

**NAMES AND PARTICULARS:
A STUDY IN DIGNĀGA AND WITTGENSTEIN**

By

AJIT KUMAR DAS

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

**SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENT OF THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

To



**DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
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
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Ajit Kumar Das



PHONE :
GRAMS : NEHU

North-Eastern Hill University

Mayurbhanj Complex, Nongthymmai, Shillong-793014

Department of

Dr. Netrananda Malla
Professor of Philosophy

Certified that the subject matter of this dissertation entitled "Names and Particulars: A Study in Dignaga and Wittgenstein", is the record of work done by Ajit Kumar Das under my supervision, and this work is neither based on any award or previous degree to him, nor to the best of my knowledge, submitted anywhere by anybody else.

In habit and character, Mr. Ajit Kumar Das is a fit and proper person to receive The Degree of Master of Philosophy (in philosophy).

Shillong
The 9th December 1991

N. Malla
(Netrananda Malla)
Supervisor.

Department of Philosophy
N.E.H.U. Shillong-793014

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
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Date-

Shillong-



Ajit Kumar Das

Lecturer

Banamalipur College

Banamalipur, Puri

ORISSA.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The title of the Thesis is **Names and Particulars : A study in Dignāga and Wittgenstein**. Naturally, the question arises what is so common between Dignāga and Wittgenstein ?. The time gap between Dignāga and Wittgenstein is about thirteen hundred years. Is it the case that Wittgenstein has been influenced by Dignāga ?. Moreover, Dignāga wrote in the context of religious milieu i.e., Buddhism whereas, Wittgenstein did not write in background of any religion.

Gautam, the Buddha was born in 6th Century B.C. Buddhism arose as a protest against certain doctrines, beliefs and practices of Hinduism. In due course of time, i.e., at the time of Ashoka, it became the state religion. The early phase of Buddhism is known as Hinayāna. The later phase of Buddhism is known as Mahāyāna. It is usually taken for granted that there is no philosophy in Hinayāna. It is purely ritualistic. Whatever little philosophy is there in Buddhism, is to be found in Mahāyāna only. But this need to be reviewed. It is true that Buddhism arose as a religion. But in due course of time, the Buddhist monks took keen interest in philosophical issues. To what extent the Buddhist monks took interest in logical problem is evident from the debate between Buddhists and Naiyāyikas for about six hundred years. It is not only Buddhist philosophy but other Brahminical philosophical systems also developed in the context of religion. It will not be inappropriate to say that Indian philosophy originated in monasteries and Mathas by monks and wanderers. Even the early phase of Buddhism could not extricate itself from philosophical problems. The Abhidharmikas contains the philosophical insight of the early phase of Buddhism. The Abhidharmikas developed a type of philosophical atomism compared to that of Russell and early Wittgenstein. The Mahāyānikas and Mādhyamikas developed a philosophy which is comparable to that of later

Wittgenstein. What I wish to suggest is that even if thirteen hundred years divide Wittgenstein from Dignāga, yet both Dignāga and Wittgenstein react almost in identical manner to similar problems. By this, we do not mean to imply that Wittgenstein did read Buddhism but the fact remains that early Wittgenstein was influenced by Schopenhauer and Schopenhauer was influenced by Buddhism and Upanisadas. There is no evidence that the later Wittgenstein read Nāgārjuna and Dignāga.

Though Buddhism originated in India, yet it remained in its homeland only for fifteen hundred years. From thematic standpoint it can be divided into three distinct period each period consisting of five hundred years. The first period is characterised by pluralism. In short, the philosophers of this period believe in pluralistic doctrines. There were extreme as well as moderate thinkers during this period. Those who advocated extreme doctrines are known as Sarvāstivādins. Those who advocated moderate doctrines were known as the Vāstiputriyas. The first period was predominantly religious. The monks were interested in their personal salvation or Nirvāna. In this respect the Buddhists share the same common programme of other Brāhmanical systems.

From 5th century A.D. onwards, a radical change took place in Buddhism. This is otherwise known as the second period of Buddhism. This period lasted for five hundred years. The radical pluralism of the first period changed into radical monism. Mystic intuition as a source of knowledge was advocated and personal salvation was replaced by salvation of mankind. There were extreme and moderate thinkers during this period too. The extreme ones were known as Prāsangika. The moderate ones were known as Svātantrika. Nāgārjuna and Deva belong to the extreme group and Bhavya belongs to the moderate group. Buddhist logic and metaphysics developed during this period. The Philosophers

of this period are broadly known as Mādhyamikas.

The 3rd period was inaugurated by the brothers saint Asanga and master Vasubandhu. During this period logic and metaphysics took precedence over religion and morality. Great and monumental works in logic were created during this period. The extreme thinkers of this period were known as Āgamānusārin. Asanga and Vasubandhu belong to this group. The moderate thinkers are known as Nyāyavādins. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti belong to this group.

Many studies have been conducted both on Buddhism and Wittgenstein. Book-length articles and book-length publications have also appeared on both Wittgenstein and Buddhism. Scholars both Eastern and Western have taken keen interest in Buddhism. But large majority of them have treated Buddhism as a form of religion. Very few scholars have treated Buddhism from philosophical standpoint. T.R.V.Murti is an exception. Murti is a philosopher and his book "The Central Concept of Buddhism" is an attempt to understand Mādhyamika philosophy from Kantian point. He treats Nāgārjuna as a Kantian. Śūnyatā or emptiness has been compared with noumenon of Kant. But no attempt (except Gudmunsen's, Canfield's and Robinson's) has been made to understand and interpret Buddhism in contemporary idioms. Every philosopher has to be understood in contemporary idioms. It may not be out of place to quote Strawson in this context:

If there are no new truths to be discovered, there are old truths to be rediscovered. For though the central subject matter of descriptive metaphysics does not change, the critical and analytic idiom of philosophy changes constantly. Permanent relationships are described in an impermanent idiom, which reflects both the age's climate of thought and individual philosopher's personal style of thinking. No philosopher understands his predecessors until he has rethought their thought in his own contemporary terms.^I

It is a fact that ancient Indian philosophical tradition is not a living one. The tradition has come to a stop. Even books of certain thinkers are not available. Even *Pramāna Samuccaya* (hence forward P.S.) of Dignāga is not available in its full form. One has to depend on secondary or tertiary works for his work. Further, certain important works on Buddhism are neither available in Pali nor in Sanskrit. They are available in Chinese, Tibetan or in Japanese. Language comes as a barrier. Moreover, the disappearance of Buddhism from India has caused many important Buddhist texts to disappear. It made its way to other countries. Further, in Indian Universities, Indian philosophy including Buddhism has not been given the same importance like that of Western philosophy. A tradition becomes lively and vibrant only when it is pursued and examined from time to time with all seriousness. But unfortunately, this is not so in context of Indian philosophy. As a result, Indian philosophy is treated as a form of mythology and religion by Western scholars. It is not being treated on par with European philosophy. The reasons are obvious. Whatever classical Indian texts are available, are not being discussed or examined in contemporary idioms.

The present essay is an humble attempt to understand and interpret Dignāga in contemporary idioms. Ludwig Wittgenstein is treated as one of the most outstanding philosophers of contemporary period. Though scholars opine that there are two Wittgensteins i.e. (1) early (2) later, yet the fact remains that it is Wittgenstein who gave rise to two distinct movements in contemporary philosophy. His first book *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* inspires logical positivism. The later work "*Philosophical Investigation*" (hence forward 'PI') inspires what is known as linguistic and conceptual analysis. The Anglo-American philosophy is greatly influenced by Wittgenstein. It is debatable whether phenomenology, Existentialism, Marxism have anything common

with linguistic or conceptual analysis. However, the objective of the dissertation is not to find out the close affinity if any, between analytic philosophy on the one hand and phenomenology and Existentialism on the other hand. Similarly, it is not our objective to find out any conceptual affinity between Dignāga, Phenomenology and Existentialism. Rather, our objective is to find out the conceptual affinity between Dignāga and Wittgenstein.

Buddhism is usually associated with Kṣanabhāṅgavāda (momentariness), Nairātma-vāda (no-soul), Pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination), Sūnyavāda (emptiness) and Nirvāna (salvation). On the surface it gives an impression that Buddhism deals with things of esoteric and transcendental in nature. If at all it has shown any interest in logic and metaphysics, it is tangential and accidental. But as a matter of fact, Buddhism from the very beginning has been philosophical in nature. It is very strange that in India not only philosophical system but other intellectual enterprises are somehow associated with some kind of monastic order. The great men in India were known as Rsis (seer or sanyāsi or monk or wanderer). This was the way of life in ancient India. But in Buddhism, even in its early stage, we encounter with deep philosophical questions. As Wittgenstein is to Western philosophy, so is Dignāga to Indian philosophy. In a way, the Buddhist tradition in Indian philosophy anticipated Wittgenstein and Russell in a very significant sense. It is wrong to say that Indian philosophers were interested only in salvation and things transcendent. As a matter of fact, they took keen interest in subtle logical problems. Only in contemporary periods Western philosophers can be said to have shown keen interest in subtle philosophical problem about a language. But in India, subtle philosophical interest goes back to 700 B.C.

Yask , the author of "Nirukta" , raised philosophical problem about language and meaning. His predecessors Audumbarāyana , Sāktāyana and Gargya equally raised philosophical problem about language. Pānini, the author of "Astādhyayee" and Pātanjali the author of Mahabhāsyā, too raised logical questions about word , meaning and sentence. "Jaimini-Sūtra" of Purva-mimāṃsā, "Nyāyasūtra," and "Vaisesika" sūtra" also raised such questions. Even in ancient India, questions about meaning and reference were discussed in detail. Vyādi, for instance, maintain that the meaning of a word is particular. Vājapāyana, on the other hand, maintains that the meaning of a word is universal. Dignāga advocates , what is known as, differential theory of meaning (Apoha).

I wish to argue out in this dissertation that Dignāga and Wittgenstein deal with similar questions and have reached almost similar conclusion. The study is basically comparative and analytical. Such study has its limitation but at the same time, it is very much necessary in Indian context. The 'PS' of Dignāga is not available in full length in Sanskrit. This is most unfortunate. Its Tibetan version is available. But we do not know an English translation of it exists. So for Dignāga, we have depended on Stcherbatsky's partial translation of 'PS'.

Names and particulars have been picked up as central to any philosophy of language. The problem of discription and universal are closely related with our discussion. Though Dignāga and Wittgenstein will be our focal point, yet reference will be made to other Buddhist philosophers as well. In fact Dignāga will be treated and discussed in the milue of the Buddhist philosophy in general. Similarly, both the works of Wittgenstein (early and later) mainly *Tractatus* and 'PI' will be refered to in the course of our discussion. In the *Tactatus*, Wittgenstein is supposed to

have presented a referential theory of meaning and in 'PI' he is supposed to have repudiated it. However, we will not enter into debate as to what extent the later Wittgenstein has rejected his earlier views. Our main task will be to present the views of Dignāga in the context of Wittgenstein. That is to say, our objective is not so much to present a critical analysis of Wittgenstein as it is to present Dignāga's views in Wittgensteinian terms. Nirvāṇa, Suṅyata, Nairātmaṇvāda and Kṣanabhaṅgavāda will be re-interpreted in the light of the contemporary idioms. But this should not give an impression that there will be an imposition of Wittgensteinian model on Dignāga. This question can be raised in any kind of interpretation and understanding. In a sense, any interpretation, is subjective. But this view is trivial. If it is argued that an interpretation is subjective because a particular individual does it, then it is trivial. Any interpretation has to be consistent and coherent. Further, it must conform to the text. While interpreting Dignāga and certain basic concepts of Buddhism, references to original texts will be made. What very often happens in philosophy is that we forget the text. The text is given a different colour in order to suit a particular purpose. This has happened in case of Indian philosophical systems. Because of historical reasons, we have already pointed out that Indian philosophical tradition has been lost to us. As a result, its idioms are out of vogue. Only when the idioms are alive, the tradition becomes lively and vibrant, and further growth is possible. So interpretation and re-interpretation of a system do not appear very strange. This is likely to be the case, if one seeks to re-interpret any Indian philosophical system in contemporary idiom. But at the same time, it cannot be denied that if Indian philosophy has to be

made alive, it has to be re-interpreted in contemporary idioms. My humble attempt is supposed to be a step in this direction

"NOTES"

- 1) Strawson, P.F., *Individuals An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*, Methuen, London, 1977 10-11.

CHAPTER I

WORD AND THE WORLD

Historically speaking, philosophers both eastern and western have raised questions about the relationship between language and the world from time immemorial. How is language related to reality? How is communication possible? Is language a picture of reality? Questions of such type have been raised and answered by philosophers. Both Plato and Aristotle raised such questions. In *Cratylus* Plato argues that reference cannot be secured by language. Language primarily consists of descriptive words. And a sentence which consists mainly of descriptive words cannot secure unique reference. So ultimately one has to take recourse to physical pointing by means of finger, if one wishes to secure unique reference. But at the same time, both Plato and Aristotle were convinced that language is one of the suitable media of communication. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers argued in the similar line. Language is one of the suitable media of communication. On the other hand, there are philosophers both in east and west who argue that language is not a suitable medium of communication. Bradley and Bergson in the west, some Buddhists and Advaitins in east claim that language is not a suitable medium of communication. F.H Bradley, the English philosopher, argues that Language including its categories and concepts is unsuitable for communication. In this context, he maintains:

It is a makeshift, a device, a mere practical compromise, most necessary, but in the end most indefensible ^I

Henry Bergson argues almost in the similar vein. The

categorial mode of understanding should be given up if one wishes to know the reality.

The Buddhist philosophers have raised such questions about language and reality. The Abhidharmikas and the Sarvāstivādins maintain that everything is real. The Sarvāstivādins are a kind of naive-realists. The Abhidharmikas presented a list of seventyfive (75) reals. In passage of time, Buddhism was modified. The realistic phase was taken over by idealistic ones. The Hinayāna stage is the realistic stage, where as the Mahayāna became idealist. Dignāga appears very late. He belongs to the logical stage of Buddhism. He has a particular view of language and reality, which has a close affinity with that of Wittgenstein. Though almost there is a gap of ~~thir~~teen hundred years between Dignāga and Wittgenstein, yet both of them have raised similar questions about the relationship between language and reality and given almost similar answers to it. In the present chapter an attempt will be made to show in detail the close affinity between Dignāga and Wittgenstein and to point out certain solutions that Dignāga offers, which are very insightful.

Though it is a comparative study, yet we will not state the views of these two philosophers separately and then make a comparative estimate. In other words, the views of these two philosophers will be examined in the context of certain issues. The title of the chapter is Word and the World. So, first we will examine their views with reference to the world and then in relation to word or language and in the end, the relationship between the two.

THE NATURE OF THE WORLD

Both scientists and philosophers have been raising questions about the nature of the world; but their questions

are different. The scientific question about the world is always about its origin, and constituents. Such questions have been raised by the scientists from time to time. Accordingly theories have been advanced and hypotheses have been formulated. But the philosophical question about the world have been altogether different from the scientific ones. The philosophical question is about the meaning and significance. What do we mean by the world? What is its significance? Does the world have independent existence? Such questions are raised by the philosophers of the world. In short, philosophical questions about the world are questions of meaning. Let us see what Wittgenstein has to say about the world. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein advances a theory of the world. He maintains:

The World is the all that is the case ²
*The World is the totality of facts, not of things.*³
The World divides into facts. ⁴

What does Wittgenstein mean by this? What does it mean to say that "the world is the all that is the case"? In answer to this question, it can be said that the world is the point of all reference. In other words, it cannot be doubted at all. Descartes' doubt was a universal doubt. He doubted everything. But Wittgenstein's answer is that the totality cannot be doubted. To doubt the totality is to embark upon a pseudo doubt. Therefore, it can be said in this connection that the obvious thing is the totality of the world. That there is a world cannot be doubted. But what sort of world? Is it a world of things? Why did not Wittgenstein define 'world' in terms of things? What was his reason? The following answer can be given on his behalf. The world consisting of things and events can be studied by scientists. But such a study of the world lacks in the concept of

totality. It cannot be complete⁴. The world of things is a countable world. In short, it does not include a concept of totality. On the other hand, the world is a concatenation of facts; it is uncountable. So, the world as a totality of facts includes in itself the idea of totality.

Let us see how the Buddhist philosophers in general and Dignāga in particular have elucidated the concept of the world. Buddha declared the world is full of suffering. He wanted to transcend the world. For him, the world is not the world of things. He was not interested in the world that consists of events and things. In short, his world was the world of dvādas nidāna (twelve linked phenomenon). Buddha does not ask this question about the ultimate constituents of the world in manner of a scientist. On the other hand, he seeks to understand the meaning and significance of the world. What does the world signify? What significance does it have for man? What happens to man when he comes in contact with this world? Such questions are uppermost in Buddha's mind. The World as visualised by him is full of sufferings. This is the significance of the world. Man has to extricate himself from the clutches of world. The world is a series of causes and effects. The series come to a stop, when we strike at its base. The Abhidhārmikas developed their own theory of the world. The world for them consists of simple and indivisible elements. The early Wittgenstein's philosophy of the world and Russell's logical atomism have close affinity with the Abhidhārmika philosophy of the world. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein maintains .

A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).⁵
Objects are simple.
The substance of the word can only determine a form, and not any material properties .
Objects are what is unalterable and subsistence; their configuration is what is changing and stable

In a similar tone, Russell, in his lecture "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", maintains:

"When I speak of 'simple' I ought to explain then I am speaking of something not experienced as such, but known only inferentially as the limit of analysis." ⁹

Further he maintains :

Ultimate simples, out of which the world ^{is built,} and that those simples have a kind of reality not belonging to anything else. Simples, as I tried to explain are of an infinite number of sorts. There are particulars, and qualities and relations of various orders, a whole hierarchy of different sorts of simples, but all of them if we were right, have in their various ways some kind of reality what does not belong to anything ~~at least~~ else. The only other sort of object you come across in the world is what we call facts, and facts are the sort of things that are asserted or denied by propositions....
.... It is true that you cannot know the world unless you know the facts that make up the truths of the world, but the knowing of facts ^{is} a different sort of thing from knowing of simples. ¹⁰

In Abhidharam Kosa, the Abhidharmikas maintain:

All dharmas (except space & nirvāna) are momentary. ¹¹


The Sarvāstivādins reckon the duration as theoretically measurable though extremely short.

Nāgārjuna the famous Mādhyamika philosopher visualises the world altogether in a different manner. He is known for his doctrine of sūnyavāda, popularly known as voidness:

That which is devoid is real,
While that of which it is devoid is unreal... ¹²

T.R.V.Murti regards sūnyavāda as a kind of absolutism.

Two considerations stand out prominently in the Mādhyamika notion of absolute: its utter indeterminateness and the consequent non-accessibility of reason. The one emphasises the logical nature of the absolute, the other the mode of its apprehension. The absolute is very aptly termed sunya, as it is devoid of



all predicates. Even existence, unity, selfhood and goodness cannot be affirmed of it. One is precluded from asserting that it "is" (sat) a positive one (thava) ¹³

The interpretation of Sūnyavāda as monistic absolutism by T.R.V.Murti is not acceptable on the following reasons. The original text of Nāgārjuna does not treat sūnyavāda as emptiness.

It cannot be called void, or not void, or both or neither, but in order to indicate it, it is called the void. ¹⁴

It means, the context tells us that sūnyavāda is a doctrine of non-essences. To say that the world is sūnya is not to say that it is void and empty. Rather, to say that the world is sūnya is to say that the world is essenceless? Does it mean that the world is just an empty cover and contains nothing? According to Nāgārjuna, the world is known to us through concepts and categories. To know means to know through concepts and categories. Therefore, the world in a way is a concatenation of concepts and categories? What about these concepts and categories? What is their nature? What do they signify? The Indian realists like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers argue that the concept and categories not only have essences but also are ultimate reals. There is no world, according to Kanāda, beyond these seven categories (Padārthas). What is a Padārtha? What is a category? The literal meaning of the term 'Padārtha' is meaning of a word. There is a sense in which all words in language including prepositions and conjunctions have meaning. Does Kanāda include the meaning of such words under Padārtha? For Kanāda, Padārtha is meaning. Only those meanings which are necessary for talking about the world are known as Padārtha by Kanāda. There are certain meanings which are very important and basic in nature. Any

communication, any talk, any description for that matter presupposes certain basic meaning. As for e.g. description involves the object to be described and the content of description. Accordingly, Kanāda treats dravya, gūna, karma, sāmānya, vishesa, samavāya & abhāva as Padārthas. Are dravyas and gunas things in the world? To this question Kanāda's answer is that they are not things of the world but they are involved in description of the world. Similarly, certain other description about the world involve the idea of action and movement. Kanāda includes karma as one of the Padārthas. Further, any description involves the idea of generality and specificity. Accordingly Kanāda treats Sāmānya (universal) and vishesa (particular) as categories. In description of communication, we make use of meaning. There are certain meanings, which are internally connected. Kanāda treats these internal connections as categories. He calls it samavāya (inherence). No discussion and description is successful without the idea of existence and non-existence. That is to say, the idea of non-existence is as much important and basic as that of existence. Kanāda raises the idea of non-existence to the status of a category. The seven padārthas can be characterised as the seven types of basic meaning in terms of which we think about and describe the world. Padārthas are meanings but they are not ordinary meanings. They are primary and basic meanings. Further, they are the world. Not only they are ultimately knowable and nameable but they are ultimately real too. To the question, "What is the world?", Kanāda's answer is that it is a system of seven types of meaning.

Kanāda is known as a realist, distinct from a conceptualist and nominalist. Plato's realism is comparable to that of Kanāda but with a difference. Plato does not fix the number of reals. The Platonic reals are innumerable in

number. Whereas, Kanāda fixes it at seven. Kanāda's philosophical views are more insightful than those of Plato, for the simple reason that it does not increase entities beyond necessity. The meanings are treated as concepts and vice-versa by Kanāda. Concepts and meanings are characterised by their essences. In short, Kanāda advocates a kind of essentialism. Whereas, Nāgārjuna rejects essentialism. For him, concepts do not stand for essence. In short, concepts are mere names and names are arbitrary in nature. This is the exact difference between Brāhminical and the Buddhist tradition in India. Brāhminical philosophical systems advocate a kind of essentialism. The non-Brahminical systems like Buddhism reject essentialism and in turn advocate a kind of non-essentialism. According to Nāgārjuna, concepts and categories are essenceless. They are empty only in this sense. Kanāda endowed names with essence, whereas Nāgārjuna disendowed names of essences. Since the world can not be known without these categories and concepts, and categories and concepts are essenceless *ipso facto*, the world is essenceless. T.R.V. Murti has failed to take note of this aspect of Nāgārjuna's philosophy. Instead, Murti characterises Sūnyavāda as a kind of monistic absolutism. By Sūnya, he means emptiness/void. Then how can it be treated as an absolute? How can we derive the world from sūnyatā or emptiness? The concept stands in need of being re-interpreted. And it can be reinterpreted as the doctrine of essencelessness. In this respect, the Mādhyamika doctrine of Nāgārjuna comes very close to Dignāga. Though Dignāga comes much after Nāgārjuna, yet there is a close affinity between the two as regard the nature of language and reality. But there is a difference between the two. It is this: Nāgārjuna does not advocate the doctrine of unique particular, whereas Dignāga advocates the doctrine of unique particular. At the time of Nāgārjuna and Dignāga, Buddhism

underwent a vital change. The Buddhist monks took keen interest in issues logical, epistemological and metaphysical. Religious issues are relegated to the background.

Seen in this light, there seems to be a continuity running in and through the three stages of Buddhism. At the time of Dignāga, Buddhist logic and metaphysics including epistemology reached its height. To the question "What is language?", Dignāga and Wittgenstein answer that it is given to man. In a way it is natural and not artificial. Language is distinct from an artificial product. An artificial is made deliberately for a particular purpose. Language is not an artificial product in the sense that it has grown with life. Wittgenstein in 'PI' treats language as a form of life.

It is easy to imagine a language consisting only orders and reports in battle. --Or a language consisting only of questions and expressions for answering yes and no. And unnumerable others -- And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life. ¹⁵

..."language game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life ¹⁶

Dignāga, in P.S. characterises language as a biotic force (anādivāsanā). What does it mean to say that language is a form of life? What does it mean to say that language is a kind of anādivāsanā? Let us concentrate on these issues. The literal meaning of "anādivāsanā" is "eternal craving". One of the cravings of man, according to Dignāga, is to use language and to talk about the world. Further, it is meaningless and odd to ask the question when did language originate? Both the Vedāntins and Buddhist treat language as a result of eternal craving of man. The craving is to express one self and to talk about, and describe the world.

This type of urge is coeval with human existence and life. It is anādi (eternal/beginningless). This means language is one of the oldest possessions of mankind. It is a possession unlike other ones in the sense that it is a result of a kind of natural necessity. It is a kind of urge in man. For later Wittgenstein, language is a form of life. Life has to be understood in this context. By life, Wittgenstein does not mean the bio-chemical principle. To say that language is a form of life is to say that language also is a kind of life. The living organism comes into existence, grows and multiplies, so is the case of language. To say that language is a form of life is to say that language grows naturally. Further, language and life, in a way, become synonymous. To know a person means to know his language. By language Wittgenstein does not mean any specific language. By language he means the linguistic categories and concepts used by men. Viewed in this light, language seems inalienable. The early Wittgenstein also advocates such a view of language. It is through language that we talk about and describe the world. For Wittgenstein, to understand the world means to understand language and human speech. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein went to the extent of arguing that language is a picture of reality. In the later work 'PI' language game has been invented to account for different facts of reality. What about Dignāga? What does he say about the relationship between language and reality? According to Dignāga, it is an inveterate habit of man to employ categories and concepts while talking about the world. Knowledge is judgemental. To know means to think and to think means to judge and to judge means to employ categories and concept. Dignāga classifies all judgements into five types taking into account the nature of predicates. Every judgement must have a

subject and a predicate. A subject is that which is described or about which something is said. In this sense, the subject of a judgement stands in need of being described. What is a predicate? It is that which describes the subject or talks about it. Without subject or predicate, there is no knowledge at all. But what is the nature of this state of knowledge? Dignāga characterised it as empirical knowledge (samvrti satya). Knowledge is a kind of characterisation or description. Without characterisation there is no knowledge. Dignāga in this respect comes very close to Vedāntins (both Advaitins and Viśiṣṭāvaitins) but with a difference. Dignāga has a common point with Advaitins that empirical knowledge (samvrti satya) is subject and predicate based. Further, for the Advaitins the true knowledge (Paramārtha satya) is devoid of this distinction. But the Advaitins endowed the Paramārtha satya with a kind of eternity. For Dignāga, the paramārtha satya is unstable and dynamic. On the other hand for Rāmānuja even genuine knowledge is descriptive in nature. Rāmānuja accepts the view that knowledge is judgemental. Every judgement has subject and predicate but ultimately there is only one subject and everything else are predicate. The relation between subject and predicate is not contingent but ^{ce} necessary and logical. This explains the doctrine of qualified monism, the reality as a subject of all judgement is qualified (viśiṣṭa).

Dignāga classifies all predicates into five types. They are as follows:

- (1) Nāma kalpanā (Name predicate)
- (2) Jāti kalpanā (class predicate)
- (3) Guṇa kalpanā (quality predicate)
- (4) Karma kalpanā (action predicate)
- (5) Dravya kalpanā (substance predicate)

Kalpanā and Vikalpa has been synonymously used by Dignāga. The literal meaning of 'Kalpanā' is 'imagination' and that

of 'Vikalpa' is 'alternative' Imagination is psychic in nature. Dignāga is not a conceptualist like Locke and others. A conceptualist is one who treats a predicate as a mental construction out of abstraction. The predicate, for the conceptualist, has been constructed out of perception of different individuals. On the other hand, Dignāga can be characterised as a realist but with a difference. He gives an objective status to predicates (Kalpanās) but unlike Plato he treats them unreal. Plato treats these concepts as objective entities. In fact, they are ultimate realities but for Dignāga, concepts are not objective and ultimate entities. That the language is an inalienable feature of human life, is accepted by both Dignāga and Wittgenstein. But former visualises a kind of transcendence. Whereas, for the later, transcendence is not possible. For Dignāga, the source of concept is the language (Vikalpāh sabda yonayah, Sabda Yonaya Vikalpāh) Language in a way, generate} concept. Concept-generation is a natural feature of language.

If there is no language there are no concept. The source of language is not human mind but language. But Dignāga forgets the fact that there can be concept without being expressed in language. It is true that concepts or categories are expressed by means of language; but, perhaps it will be wrong to identify concept with language. How to understand Dignāga's thesis? Language cannot operate without employing concepts} or categories. Dignāga is not willing to treat language purely as mechanical contrivance. What makes language meaningful and significant, is the concept. In short, human language operates through concepts} and categories. Take away the concepts and categories, language will be inoperative. It is only in the sense that Dignāga discovers a close affinity between language and concepts.

Wittgenstein too, views language in this sense. Both in

Tractatus and 'PI' Wittgenstein discovers such a link between language and categories. All the predicates (vikalpāḥ) generate by language, ^{are} ~~and~~ classified by Dignāga into five types. Does he have any justification for it? Dignāga, like Aristotle, took the 'subject and predicates' form of judgement as the basic form. And accordingly he reduced all judgements to these five types. What about the relational ones? Dignāga treats 'relation' as an instance of predication. To relate 'A' to 'B' is to judge or characterise both 'A & B'. But viewed from another angle Dignāga seems to be justified. The five types of predicates (Kalpanās) are the five different ways of describing the world. In short, all judgements and description can be reduced into five types. The five predicates are the basic or primary ones. And all other predicates can be explained in terms of these predicates. In this respect, Dignāga's theory of predication corresponds to the Vaiśeṣika's doctrine of Padārtha. Buddhist logic and metaphysics grew in the context of opposition with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. But at the same time, the fact remains that there is a close similarity between Dignāga and Kanāda and his followers. Kanāda visualised seven categories in terms of which we think about the world. Dignāga instead, visualised five categories. Dignāga excluded viśeṣa, sāmānya, abhāva from the domain of categories and included nāma Kalpanā (name predicate). The categories of Dignāga in this sense have to be understood with the reference to their Vaiśeṣika counterparts.

What is the nature of these categories (kalpanās)? Do they stand for essences? Dignāga's answer is, they are essenceless (Nisvabhāvāḥ). What does it mean to say that they are mere names? Why did Dignāga introduce jāti Kalpanā (predicate related to universal)? According to Dignāga

kalpanās are essenceless. This means that ultimately there is nothing in this world corresponding to these Kalpanās. In short, the ultimate reality does not consist of subject, attribute, action and etc. But the human mind is always inclined to conceive the reality in this fashion. It will not be out of place here to draw a comparison between Dignāga and Kant. Kant makes a distinction between forms of intuition and forms of understanding. The categories of Dignāga are really the Kantian categories of understanding. Human mind, according to Kant, is endowed with these categories. In short, the categories are given to mind. In this sense, according to Kant, the categories are inescapable and ineliminable. That is why, Kant maintains 'Mind maketh nature'. Dignāga goes with Kant upto certain distance. But he parts company with him. Yet the categories of Dignāga are necessary but they are not inalienable feature of human mind in the sense that one can transcend them. This is the difference between Dignāga and Kant. For Kant, the noumenon is unknown and unknowable. But for Dignāga noumenon, the ultimate reality, though unutterable is knowable in a very significant sense.

Dignāga's philosophy of language can be constructed from his theory of predicates or kalpanās. These predicates grow out of language. In this sense, there is an intimate relationship between language and concepts. These views of language can be compared with that of the later Wittgenstein. Further Dignāga maintains that the predicates do not stand for any essence at all. The later Wittgenstein in similar manner points out that one should not look for essence behind concept. This type of craving sometimes gives rise to absurd metaphysical theories. Both Dignāga and later Wittgenstein agree on this point. But in PI, there is a

suggestion that everything ^{else} about the world and reality can be expressed by means of language. There is no place for unutterability in later Wittgenstein. Whereas, Dignāga visualises a kind of unutterable situation. In fact, unutterability is the basis of utterability. There is something behind all expression and all languages. It is the svalaksanas or unique particular and it cannot be put into words. What could be the philosophical motive behind such a thesis? Kant posited a noumenon to account for phenomenon. The Kantian idealism cannot be understood without reference to the concept of noumenon. It is noumenon which sustains his idealism. Similar is the case with Dignāga. Without the sensuous particulars the universals or concept do not have meaning at all. The universals of Kalpanās cannot stand on their own. Plato eliminated the particulars by declaring as short-living, transitory and ephemeral. Aristotle made a device. He integrated particulars and universals together. Kant banished the so-called noumenon from the domain of phenomena. Whereas Dignāga endowed the transcendental reality. The unique particulars are ^{sensuous} ~~essential~~ in nature. Viewed in this light, it is difficult to characterise him either as an empiricist or a rationalist. He can be characterised as a rationalist, but when he talks of unique particulars, can he be characterised as a rationalist? Perhaps not. But at the same time, the unique particulars are sensuous in nature. One may be inclined to characterise this aspects of Dignāga's philosophy as empiricism. But the fact remains that he makes a distinction between two orders of reality, i.e., (1) empirical reality and (2) transcendental reality. The empirical reality is amenable to logical reasonings and concepts. But transcendental reality is not amenable to any kind of

perception

The early Wittgenstein was convinced that reality can be achieved through analysis of language. What is the nature of such analysis? This analysis is truth functional in nature. Wittgenstein in the manner of Dignāga, conceived language as consisting of the totality of propositions. The propositions are related to one another through logical connectives. He defined truth function as a compound proposition, whose truth value is determined by the truth values of its constituent propositions. The propositions are related through logical connectives. When we eliminate the logical connectives, what remains are elementary propositions. The elementary proposition does not contain any logical connective. It consists of logical proper names only. A logical proper name is distinguished from a grammatical proper name. A grammatical proper name is not absolutely free from descriptive contents. In short every grammatical proper name is a kind of truncated description. Descriptive elements are misleading in nature. Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* wanted to achieve mathematical exactness. In the field of language and communication he wanted to remove ambiguities and vagueness from the domain of language and speech. Ultimately he arrived at elementary propositions bereft of all descriptive contents. The so-called elementary proposition turns out to be a mathematical indicator. Now a question can be raised: Are they, as a matter of fact, elementary or atomic propositions. To this question, the answer is no. That there are elementary propositions follow from a particular a-priori analysis of language. As a matter of fact, we combine simple propositions with the help of logical connectives. As for instance, "It is raining and it is thundering" is a truth function or compound proposition. Therefore, "it is raining" and "it is

thundering" should be treated as elementary being constituents of a compound proposition. But Wittgenstein does not treat these propositions as elementary proposition at all. In short, the way Wittgenstein defines elementary propositions cannot be found at all in ordinary language. The so called elementary proposition has been idealised and rarefied. These elementary propositions are bereft of any descriptive content. These propositions have no meaning but sense. But the names occurring in it have meaning. Further, the elementary propositions picture reality. What sort of picture is this? It is a logical picture distinguished from physical picture. What does Wittgenstein mean by logical picture? According to Wittgenstein, not that language is a picture of reality but it must be a picture of it. What is the philosophical motive behind this sort of theory? Wittgenstein had certain assumptions about language and reality. It is this: To use language is to talk about the world, so language must have contact with reality otherwise, speech and communication will not be effective. But what is the net result? Wittgenstein argues in the *Tractatus* that since language pictures reality, the picturing relation cannot be put into words. In this connection, he distinguishes between showable and sayable. The relation between language and reality is shown and cannot be said. What does it mean? The elementary propositions and the world have an isomorphic relationship. That is to say, there is one to one relationship between language and reality. At certain stage, language and reality come very close that it cannot be put into words. It is a stage of inexpressibility Wittgenstein puts it as follows.

*What we cannot speak about
We must pass over in silence.*¹⁷

Some scholars have interpreted this doctrine of Wittgenstein as a kind of mysticism. But mysticism should not be treated in a religious sense. This is a kind of mysticism which arises out of incapacity of language. Wittgenstein was convinced that there is some aspect of reality and language, which cannot be put into words. This is the inexpressible, the unutterable. But what about Dignāga? Dignāga too recognises the significance of unutterability. But the unutterable enters into human experience. It is a kind of non-categorical mode of experience. For the early Wittgenstein, language and reality come so very close that they are found glued together. But for Dignāga, language is incapable of expressing or depicting what is ultimately real.

To the question "how word or language is related to the world?", Dignāga and Wittgenstein have almost the similar answer with a slight difference. And this difference can be attributed to the religious attachment on the part of the former. For Wittgenstein, there is only one order of reality. And this has intimate relationship with language. Even if, at certain stage he comes across what is known as the inexpressible, but this inexpressibility is not due to the nature of reality rather it is due to the limit of language in expressing the reality. In short, there is no scope for any transcendental reality in *Tractatus*. It is the picture of reality. To say that language is the picture of reality is to maintain that there is nothing in reality which falls outside the ken of language. In short, the relationship between language and reality is one to one. In the 'PI', the picturing relation is transformed into language game. In fact, in earlier works Wittgenstein visualised only one function of language, i.e., designating or indicating. But in 'PI', he talks of multifarious functions.

of language. What will be the response of Dignāga to this view of language and reality? The world we talk about is always the world made available to us by concept and categories. In short, it is a world of our own making. That is to say, it is a world amenable to linguistic categories. This broad view of relationship between word and the world is acceptable to Dignāga, Kant and Wittgenstein. In short, the world in which we live, move and have our being is a world of our own making, it is made intelligible only by our categories and concept. Take away the categories and concepts, there is no world. Like Kant, Dignāga makes distinction between sensibility and understanding, ^{But Kant combines both sensibility and} in case of knowledge about the world. Sensibility is the basic prerequisites of understanding. It is the sensibility which receives sensation. The understanding categorises it. One discovers such Kantian elements in Dignāga. According to Dignāga, the Svalaksanas have the power to stimulate the understanding. He introduces the notion of sārūpya (conformity) in this connection. But the pure sensuous particulars can never be categorised and conceptualised. This is the difference between Dignāga and Kant. For Kant, sensibility and understanding go together. Whereas, for Dignāga, they are poles apart. Both Dignāga and early Wittgenstein treat language at the core as consisting of names only. Wittgenstein talks of logical proper names. Dignāga gives an example of such names mentioning meaningless words like 'Dittha'. The word 'Dittha' does not have any meaning in conventional sense of the term. It is given a meaningless arbitrary status for which it stands but in due course of time it acquires convention. This is the difference between Dignāga and Wittgenstein. Both of them talk of names, but Dignāga contextualises the names, whereas

Wittgenstein eliminates all context whatsoever. How do we explain this difference? For Wittgenstein, language or mathematics was ideal language. It is a context free language. So as a consequence, Wittgenstein thought of contextless names. But in later writings, particularly in 'PI', Wittgenstein is aware of the importance of context. We come across two Wittgensteinian (1) early and (2) later. But we have only one Dignāga, not two phases of early and later. In 'PS', the predicates have been treated as names. They are basically names, designators, indicators. Naming relation is basic and primary function of language. Even in 'PI', Wittgenstein does not give up such a view of language. Dignāga on the other hand, makes a distinction between names. And all the names and all the predicates (pancavidha Kalpanā) are names. But they are of different types. By treating these concepts as names Dignāga does not mean to say that they are mere indicators. Infact, he wishes to draw our attention to the essenceless nature of concepts.

NOTES

- 1) Bradley, F.H., *Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay*, Oxford, 1978 28.
- 2) Wittgenstein, L., *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, tr by D.F. Pears and B.F. Mc Guinness, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961 1
- 3) *Ibid.* 1.1
- 4) *ibid.* 1.2
- 5) *Ibid.* 2.01
- 6) *Ibid.* 2.02
- 7) *Ibid.* 2.0231
- 8) *ibid.* 2.0271
- 9) Russell, B., *Logic and Knowledge, Essays 1901-1950*, ed by R.C. Marsh London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, New York, Macmillan, 1977 337
- 10) *Ibid.* 270
- 11) Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa*, trans by de la Vallée Poussin, 1923-31, ch.III, 15
- 12) Sthiramati, *Madhyanta Vibhāga Sūtra Bhāṣya Tīkā*, part 1, ed by Prof V. Bhattacharya and G. Tucci (Luzac and Co 1932) 13

Abiparītam sūnyatālakṣanam udbhāvitam : yac chūnyam
tasya sadbhāvad, yena sūnyam tasya tatrābhāvāt Sarvabhā-
vah sarvabhavo vā viparītam sūnyatālakṣanam sūnyatāya
evābhāvaprasaṅgāt

13) Marti, T.R.V. ,The Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A
study in Madhyamika system, George Allen and Unwin
Ltd., London, 1974 - 229

14) Nagarjuna, Madhyamika Sutra,

Sūnyam iti na vaktavyam asūnyam iti vā bhavet

Ubhayaṁ nobhayaṁ ceti prajñaptiyartham tu kathyate.

15) Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigation, tr. by
G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell Publishers Ltd., Oxford,
1985 19.

16) Ibid. 23.

17) Wittgenstein, L., Tractatus Logic-Philosophicus, tr. by
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CHAPTER - 2

NAMES

CHAPTER II

NAMES

In the previous chapter we have said that both Dignāga and Wittgenstein were primarily concerned with the essence of language. Language consists of sentences. A sentence consists of words. Though there is a debate as to the primacy of word-meaning and sentence-meaning, yet the fact remains that language is a system of meaning. The word becomes intelligible through it. Language has attracted the attention of philosophers, linguists, sociologists and other social scientists. Linguistics is an empirical discipline. Broadly speaking it studies the growth and evolution of languages. Linguistics as a science has different branches and each branch deals with a particular aspect of language. They seek to establish casual co-relation between language and psychic phenomena. It is known as psycho-linguistics. Social anthropology and sociology also study language at certain stage. That branch of Sociology which studies linguistics behaviour of man is known as psycho-linguistics. Socio-linguistics study language as an important factor in social development.

Philosophers while studying language raise altogether different questions. These questions are as follows :-

- (1) What is language ?
- (2) What is a sentence ?
- (3) What is a word ?
- (4) Are all words names ?
- (5) What is meaning ?
- (6) Whether sentence-meanings are primary or word-meanings are primary ?
- (7) How is language related to reality ? and etc.

Such questions about language have been raised both by Dignāga and Wittgenstein. Further, Dignāga's reflection on nature of language, meaning and names anticipates many development in philosophy of language and logic in the

contemporary period. Dignāga raised a variety of questions about the language, meaning and the word. They can be characterised as epistemological, logical and metaphysical questions. It is wrong to say that Indian philosophy is other wordly and Indian philosophers raised questions of Mokṣya or salvation only. The Buddhist philosophers have raised serious philosophical questions about logic, metaphysics and epistemology. Dignāga has made outstanding contribution in this respect. Further, the problems of language, meaning and name have been discussed in detail in almost all systems of Indian philosophy, viz., Brāhminical and non-Brāhminical. Dignāga, the Buddhist philosopher, did not discuss religious questions. He was not interested in issues about salvation or Nirvāna. Instead, he was interested in issues, logical and metaphysical.

According to Dignāga, language is a human phenomenon. It is given to us. It is, in a way, co-eval with human existence. But language is not just an amalgam of tit-bit of words. Language give rise to concepts or categories. In short, language operates through the medium of concepts.

That is to say, we characterise the world by means of a language via concepts or categories. The categories are indispensable but are not ineliminable. For Dignāga, it is neither the sentence nor the words which are primary. Rather it is the concept. If there are no concept, then no characterisation and description of word will be possible. We have said in the preceeding chapter that Kant comes very close to Dignāga on this point. Knowledge of the world is always conceptualised. But Dignāga visualises a kind of transcendence which Kant does not do. Now the question is : What is a concept? How are they related to the world or language ? Dignāga's answer is that language generates concepts. And concepts are a kind of etherial non-physical

entities. In this respect, Dignāga's theory comes very close to Platonism. Plato, the Greek philosopher, advocated a theory of ideas. The platonic ideas are not mere concepts in human mind. That is to say, they are not psychic entities. The British empiricists treated ideas as mental contents. Both Locke, Berkley and Hume advocated such a theory of ideas. For them, ideas are images in human mind. They are mental contents. They constitute the mental furniture of human being. But if this theory is accepted, it will lead to subjectivism it will make inter-personal communication impossible. It is rightly said that empiricism logically leads to scepticism and solipcism. The subjective idealism of Berkley is a logical outgrowth of Locke's image theory of knowledge. What are images? Is thinking based on images ? The empiricists particularly Locke maintains that thought is based on images. F.H. Bradley remarks that the empiricists have psychologised logic. He maintains :

In England at all events we have lived too long in the psychological attitude. We take it for granted and as a matter of course that, like sensations and emotions, ideas are phenomena. And considering these phenomena as psychological facts, we have tried (with what success I will not ask) to distinguish between ideas and sensations. 1

Bradley's argument runs as follows:

There might be images or mental pictures but they are of no consequences in thinking. In other words, most of the time thinking is imageless. Further, it is not necessary that when we think of a horse, we will entertain only image of that horse. It is quite possible that when I think of a horse, I might entertain an image of donkey. In short, Bradley wishes to point out that thought and images are not necessarily or logically connected. Further, even if there are images, they do not constitute the subject matter of logic

and metaphysics. In this respect, Bradley makes a distinction between ideas as image and ideas as meaning. Ideas as image stand for mental pictures. They are short-living, transitory and subjective. There is another sense of ideas. It is meaning. In other words, Bradley recognises the

importance of ideas in the sense of its meaning in the study of logic and metaphysics. Meanings are objective and real. At the same time, they are neither physical nor psychic entities. They have a kind of etherial, non-physical existence. Frege too advocated such a theory of meaning and ideas. For Frege, thought consists of meaning or ideas and it is in this sense that thought constitutes the subject matter of logic and metaphysics. It is in this sense that logic is different from linguistics. Linguistics studies the linguistic forms i.e. words and sentences. Whereas, logic and metaphysics study the concepts that lie behind language. In a sense, language is physical. That is to say, it consists of sound, words and these are physical in nature. But concepts and categories are non-physical and non-linguistic in nature. But at the same time, language and concepts are intimately connected. Plato and Frege did not visualise this intimate inter-relationship between language and categories. For early Wittgenstein, language has a core. The core of the language in a sense is non-linguistic in nature. The elementary propositions which consists of logical proper names only constitute the core of language. They are unutterable in nature. They are comparable to the thoughts of Frege and the concepts of Dignāga. Idealistic philosophers through the ages have concerned themselves with exploring the concept of human thought only in this sense. That is to say, they tried to explore the basic core of human thought. The underlying assumption was that by decoding the nature of thought one can decode the nature of reality. Thought and reality are of the same type. This is

an idealistic thesis. Dignāga and Wittgenstein are idealists only in this sense.

According to Dignāga, concepts as Kalpanās are basic to characterise the world. He characterise these Kalpanās as names. What is a name? A name is an indicator. A name designates or indicates. There is a sense in which all words are names. Wittgenstein both early and later also held such a view of language. Even in the "PI", he treated the name-language of the builder and assistant as a language game.

That philosophical concept of meaning has its place in primitive idea of the way language functions. But one can also say that it is the idea of a language more primitive than ours.

Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right. The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building stones; there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words 'block', 'pillar', 'slab', 'beam'. A calls them out; - B brings the stone which he has learn to bring at such-and-such a call₂ - conceive this as a complete primitive language.

The builder asks for bricks and the assistant hands over the bricks. The builder asks for cement and the assistant brings accordingly for him. What is usually held, the later Wittgenstein rejects the name theory of the language. But it is not true as a matter of fact. Naming is an important aspect of human language. There is a sense in which it can be said that most of words in a language are names. And to learn a language means to learn the names of things and objects.

In *Tractatus* Wittgenstein maintains that an elementary proposition consists of names.

*An elementary proposition consists of names .
It is a nexus, a concatenation, of names.³
A name cannot be dissected any further by
means of a definition. It is a primitive sign.⁴*

*A name means an object. The object is its meaning.*⁵

These are logical proper names distinguished from grammatical proper name. Grammatical proper names like Rama, Hari and Gopal are a kind of description. In fact, they are not devoid of descriptive elements. Russell treats the grammatical proper names as truncated descriptions. Historically speaking, the dispute regarding the meaning of proper name goes back to the medieval times. The debate whether proper names are connotative or non-connotative is well known to students of philosophy and logic. According to one group of logicians, proper names are connotative; they have meanings. According to another group, proper names are non-connotative; they are meaningless marks. Hobbes and J.S. Mill are advocates of this views. According to still another group of logicians, proper names in beginning are non-connotative but gradually they acquire connotation. But what is actually the case? Which view is correct? The answers to these questions depend on what do we mean by connotation? Historically speaking, connotation is regarded as the essential feature or attributes. In short, connotation stands for the essential attribute. This again leads us to the relationship between word and the world. According to the connotationist view, words encapsulate the essential feature or qualities of things. A thing is what it is by virtue of certain essential attributes. In medieval logic a distinction has been made between connotation, property, and accident. But it follows from the connotation. There are separable properties and inseparable properties. Accident, on the other hand is neither part of the connotation, nor does it follow from the connotation.

This debate is based upon a particular theory of relationship between language and reality. The connotationists maintain that words are a kind of picture of

things or objects. In short, the essential attribute of thing is represented by the meaning of word. In other words, the qualities signified by the meaning of a word must be possessed by things or objects named after it. On this view, language turns out to be a picture of reality. There is one to one co-relation between word and the world. For this groups of logicians even proper names are bound to have connotation. In fact, according to connotationists view of language, not only that all words including proper names are meaningful but the attributes or qualities signified by the meaning must be possessed by the things or objects. This type of theory of meaning can be characterised realism or essentialistic theory of meaning. The nominalists like Hobbes and Mill do not recognise the picturing relationship between word and the world. For them, language is a convention. Not that words are not meaningful but the qualities represented by meaning of words need not be necessarily possessed by things or objects named by these words. That is to say, the debate between connotationists and non-connotationists takes various forms. The connotationists endow all words with meanings. Even referring expression like proper names are endowed with meanings. By doing so, they assimilate references to descriptions. For the connotationists description is the basic function and referring secondary or tertiary function of a word. This is a kind of platonism relating to meaning. Further, the connotationists visualise the relationship between words and things as necessary. The pūrva-mīmāṃsakas in India, held such a theory of meaning. The urge behind such a philosophical theory is to treat all words including proper names as common names. A proper name like "Visvāmitra" has been paraphrased by Mīmāṃsakas as "friend of the universe" (visvasya mitra). For the purva-mimamsakas, "Visvamitra" is not a proper name though it happens to be a name of a person. The Mīmāṃsakas held a

particular theory of meaning. It is this: All words including proper names are meaningful; the relationship between word and the world is eternal. This theory of language was used to justify their thesis that the Vedas are not created by anybody at all. It is eternal and uncreated. The Vedas are the compendia of hymns or mantras. These mantras are meaningful. And meanings are a kind of universal. That is why, even at the time of Pralaya the Vedas are not destroyed. They remain in an implicit form. On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas advocated altogether a different theory of language and meaning. For them, words are conventional and meanings emerge in a particular context. Russell characterises grammatical proper names as truncated descriptions having similar things in mind. That is to say, certain proper names acquire, what is known as, grammatical meanings. Many of the proper names have this kind of meaning, that is to say, the literal meaning. This is particularly true of proper names in highly inflectional languages like Sanskrit. The Sanskrit name 'Padmalochana' means 'Lotus eyed'. In Sanskrit language all words are traced back to certain roots or stems. And this kind of derivation explains the meaning of words. But Russell, by treating the grammatical proper names as truncated description, has failed to distinguish between the referring

function of proper names and its meaning. The primary function of proper names is not to describe or characterise but to indicate and refer to. A proper name might be used to describe certain things or objects. But it is not its primary function. The primary functions of proper names is to refer to things, objects, or individuals. This leads us to the logical distinction between singular terms and general terms.

A singular term is of two types : Indefinite singular term and Definite singular term. A definite singular term

stands for or indicates a definite object or thing. Whereas, an indefinite singular term stands for objects of a particular kind. But at the same time the fact remains that singular term does not describe anything; they only indicate or refer to objects, things or individuals. A general term primarily functions as a description. Its rule is to characterise or to describe. Terms are combined or coupled in a judgement or proposition. A judgement or a proposition is a unit of thought. In fact, a proposition can be characterised as a coupling of terms. In order that a proposition becomes informative, it must contain terms of different type. In short, terms occurring in a proposition must perform separate jobs. This is how a proposition is defined as consisting of subject and a predicate. A subject is that about which something is said. A predicate is that which is said about the subject. What does it mean? Can a general term be used as a subject? To this question, the answer is "yes". One can say "Ram is intelligent" and "teachers are honest". In the first proposition 'Ram' is the subject and it is a definite singular term. Whereas, in second proposition "teachers are honest", 'teacher' is a general term and has been used as a subject term. Now the question is, how to identify general term? Is it the case that a general term always occurs as a predicate of a proposition? In answer to this question, it can be said that it is not always the case. As a matter of fact, general terms occur as a predicate of a proposition but even if sometimes they occur as a subject of proposition, yet their descriptive nature remains unchanged. The proposition "teachers are honest" can be paraphrased as follows: some human beings are teachers and they are honest. In short, even if general terms are used as a subject of the proposition, they have to be paraphrased and the referring character has to be honoured. In short, a proposition cannot be

understood without reference and predication.

The propositionalists in logic maintain that the logical subject of the proposition must be a point of reference. In this sense only the denial or negation of a predicate results in the negation of the original proposition ; Whereas, the negation of a subject term does not result in any proposition at all. As for e.g., let us negate the predicate 'black' in the proposition " some cows are black". When the predicate "black" is neglected the negated proposition becomes "some cows are not black". The predicate or general term black has been neglected. The original proposition was some cows are black . After the negation of predicate "black" we get the proposition "some cows are not black".Let us concentrate on this: "some cows are not black" is the negation of the proposition "some cows are black". In fact, the negation of the predicate word results in the contrary or the contradictory of the original position. As for e.g., the proposition " all cows are black" can be negated in two ways: (1) "all cows are not black" and this will ultimately result in "some cows are not black". Further, "some cows are not black" is the contradictory of "all cows are black". (2) Again "all cows are not black" can be negated as "no cows are not black". Though in this proposition the subject term 'cow' has been prefixed by the word 'no', yet it has not been negated. What is negated or denied is the predicate 'black'. To say that "no cows are black" is to say that 'blackness' is denied of all cows. But in either case the denial of a predicate or a general term results in the negation of the original proposition. In short, we get a proposition after denying a predicate. But can we get a proposition by denying term ? The answer is "no". Let us deny the subject term "Ram" in the proposition "Ram is a boy". What would be the nature of that proposition after we

negate the subject term "Ram"? The denial of subject term will amount to not using it. And not to use the subject term is to remove it from the context of proposition. Further, it is because of the general term, that a proposition becomes either true or false. In other words, a proposition is endowed with truth or falsity, because of the predicate letter. Take away the predicate letter from the context of the proposition, the question of whether a proposition is true or false does not arise. The word 'cow' and 'Ram' do not yield any proposition at all. Therefore, in order to get a proposition we must combine at least two terms i.e. subject and predicate. A proposition is neither true nor false, if there is no assertion. An assertion is not possible without there being predication. Truth and falsity, assertion and denial, predication and characterisation are intimately connected. The Indian tradition accepts this position. For the Naiyāyikas, knowledge is savikalpa (determinate) in nature. The Naiyāyikas do not recognise the supremacy of Nirvikalpaka (indeterminate perception). Savikalpaka, in the context of Nyāya means predication or characterisation. The subject must be characterised or described. Without this, there is no knowledge at all. The Vedāntins, on the other hand, try to eliminate all predicates from the sphere of genuine knowledge. To apply a predicate means to make the proposition open to doubt. That is why, the Vedāntins deny all predication or characterisation.

In contemporary philosophy, Frege made a distinction between sense and reference. According to him, two different sentences might have two different senses or meanings but have the same reference. His famous example is 'morning star' and 'evening star'. Both the expressions 'morning star' and 'evening star' refer to the same object i.e. the planet venus. But the sense or meaning of 'morning star' is

different from that of 'evening star'. What Frege wants to suggest is this : Reference is not a part of meaning but at the same time, reference is very much essential in assertion of the proposition. Without a point of reference no assertion can be made and no meaning will be intelligible. Frege's distinction between meaning and reference provides an antidote to the referential theory of meaning. Some philosophers identify meaning with reference. Frege points out that reference are no part of meaning, though they are intimately bound up with meanings.

Let us now turn our attention to Wittgenstein's view of names. In Tractatus Wittgenstein develops a theory of logical proper names. We have already said that in this respect Russell and Wittgenstein come very close. In his Logical Atomism Lecture, Russell develops a theory of logical proper names. Russell wanted to make philosophy scientific. To achieve this purpose he made an attempt to remove vagueness and ambiguity and to develop a mathematical language to be used in philosophy. Russell had great interest in the perspicuous nature of language in mathematics. Both Russell and Wittgenstein employed truth functional analysis of language .When we analyse complex proposition,we eliminate logical constants. Further, all ambiguity and vagueness disappear. Ultimately we come across very simple propositions. Russell terms these proposition as atomic propostions. These propostions consists of logical proper names. Is it true that there are such propositions ? Wittgenstein's answer was that it is for others to find out if the elementary propositions are there as a matter of fact, but that there must be such propositions as a matter of logic. If such propositions are not there, the determinate sense of the proposition cannot be accounted for. In other words, in order that the sense of a proposition be determinate and definite, there must be elementary

propositions. Similarly, When Wittgenstein was asked to give an instance of logical proper name, he refused to do that. Whereas, Russell was very optimistic. He produced examples of logical proper names. According to Russell, 'this', 'here', 'now' are some of the instances of logical proper names. To be a logical proper name means not to have any descriptive content. Expressions such as 'this', 'here', 'now', do not have any descriptive content. Russell argues that they are purely indicative in nature.

F.H. Bradley, in his *Principle of Logic*, out of different philosophical motive, examines such expressions as 'this', 'here', 'now'. His argument is that such expressions are more general than the general terms themselves. General term is one which applies to many cases. Whereas, a singular term is that which applies only to some cases. What about 'this', 'here', and 'now' Are they singular or general? Do they apply to many cases or some cases? Bradley's argument is that these expressions are applied to a very large number of cases, as for e.g. the word 'this' can be applied to anything, any object or any event. Similarly, the word 'here' can be applied to any point of space. Further, the word 'now' can be applied to any moment of time. Therefore Bradley argues that such words as 'this', 'here', 'now' are very general. What does Bradley mean by this? Is it really the case that there are no indicator words in language? As a matter of fact, indication and reference can be secured in many ways. There are what is known as linguistically secured reference and non-linguistically secured reference. With the help of physical gestures and postures we sometimes secure reference. That is to say, reference is a fact of life. Bradley is right in saying that words and language as such have generic meaning. But he overlooks the fact that these generic meanings get contextualised. The contextual meaning helps us in securing unique reference. Bradley was

looking for pure names, pure indicators, but such names he could not find in our communicative system.

According to early Wittgenstein the logical proper names must be there. He was frank enough to admit that the elementary propositions consisting of pure names do not say anything at all. They simply show things. But at the same time, logical proper names do not occur in isolation. A name is a name only in the context of a proposition. What does it mean? It can be said in this connection that even in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein recognises the importance of proposition in human thought. The truth functional analysis of language does not eliminate the proposition but it eliminates the vagueness and ambiguity. According to Wittgenstein, the perspicuous ideal language lies hidden beneath and behind the ordinary or natural language. The so called ideal language is not constructed. It is discovered. But this theory of language is replete with some rich philosophical insight. It is this : Language and communication system at the base is referential in nature. That is to say, reference lies at the base of description. All descriptions and characterisations are a later day creation. They are eliminable. In short, they are not persistent feature of communication. In this respect, the early Wittgenstein comes very close to Dignāga. What Dignāga calls Kalpanās, Russell and Wittgenstein characterise them as descriptive element. It is the descriptive elements which are the source of vagueness and ambiguity. In order to get a perspicuous view of language and communication, one must eliminate the descriptive elements. The logical proper names, according to Wittgenstein, are just like mathematical or geometrical point. They are ideal in nature. But such point-like names cannot be used in any communication at all. In fact, what Wittgenstein wishes to suggest is the limiting case of all

names is reference and limiting point of all communication is silence. "Where of one cannot speak thereof one must be silent" resembles Dignāga's doctrine of unutterability.

In 'PI' Wittgenstein advocates a liberal view of language ipso facto, he differs in his attitude towards names. In the *Tractatus* he advocates a unifunctional view of language. In 'PI', he advocates a multifunctional view of language. Though in the 'PI', he talks of different

functions of language yet, he does eliminate the names. But the names get transformed. In the *Tractatus* names are treated as on par with geometrical point. But in 'PI', names are taken in their natural and concrete nature. In short, he does not talk of logical proper names. Language consists of different elements.

Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. - The function of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects.

He compares language with a tool-box. He remarks that the tools in a tool-box perform different functions. Each tool has its own role to play. Names, adjectives, pronouns, verbs and so on, perform their respective functions. Names in 'PI' are grammatical proper names. Logical proper names do not perform any role in ordinary communicative system. Though such names play a role in geometry, they cannot play any role in ordinary communicative system.

Wittgenstein visualises the doctrine of logical proper names. The language consisting of pure names is disfunctional. It cannot perform any other role except the act of picturing. It is true that that descriptive element sometimes decides but it is the descriptive element, at the same time, which plays very significant role in communication. Now the question is, does Dignāga talk of logical proper

name in manner of early Wittgenstein ? To this question, our answer is "yes", but with a qualification. The Kalpanās of Dignāga correspond to the descriptive elements in philosophy of Wittgenstein and Russell. They do not correspond to logical proper names, though Dignāga treats these Kalpanās as names. In a broad sense, the later Wittgenstein also treats the majority of words in a language as a kind of names. Similarly, Dignāga treats all Kalpanās as a kind of name. But Dignāga does not have a word for logical proper names. The svalaksanas are particulars or point instants. They correspond to the object of logical atoms. In short, what Russell calls a logical atom and early Wittgenstein calls an object, is called as Svalaksanas by Dignāga. The Svalaksanas are unutterable. They are not part of any language. That is why they are unutterable. They cannot be put into words in the sense it can be said that Dignāga does not advocate the picture theory of language. That is to say, according to Dignāga, there is no one to one correspondence between logical proper names and svalaksanas. The svalaksanas do not constitute the part of any language nor does language has any element that corresponds to these svalaksanas. On the other hand, according to early Wittgenstein and Russell, proper names have logical object and atoms corresponding to them. That is why, Wittgenstein and Russell advocate the picturing relation of language with reality. It is Precisely because of this reason that Dignāga did not have any word for logical proper names. For Dignāga, Language can never be treated as a picture of reality.

It may not be out of place in this connection to point out that in India philosophical tradition the doctrine of ideal language has not been advocated. Reality is either expressible or inexpressible but it is never pictured or mirrored by language. In Jainism, a sevenfold Nyaya has been developed to express reality. Whatever is, is expressible.

In other words, for Jain philosophers reality can be expressed by language contrived for the purpose. On the other hand Buddhist and Vedāntins maintain that reality is inexpressible and unutterable. The Mimāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas go along with the Jains. Reality, for them is expressible. As a result, the doctrine of picture language has not found favour with the Indian philosophers. Dignāga arrives at the svalakṣaṇas not through truth functional analysis of language but through epistemological and logical analysis as such.

But Dignāga does not treat the kalpanās as misleading in nature. There is no attempt to eliminate the Kalpanās and to discover the logical proper names. On the other hand, he seeks to explain the nature and presupposition of the communicative system. Dignāga develops a theory of meaning in this connection. This theory is known as Apohavāda or the differentiation theory. After Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Dharmotara, Ratnakīrti improved this theory of apoha. 'Apoha' is a Sanskrit term. It is form out of 'Apo+uha'. Its literal meaning is exclusion of the other. What is this other and why shall it be excluded? This theory was developed in opposition to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of 'language and meaning'. The Naiyāyikas named that we perceive not only the positive objects but also the negative objects (negation). When we say 'this is a cow', this is a case of perceptual knowledge. In short, we perceive both universal 'cow' and the particularity associated with it. Then this perceptual knowledge is verbalised, this means that the 'cow' is being talked about. According to Dignāga, to say that 'this is a cow' is not to say we perceive the 'cow' but to say that the 'non-cow' are excluded. What does it mean? Why shall the "non-cow" be excluded from the 'cow'? This is known as Buddhist dialectics. According to Buddhist knowledge and meaning is dialectical. Literal

meaning of dialectic is dialogue conversation. In Western tradition, Hegel is famous for the dialectical theory. Later on Marx was influenced by it. But the Hegelian dialectics stands for a high water mark in European philosophy. According to Hegel, every concept implies its negation. The concept 'cow' implies 'non-cow' ; but in what sense ? Hegel's argument is that when we examine a concept and eliminate all its adjuncts, we ultimately come across the 'Being.' And this 'Being' is 'Nothing' for the simple reason, it is devoid of all admixtures and adjuncts. So Hegel invents another category known as becoming. So thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis or Being, non-being and Becoming characterise Hegelian logic. And this process goes on for ever unless and until the absolute idea realises it. But the Buddhist dialectic is different from that of Hegel. In short, the Buddhist dialectics relates to the doctrine of significant negation. In order to be significant or meaningful, a word or concept must be distinguished from its opposite. Otherwise, it will cease to have any meaning at all. When we say simply 'this', this is not knowledge at all. In short, the 'this' has to be characterised. In other words, predication is highly necessary for securing knowledge. No predication, no knowledge. Purely singular terms without the help of general term, cannot give us any knowledge at all. In short, predicates are basic requirement of any knowledge. In this respect, Rāmanuja comes very close to Dignāga. Rāmanuja holds almost the similar view, without predication, without characterisation, there is no knowledge at all. Dignāga makes a distinction between two types of knowledge corresponding to the types of reality. Samvrtisatya is the knowledge obtained through predication. Paramārthasatya is that knowledge which is obtained without any predication. Dignāga's doctrine of Kalpanās and doctrine of Apoha are meant for explaining the samvrtisatya. 'This is a cow',

'This is a horse', 'This is a boy', these are instances of Samvrtisatya . Dignāga like later Wittgenstein argues that the business of philosophy is to make things clear or explicit . Accordingly, he offers an explanation of meaning understanding and intelligibility.

Let us explain the concept of 'Apoha' in detail. Some scholars interpret Apoha as a negative theory of meaning. This means when we say 'this is a cow' it excludes 'non-cow' from it. So the emphasis is put on 'non-cow'. And 'non-cow' is negative in character. So it is argued that the Buddhist theory of Apoha is a kind of negative theory of meaning. This interpretation is not acceptable without the concept of 'negative' being explained. When we say 'it is a cow' it does not mean 'it is not a cow' . The doctrine of Apoha does not mean this. According to Dignāga, the meaning of the word 'cow' is not directly apprehended. 'Cow' is a concept. Its opposite is non-cow. That is to say, when we assert 'it is a cow', we exclude the 'non-cows' from it. The whole thing can be put symbolically as follows : cow = $\sim\sim$ cow In other words, 'p = $\sim\sim$ p'. It is a truth functional equivalence 'P' is truth functionally equivalent to $\sim\sim$ 'p'. Seen in this light ' $\sim\sim$ cow' will be logically equivalent to 'cow'. If this interpretation is accepted the doctrine of Apoha appears unnecessary, for the simple reason that to exclude the opposite is to assert the original concept. If $\sim\sim$ 'cow' is logically equivalent to 'cow', there is no need to do this exercise. If the exclusion of negation of 'cow' means the same as 'cow' then there is no need to exclude the negation. What could be the reason to advance this theory? Why did Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and Ratnakīrti insist upon the exclusion of negation? What is philosophical insight gain out of it ? In answer to these questions the following can be said. A concept and its complementary exhaust the

universal discourse. In short, 'cow and ~cow, 'p and ~p exhaust the entire universal discourse. 'P+~P=1'. Cow and not-cow, P and ~P are complementary to each other. Two complementary terms exhaust the universe of discourse. Dignāga and his followers had this insight. Such concepts as universal discourse, complementary class and the law of double negation was not unknown to Buddhist logicians. In other words, Dignāga realises the significance of these concepts in logical theory. There is a sense in which it can be said that the doctrine of Apoha is actually the law of double negation. Further, the doctrine of Apoha makes explicit the law of significant negation. A term is meaningful if and only if, it is distinguished from its opposite. In order that a term 'cow' is meaningful; it should be distinguished from 'non-cows'. To put both 'cows and non-cows' under the head of 'cow' will be meaningless. To be meaningful means to be distinguished from the opposite. The doctrine of Apoha envisages the law of significant negation. In this sense, it is both a logical and semantic doctrine. It makes the logical point that "P" is distinguished from "~P" and 'p' is equivalent to '~~P'. Does "non-cow" exclude "cow". The answer is "yes". But now the question arises, why does Dignāga begin with positive and goes to negative. Does, "~ cow" not imply "cow"? To this question the answer is "yes". But Dignāga does not move in this direction. In short, he stops at the exclusion of the negation. Is it the case that, as a matter of fact, after we perceive a cow we exclude the "non-cows"? In answer to this question, it can be said that Dignāga does not describe the empirical fact of perception. How do people, as a matter of fact, see things? It is not being described by Dignāga. He presents a logical and epistemological analysis of knowledge and meaning. The doctrine of Apoha can be extended to understanding, meaning, concept and statement. Not only

every concept but every proposition must be distinguished from the opposite. Their opposite must be excluded from their domain. Otherwise the concept and proposition in question will turn out meaningless.

The Vedāntins, particularly Advaitins advocate a theory of meaning, which I wish to characterise as inclusive theory of meaning. What does it mean? The statement "Sarvaṃ Kṣalū idam Brahman" (everything is Brahman) is an instance of inclusive theory of meaning. For Vedāntins, all concepts or statements merge into one unitary concept or statement. Of course, the Advaitins had their philosophical compulsion for developing such a theory of meaning. The statement "everything is Brahman" is either vacuous or contradictory for the following reasons. 'Brahman' contains also the 'non Brahman' is either vacuous or contradictory for the following reasons. 'Brahman' contains also the "non Brahman" in it. It does not convey any meaning at all. Further, if it contains its contradictory and seems to assert something it becomes contradictory. So in either case it does not say anything at all. On the other hand Dignāga and some other philosophers advocate what is known as exclusive theory of meaning. The opposite must be excluded. Why did not Dignāga advocate that the 'cow' should be excluded from 'non-cow'? What could be the reason behind it? The answer to this question could be given in the context of Nyāya-Vāisesika. Historically speaking, the Buddhists had an intellectual battle against the Naiyāyikas. The Naiyāyikas maintain that a concept or statement is understood directly. That is to say, the concept 'cow' is directly understood. It is positive concept. Further, they treated negation or Abhāva as a separate category. The Buddhist excluded the negation. Whereas, the Naiyāyikas made negation into a separate

category. Dignāga and Ratnakīrti lay emphasis on exclusion in meaning situation. According to them, the meaning of the 'cow' become clearer and intelligible only when we exclude the 'non-cows'. The Naiyāyikas recognise universals as Padārtha. On the other hand, for Dignāga and the Buddhists the so-called universals are empty and essenceless. For the Naiyāyikas to understand a concept means to grasp its essence. But what is to be done, if there is no essence. The Buddhist denied essence. Then how to understand words or concepts if they do not signify essences. For Dignāga, the exclusion of its opposite is the only method. Neither the term 'cow' nor the term 'non-cow' stands for any essence. But they have to be understood and made intelligible. How to do that? Dignāga's answer is exclude the opposite and we will be able to understand the meaning .

The so called concepts are mere names. Names as they are, do not stand for essences. But names have significant role to perform. The name 'Pegasus' may (to use Quine's expression) not stand for essence. But at the same time the fact remains that it has its use in language. Similar is the case with the word 'Dittha'. The word 'Dittha' does not stand for any essence. But it has its use in communicative system.

Further, Dignāga and other Buddhist philosophers accept only two sources of knowledge i.e. Perception (Pratyakṣa) and Inference (Anumāna). Other Pramānas are not recognised by them as independent source of knowledge. They have been reduced to either Perception or Inference. To perceive means to apply concept on the raw and brute sensation. We apply categories in perceptual knowledge. To that extent it becomes indirect. Because Reality is never captured through perception. Pure sensation gives us the Reality. Inferential knowledge is based upon perception. So in this sense, Inference becomes doubly indirect. Now the question is,

Dignāga was interested in finding out the reality which lies behind the language, why did he discuss about the communicative system?. Why did he talk about Perception and Inference, while Perception and Inference do not give the knowledge of reality? Why to waste time on that? what could be the answer? It can be said in this connection that Dignāga like other philosophers was very much interested in communicative system. The entire communicative system is discussed by him in detail. The concept of knowledge, understanding and meaning are important concepts. Dignāga presented an analysis on these concepts. He maintains that all these concepts and categories must have link with pure sensation and sensibility. In short, Dignāga, in his *Pramāna Samuccaya*, combines and anticipates the views of early and later Wittgenstein. At certain stage human experience is language-bound. In short language, thought and experience are so much intimately connected that one cannot be detached from the other. The early Wittgenstein talked of pure logical names which were hooked up to the Reality. The later wittgenstein did not recognise the importance of such logical proper names. The later Wittgenstein sought to eliminate the so-called logical proper names from his doctrine. But for Dignāga concepts are baseless and meaningless if they are detached or removed from particulars (Svalaksanas).

Now the question is why do we need names, whether logical proper names or grammatical proper name in language? In other words, what is the function of 'Names' in our language?. Both Russell and early Wittgenstein were mistaken about the nature of names. They wanted to sterilise the grammatical proper names. In other words, they wanted to eliminate all sorts of vagueness and ambiguity, not only from descriptive words but even from the grammatical proper names by characterising them as truncated descriptions.

Russell and later Wittgenstein did not recognise their importance. But Names (grammatical proper names) like descriptions have important role to perform in any language. To quote John.B.Searle :

But the uniqueness and immense pragmatic convenience of proper names in our language lie precisely in the fact that they enable us to refer publicly to objects without being forced to raise issues and come to agreement on what descriptive characteristics exactly constitute the identity of the object. They function not as descriptions but as pegs on which to hang description. Thus the looseness of the criteria for proper names is a necessary condition for isolating the referring function from the describing function of language. 7

Proper names are a kind of pillar or peg around which names are hung. What does Searle mean by this? In answer it can be said that any knowledge situation involves a kind of description. No description is possible without a point of reference. That is to say, the description must be tied together and should refer to something. If this is not done, then communication becomes impossible. Leibnitz seized upon this idea. This doctrine of 'Monad' is an explicit statement of his theory that descriptions need a point of reference. Leibnitz went wrong beyond certain points. Not only some description but all possible natural description he put round the point of reference. The point of reference is 'monad'. But at the same time they are extremely rich. Even in a fiction or imaginary story we need names. Without names reference cannot be secured. They may not be exactly proper names. Even a descriptive phrase can perform a function of proper names. The early Wittgenstein, like Russell, did not take cognisance of grammatical proper names. I wish to point out that the function expected to be performed by the logical proper names can be performed very well by the so-called impure names (grammatical proper names). On the other

hand, Dignāga's remarks on names and Kalpanās are philosophically insightful. He does not dismiss the grammatical proper names as vague and ambiguous in the manner of Russell and Wittgenstein. He retains these names. Further, he treats other descriptive phrases and concepts on par with names.

We have already pointed out that the Buddhist were against sṛti-pramāna. The Mimāṃsakas are champions of sṛti-pramāna. The Vedas were treated as eternal (Apūrṣeya). The Vedas are not destroyed. This theory of the eternality of the Vedas is based upon a particular theory of language and meaning. It is this : all words are meaningful by virtue of essences. Further, they maintain that the relationship between word and meaning is eternal. Words are physical but meanings are non-physical. Even if the particular words are destroyed but meaning is never destroyed at all. The Buddhist were against such a theory of meaning and language. Dignāga argues that word and concepts are essenceless. To understand the meaning is not to apprehend or grasp an essence but to exclude/remove the opposite of the concept. But then the question arises, are the so-called affirmative propositions negative in character? The doctrine of 'Apoha'

might create the impression that Dignāga reduces all affirmative to the negatives. But as a matter of fact he does not do it. What he wishes to point out is this:

The so called affirmative proposition or positive concepts cannot be understood without any reference to negative proposition or concept. This is that Dignāga means by the doctrine of 'Apoha'. Apohavāda does not aim at converting all affirmative propositions into a negative ones rather, it aims at finding out the logical fact that every concept is intimately bound up with its negative. The so-called names or Kalpanās are tested on the touchstone of efficaciousness

(Artha-kriyā Kāritva). It gives us a pragmatic flavour. Genuine concept must lead to some kind of successful action. How it is so?. Dignāga's answer is that all concepts must be based on Svalaksanas. If this is so, then the so-called Kalpanās must lead to successful actions. To conclude it can be said that for Dignāga, grammatical proper name are not necessary. Further, all the so-called descriptive phrases or kalpanās can be treated on par with names. These names are essenceless. They do not stand for any essence at all. Consistently Dignāga did not embark upon the task of finding out logical proper names. Whereas, Russell and Wittgenstein felt very much dissatisfied with grammatical proper names and embarked upon the task of finding out logical proper names. I wish to point out that both logical proper name and grammatical proper name perform the same function of reference to persons or things. Dignāga realised it and consequently he did not think it necessary to invent logical proper names.

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CHAPTER - 3

PARTICULARS

CHAPTER III

PARTICULARS

The controversy relating to the particulars and universals is as old as philosophy. The questions can be raised in this connection. What is a universal? What is a particular? Why are they so important in philosophical debate? Let us answer these questions one by one. When we say "Ram is a boy", 'Ram' works as a particular and 'boy' works as a universal. Ordinarily it can be said that universal is that which applies to a number of things or events of a particular kind. The expression 'boy' is a universal for the simple reason that it can be applied to a large number of human individuals of a particular type, e.g. "Ram is a boy", "Hari is a boy" and "Gopal is a boy" and so on and so forth. The word "boy" applies to 'Hari', 'Ram', and 'Gopal' and many other human individuals. What about the names 'Hari', 'Rama', and 'Gopal'? They stand for particulars. A particular is that which is referred to by the universal. Particulars and universals are neither physical nor linguistic elements. There are different ways of expressing universals and particulars with the help of language. Usually, we use general expressions to talk about universals and singular expressions to talk about particulars. So, it is maintained by some philosophers that universals are different from general terms. At the same time, a universal can be used as the subject of a proposition. But for that matter, the general term does not become a particular. As for instance, in the proposition "the tree is green", 'tree' is the subject but it is a general term and represents or stands for the universal. How could it be a particular? From the fact that a general term is sometimes used as a subject of a proposition, it does not follow that it stands for a particular. The proposition "the tree is green" can be resolved into the following two propositions (1) This is a tree and (2) This is green. So both 'tree' and 'green' are general terms and represent universals.

Philosophers like Plato have arrived at the universals through analysis of language and meaning. We apply general terms to describe or characterise objects and things. So they must be standing for certain things Plato was really worried about the general terms. How is that the same term 'table' applies to tables of different shapes, sizes and colours? How is it that the term 'man' applies to human beings, things and events. On what basis we do it? What could be justification for it? Plato's argument is that corresponding to general terms there are universals or forms. They are archetype of things. What sort of entity the universals are? Plato's argument is that, they are non-spatial and non-temporal. They do not belong to the world of senses. The senses cannot apprehend the universals. The universals can be known and apprehended only through intellectual intuition. Plato housed them in an extramundane world. What about the actual things? Plato treats them as particulars. In short, according to Plato, the things and objects that we perceive through sense organ are the particulars. The particulars inhabit the spatio-temporal world. They are born, come into existence, grow, decay,  They are bound by space and time; whereas universals are not in space and time. The particulars have been characterised by Plato as short-living, transitory, mutable and impermanent. The universals have been characterised as permanent, immutable and eternal. Spacio-temporal predicates cannot be applied to the universals. Plato faced a difficulty. He tried his best to integrate the particulars and universals. But he failed. The particulars and universals stand apart. There is no bridge between them. So, he treated the particulars as imperfect, copies of universals i.e. an imitation of imitation. In short, Plato treated the universals as primary and basic and the particulars as secondary and non-basic.

Aristotle was very much dissatisfied with the platonic

account of universals and particulars. He tried to bring the universals close to particulars. For Aristotle, universals and particulars are not poles apart. They live together. In short, according to Aristotle, the universals and particulars are fused together. Wherever there is a universal, there is a particular and vice-versa.

What does it mean to say that the universal and particular are fused together? It can be said in this connection that, universals are not entities. There is no such entity, say, for instance, an ideal 'table' behind the back of concrete table. But when we describe a concrete table we use concepts and categories. The concepts and categories are universals. They are non-material in nature. But concepts and categories are applied to things. For Plato, the question was how is it that non-material entities like concepts and categories could be applied to things? They posed a philosophical problem before Plato. Plato could not find out a satisfactory solution to this problem. As a result, in the process he demolished the particulars. The Platonic world ultimately consists of a system of categories or concepts. A concept or universal can be understood as an element of meaning. What does it mean to understand an object? What is it to understand an object? Understanding is possible with the help of meanings or categories. Without these categories and concepts understanding is impossible. Plato treats these meanings as universals. But he did not take note of the fact that meaning and reference go together. It was Aristotle who recognised it. For him, the universals and particulars are fused together. This means meaning and reference go together. The same general term 'man', 'table' not only stands for universals or concepts but it is also used to refer to particular objects. C.S. Peirce, the American philosopher is right in maintaining that the type and token of an expression are really fused together. Every

expression has two types of roles i.e. the type and the token. Type stands for meaning and concept. Token stands for the reference.

The German philosopher Kant too faced such problem. He raised the question i.e. how is knowledge possible? His answer is that knowledge has two dimensions, i.e. particularity and generality.

The particularity aspect of knowledge is obtained through sensation and the generality aspect of knowledge is obtained through understanding. Genuine knowledge is possible only when there is a cooperation between sensibility and understanding. Understanding provides man with concepts and categories. The categories, for Kant are built into the structure of human mind. They are ineliminable. For Kant, no knowledge is possible without the application of categories. But once the category is applied, the noumenon recedes back. In other words, the so-called knowledge is the knowledge of phenomenon. The noumenon remains unknown and unknowable. Kant visualises noumenon as that which is not conceptualised. But what is its role? The answer to this question it can be said that without noumenon, knowledge of phenomenon is impossible. The noumenon plays a guiding role. The Platonic Forms as universals turn to categories of knowledge in the hands of Kant. But so long as it remains at the level of categories or concepts we remain in the phenomenal world.

In the ancient Indian philosophical tradition, the debate relating to universals and particulars have assumed an important place. The Naiyāyikas treated the universals as a kind of

Padārtha. The literal meaning of 'Padārtha' is 'meaning of a word'. But the Nyāya-Vaisesika philosophers use Padārtha in the sense of category. Padārtha surely is not a physical object, though sometimes padārtha is used in the sense of physical object (Padasya artha padārtha). According to Nyāya-Vaisesika philosophers, reality consists of Padārthas. They are as follows: Substance (Dravya), Quality(Gūna), Action(Karma), Universality (Sāmānya), Particularity (Visesa), Inherence(Samavāya) and Non-existence (Abhāva). These are not only seven ways of characterising the reality but they constitute the reality. It is a kind of metaphysics. The Vaisesika philosophers reduce all concepts into seven types. These seven types are the minimum concepts in terms of which the world can be described. One may ask the following question in this connection: Why is it that they postulated only seven types of padārthas? In answer to this question, it can be said that the Vaisesika philosophers tried to find out the minimum number of concepts. A metaphysician, while aiming at explaining universals, accepts only minimum number of concepts. If we look at the padārthas, we will find that their number cannot be reduced or increased. Any description must presuppose a substantive. Attributes or actions are the main forms of characterisation. Without universality and particularity, classification are not possible. Similar is the case with inherence. The idea of some form of togetherness cannot be explained without the concept of inherence. Further, non-existence is one of the fundamental categories of human speech. In a sense, to talk of existence means to talk of non-existence. That is to say, the world as it is, is not an external world. Things come into existence and are destroyed. Men are born, grow and die. How to explain this phenomenon and with what category?. Non-existence as a category was invented to explain such phenomenon. But at the same time, it can be said that the Nyāya-Vaisesika philosophers did not take note of the concept of relation. To some extent, relation can be accommodated and

explained in terms of universality, particularity and inherence. But this is not all. How to explain 'A is greater than B' in Nyāya-Vaisesika schema? Either we reduced all relations into attributes or relation remains unexplained. The Naiyāyikas, like Aristotle, did not take serious note of relation. The attitude toward relations has resulted in treatment of subject-predicate form of proposition, as the basic form. Not only in ancient Greece, but also in India, Logicians for some reason or other did not take serious note of relation. As a result, they treated relations as a kind of attribute. Without the category of universal, the Vaisesika philosophy will be reduced to a kind of atomic pluralism. It is a kind of realism. This means, for the Nyāya-Vaisesika philosophers, universals are real. They are not concepts of human mind as conceptualists think, nor are they mere names of nominalists argue. But at the same time, the universals according to Nyāya-Vaisesika philosophers, are not set apart from the particulars. Universals and particulars though are distinct categories, yet they are fused together. This logical fusion is made possible by the help of inherence (Samavāya). Samavāya (inherence) is a kind of logical relation. It is different from conjunction (Samyoga). Though, Aristotle argues that universals and particulars are fused together, yet he does not admit of any kind of inherence in this regard. On the other hand, the Vaisesika doctrine of inherence is indicative of their philosophical insight. It may be true that universals and particulars are fused together. But how to understand this fusion? If universals are interpreted as meanings and particulars as references then it can be said that meanings and references go together. But how to account for this togetherness? Is the relationship between meaning and reference contingent or necessary? The later Wittgenstein will argue that both meaning and reference depend on the context. And context is partly non-linguistic in nature. Whereas according to Nyāya-vaisesika philosophers, the relationship between meaning and reference is a

kind of inalienable relationship. The realistic temper perhaps compels the Naiyāyikas to advocate such a theory.

They advocated a kind of essentialistic doctrines.

The classical Indian philosophical tradition may be classified into two types i.e., (1) Essentialists (2) Non-essentialists.

The Sāṅkhya, Nyāya-vaisesika, Mimāṃsā and Vedānta advocate a kind of essentialistic doctrine. Whereas, the Cārvākas and Buddhists advocate a kind of non-essentialistic doctrine. Therefore, it can be said in this connection that the philosophical debate in ancient India is a debate between essentialism and non-essentialism. The Advaitins also are a kind of essentialist. The Brahman or Atman is a kind of essence. The particulars are the tangible objects and cannot be understood without reference to Brahman and Atman. The Cārvākas and Buddhists are non-essentialists. Further, the Cārvākas treat the particulars as basic and universals are secondary in nature. But what sort of particulars they are? According to cārvakas, such particulars are spatio-temporal in nature. Earth, water, fire and air are the basic ingredients by means of which we can explain all things. The Cārvakas do not recognise ether as an ingredient. These four ingredients are physical in nature. They are amenable to sense perception. Spatio-temporality is one of the basic feature. In the contemporary period Strawson advocated such type of particulars. The basic particulars, according to Strawson, are material bodies and persons. To be a particular means, according to Strawson, to be identifiable, *and reidentifiable*. But then what are the basic requirements of identification? Strawson's answer is that space and time are the basic requirement of identification and reidentification. In short, the basic particulars must occupy spatio-temporal point. In this respect Strawson asserts a Kantian thesis. For Kant, without space and time sensation is not possible at all. That is why,

space and time are treated by Kant as forms of sensibility.

According to one tradition in philosophy, particulars are primary. And such particulars are spatio-temporal ones. According to another tradition, universals are primary and they are non-spatial and non-temporal. The particulars are understood only with reference to universals. Take away the universals, the particulars will be unintelligible and meaningless. The Naiyāyikas recognise the supremacy of universals over particulars. This is evident from their views on indeterminate and determinate perceptions. The Naiyāyikas recognise perception as one of the sources of knowledge. But what is perception? How is perception possible? According to the Naiyāyikas, perception involves two stages : indeterminate (Savikalpaka) and determinate (Nirvikalpaka). Without the Savikalpaka, perception is not perception at all. But what is Savikalpaka? It is determinate perception. What do we mean by saying that perception is determinate? Only when we apply a concept/category, the so called perception is called determinate. Further, without application of a concept, there is no assertion and consequently there is no knowledge. Every case of knowledge is a case of assertion including negation in an important sense. To assert means to characterise. To characterise means to apply a predicate or a concept. In the case of denial, the predicate is denied of the subject. But in either case, there is a predication. By emphasizing on Savikalpaka the Naiyāyikas recognise the importance of predication and concepts in case of knowledge.

Buddhism arose as a protest of Hinduism. This protest can be characterised in terms of fight against essentialism. Buddhism, from the very beginning, was against essentialist doctrine. Buddha challenged śruti pramāna (verbal testimony). The Vedas were supposed to contain eternal verities. Buddha questions such theories and attitudes. Instead, he advocated the doctrine of impermanence. Permanence, subsistence and eternity, according

to Buddhists, are figment of imagination. Further, revelatory knowledge was also challenged by Buddha. Instead, he advocated and sought to explain everything in terms of causes and effects. But he reinterpreted the law of causality. There is no necessary connection between cause and effects. But he reinterpreted the law of causality. There is no necessary connection between cause and effect. In short, cause precedes the effect and effect succeeds the cause. This is otherwise known as Pratiyasamutpāda (Doctrine of dependent origination). Origination is dependent. There is no such things as independent existence. Every existence including everything are dependent on other things. But Buddha does not advocate a kind of coherence theory. The Buddhist doctrine of causality is different from those of rationalists and empiricists in the west. According to rationalists, cause and effect are necessarily connected. There is a logical or necessary relation between cause and effect. For the empiricists, the casual relation though contingent yet can be characterised as kind of casual necessity. Further, the cause, according to empiricists, does not altogether vanish, after the effect comes into existence. Whereas, according to Buddhists, the cause disappears after the effect comes into existence. The cause and effect are not related to or bound by inherence. There is no inherence, according to the Buddhists. Human existence is also explained with the help of cause and effect. Human life has been explained by Buddha with the help of twelve links in terms of cause and effect. If there is something, there must be cause of it, or else, it will not be intelligible. If one wishes to eliminate the effect, one must, eliminate its cause. Buddha rejects Yadrchhavādā (the doctrine of emergence). Nothing happens due to chance. Everything is casually linked. If life is full of suffering, there is a cause of suffering. Further, suffering can be eliminated. In this sense, Buddhism advocates a kind of optimism and puts emphasis on accountability and responsibility. "Asmiṃ sati idam bhavati", means 'this being so, that happens'.

This is the crux of the doctrine of dependent origination. Dependent origination and momentariness (ksanabhāṅgavāda) are interrelated. Causality is the basic principle for understanding the world. But cause and effect are not permanent entities in the world. What does it mean? In answer to this question, it can be said in this connection that ultimately cause and effect are non-temporal and non-spatial entities. 'Moment' for Buddhist is not time constant. A moment is approximated to an instant but it is not temporal in nature. As a matter of fact, a moment of kṣana is non-spatial and non-temporal. How to understand this? What does it mean to say that they are moments but are not temporal? The Buddhist doctrine of momentariness does not aim at dividing or splitting time into different parts. Rather, it is a logical doctrine. It aims at understanding the world in terms of minute particles. How small is this particle? The answer is approximately, it is a moment. The Buddhist preferred a temporal analogy to spatial one. What could be the reason? Succession, impermanence cannot be understood without reference to time. Therefore, Buddha preferred temporal analogy to the spatial one. The doctrine of momentariness and dependent origination are complementary to each other. Reality is momentary, that is to say, nothing is eternal. Impermanence cannot be understood without dependent origination and dependent origination cannot be understood without impermanence. In short, the Buddhist doctrine of causality has two aspects: (1) dependent origination (2) momentariness. This might appear to be a unique doctrine of causality. One might raise the question that causality is unintelligible, if we related it with momentariness. It is true that cause and effect are related or dependent on one another. In short, origination is dependent. But causality being related to momentariness may not be acceptable. How to understand this? The Buddhist answer to this question is in the following way. A cause disappears by giving rise to effect. And an effect in its turn becomes the cause. This also in turn gives rise to another

effect and disappears. This is how the wheel goes on. But the wheel can stop by eliminating its cause.

The doctrine of casuality is thus associated with the theory of particulars. We have already pointed out ^{that} the the Buddhist particulars are non-spatial and non-temporall entities. This is one dimension of Buddhism which was not rejected by the logicians of the school. After the death of Buddha, Buddhism took a different turn. Hinayāna was succeeded by Mahāyāna. Certain doctrines of early Buddhism were modified in due course of time. But the doctrine of particulars remain unchanged. This is why it can said that the doctrine of particulars is the ~~the~~ basic doctrine of Buddhism. And these particulars are unique in nature. By advocating the doctrine of particulars, the Buddhist logicians at one stroke have demolished the essences as well as the doctrine of eternity. The early phase of Buddhism i.e. Hinayāna accepted the doctrine of pūḍgal sūnyatā or the doctrine of no soul (Nairātma vāda). In course of time, Abhidharma literature developed and since they accepted a kind of realistic pluralism. ^{Dharma can be translated as an element.} The Abhidharmists enumerated as many as 75 dharmas. Gudmunsen remarks:

In the Abhidharma, all simple objects sre known as dharmas. In the various school, list of dharmas are given which differ from each other, but not in any crucial way. The Sarvativadins had a list of 75 dharmas, which constitute an inventory of the entire furniture of the universe, as Russell would say.^I

The word dharma stands ^{both} for particulars and qualities. Dharma is not use as religion in this context. Dharma is the ultimate particular. Both Russell and the early Wittgenstein have raised questions about ultimate particulars in the manner of Abhidharmists. Russell wanted to discover the ultimate particualars of the universe. According to Russell, thr world consists of logical atoms. The atoms are the basic p_orticulars. They are neither in space nor in time. But how did Russell arrived at this particulars? He accepted the truth functional

analysis of language as the soul method of analysis. If we go on breaking the compound proposition, we ultimately arrive at the atomic ones. Names refer to particulars, and these are logical atoms for Russell. The early Wittgenstein accepted truth functional analysis. For him, elementary propositions lie at the base of compound ones. And these elementary propositions consist of logical proper names. Names are meaningful and the meaning of a name is what it refers to. That which is what is referred to by a logical proper name is known as object by early Wittgenstein. By object Wittgenstein does not mean physical objects. The Wittgensteinian objects are really logical in character. What does it mean to say that they are logical? Wittgenstein distinguishes between logical space and physical space. The particulars or objects do not occur in physical space. In short, they occur in logical space. Now the question is: Are objects as particulars amenable to sense-perception? The empiricist philosophers like Hume and others hold the views that the particulars are amenable to sense-perception. The simple ideas of Locke and impressions of Hume are both amenable to sense-perception. It is the sense-organ that catches the particulars. That is why the epistemological doctrines of Locke and Hume are characterised as empiricism. The ultimate constituents and building blocks of human knowledge are amenable to experience. In short, the simple ideas of the empiricist are experienceable items. But for Locke these simple ideas are not impermanent; they are relatively static. Whereas, for Hume, they are impermanent; they come and go. On the other hand, for the Buddhist, the particulars are impermanent. In this respect, Hume comes very close to Buddhism, but with a difference. For the Buddhist philosophers, the ultimate particulars are not spatio-temporal. They are not amenable to experience. Particulars are not in a way, not amenable to ordinary perception or experience. In this sense, Wittgenstein

comes very close to Buddhism. The Buddhists did not make use of the language. Wittgenstein made use of it. That there are particular objects follow from a particular analysis of language. According to Wittgenstein, not that there are particular objects but there must be such objects. Wittgenstein's argument is that in order that names be meaningful there must be objects. The objects are particulars and are construed as the meaning of logical proper names. Take away the particulars or objects, names will be turned out meaningless. In case it happens, communication will break down. Wittgenstein has certain assumptions about meaning, names and reference. And these assumptions have coloured his theory of particulars or objects.

The Sarvastivādins are a very peculiar kind of realists. They accepted a doctrine, according to which everything is real, but it has to be understood in the context. According to them, a dharma has its own mark. All dharmas have their own being. This view has been rejected by Mahāyānists. The Hinayānists advocated Pudgal sūnyatā or Nairatmavāda. The Mahāyānists advocated Sarvadharmā Sūnyatā. This shows the gradual development of doctrine of no-essence. Buddhism is famous for its no-soul doctrine. In the Brāhminical tradition, soul or Atman was treated as an ultimate substance with its own essence. The soul survives even after bodily destruction. The doctrine of soul has assumed various forms in different Brāhminical systems in Indian philosophy. The Sāṅkhya treats the soul as eternal and unchanging. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers treat soul as a category. The Vedāntins too treat soul or Atman as the only category. But all these philosophers treat soul as a category having its own essence. The soul has been construed as eternal, immutable, permanent, and unchanging. Such a doctrine of soul was questioned by Buddha. And the discussion was carried on by his

followers. Not only Buddhism as a religion but as a system of philosophy has not given up its doctrine of no-soul. The earlier version of no-soul doctrine has been gradually developed in the hands of Buddhist philosophers. In short, the doctrine of no-soul theory (Nairātma-vāda) was the initial stage of the doctrine of no-essence. What is a soul? Is there any such thing as soul which survives after bodily destruction? Such a type of theory have disturbed philosophers. Hume remarks :

For my part when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, power or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.²


By rejecting the substantive doctrine of soul, Hume comes very close to Buddhism. Much before, Hume, the Buddhists reduced self or substance to a string of sensation. The doctrine was anticipated in the conversation between Millinda and Nāgasena.

The conversation runs as follows :

The King said : "Is there, Nagasena such a thing as the soul?"

'What is this, O king, the soul (Vedaguṇ) ?

'The living principle within which sees forms through the eyes, hears sound through the ear.... through the mind-just as we sitting here in the palace can look out of any window out of which we wish to look.....'

The Elder replied : 'I will tell you about five doors, great king.....If the living principle within sees forms through the eye  in the manner that you mention, choosing its windows as it likes, can it not then see forms not only through the eye, but also through each of the other five organs of sense?.....'

'No, Sir.'

'No, sir'. *'Then these powers are not united one to another
indiscriminately....'*

'... Now again, great king, if Dinna here were to go outside and stand in the great way, would you be aware that he had done so ?'

'Yes, I should know it.'

'And if the same Dinna were to come back again, and stand before you, would you be aware of his having done so ?'

'Yes, it would know it?'

'Well, great king, would the living principle within discern, in like manner, if anything possessing flavour were laid upon the tounge, ?'

'Yes, it would know it.'

'But when the flavour has passed into the stomach?'

'Certainly not'.

'Then these powers are not united one to the other indiscriminately...?'

'....'

'...?'

'....'

'....'

'... Be pleased, Sir to explain to me how the matter stand ?'.

Then the Elder convinced Milinda the king with discourse drawn from the Abhidhamma, saying : ' It is by reason, o king, of the eye and of form that sight arises, and those other conditions - contact, sensation, idea, thought, abstraction, sense of vitality and attention - arise each simulteneously with its predecessor. And a similar succession of cause and effect arises when each of other five organs of sense ^{is brought} into play. And so herein there is no such thing as soul(vedagu).²

The conversation suggest that Buddhist philosopher were very much interested in logical analysis of self. The Atman is not a substance. It is a constuction of the mind. In the contemporary period, Ryle characterises these constructions as a ghost of the machine.

I shall often speak of it with deliberate abusiveness, as the ' the dogma' of the ghost in the machine; I hope to prove that it is entirely ^{false} and false not in detail but in principle. It is not merely an assemblage of particular mistakes. It is one big mistake and a mistake of special kind.⁴

Much before Ryle, the Buddhist philosophers in India rejected Soul or Mind as a substance. That it a logical construction that is a figment of imagination was adequately realised by the Buddhist philosophers. Instead the particular have been emphasised. Stcherbatsky illucidates the particulars as envisaged by Dignāga and his followers in following manner:

1. The object is pure (Suddhārthah).
It is pure sensation. It is different from intellect.
2. The particular is unique in all the three worlds (trailokyavyartta).
3. It is absolutely dissimilar with other (antyanta-vilaka-^{sane}).
4. It has not extention in space and ~~no~~ duration in time (deja-ananugata, kala-ananugata).
5. The particular is point-instant in reality (svalakṣaṇa).

6. It is indivisible (niramsa)
7. It is pure existence (satā-mātram).
8. It is pure reality (vastu-mātram).
9. It is the own essence of the thing (sva-lakṣana).
10. It is extreme concrete (vyakti).
11. The particular is efficient (artha-kriyā-kārin).
12. The particular stimulates the understanding (Vikalpa-
utpatti-Sakti-mat).
13. The particular is non-empirical, i.e.
transcendental (nasamvrti-sat).
14. The particular is unalterable (anavilāpya) 5

Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara accept this definition of particular. Vācaspati Mishra the great Naiyāyika, question the existence of such particular. To exist means to exist in space and time. Further, according to Vācaspati Mishra, to exist means to be describable or characterisable. In short, according to the Naiyāyikas all the existents are Savikalpaka. I wish to point out that this is the crux of the point. In a sense, the debate between the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists is a debate relating to universals and particulars. Both the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists advocate extreme position. The Naiyāyikas advocate an extreme kind of realism. For them universals are the names. They do not have any essence at all. This is the difference between Buddhism and Nyāya. But as has been pointed out earlier, Hume and early Wittgenstein, come very close to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein maintains:

It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something - a form - in common with it.

Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form.⁷

Object are what is unalterable and subsistent, their configuration is what is changing and unstable.⁸

In a manner of speaking, objects are colourless.⁹

The Buddhist, particularly Dignāga makes a distinction between two orders of reality (1) Samvrtisatya (empirical level) (2) Paramārtha-satya (transcendental level). How to understand

this concept ? Does Dignāga maintain that there are two different worlds with two different realities ? On the surface it gives an impression that Dignāga is advocating two orders of realities, but as a matter of fact, this is not so. Plato eliminated the world of particulars ; instead he highlighted the

supremacy of universals . Whereas, Dignāga highlight the particulars. As a matter of fact, the non-spatiality and non-temporality characterise ^{the Plato's universality and} Dignāga's particularity. As the Platonic universals are non-spatial and non-temporal, similarly the Buddhist particulars are non-spatial and non-temporal. Can it be said that the Buddhist particulars are the same as the Platonic universals ? Our answer to this question is : if the universality of Platonic universals is taken away, it becomes really the particulars of Dignāga. The Platonic universals are not amenable to ordinary sense-perception. In fact, the particulars can be apprehended only through a kind of Yogic Meditation. This appears very strange. Mystical method was accepted by Buddhists as the only mode of knowing the particulars. It is not out of place to mention Stcherbatsky:

*All India was divided at the time of Buddha in opponents and supporters of mysticism in the followers of Brahmans and those who followed the Shramans, in, so to speak, an open High Church and in popular sects strongly inclined to mysticism. The main idea of this mysticism consisted in the belief that through practice of concentrated meditation of trance could be attained which conferred upon the meditator extra-ordinary powers and converted him into a superman. Buddhism adopted this teaching to its ontology. Transic Meditation became the ultimate member of the path towards quiescence, the special means through which, first of all, wrong views and evil inclinations could be eradicated, and then the highest mystic worlds could be reached.*¹⁰

Ultimately , transic Meditation was accepted by the followers of Buddha. In Mahāyān Buddhism, this doctrine, got purified and was again transformed in Zen Buddhism. It will be shown in the concluding chapter that how later Wittgenstein comes very close to Buddhism, i.e. Dignāga's analysis of language and meaning. But

it will suffice to show in this connection that Dignāga does not eliminate the particulars; for him, ^{in certain sense lie at the back of the universe.} The particulars, have the capacity to stimulate human understanding ^{and} as a result, categories are generated. We have argued out in the preceding section that in this respect, Kant comes very close to Dignāga. Let us imagine for the time being, the world of universals without particulars. Can the world of universals sustain without being particulars? The answer is No. Dignāga's argument is that without reference to particulars, the universals cannot be made intelligible. Plato fail to recognise this point. Plato thought without reasons that the particular vitiate the universal. Ultimately, he fail to relate the universal to the particulars of world of things. Aristotle tried to save Plato by fusing universals with particulars. But Dignāga does not face this type of problem. In fact, the question is "how are the universals related to particulars?", cannot arise in the philosophy of

Dignāga. The particulars, according to Dignāga, provide ultimate base of all knowledge and all universals. The particulars are the basis of all knowledge but they themselves are not the subject matter of any knowledge in ordinary sense of the term. The Buddhist philosophers invent the word *Sārūpya* (similarity) to account for the relationship between particular and universal. Stcherbatsky is right in maintaining that Buddhist logic is epistemological in nature. That means the principle of logic cannot be detached from theory of knowledge. After all, all basic principles of logic must be known. Dignāga distinguishes between two senses of the word to know. In one sense, to know means to know through sense-organ. That is why perception is accepted as a valid source of knowledge. Inference is also accepted as a source of knowledge but inference rests upon perception. Perception rests upon a kind of knowledge i.e. intuition.

The early Wittgenstein talks of objects or particulars. He does not envisage any kind of mystic intuition. In fact, when

Wittgenstein was asked to give an example of an elementary proposition, logical proper name, or an object, he retorted that it is the ^{task of} empirical science to find out whether there are, as a matter of fact, such things. According to early Wittgenstein, not that there are elementary propositions, logical proper names, or objects but that there must be such entities. It is a kind of logical 'must'. We have already pointed out that certain assumptions about language and meaning compel Wittgenstein to accept logical proper names and particulars. He did not spell out in detail, like Dignāga, that it is particulars which sustain human communication. The particulars of Dignāga are the Kantian thing - in - themselves (noumena) A noumena is not subject of any experience but it makes experience possible. So it may be not out of place to strike a comparison between Dignāga, Kant, and early Wittgenstein. All these philosophers advocate a kind of entity which is not amenable to experience but makes all experience possible. Kant's thing-in-itself and early Wittgenstein's objects correspond to Dignāga's svalaksanas (unique particulars). Therefore, it can be said in this connection ^{that} svalaksanas are not unnecessary. They are required to account for language and communication-system.

It may be argued in this connection that Dignāga is constructing a metaphysics out of language and communication. But this is not so. If anybody is constructing a metaphysic out of language and communication. It is the realists like Naiyāyikas who constructed out of it from the different parts of speech i.e. noun, adjective, verbs and so on. The Naiyāyikas constructed a theory of realistic metaphysics. That is to say, the Naiyāyikas created a metaphysics out of speech and communication. It is a kind of illusion that the Naiyāyikas developed. On the other hand Dignāga and other Buddhist philosophers are out to demolish such type of illusion created out of language. Dignāga's nominalism is a battle to use Wittgenstein metaphor, against the bewitchment of intelligence by means of language. In 'PI' Wittgenstein is also out to demolish such illusions.

*A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.*¹¹

*When philosophers use a word - "knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name" - and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: Is the world ever actually use in this way in the language-game which is its original home? What we do is to bring words back from the metaphysical to their everyday use.*¹²

*Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; It can in the end only describe it.*¹³

In this respect later Wittgenstein also comes close to Dignāga. But now the question is does Wittgenstein accept such particulars or objects in 'PI'? I wish to point out that the concept of language is very general and broad enough to include and account for all aspects of human communication. Strawson envisages two types of particulars such as material body and human person. We have already pointed out that Strawson treated these particulars as empirical in nature. On the other hand, Dignāga will not treat the Strawsonian particulars as particulars at all. Material body and human person are things. The particulars have to be unique in nature and are non-spatial and non-temporal. In short, Dignāga established a point that particulars are not only unique in nature but also non-spatial and non-temporal.

NOTES

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CHAPTER - 4

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

In course of the preceding chapters we have tried to show that there is a close affinity between Dignāga and Wittgenstein. We have emphasised and highlighted the common philosophical points between two philosophers. Though about thirteen hundred years span between Dignāga and Wittgenstein yet there is a close conceptual affinity between the two. There are scholars who are unwilling to recognise this affinity between the two. Edward Conze is one of them. Conze remarks :

Often the view originate from a wish to find affinities with philosophers recognised and admired by the exponents of current academic philosophy, and intend to make Buddhist thinkers interesting and respectable by current Western standards. Since this approach is not only objectively unsound, but has also failed in its purpose to interest Western philosophers in the philosophies of the East, the time has now come to abandon it.¹

Whereas, Chris Gudmunsen¹ and John V. Canfield³ maintain that there is a close affinity between Buddhism in general with Wittgenstein. I wish to argue that there is a close similarity between Dignāga and Wittgenstein. Till today Indian Philosophy is not treated on par with Western philosophical tradition. The reasons are obvious. Federick Maxmuller and others were the first to translate Indian philosophical texts into English. This is how Indian philosophy was introduced into western world. Invariably Indian philosophy is represented as a system of theology and mythology. In short ,it is not treated as philosophy proper. But at present things have changed a bit. Some western scholars have begun to take interest in study of Indian

philosophy. But by and large the study of Indian philosophy have confined itself primarily to Indologists and Sanskrit Scholars in Western universities. Philosophers in the west till today have not taken serious cognisance of it. In Indian philosophical systems Buddhism has been treated as a kind of religion, primarily interested in Nirvāna and some kind of mysticism. But I wish to maintain that though Buddhism has its origin out of ultimate questions of life and Nirvāna, yet with the passage of time the Buddhist monks took keen interest in logical and philosophical problems. Even Buddha's conversation with his disciples had the philosophical basis. The earlier phase of Buddhism was known as Hinayāna (lower vehicle). But it is true that Buddha was a revolutionary. He protested against a particular kind of socio-economic order. He did not use Sanskrit language of the scholars as a medium of his preaching. Instead, he preferred to talk in the language which was intelligible to ordinary folks. He used Pāli instead of Sanskrit. This is a marked departure from tradition. Further, Buddha was against prevalent practices. He preached the ideal renunciation in lieu of enjoyment. He was the protagonist of Sramana tradition as opposed to Brahmana tradition. The Brahmana tradition stands for enjoyment whereas, the Sramana tradition stands for self-renunciation. Historians like G.C. Pandey maintains that the Sramana tradition is pre-vedic in origin. Borrowing from Rigvedasamhitā (x136) he states:

These ideas appear to have been represented by wandering ascetics and yogis surviving from pre-vedic times and called 'Munis' in Vedic literature and 'Sramanas' in the age of Buddha and Mahavira.

Stcherbatsky also thinks in similar manner. A kind of Mysticism was very much in vogue in pre-vedic India. Buddhism, according to Stcherbatsky, accepted the Sramana tradition along with mysticism and Yoga. Buddha was silent about the

so called ultimate questions. The ultimate questions are metaphysical in nature. He showed little interest in such questions. When his disciple asks him questions, he preferred to keep silent. In short Buddha can be characterised as a person to have revolted against certain kinds of metaphysics. He thought it to be useless to indulge in particular kind of metaphysics. Further, when Ānanda asked him "what should he do"?, Buddha's answer was -- be a lamp to thyself. The message is clear, one should work out one's own salvation. It is Buddha, who for the first time in 6th century B.C. declared the essencelessness of the concept of self (Pudgala-Sūnyatā). It is this : the word 'I' does not stand for any substantial entity. This view was advocated by Buddha. In this respect Buddha can be said to have anticipated both Wittgenstein and Ryle. Further in his anti-metaphysical spirit, Buddha can be said to have anticipated the logical positivist. These teachings of Buddha have been incorporated mainly in Hinayāna school. He advocated the doctrine of essencelessness of self (Pudgala-Sūnyatā). Prajñā (highest knowledge) was accepted as means of Nirvāna. What about Nirvāna? The literal meaning of Nirvāna is to be blown out. What does it mean? What is to be blown out? In this respect, Buddha was arguing against the Brāhmanical concept of self. In certain traditions in Indian Philosophy the self is regarded as eternal and immortal. It is not subject to birth and old age. It does not die. The Buddha was arguing against the substantive concept of self. The Hinayānists believed in the doctrine of Dharma (element). But the Mahāyānists treated the dharmas as empty or sūnyā. In other words, Pudgal-Sūnyatā of Hinayāna was supplemented by the Sarvadharmasūnyatā of Mahāyāna. What does it mean to say that the elements are essenceless or empty? According to Mahāyānists, the elements also are devoid of essences. They are unique particulars without any essence. Nāgārjuna, the Mādhyamika philosopher, is an advocate of such a doctrine.

Nirvāna has been characterised as Sarvakalpana-sūnyatā. To attain Nirvana is to get rid of all thoughts and all concepts. Gudmunsen points out that the early Wittgenstein must have been influenced by Buddhism. He maintains :

On the extent to which Wittgenstein was influenced by Schopenhauer, a great deal could be said. It is generally accepted that the later parts of the Tractatus bear such influence, particularly those parts dealing with ethics, religion and 'the will'. The only kind of influence which really is of interest to us, however, is that which might form a link between Wittgenstein and Buddhism. And the only relevant connection that I can find is that Schopenhauer. 5

Gudmunsen's argument is that Schopenhauer had read Indian philosophy including Buddhism. And Wittgenstein had read Schopenhauer. So, he must have been indirectly influenced by Buddhism. Further, Gudmunsen argues that Wittgenstein's arguments of 'will' and 'ethics' must have been influenced by Buddhism. But he maintains that the later philosophy of Wittgenstein has no ancestor in philosophy.

' The author of the Philosophical Investigations has no ancestors in philosophy': only predecessors. 6

But at the same time, Gudmunsen draws a comparison between later philosophy of Wittgenstein and Mahāyāna Buddhism. This means that though later Wittgenstein and Mahāyāna Buddhism developed independently, yet their responses to similar questions are similar.

I wish to argue that to a very great extent the early and later Wittgenstein were anticipated by Buddhism in general. The early Wittgenstein (the philosophy of Tractatus) and the Logical Atomism of Russell were anticipated by Abhidharmas. According to Abhidharmikas, the dharmas (elements) are reals. The dharmas are indivisible and unique in nature. The Russellian logical atoms and the Wittgenstein particulars bear close resemblance to the dharmas or

elements. All dharmas, according to Abhidharmikas, could be recognised by their distinguishing features. It gives the suggestion that the dharmas stands for certain essences. Let us concentrate on this. A dharma or element is really essenceless. The dharma is not a thing in the world. In short, the dharma has been invented not to present a list of things of the world but to talk about the world. The Russellian logical atoms and Wittgenstein particulars in this sense are not things in the world. They belong to another order of things. If we make a distinction between primary and secondary order of things, the dharmas including atoms and particulars stand for secondary order of things. In short, they have been invented to talk about the world of things but they do not stand for things. In this sense, dharmas belong to metalanguage and not to object language. This has been clearly pointed out in Mādhyamika system of Nāgārjuna. Nāgārjuna advocates Sūnyavāda (the doctrine of void). He advocates the doctrine of Sarvadharmān sūnyatā. This means the dharmas are essenceless. Robinson points out that "emptiness is not a term in the primary system referring to the world, but a term in the descriptive system (meta-system) referring to the primary system"⁷. Early Wittgenstein in similar vein maintains.

The word "Philosophy" must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them.

The "emptiness", in this sense, refutes all theories. By itself, it does not advocate any theory at all. Therefore, Nāgārjuna characterises those philosophers as Asādhya (incorrigible), who claim that Sūnyavāda stands for a metaphysical doctrine. T.R.V. Murti characterises Sūnya as something positive. He compares it with noumenon of Kant. For him, the Sūnya is unutterable and inexpressible by means

of language. But I wish to point out that Śūnya does not preach any theory. It will not be out of place to quote Robinson in this context.

*Thus it has no status as an entity,
nor as the property of an existent or an inexistent,
If anyone considers it so, he turns the key term
in the descriptive system into the root of
all delusions.*

The dharmas or elements are means of all representation. In short, they themselves are not representations. That is why in this sense only, the dharmas or elements are neither existent nor non-existent. They do not belong to primary system in this sense. Wittgenstein's distinction between the object of representation and means of representation bears close relation in this respect. The standard meter in Paris can be characterised as one meter long and at the same time, it cannot be said to have any length. Why is it so? It is a standard of measurement. Not that it does not have any length, but it is odd to ask "What is the length of standard meter?"

Both early and later Wittgenstein come very close to the doctrine propounded in the Lankāvatāra Sūtra (hence forward L.S.) of Yogācāra school. The L.S. criticises the referential theory of meaning. It has been argued that words do not derive meanings by referring to things.

*Said the Blessed One: Even when there are no
(corresponding) objects there are words, Mahamati; for
instance, the hare's horns, the tortoise's hair, a
barren woman's child etc.—they are not at all visible
in the world but the words are; Mahamati, they are
neither entities nor non-entities but expressed in
words.¹⁰*

Further, the L.S. advocates that words can be replaced by non-linguistic behaviour. This means that there are occasions when we may not use words and our bodily behaviour can take its place. This can, distinguishably, be seen in 'pain behaviour' instead of

saying I am in pain, I can groan, Shout, and roll in ground. In P.I., Wittgenstein maintains the similar view.

Words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place.¹¹

As both Russell and Wittgenstein maintain that language has a misleading nature and so in the case of L.S. Wittgenstein's argument is: Language sets a trap. The unwary is likely to fall into a trap. This view of the descriptive nature of language has been expressed in L.S. in successful manner.

Said the blessed one: Mahamati, the ignorant cling to names, ideas and signs; their minds moves along (these channels). As thus they move along, they feed no multiplicity of objects, and fall into the notion of an ego-soul and what belongs to it, and cling to salutary appearances.¹²

The distinction, made by later Wittgenstein, between surface grammar and depth grammar closely corresponds to Dignāga's distinction between Samvrti satya and Paramārtha satya. Linguistic communication has two layers (1) Surface layer and (2) Depth layer. The surface layer is likely to mislead someone. And it misleads in very many ways. In order to get rid of confusion, one must discover the depth grammar. That is to say, one must be able to see through the deceptive nature of language. Wittgenstein maintains that philosophy leaves everything as it is. It does not give any explanation. In other words, all explanations comes to an end at a certain stage. This shows that philosophy, according to Wittgenstein, has a liberating force. It liberates man from the grip that language exercises on him. This view of philosophy has been advocated by Nāgārjuna and others. Prañjāpāramita (highest wisdom) is attained, only when one sees through the deceptive nature of language. Prañjāpāramita literally means extra-ordinary knowledge. What is extra-ordinary knowledge? What is this Prañjāpāramita? The Buddhists recommended Sila and Samādhi to attain this. It is a kind of attitude, that

is effected through efforts. *Sūnyatā-drsti*, according to *Nāgārjuna*, is a kind of attitude. John Wisdom, following Wittgenstein, maintains that there are no hypothesis, theories, laws in philosophy. This means, philosophy does not explain anything at all. It remoulds the attitude. It makes us aware of the obvious. *Nirvāna*, in this sense, is a kind of attitude effected through the demolition of the categorial mode of understanding.

This interpretation of Buddhism, including *Nirvāna* and *Sūnyatā*, might appear trivial. One might point out that it belittles the importance of Buddhism as a religion. It trivialises the monastic order of the Buddhists. It is true that Buddhism played a significant role as a religion. It spreads far and wide. Nobles, laymen and even kings embraced Buddhism. They tried to conduct their life in accordance with the Buddhist tenet. Seen in this light, Buddhism, as a religion, clearly emerges as a form of life. It has moulded the attitude of the people; it has influenced State politics and many other aspects of human life. Buddhism is different from many other systems of philosophy in the sense that, it has emerged as a profound attitude moulder. The philosophy of Locke, Berkely & Hume, say for instance, did not mould the attitude of people to such an extent. It remained more or less as an academic pursuit. But certain great philosophical systems have not only brought about significant change in intellectual enterprise but has moulded the attitudes of people. In this respect, Buddhism has played its appropriate role. But behind every human action, there are certain ideas. Certain ideas sometimes play crucial role. Scientific ideas do mould the attitude but not to that extent as philosophical-religious ideas do. When philosophy and religion, for some reason, or other, get combined, they proved very effective and this happened in case of Buddhism. Buddhism emerged not only as a great system of philosophy but as a very significant religious tradition. The primary aspect of Buddhism is religious aspect, though we are mainly concerned with its

philosophical base. We do not have monks who practice the philosophy of Hume and Kant, but till today we have in India who practice Buddhism as a religion. This is peculiar in Indian philosophical systems. It is not only true of Buddhism but also true of different branches of Vedānta. This has given rise to a view that Indian philosophy is not only a way of thought, but also a way of life. Buddhism, for thousand of years, not only continued as a significant system of philosophy, but till today continues as a significant religion, embraced and practiced by the people. We have already pointed out that Buddhism arose as a protest not only against a particular type of philosophy but also against a particular way of life. But at the same time, the way of philosophy and the way of life cannot be viewed in isolation. That is to say, thought and practice have gone together. Buddhists philosophy gave rise to a particular practice. The very fact that Buddhism was embraced as a way of life, shows how seriously philosophy was taken by the ancients in this land. Nirvāna, the highest goal of life, is intimately connected with right attitude. Right knowledge leads to right action and right action leads to Nirvāna. What is this right knowledge? The right knowledge, according to Nāgārjuna and Dharmakīrti, is to see things as essenceless. Wittgenstein's view that language holds us captive, language bewitches our intelligence, bears a close resemblance to that of Nāgārjuna and Dharmakīrti. One must be able to see through this bewitchment. It is not enough to have this knowledge. It is necessary to stick to it and live by it. In order to sustain the right attitude towards world and life it is necessary to practice Sila and Samādhi. A true philosopher, according to Dignāga, is a monk who has dissociated himself from ordinary thoughts or categories. Wittgenstein comes closer to Dignāga in this respect. Wittgenstein maintains :

The philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas. That is what makes him a philosopher. 13

This is how Dignāga and Wittgenstein will characterise

philosophy as having a liberating effect. The enlightened one (Tathāgata) sees things as they are. He does not fall victim to the apparition created by language. So, in a significant sense, Wittgenstein's views that philosophy is a kind therapy, comes close to Sūnyatā, enlightenment and Nirvāna.

Both Dignāga and Wittgenstein raise similar problems and produce almost similar answers and solutions. The following are some of the questions :

- 1) What is language ,speech and communication?
- 2) How is language related to reality?
- 3) Do words stand for essences?
- 4) What is knowledge?
- 5) What is mind?
- 6) What is self?

In short, all these questions can be summed up as "How is language related to reality?" This problem worried both Dignāga and Wittgenstein. To quote Gudmunsen :

Much of what the later Wittgenstein had to say was anticipated about 1800 years ago in India. 14

To sum up, both Dignāga and Wittgenstein come very close in their solution to the problem, i.e., how is language related to reality? Both of them maintain that language cannot be taken as a trustworthy picture of reality. Of course, the early Wittgenstein advocated a picture theory of language but we have already pointed out that language was not treated as a ordinary picture of reality by Wittgenstein. Only elementary propositions were treated by Wittgenstein as the logical picture of reality.

Further, in this connection it may not be out of context to draw a comparison between Wittgenstein and Zen Buddhism, an important sect of Mahāyāna. It is usually held that Zen Buddhism stands for a set of rituals. In short, it is sometimes argued that there is no philosophy in Zen Buddhism. In the recent past, scholars have taken interest to discover close affinity between Zen Buddhism and Wittgenstein. The word 'Zen' comes from the word 'Dhyāna' (meditation). Zen Buddhism developed mainly in China, Japan and other Asian countries. The Zen master is a monk. He lives with his disciples. Both the master and disciples live a strange sort of life. Apparently, one may say that there is no philosophy in Zen Buddhism. It is just an aberrant way of life.

But W.A. Shibles and Canfield maintain that there is a resemblance between Zen and Wittgenstein's later philosophy. I am inclined to accept the views of these two thinkers. Shibles maintains that, according to Zen Buddhism, ordinary language used in everyday life situation, should guide rather than philosophy. That is what Wittgenstein advocates in 'P.I.' Canfield discovers a very close conceptual affinity between Wittgenstein and Zen Buddhism. The central thesis of 'P.I.' is this : Language has thoughts behind it; to use language means to carry thoughts or images. On the other hand, Wittgenstein in 'P.I.' lays emphasis on the language-game and practices. He talks of primitive language-game that is between the builder and assistant. The builder calls out the names of building material and the assistant brings it. Wittgenstein remarks that the assistant has learned how to act and react to certain orders. Language is a kind of response. To use language means to respond in a particular manner. Zen Buddhism lays emphasis on practical aspect of language. Both Zen Buddhists and Wittgenstein lay emphasis on thought-less action. They lay emphasis on doing something with a mind free of ideas or concepts. The entire courses of training, given by Zen master to his disciples, consists in disengaging the mind of the disciple off ideas and concepts. Bacon advocates demolition of 'Idols' but at the same time, he pleaded for a

fresh set of ideas. But the Zen master aims at removing all ideas, concept and thoughts from the mind of his disciples. In short, the entire Zen training aims at emptying mind. To empty the mind means to remove and demolish all ideas, concepts, categories and thoughts. After successful training the Zen disciples gain enlightenment. It is a kind of enlightenment which comes after removing all ideas and concepts from the mind. The Zen master initiates the disciples, disciplines the mind, gives them training to acquire, what is known as, the idea-less mind. It is a difficult task. This cannot be achieved by the knowledge acquired from philosophical text. It can be achieved by being initiated by the master. Seen in this light, philosophy, turns out to be a kind of initiation. In this respect, Zen Buddhism including other forms of Buddhism come closer to Upanisadic tradition. It is the fact that Buddha revolted against the Brahmanical tradition. But it is true that Buddhism arose as a protest against the so-called Brahmana-culture. But the fact remains that Buddhism did not deviate from the general tone of philosophising in ancient India. In short, that philosophy is a kind of initiation was not given up by Buddhism including the Zen master. In Zen Buddhism to be en-lightened means to live free of thoughts. For Wittgenstein, the activities that make up 'linguistic life' are not made of by them.

Further Canfield maintains:

Moreover, it appears that for Wittgenstein the base of language is exactly that mode of existence which in Zen is the culmination (as well as the starting point) of the religious life. 15

What Canfield means is that for Wittgenstein language has mystical and religious base. How is one to understand this remark?

I wish to suggest in this connection that for the Zen master and Wittgenstein, it is possible to participate in a language-game without being carried by pictures. The only difference between Zen and Wittgenstein is this: The Zen master recommends certain

monastic order of life, whereas, Wittgenstein does not make any explicit remark. Canfield maintains:

*We can view language in full operation,
and as carrying its full freight of meaning
and significance, in the total absence
of even the most fleeting thought.*¹⁶

What is suggested here is this: Both for Wittgenstein and Zen, language and understanding do not require thought. For Wittgenstein, language and understanding are grounded in, what he calls "practice". Wittgenstein's ideas of "practice" converge with the Zen idea of "just doing". What is this "just doing"? It is a kind of doing with a mind free of ideas and concepts. Canfield is right in maintaining that Wittgenstein's "practice" has Zen antecedent. The thoughtless activity is Nirvāna (enlightened state). In Wittgenstein, this is characterised as seeing everything as it is.

Dignāga represents one important tradition in Indian philosophy. He appears in the last stage of Buddhism in India. To use Stcherbatsky's term, he appears in the 3rd stage of Buddhist philosophy. Before Dignāga, various philosophical systems were prevalent in India, such as , Sāṅkhya-yoga, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and certain other form of materialism. Dignāga, in order to establish his own thesis, had to refute the prevalent philosophical theories. Non-essentialism is a kind of nominalism. It is the fruit of his endeavour. Wittgenstein comes from another great tradition in philosophy. The Western tradition which produced Plato, Kant and Hegel also produced a Wittgenstein. In the 20th century, it is Wittgenstein who gave a turn to Anglo-American philosophy. He advocated a kind of non-essentialism, a kind of nominalism. But it is utterly surprising that for more than thirteen centuries before Wittgenstein, his ideas were anticipated in this land by Dignāga, a Buddhist monk. It is not to glorify the ancient Indian tradition but simply to highlight the fact that most of the things

that have been said in analytical philosophy, have been anticipated in some form or other by Buddhist philosophers in India.

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