and having an idea of it. And the distinction between impressions and ideas is simply a distinction between the degrees of force and liveliness of perceptions.

Hume further points out that all the perceptions of the mind are double, and appear both as impression and ideas. Hume says,

> When I shut my eyes and think of my chamber, the ideas I form are exact representations of the impressions I felt; nor is there any circumstance of the one, which is not to be found in the other. In running over my other perceptions, I find still the same resemblance and representations, ideas and impressions appear always to correspond to each other. This circumstance seems to me remarkable, and engages my attention for a moment.4

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2. David Hume, 'Treatise of Human Nature' p. 1.
3. David Hume, 'Treatise of Human Nature' pp. 1-2.
4. David Hume, 'Treatise of Human Nature', p. 3.

Hume contends that not only every perception of the mind is either an impression or an idea, it also means that there is an exact resemblance of impressions and ideas. Thus, when we analyse our thoughts or ideas, however, either simple or complex, ideas resolve themselves into such simple ideas which are copies of precedent feeling or sentiment. And he says that if we proceed with this inquiry then we find that every idea is a copy of a similar impression. In order to prove that for every idea, there must be a corresponding impression, we can take one of the famous examples, that is, a blind man can have no notion of colour. Ideas are copies of impression, or knowledge is derived from impression. The way to determine the truth of any simple or complex ideas is to trace its origin to the impression or impressions. Hume then appeals to the experience to show that simple impressions always precede their corresponding simple ideas in the mind and that simple ideas are caused by simple impressions. Thus complex ideas or complex perceptions are made up of simple ideas. Therefore, Hume proceeds on to say that everything in the mind is either an impression or an idea. But Hume points out that it is important to note that impression of reflection occur only as a result of something occurring before the mind, and as the impression and ideas are the only things that appear, and therefore,

it cannot be the case that the only impression that ever occur in a mind are impression or reflection. So there would be no impression of reflections unless there are some sensations. From the above consideration it appears that, whatever appears in the mind, appears as a result of our having impression of sensation. Such impressions are casually required for the appearance of ideas. From the above considerations, it appears that Hume accepts that there is a mind. But he does not accept that there is a mind. Hume may be regarded as a pioneer in the empirical study of self, and he is the first philosopher to study self from the aspects of plurality. His theory of self is not only original but also revolutionary. Hume mercilessly attacks the Platonic-Aristotelian concept of self and reduces the unity of the self to an unending series of sensations and perceptions. He analyses the so called self into one kaleidoscopic series of experiences and offers a psychology which is nothing but the study of a series of experiences combining and re-combining, and following one another in an endless chain.

Hume maintains that there cannot be any impression about unreal things so impression of self is not possible as we have possible impressions in cases of things, objects etc. He is of the view that one can discover that he is having various perceptions at any moment like pleasure, pain,

sights, sounds, desires, thoughts and the like. But no one can discover that there is an unchanging self which can be regarded as a unitary principle behind the multiplicity of experience.

Thus, Hume is confident that there can be no self as an entity that remains the same in the manifold changes in life. So there can be no identical impressions corresponding to this identical self. He has two arguments in support of his view.

(1) All our distinct perceptions are distinct existences.
(2) Mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences.

Hume comes to the conclusion that self is nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed each other in a perpetual flux and movement. Thus, there is no doubt that there is unity among different perceptions and that these different perceptions are bound by a force which he calls association.

Hume's theory of self identity is known by different names, namely, 'The Bundle Theory', 'The Serial Theory', 'The Associationalist Theory' and 'The Logical Construction Theory'. I would make an endeavour to interpret Hume's theory of the self as a different sort of logical construction theory in my third chapter.

Hume's theory of mind may be summarised as follows:

1. There is no thought or mental activity unless there is a perception before the mind.
2. Every perception is either an impression or an idea.
3. Every perception is either simple or complex.
4. Every complex perception consists completely of simple perceptions.
5. For every simple idea there is a corresponding simple impression.
6. Every simple idea arise in the mind as the effect of its corresponding simple impression.
7. There are no impressions of reflection without some impressions of sensation. Therefore,
8. There is no thought or mental activity unless there are impressions of sensation.

According to Hume, complex impressions are composed of simple impressions. Thus, through efforts of our imagination or from the errors of our memory we may form complex ideas, which in their combination are copies of complex impressions, but in every such complex idea, the various constituents are all copies of simple ideas that we have previously perceived at sometime or other.

But how should we form a complex idea? In order to answer this question he points out that our thoughts or ideas, however, are not entirely loose or connected or joined by chance. They introduce one another with a certain degree of method or regularity. He further points out that there is a principle of connection between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind. There is a bond of union between them, so much so that one recalls another. This is the phenomenon called association of ideas. These associations are resemblance, contigent in time and space; and cause and effect. Thoghts, in other words, tend to call up thoughts of like things, of things contiguous in time and space, and of things related as cause and effect.

When we examine Hume's theory of knowledge, we find that his theory is mainly based on the distinction between two kinds of relation between ideas. In the 'Treatise', the distinction is between relations that depend completely on the related ideas and those that can be changed without changing the ideas, i.e., he makes the distinction between those (i) that constitute necessary connection and (ii) the factual ones. In the 'Enquiry concerning human understanding,' the distinction is between relation of ideas and matters of fact. He has given some examples about relation of ideas as well as matters of fact, to make this point clear. The first

is about the relation of ideas. He is of the view that judgements about the relation of ideas are necessary which can be found in Geometry, Algebra, and in Arithmetic. The laws, or rules about either geometry or of Algebra are well established truths and that, it is impossible to draw out one conclusion without depending on the other or of the former views. Hume further points out that if we take any affirmation about these laws or rules then it appears that these laws or rules are either intuitively or demonstratively certain. He gives further examples to prove this view. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the square of the two sides, is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. That 'three times five is equal to that of half of thirty', expresses a relation between these numbers. Thus he points out that by the mere operation of thought, proposition of this kind are discovered, and they are not dependent on anything else of the universe. He further points out that though the geometrical triangle or a circle is not really existing in nature, yet the truth about circles or of the triangles established by 'Euclid would remain certain and will remain as evidence.'

Regarding the matters of fact he holds the view that judgements about matters of fact can never be necessary due to the fact that they are based on experience and judge-

ments concerning matters of fact can never be attained through apriori relations. Hume maintains that matters of fact are nothing but the second object of human reason, and that, the truths about the matters of fact are not certain in the same manner as we ascertain in case of relation of ideas. The evidences of truth we get about the matters of fact are not exact like those of relation of ideas. Therefore regarding the propositions about matters of fact, it is possible to deny them without any self-contradiction. For example, if someone says that 'the sun will not rise tomorrow' is a proposition which does not involve contradiction, for it might be the case. Matters of fact are either true or false whereas the relations of ideas are always true.

Hume has a theory of probability regarding the matters of fact, which may be summarized as follows:

The first judgement about matters of fact involves a doubt, the second with another doubt, and the third is also atone with another doubt and as a result it reaches to ad-infinity. As a result no judgement about matters of fact is possible. But he points out that we still continue to make judgements. He believes that this conclusively proves that certain beliefs are fundamental to the very nature of human beings and that these beliefs are not founded on reason but

on imagination. Imagination according to Hume, is a principle which is found in all the human beings without any exception. Though human beings have certain universal beliefs, these beliefs cannot be justified by philosophical arguments. If we try to justify these beliefs by producing wide ranging philosophical arguments, we cannot succeed because our human understanding is limited by experience. Hume considers three sources of the belief in the existence of the external world namely senses, reason and imagination. He rejects the first two and comes to the conclusion that the belief has been illegitimately derived from sense experience by imagination.

Hume in his next explanation says that all the statements concerning matters of fact are based on relation of cause and effect i.e. we always seek a connection between a present fact with another. But his view is that the statement about causal connection cannot be a necessary truth, because the causes precede their effects, are contiguous to them and are as such that there is a constant conjunction between them. As a result, mind tends to pass from one to another. Hence, there can be no objective justification for inference from cause to effect. He allows that, it is a truth that certain rules can be provided which, when followed will give some kind of probability to those inductive inferences which we actually do make. The aim of these rules is to make custom reliable and avoid superstition.

Hume points out that the knowledge about causal relation arise not from a prior reasonings but by experiences. Regarding the knowledge about the matters of fact or of the real existence, whatever knowledge we get or inference we draw are not independent of experiences. Thus the proposition that causes and effects are not discovered by reason but by experiences will readily be omitted if we understand properly how knowledge comes or how apriori knowledge is possible. Hume believes that foundation of all apriori knowledge is experience. Thus, Hume who precedes Kant, accepting the usual view as knowledge apriori, discovered that, in many cases which has previously been supposed analytic and notable in the case of cause and effect, the connection is really synthetic. Before Hume, rationalists had supposed that the effect could be logically deduced from the cause, if only we had sufficient knowledge. Hume argues correctly that this could not be done. He comes to the conclusion that there is no objective relation holding between cause and effect.

J. S. Mill's philosophical method can be called as a construction or propagation of the positive assistance to the progress of scientific method. His epistemological method, consists largely of an account of experiential knowledge. The method is applied in order to show, why nothing beyond such kind of knowledge is either possible or necessary. About the

reality of the external world, Mill presents an empiricist theory of knowledge. His method is very different from the skeptical method of Hume and from the theological method of Berkeley.

Mill believes that true knowledge is possible. He says that if we want to know anything at all truly, this is possible only by means of intuition. He rejects inferential knowledge on the ground that it is not certain because there is no fixed starting point. Knowledge is not possible by means of inference, because thereof, we would be involved in a vicious infinite regress of premises. His view is that the knowledge acquired by means of intuition is beyond the realm of rational discussion and experimental test. In the 'Logic' he argues that no intuition is necessary for mathematics, logic or the procedures of natural sciences. If we pay special attention to his writing then it appears that in his examination of Sir Hamilton's philosophy he wants to deal specially with those questions regarding the nature and foundation of human knowledge. He also wants to find out the nature of bodies and minds. According to Mill, though it is possible to have knowledge by means of intuition, it is not enough. His view is that the knowledge acquired by

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5. Mill, J.S. 'System of Logic' Edited by J.M. Robson, Introduction by R.F. Merae, Toronto University.

intuition can be accepted by us as a best method of acquiring knowledge. He further holds that as men are rational everyone must have the feeling of consciousness. He points out that human beings are conscious of a thing or happening directly or indirectly. By direct consciousness he means the consciousness, the awareness which is immediately present to the mind. Indirect consciousness, on the other hand, means the consciousness which is presented to the mind in a suppressed way. Thus in order to distinguish between direct consciousness and intuition, we must try to make an investigation of the origins of the present convents of our minds. But there arise a logical difficulty because this kind of investigation cannot be done directly. Thus Mill says that the original elements can come to light as a residual phenomena by a previous study of the mental facts which are not original.

But he points out that this method is actually originated in Locke and that it is a kind of psychological method. Mill further holds that, experience acts in accordance with the known laws of our knowledge.

Mill believes that the existence of matter or body as well the existence of Mind is possible. This he explains in the treatise 'Psychological theory of the belief in an external world.' His view is that the mind is capable of

expecting, of forming the conception of possible sensations which would be felt, if certain conditions are realized and second, the psychological laws of association, and those factors operating on experiential sensation and reminiscences of them, would generate not only a belief of an external world but in addition a blief that this belief is immediate intuitive.

Mill argues that by external object we generally mean only something which remains same even if the sensations we get from its change and which is common to many observers in a way that sensations are not. According to him, the notion of the external can be made intelligible only in terms of actual and possible sensation. The possible sensations are thought of as being in groups. Further, there is regularity in the sequences of our actual sensations. The groups of possible sensations depend on regularity and succession, but not necessarily the actual sensations.

He concludes by saying that sensation and feeling are the data of experience. He is also of the view that the link between past and present is known intuitively.

Russell's philosophical work is a reaction against the absolute idealism. He points out that every knowledge is dependent on the doctrine of 'internal relations'

according to which any relational fact, for example, that X is above Y is really a fact about the natures of the terms involved. Whenever X and Y are related, each enters into the nature of the other for when X is above Y then being Y is part of the nature of X and being below X is part of the nature of Y. Since everything is related with everything else, the very concept of relation enters into the nature of any 'given' which is just another way of saying that there is no other thing relative to a given thing. From the relative principle it appears that when we are conscious of something, that something enters into the nature of the awareness of the mind which has the awareness. It follows from this that it is impossible to conceive anything which is not included within consciousness. Thus, the all comprehensive unity is a unity of consciousness.

Wittgenstein can be regarded as one of the greatest philosophers of Twentieth Century. As an empiricist he exerts an enormous influence on the contemporary philosophical thought. His philosophical approach differes from those of the other philosophers I have discussed so far, because he applies a new method in his philosophy. Among his philosophical works his fame lies mostly on those two books, the first is the "Tractatus Logico Philosophicus" and the second is his "Philosophical Investigations." But my concern here

is only to discuss his 'Tractatus' which can be regarded as the better starting point of his earlier philosophy. The following proposition can be regarded as the primary thesis of his book. Wittgenstein says,

(1) The world is all that is the case. - (1.21)

(2) The world is the totality of facts, not of things. - (1.11)

(3) The world divides into facts. - (1.2)

Wittgenstein is of the view that, in order to know the world one must have to give a description of the world, and the description will be a complete description. But when one goes on describing the world, he naturally describes the things or objects which are there in the world. For example, if anybody tells me to give a complete picture of a room I may offer a very poor answer because I may say that the room is composed by certain articles plus the walls, windows floor and so on. But what is actually wanted is not just this kind of list but something else i.e. how the room is arranged. And in such a case it is necessary to furnish not only the list of objects but also the facts about the room. According to Wittgenstein, in order to know the truth about this world one must be aware about facts, not of objects.

The world can be known uniquely by means of facts only because it is possible for us to know the facts. But he says that the objects cannot be known. As a result, world cannot be known uniquely.

When Wittgenstein points out that the world is the totality of facts, one very important question arises. 'What Wittgenstein means by the term 'fact'?' He points out that 'a fact as being a kind of complex entity existing in the world, as being a group of things arranged or combined in a certain way.'[6] He gives the following example to explain this position. 'The fact that the cat is on the mat' is a sentence, and it is a complex sentence consisting by these two words the 'cat' and the 'mat' and they are arranged in such a way that the former is on the latter. To explain this position more elaborately he applies some example about the state of facts and about the state of affairs (objects) Wittgenstein says.

2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects.

2.03 In a state of affairs objects fit one another like the links of a chain.

2.031 In a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another.

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6. George Pitcher, 'The Philosophy of Wittgenstein,' p. 20.

Thus, he appears to be believing that there are facts really existing and these facts are related to one another like the links of a chain, and as a result of this he thought that there are really complexes existing in the world, Further, he thought that the facts have the most basic kind of reality because the facts are the only things which can exist themselves independently of anything else in the universe. The facts are there in the world and the word is divided into facts. He points out that though objects make up the substance of the world; they cannot exist apart from facts.

Therefore, nothing exists in this world except facts and facts are composed of highly complex and are composed of less complex facts and so on. But he further says that there are not only complex facts, but there are also atomic facts. For him, an atomic fact is one 'which cannot be further reduced, which do not consists of any further, less complex, facts,'[7] He further says that though atomic facts are simple, they are not absolutely simple because they are composed by those components which are not simple. But he says that those atomic facts are the ultimate building blocks of the world because the word is ultimately divided into them. Thus the atomic facts are the simplest things that are self subsistent, that can exist by themselves, in isolation. So if anybody wants to assert the existence of a state of affairs he must have to assert an atomic facts.

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7. George Pitcher, 'The Philosophy of Wittgenstein' p. 21.

Regarding the nature of the state of affairs, Wittgenstein is of the view that the state of affairs are either actual (existent) or merely possible and non-actual (non-existent), i.e. states of affairs are either positive of negative, because it follows from this that according to Wittgenstein some combination of objects exist and some combination of objects do not exist. Thus the former one i.e. 'state of affairs are existing' can be associated with positive facts and 'state of affairs are non-existent' can be associated with negative facts.

But the question arises, what Wittgenstein means by a positive fact? How the positive facts are associated with the existing states of affairs.

Wittgenstein's answer is that,

1.14 The world is the totality of facts not of things.

2.04 The totality of existing states of affairs is the world.

Here, Wittgenstein identifies the facts with the existing states of affairs, i.e. all existing states of affairs are facts. But in Tractatus 2.06, he points out that the existing states of affairs are to be identified only with positive facts and as the state of affairs are atomic, we must

say that the existing state of affairs are nothing but positive atomic facts. Thus the world is composed of positive atomic facts and the world is also divided by these positive atomic facts.

In order to describe reality, Wittgenstein points out that, reality includes not only the positive facts but also the negative facts. But 'what is a negative fact?' Wittgenstein says that negative facts can be regarded as a state of affairs that have no existence and it implies something which is not existing. As for example, "S is P" and "R is not P" asserts the non-existence of a state of affairs that "R is not P." Wittgenstein therefore says that if the former i.e. the positive state of affairs is true then the latter i.e. the negative state of affair is also true.

Thus, he comes to the conclusion here that the real world then includes the positive as well as negative facts (i.e. existing facts as well as non-existing facts). Thus he says,

2.063 The sum total of reality is the world.

But the world he says is divided into atomic facts and not into general facts because the general or universal propositions are ultimately analysable elementary proposition.

All propositions are truth functional molecules or structures of elementary propositions and all non-atomic situations and facts are molecules or structure of those of the state of affairs and atomic facts. Wittgenstein says,

> I am afraid that it may be somewhat misleading to speak of non-atomic situation and facts being molecules or structures of states of affairs (atomic situation) and atomic facts. This way of putting it is apt to suggest that they are molecules or structures in the same way that physical molecules or structures are composed of physical atoms and parts — in the way that a house, for example, is a structure of beams, floors, roof, and so on. But besides all the other differences in the two kinds of cases, there is this crucial difference: in the case of physical molecules or structures, all the components must at least exist, whereas in the case of situation or facts, some of the components may be components precisely by not existing. To take a simple example, one possible situation can be described by a proposition of the form "p, q$\overset{\sim}{\cdot}$r", where p, q and r are elementary propositions. The states of affairs described by p, q and r are all components of the complex situation; but if the situation exists, the states of affairs described by p and q exist (i.e. are atomic facts), while that described by r does not exist. So although to speak of non-elementary propositions being molecules or structures of elementary propositions is not, I think, apt to mislead, the analogous talk of non-elementary situations and facts being molecules or structures of states of affairs and atomic facts is slightly misleading. Still, no harm need be done if only the picture is not taken to seriously.8

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8. Wittgenstein, 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism.' by B. Russell, Marsh volume, p.236.

Wittgenstein points out that there is nothing which binds the state of affairs together to constitute a complex whole. He says that the truth function of the elementary proposition describes a complex situation and those states of affairs described by those elementary proposition in order to make a complex situation, so it can be said that if there is anything that connects the state of affairs these are nothing but the truth functional operates. They are called by him as logical constants. These logical constants, he says are very much needed in the language to construct non-elementary propositions, and they are thus indispensable derives, but they are not names.

In conclusion it can be said that as this philosophical work of Wittgenstein can be regarded as 'logical atomism' on the ground that his theory can be regarded as a theory of proposition and also at the same time it can be regarded as a metaphysical theory, because he is of the view that all genuine propositions are the molecules which are constructed by logical atoms and are thus called elementary proposition. Moreover, he says that all situations are molecules constructed by logical atoms and are called the state of affairs. Thus the elementary propositions are atomic by nature and are incapable of reducing themselves to any more basic propositions (state of affairs).

From the above consideration it appears that for Wittgenstein objects are simple. He says,

2.0001 Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a statement about their constituents and into the propositions that describe the complexes completely.

2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite.

2.0211 If the world has no substance, then whether a proposition has sense would depend on whether another proposition was true.

2.0212 In that case we could not sketch out any picture of the world (true or false).

From the above arguments it follows that for Wittgenstein, without simples there cannot be any proposition with a sense and we cannot sketch out any picture of the world. Thus we cannot deny the existence of simples. In the 'Notebooks' Wittgenstein says,

> It does not go against our feeling, that we cannot analyse PROPOSITIONS so far as to mention the elements by name; no, we feel that the world must consist of elements. And it appears as if that were identical with the proposition that the world must be what it is, it must be definite. In other words, what vascillates is our determinations,

> not the world. It looks as if to deny things were as much as to say that the world can, as it were, be indefinite in some such sense as that in which our knowledge is uncertain and indefinite. The world has a fixed structure.9

In order to know what Wittgenstein means by world we can take few examples from Wittgenstein's Tractatus. He says,

2.04 The totality of existing states of affairs is the world.

2.06 The existence or non-existence of states of affairs is reality.

2.063 The sum total of reality is the world.

From above it is evident that Wittgenstein draws a distinction between world and reality. The world is denotative of sum total of the existing state of affairs. But the reality refers to the totality of actual and possible state of affairs, The relationship between language and reality is 'one of the picture and the pictured' language pictures reality in the sense that the structure of the world is reflected in the structure of language.

Thus in conclusion it can be said that Wittgenstein has adopted a novel procedure in order to determine the true nature of the world. Though he also appears

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9. Wittgenstein, 'Notebooks' p.62.

to be an empiricist on the ground that Wittgenstein based his view on his ontological atomism i.e. he wants to define the world by means of simples, because he says that simples determine the true picture of the world, and picture is attached to reality, it reaches right out to it. A picture is thus a logical form of the world ie.e. the form of reality. Thus reality is known only by means of pictures.

It is very difficult to furnish right at the beginning a clear cut definition of logical positivism because logical positivism is the name given by Herbert Blumberg in 1931 to a group of allied schools of philosophy who derives their inspiration from the positivists and empiricists tradition, and their ideas were put forward by the 'Vienna Circle.' The expressions like 'consistent empiricism,' 'logical empiricism', 'scientific empiricism', and 'logical neo-positivism', etc. are synonymous. Logical positivists are philosophers for the following important reasons. Logical positivism is a movement and an international one promoted by philosophers in Germany, Austria, Holland, England and the United States. There are number of philosophers who agree on what may be called and what will be, presently, analysed as the core of logical positivism, but who would not like to be labelled as logical positivists. For they

have their own peculiarity and preferences relating to the same approach, terminology and aims of the philosophy. It is very much quo-conscious and action minded. Thus it can be said that logical positivists adopt a linguistic approach to knowledge and promote knowledge through analyses and specification. Thus in short it can be said that logical positivists are interested in the promotion of knowledge through promotion of communication. Thus logical positivists are unlike the traditional philosophers.

The logical positivists thought of themselves as continuing a nineteenth century Vienese empirical tradition closely linked with the British empiricism. They accept Berkeley's empiricism though of course they have rejected Berkeley's materialism. Hume's consistent, thorough going and relentless empiricism injected inspiration and confidence to logical positivism. The logical positivists share his empirical, cautious, sober and warranted approach to the problems of philosophy. This also share the view that a philosopher has no warrant to be definitive or absolutistic about his view on philosophy, theology, ethics, psychology metaphysics and so on. Indeed there is no definitive or absolutistic bases for human knowledge since the limits of human knowledge are the limits of human experience, which

does not admit of any definite or absolutistic treatment or prediction. They also share with him the despair of having any necessary connection between cause and effect which in effect not only questions but constitutes the very basis of induction. They share the distrust of metaphysics, any philosophy or any branch[illegible] of knowledge which claims to be definitive or absolutistic[illegible]. But they do it for different reasons. While Kant despires the possibility of knowledge of the things beyond the phenomenal world because, on employment of this critical method he finds that the possible knowledge of the noumenal world is not amenable to the categories of knowledge. Logical positivists maintain their distrust on the strength of the fact that the questions concerning ethics, metaphysics or about the things beyond the phenomenal world are either in spite of their grammatical soundness are not genuine questions at all. To them, what is expressible about things is much more important, than what should be actually said about them.

The whole essence of linguistic approach of logical positivism consists in its demand that before one claims anything to be knowable one must be sure of its being expressible. What cannot be meaningfully said or expressed, cannot be, fruitfully, studied or known. Thus by an intensive and thorough going adoption of linguistic approach

some problems are eliminated outright while the remaining ones are sought to be resolved by subjecting them again to the same method. Thus from the above consideration it appears that logical positivists look upon language as an inexhaustible source of muddles and problems, on the other hand, they look upon it as an instrument of resolving such muddles and problems or any problems for the matter of that. From the above it appears that the role of a true philosopher according to logical positivists is to analyse and elucidate proposition of sciences, to bring economy and effectiveness in the use of language. Carnap would accept that proposition would be true if they stand the test of being reducible to his 'protocol statements.' Ayer would accept them as true if they refer to meaning situations. In any case, all logical positivists agree that elucidation and clarification of sentences or proposition is the first and foremost aim of philosophy. Philosophy, in other words, must issue in definitions.

Philosophy must provide a grammar of science (according to Wittgenstein or 'logical of science,' according to Carnap i.e. philosophy must form rules and forge techniques to facilitate and further the purpose of science for the conduct of life). In other words, philosophy has a tremendously positive, constructive and useful role to play.

From the point of logical positivism a genuine science does not have to be apologetic. It is scientific and respectable of its own, it does not owe the validity or worthwhileness of its inquiry to philosophy. Thus on this view, sciences and similar emerging disciplines have every reason to assert their autonomy from philosophy.

In the light of above discussion it is possible to enumerate by way of summary the outstanding features of logical positivism on which the different schools of it are in broad agreement.

1. All knowledge is knowable in so far as it is expressible.
2. The natural and social sciences can be studied competently and fruitfully by adopting the logico-linguistic approach and method.
3. The logical positivist accept and carry forward Hume's legacy which consist in disputing the possibility of valid metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, psychology and questioning the very basis of causation and thereby of all induction.
4. The combination of logico-linguistic approach and Humeian legacy disqualifies all the traditionally respectable branches of knowledge, like metaphysics, ethics, aesthetic, and philosophy which are bound to contain

emotive propositions or meaningless sentences from being worthy subjects of study.

5. Consequently, the traditional role of philosophy as a super science shrinks into a science of analyses and elucidations in language, into an approach and a technique designed to promote knowledge through the promotion of communication.

Conclusion

Though it is very difficult to determine the place of Hobbes in the empiricist tradition, I have no doubt that he is more an empiricist than a rationalist. I have argued for this position. The empiricists doctrines are found in the writings of Hobbes though in a rudimentary form. Though I do not agree with the view that Hobbes' is paradigm case of empiricism, I have no hesitation in claiming that he is an important member of this tradition. It is no exaggeration to say that his political philosophy is based on his empiricism.

Many consider Locke to be the father of modern empiricism. I have examined his theory of perception. Locke, in my opinion is the first philosopher to have made a philosophical distinction between primary and secondary qualities. I think that his distinction between these two sorts

of qualities on the basis of the concept of body as original and worth pursuing. I have also discussed his theory of perception in detail. George Berkeley believes in the infallibility of sense perception. I think, therefore, that he can be said to advocate a kind of sensationalism. I have examined his immaterialism thoroughly. I have also examined the problems concerning the 'principle.' I have also analysed Berkeley's proofs for the existence of God.

The significance of Hume's philosophy can hardly be over emphasised. His philosophy has therapeutic function. I think he is the first philosopher to have pointed out what question are relevant in philosophy and what questions are not relevant in philosophy. He occupies a central position in the empiricist tradition. I have discussed his distinction between impression and ideas, his theory of the external world and his theory of causality in great detail.

J.S. Mill, though differs with Hume regarding certain problems, he is basically an empiricist. I have tried to bring out the various aspects of his epistemological methods.

Bertrand Russell is nothing but a re-incarnation of David Hume in the Twentieth Century. His reaction against the absolute idealism has been spelt out clearly in this chapter.

Early Wittgenstein can be regarded as an empiricist and he is a source of inspiration for many an empiricists. I have given a comprehensive account of his ideas contained in the 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.' Wittgenstein has taken a new procedure in order to determine the true nature of the world which differs from those of the other empiricists. For he tries to do it mainly on the basis of his ontological atomism.

Logical positivism is an off shoot of modern empiricism. This movement in philosophy has been mainly responsible for clearing a lot of cob-webs in philosophy. I think that their theory of meaning, namely, verification principle is still relevant as far as cognitive meaning is concerned.

CHAPTER - III

IDEALISM AND PHENOMENALISM

Idealism in its philosophical sense is the view that 'mind' and 'spiritual values' are fundamental in the world as a whole or the world of experience has not any extramental existence of its own as the realist thinks. The world is only an idea of the mind. Thus ideas alone are real, and the world and its objects are merely the projections of ideas.

There are different kinds of idealism such as phenomenalistic idealism (Kant), objective idealism (Hegel), absolute idealism (Fichte), aesthetic idealism (Schelling) etc. My concern in this chapter is to discuss only the subjective idealism of George Berkeley.

Berkeley is an exponent of subjective idealism. His basic argument is that what we immediately perceive are sensations or ideas, that sensation and ideas are necessary objects of perception, that what we call physical thing such as trees and rocks and tables are orderly groups or collections of sensation and ideas and are thus mind dependent. This argument proceeds on the assumption that only sense experience is basic and reliable.

Berkeley's idealism is mainly based on empiricism and his view is that all truths must be founded on truths of sense experience, and that all the ideas about the external world come from sense experience. He points out that statements about experience are statements about reality and these statements have a meaning which can be expressed by ideas or by means of sense data, and that these ideas are the only objects of the understanding.

Berkeley's first view is that objects are collections of ideas. Thus according to idealism,

F's are collections of G's

From the above statement it follows that,

If there are ideas, someone is in a sensory state.

Therefore,

If there are objects someone is in a sensory state.

Berkeley's positions is that objects are collections of ideas, and if there are ideas someone is in a sensory state. Berkeley accepts this view, more or less for the reason that no object can exist unless each of its member ideas is had by someone. Berkeley applies two arguments in support of his view.

1. Objects are collections of qualities.

2. All qualities are collections of ideas.

Therefore,

3. All objects are collections of ideas.

I would like to quote here one famous passage from Berkeley, where he tries to prove that all objects are collections of ideas. Berkeley says:

> "As several (ideas) are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so reputed as one thing. Thus, for example, a certain colour, tests... are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple. Other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book and the like sensible things."[1]

According to Berkeley, such sensible things or qualities are simply some subjective states of the mind, because sensation needs a substantial support which comes very well from the mind. The simple ideas about colour, whiteness, sweetness etc. cannot exist anywhere other than in the mind, and thus the existence of sensed object consists in its being perceived. Things that are perceived are called sensible qualities or sense data or ideas. These sense data are the passive objects of the mind, and the active being must perceive and will perceive the object.

As to the origin of our knowledge, what we know as matter, according to Berkeley, is the aggregate of sensation only. It is important to notice that if these sensations

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1. Berkeley, Principles, S-1.

are removed the perception of the object automatically stops, and as a result what is known to be an object outside the mind disappears. It is impossible to know objects which have no colour, sound, taste, smell, etc. Thus what we call material object or sense-data or are also known in the form of our sensation and perception. Berkeley wants to maintain that, an object is a collection of ideas, and that perception is having an idea. Berkeley says:

> "The question, whether the earth moves or not amounts in reality to no more than this, to wit whether we have reason to conclude from what hath been observed by astronomers, that if we were placed in such and such circumstances, and such and such a position and distance both from the earth and sun, we should perceive the former to move among the choir of the planets and appearing in all respects like one of them."2

Thus, Berkeley advocates the presentative theory of perception according to which mind perceives things immediately. Berkeley says,

> "The table where I right on... exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study, I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it."3

From the above, it appears that, according to Berkeley, existence of a thing consists in its being perceived

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2. Berkeley ", Principles S- 58.
3. Berkeley . Principles S-3.

"esse-est percipi" i.e. existence is perception or in other words, which is not perceived cannot exist, and cannot be known to be existent.

Let me first explain what Berkeley exactly means by the principle of "esse-est-percipi."

Berkeley translates the word "esse" sometimes by 'being' but most often by 'existence.' In Pr - 6, he says, the 'being' of the sensible things 'is to be perceived or known.' Thus, according to the principle of "esse-est-percipi' the property of being perceived anything necessarily belongs to the idea of existence.

The term 'percipi' or 'perception' has been used by Berkeley in a very wide sense i.e. by 'percipi' he means direct awareness about an idea or object or about a thing, i.e. an actual awareness of an idea. "Esse" is also "posse percipi" or possible awareness of an idea.

The interpretation of 'est' involves many difficulties. Berkeley, without being aware of it, takes the term in two different senses, a stronger and a weaker. The stronger indicates that 'esse-est percipi' is an analytic statement and the weaker, a synthetic statement.

Thus from the 'esse-est-percipi' principle it follows that according to Berkeley -

(X) (X exists then X is perceived)

That is if there is anything as X, and if X is existing, then it naturally follows that X is being perceived.

This sensationalistic theory of Berkeley's philosophy follows logically from the "esse-est-percipi" principle and it is an identity relation between 'esse' and 'percipi' as identity which are strictly equivalent, or are formally equivalent. According to Berkeley, there is no doubt about sense experience and things which we actually perceive by sense. He says,

> "It being a manifest contradiction, that any sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at the same time have no existence in nature, since the very existence of an unthinking being consists in being perceived."4

Berkeley denies the very possibility of existence which is unperceived. From the "esse-est-percipi" principle, the following three arguments can be drawn.

(a) Ideas cannot exist without the minds.

(b) Their existence therefore consists in their being perceived.

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4. Berkeley, 'Principle' - 88.

(c) Where they are actually perceived there can be no doubt of their existence.

Berkeley denies the existence of the external world or objective world. To him there is no physical universe apart from the mind, the existence of external world is a superflous assumption. Thus instead of supposing that mind is in the world we have rather to suppose that the world is in the mind. Mind is the only reality, matter and substances are the creation of the mind. Berkeley further holds that all the qualities, primary or secondary are simply some subjective ideas and as such a man is to be contented with a world in which mind and its ideas alone exist. According to Berkeley, what we call the objects of the world are only experiences or ideas of the mind. There is no object without a subject to know it, or in other words, there cannot be any existence without a consciousness of it. Berkeley says that 'to be is to exist' is a necessity to perceived or known and this view of Berkeley is characterized by the doctrine of "esse-est-percipi." Accordingly the world and its qualities and the objects are nothing but perception or ideas of our minds.

However, if this doctrine is right and if Berkeley is correct then nothing can exist in this world unless it is perceived or known. This view of Berkeley is a logical

outcome of the view of empirical thinkers like Locke and his followers and this may be called solipcism, according to which the self alone exists. But there is no adequate reason for accepting this as correct view. Objects of knowledge exist in nature and they have a tendency of being thrust upon our minds. Whatever a man perceives, he is obliged to perceive that and thus the object of perception cannot be our idea entirely dependent upon our mind for its existence.

Berkeley's idealistic view as described above also means that, mind is the only reality and objects are the ideas of our mind. But this is not true because objects of knowledge do not agree actually with our own experience in life.

Besides, this subjective idealism of Berkeley does not justify our belief in the continued existence of physical objects because if mind alone is real and if matter is only an idea in the mind of a man who perceives them, then there cannot be actually anything outside perception and there cannot be any guarantee for any object to exist when there is nobody to perceive it. Existence in such a case is always a matter of doubt. Moreover, if an object cannot be perceived more than once, i.e. it follows that object vanishes when they are not perceived.

If this doctrine is right and if by perception we mean a perception by some knowing being, then we shall have to face a lot of difficulty in explaining the different experiences of our life. So long as we remain present in a classroom we perceive the benches and chairs and thereby we know that they are existing. When we go out of the classroom and the room is kept under lock and key, there cannot be any chance for any man to perceive those benches and chairs inside the room. Under this situation if Berkeley's "Esse-est-Percipi" principle is to be strictly applied in interpreting perception in the sense of human perception alone then the benches and chairs are not to be existing within the room as there is no man to perceive them there. But this is quite contrary to our experience. If Berkeley's doctrine is interpreted in this sense of subjective idealism i.e. interpreting perception as the human perception alone then this contention cannot be accepted to us. There is continuity of the existence of chairs and benches in the classroom irrespective of the fact that there are some person to perceive them or not.

Berkeley himself is fully conscious of this difficulty and confusion in the interpretation of his doctrine and so to avoid this difficulty or confusion to explain the continuity of existence, Berkeley has stated of God, a Being

possessed of mind universally present to perceive all things at all times whether the human beings are thre to perceive them again there or not. Thus Berkeley's answer is that though we are not able to perceive a thing always it is perceived by God and our perception is partially the reproduction of the Divine Mind. Thus the objects exist independent of our mind and they continue to exist as the ideas of infinite minds.

Here is one source of Berkeley's error which is very crucial. Berkeley says 'X has an idea belonging to object O which X perceives O at T.'

The above statement is a combination of two statements.

X perceives idea O at T.

X perceives the idea O at other time or at a time other than T.

Berkeley is right in saying that X perceives O at time other than T is a conjunction of memory and ideas. But he goes wrong in saying that only the first one is a genuine perceptual statement while the other is not.

There are four bad consequences of Berkeley's idealism which are follows:

1. Objects cannot have histories for the following reason. I cannot 'perceive' at T a collection of ideas some of which do not exist at T. This means that what I perceive at T is only a collection of T - dated ideas - no member of that collection can exist at another time.

2. I cannot 'perceive' an idea which someone else 'perceives'. This means that I can never perceive a whole object that only 'my share of it' that is those members of which occur in my mind. In other words, objects are not interpersonally perceived.

3. Two ideas belonging to two different senses cannot be members of a single object -constituting even if they occur in one mind at one time. This reduces Berkeley's sensible things. Two 'collections of ideas' which are so poverty striken that they can hardly contain more than one member each.

4. This distinction between appearance and reality does not seem to have any place in Berkeley's theory, for their perceived object tends out to be a single idea, and Berkeley does not think one can err about the ideas one actually have.

Moreover Berkeley's argument proves too little. What Berkeley wants to prove is that there can be no idea which is that there can be no idea which is unperceived at any time but he fails to prove this thesis completely.

His argument also proves too much because his argument contradicts one of the premises of his argument that is, no idea can perceive unless it is perceived by me but this argument proves that an idea must not necessarily be perceived by me; it can exist as perceived by other minds at least by God.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that Berkeley's idealistic view is totally untenable because he upholds both extreme empiricism and idealism, both immaterialism and common sense, both subjectivism and epistemological realism. Berkeley says so much about the relativity of each particular sense and says so little about our perception of the physical world. He makes a mistake by saying that the existence of a sensible thing consists in its being perceived. But he does not bother about the difficulties which has arisen due to the view that perception is direct. As Berkeley has put great emphasis on sense experience, and says that human knowledge is caused by experiences. Therefore, we find that he has thus formulated a theory which the twentieth century philosophers have formulated. Though

it is true that he has not intentionally done this yet he briefly formulates the theory of phenomenalism, the theory that, the other empiricists have adopted in order to avoid postulating objects that transcends sense experiences. In order to understand what phenomenalism is, we have to know the different phenomenalistic position given by different philosophers.

J. Bennett[5] points out that there is a necessary connection between 'sensory states as a whole' and 'the objective realm as a whole' or between the concepts of appearance and reality. According to phenomenalism if the question is asked 'is appearance ever a reliable guide to reality?' it should be answered 'yes' or 'no' on logical grounds. Phenomenalist holds that reality is a logical construction out of appearances. J. Benett points out that, phenomenalism is a natural development out of idealism and an improvement on it. He further points out that the gap between appearance in general and reality in general can be bridged by logical or apriori means which involves attention to meaning or concepts. Accordingly, any objective statement is equivalent to a set of sense datum statements including counter-factual conditions and any such set will be a long and complex and will contain members of the form, "If it were the case that...

5. Bennett, J. 'Locke, Berkeley, Hume' Central Themes, 9.68.

then such and such sense data would be had." Thus phenomenalist holds that objects are logical construction out of sense datas.

J. L. Pollock[6] in his book 'Knowledge and Justification' points out that phenomenalism is a theory of perception. Pollock points out that according to phenomenalism, a statement about physical object is to be analysed validly in terms of sense data, i.e., the statement about physical object must entail any statement about sense data. But Pollock points out that any statement about physical object cannot entail any statement about sense data, for it is possible for us to conceive circumstances in which the physical object statement is true, whereas the statement about experience is false due to the malfunctioning of certain organs, hallucinations etc.

Anthony Quinton[7] discusses phenomenalism in his article, 'The problem of perception.' 'The problem of perception' discusses the relationship between sense experience and material object i.e. belief about object can be established by means of immediate experience. Phenomenalist holds that

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6. 'Knowledge and Justification' by Polock John L. Princeton University Press.
7. The article 'The Problem of Perception' by Anthoney Quinton. From the book 'The Philosophy of Perception' edited by G.J. Wornock, Oxford University Press.

there is a necessary connection between experience and objects and the inference involved here is an inductive extrapolation.

Quinton points out that the drawback of phenomenalism is that it consists in making the unobserved object as mere possibilities and in making this the actual effects come from mrerely potential causes, and by doing so it creates a serious difficulty because reference to objects cannot be replaced by reference to ones orienting experience. This assumption amounts to begging the very question at issue since it is not possible for anyone to assume that statements about experience are equivalent in meaning to statement about object in order to show, what they are. The phenomenalists try to avoid the above difficulty by translating the statements about experiences into statement about objects instead of claiming that there is a strict logical equivalence of statement about experience and statement about objects. Quinton says that we are never directly aware of or acquainted with objects. Ayer agrees with Quinton that the antecedent of hypothetical statements do mention objects. He is of the view that the translation of physical object statement is impossible because the reference to physical object is required to identify the sense data - in question due to the poverty of our sensory languages. This sort of translation

is not possible even in principle since it would lead to the erroneous view that a physical object statement cannot be equivalent to a finite set of sense datum statement.

The sense datum theory holds that knowledge is of two kinds (1) direct, and (2) indirect. It holds that knowledge of object is indirect while knowledge of experience is direct. In other words, the statements about objects are not basic but statements about experience are basic. Quinton points out that the crucial terms 'direct' and 'basic' given by sense datum theory is wholly unintelligible. Two sorts of definitions are offered to explain these two terms, one in terms of certainty and the other in terms of inference. For example, I directly know that 'P' (or P is a basic statement) if I know for certain that 'P'. This conclusion has been arrived at from three premises, namely (1) beliefs about object are never certain, (2) something that must be certain for any uncertain belief to be even probable, and (3) all beliefs about object are logically derived from belief about experience. Quinton points out that all these statements are false. Ayer's believes in the incorrigibility of statements about experience. According to him, the mistake in the statement about experience are merely verbal, but Quinton points out that this view of Ayer also cannot defended. Sometimes a definition in terms of inference is preferred. For example,

'I directly know that 'P' (or P is a basic statement if I know P without inference). There is no conscious process of reasoning involved here, but only implicit inference is involved. Thus it is the business of philosopher to show that reasons exist for beliefs about object. Quinton says that there is no relevant sense of 'reason' in which a reason for such belief always exists.

The sense datum theory asserts three different things namely, (1) sensation as well as physical stimulation, if the sense organs are casually necessary conditions of our knowledge of matters of fact. (2) The establishment of any such truth about objects logically requires that someone shall have perceived something, and (3) the statements about objects are logically derived from statement about experience. Quinton wants to refute the third principle that the statement about objects are logically derived from statement about experience.

The definition of 'direct' and 'basic' in terms of certainty and inference are the conclusions to the argument from illusion.

The argument from illusion claims that there is no discoverable distinction between what appears to be the case and what actually is the case. This argument comes from the

conclusion that the only thing we really perceive are appearances since we know only what appears to be the case. Quinton wants to show that this argument is false. He points out that the mistake in the argument is due to the identification of what appears to be the case with sense experience. The sense datum theory holds that, three form of words. 'This appears to be Ø', 'there is a Ø appearance', 'there is a Ø sense datum', to be equivalent in meaning. Quinton wants to show that a statement of what appears to be the case is seldom a description of our sense experience, but it expresses an inclination to believe something about objects. Quinton points out that the statements about sense experience are not claims to knowledge but only tentative experience of beliefs. Therefore, the statement about sense experience cannot be the premises from which the statement about objects can be inferred.

Quinton points out that the problem of perception is to bring out the relation of thought or language to the world. As to the ultimate relation of, or of the ultimate support of knowledge to body, Quinton says, there are diametrically two opposite views, (1) that, the ultimate support is logically related to the body of knowledge, and (2) ultimate support is not related to the body of knowledge. Quinton takes the second view to be the correct one. The

argument from illusion states that we have direct knowledge only of appearances. This argument claims that the appearancesare sense data.

Quinton argues that some uses of 'appear', 'seem' etc. clearly indicate that they do not describe experience and therefore there is nothing 'basic' about them. From this it becomes clear that 'appearances' are not ordinarily sense objects. Though these appearances are incorrigible and uninferred, in a way their incorrigibility is imperfect and spurious. They are imperfect because they are not making a definite claim about something private, but they are making weak claim about something public. Thus Quinton argues that experience cannot be regarded as the sole object of acquaintance because we are not only always aware of experience in all the perceptual situations. He further thinks that his argument can be strengthened by considering what is meant by saying that experience is the only object of acquaintance. He considers the view that only through experience we can have certain knowledge. This view holds that statements about object can never be certain on the ground that these are only empirical statements. Since the empirical statements can be seemed to be false, there can be reasonable doubt of their truth. It follows from the above that if there can be reasonable doubts about their truth they cannot be certain.

This kind of argument brings about the consequence that, only necessary truths can be certain. Some philosophers want to show that a statement is certain only if there can be no reasonable doubt of its truth. Quinton here wants to prove that those philosophers who want to prove that no empirical statement is true, are trying to prove too much because if the argument is valid the different epistemological status between objects and experiences cannot consist in a difference on the basis of certainty between the statements describing objects and experiences. Quinton here wants to consider the arguments which purport to show that there is always doubt about descriptions of objects which 'go beyond' or 'lie outside' the given observation. The first argument holds that no description of object is certain since it is always possible to obtain evidence against it. Quinton is of the opinion that the same argument can be directed against the descriptions of experience and thus the difference in epistemological status disappears. He points out that this argument is fallacious by concluding that, statement with open consequences are never certain. He points out that if the 'logical neighbourhood' has sufficient favourable evidence then a remote unfavourable evidence will not be taken as refuting the statement.

The second argument asserts that statements about objects are always necessarily predictive and as such they always logically imply something which the given observation is not sufficient to establish. Quinton points out that it is a mistake to hold that the statement about objects are always necessarily predictive. His view is that these two arguments involve a crucial error, i.e. both the arguments are based on the supposition that certainty and probability are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. It may be worth noting here that Hume also holds such a view. Quinton argues that all the less than certain statements are not probable, because they are the conclusions of those inferences which are drawn from uninferred premises, which are always less certain.

There is another argument which denies that all descriptions of experience are certain. Quinton wants to examine the above view. This view states that a statement of fact must be expressed by a sentence having a predicate and as such involves classification and descrimination of the predicate concerned. Therefore, it argues that this classification can go wrong as any other learnt, regular procedure, because it is impossible to classify and descriminate any experience. This argument further points out that not only we cannot revise past descriptions of experience but also we

can be uncertain about present descriptions of experience. There is another opposite argument which claims that the errors corrected by such a revision are merely verbal. Ayer holds such a view and says "All that one doubts whether this (sense datum) is green is that one is doubting whether green is the correct word to use."[8] Quinton asks the following questions to Ayer that 'what else is one doubting whether this object is green.' Quinton further says that there is a difference between ones doubting whether this sense datum is green and ones doubting whether this object is green, because we can have a better look at the object whereas it is not possible to do so as regards sense datum. However, it does not follow from this that all mistakes are not merely verval. According to Quinton, 'a merely verbal' errors are due to the wrong expressions of beliefs which is due to the slips of tongue or pen or laziness and inattention. Ayer says that experience is described not by relating it to anything else but by indicating that a certain word applied to it in virtue of a meaning rule of the language. Quinton says that the meaning rules are not so simple so as to enable us to apply them correctly.

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8. 'The Philosophy of Perception' edited by Warnock, G.J., article, 'The Problem of Perception' by Anthoney Quinton, p.77.

Quinton comes to the conclusion that there is no distinction between statement about object and statement about experience because both are certain sometimes and sometimes not. The certainty of a description of object depends mainly on the circumstances in which it is given and what is known about the object. The certainty of a description of experience depends on its familiarity and stability. We can be mistaken about statements about object and the statement about experience on account of linguistic incapacity and the loose correlation of language and the world. We commit these sort of errors about objects due to unfavourable conditions of observation and about experience and sometimes about objects due to their fleeting appearance. Quinton points out that the differences into the sources of error is not sufficient to show that the statement about experience is logically prior to statements about object.

There are also some philosophers who have developed a new definition in terms of inference, and those philosophers believe that there are inefficiency in realising that certainty is a criterion of inference or of basic statements. According to these philosophers basic statements are primitive and uninferred and as such they believe that only acquaintance can give us such statements. They further believe that descriptions of experience are uninferred, whereas

description of objects are inferred. They say that only uninferred premises can validly determine the knowledge about the matters of fact, and it is therefore the business of the theory of knowledge to make a rational reconstruction of the knowledge of matters of fact on this basis. They argue that people seldom use those inferences consciously. Finally, the point out that experiential uninferred premises must 'underline' what we believe about objects.

Quinton's position is that if the above view is correct, then from this we must satisfy two main conditions which are as follows:

1) Statement about experience must count as reason or evidence for statement about object, and
2) the statement about experience cannot count as reason or evidence unless one is aware of his experience.

By considering the above conditions, Quinton points out that the second condition of inference theory is a mistake because in every perceptual situation we are not aware of our own experience. Quinton points out that the first condition of inference theory is not also satisfactory because if these conditions are true, it must prove that statement about objects are inferred from statement about

experience, but what happens here is different. He points out that there are many such inferences where no conscious process of reasoning is involved. Quinton says that a true inference is such which must involve a conscious process of reasoning, and which are unfamiliar and complex. He holds the view that this sort of conscious process of reasoning is not very frequent.

Quinton concludes that, from the above, it appears that experience cannot be regarded as the basis of knowledge, but the objects are the basis of our empirical knowledge. The statement about objects are open to error and therefore we should revise our way of speaking and thinking completely so as to use them as a basis. He says that the relation between experience and object is causal rather than logical as the 'sense datum theory' holds. There is no doubt that our beliefs about objects are based on experience but experience are not reason for our belief about object, they may be causes of our beliefs and explain them and not justify them.

Conclusion

Ayer believes in the incorrigibility of statements about sense experience because he believes that mistake in the statement about experience are only verbal. But Quinton rejects this view on by saying that in order to have a belief

about the external world not only experience but reason also plays a vital role. So in order to have correct knowledge about objects not only experience but there must be conscious process of reasoning.

Quinton also rejects the position described by Jonathan Bennett i.e., the gap between appearance and reality can be bridged by logical means. Quinton argues that there is no such bridge or logical connection between statements about sense data and statements about external object.

By considering the position of J. Pollock it appears that he is right in pointing out that in order to justify our knowledge claim about external object which are based on perception can be answered in two ways. The first one, is by inductive justification, and the second, one, is by logical justification. He is also right in pointing out that in order to justify our perception or experience as the source of our knowledge about objects the statement about object must have to be analysed into perception.

According to Quinton, statement about experience do not constitute in any sense the logical foundations of all beliefs, judgement about material world. Quinton is of the view that the phenomenalists do not claim that there is a strict logical connection between statements about experience

and statement about object. Thus he says that the phenomenalist have to accept that there are no direct awareness between external object and sense organs. He rejects sense datum for the same reason that they say that the statement about object are direct and basic. He also rejects the argument from illusion which is itself false because it identifies what appears to be the case with sense experience. But Quinton says that statements about experience cannot be a promise from which statements about objects are inferred.

Quinton is of the opinion that experience cannot be regarded as the basis of empirical knowledge. On the other hand, objects form the basis of our empirical knowledge. He rightly points out that we can be mistaken about experience about objects as well as statement about experience. He concludes by saying that the connection between experience and object is not logical but causal.

By considering the above position it appears that phenomenalism cannot be accepted at all. But when we consider the position given by John Pollock it appears that phenomenalism can be regarded as the only acceptable theory about the external world. Because when we consider phenomenalism with Berkelian idealism it appears that Berkelean theory cannot be accepted at all because he is of the view

that the existence of sensible thing consists in its being perceived and objects are merely the projection of our mind. But this statement creates a great difficulty which I have tried to discuss in this chapter. Thus by comparing these two theories about the external world it appears to me that though there are many difficulties in phenomenalism yet phenomenalism can be regarded as an acceptable theory about the external world, and not the Berkelean idealism.

CHAPTER - IV

SELF AND SELF IDENTITY

There are different theories of self. Most of these theories consist in saying that, there is a dynamic principle of unity which can be regarded as the governing factor of our mental life. We choose to call this fundamental or dynamic principle as 'Self.' There are some philosophers who use the term 'mind' as synonymous with 'Self.' It is also held that the self or mind is something which unifies all our sensation, feeling, perception and action into a living harmony which is our personality. This notion of self involves the fundamental problem of 'self identity'. In order to solve the problem of self identity different philosophers have given different views. I want to begin my discussion with Hume.

Hume denies the simplicity and identity of the self. According to Hume, it is not possible to have constant psychology or science about the soul just as we cannot have a rational cosmology or metaphysics. The idea of self is meaningless and that we cannot have any idea of a simple or identical self because there is no evidence for the existence of such simple and continued principle in us. The self indicates nothing but sum total of experiences. Hume believes in Berkeley's 'esse-est-percipi' principle

and he denies the perception of any such substance distinct from our perceptions or ideas. Thus there is no impression about the self and as such the question 'From what impression could this idea be derived?' cannot be answered without contradiction and absurdity.

Here one important question arises, that is, if it is the case then 'how should we determine the identity of a person?' Hume's position regarding such a view is that since we do not have any idea about the self so we do not have any impression about the self. Thus to say that there is a perfect identity and simplicity is contrary to the facts of experience. His view is that a person consists of impression and ideas only. The notion of identity has the same origin as the plant vegetable etc. Therefore, the notion of personal identity depends on the smooth and uninterrupted progress of thought along a chain of ideas. Identity is determined only by means of memory because memory discovers identity by giving us the notion of causation among different perceptions. Thus identity goes beyond memory. According to Hume, self-identity exists in thought alone and that it is an illusion. Hume reduces the unity of self to an unending series of sensations and perceptions. He analyses the so called self into one series of experience.

Thus the study of self is nothing but a series of experiences, combining, recombining, and following one another in an endless chain. Hume regards the self as a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. The self is thus nothing but a bundle of perceptions.

Strawson discusses the concept of person in the third section entitled 'persons' of his book 'Individuals.' His discussion can be summarised as follows: we ascribe to ourselves actions, intentions, sensations, thoughts and feelings, perceptions and memories and position. We also ascribe to ourselves certain relatively enduring characteristics including physical characteristics like hight, colouring, shape and weight. Thus we ascribe to ourselves two different kinds of perceptions, namely, states of consciousness and certain physical characteristics. This leads to two questions, namely, (2) why are one's state of consciousness ascribe to anything at all? and (2) why are they ascribe to the very same thing as certain corporeal characteristics, a certain physical situation etc? The answer to these two questions are not independent of one another. It may be thought that an answer to both of these questions could be found in the unique role which each persons body

plays in his experience. The uniqueness of body will not suffice since it is a contingent fact that it is the same body.

According to the Cartesian's view, the second question does not arise; it is only a linguistic illusion. Since it is a mistake to talk about a common owner of two different types of predicates.

According to Wittgenstein and Schlick, the first question too does not arise, it is also a linguistic illusion, they advocate the 'no-ownership' or 'no-subject' doctrine of the self. The 'no-ownership' theorist maintains that the uniqueness of human body is sufficient to give rise to the idea that ones experiences can be owned by this body. He thinks that though this idea is misleading when expressed in terms of ownership, it would have some validity, if 'body', is considered to be the owner of these experiences. While we describe a particular state of consciousness of this body, we may say something that is false; because the experience in question might have belonged to some other individual. But now the theorist suggests, one becomes confused if he considers this particular thing not as body, but as something else, say an ego, we may call the first type of possession, which is really a certain

kind of causal dependence, 'having$_1$' and the second type of possession 'having$_2$'; and call the individual of the first type 'B' and the individual of the second type 'E'. The difference between these two kinds of possessions lies in the fact that while it is generally a contingent matter that all my experiences are had$_1$ by B, it appears as a necessary truth that all my experiences are had$_2$ by E. But the belief in E and the belief in having$_2$ is an illusion. Any sort of ownership must be logically transferable. But in the case of E, the ownership is supposed to be logically non-transferable. Since there is no such sort of ownership, E must be removed completely out of the picture. It has come into the picture due to a confusion.

Though this 'no-ownership' doctrine explains some facts, it is not coherent. If the theory maintains that 'all the experiences of person P' means the same thing as 'all experiences contingently dependent on certain body B', then the position would not be contingent, but analytic.

This internal incoherence is philosophically consequential when something prima facie obvious, is denied. We do identifyingly referred to except as the states or experiences of some identified person. From this it follows that if these particulars are to be so identified, they

would be logically 'non-transferable.' The requirements of identity rule out logical transferability of ownership. The 'no-ownership' theorist could deny his position only by denying a prima facie case, that is, that we can never refer to particular states or experiences at all; and this position leads to an absurdity.

The above two questions are connected in the following way: A necessary condition of States of consciousness is that they should be ascribed to the very same thing as certain corporeal characteristics. In other words, states of consciousness could not be ascribed at all, unless they were ascribed to persons. One is tempted to think of a person as a compound of two kinds of subjects: an ego, on the one hand, and subject of corporeal attributes, on the other. But it is not a compound of two subjects; it consists of one subject and one non-subject. The word 'I' never refers to the pure subject or ego. This does not mean that 'I' does not refer at all, 'I' refers to persons.

The concept of a person is logically prior to that of pure ego. The concept of person is logically primitive concept. It cannot be, therefore, derived from any other concept. The concept of pure ego on the other hand, is a

derivative concept as it is derived from the concept of person. Thus the pure ego can have a logically secondary existence.

I would like to compare and contrast the views of Strawson as regards the concept of person with that of Hume. Both Strawson and Hume agree that pure consciousness or pure ego is a derivative concept. But they differ as far as the primitive concept is concerned. According to Strawson, the concept of person is a primitive concept whereas according to Hume the 'impression' is the primitive concept.

Now I would like to discuss the views of Hampshire as regards the problem of personal identity. He says:

> "The deepest mistake, in empiricist theories of perception, descending from Berkeley and Hume, has been the representation of human beings as passive observers receiving impressions from "outside" of the mind where the "outside" includes their own bodies. In fact, I find myself from the beginning able to act upon objects around me... I not only perceive my body, I also control it; I not only perceive, external objects, I also manipulate them. To doubt the existence of my body would necessarily be to doubt my ability to move... I find my power of movement limited by the resistance to my will defines for me, in conjunction with my perceptions, my own situations as an object among other objects."1

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1. Prof. Hampshire. 'Thought and Action', pp. 47-8.

According to him, it is a gross mistake to represent human beings as mere passive observers. It is also a mistake to doubt the existence of ones' body. He contends that the concept of human action provides the key to the problem of personal identity.

According to Hampshire, the notion of a disembodied person and the notion of personal survival in a disembodied state is self-contradictory or meaningless. Strawson thinks that there cannot be an underived concept of a pure individual consciousness, but he finds no reason why such concept should not have what he calls 'a logically secondary existence,' and in such a case one can easily think of one self as surviving one's bodily death. For one can in such a case imagine one self to have continuing experience of various types without any power to make physical changes in the world, and without having any perception of the body which is related to these experiences in the way as one's living body is related to one's present experiences.

Russell also holds the view that 'a person is a certain series of experiences'. He points out that the grammatical form of the sentence 'I think', 'you think', and 'Mr. Jones thinks' are misleading, because it suggests something that is false. This kind of grammatical sentences

suggest that thinking is an act of a person. He denies that thinking is a mental act, because an act needs an agent and this is exactly what he has been trying to deny.

According to Russell, a total group of my experience through time may be defined in terms of memory. What we know is the string of experience that makes up a person and that is put together in a certain relation such as memory. Locke is perhaps the originator of this view. According to Hume, memory is a kind of perception that resembles and is caused by the past perception. The memory testifies to the identity of a person. It also helps to make prediction by producing the relation of resemblance among the perceptions. Ayer holds that a series of experience constitute the history of a single person.

Thus memory or personal identity or the unity in the series is sought to be explained in terms of 'common something'. This 'common element' are the laws peculiar to the mental world. But the crucial problem is who would recognise those series of experiences as similar or being causally linked up so as to form an idea about the unity of the series. Such a position indicates that there must be an agent or an owner which brings unity in the experiences. So there must be certain organising principle which unites

these experiences which may be the brain or something beyond the services of the experiences themselves.

This theory would have to meet the serious challenge of explaining the first person psychological statement like 'I see an image', 'I feel better now.' Though this theory denies ownership of the mental states yet this theory cannot reject statements such as 'I see an image' as meaningless. This theory gives due importance to the diverse mental phenomena than to recognising one super principle, which discovers how we think, feel and will.

In the chapter entitled 'self identity and memory' Shoemaker makes an attempt to show that first person statements which are completely based on memory are not judgements of personal identity. He feels that people are always led to the conclusion that the criteria of personal identity. are mental or psychological because people make statement regarding the past without asserting personal identity. When we make memory statements we do not use any criteria of identity at all. He opines that if we make memory statements in a law like manner, then we are able to make a distinction between what is actually right and what seems to be right. In such a case only it is possible for one to make the generalization regarding certain matters, and also

make consistent statements with all his memories. Thus he wants to find out those memory judgements which seem to be correct and memory judgements which are actually correct.

Hume is of the opinion that we have correct as well as false memory. He believes this on the basis that one remembers a past experience by having a present experience. This implies that one can assert about the identity of a mind by perceiving the resembling states of one and the same object on the basis of memory.

According to Shoemaker, Hume's view does not imply that someone can observe his own mind. This view does not represent something by which he can observe his own mind. Even if it is possible for someone to make a generalization that all of his memories are correct, yet, it is absolutely impossible to make all the memory judgements consistent with each other. Thus, in order to find out the correctness of my memory I have to compare my memory statement with the memory statements of another person which are actually correct. He further points out that when we use our own memory we are not absolutely sure of its truth or falsehood, because it is not possible for me to collect all the evidences which happened at a particular time place and circumstances. Bernard Williams also believes that only memory

cannot be treated as a criteria of personal identity at all. He points out that bodily criteria are also necessary condition of determining personal identity. Thus he says:

> "If I am asked whether the person in front of me is the same person as one uniquely present at place a, at time t, I shall not necessarily be justified in answering 'yes' merely because I am justified in saying that this human body is the same at that present at a at t. Identity of body is at least not a sufficient condition of personal identity, and other considerations, of personal characteristics and, above all, memory, must be involved."2

Antony Flew has formulated Lockean thesis of personal identity as follows.

> "X at time two is the same person as Y at time one if and only if X and Y are both persons and X can remember at time two (his doing) what Y did, or felt, or what have you at time one."3

Flew points out that the parenthetical (his doing) must be included in the formulation because as Bernard Williams has pointed out he constantly say things like "I remember my brother joining the army without implying that I and my brother are the same person."4

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2. Bernard Williams, 'Problem of the Self', p.1.
3. A. Flew - 'Locke and Problem of Personal Identity' from 'Locke and Berkeley' Edited by C.B. Martin and D.M. Armstrong.
4. B. Williams - 'Problems of the Self', p. 4.

He believes that the above mentioned formulations of Lockean thesis on personal identity will take care of the criticism of Bernard Williams. Antony Flew is of the view that the concept of person involves an 'open texture.' He borrows the term 'open texture' from F. Waismann. The notion of open texture runs as follows.

'Open texture' is different from vagueness which can be remedied by giving more accurate rules. While 'open texture' cannot. This is to say that definition of 'open texture' such as persons are always corrigible or amendable. 'Open texture' then is something like the possibility of vagueness.

'Open texture', Flew argues, is a very fundamental characteristic of the concept of person. Flew, therefore, comes to the conclusion that the concept of person defines a definition since it involves 'open texture'.

I agree with Flew's view that the problem of personal identity does not admit of any definitive answer for the following reason. The concept of person is such that the descriptions will be always incomplete and that it is not possible to foresee all the possibilities. Though as a

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5. F. Waismann - 'Verifiability' In Logic and Language . Ed. by A.G.N. Flew, Black Wellmm 1951.

matter of fact, we are able to identify persons, this does not preclude the possibility of being wrong.

Conclusion

So far I have discussed about the concept of self or about self identity. It appears that no philosopher is able to give a correct explanation about self or self identity. Hume is of the view that we do not have any idea of the self since we do not have any impression about the self. Thus to say that there is a perfect identity and simplicity is contrary to the facts of experience because a person consists of impression and ideas only and he says that the notion of identity has the same origin as the plant, vegetable etc., therefore, the notion of personal identity depends on 'the smooth and uninterrupted progress of thought along a chain of ideas.' He holds that identity is determined only by means of memory because memory proves the identity by giving us the notion of causation among different perceptions. Thus, the notion of identity is an illusion.

Strawson is of the view that Hume's theory cannot be accepted because there cannot be any principle of unity without any principle of difference and Hume tried to look for the principle of unity in the pure consciousness and



he says that, that is the only reason why Hume fails. But though they differ on this point yet both of them regard that there is no dualism between mind and body and therefore, they reject the soul substance theory.

Prof Hampshire maintains that the concept of human action provides the key to the problem of personal identity, and Hampshire like Strawson believes that the idea that there being persons, who are not at any time embodied is not intelligible. They hold that one can retain one's own identity only in so far as one perceives the memory of one's own embodied existence.

Shoemaker makes an attempt to show that the 'Bundle theory' and the logical construction theory are unintelligible and incoherent. According to the 'Bundle Theory', a person can have self knowledge by constructing the self out of the perceptions which are observable. Russell's view is that the mind of person is nothing but a bundle of thoughts, and he further holds that a person is a 'certain series of experience.' But shoemaker holds that the bundle theory is not correct because nothing can be observed without there being something that observes. Russell's view is also rejected on the ground of saying that 'a person is a certain series of experiences' and there is no

agent or subject is unintelligible and incoherent. And I think that shoemaker is right here. But shoemaker mistakes when he asserts that first person psychological statements which are completely based on memory are not judgements of personal identity at all. When we consider the position of Bernard Williams I find that he rightly asserts that though identity of body is a necessary condition of personal identity yet it is not a sufficient condition of personal identity. He points out that, at least in some cases, memory can be regarded as a criterion of personal identity (article-personal identity and individuation).

CHAPTER - V

SYNTHETIC APRIORI

Kant's philosophy can be best understood if we take into account the historical background against which his system comes into existence. Kant's philosophy may be said to be an evolution of the two lines of the contending thinkers i.e. the empiricist and rationalist. At first Kant accepted the rationalistic position that knowledge is possible only by means of reasoning but later on, he is very much influenced by Hume's empiricism i.e. knowledge is possible only by means of experience. Thus, he was awakened from his dogmatic slumber by the writings of Hume and he could agree neither with extreme rationalist nor with extreme empiricist but set himself to find out the truth involved in both.

The fundamental problem which troubles Kant is the problem of knowledge. Kant wants to answer the following questions: What is knowledge? How is it possible? What are the boundaries of human reason? In order to answer these questions we must examine human reason and subject it to criticism.

After proper examination, Kant comes to the conclusion that knowledge is something which is always in the

form of judgement. But every judgement is not knowledge, in an analytic judgement, the predicate merely elucidates what is already contained in the subject e.g. 'Body is an extended thing.' Here in this statement no new information is given. Hence such kind of judgement does not give us any new knowledge. Thus, in order to get knowledge, the judgement must always be a synthetic i.e. the judgement must surely add something new to the predicate, in order to extend our knowledge and not merely elucidate it, as for example, "All bodies have specific gravity' is a judgement where the predicate gives some new information about the subject. So it gives us knowledge. But Kant says that not all synthetic judgement gives us true knowledge, in the proper sense of the term. There are some synthetic judgements which are derived from experience and these judgements also inform us, for example, 'that object has such and such properties or behaves so and so' is such a judgement, there is lack of necessity. Though it is true that from experience we get knowledge about fact, as for example, 'this flower is white' is a factual judgement and here what we say is just that the flower is white, but we cannot say that the flower must be white because such kind of judgements are lacking universality. Such kind of judgements are aposteriori judgements and his view is that true

knowledge cannot be attained by means of aposteriori judgements. In order to get the proper knowledge in the proper sense of the term, a synthetic judgement should be universal and necessary and as such knowledge must be apriori. So the problem before Kant is how synthetic apriori judgements are possible.

Let me first try to explain what Kant actually means by the term 'apriori' and 'aposteriori.' In the 'Critique of Pure Reason' we find that Kant describes knowledge of these two kinds as follows:

> "Whether there is any knowledge that is thus independent of experience and even of all impressions of the senses. Such knowledge is entitled apriori, and distinguished from the empirical, which has its sources aposteriori, that is, in experience."1

In order to explain this point more clearly I would like to quote one passage from the 'Critique of Pure Reason' which is as follows. Kant says,

> "Experience tells us indeed, what is, but not that it must necessarily be so, and not otherwise. It therefore gives us no true universality; and reason, which is insistent upon this kind of knowledge, is therefore more stimulated

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1. Kant Immanuel 'The Critique of Pure Reason', p.42.

> by it than satisfied. Such universal modes of knowledge; which at the same time possesses the character of inner necessity, must in themselves, independently of experience, be clear and certain. They are therefore entitled knowledge apriori, whereas, on the other hand that which is borrowed solely from experience is, as we say, known only aposteriori, or empirically."2

Kant points out that, there are certain knowledge which are by their very origin apriori, that is if we eliminate our sense experience from those of the other experiences, there still remains certain original concepts, and as a result, the judgements which derive from these original concepts are purely apriori, i.e. independent of all our experiences. These judgements, are true universal and strictly necessary. 'Apriori' knowledge are not derived from experience, but from a universal rule — a rule which is itself, borrowed from experience.

What follows from the above consideration is that an apriori knowledge is one which is not independent of this or that experience, but which is independent of all kinds of experiences. On the other hand, an empirical knowledge or an aposteriori knowledge is one which is attainable only by means of experience. Kant says that necessity and strict universality are sure criteria of apriori knowledge. If the

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2. Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason', p. 42.

judgement 'All F's and G's' is apriori, then experience cannot falsify it by yielding even a single F which is not C. Whereas if the judgement 'All F's are G's' is not apriori, it can be falsified by experience.

Thus 'analytic judgements are all apriori.' If we say 'All bodies are extended' is analytic; then we can say that "There cannot be a body which is not extended', and this judgement appears to us as necessarily true so apriori and hence analytic. Whereas on the other hand, the judgements attained by means of experience are all synthetic because these judgements are attained through aposteriori knowledge. Therefore,'all judgements which are synthetic are aposteriori.' The distinction which Kant makes between analytic and synthetic judgement can be summarized as follows:

When the relation between subject and predicate is made in a judgement, in such cases, there are two kinds of relation which can be expressed as follows:

1) The predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is (covertly) contained in this concept A;

2) Or B lies outside the concept A, although it does indeed stand in connection with it.

According to Kant, the first argument can be regarded as analytic while the second as synthetic. An analytic judgement is one where the connection between the subject and predicate is thought through identity. Whereas those judgements which are thought without identity are synthetic judgements. The former judgement does not give any new information about the subject but is merely breaking up or analysing those constituent concepts that we have all along been thought of it, whereas in the case of synthetic judgements, the judgement adds to the concept of the subject a predicate which has not been in any way wise thought in it, and where no analysis is possible. Thus analytic judgements can be regarded as explicative judgements whereas synthetic judgements can be regarded as implicative judgements. Kant says,

> "If I say, for instance, 'All bodies are extended,' this is an analytic judgement. For I do not require to go beyond the concept which I connect with 'body' in order to find extension as bound up with it. To meet with this predicate, I have merely to analyse this concept, that is, to become conscious to myself of the manifold which I always think in that concept. The judgement is therefore analytic. But when I say, 'All bodies are heavy', the predicate is something quite different from anything that I think in the mere concept of body in general; and the addition of such a predicate therefore yields a synthetic judgement."[3]

3. Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason.' p. 48.

According to Kant, every analytic judgement is either necessarily true or necessarily false, and we establish the truth or falsity of an analytic judgement by reference only to definition of the terms it claims and by the principle of contradiction. In a synthetic judgement on the other hand, the connection between the subject and predicate term is 'thought without identity' i.e. in the case of every day judgement of facts, we need to consult experience to see whether the connection asserted actually holds.

Kant is of the view that pure thoughts, as they depend entirely on the principles of identity and contradiction, are only 'analytic' judgements, the purpose of which is only to clarify and analyze those concepts we already possess which do not give any new information or fresh knowledge.

Kant wants to make a synthesis between these two kinds of ideas (i.e. synthetic and apriori). His view is that it is possible for some judgements to be synthetic as well as apriori at the same time because there are judgements which are quite independent of our experience and adds also to our knowledge.

Kant says that a synthetic apriori judgement helps the expansion of our knowledge about things and objects of

this world and, that it claims to embody the knowledge a necessity, and the predicate in it is not a mere totality of what has been stated already in the subject, and also in making a judgement as such that our human understanding asserts to claim its universal validity and necessity.

In Transcendental Exposition, Kant tries to prove one part of his main programme that is, how synthetic apriori judgement is possible. Here, he is trying to prove the possibility of synthetic judgement; in mathematics.

Kant says that mathematical propositions and fundamental principles of physics undoubtedly embody such judgements which are both synthetic and apriori. A mathematical judgement like 7 + 5 = 12, is both synthetic and apriori. Though the number 12 is quite different from the other two numbers 7 and 5, yet the relation of equality between the sum of 7 and 5 on the one side and 12 on the other side is acceptable to us as absolutely necessary and universal. Similarly, some fundamental principles of physics, such as 'every event must have a cause', 'all things act and react upon each other', 'a substance underlying phenomena remains always constant in spite of various changes in and out.' These judgements are both synthetic and apriori. They are synthetic in the sense that they add much to our knowledge,

but still they remain quite independent of our experiences in life. This knowledge is something in born in us, and does not require any of our experiences.

Such a view of Kant has been rejected by some of the empiricists as impossible. According to Hume, admitting a judgement to be strictly universal and necessary is nothing but an indirect way of describing it as tautology, but it is not actually a correct view. If the sum of the two numbers would have been the same as the third number than the mere presence of the two numbers could have immediately pointed out three numbers and there should not have been any need of synthesis or serving up. In order to arrive at the third number we must have to add the third number, and for that addition we always take the help of successive out of intuition.

Again as to the nature and principles admitted in physics, the great empiricists hold that they are synthetic no doubt, but not necessary or certain. Such a comment of Hume cannot be accepted by us. The actual existence of physics as a science, and also its study and mathematical progress throughout the ages, unmistakably points to their validity and necessary truth. If we accept Hume's position then the whole structure of physics as a science will surely

break down. In the same way, though there may be differences of opinion among metaphysicians with regard to their assertion of God, Soul etc., yet metaphysics as a genuine intellectual enterprise can in no way be doubted or neglected. Thus, synthetic apriori judgements are quite possible because we have apriori syntehtic mind. There are certain universal notions or forms inherent always in our mind. Whatever sensations are at first admitted into our mind they all fall under certain universal and necessary laws because our mind in the process of consciousness have necessity to give them certain forms, to unite them into certain ways by reason of its apriori modes of synthesis. Kant also admits this fact. Thus the main purpose of the 'Critique of Pure Reason' has been to find out this apriori form of synthesis judgements and to study their nature.

By considering the above position, it appears that Kantian method can be called as one kind of intuitionism because he points out that the knowledge about synthetic apriori judgement is not possible only by means of perception, one has to adopt this kind of thinking in his mind. Thus intuition can be regarded as a necessary condition of attaining synthetic apriori knowledge. Kantian method can be regarded as a kind of intuitions because he is of the

view that intuition can be regarded as a necessary condition of attaining synthetic apriori judgements. Kant asserts that there are apriori as well as synthetic judgements the knowledge of which is not limited to experience only but also transcends experience. Thus in order to have apriori knowledge, the knowledge must be contributed by the mind. Kant comes to the conclusion that the knowledge of everything must be made by us (out of given materials), otherwise we are unable to explain those apriori categories without which knowledge is impossible. Thus subjective awareness is a necessary condition of attaining apriori knowledge. While considering the above view, it appears that for Kant, space and time are sensible and yet apriori means space and time has both the perceptual and conceptual property and those characteristics found in space and time are true of all experience in general and are thus apriori. From this it follows that the principles of geometry are both apriori and synthetic. Synthetic because it is based on something external, sensuous, apriori because space is interpreted in all outer experience and therefore, the object of this experience had to conform to geometry if things are to be experienced at all. The justification of the apriori concept though different has a certain similarity. Kant therefore, says that the reason why we know these

to hold of all appearances is that they are implied in the sensible intuition of time, being deducible from the very notion any possible experience in time. Kant says,

> "A synthetic apriori judgement is valid if and only if there is some third factor which includes and unites its subject and predicate. This third factor which unites its subject and predicate together is experience in time."[4]

According to Kant, there are no pure judgements which do not contain any element of experience. He points out that judgements about formal logic also involves empirical elements because if we do not have experience we cannot follow what is meant by S is P. Thus arithmetic also involves empirical element because 'to try to judge without using anything derived from experience would be like trying to build a house without any bricks or other building materials.'[5] Hence analyses of analytic judgements are also impossible without applying any empirical content. I would like to apply the following example in support of this view.

> "I discover by considering a particular triangle that its angles must be together equal to two right angles, and I see that in making this inference I have included in my premises neither

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4. A.C. Ewing - 'Idealism a Critical Survey', p.72.
5. A.C. Ewing,'Idealism a Critical Survey', p. 72

> the particular size of the angles in this particular figure nor... therefore the inference is valid of all triangles whether perceived or not. This does not rule out the possibility that..., if triangles do exist unperceived, my conclusion must still apply to them. Yet both this triangle and the fact that its angles are equal to two right angles are essentially empirical data."6

The Kantian view that, judgement can be distinguished into two types, namely, analytic and synthetic has given rise to a big controversy, i.e. whether there is really any such distinction between judgements.

There are philosophers such as Quine who are of the opinion that, it is not possible to make such kind of distinction between judgements. He points out that analyticity is a mere dogma and a metaphysical article of faith. Let me consider his arguments by means of which he wants to prove the same.

Quine maintains that modern empiricism has been conditioned by two dogmas. The first one is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, are grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truths which are synthetic are grounded in facts. The other dogma is empiricism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construction upon terms

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6. Ibid., p. 75.

which refer to immediate experience. Quine has taken an attempt to prove that both these dogmas are ill founded.

Quine says that the distinction which Kant makes between analytic and synthetic resembles very much with that of Hume's distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact. Leibniz holds that 'truths of reason are true in all possible cases, i.e., truths of reason are something which cannot possibly be false. Like the same manner Kant defines analytic statements as statements which are necessarily true and the denial of analytic statements are self contradictory by nature.

According to Quine, this formulation of Kant has two shortcomings: the first is that it limits itself to those statements which are of the subject-predicate form, and second, it appeals to a notion of containment which is left at a metaphysical level. Quine says that Kant explains analytic statement in a slightly different way. Kant holds that a statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of meanings and independently of its fact. Quine has taken an attempt to examine the concept of meaning which Kant presupposed.

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7. Willard Van Orman Quine, 'The Two dogmas of empiricism' from the book 'Readings in the Philosophy of Language' by Jayf Rosenberg, p. 63.

According to Quine, meanings are something which are different from references, because meanings cannot be identified with name. But now the question arises what sort of things are meanings? In order to understand this question, Quine seeks to know the nature of analytic statement.

Quine says that analytic statements are of two types. The first kind of statements can be regarded as logically true, as for example,

(1) 'No unmarried man is married'. In this statement we find that the statement is regarded as true in all circumstances and it remains true as long as we understand any and all reinterpretation of 'man' and 'married.'

The second class of analytic statement can be typified as follows.

(2) 'No bachelor is married.'

The peculiarity of such kind of statement is that these statements can be turned into logically true statements by putting synonyms for synonyms. Thus, (2) can be turned into (1) by 'unmarried man' for its synonyms 'bachelor'. But Quine says that we still lack a proper characterization of this second class of analytic statements, and

therewith of analyticity generally, in as much as we have had in the above description to lean on a notion of 'synonymy' which is no less in need of clarification than analyticity itself.

Carnap has made an attempt to explain analyticity by means of what he calls the 'state description.' Carnap says,

'A state description is any exhaustive arrangement of truth values to the atomic, or non-compounded, statements of the language. All other statements of the language are, Carnap assumes, built up of their component classes by means of the familiar logical devices, in such a way that the truth value of any complex statement is fixed for each state description by specifiable logical laws. A statement is then explained as analytic when it comes as true under every state description.'[8]

Quine rejects such a view of Carnap and says that the theory of state descriptions aimed primarily not at the general problem of analyticity but at another purpose, the clarification of probability and induction. He points out, this criterion cannot be applied to analytic statements

8. Carnap (1), pp. 9 ff (2), pp. 70ff.

because by means of this criteria the statement like 'no bachelors are married' will be reduced to synthetic judgements. The criterion in terms of state description is a reconstruction at best of logical truths, not of analyticity. Further the theory of state-description depends on the notion of synonyms.

Quine points out that, the notion of synonym of the linguistic forms consists simply in their inter-changeability in all contexts without change of truth value.

Quine asks the question whether inter-changeability is a strong condition for synonym, or whether some heteronymous expression might be thus inter-changeable. Quine is not here considering the synonym expressions of complete identity but he is concerned here with those expressions which may be called cognitive synonymy. A cognitive synonym is such that by means of this cognitive synonymy any analytic statement can be turned into a logical truth by putting synonym for synonyms. He says that we can express the cognitive synonymy of terms as follows, to say that 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' are cognitively synonymous is to say no more nor less than that the statement.

(3) 'All and only bachelors are unmarried men' is analytic.

Quine again asks the question 'whether such interchangeability is a sufficient condition of cognitive synonymy.' Let me consider the following statement.

(4) 'Necessarily all and only bachelors are bachelors.'

It is a true statement and hence is an analytic statement. Then if 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' are interchangeable, then the following result follows.

(5) 'Necessarily all and only bachelors are unmarried.'

Quine points out that if we accept (5) as a true statement then we have to say that (3) is as true is analytic, and as a result, 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' are cognitively synonymous.

Quine rejects the theory of interchangeability for the following condition.

Interchangeability is meaningless because it cannot be regarded as an assurance of cognitive synonymy of the desired type. That 'bachelor' and 'unmarried men' are interchangeable in an extensional language assures us of

no more than that (3) is true. We can here simply assure that the extensional agreement of 'bachelor's and 'unmarried man' is simply based on the relation of accidental matters of fact. Quine points out that the type of cognitive synonymy required here is such as to quote the synonymy of 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' with the analyticity of (3), not merely with the truth of (3).

He comes to the conclusion that if construed in relation to an extensional language, it is not a sufficient condition of cognitive synonymy to derive analyticity.

Quine says that a cognitive synonymy is one when their bio-conditional is analytic.

Now I want to discuss the second dogma i.e. the theory of reductionalism or the verification theory of meaning.

The verification theory holds that, the meaning of a statement is the method of empirically confirming or informing it. Two statements are synonymous if and only if they are alike in point of method of empirical confimation or infirmation.

Here the question arises, if it is so, then 'what are the methods which are to be compared for likeness?' What is

the nature of the relation between a statement and the experiences which contribute to or detract from its confirmation?

The most naive of the relation is that it is one of direct report. This is radical reductionalism and holds that every meaningful statement is held to be translatable into a statement about immediate experience. Locke and Hume hold that, every idea must either originate directly in sense experience or else be compounded of ideas, thus originating a term to be significant at all, must be either the name of a sense datum or a compound of such names.

Thus it appears that the empiricists are greatly influenced by this theory of reductionalism, which holds that in each synthetic statement, there is associated a unique range of possible sensory events such that the occurrence of any of them would add to the likelihood of truth of the statement, and that there is associated also another unique range of possible sensory events whose occurrence would detract from that likelihood.

Quine points out that the dogma of such kind of reductionalism is that, this theory presupposes that each statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of

confirmation or infirmation at all. He maintains that our statement about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but as a corporate body.

According to Quine, these two dogmas are identical in their very root. The truth of a statement generally depends upon language and upon extra linguistic fact, i.e. the truth of a statement is somehow analyzable into a linguistic component and a factual component. The factual components must boil down to a range of confirmatory experiences. Quine's suggestion is that it is non-sense and the root of such non-sense consists in speaking of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of any individual statement.

The analytic/synthetic distinction runs according to Quine, through the verification theory of meaning. He says that if the verification theory can be accepted as an adequate account of statement synonymy, the notion of analyticity is saved after all.

This position of Quine has been vehemently criticised and rejected by other philosophers like H.P. Grice and P.F. Strawson and they approach Quine's argument directly. They argue that there must necessarily be a genuine distinction grounding the classification.

Let me explain how H.P. Grice and P.F. Strawson reject the views of Quine and wanted to prove that the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgement is possible for the following considerations.

If the question is asked whether the distinction really exist? In answer to that question they point out that, it must be admitted that there is such a distinction. Thus they say,

> "An appeal to philsophical tradition is perhaps unimpressive and is certainly unnecessary. But it is worth pointing out that Quine's objection is not simply to the words "analytic" and "synthetic", but to a distinction which they are supposed to express, and which at different times philosophers have supposed themselves to be expressing by means of such pairs of words or phrases as "necessary" and "contingent", "apriori" and "empirical", "truth of reason" and "truth of fact"; so Quine is certainly at odds with a philosophical tradition which is long and not wholly disreputable. But there is no need to appeal only to tradition; for there is also present practice. We can appeal, that is, to the fact that those who use the terms "analytic" and "synthetic" do to a very considerable extent agree in the applications they make of them. They apply the term "analytic" to more or less the same cases, ...This agreement extends not only to cases which they have been <u>taught</u> so to characterize, but to new cases. In short, "analytic" and "synthetic" have a more or less established philosophical use; and this seems to suggest that it is absurd, even senseless, to say that there is no such distinction. For in general, if a pair of contrasting expressions

> are habitually and generally used in application to the same cases; where there cases do not form a closed list, this is a sufficient condition for saying that there are kinds of cases to which the expressions apply; and nothing more is needed for them to make a distinction."9

Grice and Strawson point out that the supposition which exists in favour of this distinction of analytic and synthetic are mainly based on philosophical usages. According to them, if we are to accept Quine's account of the matter, the presumption in question cannot be based on well foundation. They further point out that the confusion about this distinction arises simply because the clarification about the distinction is not clear at all to us.

Quine points out that the most trouble arises by the term 'analytic', yet the trouble can be removed if we replace 'analytic' by the term 'true'. But Grice and Strawson point out that it is not the case, but the trouble arises because the boundaries of words are not determined by usage in all possible directions, and as a result the example supplied by Quine is not applicable because we are not troubled only by the term 'analytic' but also by the term 'synthetic'. They point out that this kind of trouble

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9. H.P. Grice and P.F. Strawson in the article 'In defence of a dogma', p. 83, from the book 'Readings in the Philosophy of Language' by Jayf Rosenberg.

does not naturally create any obscurity in order to make a distinction between analytic and synthetic.

Putnam is also of the view that the rejection which Quine made regarding the distinction between analytic and synthetic is not correct.

> "I do not understand 'he writes' what it would mean to say that a distinction between two things that different does not exist."10

Finally, in Kant the technical machinery of transformational linguistics is used to develop precise definition of 'analytic', 'synthetic', as adjuncts of a general semantic theory, extended among other things, to satisfy Quine's critical demand.

Conclusion

Immanuel Kant is one of the greatest philosopher. He tries to synthesize empiricism with rationalism. He agrees with the empiricist that knowledge begins with experience. But he does not agree with the empiricists' contention that knowledge arises out of experience. According to him there are three fundamental faculties of the mind, namely, sense, imagination and understanding. He is of the view

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10. Readings in the philosophy of language edited by Jayf Rosenberg/Charles Travis, p.14.

that knowledge is possible due to the combination of those three faculties. He believes that there are three kinds of judgements namely, synthetic, apriori, and synthetic apriori. I have discussed the problem of synthetic apriori in this chapter. It is no exaggeration to say that Kant's monumental work 'Critique of pure reason' stands or falls with the possibility of synthetic apriori. These judgements are synthetic, because they extend knowledge, and they are at the same time apriori because they are necessary.

I have highlighted the problem of synthetic apriori in this chapter. Quine in his article, 'The two dogmas of empiricism' forcefully argues that there is no distinction between synthetic and apriori propositions because he holds that the notion of analyticity cannot be explained by means of synonymy and by means of necessity. He points out that analyticity is a mere dogma and a metaphysical article of faith.

P.F. Strawson and H.P. Grice in their article, 'In defence of a dogma' argued that there is a valid distinction between synthetic and apriori propositions and they hold that this distinction is based on philosophical usages. They point out that the confusion about this distinction arises simply because the clarification about this distinction is not made clear.

I agree with Strawson and Grice that there is a valid distinction between synthetic and apriori propositions. Only when there is a distinction between these two sorts of propositions would be meaningful to discuss the possibility of synthetic apriori propositions. I have not discussed the problem of synthetic apriori propositions. I have not discussed the problem of synthetic apriori as such since I think that it is outside the scope of my dissertation.

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

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