

SOME PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE STUDY OF FREUD

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
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This is to certify that Mr. Charles Pothan Alexander has worked under my supervision for his M. Phil Dissertation entitled "Some Philosophical Problems in the Study of Freud", and that no part of it has been submitted elsewhere for any degree.

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MY

GRAND PARENTS AND PARENTS

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CHAPTER - I

SOME PROBLEMS IN FREUDIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS :
A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION.

As the great nineteenth-century medical schools arose a systematic and genuine knowledge of histology, embryology, pathology, immunology and the art of prevention came about. Studies, then were based on principles of newly established sciences such as physics, chemistry and biology, etc. However, mental disorders were refractory to treatment. Different methods such as helio therapy, hydro therapy, mud bath, and many other types of physical therapies were being administered on the 'nervous sufferers'. Although, Freud agreed to these therapies as a physician, he was more on the side of cures by suggestion; if at all there is any cure. But, he did not completely stop with the idea of hypnotic suggestions; he rather moved further with an un-hypnotic associative model for catharsis. Thus, his therapy came to be known as psychoanalysis, which emphasised on the value of 'verbal outpouring' from the patient for the purpose of catharsis. This was originally referred to by Freud and Breuer as 'chimney sweeping'.

Freud has been, indeed, subject of enormous amount of research by psychologists, philosophers, theologians, social and political thinkers. This shows the great fertility and fascination of Freudian thinking. There is no doubt at all that Freud is one of the great masters of modern thought. In my study I've picked up a few problems which arise in

connection with Freudian theory generally and try to show their implications.

One of such problems, which has been the subject of some debate, is that of the scientific status of Freudian psychoanalysis. The precise reason behind this could be that Freud himself was convinced that physics and chemistry had (the answers to the questions of the life sciences. There had been attempts, on the one hand to reduce Freudian theory into behaviourism, so that his theory can be given a proper scientific clothing, while on the other hand, Freud has been regarded as a foundational thinker in the development of a science of man which is radically different from science in natural science sense of the term. This issue has been debated over and again by thinkers like K. Popper, Cioffi, Wittgenstein and others. I've tried to show, how some of these issues are based on the misconception of Freudian theory. Yet another important aspect of dispute over his theory is that of the causal explanatory capacity of psychoanalysis. I've pointed out from the evidence of his works that he was not considering a causal relation, that he talked of the relationship to be of the sort: given X strictly Y; rather he was proposing an emanation theory of causation. Although, he duplicated the procedures of physical sciences - specially the law of thermo-dynamics and principle of energy

conservation - he was strictly against any kind of endeavour to verify his theory experimentally. He neither considered causal explanation in psychoanalysis to be better and complete than that of chemistry, specially bio-chemistry, nor advocated a complete cure or catarsis. But, all what he thought was possible through psychoanalysis is to make the 'uncommon unhappiness' a 'common unhappiness'. What Freud meant by science or scientific was being in touch with reality. He was scientific in his formulation of theory not because he followed the strict methods of science in its natural science sense. But, his enterprise was a systematic study of human psychic and related phenomena around, with his own methods without any strict guards. This, however, does not make him unscientific nor unreliable in the same sense as an astronomer cannot experiment; the geneticist can predict only probabilities; an atomic physicist need to postulate entities that cannot be observed, would make them neither unreliable nor exclude them from the realm of science, because they have different methods and focus of interests.

In my chapter on Freud's concept of morality I've tried to show how morality as we traditionally understood it faces a most radical difference in the hands of Freud. Here Freud, is more or less like Nietasche with a thin line

of difference. According to Nietzsche the will to power is the source of what is and of what ought to be. Morality is the construction of the weaker herd who are unable to affirm life, and they accordingly construct a morality that will enable them to evade it and yet give a wherewithal to gain power. In doing this they sanctify their weakness by preaching virtues of pity, love of neighbour and so on. They then class power of passion, selfishness, etc. as evil. But, they suffer in the hands of the strong who practice them. In this kind of morality there is a kind of indirect satisfaction of will to power, because, he who cannot raise himself to the level of those above him can at any rate pull them down to his own in the name of morality. Although, will to power is alien to Freudian framework, Nietzsche's concept of herd morality tallies to some extent with Freud's concept of origin of religion in his 'Totem and taboo'. Morality to Freud is skin-deep as far as biological man is concerned. This fact can be observed from the war behaviour of man. Man, basically, has two instincts - eros and thanatos. But, these instincts themselves are value free. But, by the origin of society to protect oneself and the dependants from the dominant powers of nature as well as his own counter-parts, each individual was forced to repress and keep aside his instincts in order to have a well ordered peaceful life. There then came up a society, (collection of the weaker), of civilized

and cultured man with moral and legal codes; here it would be appropriate to understand the Freudian concept like that of Plato's concept in Gorgias that the original state of affairs consisted of the domination by whoever had the greater might, but as the time passed things were changed and right became the might of majority. However, instincts are being transcribed into offsprings biologically, although as a social animal he is forced to denounce them. Morality or conscience in Freud's structure of mind is like a punishment and it is carried out due to the fear of punishment of one's super-ego on ego. But Freud was not talking of a completely determined and unfree man. His idea was that man is free and delicate, allowing himself to be influenced by circumstances. He was in fact talking of a 'Freedom for' to achieve a 'freedom from'. 'Freedom for', here, stands for self-mastery, with self-awareness, over the repression and unconscious. Because, it is the self-awareness of all that one is, and happened or happens to one, that frees man from the clasp of the bondage of the burden of repressed wishes. In Nietzsche we see a transvaluation of values; what has been condemned for centuries is now applauded. He was of the opinion that man must begin by the acceptance of a rule imposed on him from without. This will lead him to become free and reach the stage at which he can defy with his "I will", the dragon

that confronts him with "Thou Shalt". Then, comes the final stage with a naturalness and spontaneity, to accept and live out one's life in simplicity and directness. However, in Freud, there is no suggestion that restraints must be thrown away. His main concern was to help the individual to have a healthy social life, because man is a social being and he cannot just escape the moral precepts. There is no chance of defying the 'Thou shalt', with his "I will", because, once the child grows up to an adult, he, often is not at war with the external 'thou shalt', but the internalised 'thou shalt'. It is this factor that determines the whether or not possibility for one to live one's life with simplicity, without guilt of 'should be undone' deeds, and life in a natural way in harmony with people around him. Hence, Freud believed that it is only the scientific knowledge, knowledge of reality, that can save men from their troubles, not eschathological hope.

Another problem in Freud, which I think has great significance is one of his concept of dream. Freud calls dream as "the royal road to the unconscious". Dreams are usually considered to be symbolic. Freud contended that some symbols are universal. There are different theories of dreams, such as cipher-method and various others. Freud was not prepared to support any sort of prognosticatory or prophetic theory of dream, as Indian Philosophers and Jung did, although he to some extent supported telepathic dreams. He has a

profound understanding of the unconscious. He considered unconscious neither as a second mind nor as a container, but as a continuity that fills the gap between the 'thought and memory'. Thus, the unconscious is that which is all that is unconscious at present. He, however, did not attribute to any symbol any fixed meaning, because each individual's latent content has different symbolic representation. But, in Freudian account, as mentioned earlier, there is no scope for prediction of what sort of a dream one is likely to experience, even if given all the latent content. Freud, was a neurologist, and he perhaps, was engaged in a kind of speculative neurology, fragments of which are, today, being concretely proved by Penfield and others. Nonetheless, his understanding of Dreams, in particular and theory in general, might tempt one to ask if Freud's understanding of human mind similar to that of the understanding of computer intelligence in artificial intelligence, in so far as taking decisions (regretful or otherwise) = (output) to the stimulus, motives or latent wishes = (input) are concerned, much like that of a pre-programmed machine. But, I've shown in the chapter on Freud's interpretation of Dreams that, that is not possible, because man's decisions, mostly are based on practical reasoning, as a member of a society. Although, there is no problem in understanding human being mechanically to some extent,

we cannot deny that he is a social and self-conscious individual, with lot of individual differences. Therefore, a purely mechanical model of 'man' cannot be constructed because as I've stated in my concluding chapter, all through history only one fact remained constant about 'Man' is that he is a multi-natured being. Freud indeed revealed some of such natures i.e. the repressive or self-deceptive capacity of man, and individual potentiality of self-knowledge. Perhaps, still more and more of such facts are added to the account of man day-by-day by some insightful minds.

CHAPTER - II

SCIENTIFIC STATUS OF FREUDIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS.

I

As late as 1900 the term Science referred essentially to the techniques, findings and theories in natural sciences - Physics, Chemistry, etc. Today there is more emphasis upon the procedures that are used in acquisition of knowledge than upon the field of study. Science is considered to be the observation and classification of facts using verifiable and objective methods. In addition, the gathered facts are interpreted; science is concerned with explanation. The data are considered in terms of their relationship - causal or otherwise - to one another. The adjective 'Scientific' does not indicate that a conclusion is true in itself but rather that certain methods have been followed in the study of phenomena with the aim of understanding the conditions under which they occur.

The chief characteristics of science might be described as empiricism - attempting at evidences through direct experience; evidence through observation rather than depending upon any authority (revealed or otherwise). The ultimate aim of scientists is to increase understanding, and to better the existential conditions of man. Among the diverse factors that have encouraged and sustained scientific enquiry through its long history are two pervasive human concerns which provide

the basic motivation for all scientific enquiry. One of these is man's persistent desire to improve his strategic position in the world by means of dependable methods for predicting, and whenever possible, controlling the events that occur in it. Besides this practical concern, there is a second basic motivation for the scientific quest, namely man's insatiable intellectual curiosity, his deep concern to know the world he lives in and to explain and understand the flow of phenomena it presents to him. Surely, what subject is more fascinating to him than the study of himself¹ ?.

"Science seeks to discover and formulate in general terms the conditions under which events occur", writes Ernest Nagel. It is convenient to divide science into branches, which are differentiated by their methods and focus of interests. These branches may encounter different problems; an astronomer cannot experiment; the geneticist can predict only probabilities; the atomic physicist must postulate entities that can not be observed; a political scientist may have to explain his own motives in explaining other people's actions; the sociologist finds that his prediction may be unwittingly altering the phenomena he is investigating. But none of these peculiarities make astronomy, genetics, atomic physics, political science, or sociology neither

in herently unreliable nor exclude them from the realm of science. Science is a social, self-corrective and entirely a human enterprise. The objectives of sciences are to describe, explain, understand, investigate, predict and control, which are also characteristically human goals. The ideals of science are reliability, definiteness, precision, objectivity or inter-subjectivity, testability, comprehensiveness, universality and systematic coherence². The functions of a scientific theory may then be variously stated as to inform, predict, control, summarize the data economically etc.

According to Whitehead, Science tries to "see what is general in what is particular". This may hold true of psychology too, of which psychoanalysis is a reputed theory of human behaviour (abnormal) or mental acts. Psychology is as old as civilization. From behaviourism or Gestalt Psychology to Psychoanalysis or the objective measurement of character the eye wonders over an interminable range of experiments, measurements, hypothesis and dogmas, disconnected facts and systematic theories. Since Descartes and Hobbes have woven together the psychology of antiquity and the physical sciences of the renaissance, a multitude of social forces as well as strokes of individual genius have shown unites of method and


conception underlying all the problem of psychology and indeed of life itself. Here it should be noted that, if experimental psychology sprang from the conception of a fundamental unity of psychology and physiology; behaviourism from an attempt to make that unity more complete, then psychoanalysis as an instance of the fundamental unity of normal and abnormal and of conscious and unconscious motives.³

However, if psychology, like other fast moving current trends proceeds in the direction of an autonomous science, (in the sense Chemistry became a science in nineteenth century and physiology and embryology in late nineteenth and early twentieth century), Psychology breathes their spirit; exchanging ideas and methods with them. When one is interested in studying human abilities or capacities, he can consider the physiological nature of the responding organism. He can examine the neural mechanisms, the senses, the musculature and other aspects of the organism's biological nature which play a fundamental role in (human) experience. The interdependence of physical structure and behaviour is accepted by most psychologists, although the details of many of these relationships remain unknown. In this sense, psychology is a biological science. Psychological observations of any

type are focused on living organisms, and each of the biological science is concerned with some special aspects of living things. But the distinguishing factor of psychology is that it focuses on the behaviour and adjustment of organisms to the world around. Perhaps, it would be natural here, as in other inquiries, to raise the question whether all matters of human nature and society can, in principle, be dealt with by the same procedures or methods in science by social sciences. The possible existence of free will which does not enter into natural sciences, may well seem to make a fundamental difference between the two. That guides one to ask whether or not social science, one among them is psychology, is science at all ? If in social sciences we consider people and their rapid exercise of free will, we don't know what they will do next as individuals, nor do we know how a group of people would act at any given time. Hence, there can be no orderliness and so a restricted science ?

Modern natural science does not, since the turn of the century, presuppose determinism any longer. There is a certain play of freedom, there is a randomness underneath the phenomena, that was not to be supposed to be present, yet one do infact, get regularity of laws. There is an unpredictability in the behaviour of sub-atomic particles; there is a

randomness in the breakdown of radium atoms; there is a peculiarity in the impossibility of measuring precisely the position and movement of fundamental particles. Yet none of these disturbs the possibility of having regular laws. If this is so, freedom of will need not prevent the social sciences from being scientific and presenting some sort of orderly picture either. It has long been known that insurance companies can give one very accurate information, say about how many people are going to die at the age of 41. Now, nobody knows, before hand, whether John Smith is going to die at the age of 41, but an insurance company can tell in the mass what portion of people are going to die; for here all those subtle individual differences are swamped statistically by the large numbers, exactly as in the natural sciences. So, one, in social sciences, can easily get regularities even though he does not know all the details about the fundamental units, exactly as in natural sciences; and therefore, the appearance of free will does not stop it from becoming social 'science'.⁴ Man is a social as well as biological organism. Social interaction is one of his most obvious traits. His behaviour is modified through social interactions and partly, in turn, he influences in modifying the behaviour of others. It is widely maintained that while studying society or an individual, people who study them, after the manner of



natural scientists', ipso-facto place themselves outside the group or the context of the person being studied. But, it is contended that social sciences cannot be done, in principle, this way because an unreality is introduced by placing the observer outside, when in fact he is one among the people or organisms he is studying. That is, he here tries to make an abstraction of himself and the society or the person being studied. Actually, what it means is nothing other than the idea that the observer will have to split himself into two, being, on the one hand, observer outside that which he observes - society or individual - while on the other hand living in the society as a member of it, possessing an individuality, a set of mental traits, etc. as the other. This could be seen to its further extent in the case of a psychoanalyst, who has to remain outside his patient, while, at the same time recognize that he shares (at least potentially) the same stress and conflict as the other do. Now, from the preceding paragraphs it is clear that psychology is both a social as well as a biological science.

The unity of science is one of the great pivotal ideas of our times. There are still dozen or a hundred

sciences, each with its own modalities, methodologies and conceptualizations, its own established methods of observations and treatment and interpretation of data - such a science is psychology which stays apart as a separate science since near the end of last century. Kudos to Wilhelm Wundt, who, earlier had been known as psychologist and philosopher, could group the intricacies of conscious experience which he considered as synonymous with the mind, that could be measured, and the data from the testimony of experience that could be analysed in laboratory. Till a few decades ago, it was believed on the basis of studies of psychophysics, psychophysiology and other aspects of theories of learning which were precisely mathematical, that the aim of making psychology a science was possible only in those aspects of psychology which were closest to physics. But this is proved false. The severity of criteria for research design, the elaborateness of controls, the care given to the null hypothesis, the attempts to define how far a conclusion may be generalized and where the generalization must cease on the basis of a specific piece of research work all these apply to all psychology; abnormal to social psychology to developmental psychology to neurophysiology and to the learning process. Hence, it is sure from this that not a portion of

psychology is moving in the direction of standardization of concepts and methods to make itself a part of today's general science⁵. What, then, are those methods and concepts that can be called scientific and adopted by psychologists adequately to make it a scientific enterprise ? Here one is left blank, for due to many different areas of scientific study and continuing tasks of science to develop improved research techniques, the scientific method cannot be specified, although one often hears that it consists of observation, development and testing of hypothesis and verification, there are many variations to this procedure depending on what the scientist study and what approach he uses.

Therefore, having stated that psychology is both a social and a biological science, in so far as it takes into account the organic constitution of individual and social impact on the individual diversely or collectively and their influence on the society, the question still remain whether the methods of social sciences same as those of the natural sciences. This, in other words is to ask, will it be possible for us to predict, generalise, quantify or measure phenomena in social sciences like that is done in natural sciences. It comes up as a problem because of the large number of phenomenological derivatives that abound, whether rightly or

wrongly, consistently or inconsistently, insist that they should 'go it alone' and have no truck with the methods of natural sciences. A few phenomenologists would refuse to accept the role of science in the area of studies pertaining to society, social behaviour in perplexities and so on. What they are more concerned with is the inadequacy of classical scientific methods used in connection with phenomena that they are empirically interested in. Hence, for them the behaviour of people in a village is to be understood not in terms of rites de passage but in terms of the encounter between an adolescent and an adult and the encounter between an adolescent young man and an adolescent young girl. (But the question may legitimately be asked whether these encounters do not raise scientific questions about such customs as rites de passage). But as a metascientific word of caution here it should be mentioned that if a new method of 'going it alone' can be invented or found satisfying, (some non-subjective criterion of reliability), that would be a tremendous achievement and advance. The question that, however, arises here is whether such a method is possible. Such a method is claimed by phenomenologists, but there is a doubt as to whether it leads to uniform results and offer reasonable reliability. But, if no 'go it alone' method is as yet satisfactory, there is little

alternative but to rely upon the classical methods of science. It should, then, be noted here, that the phenomenological approach is weak from both the side of sociology as well as that of science, because even though it may claim that in principle explanatory social theories are possible, this approach is weak unless some such theories can be found or invented. The academic social sciences have produced none at all outside the field of economics. The only candidates there seems to come from outside the field of academic social science are Freud and Marx, and most commentators brought up in the field of natural science tend to deny that these theories are scientific at all.⁶

Nevertheless, if one takes a step back into history one would see that almost all important on-going movements in psychology were through those important ideas from other science(s) or from a domain of experience which is not a science at all. Fisher's conception of the measurement of co-working and interacting components in plant growth fit so perfectly into the development of experimental psychology, so was Kohler's idea of physical forms, derived from physics, had an impact on development of form theory in psychology.

Same was true of Freud too. His observations and ideas ran through many formulations; many of them found a place in the on-going psychological system. There has been a controversy since Freud's establishment of psychoanalytic school, over the scientific status of his work, due to his theoretical considerations. As a doctor, Freud studied the fashionable subjects of his day - physiology and anatomy - but was not much interested in practicing. Rather his interests were theoretical. They received a fillip when, after graduating he started as a neurophysiologist. His constant encounters with the patients of behaviour pathology in clinics provided him with considerable amount of informations about psychic conditions, which he ingeniously employed in the formulation of his several related theories of psychoanalysis. This, however, does not pursue us to conclude that Freud, only, used his soaring imaginations and was purely speculative in the constitution of his psychoanalytic theories. His thoughts were influenced and modified, not only by Charcot and Breuer - hypnosis masters - but also by then existent mode of scientific outlook. In his time laws of thermodynamics specially energy conservation and entropy, were applied from physics to physiology and to anatomy confidently. The latter two disciplines were studied as the great liberating sciences of medicine. The application of the scientific principles to an intellectual enterprise, were gradually extended from the material to the mental world. It came to be viewed that

there was nothing supernatural about matter or mind or their conjoint reaction. The combined activity of matter and force was said to be sufficient and necessary to explain adequately everything material and even mental. Now, after a considerable modification of these scientific principles, he established his concepts in psychoanalysis. He concluded that human psychic process can be explained in terms of the inter-play of forces those are purely physical and mechanical. The law of thermodynamics guided him into formulating his psychic law of libido or psychic energy and the unconscious⁷. Surely, Freud was scientific in work since he rely on the procedures, because explicit operation is one of the characteristics of scientific inquiry. This means that a scientific inquiry is characterized by procedures which are described so completely and in such detail that other investigators (from any field whatsoever) may duplicate them. So did Freud exactly the same.

II

There have been numerous criticisms built about psychoanalytic project as a whole, most of which are with empirical attacks claiming the unscientific status of psychoanalysis. Their basic claim is that its theories rely on no legitimate base of observation or experiment and have only a status of speculation. Hans Eysenck has been one of such to point out, being a behaviourist, that the veracity of psychoanalysis is testable through traditional empirical means and that in all the areas where such tests have been made, psychoanalysis proved failure; as he writes:

"we are left with nothing but imaginary interpretation of pseudo events, therapeutic failures, illogical and inconsistent theories unacknowledged borrowings from predecessors, enormous 'insights' of no proven value, and a dictatorial and intolerant group of followers insistent not on truth but on propaganda."⁸

But, Freud aimed at constructing a new 'science', fusing biology and psychology - the body and the word - and even at creating a scientific world view, which could only be a saviour of mankind from their terrifying situations.

What 'science' meant for him was the distinction between the insights of philosophers and mystics on the one hand and on the other hand the careful, uncompromising and impartial attempt to uncover the governing rules of the mind. He therefore wrote:

"Scientific thinking does not differ in its nature from the normal activity of thought, which all of us ... employ in looking after our affairs in ordinary life; it takes an interest in things even if they have no immediate, tangible use; it is concerned carefully to avoid individual factors and affective influences; it examines more strictly the trustworthiness of the same - perception on which it bases its conclusion; it provides itself with new perceptions which cannot be obtained by everyday means and it isolates the determinants of these new experiences in experiments which are deliberately varied. Its endeavour is to arrive at correspondence with reality - that is to say, with what exists outside us and independently of us, is decisive for the fulfilment or disappointment of our wishes. This corresponds

with the real external world we call "Truth".
It remains the aim of scientific work even if
we leave the practical value of that work out
of account."⁹

The basis of Freudian psychoanalytic theories were the observed facts, collected under controlled conditions - on the couch. Whatever Freud did, he was clear in his mind not to be confused with poetry or philosophy. Even when his ideas were at their most uncertain Freud still felt them to be scientific in essence. There are, albeit, critics like Farrell, Wittgenstein, Popper, Cioffi, etc. who evaluate psychoanalysis to point out one or other inadequacy of psychoanalysis in acquiring its scientific status. Their evaluations were on the assumption that a scientific theory must be a successful outcome of empirical tests or empirical model. Farrell, for instance, held, strongly, psychoanalysis as a 'premature' theory although not necessarily a wrong one; as he writes.

"The impact of psychoanalysis on the west cannot be justified on the ground that it contain a body of reasonably secure or established knowledge about human nature".¹⁰

However, to come a step further, Popper denies scientific status to psychoanalysis for its unfalsificability.

Although Freud himself always claimed that the treatment setting is the arena per excellence for psychoanalytic research, (experimental tests being essentially superfluous), Eysenck asserted that Freudian theory is experimentally testable, but he denied that well designed clinical tests are falsifiable. The notion of actual testability of the theory has been repeatedly denied by Karl Popper, by even rejecting the logical possibility of empirical testability of psychoanalytic theory. Popper (1974) in his 'Replies to my critics' reiterates his earlier claim on Freudian theory as 'simply non-testable and irrefutable', because there is no conceivable human behaviour which would contradict them. Popper emphasised that:

"Psychoanalysis was immune (to falsification by any logically possible empirical findings) to start with, and remained so"¹¹.

Popper's attempt was, as seen in his 'Logic of Scientific Discovery' to develop criteria for demarcating science from metaphysics, as that of Cioffi's was to distinguish sciences which are genuinely empirical from pseudo-sciences. When Popper claims that falsifiability criterion excludes psychoanalysis from the pantheon of the bonafide empirical sciences,

his principle concern is not with psychoanalysis as such. In his 'Conjectures and Refutations' Psychoanalysis plays a role as a method of scientific theory or as criterion of demarcation between science and non-science. Here inductivism accept the claims of abundant empirical confirmations made by Freud's theory. Popper would have been convinced of unfalsifiability of psychoanalysis because he thought it always confirm to inductivism. And, having found, in 1919, that inductivism still held sway as a criterion of demarcation, Popper concluded;

"Thus there clearly was a need for a different criterion of demarcation".¹²

So having rejected inductivism, he established his own theory of falsifiability and psychoanalysis has been Popper's prime victim for his illustration of the superiority of his falsifiability criterion. Popper's concern was to contrast the scientific status of modern physics with the non-scientific character of psychoanalysis. He does so by claiming that the former is empirically falsifiable whereas the latter is not. Popper's conviction of non-scientific status of Freudian theory is amply evident from his writings immediately after predicting the falsifiability of Newtonian physics; he writes:

"And this is the heart of the matter, for my criticism of Freud's theory was that it simply does not have potential falsifiers".¹³

Therefore, Popper's charge against psychoanalysis is that, since it cannot be falsified, it is not scientific. In the same manner, although with a little variation, Cioffi, in his "Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences", exposed unscientific status of psychoanalysis, in natural 'science' sense of the term. Cioffi distinguishes between formally defective theses and methodologically defective procedures, and claims that his notion of a pseudo-science is pragmatic (procedural) rather than syntactic (referring to the logical relations between the theses). This can be pointed out as somewhat similar to what Popper has said,

"it might indeed be said that the majority of the problems of theoretical philosophy... Can be interpreted... as problems of method."¹⁴

Cioffi claims that for a theory to be scientific it must not only be such that a state of affairs which disconfirms it be logically possible, but must also be calculated to discover

whether such (disconfirming) states of affairs exist¹⁵.
Thus, the crucial element in the criterion for a genuinely empirical science is that honesty of the intention of its practitioners. Here perhaps, what they meant is that even where the hypotheses which are part of a scientific theory are logically capable of being refuted the scientist may intervene to forestall the effect of such refutation by modifying the hypotheses so that it is no longer refuted. Such devices are specially used to save a theory in time of crisis. And such a kind of manipulation is termed as 'conventionalist model'. Therefore, Cioffi says:

"There is surely good ground for the suspicion that Freudian theory can always be manipulated so that it escapes refutation no matter what the established facts may be".¹⁶

To move further let us consider the interesting co-relative comparison that Cioffi makes between Freudian Psychoanalysis and such other 'pseudo-Sciences', Such as numerology and pyramidology. But one may find that the relationship between their findings and theory are very much different from that of Freudian theory. It is doubtful, indeed, to talk of numerology and pyramidology as theories. Theoretical presuppositions underlie their activities and only an examination

of these could make sense of the idea that they are explaining or intended to explain something. But, these presuppositions are borrowed from 'common sense'. Again, the findings of numerology and pyramidology cannot be described as facts, because the findings of numerology and pyramidology are discrete in the following sense. The discovery of new links does not alter the meaning of the old, while the old give us no guidance for the discovery of the new; while this is the other way round in Freudian theory. Their findings accumulate purely quantitatively rather than qualitatively as Freudian theory does. There is, then, no reason to believe that a comparison between psychoanalysis and numerology/pyramidology would do otherwise than highlight the differences between them.

Theories which claims to be scientific must certainly, contain criteria as to when a phenomenon has been correctly classified and when incorrectly; when a particular relation holds and when it does not. But, that does not mean that to be scientific a theory has to contain criteria for its own total refutation. One of the characteristics of a scientific theory may be its potential refutability; yet there are different characteristics apart from it which makes a theory scientific; as in the case of Freud was the procedure by

which he emulated with physical sciences. Recent works in the philosophy of science has suggested that the physical science theories are not discarded in this way - in the falsificationist model - but because they are no longer able to generate research problems or because an alternative theory can account for the same subject matter more successfully. Therefore, to suggest that the claims of psychoanalysis to be scientific must depend upon its ability to specify conditions in which it would be totally wrong is a misconception.

In natural sciences there is no limit to the number of levels as the kind of entities that can be used for explanatory purpose. Hence, the generalisations or laws of Kepler to do with planetary motion are explained by the Newtonian theory of gravitation. That theory embodies a most extraordinary entity, namely, gravitational forces acting as a distance, something that cannot be observed in any circumstances whatsoever, nonetheless, it pervades a most powerful explanatory theory. In its turn Newtonian theory can be explained by a higher level theory, namely, Einstein's general theory of relativity, which explains the Newtonian conception of gravitational force in a new way by means of a new kind of explanatory entity. The theory embodying the new explanatory entity has to do with ways in which the geometry of space is modified by the presence

of matter. Another example could be of molecule, atom, behind them electron etc. and behind them strong and weak interactions. In this case Einstein sought to look for a further explanatory theory beyond the general theory of relativity. If he had succeeded he would have produced a theory two levels away from the ordinary level of explanatory theory. In terms of the way Woodger puts it: observations are level zero, generalizations or laws are at level one, then come the first lot of theories, such as Newton's theory of gravitation. They are level two and this is the common level of all explanatory theories. Einstein's comes at level three, and the one he was looking for beyond it would have been at level four and so the process could go on.¹⁷ Surely, gravitational force is down words which cannot be empirically observed. To falsify any theory counter factual evidences are necessary, but in this case even if there is a possibility of its falsifiability theoretically, as a matter of fact it occurs empirically, with one of its characteristics as objective approachability. It is also, interesting to note that Freud talks of a similar kind of tripartite structure of human psychic and its functions which too cannot be observed and experimentally studied, yet in human life it is. In psychoanalysis the main concern is rendered not so much

to things which are being - as is the case with natural sciences - but to being as such. Here, the concern is focused on human mind and human behaviour of an existential being. Hence, human interrelations become the rock-bottom and it would, therefore, be impossible to go beyond in explaining human behaviour. Any systematic enterprise dealing with human behaviour, while formulating its theory, should take into consideration seriously the unpredictability of human nature and behaviour, caused by hidden causes or motives in one's life. So did Freud, Falsibility, at best is possible only when nature of the subject, (thing) being studied is constant and on the basis of which a theory is formulated. But this is not the case with human beings and so far as Freudian theory is concerned. One may, for instance behave in two similar situations, at different occasions in different manner; even though all conditions remain the same. Again, while in natural sciences diverse aspects of nature are studied diversely, the studies in behavioural sciences are different, for their studies can not be in isolation to the totality of the individual, which not only take present but also the past seriously. Hence, one may have enough counter-factual evidence in natural sciences so as to refute an existing theory, due to the constant nature of its phenomena. But,

this is not the case with psychoanalysis, for one may not have counter-factual data, due to the individual diversity, although one may have enough facts about human behaviour and human nature. Hence, the quest of falsifiability is pointless. However, a question still remains, is psychoanalysis (theory) scientific proper ? This could be illuminated more by moving a little further, questioning the explanatory characteristics of psychoanalytic explanation a scientific explanation at all ?

III

An explanation contains as core of it what J.S. Mill called 'considerations for the intellect to give its assent'. If in an explanation the puzzle that it meant to eliminate is not eliminated that kind of explanation is an inadequate one. Science explains facts, by embedding it within a general law from which the fact to be explained may be logically deduced. It is sometimes said that science explains rather than describes. But actually no sharp line can be drawn between description and explanation. If scientific explanations of why a pond froze and why there was an eclipse are really only descriptions, what would be an explanation? There are of course, various kinds of explanations, viz. explanation as a definition (e.g. What is photosynthesis?); explanation could also be a paraphrase of documents (e.g. What does Finnegans wake means?); it could be like in the case, 'Will you explain cricket to me? etc. Nonetheless, a scientific theory is expected to be explanatory in causal terms - 'what caused so and so?' etc.

There are two main conceptions of causation: What might be called 'emanation' and another called 'covering law'. The idea underlying the former can be best conveyed, at least

initially, in a kind of pictorial or suggestive way with the idea behind that things have deep natures or constitutions or structures or inner essences, or whatever one wishes to call them. These are normally or permanently hidden from view, and the regularities we discern in the phenomena that are open to view emanate or flow from those hidden inner forms. Once those inner forms are perceived or understood or conceptually seized and analysed, all else, that originates from it, follows and is clear. But, without such an understanding, any attempt to bind the visible phenomena under generalisations is bound to remain superficial and will probably be abortive; even if it restricts itself to surface classification and prediction, very often those inner forms tend to be not merely potent in their explanatory force but also gratifying aesthetically and ethically. They reveal a moral as well as an ontological order; in fact, these various orders converge. Truth, beauty and goodness are one. From the view point of someone interested only in the philosophy of science and cognitive realms these are a kind of optional extra; emanation view of causation can be held on its own, without these moral and aesthetic overtones or associations. They are not actually entailed in the emanation view of causation as such.¹⁸

In recent centuries with the advent of positivism, the emanationist view has been on the whole on their decline.

The logical reason behind this has been an increasing reluctance to rely on inherently hidden, inaccessible entities for purposes of explanation. Positivists' view them as mere shorthand abbreviations of descriptive accounts of events in this perceptive and accessible state of affairs in terms of inaccessible and non-perceptive one. It was David Hume who, starting from the premise that the world we think is bound by what we can sense, ended with an early form of the 'covering-law theory of causation. The main thrust of covering-law is that there is no link, no 'power' connecting elements in a causal chain, that the only connection is in an extraneous law which is not intrinsically part of either of the connected events. The question here, certainly, is not the controversy between emanation theory of causation and that of covering-law. But it is that of what kind of causal explanation does Freud attribute to psychoanalysis. Surely, it is an emanation view of causation, diverging from its traditional stand point to look for a deity who regulates the entire system. Emanation here is a mechanical one. Just as in the movements on a watch dial, successive positions of the hands do not really cause each other, but are, all of them caused by the central and hidden mechanism; so the successive states of mental life, all flow from the hidden unconscious wishes. Freud, in his work on, 'The relation

of wit to dreams' projected his conviction of emanation quite intelligibly as he wrote:

"The wish emanating from the dream-thoughts forms the first step and later on the nucleus of the dream In the case of adults the universally valid condition for the dream-creating wish seems to be that the latter appears foreign to conscious thinking, that is, it should be a repressed wish, or that it should supply consciousness with reinforcement from unknown sources."¹⁹

This conviction can be explicated more from some of his case studies such as 'Rat-man'. Generally speaking, all actions which has vile motives appear to be conscious as having quite different ones. Everytime there is a conflict between what one wants to be and what one is, one acts to appear as what one wants to be. Freud derived his idea of repression from this simple notion. Everything that one have repressed comes out in everyday life in the form of dreams and unsuccessful actions, and pathologically in the form of neurosis and obsessions. For e.g. clumsiness makes it impossible to do a boring piece of work; missed a train when one really doesn't want to catch it, etc.

The Rat-man(Paul Lorenz) was in his late twenties when Freud began his treatment. He was afflicted with superstitions, feeling of guilt, compulsions and obsessive fears. He was, of late, obsessed with the thought that a torture he had learned of during his military service would be applied to his father, who was dead at the time of the treatment began, and to a young woman with whom he had long been infatuated. The torture required that a person be sat upon a cage filled with starving rats, the top of the cage, then, slid away and the victim devoured from the bottom up. Lorenz suffered from fears that unless he do or don't do certain things the rat torture and other unpleasant events would befall "on the young women in this world and his father in the next. He developed an intricate and compulsive rituals in the belief that they would protect the young woman and his father and others from such harms. As a boy of six or seven he indulged in sex play with his nurses and had particularly strong desires to see women naked. The occurrences of these wishes were on some occasion accompanied by a fear of his father's death and the impression that his parents can read his thoughts. Despite his deep affection for his father, on several occasions associated with several desires, Lorenz, none-the-less, had thoughts of his father's death, always accompanied by a feeling of dread at such an event. At the age of twelve such a thought occurred to him, that a young girl, of whom he was

fond, would show him affection if something unfortunate were to befall on him, in particular, should his father die. Lorenz was able to recall only one instance of severe overt conflict between himself and his father. At about the age of three or four he was beaten by his father - for biting a nurse - and in rage he began calling his father, 'you plate, you, towel, you lamp' Now, Lorenz felt a great deal of guilt over his father's death, for the only reason that he was not present at moment of his demise but had fallen asleep in an adjoining room.²⁰

The central features of Freud's explanation of Lorenz's obsessional behaviour is that, his guilt, obsession and compulsions were the result of the unconscious conflict between his conscious love and unconscious hatred for his father. The unconscious hatred in turn was the consequence of an acute conflict between he and his father, when he was a child. Lorenz's obsessions were, in fact, the result of the re-emergence of repressed wishes, formed in his early childhood but permitted into consciousness only in altered symbolic form. Freud, thus, insisted that the cause of the adult behaviour lies in the infantile sexual practice. Freud writes in perfectly general terms that:

"Such cases (obsessional neuroses), unlike those of hysteria, invariably possess the characteristic

o of premature sexual activity. Obsessional neuroses makes it much more obvious than hysterias that the factors which go to form a psychoneurosis are to be found in the patient's infantile sexual life and not in his present one."²¹

Lor nz recounted the 'criminal guilt, he felt at his father's death. A desire for the death of one's own father is evidently something which would warrent feelings of guilt. What it exactly is, Freud describes in his 'Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis':

"These thoughts (of benefits to Lorenz from his father's death) surprised him very much, for he was quite certain that his father's death could never have been an object of his desire but only of his fear ... According to psychoanalytic theory, I told him, every fear corresponds to a former wish which was now repressed; we were therefore, obliged to believe the exact contrary of what he had asserted. This would also fit in with another theoretical requirement, namely, that the unconscious must be the precise contrary of the conscious."²²

The unconscious and the associated concept of repression are the central unifying concepts of Freud's theory. The discovery of the resistance, an aspect of repression, was made possible only when he abandoned the hypnotic method. This discovery permitted Freud to carry out cures by catharsis. Freud's model of psychic treatment was constructed basing on the continual observation of clients in his clinic. But majority of experimental psychologists regard psychoanalysis as nearly bereft of evidences worth. This is not satisfactory a claim, because the content of the neurotic receiving therapy, and particularly, the content of psychoanalytic case studies are, surely, principle sources of evidence for psychoanalysis. This view was put forward by Freud himself in a letter to an American psychologist S.Rosenzweig

"My dear Sir,

I have examined your experimental studies for the verification of the psychoanalytic assertion with interest. I cannot put much value on these confirmations because the wealth of reliable observation on which these assertions rest make them independent of experimental verification. Still, it can do no harm.

Sincerely yours,

Freud." 23

Here it should, well, be noted that psychoanalytic theory being one which is to decipher the meaning and source (motivational force), of human behaviour or action, it operates causally and also tries to explain behaviour or mental acts causally. Therefore, the thesis that in psychoanalysis, explanations are reason based and not causal can be shown to be untenable on the following grounds:²⁴

1. The thesis rest on the misconception of the relation of causal relevance between an antecedent X and an outcome Y; it overlooks that X may be physical or mental, so long as it makes a difference to the occurrence of Y, and affects the incidence of Y. But in psychoanalytic explanations of unconscious motives are held to have just that kind of relevance to the phenomena that is being explained. Thus, the hypothesized unconscious motives, X, become the (partial) cause of human conduct Y, whether or not psychoanalytic explanations confirm to the so-called practical syllogism.

2. Explanations in terms of reason normally do confirm to practical syllogism. An agent carries out an action A, because he desires to achieve a goal G, and also believes that doing A will bring him G. Thus, the desire-cum-belief

set supplies 'the reason for his action A. But by virtue (1) an explanatory reason for an action is causally relevant to its performance. Hence, such reasons are causes.

3. Though explanatory reasons do qualify as (partial) causes, it is shown that unconscious motives do not constitute such 'reasons', because classical psychoanalytic explanations typically do not even conform to the practical syllogism. It turns out that the explanatory unconscious motives do not include any unconscious belief that the explained behaviour is a means of realising the repressed wish. Therefore, such behaviour fails to be a species of intended action, although the impulse that instigates it can be said to be a repressed wish or motive.

Therefore, when Freud maintained that both unconscious and conscious motives qualify as causes, he certainly was neither supposing that all causes has to be physical nor need to be understood in physical sense of the term. Yet, Klein has claimed in his 'psychoanalytic Theory'(1975) that bonafide psychoanalytic explanations provide reasons rather than causes for human conduct; and in the same way did Roy Schafer in his, 'A new Language for Psychoanalysis'(1976) by stating that the unconscious reasons fail to qualify as causes. Apparently, the exponents of reasons Vs. causes theses are, in effect, contradicting Freud's view rather than explicating them.

IV

Freud's theory can be seen as extending the notion of behaviour or action, by offering explanations in terms of unconscious motives. True indeed, as one may claim that Freud's explanation of the neuroses was limited to the individual. He, too, believed that the neuroses had no specific determinants, and in estimating the pathogenicity of an event in a particular person, he was concerned with its meaning for that person - even though someone else might experience an apparently similar traumatic event in a completely different manner.²⁵

At this juncture, one may ask of the predictability of human nature; as in the case of natural sciences - given $X \rightarrow Y$. In physical sciences one can predict the consequence (at least a probable one) given the antecedents for it. Here one precedes the other. But in psychoanalysis the system is entirely different, here one will have to proceed from the consequence (for e.g. Neurotic behaviour) to the antecedent (unconscious wishes) and the other way is impossible. One might be able to make hazard-guesses about what kind of a dream a person is likely to have from the given data. But one can never knit an absolutely predicted dream one is likely to experience tonight. Although neuroses has its hidden causes

they are never noticed by the individual himself, and if it were known to him there would have ceased to be any sort of neuroses or obsessions in him. Therefore, the therapist and the patient proceeds from the obsessions of the patient to backward till the patient himself trace out those causes for his obsessions, realizing and acknowledging them, there onwards to attain the cessation of cathaxis.

The advance of Freudian theory has been to make available to systematic study, (science) a new area of inter-related phenomena. In this way Freud can be said to have discovered new facts. Many of the relevant phenomena and even some of the relationships between them had long been known in a way. Freud's endeavour was to show the basic constitutive principles structuring these materials, much of which had been written off as inexplicable or unimportant by contemporary scientists. He did this by a shift of attention - a new approach. For e.g. what had previously been thought as gaps in memory (foregetting), Freud suggested as significant as what was remembered, and could be explained in terms of the content of what was forgotten and its meaning for the person in question. What had been previously thought of as paradigmatically nonsensical and by definition unrelated to waking life (dreams), Freud made useful in the study of mental disorders. While the extent of individual differences has been seen as the stumbling block in the way of

explaining neurotic symptoms, Freud showed that the content of those symptoms were related to the whole life experience of the person having them. Thus, the central advance of Freudian theory is to see, previously, inexplicable behaviour, symptoms, phantasies and dreams of the individual as explicable attention, attempts to communicate thoughts and so on. Freud, certainly, had shown that repression is a fact of life, essential for survival in a society. However, Freud's formulation of the aim of therapy does not include the loss of all pain; instead, it focusses on the necessity of living with one's ailments; it is quite evident from what he had written as a reply to his imaginary patient:

"No doubt fate would find it easier than I do to relieve you of your illness. But you will be able to convince yourself that much will be gained if we succeed in transforming your hysterical misery into common unhappiness."²⁶

Such a formulation not only supplies a rebuff to those who attempts to evaluate psychoanalysis on the narrow grounds about its success at removing symptoms completely, but it also contains a subtle political formulation; that the common unhappiness of normal living is different only in degree from

from 'hysterical misery'. Both are connected with circumstances and events in life, which no analyst can change. Freudian pessimism over the possibilities of cure, expressed in his dictum that, all that can be hoped for from psychoanalysis is the conversion of hysterical misery into common unhappiness, prevent him from espousing any particular model of mental health as a positive aim of therapy. Instead, he constructed an approach, a practice defined by its process rather than its product. The distinctive attribute of Freudian practice is the adoption of an analytic attitude which exposes contradictions and differences which, but, is left to the individual to choose the particular direction s/he will take;²⁷ more of which is made lucid by Freud himself:

"Our impression is that we must not be surprised if the difference between a person who has not and a person who has been analysed is, after all, not so radical as we endeavour to make it and expect and assert that it will be."²⁸

Freud's own comment here acknowledges and side-steps the criticisms of psychoanalytic practice that have bedeviled the entire history of it's movement. Psychoanalysis is itself one of the three 'impossible professions' doomed to producing unsatisfactory results, as he pointed out in 'Analysis

Terminable and Interminable' (p.352), the other two being the bringing up of children and the governing of nations.

The reason being, first of all, that psychoanalytic practice is immensely laborious, expensive and time consuming so that most analysis are doomed to be incomplete, 'Poor ourselves, and socially powerless' laments Freud, psychoanalysis can never be introduced at a level which will produce mass changes in consciousness.²⁹ Moreover, psychoanalysis cannot really produce a deep-rooted change. Although, Freud frequently compares analysis to 'Surgery', and asserts that it is a 'relatively causal' approach to the solution of the psychological disorders, he retains a persistent admiration for biochemistry of the psyche, regarding, the manipulation of that as the only truly causal approach. Because psychoanalysis cannot intervene on the chemical level, it is only partially causal, preferable to other treatment methods because it does not restrict itself to the treatment of symptoms. Freud writes: Suppose,

"that it was possible by some chemical means, perhaps, to interfere in this mechanism (of psychic energy), to increase or diminish the

quantity of libido present at a given time or to strengthen one instinct at the cost of another - this then would be a causal therapy in the true sense of the word, for which our analysis would have carried out the indispensable preliminary work of reconnaissance."³⁰

Therefore, to conclude, one, rightly can point out that psychoanalysis' claim to credence is not so much as a therapeutic system as pure medical science is, but as Freud emphasised its status as a science, (a systematic study) that that helps one to 'correspond to the external world', conversing the 'uncommon unhappiness' in to 'common unhappiness'. Psychoanalysis, of course, reveal that life is a project lived in a mixture of pain and joy; there is a conflict between desired pleasure or happiness and undersired constraints on the way to one's desired goal and externally imposed restrictions and pains; there is a conflict between what, may be, desired and what, may be, achieved. Hunting for happiness is not a project that psychoanalysis can accede to, because it is itself the most radical critic of the foundations of such a project.³¹ But, it aims at making one understand the existential conditions of man and to strengthen him to confront those

unhappy situations in life ruthlessly.

As Freud himself states:


"One feel inclined to say that the intention that man should be 'happy' is not included in the plan of creationOur possibilities of happiness are already restricted by our constitution. Unhappiness is much less difficult to experience."³²

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CHAPTER - III

FREUDIAN NOTION OF MORALITY

Psychology is the study of normal behaviour and psychiatry is that of treatment and study of abnormal behaviour. Psychoanalysis is the name given by Sigmund Freud to his own theory and practice of treating psychic disorders. It was Freud, towards the end of the nineteenth century, leaving the realm of religion, Witch craft and magic brought forth his theories about mental disorders that he claims to be scientific. His theories were based on his conception of interaction between unconscious and conscious and basically around unconscious repression - that is to say that a large part of man's mental life goes on without his being consciously aware of it.

The early development of psychoanalysis took place within the medical profession. According to Freud, the life energy of a person or the structure of the personality is divided into three parts; the ego - the element of individuality which is capable of deliberation and which at times exercises some control over the impulses of the id. Id is then an important part - the seat of instinct, impulse and passion. The third part is super ego - an internalised (moral) demands of society that we call conscience¹. No account of Freudian notion of morality can then, be discussed without taking into account his idea of super ego. Freud distinguished between the states in which each of them might be

maintained - (conscious, preconscious, unconscious)-and the way in which these states might be organised - this he called the systems Cs, Pcs, and Ucs. The Pcs stands in a crucial relationship to the other two systems, enabling communication between them, being the locus of censorship between them, as well as possessing important internal functions of its own. He also argues that there may be censorship between Cs and Pcs, as well as between Pcs and Ucs; derivatives of the Ucs may, at times, circumvent the earlier stages of repression to reach a certain energetic 'intensity' in the Pcs, when, however, this intensity is exceeded and they try to force themselves into consciousness, they are recognised as derivatives of the Ucs and are repressed afresh at the new frontier of censorship between the Pcs and the Cs'.² Repression is, therefore, a continuous process, a constant struggle at all levels of the mind.

Freud long thought and used the term 'ego'(das Ich) in a traditional manner. His notion was that it is an active agent. He argued till 1920 that, "ego is the true and original reservoir of libido, and ... it is only from that reservoir that libido is extended unto objects."³

But, in 1923 he wrote again with an inkling at Id, i.e. the 'it' (das Es) as the thing inside but beyond us, the impersonal source of our unconscious desires. He writes:

"Now I think we shall gain a great deal by following the suggestion of a writer who, from personal motives, vainly asserts that he has nothing to do with the rigours of pure science. I am speaking of George Groddeck, who is never tired of insisting that what we call our ego behaves essentially passively in life, and that, as he expresses it, we are 'lived' by unknown and uncontrollable force."

The Id is mysterious - the rest house of fundamental instincts - and yet, source of energy, it is the original self that which feed the activities of the entire psychic system. But, although all that is in the Id is unconscious the vice versa is not quite true. With the discovery of Id, Freud had given a new colouring to the notion of ego. The ego is not primeval; rather it is precipitated by the Id. An important point is that, here, he considers the ego as a bodily ego, representing itself to itself along the lines of the bodily sensations with which it is imbued, 'a mental projection of the surface

of the body'. A growing child has to give up the desired sexual objects, so the ego takes them on and internalises them. The ego, thus, comes to be a home for lost desires and forsaken objects - its character is formed along the line of the objects in the world which are introjected and absorbed, along with the id-originated psychic energy invested in them. Ego, then, gradually becomes stronger through experience and through the libidinous investments made in it by the id; as the ego transforms the object of the id into egoic structures with a similar principle the super-ego is formed. In part, all that happens is that some internalised objects are set up as 'ego ideals'. At some point in development, there occurs such an intense internalisation of the parents and elders that has the power to set up an influence of major significance within the mind. When the child is forced to swallow his desires, which a society considers to be immoral, he tries to cope with this by forming identifications with father, mother and other morally and socially respected personalities.

The super-ego operates as carrot and a stick - an ideal and a punishment, compelling obedience to an internal authority in the same way as the child once was forced to obey

an external authority. The ego strives to please id and to be loved by it, but it cannot escape the sense of guilt which arises from the demands and the criticisms of the super-ego, which is supermoral. Hence Freud wrote:

'We see the same ego as a poor creature owing service to three masters and consequently menaced by three dangers; from the external world, from the libido and the id, and from the severity of the super ego'.

To avoid those consequences which could be brought forward by these menaces, Ego checks those repressed instinctual impulses so as to keep it permanently withdrawn from any sort of influence by ego. He rightly pointed it out in his chapter on 'Anxiety and Instinctual Life', in the following words:

"I believe the ego exercises this influences by putting into action the almost omnipotent pleasure - unpleasure principle by means of the signal of anxiety. On the other hand, it shows its weakness again immediately afterwards, for by the act of repression it renounces a portion of its organization and has to allow the repressed instinctual impulse to remain permanently withdrawn from its influence".⁵

Here one thing, important to be taken seriously in discussing Freudian notion of morality - if at all there is one - is that he had a few fundamental conception, with which he formulated his notion of nature and growth of religion and such other social institutions. One cannot neglect Freud's understanding of a biological being, (man), diverted into a social being in course of time, with a due respect for becoming what he actually is not, for biologically all man are instinctive - sexual and aggressive being - but socially he is being forced to be a gentleman.

II

Ethics became a cinderella subject in philosophy as a result of various trends, particularly, the rise of logical positivism with its resistance on necessary divorce between facts and values, and the development of continental existentialism and its californian offshoots, with their emphasis on choice without rational foundations. Both philosophical positions lead to the same conclusion that ethics as a subject is not to be taken seriously, and that value judgements themselves have little status in a world in which the weightiest pronouncements are those which can claim the stamp of scientific authority. However, there are certainly

many flourishing ethical theories for e.g. utilitarianism, the real aim of which is to render indifference to the ethical notions, regarding what is right independently of what the consequence is. Yet another such theories is marxism in its multiplicity of forms, which of course is based on a view of morality as a phenomenon, holds it as a mere product of social class and circumstance, always reflecting the interests of a dominant class. Liberal morality then would be, from this point of view, a bourgeois morality. At the same time many people regard morality as narrowly confined to sexual morality and dissociate themselves from it, believing themselves, in this way, to be living up to some amorphous ideal of freedom⁶. It is precisely at this point where one may abandon or subscribe to Freudian inbuilt notion of morality. Man is by birth an instinctual and a self-organizing system, therefore, be 'what you are'.

Freud wrote in 1932, in a letter to Einstein that, "Today right and violence appear to us as antitheses. It can easily be shown, however, that the one has developed out of the other".⁷ He again proceeds from there to assert himself as to what was that led, (modified), violence to right and law. He wrote that:

"The path led by way of the fact that the superior strength of a single individual could be rivalled

by the union of several weak ones... The power of those who were united now represented law in contrast to the violence of the single individual.... Right is the might of a community. It is still violence ... it works by the same methods and follows the same purpose. The only real difference lies in the fact that what prevails is no longer the violence of an individual but that of a community".⁸

Here, one may be right in pointing out a similar account of right and law - a collectively constructed social morality - was given by Plato in his Gorgias about twenty - three centuries ago. According to Plato, the original state of affairs consisted of the "domination by whoever had the greater might". However, "this regime was altered in course of evolution".⁹ But Freud has given it an altogether different psychological colouring. He says:

"The Union of the majority must be stable and lasting".¹⁰

What bring forth this kind of lasting stability amongst united group ? He answers that,

"The growth of emotional ties between the members of a united group of people - feelings

of unity which are the true source of its strength." ¹⁰

Here, what Freud has shown is that morality is an external sanctions imposed upon the individual forcefully. The insight behind being that if it were possible for man to be 'left to himself', he would not heed the precepts of morality - because it is imposed and he does not adhere to it willingly. Perhaps, one can find another version of Thomas Hobbes' Levithan in Freud which I will try to explicate, biologically, in the following pages.

Having rejected the origin and the nature of religion as illusiory in 'the future of an illusion', 'Civilization and its discontents' and specially in 'Totem and Taboo' , there may be a point in claiming Freudian theories as against any sort of moral beliefs. The exigent need, therefore, to Freud, was to give the common mass a scientific self-awareness, whereby an individual can be aware of oneself without being forced to accept, and pass on to generations after generations, those "illusory" precepts of religion and morality. Freud says in regard to the formation of super-ego, (conscience):

"Since their own feelings would not have led men along the same path, they must have had a motive

for obeying this extraneous influence. It is easy to discover this motive in men's helplessness and dependence upon others; it can best be designated the dread of losing love, ... Because of the dread of this loss, One must desist from it - viz. from what is bad, from whatever causes one to be threatened with a loss of love, ... At this stage the sense of guilt is obviously only the dread of losing love, 'social' anxiety ... (this) anxiety relates only to the possibility of detection, ... A great change takes place as soon as the authority has been internalized by the development of a super-ego. At this point the dread of discovery ceases to operate and also ... any difference between evil and wishing to do it, since nothing is hidden from the super-ego".¹¹

Here what Freud meant is that the culture and morality are built on coercion and instinctual renunciation. Man, in his childhood, takes over external compulsions and conforms to the precepts of morality conveyed by elders and parents unwillingly. This instinctual renunciation although has a great significance for the collective life of people it too has a very significant demerit of its own kind for the, psychologically, now,

deprived, life of the individual. It is here that one can notice the expansion of Freud's notion of repression from individual level to a social repression, with its positive and negative ramifications on individual life. Human beings are instinctual animals, and aims at the achievement of pleasure through the expression or actualization of these instincts. Freud, thus writes in Civilization and its Discontents that,

"What decides the purpose of life is simply the programme of the pleasure principle".

But, unfortunately, the pleasure principle also happens to be 'at loggerheads with the whole world, with the macrocosm as much as with the microcosm'.

This is because of two reasons :

(1) Pleasure is a transient phenomena, which can only come about as a contrast between tension and its reduction, tending towards but never fully achieving a state of ease - of inactivity. Prior to death, pleasure is obtained in this process of tension - reduction - although absolute liberation cannot be obtained because of internal and external sources of stimulations which impinge on the psyche. All these stimulations create tension and an unpleasurable state that motivates activities of the body and mind to search for solution, breaking through all the possible Ostrangulatory loath, with the aid of fantasies. This circularity thus, continues.

(2) In addition to above, human beings are threatened and are to face real pain from three sources:

- (i) the feebleness of their own bodies.
- (ii) the superior power of nature.
- (iii) the activities of other people.

Pleasure resides in the attainment of the aims of the instincts - erotic instincts and aggression, that which get manifested in different forms as life and death - these instincts are in accordance with two great needs of human beings i.e. hunger and love.¹² Yet, the expression of these instincts in an unlimited manner might lead to an interpersonal rivalry and a social devastation. But in reality, in a civilized culture the possibilities for pleasure are limited. It is here that one in order to live in a well knit society, recognizing that avoiding pain is more fruitful for life than achievement of pleasure, renounces his indulgence in instinctive activities unlike the lower animals. To Freud; 'In general the task of avoiding suffering pushes that of obtaining pleasure into the background'¹³ Each individual has in oneself a noumenal as well as phenomenal aspect. This is something man cannot lose. Hence, no doubt, someone may allow himself to be wholly influenced by what is pleasant (or pleasure donoring) or painful; nevertheless, radically unlike a beast, because a beast's actions are pathologically compelled, as 'will arbitrium brutum', whereas a man's actions are pathologically influenced, as a 'will arbitrium

liberum! The beast's relation to stimulus and action is mechanical, as cause and effect. When a dog, for eg. is hungry and sees food, he 'must' eat, where as a man can restrain himself. Nay, this need not necessarily be so, a dog can be trained in a way to wait until the master commands - even when the dog is hungry and is in the presence of food. Now, how is it different from another example, (given by Kant in Ground work), of a man who claims that, when moved by lust, he must enter a brothel, which he would not if there were gallows outside on which he knew he would be hanged on his coming out ? Here, the dog did not restrain himself, but is restrained by the fear of his master; in the same manner the man did not restrain himself but is restrained by his fear of gallows. The man might also be restricted by his consciousness that going into the brothel would be contrary to the moral law (the external percept, to Freud, received by the individual from childhood on words). But, in this case the man, unlike dog, would be actively restraining himself and not merely being passively restrained. Now, what is the difference ? The difference is that the man deterred by the gallows is not, like dog, wholly compelled by a conjunction of hunger and fear, but that he allows himself to be influenced by the conjunction of hunger (lust) and fear. Here the word 'allows'

is an indication of man's freedom of choice - to make a rational choice between pleasure and pain or pleasures and pleasures or pains and (less intense) pains.¹⁴

Therefore, I feel, it is appropriate to say that Freud was not against freedom and notion of liberation; Liberation from the grip of the conflict between the pull of two great forces viz. external (moral precepts) and innate instinctual desires (unconscious desires). Freud's aim, certainly, was, as I've already stated elsewhere, to make man aware of his own psychic structure; what exactly he is, his problems are along with others in the society and thereby to bring him back from his neurotic and obsessional behaviour to a normal way of life with other members of society. It is, here, in one's relation to society, the notion of good and bad come to play. (In that case, moral assessments cannot be operative on neurotic and obsessional cases). That is the precise reason why he stated as a hall mark of Freedom in his 'Civilization and its Discontent' that :

"every man must find out for himself in what particular fashion he can be saved".¹⁵

In Freud's account the main defence against the power of the world and individual desires is social; the formation of civilization. Civilization, which is often

considered to be the highest expression of human existence is built on the denial of everything that we really want.

Freud wrote about civilization as:

'the whole sum of the achievements and the regulations which distinguished our lives from those of our animal ancestors and which serve two purposes - namely to protect man against nature and to adjust their mutual relation'.¹⁶

Therefore, it would sound that civilization, to him, is not a gift to the individual, but it produces misery and is opposed to the individual desires - its nature is to unite individuals against the threats posed by nature and their own inclinations. Before the formation of society there was only calamitous liberatarianism of the instincts; but as soon as these instincts were bridled society was formed. One of the most revolutionary aspects of Freud's method of investigation was his search for origins - his explanation of how things come to be, (which is a model of scientific enquiry).

In 'Totem and Taboo', Freud postulates of a 'primal horde' being dominated by a powerful Father, who possessed all the available women. In rage and frustration his sons ('the brothers') banded together and killed him (the Pater families). However, natural remorse and a sense of guilt gnaws their hearts, clamouring for recompense. This situation calls for a reconciliation among themselves and a need to bind

themselves into a more cohesive fraternity to prevent the recurrence of such heinous crimes as murder and incest. The ambivalent nature of instincts created not only a feeling of hatredness, to the father, but also love. This encouraged them to set him up as a 'totem' and to incorporate his terror within them. The murdered Father is ritually celebrated and eaten in the hope that the clan will be nourished with the strength of the Father and that, the unity in brotherhood is indissolubly forged. The pater familias, who was also the pater primogenitor is sacralized and venerated, is metamorphosed into deus pater¹⁷. Thus, the brothers (sons) under the shadow of totem imposed a few self-restricting rules upon themselves, to regulate their relations, repressing their passions and instincts to bring about social solidarity. Here, with the development of the individual's super-ego, what had been an external authority was internalised as a mark of respect and guilt, more forcefully. This works as a connecting-emotional-link between each brothers,(sons), because the essential purpose of it is to prevent a repetition of the primal situation. These rules marked the beginning of culture, as the point at which natural desire is regulated by social necessity.

However, despite all these great changes socially, individually the claims of morality remain external to the

individual's will - the super-ego remains divided from the ego. The individual has to compell himself to conform to the demands of morality and does so to avoid punishment in the hands of a harsh super-ego (the pangs of conscience). These super-ego or pangs are, to Freud, aggressiveness turned inward.

"What means does civilization make use of to hold in check the aggressiveness that oppose it... ? What happens in him (the individual) to render his craving for aggression innocuous ? ... The aggressiveness is introjected, 'internalised'; in fact, it is sent back where it came from, i.e. directed against the ego. It is there taken over by a part of the ego that distinguishes itself from the rest as a super-ego, and now, in the form of 'conscience', exercises the same propensity to harsh aggressiveness against the ego that the ego would liked to to enjoy against others."¹⁸

Freud recognized that human nature and culture are essentially opposed and, therefore, irreconcilable. Civilization is alien to man's nature (that primordial man who was like other animals were ruled by instincts - specially aggression - although

that is not to mean that man in modern society are devoid of instincts). Civilization is due to something that was imposed upon man. However, on the other hand, human nature resists conforming to culture and unwillingly submit to its demands; when the individual yields, civilized behaviour necessarily remains a veneer. Here we can compare Freud with Plato (as seen in Gorgias) and Nietzsche (in Twilight of the idols) ; Nietzsche called the cultural situation he saw as Decadence in which the spurious had come to be substituted for the genuine, standards had gone by the board and a revolt of the many against the few prevailed. To Freud,

"Culture must be built upon coercion and instinctual renunciation."¹⁹

The implication behind it is that the individual is not capable of caring and showing consideration for others - of feeling sympathy for them, of feeling unhappy if he hurts them etc. Hence, in his paper on 'Thoughts for the times of War and Death' (1915) wrote:

"Two things in this war have evoked our sense of disillusionment: the destitution shown in moral relations externally by the states which in their interior relations pose as the guardians of accepted

moral usage and the brutality in behaviour shown by individuals whom, as partakers in the highest form of human civilization, one would not have credited with such a thing."

Here, his argument is that this disillusionment is unjustifiable for it has in it, inherently, the destruction of an illusion. His notion of 'illusion', here, is of our beliefs about human beings, our belief in the values of a morality of love. "In reality there is no such thing as "eradicating" evil tendencies.... The inmost essence of human nature consists of elemental instincts, which are common to all men.... These instincts in themselves are neither good nor evil. We but classify them and their manifestations in that fashion, according as they meet the needs and demands of the human community."²⁰ This infliction of concepts of good and bad into human psyche prevents man from acting in accordance with the desires of his instincts. Therefore:

"In actual fact primitive man was better off in this respect, for he knew nothing of any restrictions on his instincts.... Civilized man has exchanged some part of his chances of happiness for a measure of security."²¹

Freud admits that, with the rise of civilization, "these primitive instincts undergo a lengthy process of development".²² But what kind of development is this ?

Freud seems to answer on the one hand that these instincts can be transformed; but he pointed out:

"We are ... misled by our optimism into grossly exaggerating the number of human beings who have been transformed in a civilized sense."²³

It is this which he earlier qualified as illusion, and he thinks that such a transformation is impossible:

"These primitive instincts ... are inhibited, directed towards other aims and departments, become comingled, after their objects, and, are to some extent turned back upon their possessor. Reaction-formations against certain instincts take the deceptive form of change in content, as though egoism had changed into altruism, or cruelty into pity."²⁴

These lines clearly shows that, in his view, such a change or transformation is more apparent than real. It is more evident in 'Civilization and its Discontents' (P.301) as he puts it:

"The primitive mind is, in the fullest meaning of the word, imperishable". There could be a repressive adjustmental endeavour and a successful attainment of a socially refined nature, yet remain same individually, at the core.

If Freud is right at his claim that the hatredness and propensity to destructiveness that an individual have had in him may remain within him throughout his life, in one or other distorted forms - although it may diminish in course of time, then, one may ask, how man's original but set aside and also refined nature being transcribed into offsprings? Well, science has its own explanations. Freud says in Civilization and its Discontents;

"Men are not gentle ... but a powerful measure of desires, for aggression has to be reckoned as part of their instinctual endowment."

We have no problems in accepting such instincts in the case of lower animals, but as far as the question is of 'rational' human being, one may have his reservations. However, scientists, (from Darwin to modern times), concerned with the mysteries of chromosomes - the supposed key to inheritance - would argue in favour of Freud. Chromosomes consist of a hereditary substance - Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and various proteins.

DNA is a long molecule made upon a chain of four repeating units called nucleotides. That is to say, that it consists of a long chain or sequence of smaller molecules arranged in the form of two intertwined helices. It's important property is that the order and position in which the smaller molecules appear along with the chain constitutes a code. These codes determine the characteristics of the organism. There is also a means of replicating the DNA molecules so that the copies of those codes could be transcribed and used in constructing the DNA molecules of offsprings. The reason why parents (at least one) and the offspring resemble is due to that of the similar DNA codings. But, it is important to note that not only physical resemblance as height, colour of eyes, hair, etc. but also level of intelligence and a series of instincts and refined or controlled behaviour are also passed on and inherited by the offsprings from parents through this procedure. Freud calls instinctual stimulus "need". Surely, we can not simply identify instinctual wants with biological needs. Some needs are without corresponding felt wants - for e.g. the need for vitamins; but our interest here is in those needs that has "psychical representative". Hence, it could be wise to say that in understanding human behaviour, one must accept that he is, at least in part, driven by instincts.

Instincts are part and parcel of one's and those behaviours and instincts one passes on from oneself to one's decedents. Thus what is 'finite' to a philosopher, 'sinful' to a christian is instinctual to a psychologist - to a psychoanalyst like Freud.²⁵ However, initially, soon after the felt necessity of an unity for security, the description emerged, labelling evolved in the form of categories as right and wrong, good and bad and contracts were made by different groups of people (or brothers/sons), who had similar opinion on these descriptions and categories, in order to avoid dread and anguish of the other. The so-called purgatory process began with an intention to create an ever best possible peaceful and a civilized society; to which, perhaps, the endeavour is still on. But, what does, from time to time, the out burst of violence and the existing social situations show ? It, certainly, buttress Freud's concept of individual psyche, that at the personal level each individual is alone and would prefer to be left to himself.

III

Taking the above argument seriously one would say that Freud was in the direction of biological determinism and if so there is no question of freedom of will. The quest of freedom of will, further brings forth yet another question of choice. Aristotle for e.g., says that 'what is decided by deliberation' is chosen. But he also insists that an uncontrolled man does not choose to do what he does; that is to say, what he does in doing the kind of thing that he disapproves of is not what Aristotle will call exercising choice.²⁶ Therefore, an uncontrolled man (neurotic and psychotic) does not act from choice. From this point of view and the example given above (from Kants 'Ground work') it is intelligible that 'what is decided and allowed by deliberation (willingly) is chosen. Neurotics, according to Freud, are not controlled by their conscious part but by the unconscious part of them - the flow of which is uncontrollable, and, the helpless man carry out the command of these instinctual (sexual and aggressive) impulses. Therefore, the notion of freedom of choice is applicable only of the normal human beings, for they are controlled by the conscious part of the psyche and it is the conscious part of psyche that

helps one to 'decide by deliberations'.

Freud, was in the age of scientific achievements and had its influence on his works. He had, in his mind, like Darwin the idea of an on going evolution. This fact can be clearly noticed, in his study of religion. He concluded his study of religion on a note of optimism. He envisages the scientific and the critical spirit of enquiry to dissolve soon religions everywhere. But he does not advocate the abolition of religion by force; because to the uneducated and the oppressed, religion has been a source of morality. Hence, without providing them with a critical and scientific source of morality, their only moral ideal must not be pulled down. In the process what is required of people is an 'education for reality'. Life, to him, as lived cannot be improved, with an eschatological hopes and aspirations. Man must learn to reconcile himself with the inescapable vicissitudes of Life.²⁷ This fact points out that psychoanalysis aims at individual developmental mechanism, (reality education), with which he evolve into a self-respecting, self-understanding being with the evolution of systems around him. It is assumed that we begin, as a species, with certain primitive intuitions and responses that may have been biological. But we have in addition to it a capacity that allow us to assess, synthesis, systematize, extend and in a few cases reject

those pre-reflective responses. Instead of sticking on to an idea of the physical world (that we receive through senses), we have progressively questioned them and developed methods of answering them that yield a picture of physical reality further and farther moved from appearance. We could not have done any of these things if we had not, as a species, have had a few pre-reflective beliefs about the numbers and the world.

Progress beyond this has required both the efforts of creative individuals and the communal activities of criticism, justification, acceptance and rejection. The motivating idea has been that there is always more to be discovered than our current intuitions or understandings are only a stage in an indefinite developmental process. This idea can be applied to ethics with a difference that ethics is meant to govern action, not just belief. In dealing with ethical problems our endeavour is to find out the best way of life and the best way of arrangement of social institutions. Therefore, ethics is connected with motivation. It begins not with pre-reflective ideas about what the world is like, but with pre-reflective ideas about what to do, how to live, and how to treat other people. It progresses by the subjection of these impulses to examination, codification, questioning, criticism and so on. The progress of earlier state is included as part of the socialization of members of later stage,

some of whom may make advances in turn. The ethical development in this case is not just intellectual but more a motivational, and it cannot be pursued exclusively by small groups of experts, as some scientific or technical subjects can be. Yet, the premise of this view of ethics as a subject of rational development can be criticised, justified and improved - in other words there is such a thing as practical reason. This means that we can reason not only about the most effective ways of achieving what we want but also about what we should want, both for ourselves and for others.²⁸ Alfred Mele gave a profound description of an action performed from motivation, (pre-ponderant motivation). One may claim, while talking about intention, that X intends to do A, because X is preponderantly motivated to A - more motivated to A than to do something incompatible. In his work on "Intending and the Balance of Motivation" , he denies this popular notion. In his first example Mele points out; Alex and Bob swear to become blood brothers, and Alex forms the intention to cut his hand here and now with a knife in the requisite way. He brings the knife down towards his palm to do so, only to find himself unable to proceed, defeated by his motivational condition.

On Mele's reading what one understands is that, before bringing down the knife, Alex forms the intention to

cut his hand here and now, but his failure to carry out the act indicates that he lacks preponderant motivation to do so. He does begin to perform the act, and this indicates he has preponderant motivation to begin it, but he has the intention to cut his hand while lacking preponderant motivation to do so. We can have an alternate understanding of Mele's case, as he himself admits; when Alex forms the intention and begins to bring down the knife, he is preponderantly motivated to cut his hand, but as he brings it down and gets close to the flesh, his motivation changes ! One form a few resolutions supported by what seems to be preponderant desire, and then find one's balance of motivation shift in the immediate presence of the relevant opportunity. This shows that we can form intentions on the basis of practical reasoning that runs contrary to our antecedent preponderant motivation, and in fact such reasoning can influence our motivational condition too.

Taking this view seriously, to some extent, we can say that Freud's conception of morality was right. Man by birth, is an instinctual being - of which aggression and eros are major ones. Today, scientists claim that neither in animate nor in inanimate being there exists a particle which is not found in the other. The history of human civilization shows that our ancestors too, like other animals were living

in constant fear of his own counter-parts as well as nature. He was as arrogant and aggressive as any other animals around him. Therefore, the urgent need of the day was courage and strategy to defeat his enemies. There existed suspicion, and fear of being attacked by other being like him as well as wild animals. To protect himself and his dependents the instinct-aggression - was brought forth into fore front; to strengthen his power the most urgent need was to increase the population, therefore, there actualised the potential erotic instinct. In this regard Foucault was almost in the same track in offering two axis of sexuality: 'disciplines of the body, of harnessing, intensification and distribution of force the adjustment and economy of energies. On the other hand ("sexuality") was applied to the regulation of population²⁹. Aggression is nothing but, to Freud, the inclination of the individual to get back to the stage from which he came into being - an inorganic state.

"If it is true that at some immeasurable remote time and in a manner we cannot conceive - life once proceeded out of inorganic matter, then according to our presumption, an instinct must have arisen which sought to do away with life once more and to re-establish the inorganic state."³⁰

Therefore, the antecedent preponderant motivation to fight, to be aggressive was forced to renounce (at least outwardly) by

the coming together of people to form a society. There came up, then, a new system - (although in the private life one still has those instincts and the preponderant motivation to carry them out) - due to the changes in his intentions as he, now, is being guided by practical reasoning. He, at once, obeys the norms and rules of the society, beginning with his own family elders. But, at times he feels victimised. He feels lack of freedom; although he has the freedom to choose what he wants ! He, being like other creatures, wants to be himself and carry on his impulses and intentions unhindered by anyone, and, here, moral precepts stand as an externally imposed burden to him. He gets into a conflict, either to be himself or to be distorted. He represses a few of himself. But then, when the pressure is far more to be himself than what he is forced to be, he breaks down. This was the reason of Freud's claim that moral precepts are external to man and he accepts it unwillingly.

Freud, on the whole was putative in considering that morality is only skin-deep with people. Freud was, perhaps, right in thinking that morality is something that comes to the individual from outside and that in the course of moral development it has to work its way downward, as it were, penetrate what is deeper and conquer what is intimate to

the individual. Individual, in this process of assimilation and civilization has to renounce something and has to be master over himself. He writes conspicuously:

"Whenever we sleep we cast off our hard-won morality like a garment only to put it on again next morning." ³¹

This view may seem contradictory to what he had already stated, elsewhere i.e. "those instincts in themselves are neither good nor evil". But this at a close analysis would assert once again that, the concepts of good and bad, right and wrong arises only in a civilized social human relationship. If man is left to himself free, (rather already left in his private life), then, these social moral codes are value neutral because it is left to the individual to judge them himself, to have his choices etc. And the individual choice is always that which gives him pleasure, that which gratify his desires. What our dreams show is that we have such pleasure propensities; but not that we are indifferent to having them, rather we repress them due to the fear of pangs of super-ego as well as the society. Perhaps, that could be the reason why Freud thought that self-mastery is "the highest achievement which is attainable by any human being." ³²
But, it should be a self-mastery with a mastery of self-awareness.

His ideas are more lucid in his discussion on 'Group Psychology', where he compares the actions of the individual to that of hypnotic trance where a person puts his will in commission, and entrusts it to the safe keeping of another person. Each individual has an inbuilt aspiration to be left as himself, this can be seen from the way individual lowers his standards-to the same old brutality - during war; when to people around him this is acceptable. A man who is caught up in a group relinquishes his individuality, (what he actually is), and his morality mark him off from rest of the people and creatures - the unthinkable, as an individual, is, now, actualised to survive as a social being. Obviously, a man's disapproval, if that disapproval is suspended he will cease to behave as he has done so far. It follows that such a behaviour was inspired by considerations not of moral, but self - such as prudence, fear (of loss of love), etc. This resounds in Freud's statement:

"We can find no difficulty in understanding the disappearance of conscience.... It has long been our contention that dread of society is the essence of what is called conscience".³³

Here, what Freud means is that in going with the group, the individual does not actually do what he always, inherently

wants to do, but on the other hand, he does it all for conscience. Two fundamental forces in man's life are 'eros' and 'aggression' - that which arises from death instincts. Eros is what gives life and he calls it 'the life instinct'. But he does not see that the life instinct or love as co-operating with what comes from outside in the name of morality. It is aggression that plays a crucial adjustmental role and not love. 'Conscience is aggression introjected on the self; it treats the ego with the same harshness the ego would like to exercise on others' (Freud: Civilization and its Discontents; p.105).

Freud, then, does not speak of values, but of conventions conceived as rules of behaviour. He speaks of admiration we attach to people for their qualities of characters, and also of our idealization of them, by which he means exaggerating the degree to which they have these qualities and minimizing the degree to which they may also have opposite qualities.³⁴ As he writes:

"A human being is seldom altogether good or bad; he is usually "good" in one relation and "bad" in another, or "good" in certain external circumstances and in others decidedly "bad".³⁵

This shows that the notions of good and bad, too, are the out-come along with the rise of a society, and more of it is felt necessary in a civilized society with its complex nature of human relations. This, perhaps, prove his far reaching claim that instincts are by nature neither good nor bad but are neutral. Hence, "conscience", Freud writes, "is no doubt something within us, but, it has not been there from the beginning"³⁶. What one, then, has with him from the beginning is these neutral instincts which are later classified as good or bad in the course of growth and development, (which of course differ from society to society and circumstance). As a result of which in course of time when the demands of the unconscious repressed urges superceeds those of moral norms - the conscience - one always collapses into, an unnoticed, conflict between what one wants to be and what one now is. He turns to be neurotic or psychotic, because "the dread of community" always makes him conscious of his social acceptance and rejection, and so he sticks to the moral demands more than to the demands of the unconscious. It is about this dread that Freud had written as follows:

"It cannot be a matter of astonishment ... that this relaxation of all the moral ties between the greater units of mankind should have a seducing influence on the morality of individuals;

for our conscience... in its origin is "dread of the community" and nothing else. When the community has no rebuke to make, there is an end of all suppression of the baser passions."³⁷

Therefore, to conclude, the task of psychoanalysis is to make the client (or the individual) aware of the existential condition in which one is and to encourage him to evoke a practical reasoning. Once the individual realises his own conflicts by 'himself' he can be left to himself to solve his own, further similar, conflicts. Perhaps, then, there is truth in Freud's talk about what one actually is and what one is forced to be by the external conditions and circumstances, because of which he turns abnormal. As he says:

"He is no longer conscious of his acts....He is no longer himself, he has become an automata who has ceased to be guided by his will".³⁸

Nonetheless, each man is free, each individual has freedom to 'be himself' in his private life (although, at social level it has its limit). If a man's conflicts remains unsolved in his private life, he becomes useless for a society and will not be able to lead a better social life a healthy human relation, (even if the conflict in his personal life was caused by

social restrictions on his freedom). The objective of psychoanalysis is, therefore, to enhance the individual in understanding his psychic conflicts and his existential surroundings scientifically, so that there will be no more unresolvable conflicts in the individual - between basic instincts (which originally, are neutral and later classified as perverse) and external (necessary) norms - there will be no more 'dread of community', but only willingness to be one among the group (society), channalising the instinctual energies appropriately for creative activities. Therefore, psycho-analysis inspires the individual to use his 'Freedom For' to achieve 'Freedom From' the bondage of conflicts and most urgent, primitive and repressed wishes; and that is the underlying spirit Freud shown in his 'Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood', "to blacken the radiant and grange the sublime into dust is no part of (the) purpose of psychoanalysis"³⁹.

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CHAPTER - IV

INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS

I

Almost all men have had dreams, yet a few could say with confidence what they really are, beyond agreeing that they occur during sleep. There has been various theories of sleep. Alcmaeon, a Greek physician of the fifth century B.C. said it was due to a retreat of the blood into the veins. Aristotle related sleep to the heart's activity and to "the evaporation attendant upon the process of nutrition." Modern theories, though, usually hold that sleep is necessary for the body and brain to rest, it, however, now, seems clear that sleep is not just a necessity for tired muscles, aching bones and brain. More metaphysical explanations include those which suggest that sleep is an opportunity for the soul or spirit to leave the body and travel - as easily to the future or past, as to remote places in the present. Dreams, they suggest, are real experiences of the soul.

According to Plato (in *Timaeus*), dreams are "visions within us ... which are remembered by us when we are awake and in the external world". Aristotle in his '*De Somniis*' said that, the dream is a kind of imagination and more particularly, one which occurs in sleep. Many writers had suggested that mental states are revealed by dreams, but there were little serious study of this idea till Sigmund Freud's view

of the unconscious added substantially new insights to the concept of dream. He declared dream as an outlet for natural urges and conflicts which social demands caused to be repressed. In sleep these socially unacceptable drives could be released in the form of dreams. Dream, if seems entirely meaningless, is because the content of the dream thought is so shocking and uncomfortable, so is disguised in order not to wake the dreamer. However, one will be able to understand Freud's theory of dreams, only if one understands his concept of working of conscious, preconscious and unconscious.

Each individual's mental interior may be like, in Freud's view, a house with two floors. Each floor is inhibited by a different family. The ground floor family i.e. the conscious is small, select and respectable. It is anxious to keep itself to itself, while at the same time to put up a good show before others. In this laudable endeavour it is continually troubled by the activities of the basement-the unconscious - which persists in an attempt to elevate itself in society by mixing up with the conscious activities.² The conscious always acts accordingly with the view of keeping these unpleasant desires and urges of the unconscious repressed. Therefore, the only option left for the unconscious is to take an opportunity to gratify itself, while one is asleep. But the psychic has its own censor; due to which the wishes take

a distorted and disguised form - altogether different from the real wishes - along with the remnants of the day experiences. This distorted form, then, easily crosses the censor and the wishes get fulfilled; that is the wishes are fulfilled through dreams.

Freud was impressed by the analogy he saw between the facts of hypnosis and the phenomena of hysteria, (under various experiments with Charcot and Breuer), that hysterical conditions can be produced and cured by hypnotic suggestions. Freud had heard from Breuer, neurologist, that a girl Anna O, who under the hypnosis recall events from her earlier life which she could not recall under normal circumstances. He wrote in paper 'on Hysterical mechanism', that "hysterical patients suffer principally from reminiscences". Although, the concept "unconscious" has been used by philosophers and other literary personalities in its Freudian sense, the concept was formulated, defended, amplified and modified by the therapeutic project of psychoanalysis.

Freud shows the legitimacy of using the term "unconscious", and exposes the intellectual prejudices of equating the psyche with what is only conscious. It is evident from the following words:

"These opponents had never witnessed the effect of a post-hypnotic suggestion, and they

were immensely surprised of the evidence I imparted to them gleaned from my analysis of un-hypnotised neurotics. They had never gained the conception of the unconscious as something which one does not really know, while cogent proofs force one to supplement this idea by saying that one understands by the unconsciousness, something concerning which one has not thought and which is not in the field of vision of consciousness."³

At least to this extent one must admit of Freud's exceptional intuition in pointing out conscious as discontinuous - that it is incomplete and contains gaps. His simplest model of example could be that, 'A' now thinks of a particular idea. Momentarily 'A' distracts the concentration and turns to some other thought. This second time 'A' is unaware of the idea which previously occupied his mind. The same idea is missing from conscious awareness, while 'A' is distracted by something else. But the "unconscious" has taken its part in the intervening period, as the consequence of which 'A' can recall it back again (if the thought is not so painful and not so much unwarranted). In his view point, all ideas, (thoughts or wishes or desires or whatever may be), of which we are ever conscious will be "unconscious" most of the time - certainly,

at any given time, all but a few ideas will be conscious. Hence, it is worth noting here that the term unconscious is used as a predicate of the object - the idea - rather than of the subject. However, he takes a leap from his contention, that all the ideas we are ever aware of will also, at other times, be ones of which we are unaware, to the view that there are unconscious mental processes to which ideas belong, of which we are unaware. Those who continue to equate psyche with what is conscious, to Freud, either cannot explain the 'gaps' in experience or are prone to explicate them in terms of physiology, which is nonphysical.⁴

Psyche in itself is unknowable. Some mental processes have conscious attributes or "qualities" which can be directly "perceived" or cognised. Any psychic process is unconscious if that cannot be perceived or directly known. There are different practical aspects of conscious psychic processes - such as thoughts, fears, memories, wishes, etc. Freud, thinks it legitimate to ascribe them to the unconscious psychic processes as well in order to maintain the continuity - to fill the "gap"; one then can speak of unconscious wishes, thoughts, feelings, etc. This is to be understood to mean that given a few conscious stimulus such and such unconscious psychic events - thoughts, memories, wishes - could be produced. In this sense, "unconscious" merely means the absence of a few psychic process that belongs to conscious. Hence, it is unconscious.



In order to illustrate, how the unconscious mental processes have a role in determining the conscious mental processes, Freud adopted the example of post-hypnotic suggestions. Under the hypnosis an individual is ordered to carry out a certain action at a certain moment after s/he is dehypnotised. On awakening the individual may have no conscious memory of any thing being done under hypnotic trans, yet, at the given moment would carry out the assigned task - perhaps irrelevant to the content, for eg. opening of the windows in a midwinter. But if the person is asked as to why s/he does it, would make an excuse by saying "it is too hot". However if asked, further with the contextual affirmation that, "it is too cold in here, why did you do that ?" would be puzzled for a while just to recollect and say "you have told me to do so." Freud saw no alternative, but to describe the order as "latent" or "unconscious" during post-hypnotic period. Albeit, it is not merely latent or absent, but both unconscious and active because the conscious execution of the order was eventuated due to the activity of the unconscious. The phrases 'unconscious and active' also serves to designate those ideas that are found in hysterical patients. It is principally with such pathological evidences that Freud introduced what he called the dynamic conception of "unconscious".

This dynamic conception of the 'unconscious' leads to a distinction between the conscious and the preconscious. The latter is those ideas which the individual is able to recall without much difficulty. The term unconscious proper, now designates those ideas which show evidence of having to remain inadmissible to conscious, as it is. In so far as the distinction between conscious and unconscious is descriptive the important line of division lies between conscious on the one hand and preconscious and unconscious on the other hand. But, for the dynamic sense of the unconscious, the line is between unconscious and preconscious ideas that serve as stepping stone for the appropriation of the term unconscious. What matters is not what an idea should be unconscious, but what has causal efficacy in relation to conscious mental states.⁵

However, Freud's study of the conscious/unconscious led him to the discovery of:

(1) The possibility of distinguishing between appearance and reality in the mental world.⁶ He was convinced that a person could really have a thought or desire or even (an unthought) memory of an unpleasant event and related feeling of aversion, yet not recognised by him, (but recognizable).

(2) It became clear to Freud that when (1) the person himself opposes it's recognition. He unwilling to face these wishes and events avoid them, (resist them), by repression.

(3) Freud was further struck by the way the content of a person's unconscious mind remain immune from considerations that otherwise (consciously) weigh with him. Thus an unconscious wish (erotic or aggressive) may remain dormant over a period of years, unaffected by the intervening passage of time and whatever may have occurred in the course of it.

(4) In refusing to equate appearance with reality in the mental world, Freud altered our vision about the contents of conscious. He enabled us to understand that some of these contents - the conscientious good show - as more apparent and incomplete. He has shown us that what appears to us as something new, as the outcome of something that has been all along with us. As Jung puts it:

"We are like those primitives who believe that every evening the sun dies and vanishes, and that if anything rises next morning, it is a new sun."⁷

(5) In his paper, 'The Unconscious', he wrote:

"Unconscious processes can only be observed by us under the conditions of dreaming and of neurosis; that is to say, when the processes of the higher systems of Pcs. revert to an earlier level by a certain processes of degradation (repression)"⁸

(6) The proper object of psychoanalytic theory may be defined as 'the unconscious' in the dynamic sense and explicitly distinguished from both conscious and preconscious. The unconscious differs from conscious in far more than a mere absence of consciousness. The character of conscious process is determined by that of unconscious processes.

Freud's perception, therefore, was that one cannot apprehend the hidden meaning of one's utterances and actions, so long as one is not aware of the unconscious processes which cause one to say or do something. This means that, in any case we cannot, by means of the logic of conscious ratiocination, adequately grasp the dislogic of unconscious - although we can understand the logic of unconscious by means of the dislogic of the conscious

actions and utterances or behaviours. Here it would be right to go with Ernest Jones in saying:

"Careful students of Freud have perceived that Freud's revolutionary contribution to psychology was not so much his demonstrating the existence of the unconscious, and perhaps, not even his exploration of its content, as his proposition that there are two fundamentally different kind of mental processes, which he termed primary and secondary respectively, together with the description of them".⁹

It is, now, quite clear that Freud was not simply redefining the entire psyche as an unconscious mind in addition to the conscious mind. Human beings possess unconscious, not as a second mind, but as an unthinking-desirous-core, formulating or insisting to formulate all that a person (consciously) say or perform or be in.

II

In Indian psychology, dreams are considered to be presentative cognition during sleep, though they have no objective counterpart in reality. Some of them are peripherally excited and others are centrally excited. The peripherally excited may be called the dream-illusion and the centrally excited, dream hallucination, after James Sully. Dreams according to Nagasena is a kind of suggestion coming across the path of the mind.¹⁰

Nevertheless, generally speaking all dreams according to Buddhism, are classified under four heads:

1. Dreams due to organic and muscular turbulences generally occur to persons whose nature is full of flatulent, phlegmatic or the bilious (Dhatukkobbha) - including dreams of a fall over a precipice, flying into the sky etc. (this also includes what is called night-mare).

2. Recurrence of the previous incidents, activities and events due to previous experiences (Anubhuta pubba) - including echoes of past waking experiences.

3. There are some dreams due to the spirit-influence. Dreams, here, drew suggestions from spiritualistic agencies (Devatopasamhāsa) - including dream coincidences.

4. Dreams with foregoing signs; prophetic dreams due to the clairvoyant character of the dreamers (pubbanimitta).

It would be easier to proceed from here, since my major task is with psychoanalysis than Indian psychology, to see how far Freud's dream theory is different from it. First of all any one may note that the entire dream theory of Freud was formulated around the concentrated functioning of the unconscious. His theory of 'interpretation of dreams' was to construe the content of the unconscious - which are the causes of hysteria or other mental disorders.

Freud, too, partly, suggests of the potential impact of waking experience on dream-work, to formulate a dream disguised of its latent content. As he writes about the dream-work.

"... This day remanant is transformed into a dream by the dream-work and in this way rendered harmless to sleep. But in order to make possible its employment by the dream-work, this day remanant must be capable of being cast into the form of a wish, a condition that is not too difficult to fulfill. The wish emanating from the dream-thoughts forms the first step and later on the nucleus of the dream."¹²

To Freud, therefore, wishes are the emanatory causes of dreams and dreams are the peracute fulfillment of (pend-up) wishes. There are two kinds of wishes fulfilled here. (1) Fulfilment of psychological wishes, which could not be fulfilled in waking life due to the conscience or super-ego and the surroundings. (2) This is a biological necessity and, therefore, a psychological wish i.e. 'the wish to sleep', is fulfilled by the distortion of the dream-thought into a harmless dream, by the dream-work. This is more evident from his statement in 'Revision of dream theory', he writes as follows:

"This piece of the dream-work gives us information about some of the most striking and peculiar features of dreams ... the wish to sleep and intentional turning away from the external world. Next, two consequences of it is for the mental apparatus: first, the possibility for older and more primitive methods working to emerge in it - regression; secondly, the lowering of the resistance due to repression which weighs down upon the unconscious. As a result of this last factor the possibility arises for the formation of a dream and this

is taken advantage of by the precipitating causes, the internal and external stimuli which have become active. The dream which originates in this way is already a compromised structure. It has a double function, on the one hand it is ego-syntonic, since, by getting rid of the stimuli which are interfering with sleep, it serves the wish to sleep; on the other hand it allows a repression instinctual impulse to obtain the satisfaction that is possible in these circumstances, in the form of the hallucinated fulfillment of wish. The whole process of forming a dream which is permitted by the sleeping ego is, however, subject to the condition of the censorship, which is exercised by the residue of the repression still in operation¹³.

From the above, it is clear of the purpose of dream and what kind of wishes are fulfilled by dreams through dream-work. Freud too, however, speaks of the impact of telepathy and thought transference, on dreams; albeit, he would not attribute to it the quality of predictability or would not consider dreams to be prophetic in nature, as Buddhists'

talk of prognosticatory dreams. He nevertheless, admits with willingness to accept the lack of knowledge as to how it happens - the effect of telepathy in dreams.

Telepathy is an event which occurs at a particular time, at about the same moment, to the consciousness of someone distant in space, without the modes of communication those are familiar to us. It is also presupposed, implicitly, that this happens to the person in whom the other one - the sender of the message - has a strong emotional interest. To Freud, telepathy does not throw any fresh light on the nature of dreams, nor do dreams give any direct evidence of the reality of telepathy. But the reason of his discussion of dream with telepathy is that the state of sleep seems, particularly, suitable for receiving telepathic message. In which case one can have a telepathic dream ! But, it is interesting to note here, that the telepathic news changes as to adjust and accommodate itself with the unconscious wishes, by the dream-work, and uses it in order to fulfill the unconscious wishes. In his 'Dreams and Telepathy' (1922), he gave the following case study to as though to prove his belief in

the working possibility of telepathy:

"An obviously intelligent man, who was not in the least 'inclined towards occultism' wrote to me about a dream he had had which seemed to him remarkable. He began by informing me that his married daughter, who lived at a distance from him was expecting her first confinement in the middle of December. This daughter mean a great deal to him and he knew too that she was very much attached to him. During the night of November 16-17, then, he dreamt that his wife had given birth to twins... The wife who in the dream had become the mother of twins was his second wife, his daughter's step mother. He did not wish to have a child by his present wife who, he said, had no aptitude for bringing up children sensibly; moreover, at the time of the dream he had long ceased to have sexual relations with her... what induced him to report this dream to me was the circumstances that on the morning of November 19, he received a telegram announcing that his daughter had given birth to twins... the birth had taken place during the night of November 16-17, at about the same time at which he had had the dream of his wife's twin birth... He believed his daughter would certainly have 'thought particularly of him' during her labour."¹⁵

In the above example, Freud points out two possibilities. The man concerned was first of all, dissatisfied with his second wife and often entertained the thought of his second wife to be more sober as the daughter of his first wife. So now, in sleep, the telepathic message arrived to say that his daughter had given birth to twins. The dream-work took control over the news and allowed the unconscious wish to operate with it. Hence, he could fulfill by the dream, his wish of having a wife like that of his daughter. Freud, yet gives another possibility. The man's latent dream-thought might have been: 'Today is the day the confinement should take place if my daughter is really out in her reckoning by a month, as I suspect. When I saw her last she looked just as though she was going to have a twins. How my dead wife who was so fond of children would have rejoiced over twins¹⁶'. He, however, points out that the interpretation of dreams would say nothing on the question whether we should allow objective reality to telepathy; although that the interpretation of dreams of psychoanalysis may reveal a telepathic event which we should not have otherwise discovered - but before deciding in favour of any such conclusions one must have a thorough - going investigation of all the possible circumstance of the case !

Freud's dream analysis, however, is different from traditional dream interpretation, in which each symbol is fixed for a specific thing or event. As far as Freud's dream interpretation is concerned one is not to follow from the symbol to pre-predicted meaning but from symbols to the unconsciously associated meaning of it. In 1886 a contemporary of Freud, Raphael gave an occult interpretation of dreams. He was of the opinion that when the sensual and moral parts of men are inactive the soul shines forth, and produces certain impression upon the brain, these impressions are dreams. Everything has a purpose and, Raphael too, concluded like our Indian thinkers that dreams have prophetic messages in them. In his introduction to the 'Book of Dreams', he gave a detailed description of cipher method of dream interpretation. Here the dreamer is asked to draw ten rows (in two sets as 5,5) of ciphers, without counting them, so that the numbers of the ciphers may be left to chance; ciphers can be set down as it were, at random, no matter how roughly they are made. For e.g.

<u>Line</u>	<u>Ciphers</u>	(<u>Sign. 1</u>)
1. 0 0 0 0 0	5	0
2. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	7	0
3. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	9	0
4. 0 0 0 0 0 0	6	0 0
5. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	7	0
		(<u>Sign 2</u>)
6. 0 0 0 0 0 0	6	0 0
7. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	8	0 0
8. 0 0 0 0 0 0	6	0 0
9. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	8	0 0
10. 0 0 0 0 0	5	0

If the number of the ciphers in the first line be 'odd' then mark 'one' cipher and if 'even' then two. This method should be followed for each line in the first set of five and then separately on to the second set of the five. Now, having found out two sets of signs by ciphers, place them side by side to figure out an index, from the table of indexes, by the same procedure of 'odd' 'even' as follows:

<u>Sign 1</u>	<u>Sign 2</u>	<u>Index</u>	Jove *
0	0 0	0	
0	0 0	0	
0	0 0	0	
0 0	0 0	0 0	
0	0	0 0	

Table of Indexes

<u>Aries</u>	<u>SOI</u>	<u>Taurus</u>	<u>Jove*</u>	<u>Gemini</u>	<u>Luna</u>	<u>Cancer</u>	<u>Saturn</u>
0 0	0 0	0	0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0
0 0	0 0	0	0	0 0	0	0	0 0
0 0	0	0	0	0	0 0	0 0	0 0
0 0	0	0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0
0 0	0	0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0

<u>Leo</u>	<u>Mars</u>	<u>Virgo</u>	<u>Mercu</u>	<u>Libra</u>	<u>Venus</u>	<u>Scorpio</u>	<u>Pallas</u>
0	0	0 0	0	0	0	0 0	0 0
0 0	0 0	0	0 0	0	0	0	0 0
0 0	0 0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0
0 0	0 0	0	0	0 0	0	0	0
0 0	0	0 0	0	0	0 0	0	0

<u>Sagitt</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Capri</u>	<u>Ceres</u>	<u>Aqua</u>	<u>Vesta</u>	<u>Pisces</u>	<u>Diana</u>
0	0	0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0	0 0
0	0	0 0	0	0 0	0	0 0	0 0
0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0	0
0 0	0 0	0	0	0 0	0	0 0	0 0
0 0	0	0	0	0	0 0	0 0	0

<u>Medusa</u>	<u>Phoe^e- cus</u>	<u>Hecate</u>	<u>Appollo</u>	<u>Farturn</u>	<u>Neptune</u>	<u>Orion</u>	<u>Finis</u>
0 0	0	0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0	0
0	0 0	0 0	0	0 0	0	0	0
0 0	0 0	0	0	0	0	0 0	0 0
0 0	0	0	0 0	0	0 0	0	0
0	0 0	0 0	0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0

The index found here, is Jove. Each index has different possibilities of which here sign 1 and sign 2 are also possibilities; what is given in index Jove against Sign 1 and sign 2 is the interpretation of the dream (here all the possibilities cannot be given due to the lack of space). The

interpretation of the above sorted out dream, therefore, is "thou mayest expect anger or angry words from this vision."¹⁷

Freud, however, was in disagreement with then existing methods of dream interpretation, of that one was cipher method. He calls them 'unscientific' because these theories of dreams are not pertaining to that of psychic activity, but ~~of~~ somatic processes which make itself known to the psychic apparatus by means of symbols'.¹⁸ There are 'essentially' different methods of this unscientific version of dream-interpretation. The first one, 'envisages the dream-content as a whole, and seek to replace it by another content which is intelligible and in certain respects analogous'. This is symbolic dream interpretation.¹⁹ Here, then the motive for symbolic interpretation is 'the future', because the dream is a prophetic message which need to be translated into the future meaning, to avoid the predicted unwanted consequences. But the way in which one arrives at this kind of symbolic interpretation is vague and in this case the success of interpretation is a matter of ingenious conjecture; of direct intuition.

The second of these methods is the cipher method of which above demonstrated is one. Here, dreams are considered as secret codes. So, every sign is transcribed into another signs of known meaning, according to the established key.

In some of such dream interpretations not only the dream-content is taken into account but also the social position and status of the dreamer. This indicates that essentially the interpretation is not done to the entirety of the dream, separately. Gomperts, like others distinguished between his own art of interpretation, basing on observation and experiment, from that of what he considers to be fraudulent dream-interpretations. Gompertz's method, to Freud, is identical with that of magic i.e. the principle of association. Here, in this method the meaning of a dream is that which is recalled to the memory of the 'dream-interpreter', of which Freud was dissatisfied and pulled up the thread to put it the other way round i.e. the meaning of the dream (of each fragment) is that which is recalled to the memory of 'the dreamer'. This is so, because he understood from his psychoanalytic experience that dreams may be interpolated in the psychic concatenation.

Each dream, then, is a symbolic expression of unconscious ungratified wishes; of course, the same symbol

may have different meaning for different individual on the basis of the unconscious variations. Freud's notion of dream and it as a symptomatic expression distinguishes it from the rest of accounts' given by others. Each and every dream, though it may at times seem meaningless, connectionless and vulgar, has a manifest content and a latent content or dream thought. The only way to arrive at this latent-dream thought is through a backward journey from the manifest content. In doing this Freud isolated each term or complex ideas in the dream, separately, one by one and associate with what each of these terms or symbolic ideas leads the dreamer to think of. This is quite clear from his introductory lectures, a 'tertium comparationis'; that is to say, each association leads to some unstated 'P_s', and provide a point of co-relation between the given and the unstated P_s (the latent-content). The next step in his method, is to put all the different associations together to assign a meaning to the dream-report as a whole."²⁰ The various associations and the 'P_s' to which they severally lead, operate in a qualifying manner upon one another; and although isolates the elements from one another and associates to each in turn, the final conclusion or interpreted meaning of the entire dream is not a stringing together of separate meaning

but the condensed fleeting idea deciphered from all the separate ideas or aspects. However, given all the unconscious desires or repressed wishes, if we are to predict as to what the possessor of them will dream, we are in a vain attempt. It is possible for one to move in Freudian account from symbolic manifest content to the latent-dream thought, but it is impossible to proceed from dream thought so as to construct an exact dream !

III

Indeed, Freud was a neurologist, who landed up in Paris as a bright young neurologist and returned to Vienna as a pioneer in psychopathology, after a short visit to Charcot the master of neurology and the napoleon of the neuroses. It was Charcot, the typical precursor, who (in 1885-86) revealed to the twenty-nine year old visiting physician about the new existing possibilities of interpretation, experimentation, and even treatment of hysteria by the use of hypnosis.²¹ Nevertheless, Freud deviated himself from hypnotic treatment to free-associative method. It should also be not forgotten that in his time there was very little knowledge of the nervous system and its physiology, and consequently, most of the hypotheses and theories advanced by Freud's speculative neurology were left to be investigated and confirmed by experiments only years later - such as the work of wilder penfield.²² Penfield has shown that electrical stimulation of focal areas of the brain could not only elicit motor responses but ideotional material in the form of memories, visual imagery and auditory experiences.²³ Perhaps, the most significant discoveries ever made by Penfield was that not only past events are recorded in detail, but also that the feelings that were associated with them. An event and the associated feeling are inextricably

blended or tied together in the brain that one cannot be ignored while the other is evoked.²⁴ Recollections are evoked by the stimuli of day-to-day experience, in much the same way that of artificial probe evocation. In each case the evoked recollection can be more accurately described as 'reliving'. In response to the induced stimulus the individual is momentarily displaced into the past. S/he feels that s/he is experiencing that memory event, which is (artificially) activated, with the same feeling s/he once had had. This may last for a few fraction of seconds; or even more. In artificial reliving, feelings are spontaneous and involuntary while remembering involves a conscious and voluntary effort of the person in bringing forth the past events or the wishes he set aside due to certain social and psychological constraints. Dream, could be also due to the stimulation (reliving) of certain memory nerve cells, or neurons in the cerebral cortex along with other cells. The natural stimulator, here, could be chemical alterations within the central nervous system - such as psychoendocrines and neurotransmitters. Any psychological calamities produce certain chemical disturbances or disorders. These disturbances in turn stimulate brain centres that are linked to the memory traces - both pre-conscious and unconscious.²⁵ The stimulation of certain cells consisting of one's past

experience - even wishes that are yet to be fulfilled and those present analogous conflicts due to which one is disturbed - may lead one to have dreams, (which, to Freud, gratifies the unsatisfied wishes), after being under the process of rationalization (or censorship) in frontal lobe. However, Freud's biological concern, as a neurologist, can be really noticed from his writings on depression (in 1917) in his 'Mourning and Melancholia', where he talks of depression, that may lead one to some sort of dreams which helps in satisfying wish fantasies, from two vantage points. He wrote that the melancholic's self-criticisms is a correct description of his psychological situation and at the same time he stated that,

"What is probably a somatic factor, and one which cannot be explained psychologically, makes itself visible in the regular amelioration in the condition that takes place towards evening."²⁶

Here Freud specifically singled out the diurnal variations as somatically and not psychogenitically determined; which clinicians would now conclude with an assertion that disturbances in appetite, sleep and sexual interest are due to the chemical alterations within the central nervous system.

Therefore, the insight of Freud need to be appreciated for it is evident from modern advanced studies that when a clinician extrapolates any affective disorder, this paradigm suggests a mechanism whereby early childhood experiences such a loss of love, castration anxieties, object loss, etc. could result in permanent alterations in nervous system's biochemical (receptor) functions which might not become clinically evident for years.²⁷ But, Freud, due to the lack of advanced informations pertaining to neurology and biology could do only a speculative neurology that, of course, served as a prototype for further research.

After having seen Freudian view of neurology, his consideration of man both as a psychological and a biological being and his theory of dream that he uses effectively in his analysis, one may be tempted to ask, if we can proceed in the line of Artificial intelligence. One may ask, if it is possible to bring out a particular instance (here it is the symptoms) given the anterior (cause); as much as a computer (Fobot) acts solely on the ground of the inputs or feedings or conditioned logical possibilities - may it be even 'squidgy' logic/geometry or whatever. A computer acts purely on a mechanical foundation, on pre-ordained memories.

In Freud's therapy, too, the unconscious seems to be of similar in nature. In his explanation, (psychic) behaviours are caused by unconscious wishes, desires, etc. That is to say, once upon a time, that which is now repressed was consciously fed into and slowly it has been repressed or even assimilated, and now direct the action spontaneously without the person's being consciously aware of it.

It is true to an extent that through a mechanical model one can understand things better and that mechanical model of things, events, behaviours etc. satisfy us because that enhance our apprehension with less effort.²⁸ Psychoanalysis similarly seems to be a mechanical modelling, in which a set of particular unconscious wishes (inputs) bring forth the subsequent mode of life, behaviour and dreams (outputs). There would be no harm in understanding human psychic mechanically, although a danger lies in reducing them purely in Artificial intelligence model. Truly, one may assume human being(s) to be mechanical being(s) as far as the biological functions are concerned. Indeed, man is a mechanical as well as a social being. Human brain like the 'silicon neuron'²⁹ and soft ware of a sophisticated computer (Robot) has neurons or nerve cells. Each nerve cell has a number of filaments known as dendrites. One of these is quite longer and finer than other ones - the axon. It is through the axon that

stimulus passes to the next neuron in the chain. The spinal cord, like a highway, helps in passing the stimulus. Apart from these, human cerebral hemispheres have different lobes, - frontal lobe, parietal lobe, occipital lobe, temporal lobe, thalamus, hypothalamus, etc. which help, one, in responding to (an exciting) stimuli, automatically, through the effector nervous system. This seems to assure us of the mechanical similarity between the brain of a man and that of a computer - because man's brain, in principle, in so far as taking decisions (outputs) to the stimuli (inputs), operates in a similar manner as that of a computer. But there is a diverging point right in here. Man does not take decisions purely on the basis of the mechanical responses to the stimuli, by the brain; they are taken considering many other factors, because he is a social being. This (external) factors that influence his mechanical (neurological or biological) response cause, sometimes, the individual behave unlike the manner in which he was originally instructed by the particular response of the brain. Moreover, individual differences is to be taken into consideration in the case of human beings. Due to individual differences and different natures of human being(s), actions or attitudes of any given individual at any given moment cannot be predicted. Therefore, there is no quest of the possibility of given $X \rightarrow Y$.

However, while a human being responds (acts) to (the stimulus of the unconscious, he is potentially aware of what he is unaware of and about what he is aware of - the actions or the event in which he is involved actively; for e.g. one may have a dream of a dream or a dream about a dream or a dream that his dream is nothing but just a dream. But this awareness of awareness is completely vague in the case of a programmed machine. Freud's (pathological) man, too, is conditioned - for the unconsciously determined thoughts, wishes etc. are the source of pathogenesis. But, the major task of a psychoanalyst is, as was Freud's, to help the patient come out of the trauma, making them consciously aware of their obsessions, neurosis, etc. of which one is aware as the performer, and those thoughts and wishes they kept repressed. Once this awareness is achieved the trauma vanishes; no more obsessions, no more neurosis and no more hysteria, etc. until the next episode of repression begins. This bringing into conscious awareness is not carried out in isolation to the patient's family background, environment, society, etc. in which he is either accepted or rejected due to one or other reasons; for the whole endeavour of psychoanalysis is to help one live in a society, with other members of the society, with less conflicts and more knowledge of oneself. Therefore, Freud's depiction of the function of human mind cannot be completely reduced

to the model of the 'artificial intelligence' of a sophisticated machine, deprived of the richest aspects of human life viz. freedom to be and emotions. They light up our lives and darken our days, they give tone to our experience and colour to our passing moments. And, I am sure, Freud would never prescribe such a complete reduction, for throughout his career he was interested in freeing man from the grip of any determinant or conditioning factor in life, which may in due course produce one more psychic!

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CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

Throughout history one readily notices that man has been troubled everywhere and he is constantly seeking for outright solutions to his problems - personal, social, national and global. In the midst of it he poses for a moment to ponder about "the meaning of Life". One's conviction of the so-called real nature of man, inevitably affects his formulation of purpose and meaning of life. There are, indeed different conclusions about the purpose and meaning of life; as to what one ought to do and how should one do it, etc. However, an external perspective, detached of any system, would make it pretty clear that only one impression of human nature has been persistent despite the conflicting views and controversies i.e. man is a multiple natured creature. Each and everyone, therefore, is engaged in explicating one or other of his natures, which one thinks to be the dominant; so said Somerset Maugham:

"When I look over the various parts of my character with preplexity, I recognize that I am made up of several persons and that the person that at the mement has the upper hand will inevitably give place to another. But which is the real one ? All of them or none ?"

One such great personality to point out one of the dominant natures of man was Sigmund Freud, who appeared on the scene in early twentieth century with his thought provoking new scientific theory - psychoanalysis. One of his most important contributions was that there exists in each individual a warring psyche; a war between 'what one ought (morally) to be' and 'what he actually wants to be'. He spent nearly fifty years in formulating and modifying his theories. He aimed at a 'scientific weltanschauung,' which explains the universe with 'intellect working - over carefully scrutinized observations'. "A scientific weltanschauung", he writes:

"is an intellectual construction which solves all the problems of our existence uniformly on the basis of one over-riding hypothesis which accordingly, leaves no question unanswered and in which everything that interests us finds its fixed place".²

Psychoanalysis as a 'specialist science, 'depth-psychology' or 'the psychology of the unconscious', to him, must accept a scientific weltanschauung. He rejected any knowledge claim based on religion, revelation or divination. They are, to him, illusions and as shown in 'Totem and Taboo' the fulfilment of unconscious wishes, impulses, etc. A total scientific

research, to him, would be incomplete devoid of human intellect and mind as its subject of study, and therefore,

"Psychoanalysis has a special right to speak for the scientific weltanschauung at this point, since it cannot be reproached with having neglected what is mental in the picture of the universe."³

One of the tasks of a scientific enterprise is to take note of the fact that human mind has certain demands and as the consequence of which produces some views like religion and so on. It should, therefore, be ready to examine their sources. But this sort of scientific enquiry into the nature and origin of them, is not to justify them any way, but on the contrary to carefully separate between knowledge and illusory emotional products. However, there has been lot of paltry and somewhat irrelevant criticism of the scientific status of Freudian psychology. If Wittgenstein had his reservations in supporting Freud, it was because he thought it to be no more than speculation, which is even prior to the formulation of hypothesis. Timpanaro, on the other hand, accuses psychoanalysis, as

"The captious and sophisticated method resistant to any verification, quick to force interpretations to secure pre-ordained proofs"⁴.

But, as I've shown in my chapter on 'The scientific status of Freudian psychoanalysis', neither Wittgenstein nor Timpanaro, nor any one like Popper, Cioffi could reject Freudian theory as unscientific, because each of their ideas were coloured by their view of what do science mean. The perspective view they had on science was the model of natural science in which experimentation, verification and prediction could be made readily available. But Freud himself rejected that kind of a view. He, even would not claim psychoanalysis to be a theory which gives causal explanation in its natural science sense of the term; although he believes it to be a better therapy for it not only cures the disorders but also takes into account the totality of analysand's life experience, society, culture, etc. into consideration while analysing. There is neither any quick cure nor any complete cure but only an endeavour to make the uncommon unhappiness in one's life the common unhappiness; after which the patient recovers from the trauma, realising that all that s/he experiences is also part of one's life which s/he need to accept willingly and face boldly. His theory is scientific

not because he adopted scientific methods, but because he had first of all duplicated some of the procedural characteristics of physics and used it efficiently and systematically in formulating his theory. Secondly he at least tried to give a (partial) emanative causal explanation of the mental disorders and other works of phantasies - like religion, intuition, slips, wit, etc. He but, never appreciated and supported the experimental studies for the verification of psychoanalytic assertions, because these assertions are independent of experimental verification, as I've shown, in chapter two.

The person is an entity and life a process; in which there is a persistent conflict between what one, consciously or unconsciously wants to be and what one is or has made of oneself, due to the situation into which one is thrown. In order to understand this process, then, we have to take into account a few major interactions between the past, present and future; between the conscious, preconscious and the unconscious systems of mind, between what one wants (wishes) to be and what he actually made of himself (unwillingly). In his expatiation of morality, Freud has evinced the development of super-ego (the conscience). Super-ego is a part of Ego. It is rather the

aggression which Ego would like to enjoy on others turned inward. In his 'Civilization and its Discontents' Freud had shown that the moral precepts and social norms are external to individual psyche. Man has mainly two instincts - eros and thanatos. These instincts are neither good nor bad in itself, but neutral. Freud's idea, surely was not to let the individual freely carry out his instinctual free play. But to help him channelise these instincts to make him more creative. He was of the opinion that if the individual is left to himself, he would not bother for moral norms; rather behave as he desires. Freud's insight, perhaps, was true to some extent that instincts are neutral, because the concept of right and wrong, good and bad (for that matter, normal and abnormal), differ widely from society to society or culture to culture. Neither was he talking of a biological determinism nor of individual autonomy in the sense of a complete isolation from the main stream social affairs.

However, he was the master of 'be yourself'; understand yourself; learn to be one among the society consciously recognizing one's own psychic make up and the social demands. He also in his scientific endeavour admitted it willingly that only a knowledge of reality can

help progress in human life and society not an eschatological hope. But at the same time he was cautious, unlike Karl Marx, in not destroying religion or other revelatory authorities and myths - the only source of the unscientific man's moral life - without providing them with an adequate scientific knowledge. Nonetheless, one should not be confused or carried away by thinking that his attempt was to release individual free of all responsibilities and moral obligations. It is, indeed, true that Freud believes that moral precepts are skin-deep in man, for they are externally imposed on him at first and then later on carried out by the individual as he assimilates it with a feeling of himself as the authority who imposes those norms and obligations on him. Freud, was in no way condemning the society for moral precepts. What psychoanalysis aims at is, rather, to bring back the mentally disordered into the social life, after administration of an adequate dose of psychoanalysis. Mental conflict begins when the biological man is asked to set aside his inherent natures (instincts) to be a social man, which in turn deprives him of many pleasures in life. He, then, instead of observing his psychic processes begin self-reflection in which he uses his critical faculties - as a defence mechanism in order to repress the painful - and begin to reject some of the thoughts that comes to

consciousness. As a result of that he begin to condemn himself and punish himself for the guilt he felt, for he thinks (for example), he is responsible for all that should not happen had happened. Freud's task, here was to help an individual to catharsis of self-defeating prejudiced thoughts and to help one to get rid of unwarranted part of the psyche and demeanours.

The underlying current in the whole of psychoanalytic principle is the unconscious. Unconscious need not to be taken as a second mind as existentialists or Simone Weil thinks of Freudian notion to be.⁵ Weil takes the subconscious (the unconscious) to be 'a container in our soul' that contains the repressed motives and wishes. However, she had made a conceptual mistake in equating unconscious with subconscious. The equation, perhaps, would not be accepted by Freud, because it stands for a sub-conscious. Only with Freud's pre-conscious - less sullied, measured against the unconscious and can be brought to conscious with little effort-sub-conscious can be equated with, if at all possible. In reality, in conscious state, one is neither aware of what is in the unconscious at all, nor are the natures of conscious and

the unconscious same that they can go together. She also thinks that the term repression can be retained and the 'subconscious' can be done away with. But to me, it is the collective repressed wishes, motives, desires, etc. that which give birth to the unconscious; certainly not as a container, but as the name of this collectivity. What Freud did by his formulation and expostulation of the unconscious was the filling of the gap in the mind - between the present and the past, remembered and set aside etc. The unconscious is not a new entity, just as the conscious is not an old one. One may talk of a person's mind, as though an entity, in reference to his emotions, intelligence, sentiments, etc. But mind is not an entity with any kind of concrete substantial unity; although there is an unity of all those abstract mental phenomena. This could be true of the unconscious too. This unity is further stabilised by the continuity of memories, beliefs, intentions, etc. that push and regulate one's activities from a centre. Here, we are not referring to any unconscious entity apart from discrete memories, beliefs, intentions etc. those are an 'active' part of us, that directs our actions - symptamological, substitutional, sublimational, dreams, wit, etc. - without our recognizing


the force of them. Thus, the unconscious is a collective name for the aspects of our lives to which we have special relation, because what drives us to a special goal or frustrates the pursuit of our conscious goals is an aspect of an agent himself. Hence, unconscious is neither a second mind nor completely a new entity. But, it is a continuation of one's consciousness. Freud but did not claim the credit for the discovery of the unconscious, as he acknowledged it on his seventieth birth day:

"The poets and philosophers before me discovered the unconscious. What I discovered was a scientific method by which the unconscious can be studied."

One of the classic rejoinders to this claim is that of Fyodor Dostoevsky's character Raskolnikov in his 'Crime and Punishment'.

To take a leap from here would be to land on Freud's Theory of dreams, apart from other mental (disorder) processes. Dreams to him, unlike his predecessors, serves in the fulfillment of repressed wishes. Dreams involve (imaginative) representation of something like experience, belief, feeling, etc. After the association of manifest content with that of the latent content, it evidences us further

that dreams are caused by wishes. The dream is, then an imaginative or as Wittgenstein calls it a camouflaged gratification of a desire (or wish-fulfilment). Freud, remarked that in wishfulfilment there is a sort of identification of that which is already being repressed, yet unnoticed (latent content), with familiar objects and represented in the manifest content. However, if a person is represented that involve symbolism, metaphor or likeness to what s/he stands for etc.; because the wishes cannot be fulfilled in reality due to some social factors.

Freud used terms like express, represent, imitate, realize, allude, fulfill, gratify, etc. apart from 'causal' in connection with 'wish-fulfilment'. He held that these are necessarily connected with wish-fulfilment, for wish-fulfilment express wishes which not only caused them but also represent them as fulfilled, gratified or realized. He used the term imitate, because representation as cited above, may involve an (imaginary) imitation. He used the term allude or announce, because wishfulfilment representation can be said to announce or allude  the latent content. Hence, Freud's use of these terms were not to escape refutation as Cioffi suggests.⁶

Today we are in the grasp of a mechanical world; trying to apprehend every thing in scientific mechanical terms. There are lot of researches around to construe if dreams are due to certain endocrinal alterations. As a matter of fact researchers have more or less proved it to be so, as I've pointed in my chapter on Freud's interpretation of dreams. Some scientists believe that dreams help consolidate the memories and learning of previous day, while others think of dreams as a mechanism for allowing busy brain cells to recharge their depleted stocks of transmitter chemicals. However, Freud's conception of dream as the fulfilment (output) of the latent wish (input), might lead us to get another question of the reducibility of Freud's theory to the model of Artificial intelligence. No doubt, Freud was doing a (speculative) neurology; which modern researchers on brain and neurotransmitters prove concretely. But, this model reduction is unsuitable and would be done, if at all, only on the basis of a misunderstanding of psychoanalytic theory as a whole and it's treatment and consideration of man. Man, to some extent is a mechanical being, but he is more a social being. He builds his life from two perspectives - internal and external. From internal perspective, he carries out his desires, actions,

etc. and lives a sentimental, emotional and passionate life. However, from his external perspective he evaluates all his commitments and actions held on or done from internal perspective because he is a social being and in order to escape the pangs of his own super-ego as well as to be a being adjustable in the society, he represses a few socially unwanted elements in him. These repressions can be gratified, but, only through diverse wish-fulfilment processes, such as dreams, obsessions, hysteria, etc. Hence, there is no harm in trying to understand man, specially the behavioural reactions in the brain, mechanically. But we cannot reduce man in the study of his psyche or behaviour purely on a computer model because though human body is world's most advanced machine, yet human mind is more sophisticated than any brilliant computer of the world. Freud's view of psychoanalysis as a science interested in the history of the individual and rejection of psychiatry due to its modelling with purely mechanical operation and it's interest in the conditions common to given symptoms could be noticed from his statement in the 'Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis':

"Psychiatry ... in pointing to heredity gives us a general and remote aetiology instead of

first disclosing the more specific and immediate one."⁷

Therefore, Freud's theory as a whole, is directed to help us to have a better understanding of ourselves. Although there are controversies and debates, I remain convinced that his structuring of mind is novel. It helps one to take a fruitful scientific perspective towards aberrant and normal human conduct. What, all, psycho-analysis mean is that although there can be serious studies of human being, these cannot be experimentally carried out.

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